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Welcome back everyone. 
I am Cass PNC. 

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I'm joined as usual by my 
partner in crime, Mr. Bennett 

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Tomlin. 
How are you today? 

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I'm doing well. 
How are you, Cass? 

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I'm doing, I'm doing good. 
I'm hoping my Internet stays OK 

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today because we have a very 
special guest, Travis Kimmel, 

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CEO of a startup we've had him 
on previously, one of our 

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favorite guests. 
How are you, Travis? 

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I'm doing great, how y'all? 
Doing awesome. 

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We're we're here to discuss 
venture capital with you, which 

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is a topic that we bring up 
pretty regularly with a lot of 

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animus usually. 
To me, the arc is sort of like, 

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you know, there was like a lot 
of things like just sort of 

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capitalism generally there. 
There is this original intent 

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around it that that's really 
good. 

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Like I'm a, you know, I'm a 
capitalist myself, like, and I 

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believe in it. 
And yet you look at the way that

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it is that it has been playing 
out lately and there are still, 

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there are a lot there. 
It's complex because there are a

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lot of people doing that sort 
of, you know, healthy 

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capitalism. 
And then there's a lot of like 

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weird regulatory capture stuff 
that goes on as well. 

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So I think, you know, certainly 
open to talk about history. 

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You may know more about it than 
I have. 

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I mean, I've said read a few 
books on it, but I think that 

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the we're at this weird place 
with venture capital where it 

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is, it has sort of escaped 
containment. 

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So for a while, you know, we had
this like it was very much a 

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Silicon Valley thing. 
And I think some of the best 

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venture capital is still there. 
And, and in New York, it's on 

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the coast. 
And I, I think that the way that

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venture has escaped containment 
is really strange because now 

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they all have media companies, 
right. 

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So like, if we think, I mean, we
could sort of just get into it 

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here. 
Yeah. 

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If you think about like, if we 
think about like venture 

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capital, the effect of having a 
large megaphone around a certain

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aesthetic that works really 
well. 

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What is that aesthetic, that 
aesthetic? 

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It is growth companies. 
Growth companies are a little 

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weird and you have to be a 
little, a little broken to try 

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to go make one safe from 
experience, because it's like 

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it's really hard and there's a 
lot of risk and there's a lot of

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risk on the entrepreneur side, 
more so than on the venture side

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because they're building like a 
proper portfolio. 

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And So what you, one of the 
things you want to look for in, 

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in funding these companies is 
zealots. 

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So you, it's a little bit of a 
zealot culture, right? 

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So it's to my mind, there's this
strange thing where like a 

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Messiah culture inside of a 
little company that's doing 

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something incredibly hard is 
like kind of fine because it 

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gets you through the really hard
times where you're not sure 

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you're going to make it. 
But then the distribution of 

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Messiah culture generally into 
Gen. pop is like, don't know if 

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we want that. 
Well, I like this is interesting

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to me because this this brings 
up to me when I get into the 

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history of Silicon Valley and 
venture capital, because in my, 

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in my opinion, venture capital 
started in Silicon Valley. 

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So Fairchild Semiconductors is 
known as the initial venture. 

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Like as we know venture capital 
today, like that was when it 

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happened. 
For anyone that doesn't know, 

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they like really got integrated 
chips started and chose to use 

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silicon and they were known as 
the traitorous 8. 

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They left Shockley and form 
their own company. 

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So there is a little bit of a 
few things that I think about 

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that's still being involved in 
Silicon Valley and venture 

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capital today, which are a bunch
of people screwing over someone 

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to start their own thing. 
And also what you're talking 

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about, which was a zealotry, but
a zealotry in relation to 

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wanting to innovate in the 
fastest way possible 

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passionately. 
And I don't think that that is 

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the goal in venture capital 
anymore. 

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I it's in there, it may not be, 
you know, the, the single goal 

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or even the median goal, but 
it's still round. 

