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Welcome back everyone. 
I am Caspian Sea. 

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I'm joined as usual by my 
partner in crime. 

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Mr. Bennett Tomlin. 
How are you today? 

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I'm doing well. 
How are you kiss, tired? 

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Drinking some coffee. 
It's pretty late for it, but I 

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need it today. 
We are going over something that

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we didn't go over previously, 
which I found interesting. 

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We've, we have talked about 
Wormhole. 

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We did a full episode on that 
though at the time. 

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Yeah, I don't think we 
understood who had done it or 

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what what it was about. 
We still don't know who's done 

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Wormhole right? 
But we didn't. 

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Yeah, we'd it's I guess it's 
just very curious to me. 

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That one was so big. 
The other big one that I we've 

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mentioned in other episodes is 
definitely axi axi Infinity, 

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Ronan Network. 
They got hacked for the biggest 

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bridge hack ever. 
That was also last year 

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believes. 
So two of the biggest hacks ever

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last year, and we also had over 
a billion in Bridge facts alone 

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in 2022. 
You so it was a crazy year but 

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today we're talking about 
Harmony because they're in the 

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news. 
Again, The Horizon bridge on the

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harmony blockchain which 
happened last year. 

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Again, one of the bigger ones 
roughly 100 million dollars and 

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basically this was done. 
It's been confirmed by the 

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Lazarus Group which also did the
Ronin network. 

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If I'm remembering correctly. 
It is correct. 

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They're moving These funds and 
that's why we're going to talk 

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about it. 
Let's get started with what 

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actually happened last year to 
the horizon. 

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Aizen Bridge there Bridge might 
many so-called Bridges was a 

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glorified multi signature wallet
and it seems what happened is 

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their private Keys. 
Got compromised is what we knew 

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up until a few days ago when the
FBI issued their reports 

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confirming that the Lazarus 
group was behind this hack and 

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detailing a little bit more 
about how they did it. 

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In some respects, it was very 
similar to the 2015 bitstamp 

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pack or what we believe happened
with the 2016. 

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Phoenix hack, where was a spear 
phishing attack with 

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well-designed malware exploits? 
That once the user open them on 

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their system, would then be able
to compromise and get the 

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private Keys. 
It seems Lazarus group was able 

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to successfully Spearfish. 
Enough key holders at Harmony to

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be able to compromise the bridge
and withdraw a whole bunch of 

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assets. 
And to be clear there, multisig 

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was composed of if I and I 
believe I'm getting this 

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correctly. 
I don't know what the deal is 

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now. 
I know they're still kicking 

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somehow, I believe there were 
four multi cigs and you 

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basically just need to 
compromise to of those multi 

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Sig's to compromise the bridge 
itself, which ultimately is what

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happened, right? 
So they compromised this chain, 

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this chain is, as you said 
etherium Finance, Mart chain, we

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got this hundred million 
dollars. 

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That was moved into numerous 
State numerous coins. 

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It was in USD T, it was in 
aetherium, it was in rap 

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Bitcoin. 
But they transferred, if I'm 

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going again, hopefully, I'm 
getting this correctly. 

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They immediately transferred all
of it into a theorems that 

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right. 
I think the swapped least the 

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majority of it pretty quickly 
into aetherium, they especially 

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had to make sure they did that 
with the centralized stable 

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coins, Circle, and tether in 
those, because those can be 

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frozen by the issuer, right? 
And so I know those were quickly

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swapped for etherium. 
I don't know if all of the 

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assets were immediately swap for
aetherium, but broadly, their 

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goal was to get Them into a 
theorem because aetherium is 

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harder to freeze or stop. 
Ultimately, they got this 

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etherium, they did tornado cash,
they basically mixed it right. 

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They mix this etherium at some 
point after stealing it, but 

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people were still, or did they 
not was that just recently? 

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So, I don't think they did use 
tornado cash on. 

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Think, the harmony hacker did 
before, their recent little 

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thing that we're about to get 
to, they did pass it through 

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railgun, which is a chain hop. 
Kings zero-knowledge privacy 

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protocol and then they started 
moving it onto a whole bunch of 

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different exchanges including 
notably will be which is which 

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is run by Justin son. 
They won't say it's run by 

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Justin Sun but holy shit. 
It's run by Justin son. 

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Can we all just agree? 
It's run by Justin son. 

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I mean I think even Justin son 
is ready to admit that now. 

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Right? 
Kind of think so you'll have to 

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admit it. 
Yeah, and so tens of millions of

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dollars were transferred on do 
OB and then immediately 

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Transferred off and then sent to
a whole bunch of different 

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addresses and I think mixed 
again before then moving on to 

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some other exchanges. 
So what they were clearly trying

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to do with this quick move 
through who OB is this exchange 

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was to try to add this extra 
level of mixing to their asset 

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because as it goes into the hot 
wallet and then out of the hot 

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wallet into these other 
addresses. 

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These coins are fungible, the 
etherium, in a single VOA 

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account, is fungible all of its 
going in, and it's coming out, 

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it's not Like Bitcoin where you 
can track specific, unspent, 

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transaction outputs. 
And so by sending it to The 

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Exchange and immediately 
withdrawing your helping confuse

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the path of the funds. 
We basically had this major hack

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for roughly 100 million dollars.
I believe in total, it was 

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actually ninety-nine point seven
million dollars worth of assets 

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at the time. 
So this happened in June of last

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year. 
This is pretty interesting to 

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me. 
That what happened was? 

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They drained a bridge for all of
its assets or most of its 

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assets. 
Roughly 100 million dollars at 

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the time. 
They did some coin hopping 

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Maneuvers, they Consolidated 
their assets and now we're 

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seeing eight months later. 
North Korean hacking group 

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Lazarus is now doing something 
with them. 

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I guess a bunch of it was 
frozen. 

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I want to say, like, 150 Bitcoin
worth got frozen which would be 

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a chunk of it, but certainly not
the whole thing. 

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I think Zach xbt. 
We've had on the show before, 

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identified at least twenty six 
point four million, which was 

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pulled off of will be after 
being deposited there, into that

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part definitely. 
Is not frozen and we're saying 

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Frozen, we should really more, 
say seized, right? 

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Like will be took possession of 
his assets before, they could be

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withdrawn by the hacker. 
And then what we saw after 

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they're mixing and stuff, is 
they left to OB was them, trying

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to get it to a bunch of other 
like, small OTC death, small 

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exchanges. 
And so, it looks like Lazarus 

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group is trying to convert 
cryptocurrency into dirty, feet 

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to fund their missile program, 
their nuclear program. 

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That seems to be What some 
reporting has suggested the 

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Lazarus group funds are used for
so I just did the math. 

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You said roughly 150 Bitcoin. 
I think that a amounts to at 

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right now current prices, I'm 
suggesting that what it's 

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22,000, I haven't checked its 
recently, probably, right? 

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So I'm just saying 22,000, 
that's that's, we'll just go 

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three and a half million 
dollars. 

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So that's a 3.5 percent fee. 
If they got the rest off of 

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whoa, be and were able to move 
it. 

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That that is A 3.5 percent 
transaction fee for being able 

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to move the rest of these funds.
These illicit funds for them. 