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And I think there's a couple, 
there's a couple things I'd say 

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on that. 
One, that pattern of like 

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innovation at all costs works 
really well on software. 

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It's one of the reasons I like 
staying in like software because

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software is a little, it's a 
little easier to like innovate 

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at all costs when the downside 
of screwing up is like the site 

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goes down and people don't have 
the SAS product you're selling 

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them. 
That's not really, there's 

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nothing really like violent 
about that. 

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You know, it's sort of there's 
like a little bit of a broken 

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promise and you got to make that
up to the customer and you got 

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to try to prevent that. 
But you can move very quickly 

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and be like kind of safe a lot 
of times with software products.

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And then when that same ethos 
gets translated into other 

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domains as venture expands 
outward. 

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So like Theranos is a great 
example that everybody sort of 

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loves to talk about here, like 
move quickly and break things 

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when you're dealing with 
medtech. 

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It's just not clear that that's 
a lean startup type of problem. 

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And I think you, you know, any 
time we try to take this into 

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another industry where now we're
dealing with like, you know, I 

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think you see a lot of the the 
drama around Tesla here, right? 

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Like, OK, let's just ship 
something before it's ready and 

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then keep iterating on it. 
Like, cool, that's great. 

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Unless it's the thing driving my
car and then like I kind of want

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to be a late adopter there. 
See, I, I started laughing there

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when you brought up Tesla 
because you were talking about 

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how this move fast and break 
things type of model kind of 

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works in software, but it 
doesn't work as you head into 

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other domains. 
And I was going to talk about 

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how software is eating 
everything, as they like to say 

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in the example I was just about 
to bring up was autonomous 

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vehicles being distributed 
perhaps before their time. 

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And then you jumped right to 
there. 

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Yeah. 
And I think, you know, you saw 

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you see this in the packaging of
other products as well. 

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I get, I may get this example a 
little wrong, but it's 

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directional. 
Right before the latest Boeing 

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thing, there was some other 
Boeing thing where they had like

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they were selling these planes 
and they had like different 

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tiers, almost like SAS pricing. 
So you got like the basic model 

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and then you got the mid tier 
model and you could sort of buy 

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whatever. 
What are autopilot control 

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system? 
And like it turns out you kind 

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of needed the mid tier one if 
you didn't want the plane to 

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stall out and fall out of the 
sky. 

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And I'm just not sure we 
wouldn't apply these lessons. 

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They come from this sort of like
blast scaling ethos around 

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software where where I think 
it's safe to do that if you're 

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if you're mindful of the 
externalities and and they're 

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not there's no actual damage 
other than like the app being 

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unavailable. 
But as soon as this stuff starts

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to get distributed as like the 
way the business is done by 

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people with these large 
megaphones, that's where you run

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into some real issues. 
And I think that's a really 

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interesting angle that we 
actually talked about a little 

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bit on here way back in one of 
our very first episodes, like 

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episode eight or nine or 
something. 

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We were talking about when 
Coinbase was launching their 

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media business and compared it 
to some of Andreessen, 

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Andreessen Horowitz's efforts in
the media landscape with kind of

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that same conclusion that 
entrepreneurial success requires

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an unusual type of person in an 
unusual type of circumstances. 

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The type of success that is 
created there generally is not 

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going to replicate broadly or 
across other circumstances or 

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other types of people. 
But there was a tendency to use 

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these stories to make it seem in
these media projects like it did

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generalize more than it did. 
And then there was a second 

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thing that you'd see these media
companies sometimes do, which 

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would be to take kind of 
successful examples or ones that

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didn't seem like they were 
likely to actually lead to the 

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same kind of massive 
entrepreneurial success, but 

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match it up against previous 
successes on its way there to 

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like they wanted things that 
were. 

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Not made the case. 
Yeah, yeah. 

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That the media out effort they 
were doing was like part of 

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their making the case that these
other firms were like the big 

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successes, yeah. 
I mean, it might be useful to 

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talk through like, OK, so you 
know, just laying the ground 

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with here. 
What is venture capital today? 