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Hopefully I guess right? 
If they're if the idea was to do

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this is to be able to exchange 
that for either US dollars or 

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Services of some kind. 
I don't know what services you 

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could get with actual etherium 
but I would think you would be 

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trading this for US Dollars un 
or some other like currency that

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you could then buy goods from 
any. 

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A allies that you have, if they 
got the rest of those funds off 

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of Woe be, I don't think the 
story is, will be freezes, 3.5 

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percent of the funds. 
I think the story is they moved 

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97% of their funds. 
But did they move all of the, 

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all of the money on to OB or 
just a small chunk? 

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I am honestly, not sure. 
And part of the issue here is 

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these quote, these hacks are 
always quoted in dollar amounts,

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right? 
But they'd eventually became 

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etherium in whatever else, 
right? 

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And that asset is Malin. 
And so I don't know how much of 

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the numbers were seeing were 
changed because the price of 

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aetherium has fallen and how 
much might be them moving other 

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funds through other avenues that
they weren't trying to mixer 

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obscure through, who won't be 
right. 

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I'm going through Zach's work 
which is great. 

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We also this friend of the show 
we've had them on so I you know 

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I urge anyone who isn't already 
following Zach xbt on Twitter 

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obviously, go ahead and do that.
They were able to withdraw 

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according to Zach, 38 million 
dollars. 

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Worth of worth of bitcoin, which
is 10% of the total was frozen 

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is what we can say, which is 
better than nothing. 

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I don't know. 
Not great. 

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That's still again, like I'm 
saying the story doesn't seem to

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be. 
So, whoa, be seizes all of all 

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of this cryptocurrency and does 
a good job of stopping the North

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Korean Hackers from deploying 
their Capital. 

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It seems to me like a story is 
North Korean hackers are able to

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obvious Kate majority of the 
funds they put on. 

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Whoa, be yeah, and I think 
something I might have not fully

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appreciated here. 
Did they swap at her will be? 

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Did they transact? 
Because they came in with a 

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theory, I mean, came out with 
Bitcoin, right? 

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Yeah. 
So they didn't just like hit the

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exchange and then withdraw, they
hit the exchange transact, sold 

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this aetherium in and then coin 
and then hold it out, which is 

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definitely worse for. 
Whoa. 

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Be also worth pointing out. 
He shows an example will link to

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it but he shows an example of 
the Lazarus group chain hopping 

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funds and Example, he shows is 
Bitcoin to Avalanche. 

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We've never talked about that on
the show, but that is another 

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Block Chain. 
So Bitcoin to Avalanche to 

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aetherium to bit torrent, which 
is not something you would 

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necessarily suspect to Tron and 
BitTorrent intron or both Justin

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son coins. 
So I don't know, like they're 

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relying on adjusting son 
exchange and then they're 

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chained hopping to to Justin son
cryptocurrencies. 

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Like, it seems like the 
terrorists and criminals are 

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enjoying the concepts that 
Justin son is building out. 

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Yes, we did an episode on Justin
son, you and I have very strong 

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opinions on Justin son. 
I certainly do and it is strange

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that they chose will be to do 
this. 

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I don't think it's that strange.
That like to Justin Sun coins 

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were involved in this chain 
hopping. 

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My understanding is that how 
this privacy protocol is. 

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Supposed to work, as you move to
a whole bunch of chains to try 

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to obscure it as much as 
possible. 

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But yeah, I get that toy. 
I got it. 

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That was a little weird but 
yeah. 

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No, you're right, broadly that 
like Justin sun has ended up 

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whether knowingly or unknowingly
providing useful infrastructure 

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for criminals. 
And I think that's kind of the 

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question, right, knowingly, or 
unknowingly. 

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I'm interested in why they would
use BitTorrent particularly to 

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chain up. 
I don't, because it's not like 

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she don't suspect that bit that 
I don't suspect. 

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A BitTorrent, is getting a ton 
of Volume did chain. 

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I got maybe I'm wrong. 
Right, my understanding is it's 

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a dead chain, no? 
Real development, very little 

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use trading, volume, 15, 15, and
a half million. 

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I mean, in the scheme of things 
that isn't very much and it's 

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likely, I'm Shane volume like, 
people actually transacting with

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that. 
I think is yeah, that's true. 

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First. 
Probably nothing. 

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Yeah. 
Probably nothing. 

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And so, I was just looking back.
I think it was by Nance, who 

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ended up being the one who froze
those Bitcoins. 

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We're previously discussing it 
almost exclusively trades on 

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Justin Sun, exchanges 30% of its
volume is on Polonia X and Y OB 

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and the rest is just spread out 
between a bunch of other things.

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But again this points to the 
idea of like I don't know, maybe

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maybe that suggests that when 
they're chained hopping, those 

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are the cheapest chains for them
to transact in. 

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Well okay so either we willing 
to do that is that why is the 

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volume doesn't benefit the We 
understand that on chain volume 

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certainly doesn't benefit. 
I have only kept the barest of 

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00:12:05,700 --> 00:12:09,800
looks at BitTorrent since 
Justin's an acquired it and I 

227
00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:14,800
just checked it out again and it
seems part of its own purpose is

228
00:12:14,800 --> 00:12:18,400
to serve as some kind of cross 
chain infrastructure. 

229
00:12:18,700 --> 00:12:22,400
Like their advertising is the 
chain connecting the chains. 

230
00:12:22,700 --> 00:12:25,300
And so now I wonder if the 
reason it was used just because 

231
00:12:25,300 --> 00:12:30,100
it is useful for chain hopping 
specifically because of How it's

232
00:12:30,100 --> 00:12:32,200
built. 
Which again, I haven't kept that

233
00:12:32,200 --> 00:12:35,500
much up on me cuz it's Justin 
son, doing just in Sun bullshit.

234
00:12:35,500 --> 00:12:40,200
I'm wondering if if our 
perception of Justin son has 

235
00:12:40,200 --> 00:12:44,700
been, I guess misguided insofar 
as perhaps a lot of the stuff 

236
00:12:44,700 --> 00:12:47,300
he's doing is quite deliberate 
and the crowds that he's 

237
00:12:47,300 --> 00:12:51,300
attracting are exactly who he 
wants to. 

238
00:12:51,700 --> 00:12:54,900
Also I see him getting a lot 
more, praise as he still exists 

239
00:12:54,900 --> 00:12:59,000
even in the cryptocurrency 
industry which I think is funny.

240
00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:03,200
Like I feel like I was just 
giving him props because he 

241
00:13:03,200 --> 00:13:05,700
hasn't been arrested yet 
continued. 

242
00:13:05,700 --> 00:13:08,200
Existence is now the standard 
for excellence in 

243
00:13:08,200 --> 00:13:11,200
cryptocurrency? 
Bar is so low. 

244
00:13:13,600 --> 00:13:17,300
Have you ever being in prison 
over the last two years not yet 

245
00:13:17,300 --> 00:13:19,600
been indicted in her still 
currently breathing? 