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In my mind, you're, you know, 
you get a pool of money, which 

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is often, you know, like pension
money or whatever these like a 

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large LP's, you pull this stuff 
together and then you go fund a 

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cohort of companies. 
And if you're investing early 

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on, so like, let's just say the 
company is from inception. 

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I mean, most of those are going 
to fail just like outright. 

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And so the model requires you to
think about each of these bets 

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almost the way you would a, a 
portfolio of options. 

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Like they've got to have 
asymmetric upside. 

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That position has to be able to 
be at a 203040 X. 

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So you're only investing in 
stuff with, with really big TAN.

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This is why there's this 
obsession with market size. 

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Like if you're, if you're going 
to invest in something with a 

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small TAN, that portfolio, 
you're kind of wasting a bet. 

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You know, out of 10 bets, maybe 
two to three of those return 

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like a double or a 111 of those.
It makes your whole makes the 

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whole thing makes all the rest 
of the 10 and seven of them just

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like go to 0, some little like 
acquire thing that really scopes

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how VCs think about what 
companies are investable. 

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And then I think if you take 
down one more step there into 

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the into the operator side of 
it, you also want a business 

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that is capable of being a 
growth business. 

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And and that means it has to be 
structured such that the gross 

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margins are super fat. 
So you're talking like 80 plus 

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percent gross margin. 
So like the beauty of software 

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basically is in this growth 
model where if I have, if I 

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stand up a web application and I
want to sell to add a customer, 

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it costs almost nothing. 
Like there's a little bit of 

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server cost there, but but it's,
it's, you know, it's more or 

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less free. 
And so that's what defines these

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growth companies is you can then
take all of this capital you 

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have and use it on sales and 
marketing and further R&D and 

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you really just try to like grow
as fast and as aggressively as 

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possible. 
Now the, the failure pattern 

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around venture is when you get 
a, a business that is sort of, 

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you know, I guess I mean, you 
all I'll use cooking the books 

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because you all appreciate it. 
But the way that you categorize 

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the P&L, I mean, there's 
actually just a lot of 

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discretion in there. 
So sometimes what you'll see in 

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the world where I'm from, which 
is like SAS software is that the

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you'll have stuff that should be
rolled into COGS, which is cost 

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of goods sold And it's not. 
And so like let's say you evolve

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this really you have a software 
product, but like nobody really 

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knows how to use it. 
And so you see you stand up a 

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CSM department, just customer 
success and they handle like 

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renewals and then they help 
onboard people. 

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And if you, if you unpack what 
the customer success team is 

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doing, you see that it's 
basically just like services. 

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Well, now you're running a 
business that's a little bit 

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more like McKinsey or, you know,
something like a consultancy, 

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then you are a, a software 
business. 

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So that's the pattern in B2B 
SAS. 

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But I think if you, if you 
generalize that out and you look

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at like, you know, these people 
who are doing manufacturing or 

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whatever, are they really like, 
can we really think of them as a

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tech company? 
Do these comparisons that 

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you're, that you alluded to 
here, like do they really track 

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and are you going to get the 
kind of gross margins out of 

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there that allow for this really
rapid growth and a lot of 

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control over the business is 
destiny. 

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And, and just to be to be clear 
and like net out what control 

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over destiny means is euphemism.
You know, that means that most 

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of your costs are labor. 
And if the economy turns and 

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your growth falls off, you have 
this, the lever you have is to 

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cut labor. 
So it's like, it's kind of a, 

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it's a fairly brutal model to 
really scale very rapidly. 

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And you see this in in tech and 
it it contributes to the sort of

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short average tenure of tech 
staffers. 

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Like, there's just not a lot of 
mutual loyalty there in the way 

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that there might be in a. 
Manufacturing business. 

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So to me, a lot of the things 
you're discussing right now are 

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like even as they are are quite 
tenuous for, for venture 

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capital. 
And the reason I say that is 

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because of things like 
cryptocurrency. 