246
00:13:20,000 --> 00:13:23,500
You're a hero? 
Yeah this is It's funny because 

247
00:13:23,500 --> 00:13:26,000
it's like I'm reflecting on it. 
I'm like literally though like 

248
00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:29,800
the fact that do Quan has been 
charged but is not sitting in a 

249
00:13:29,808 --> 00:13:32,100
prison cell. 
People are like celebrate him 

250
00:13:32,300 --> 00:13:37,100
celebrate this man and it's 
like, is a sewer trying to raise

251
00:13:37,100 --> 00:13:41,200
25 million to do whatever it is.
They're doing, it's a comedy. 

252
00:13:41,300 --> 00:13:43,400
It's a fucking comedy. 
See, I just wonder if a lot of 

253
00:13:43,408 --> 00:13:46,700
this is very deliberate. 
And as much as like, it clearly 

254
00:13:46,700 --> 00:13:50,300
attracts the wrong, kind of 
attention right here. 

255
00:13:50,300 --> 00:13:55,900
We are talking about a known 
North Korean hacking group, 

256
00:13:55,900 --> 00:14:01,700
that's done insane things before
like they literally, almost were

257
00:14:01,700 --> 00:14:05,200
able to hack the, the FED. 
Do you know that story have? 

258
00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:07,800
We talked about that before. 
I don't think we've talked about

259
00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:10,600
it. 
I do remember that they like 

260
00:14:10,600 --> 00:14:14,300
broadly North Korea switched 
from Interrupt Banks to robbing 

261
00:14:14,300 --> 00:14:16,900
cryptocurrencies because it was 
so much easier to get the 

262
00:14:16,900 --> 00:14:20,000
cryptocurrencies. 35 fraudulent.
Instructions were issued by 

263
00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:23,400
security hackers via the Swift 
Network to illegally transfer 

264
00:14:23,600 --> 00:14:26,500
close to a billion dollars from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New 

265
00:14:26,500 --> 00:14:30,500
York belonging to a Bangladesh 
Bank, the Central Bank of 

266
00:14:30,500 --> 00:14:34,800
Bangladesh, these guys are 
clearly quite talented and able 

267
00:14:34,800 --> 00:14:37,800
to deal money almost that they 
did steal. 

268
00:14:37,800 --> 00:14:40,900
They didn't steal billion 
dollars but they did steal money

269
00:14:41,200 --> 00:14:44,900
essentially from I'm not only 
the Central Bank of Bangladesh, 

270
00:14:44,900 --> 00:14:46,800
but the Federal Reserve of New 
York. 

271
00:14:46,800 --> 00:14:51,400
So it's kind of crazy that like 
you said now they've just moved 

272
00:14:51,400 --> 00:14:55,200
onto like Oh you mean we can 
steal like ten times as much by 

273
00:14:55,200 --> 00:15:00,500
just Hacking these civilian 
networks instead that aren't 

274
00:15:00,500 --> 00:15:06,300
protected and have all of their 
code open source and haven't 

275
00:15:06,300 --> 00:15:10,700
checked for errors and are 
simple multi cigs that we can 

276
00:15:10,700 --> 00:15:11,900
break. 
I don't know. 

277
00:15:11,900 --> 00:15:15,600
It's troubling to me that it. 
I would be worried if I was just

278
00:15:15,600 --> 00:15:19,200
in Sun and it's funny. 
I kind of figured that we 

279
00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:23,200
wouldn't be discussing bridges 
in 2023 but I think this is 

280
00:15:23,200 --> 00:15:24,800
going to come up. 
Like I do they're not going 

281
00:15:24,800 --> 00:15:26,400
away. 
They're not going away and this 

282
00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:29,200
is Come up again. 
Yes, it absolutely will. 

283
00:15:29,500 --> 00:15:31,900
I mean, there's two more we 
intend to discuss in this 

284
00:15:31,900 --> 00:15:34,400
episode alone, but I do think 
there is kind of an interesting 

285
00:15:34,400 --> 00:15:36,000
Dynamic. 
I want to focus on here. 

286
00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:39,000
One of the other Bridges we want
to discuss is Wormhole which we 

287
00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:42,000
discussed in the past. 
And at the time was one of the 

288
00:15:42,000 --> 00:15:46,200
largest cryptocurrency hex ever 
with about 300 million being 

289
00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:49,900
taken out of the bridge that 
hacker had. 

290
00:15:49,900 --> 00:15:53,900
Since swapped basically all of 
it into ether and has now 

291
00:15:53,900 --> 00:16:00,300
started this absurd process. 
S of going levered long and 

292
00:16:00,300 --> 00:16:05,000
staked ether. 
So they swapped their ether for 

293
00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:10,300
wrapped staked ether borrowed, I
against that use that to buy 

294
00:16:10,300 --> 00:16:13,700
more staked. 
Ether wrapped that borrowed more

295
00:16:13,700 --> 00:16:16,700
die against that use that to buy
more staked. 

296
00:16:16,800 --> 00:16:20,200
Ether wrapped that borrowed more
die against then use that to buy

297
00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:24,700
more staked ether. 
Until the hacker of the Wormhole

298
00:16:24,700 --> 00:16:29,800
Bridge has ended up as the If 
largest holder of staked ether 

299
00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:32,600
and the reason I'm bringing this
up is one, it's wild to watch 

300
00:16:32,600 --> 00:16:36,100
this hacker. 
Just go levered long on staked 

301
00:16:36,100 --> 00:16:39,100
etherium but also because it 
illustrates something we talked 

302
00:16:39,100 --> 00:16:42,300
about back in our episode about 
the 2016 bitfenix hack. 

303
00:16:42,500 --> 00:16:46,600
When we're talking about Roswell
con and a Dutch it's hard to 

304
00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:50,200
cash out, hot cryptocurrencies, 
these groups do it. 

305
00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:54,200
Like Lazarus group works with a 
variety of money launderers, 

306
00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:57,500
around the world to be able to 
make these Versions and to 

307
00:16:57,500 --> 00:17:01,300
eventually get this into cash, 
but it is challenging for these 

308
00:17:01,300 --> 00:17:05,099
hackers to get the majority of 
their funds out in usable 

309
00:17:05,099 --> 00:17:07,400
currency. 
And so we see them take these 

310
00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:11,800
moves where they end up more in 
the cryptocurrency ecosystem, 

311
00:17:11,800 --> 00:17:14,200
right? 
Because it is so challenging to 

312
00:17:14,200 --> 00:17:16,500
cash out. 
And I think this Wormhole hacker

313
00:17:16,500 --> 00:17:19,800
behavior of leveraging long and 
into the cryptocurrency, 

314
00:17:19,800 --> 00:17:23,300
ecosystem is an interesting 
contrast to the harmony Bridge. 

315
00:17:23,300 --> 00:17:26,400
Hacker who just keeps mixing and
chain hopping mixing in. 