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Now I don't mean this in a 
positive way. 

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I, I want to be clear, like I'm 
not saying, oh, cryptocurrency 

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is coming along and defeating 
venture capital and it's good. 

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I'm saying this is a 
conversation I've had with a lot

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of people. 
There's this new VC class like 

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A16Z, Anderson Horowitz or I'm 
trying to a lot of the PayPal 

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mafia guys, these types who are 
all into they love 

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cryptocurrency, but they love 
cryptocurrency not because it's 

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innovative and changing things. 
It's because their vesting 

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periods are shorter. 
It's because they can sell and 

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dump on retail faster. 
It's because they don't have to 

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wait for it to IPO. 
It's because like the the 

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reasons that they love it are 
for the greediest reasons. 

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And I genuinely think that this 
is something that is going to 

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help self destruct part of 
venture capital. 

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It could. 
I mean, my, there's sort of a, I

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think we have to consider what 
role we want these various 

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agents to play, right? 
Like, like for, from my 

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perspective of venture 
capitalist, their job, their 

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mandate is to like take that 
money and get a return. 

249
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And you know, it's a big return.
And so if you create a, a sort 

250
00:12:41,600 --> 00:12:46,400
of societal set of incentives 
where you can get liquidity in, 

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in sort of a shadow public 
market very quickly, in some 

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sense, it makes sense to me. 
The venture has gravitated 

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toward that. 
Like it is just sort of a, you 

254
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know, it's, it's, it's like 
water flowing downhill. 

255
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And I don't know when I, when I,
when I rant about crypto, it's 

256
00:13:02,520 --> 00:13:05,200
less about those specific 
players because I look at 

257
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venture capitalists and I say 
this lovingly, like they're 

258
00:13:07,680 --> 00:13:11,880
sharks, You know, they're very, 
you will get when you go in 

259
00:13:11,880 --> 00:13:14,400
there as an entrepreneur, you'll
get the brutal feedback. 

260
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And, and part of your job is to 
like, take that feedback to be 

261
00:13:17,680 --> 00:13:20,600
able to receive it because it's 
often very direct and just sort 

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00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:24,360
of like intake it and, and, and 
react to that and like change 

263
00:13:24,360 --> 00:13:27,560
your business so that it so that
it is a little bit more 

264
00:13:28,400 --> 00:13:30,880
aggressive. 
And so the the idea that you 

265
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have this set of fairly 
aggressive upside oriented 

266
00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:38,600
investors who very quickly 
noticed that they could, you 

267
00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:41,200
know, get liquidity faster and 
de risk their entire investment.

268
00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:44,400
In some sense that's their 
mandate and in some sense 

269
00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:46,440
they're playing with like 
pension money. 

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00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:49,560
I agree that I don't think we 
want to see more and more of 

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that in the world, but that is 
probably a regulatory framework 

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00:13:52,560 --> 00:13:53,240
problem. 
Right. 

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00:13:53,400 --> 00:13:56,880
I mean, yeah, maybe I got so 
part of this for me, it gets 

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back to exactly the beginning of
our discussion where I was 

275
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saying back in the early days of
venture capital, innovation was 

276
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was put more maybe it wasn't 
completely the only prior. 

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I think money is always the 
number one priority. 

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But I do think that innovation 
was bigger priority back in the 

279
00:14:13,480 --> 00:14:16,680
1960s, seventies and early 80s 
maybe. 

280
00:14:16,920 --> 00:14:20,160
But like by the 80s, nineties, 
you have a complete 

281
00:14:20,160 --> 00:14:24,400
transformation to like, OK, so 
money is the the only priority. 

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00:14:24,520 --> 00:14:29,440
And now we're at late game, you 
know, like not only is money the

283
00:14:29,440 --> 00:14:34,320
only priority, but like the 
fastest way possible at the 

284
00:14:34,320 --> 00:14:38,760
highest returns imaginable. 
And like, it almost feels like a

285
00:14:38,760 --> 00:14:40,360
Ponzi scheme. 
Like it doesn't. 

286
00:14:40,520 --> 00:14:44,720
In fact, this is something, this
is something our for what it's 

287
00:14:44,720 --> 00:14:47,560
worth, our discussion with Mark 
Cuban did not go well. 

288
00:14:47,560 --> 00:14:51,280
Let me say that it did not go 
the way we wanted it to. 

289
00:14:51,360 --> 00:14:55,000
However, one of the things he 
said, I asked him if it's AI was

290
00:14:55,000 --> 00:14:58,440
like, is this a Ponzi? 
Is the investments, this kind of

291
00:14:58,440 --> 00:15:02,240
thing, this venture capital, all
these seed rounds, etcetera. 

292
00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:04,320
Is this a pond? 
It sounds like a Ponzi scheme 

293
00:15:04,320 --> 00:15:07,080
and he's like it is. 
So I would take issue with that.

294
00:15:07,080 --> 00:15:10,080
I would take issue with that in 
that the portfolio should be 

295
00:15:10,080 --> 00:15:12,960
constructed in such a manner 
that it's not right. 

296
00:15:13,360 --> 00:15:17,200
So so if you're investing in 
companies and like a bunch of 

297
00:15:17,200 --> 00:15:20,040
them go to zero, there are 
things in there that are Ponzi 

298
00:15:20,040 --> 00:15:24,600
scheme like, but it should be de
risked by having a proper 

299
00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:25,920
portfolio. 
Now, when you when you think 

300
00:15:25,920 --> 00:15:28,640
about crypto, I mean, if we 
circle this back to crypto and 

301
00:15:28,640 --> 00:15:31,760
think about let's address the 
root cause of why we might not 

302
00:15:31,760 --> 00:15:33,800
want this type of structure 
around, right? 

303
00:15:33,800 --> 00:15:35,720
Like let's look back at like 
Wildcat banking. 

304
00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:38,360
And also we tried this before. 
It's not like this stuff is new.

305
00:15:39,040 --> 00:15:44,000
So, so I think the fear is not 
so much for, for me at least 

306
00:15:44,000 --> 00:15:46,880
it's not so much that people are
behaving badly, like some 

307
00:15:46,880 --> 00:15:49,840
percentage of people always 
behave badly, but it's more that

308
00:15:49,840 --> 00:15:53,840
the we're creating structures 
that seem to be unstable in a 

309
00:15:53,840 --> 00:15:55,400
way that we might not like 
later. 

310
00:15:55,600 --> 00:15:59,360
So if we take a bunch of capital
and we funnel it into a, a sort 

311
00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:02,840
of negative sum game, which I 
would argue that most crypto is,

312
00:16:02,840 --> 00:16:05,920
I think we would agree on that. 
What'll happen over time is that

313
00:16:05,920 --> 00:16:09,120
the capital coming in from these
LP's, you know, initially it'll 

314
00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:11,880
be awesome because like the, you
know, initially these, these 

315
00:16:11,880 --> 00:16:13,880
initial rounds, like you get a 
bunch of returns or whatever, 

316
00:16:14,040 --> 00:16:16,760
but eventually that stuff is 
unstable and it falls over. 

317
00:16:16,880 --> 00:16:20,720
And, and if it falls over, you 
destroy a bunch of capital in 

318
00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:23,640
that, that capital will no 
longer come from these LP's to 

319
00:16:23,640 --> 00:16:27,000
fund ongoing innovation. 
And if I were, you know, sort of

320
00:16:27,000 --> 00:16:29,800
like talking my book here as an 
entrepreneur, that's what 

321
00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:32,920
worries me about tech. 
I think tech and the venture 

322
00:16:32,920 --> 00:16:36,000
ecosystem are sort of like 
they're one unit like that 

323
00:16:36,000 --> 00:16:39,040
capital ecosystem is a is a 
thing that self sustains. 