316
00:17:26,599 --> 00:17:29,900
Not helping and sending the road
desks and exchanges to cash out 

317
00:17:29,900 --> 00:17:32,900
what they can't. 
And so like, it looks to me, 

318
00:17:32,900 --> 00:17:35,600
like, they're probably too, 
pretty distinct groups with 

319
00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:38,700
different motivations. 
It's fascinating as well that 

320
00:17:38,700 --> 00:17:41,500
like yeah, as you said, okay, so
one of them is like becoming 

321
00:17:41,500 --> 00:17:45,400
this whale and the other. 
It's like it's wild because it's

322
00:17:45,400 --> 00:17:49,200
almost like the Lazarus group is
poisoning Wells as it goes to 

323
00:17:49,200 --> 00:17:51,800
these different places to cash 
out who's going to pay a 

324
00:17:51,800 --> 00:17:55,100
responsibility, right? 
If they cash out money, if 

325
00:17:55,100 --> 00:17:58,100
they're able to move money 
through, these exchanges and 

326
00:17:58,100 --> 00:18:02,100
they're able to cash out into 
something either less 

327
00:18:02,100 --> 00:18:07,900
transparent or more obvious 
gated or however they make it 

328
00:18:07,900 --> 00:18:12,900
work for themselves or straight 
up cash who is going to have to 

329
00:18:12,900 --> 00:18:16,300
bear that burden and I suspect 
it's the exchanges and the 

330
00:18:16,308 --> 00:18:18,800
people who work with them I 
think poisoning the well was a 

331
00:18:18,800 --> 00:18:22,000
really interesting way to put it
because you'll remember from 

332
00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:26,400
when tornado cash was added to 
the list of ofac sanctions one 

333
00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:30,700
The justifications is that 
Lazarus group had used tornado 

334
00:18:30,700 --> 00:18:35,100
cash in the past. 
And so now, any other mixer, 

335
00:18:35,200 --> 00:18:37,900
they end up using any of these 
privacy protocols they end up 

336
00:18:37,900 --> 00:18:42,800
passing their coins through are 
potentially future targets of 

337
00:18:42,800 --> 00:18:47,700
the global us, sanctions regime.
It's a tough position to be in 

338
00:18:47,700 --> 00:18:50,300
and I'm not in a sense I am. 
But that, I mean, geez, what are

339
00:18:50,300 --> 00:18:51,700
you supposed to do? 
I don't know what you're 

340
00:18:51,708 --> 00:18:53,100
supposed to do. 
I don't know how you're supposed

341
00:18:53,100 --> 00:18:54,900
to deal with that in any 
meaningful sense. 

342
00:18:54,900 --> 00:18:59,600
Clearly, if Easy and Justin son,
two of the biggest names in the 

343
00:18:59,600 --> 00:19:03,000
industry are working together to
try to stop these guys from 

344
00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:07,300
using their exchanges and yet, 
they're able to move. 

345
00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:11,900
I don't know how 90% of their 
money still into and out of 

346
00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:15,400
places. 
Like, whoa, be, I mean, I don't 

347
00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:16,500
know. 
I don't know what you do. 

348
00:19:16,700 --> 00:19:20,000
I don't know how you solve that.
That seems like a potentially 

349
00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:25,000
very serious problem for a 
centralized exchange I think. 

350
00:19:25,400 --> 00:19:29,000
And there have been Cases of 
this in the past especially with

351
00:19:29,000 --> 00:19:35,100
like us domiciled exchanges, 
where there have been 

352
00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:40,800
prohibitions or limitations on 
people depositing using coins 

353
00:19:40,800 --> 00:19:44,300
that were recently mixed. 
It's not necessarily common or 

354
00:19:44,300 --> 00:19:47,500
Universal but you can dig 
through Reddit or the old forms 

355
00:19:47,500 --> 00:19:50,800
and find exchanges basically 
saying you're set to withdraw, 

356
00:19:50,800 --> 00:19:53,000
only you deposited from this 
mixer. 

357
00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,100
We don't want to do business 
with you anymore. 

358
00:19:55,100 --> 00:19:59,000
I think that It is possible, 
that is going to become a more 

359
00:19:59,000 --> 00:20:04,900
common compliance strategy for 
exchanges to just reduce some of

360
00:20:04,908 --> 00:20:08,300
that risk. 
Then you can track the known, 

361
00:20:08,300 --> 00:20:12,900
hot addresses and hot coins and 
reduce the risk that those are 

362
00:20:12,900 --> 00:20:16,400
going to quickly be mixed 
deposited and then withdrawn, 

363
00:20:16,400 --> 00:20:19,200
right? 
Because you're not going to let 

364
00:20:19,200 --> 00:20:21,600
them take those at. 
Once you see them, come from the

365
00:20:21,600 --> 00:20:25,500
mixer, right? 
And so, potentially, I think 

366
00:20:25,500 --> 00:20:28,800
that there's going to More 
pressure on exchanges to take 

367
00:20:28,800 --> 00:20:31,900
more, proactive steps like that.
So I think that's may be 

368
00:20:31,900 --> 00:20:35,300
accurate, but but my issue, I 
guess my issue with it. 

369
00:20:35,300 --> 00:20:37,600
Is that I think and we see this 
with banks as well. 

370
00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:40,700
We see this with all kinds of 
platforms. 

371
00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:46,800
I think in l.a. even clubs and 
stuff are like basically what 

372
00:20:46,800 --> 00:20:50,300
I'm going to suggest is that 
there's a you understand, 

373
00:20:50,300 --> 00:20:53,200
there's rules that are going to 
be broken and finds that you're 

374
00:20:53,200 --> 00:20:56,000
going to have to pay and 
literally as a part of your 

375
00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:56,700
budget. 
It. 

376
00:20:56,700 --> 00:20:58,500
And I suspect this is at every 
Central. 

377
00:20:58,500 --> 00:21:00,900
Again, every centralized crypto 
currency exchange of part of 

378
00:21:00,900 --> 00:21:05,300
your budget is just designated. 
Okay, these are the fines we're 

379
00:21:05,300 --> 00:21:06,900
expecting to pay for the next 
year. 

380
00:21:06,900 --> 00:21:12,900
For breaking ofac sanctions for 
offering unregistered Securities

381
00:21:12,900 --> 00:21:15,900
for whatever, right? 
And there's a trade-off that 

382
00:21:15,900 --> 00:21:18,600
you're making because you're 
like, we're paying maybe a 

383
00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:22,500
hundred million dollars in 
fines, but we're going to make 

384
00:21:22,500 --> 00:21:26,400
three hundred million dollars 
from offering all this stuff and

385
00:21:26,500 --> 00:21:30,700
These rules so who cares and I 
think that having the volume 

386
00:21:30,700 --> 00:21:35,400
allowing these tradable markets 
and allowing people to do a 

387
00:21:35,408 --> 00:21:40,700
certain amount of kyc free 
trading on your platforms. 

388
00:21:40,900 --> 00:21:44,400
Like it's always going to be an 
easy and attractive option to 

389
00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:46,900
these business owners. 
I think is my way of putting it 

390
00:21:47,000 --> 00:21:50,500
especially if the potential 
penalties that they're paying 

391
00:21:50,800 --> 00:21:53,700
are simply finds you. 
And I think this is kind of what

392
00:21:53,700 --> 00:21:57,800
it comes down to if there is 
ever Ever meaningful enforcement

393
00:21:57,800 --> 00:22:01,000
against offshore exchanges by 
the United States? 

394
00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:05,000
Are they going to be looking for
like death penalties? 