324
00:16:39,040 --> 00:16:41,000
You get these founders who have 
an exit. 

325
00:16:41,200 --> 00:16:44,280
When I'm a second time founder, 
I've done some seed investments 

326
00:16:44,720 --> 00:16:47,560
and that capital sort of goes 
back in to fund future 

327
00:16:47,560 --> 00:16:49,640
innovation. 
But when we when we shift to a 

328
00:16:49,640 --> 00:16:53,160
psychology, we're like it. 
It's just about the gains and 

329
00:16:53,160 --> 00:16:57,800
it's very risky sort of Val 
money transfer stuff like it's 

330
00:16:57,800 --> 00:17:00,920
not really a creative overtime. 
That's super problematic because

331
00:17:00,920 --> 00:17:03,800
what will eventually happen if 
if we're right about this stuff 

332
00:17:04,079 --> 00:17:07,079
and that it it ends up being a 
negative sum game is there will 

333
00:17:07,079 --> 00:17:10,240
be this big rinse and a lot of 
that money that they could have 

334
00:17:10,240 --> 00:17:13,920
been sustainably accretive to 
the economy by investing in tech

335
00:17:13,920 --> 00:17:17,880
in super risky ventures, most of
which fail, but which we found a

336
00:17:17,880 --> 00:17:21,760
way to bundle together and make 
like a pretty good uncorrelated 

337
00:17:21,760 --> 00:17:23,400
return. 
That's beautiful. 

338
00:17:23,400 --> 00:17:26,160
Like I think venture capital is,
is beautiful done right. 

339
00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:29,120
It's just it's one of the big 
growth engines of the American 

340
00:17:29,120 --> 00:17:31,240
economy. 
I've been preparing today to 

341
00:17:31,240 --> 00:17:35,120
piss Cass off by doing a defense
of venture capital that went in 

342
00:17:35,120 --> 00:17:41,040
kind of that same direction, 
which is that most venture 

343
00:17:41,040 --> 00:17:45,280
capital investments go poorly. 
I think most venture funds 

344
00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:50,160
return sub S&P 500 with like the
few outliners carrying like the 

345
00:17:50,160 --> 00:17:53,680
bulk of that market forward. 
And like even in the funds that 

346
00:17:53,680 --> 00:17:57,080
return outsize returns, that's 
driven by like a small portion 

347
00:17:57,080 --> 00:18:01,320
of companies inside of those. 
And if you assume that having a 

348
00:18:01,320 --> 00:18:04,080
reasonable portion of new 
companies trying new things is a

349
00:18:04,080 --> 00:18:08,000
societal good, then coming up 
with a, a socially acceptable 

350
00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:13,280
way for high capital former 
entrepreneurs to gamble on which

351
00:18:13,280 --> 00:18:17,640
things might do well helps you 
get more of that type of thing 

352
00:18:17,680 --> 00:18:22,440
in the world. 
However, that that works by 

353
00:18:23,080 --> 00:18:26,440
putting capital at risk by 
having a chance of not having 

354
00:18:26,440 --> 00:18:30,240
the return. 
And some of the problem Cass and

355
00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:32,840
I've had with the cryptocurrency
investments that he was alluding

356
00:18:32,840 --> 00:18:37,880
to before, is that like by 
finding a way to exploit a group

357
00:18:37,920 --> 00:18:41,640
outside of the rich capital 
class? 

358
00:18:41,880 --> 00:18:45,960
Like if A16Z actually, let's not
say A16Z, let's say a 

359
00:18:45,960 --> 00:18:52,080
hypothetical firm in California 
is able to get a 90% discount on

360
00:18:52,080 --> 00:18:54,920
a token they know is going to go
on sale in two months or 

361
00:18:54,920 --> 00:18:57,800
whatever, and then they 
immediately dump it on retail. 

362
00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:01,400
The issue with that compared to 
like regular VC in my mind, is 

363
00:19:01,400 --> 00:19:05,320
that they're not really at risk.
The entire risk has shifted from

364
00:19:05,320 --> 00:19:09,160
the people who can bear the 
risk, the moneyed interest, to 

365
00:19:09,160 --> 00:19:11,160
the retail people buying the 
token. 

366
00:19:11,400 --> 00:19:15,160
And it's like that level of move
makes complete sense for their 

367
00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:17,720
incentives, right? 
These venture capitalists want 

368
00:19:17,720 --> 00:19:20,960
to make as much money as 
possible as quickly as possible.

369
00:19:21,120 --> 00:19:24,760
But like you're kind of talking 
about there, it corrodes 

370
00:19:24,760 --> 00:19:28,480
whatever societal role we 
believe venture capital or this 

371
00:19:28,480 --> 00:19:32,840
form of investing can play. 
That makes, it makes sense to me

372
00:19:32,840 --> 00:19:36,240
why Cass thinks that that would 
self destruct venture capital. 

373
00:19:36,680 --> 00:19:40,360
However, I I don't know that 
capitalists finding ways to make

374
00:19:40,360 --> 00:19:43,400
money for themselves quicker 
generally results in those 

375
00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:49,840
capitalists destructing. 
Yes, I guess my to react to what

376
00:19:49,840 --> 00:19:52,200
you said there, I sort of agree 
that the structure is 

377
00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:56,000
problematic and part of part of 
the reason it's problematic is, 

378
00:19:56,000 --> 00:20:00,440
is again like tech and venture 
to share a culture. 

379
00:20:01,120 --> 00:20:03,400
Like it's a it's a it's a 
unified capital ecosystem. 

380
00:20:03,400 --> 00:20:05,440
It's a unified culture. 
It's hacker culture, right. 

381
00:20:05,560 --> 00:20:07,960
And like we get in trouble for 
this stuff all the time. 

382
00:20:08,040 --> 00:20:10,440
It's just sort of, you know, 
we're like, we're like Napster 

383
00:20:10,440 --> 00:20:13,480
kids, you know, we're like. 
Making jokes about you wouldn't 

384
00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:16,200
download a car and we all laugh 
like I'd download a car if I 

385
00:20:16,200 --> 00:20:19,800
could. 
It's that there's this ethos 

386
00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:22,000
about it's a little anti 
establishment. 

387
00:20:22,000 --> 00:20:24,240
It's very like hacker culture is
still alive and well. 

388
00:20:24,240 --> 00:20:26,840
And now think about what happens
when you take hacker culture 

389
00:20:26,840 --> 00:20:30,080
into the realm of like 
investments and VC. 

390
00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:32,680
They're going to find the 
exploits, entrepreneurs or 

391
00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:34,400
people who go out and they find 
the exploits. 

392
00:20:34,400 --> 00:20:36,680
And you know, we got to like 
shore those things up. 

393
00:20:37,720 --> 00:20:40,000
And I think venture capitalists 
are going to find the exploits 

394
00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:44,840
in a in a regulatory environment
and it is in we should expect 

395
00:20:44,840 --> 00:20:48,800
them to it's almost like a, a 
function they they perform. 

396
00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:52,880
And then I think we should 
follow on and decide whether or 

397
00:20:52,880 --> 00:20:55,000
not that's something we want to 
keep doing like. 

398
00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:57,560
If you if you patch this 
exploit. 

399
00:20:58,040 --> 00:21:00,200
I think so. 
I think like this is where I'm 

400
00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:04,280
like, come on, devs and the devs
are basically people in virus 

401
00:21:04,320 --> 00:21:06,520
who don't know what the hell is 
happening. 

402
00:21:07,880 --> 00:21:11,480
And so we have a real problem 
here where the where the the the

403
00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:14,200
devs are way out of sync. 
What's happening? 