395
00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:08,000
Take these places out. 
Lock these people up kind of 

396
00:22:08,000 --> 00:22:13,200
things or are they going to be 
willing to take large fines and 

397
00:22:13,200 --> 00:22:15,700
settlements and things like that
in theory? 

398
00:22:16,000 --> 00:22:19,100
Like you would think that the 
differentiator between those two

399
00:22:19,100 --> 00:22:22,100
types of cases should be whether
or not the exchange was making a

400
00:22:22,100 --> 00:22:25,200
good faith effort. 
And so things like exchanges 

401
00:22:25,200 --> 00:22:29,200
collaborating to He's Bad Assets
and collaborate with the 

402
00:22:29,200 --> 00:22:32,500
Department of Justice on that is
probably going to make it more 

403
00:22:32,500 --> 00:22:35,000
likely you get a fine rather 
than a death penalty. 

404
00:22:35,200 --> 00:22:38,200
I think that's a fair assessment
and again reason for me to 

405
00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:41,700
suspect that we're not going to 
see meaningful transitions or 

406
00:22:41,700 --> 00:22:44,300
changes to plenty of these 
exchanges. 

407
00:22:44,300 --> 00:22:48,700
While we might see more from a 
few or maybe even these major 

408
00:22:48,700 --> 00:22:52,500
exchanges like Finance have been
kind of forced to I think 

409
00:22:52,500 --> 00:22:55,400
overall, that's right. 
Like that isn't the design 

410
00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:58,900
that's not not that that's not 
going to drive potential 

411
00:22:58,900 --> 00:23:03,700
business to you and the note of 
Finance if I can take over for a

412
00:23:03,700 --> 00:23:07,700
second. 
Yeah please Finance kind of has 

413
00:23:07,700 --> 00:23:13,000
their own Bridge, it's not 
really a bridge but by Nance 

414
00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:18,300
issues, 94 tokens on by Nance, 
smart chain that are supposed to

415
00:23:18,300 --> 00:23:21,800
be backed by tokens from other 
chains and things like that. 

416
00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:25,300
It's basically a bridge except 
they're more open about it being

417
00:23:25,300 --> 00:23:26,300
administered. 
Bye-bye. 

418
00:23:26,500 --> 00:23:30,600
It's and a few days ago, 
Bloomberg reported that for 

419
00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:33,200
dozens of these coins. 
That's right. 

420
00:23:33,200 --> 00:23:37,700
They had not been keeping the 
collateral for them separate and

421
00:23:37,700 --> 00:23:42,900
had instead been commingling it 
with client funds in cold 

422
00:23:42,900 --> 00:23:46,000
wallets. 
This comes after data fin 

423
00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:50,900
Ovation confirmed, that Finance 
Peg, be USD issued, out of 

424
00:23:50,900 --> 00:23:55,900
Finance Gene was regularly not 
backed by adequate collateral in

425
00:23:55,900 --> 00:23:57,600
the wallet. 
That was supposed to have it. 

426
00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:01,200
So there's a couple of things 
going on here that I think are 

427
00:24:01,200 --> 00:24:03,500
really important to draw 
attention to and then something 

428
00:24:03,500 --> 00:24:06,500
that's kind of related them and 
I want to pull this towards but 

429
00:24:06,500 --> 00:24:10,800
one this suggests operational 
issues and shortfalls because 

430
00:24:10,800 --> 00:24:14,100
they were not making sure that 
they had the Assets in the right

431
00:24:14,100 --> 00:24:16,000
places. 
Before these tokens were being 

432
00:24:16,000 --> 00:24:20,200
issued on to finance, chained to
these assets were being stored 

433
00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:23,500
in these cold wallets. 
Finances proof of reserves that 

434
00:24:23,500 --> 00:24:27,900
was done in December by Masters.
No longer does cryptocurrency 

435
00:24:27,900 --> 00:24:33,200
work compared the balance in the
finance, cold wallets to user 

436
00:24:33,200 --> 00:24:35,800
liabilities, to prove, they were
fully reserved. 

437
00:24:35,800 --> 00:24:42,600
These B tokens are not customer 
liabilities, but the assets for 

438
00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:45,000
them were stored in these cold 
wallet. 

439
00:24:45,000 --> 00:24:47,100
So the assets were 
over-represented in the 

440
00:24:47,108 --> 00:24:50,300
liabilities were 
underrepresented in this 

441
00:24:50,300 --> 00:24:51,900
analysis for the proof of 
Reserve. 

442
00:24:51,900 --> 00:24:54,800
So we've got commingling of 
client and corporate funds, 

443
00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:57,000
which is already problematic. 
Attic. 

444
00:24:57,000 --> 00:25:00,700
We have them having these 
corporate Assets in there for 

445
00:25:00,700 --> 00:25:03,700
the proof of reserves. 
And we have them just not having

446
00:25:04,500 --> 00:25:06,600
evidence of having adequate 
collateral for these. 

447
00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:11,300
And, well, I was looking into 
this, I read the by Nance proof 

448
00:25:11,300 --> 00:25:14,300
of reserves report again, and I 
noticed there was two thousand 

449
00:25:14,300 --> 00:25:19,200
one hundred, fifty times as much
u.s. d.c. in reserves. 

450
00:25:19,500 --> 00:25:22,900
As they needed to cover user 
liabilities, they had about 1 

451
00:25:22,900 --> 00:25:26,300
million dollars in total user 
liabilities and well over. 

452
00:25:26,500 --> 00:25:30,000
Two billion USD, see and hand, 
when this report happened, the 

453
00:25:30,000 --> 00:25:32,100
reason for this seems to be that
they announced. 

454
00:25:32,100 --> 00:25:35,200
They were going to be 
converting, all us DC, deposits 

455
00:25:35,500 --> 00:25:39,400
into be USD, but they needed to 
keep enough u.s. 

456
00:25:39,400 --> 00:25:42,800
DC on hand, to be able to 
service withdrawals and things 

457
00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:45,000
like that. 
However, we have issues again, 

458
00:25:45,100 --> 00:25:51,100
namely one, it suggests that 
they had over two billion 

459
00:25:51,100 --> 00:25:55,600
dollars of unencumbered assets 
that they were a corporate 

460
00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:59,400
assets that They were able to 
use to acquire these Surplus 

461
00:25:59,400 --> 00:26:02,700
table coins, because when you 
hear conversion, what you would 

462
00:26:02,700 --> 00:26:07,100
expect by Nance to do, is take 
the deposited USD, see redeem, 

463
00:26:07,100 --> 00:26:11,800
it issue, be USD, and have that 
on hand, but instead they have 

464
00:26:11,800 --> 00:26:15,400
billions of dollars in Surplus 
means they had to create 

465
00:26:15,500 --> 00:26:19,000
billions of dollars of extra. 
Be USD, without the benefit of 

466
00:26:19,000 --> 00:26:22,500
being able to redeem that u.s. 
DC, which suggests Finance has 

467
00:26:22,500 --> 00:26:25,600
far more liquid unencumbered 
cash in the banking system than 

468
00:26:25,600 --> 00:26:28,300
I initially. 
I acted the other problem is 

469
00:26:28,300 --> 00:26:33,100
that us DC shows up on the proof
of reserves again and there are 

470
00:26:33,100 --> 00:26:35,300
no customer to liabilities in 
u.s. 

471
00:26:35,300 --> 00:26:38,600
DC which means all the u.s. d.c.
they have on hand is Corporate 

472
00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:40,400
fun. 
They're showing those corporate 

473
00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:42,700
funds in the proof of reserves 
again. 

474
00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:46,500
And as I looked into this even 
more, I started all of their 

475
00:26:46,500 --> 00:26:50,400
corporate funds are likely 
stored in the by Nance wallets 

476
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:54,200
and we know this, because if you
go back to their own blog posts,

477
00:26:54,200 --> 00:26:57,500
specifically the one entitled 
to, Transparency on wallets at 

478
00:26:57,500 --> 00:27:01,800
Finance, you hear them claimed 
that they hold all of its 

479
00:27:01,900 --> 00:27:05,300
clients crypto Assets in 
segregated accounts which are 

480
00:27:05,300 --> 00:27:09,000
identified separately from any 
accounts, used to hold crypto 

481
00:27:09,000 --> 00:27:12,900
assets belonging to buy Nance. 
But when you read further down 

482
00:27:12,900 --> 00:27:14,800
in that same article, you 
realize they don't mean 

483
00:27:14,800 --> 00:27:18,600
segregated into a separate 
account like on the blockchain. 

484
00:27:18,700 --> 00:27:22,200
They mean they have an internal 
accounting system that keeps 

485
00:27:22,200 --> 00:27:25,800
track of how much of the amount 
in these cold wallets or 

486
00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:28,300
whatever. 
Is client funds and how much is 

487
00:27:28,300 --> 00:27:31,000
Corporate funds? 
Which again, brings us back to 

488
00:27:31,000 --> 00:27:33,800
two issues, one, the proof of 
reserves. 

489
00:27:33,800 --> 00:27:37,200
Almost certainly contains by 
Finance corporate funds, which 

490
00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:41,000
were used as assets, and not 
represented as liabilities, 

491
00:27:41,300 --> 00:27:46,800
which brings into question. 
The claims of solvency that's 

492
00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:50,800
easy was making after that 
report was published to the 

493
00:27:50,800 --> 00:27:54,800
entire ability for that to count
as any kind of segregation, 

494
00:27:55,000 --> 00:27:58,600
depends on finances of Ability 
to maintain accurate, internal 

495
00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:02,700
accounting records and they had 
dozens of their betokens not 

496
00:28:02,700 --> 00:28:05,600
appropriately manage. 
They had their Flagship by Nance

497
00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:08,100
Peg. 
Be USD, stable coin, not 

498
00:28:08,100 --> 00:28:10,500
appropriately. 
Managed to the tunes of millions

499
00:28:10,500 --> 00:28:11,700
and millions and millions of 
dollars. 

500
00:28:11,700 --> 00:28:16,000
So their entire claim 
segregation of client crypto 

501
00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:21,400
assets depends entirely on by 
Nance having perfect or very, 

502
00:28:21,400 --> 00:28:24,200
very good. 
Internal accounting records and 

503
00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:28,500
the former CFO up Finance Italy 
was not allowed to even see the 

504
00:28:28,500 --> 00:28:32,700
by Nance books. 
The entire thing is fucking 

505
00:28:32,700 --> 00:28:36,200
bullshit in, which you have to 
place your entire trust into the

506
00:28:36,200 --> 00:28:39,700
demonstrated lack of ability, 
for finance to maintain accurate

507
00:28:39,700 --> 00:28:41,900
records. 
Hopefully, everybody knows where

508
00:28:41,900 --> 00:28:44,300
I'm going with this, where have 
we seen this before, right? 

509
00:28:44,300 --> 00:28:48,500
Where have we seen this before? 
And if you, if your answer is 

510
00:28:48,500 --> 00:28:52,500
FTX, you're right, but if your 
answer is also almost every 

511
00:28:52,500 --> 00:28:57,100
fraud ever, you're also right? 
Like Enron When was this 

512
00:28:57,100 --> 00:29:01,200
Worldcom was that most of the 
major corporate frauds in the 

513
00:29:01,200 --> 00:29:05,800
past 50 years have relied on 
accounting fraud to some degree 

514
00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:09,500
or at least like significant 
mismanagement to the point of 

515
00:29:09,500 --> 00:29:13,200
paying no attention whatsoever 
to the point of criminal 

516
00:29:13,200 --> 00:29:14,500
negligence? 
And what? 

517
00:29:14,500 --> 00:29:18,700
You're pointing to suggest that 
and we've talked about this with

518
00:29:18,700 --> 00:29:22,200
tether with other companies, 
like either, what what is 

519
00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:26,100
happening here is that they're 
purposely op you skating? 

520
00:29:26,400 --> 00:29:31,000
Hide something that if it comes 
out they know is very bad for 

521
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:34,400
their business which is terrible
and you hope that's not the 

522
00:29:34,400 --> 00:29:40,000
case. 
Or they're so bad at corporate 

523
00:29:40,000 --> 00:29:46,300
management and accounting that 
they just have completely lost 

524
00:29:46,300 --> 00:29:49,200
track. 
And that's terrible to because 

525
00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:52,700
you really need these people to 
be in control of what is 

526
00:29:52,700 --> 00:29:56,500
happening with with these funds.
We understand we've seen we've 

527
00:29:56,500 --> 00:29:58,900
seen what can go wrong when 
you're not paying enough 

528
00:29:58,900 --> 00:30:02,300
attention to, what is happening 
with your, with your funds, in 

529
00:30:02,300 --> 00:30:05,000
your centralized exchange, he's 
called sandbank manfried. 

530
00:30:05,300 --> 00:30:09,400
And like I just, this is 
terrifying to me, I would be 

531
00:30:09,400 --> 00:30:12,700
scared, it doesn't mean that 
anything is on essentially 

532
00:30:13,100 --> 00:30:17,700
unbag, even though it is on back
door, it's improperly directed 

533
00:30:17,700 --> 00:30:20,400
funds. 
It doesn't mean that anything is

534
00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:23,000
going to go bankrupt. 
It doesn't mean that anybody 

535
00:30:23,600 --> 00:30:28,800
like Finance doesn't have Funds 
to continue operations. 

536
00:30:28,900 --> 00:30:31,700
It's nothing like that. 
That is not what the suggestion 

537
00:30:31,700 --> 00:30:34,000
is. 
I'm saying the scared part is 

538
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,400
that they're not paying 
attention. 

539
00:30:36,800 --> 00:30:39,600
They are not paying attention 
and either it's on purpose or by

540
00:30:39,600 --> 00:30:42,500
accident and both are bad. 
That's all I'm saying and that 

541
00:30:42,500 --> 00:30:47,500
and if these people are the ones
in charge of your money and your

542
00:30:47,500 --> 00:30:51,900
moving money on to their 
platform, This should worry, 

543
00:30:52,100 --> 00:30:54,700
that's all. 
It doesn't mean you have to like

544
00:30:55,300 --> 00:30:58,000
at this is not Financial advice,
I guess is what I'm trying to 

545
00:30:58,000 --> 00:31:03,200
say, but like it just it's 
troubling, yes, it absolutely 

546
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:04,900
is. 
And like I do want to go back to

547
00:31:04,900 --> 00:31:08,000
your point of this doesn't mean 
that the funds weren't there, 

548
00:31:08,000 --> 00:31:10,100
right? 
It gives us reason to question 

549
00:31:10,100 --> 00:31:13,300
it based on finances, own public
statements in this evidence, but

550
00:31:13,300 --> 00:31:16,800
that doesn't mean it's untrue. 
And if we go back to the cftc 

551
00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:19,700
case against Heather, one of the
things they ended up proving is 

552
00:31:19,700 --> 00:31:22,800
that tether? 
I was willing to issue tethers 

553
00:31:22,800 --> 00:31:25,400
against anticipated, wire 
transfers. 

554
00:31:25,500 --> 00:31:29,500
There's this tendency among 
cryptocurrency companies because

555
00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:33,200
they're already operating 
somewhat in the gray to convince

556
00:31:33,200 --> 00:31:36,400
themselves. 
The exact order of operations is

557
00:31:36,400 --> 00:31:38,900
not that important. 
It doesn't matter. 

558
00:31:38,900 --> 00:31:41,800
If you issue them before you get
the money in your bank account, 

559
00:31:41,800 --> 00:31:44,300
as long as the money eventually,
gets to your bank account, it 

560
00:31:44,300 --> 00:31:47,700
doesn't matter if you have these
without the appropriate tokens 

561
00:31:47,700 --> 00:31:50,100
in the collateral wallet, as 
long as they eventually get. 

562
00:31:50,400 --> 00:31:55,400
And I think that kind of idea 
combined with the fact that by 

563
00:31:55,400 --> 00:31:58,900
Nance has been playing a 
regulation and jurisdiction 

564
00:31:58,900 --> 00:32:01,600
hopping game over the last 
several years where they 

565
00:32:01,600 --> 00:32:03,600
transfer between these corporate
entities. 

566
00:32:03,600 --> 00:32:07,800
So often, I have an intuition 
that it would be very 

567
00:32:07,800 --> 00:32:11,500
challenging even for the current
c-level executive leadership at 

568
00:32:11,500 --> 00:32:15,800
Finance to really get a solid 
understanding of the complete 

569
00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:18,000
financial situation of the 
finance Empire. 

570
00:32:18,500 --> 00:32:23,200
There's these Questions like 
this USD see like these B tokens

571
00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:26,800
like this by Nance Peg. 
PUSD that suggests, there are 

572
00:32:26,800 --> 00:32:30,600
serious gaps in the record. 
Keeping when you can't get an 

573
00:32:30,600 --> 00:32:34,000
audit, it's concerning if it's 
clear that you can't get an 

574
00:32:34,000 --> 00:32:39,100
actual audit and nobody knows 
where the money is, which again 

575
00:32:39,100 --> 00:32:43,600
like this should sound familiar 
to people, you should be like 

576
00:32:43,600 --> 00:32:49,300
reacting like, oh yep, this 
sounds like FTX the sounds like 

577
00:32:49,300 --> 00:32:52,000
tether the Like bitfenix. 
This sounds like it. 

578
00:32:52,300 --> 00:32:53,300
Yeah, of course. 
It does. 

579
00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:55,800
Of course it does. 
That doesn't mean it ends up the

580
00:32:55,800 --> 00:32:59,700
same way. 
It just means even the even the 

581
00:32:59,700 --> 00:33:05,500
most powerful and largest 
players in the industry are 

582
00:33:05,500 --> 00:33:13,100
doing a piss-poor job of 
maintaining, any semblance of 

583
00:33:13,800 --> 00:33:16,800
being a respectable Financial 
entity. 

584
00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:21,000
It's especially striking to me 
because arguably by Is systemic 

585
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:23,000
importance, just keeps going up 
there. 

586
00:33:23,000 --> 00:33:24,400
What? 
Like seventy percent of the 

587
00:33:24,408 --> 00:33:26,500
volume and cryptocurrency at 
this point. 

588
00:33:26,500 --> 00:33:27,700
Yeah. 
Something like that. 

589
00:33:27,800 --> 00:33:30,900
A complete asset seizure, a 
shutdown or an F. 

590
00:33:30,900 --> 00:33:35,700
Textile, collapse of Finance. 
It's devastating, it's Mount gox

591
00:33:35,700 --> 00:33:37,000
level. 
I think that's right. 

592
00:33:37,000 --> 00:33:41,200
I would perceive that the 
regulators and law enforcement 

593
00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:48,100
agents would prefer to work with
the largest player as opposed to

594
00:33:48,100 --> 00:33:50,400
shut down the largest player. 
R. 

595
00:33:50,700 --> 00:33:56,900
So I don't think I don't think. 
Guess we'll find out. 

596
00:33:56,900 --> 00:33:59,900
So it would be more likely, I 
think it would be more likely 

597
00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:04,900
that there would be such drastic
mismanagement at finance that it

598
00:34:04,900 --> 00:34:07,900
could have catastrophic failure 
on its own. 

599
00:34:07,900 --> 00:34:11,000
I think that is a real 
possibility just based on what 

600
00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:13,500
we've seen recently regarding 
their books. 

601
00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:16,800
So I think that is far more 
likely than regulators and law 

602
00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:19,300
enforcement agents figuring out 
a way to shut it down. 

603
00:34:19,500 --> 00:34:23,600
Entirely I I think I agree with 
you. 

604
00:34:24,900 --> 00:34:27,900
There was a Department of 
Justice press conference 

605
00:34:27,900 --> 00:34:32,100
recently, which left a lot of 
people feeling unfulfilled, 

606
00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:34,699
because they announced that it 
was going to be the, like, 

607
00:34:34,699 --> 00:34:38,600
largest cryptocurrency 
indictment they had done and it 

608
00:34:38,600 --> 00:34:43,300
ended up being B Lotto, a Hydra 
darknet Market connected, 

609
00:34:43,400 --> 00:34:47,500
Russian Chinese exchange, that 
had been laundering the proceeds

610
00:34:47,500 --> 00:34:50,199
from this drug trafficking and 
probably laundering some money 

611
00:34:50,199 --> 00:34:54,199
for an oligarch somewhere. 
What's interesting is that since

612
00:34:54,199 --> 00:34:57,800
the feds shut down Hydra several
months ago, they have seemed to 

613
00:34:57,808 --> 00:35:01,100
have been working through many 
of the counterparties for Hydra 

614
00:35:01,100 --> 00:35:04,000
and you know which one is the 
largest one still standing. 

615
00:35:05,000 --> 00:35:10,800
Is it by any chance? 
It is yeah so there's a part of 

616
00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:14,200
me especially with Reuters 
reporting again that they got 

617
00:35:14,200 --> 00:35:20,300
confirmation that like 300 
million went from B Lotto to buy

618
00:35:20,300 --> 00:35:23,700
Nance after coming from Hydra 
besides the direct Hydra 

619
00:35:23,700 --> 00:35:28,000
transfers to buy Nance. 
Listen Finance has the former 

620
00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:30,800
Chief of the Department of 
Justice's. 

621
00:35:30,900 --> 00:35:34,600
Am Lars money laundering and 
asset recovery service in these 

622
00:35:34,700 --> 00:35:37,200
See metaphorically, I don't know
if he's physically, they're 

623
00:35:37,400 --> 00:35:39,200
trying to negotiate a deal for 
finance. 

624
00:35:39,200 --> 00:35:41,800
According to the Reuters is 
reporting, my gut instinct is 

625
00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:45,100
they're going to get a deal but 
there's a part of me that looks 

626
00:35:45,100 --> 00:35:48,100
at what they did to B lotto and 
if you end up with Finance being

627
00:35:48,100 --> 00:35:51,800
larger than that, how do you 
publicly justify pursuing one 

628
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:56,700
and letting the other go, they 
seemingly have done done as much

629
00:35:56,700 --> 00:35:58,300
with banks and other things 
before. 

630
00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:00,700
So you agree that I my only 
counter point would be that. 

631
00:36:00,700 --> 00:36:05,500
Yeah that like if we look at how
the great financial crisis Was 

632
00:36:05,500 --> 00:36:10,800
handled by regulators and law 
enforcement, you know, I think 

633
00:36:10,800 --> 00:36:15,000
what was it like 11 Bank was 
criminally prosecuted. 

634
00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:16,800
Wasn't it? 
Like the chairs like small 

635
00:36:16,800 --> 00:36:18,600
Community Bank for? 
Yeah. 

636
00:36:18,800 --> 00:36:23,000
And even they ended up grants. 
Not getting sentence. 

637
00:36:23,300 --> 00:36:25,000
We're not getting yeah. 
Found guilty. 

638
00:36:25,000 --> 00:36:28,500
And so like, well because they 
really were not the ones to 

639
00:36:28,500 --> 00:36:32,400
prosecute and so yeah, anyway 
yeah, money power Prestige 

640
00:36:32,400 --> 00:36:35,600
within the in the industry in 
the department of Of justices 

641
00:36:35,800 --> 00:36:42,200
hesitancy to, cause a collapse 
of in Industry makes me favor 

642
00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:45,200
Finance getting some kind of 
deal especially when you have 

643
00:36:45,200 --> 00:36:47,400
the former Chief negotiating on 
your behalf. 

644
00:36:47,400 --> 00:36:51,600
But Anything is possible. 
I agree with that. 

645
00:36:51,700 --> 00:36:53,500
Anything is possible. 
Yeah, I'm not suggesting, it's 

646
00:36:53,500 --> 00:36:55,400
impossible and that I am not 
suggesting. 

647
00:36:55,600 --> 00:36:59,800
Also, the biggest likelihood is 
that, you know, realistically 

648
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:00,900
finances. 
Fine. 

649
00:37:01,000 --> 00:37:03,200
And nobody needs to worry, 
right? 

650
00:37:03,200 --> 00:37:05,800
Yeah. 
That's like I think it's we need

651
00:37:05,800 --> 00:37:10,400
to counter all of this with, 
we're not trying to pull a fire 

652
00:37:10,400 --> 00:37:16,400
alarm when there is clearly just
an oven that's overheated or 

653
00:37:16,400 --> 00:37:18,900
something and you just need to 
turn the oven off or something. 

654
00:37:19,200 --> 00:37:23,600
Like we don't know. 
We don't know what if it's an 

655
00:37:23,600 --> 00:37:26,300
oil fire in the oven? 
We don't know. 

656
00:37:26,300 --> 00:37:28,500
Like we don't know what's 
actually going on, so we can't 

657
00:37:28,500 --> 00:37:32,700
really suggest anything, but we 
absolutely do not have like a 

658
00:37:32,700 --> 00:37:35,200
strong reason to believe 
finances. 

659
00:37:35,200 --> 00:37:40,000
Insolvent what we do know is by 
Nance has serious process gaps 

660
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,800
that they seem to have 
transparency issues, even 

661
00:37:42,800 --> 00:37:45,200
internally to c-level 
Executives. 

662
00:37:45,200 --> 00:37:49,000
And there are these Strange 
Behaviors and ongoing. 

663
00:37:49,100 --> 00:37:50,600
Oceans. 
That's what we know. 

664
00:37:50,600 --> 00:37:52,100
But yeah we're kind of off the 
rails here. 

665
00:37:52,100 --> 00:37:55,300
Anyway, this was supposed to be 
a bridge discussion about 

666
00:37:55,300 --> 00:38:00,600
Lazarus group and I think we've 
covered that, if anything else 

667
00:38:00,600 --> 00:38:02,800
occurs with this, I this is a 
story. 

668
00:38:02,800 --> 00:38:07,000
I'd like us to Circle back to it
some point because I think North

669
00:38:07,000 --> 00:38:10,100
Korea is just fascinating and 
them trying to get their hands. 

670
00:38:10,100 --> 00:38:15,500
So desperately on anything. 
Even cash adjacent is a, I don't

671
00:38:15,500 --> 00:38:18,400
know, it's a fascinating story 
to me so we'll continue to cover

672
00:38:18,400 --> 00:38:22,900
this obviously. 
Lee and let's let's give a shout

673
00:38:22,900 --> 00:38:25,600
out to the Lazarus group for 
funding crypto critics corner. 

674
00:38:25,600 --> 00:38:28,200
Thank you guys. 
Hit that like And subscribe 

675
00:38:28,200 --> 00:38:31,100
button for all our Cheese's. 
I really don't want the OCC or 

676
00:38:31,100 --> 00:38:33,600
some shit to cut out for us. 
Absolutely fucking joking. 

677
00:38:34,500 --> 00:38:38,600
Absolutely fucking joking FBI 
like Christ almighty. 

678
00:38:40,100 --> 00:38:41,000
Yeah, yeah. 
Yeah. 

679
00:38:41,100 --> 00:38:42,200
Emily. 
You never know what? 

680
00:38:42,200 --> 00:38:44,100
You never know. 
What the fuck is Griffith. 

681
00:38:44,900 --> 00:38:47,300
I'm gonna, you know, your 
backpack here. 

682
00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,100
Let's figure out a different way
to end this episode. 

683
00:38:57,500 --> 00:39:02,300
Actually big news out of crypto 
critics Corner, we have we've 

684
00:39:02,300 --> 00:39:05,800
created our own bridge on the 
cast, Coin Block Chain. 

685
00:39:06,200 --> 00:39:08,600
It is, it allows you to bridge 
likes. 

686
00:39:08,800 --> 00:39:11,900
Subscribes and reviews and 
ratings and all that stuff, but 

687
00:39:11,900 --> 00:39:14,500
you have obviously have to buy 
Cass, going to use the bridge. 

688
00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:19,400
So if you could go ahead by more
cast coin, it's obviously not 

689
00:39:19,400 --> 00:39:22,900
available on any currency 
crypto, currency exchanges. 

690
00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:28,200
It is available on my personal 
decks, The Cask It's so go ahead

691
00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:34,400
by some cast coin, wire us that 
money to my personal bank 

692
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:37,200
account and see you guys soon.