404
00:21:14,680 --> 00:21:18,480
To my mind, it's AI look at it 
and I think it's just like it's 

405
00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:21,440
a fairly simple fix. 
We just need to look at these 

406
00:21:21,440 --> 00:21:25,280
things which are like public 
markets as defined by, you know,

407
00:21:25,280 --> 00:21:28,480
public investors are able to 
invest in them without a bunch 

408
00:21:28,560 --> 00:21:31,960
of accreditation stuff and then 
regulate them like public 

409
00:21:31,960 --> 00:21:34,360
markets. 
And what we see is the is 

410
00:21:34,360 --> 00:21:36,960
already the pre emptive 
narrative pressure to say, well,

411
00:21:37,160 --> 00:21:38,800
no, it's the accreditation 
that's wrong. 

412
00:21:39,080 --> 00:21:41,240
And I and I think that is very 
toxic. 

413
00:21:41,240 --> 00:21:44,280
Like to my mind, the 
accreditation is it's pretty 

414
00:21:44,280 --> 00:21:48,160
good if you're going to invest 
in a hyper risky venture, I, I 

415
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:51,080
think you want to validate that 
the person making that decision 

416
00:21:51,120 --> 00:21:56,360
can lose that money because AVC 
fund will invest in 200 deals or

417
00:21:56,360 --> 00:21:59,000
something. 
And if you're an Angel investor 

418
00:21:59,280 --> 00:22:01,040
and you're not doing it 
professionally, you just start 

419
00:22:01,040 --> 00:22:03,240
doing it as a punt. 
I mean, I have like 3 or 4 Angel

420
00:22:03,240 --> 00:22:05,080
investments, right? 
It is not a portfolio. 

421
00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:07,320
It's not even rational. 
I fully recognize that. 

422
00:22:08,480 --> 00:22:11,720
But they're, they're sort of, 
you know, I, I, I like the 

423
00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:14,560
entrepreneur, I like the idea. 
I think you go somewhere and 

424
00:22:14,560 --> 00:22:17,080
it's like it's a level of 
capital that's acceptable. 

425
00:22:17,280 --> 00:22:20,400
So I think the attention that 
exists now is you've got this, 

426
00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:23,080
you've got tech culture, which 
is doing its thing, It's finding

427
00:22:23,080 --> 00:22:27,120
the exploits and and society 
writ large doesn't quite know 

428
00:22:27,120 --> 00:22:29,400
how to handle that. 
And we see that in a lot of 

429
00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:32,160
arenas right now. 
The only thing I'm I'm taking 

430
00:22:32,160 --> 00:22:36,640
issue with here is this goes 
back to the very beginning 

431
00:22:36,640 --> 00:22:41,480
again, or the historical 
significance of venture capital,

432
00:22:41,960 --> 00:22:45,000
where I don't think I've 
expressed this yet during this 

433
00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:47,280
podcast. 
But to me, the beauty of early 

434
00:22:47,280 --> 00:22:51,200
venture capital was that it was 
not it was not everyone fighting

435
00:22:51,200 --> 00:22:54,560
each other, which I do think is 
like, this is a huge part of 

436
00:22:54,560 --> 00:22:58,680
venture capital now where like 
I'm trying to like, yeah, you're

437
00:22:58,680 --> 00:23:01,400
not going to yeah, if you're 
investing in Samsung, you're not

438
00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:04,400
going to be investing in Apple 
at the same time. 

439
00:23:04,400 --> 00:23:07,240
Maybe you are, I don't know. 
But like the idea is you want 

440
00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:09,400
one to succeed and the other to 
fail. 

441
00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:12,160
Like it is 0 sum, if if not 
negative sum. 

442
00:23:12,880 --> 00:23:16,320
And I don't think that that was 
necessarily the case early on 

443
00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:22,440
because what you had was every, 
you had government, academia and

444
00:23:22,440 --> 00:23:25,800
private capital working together
to innovate. 

445
00:23:26,040 --> 00:23:28,880
And I like you could argue it's 
because we were at war. 

446
00:23:28,880 --> 00:23:32,160
You could argue it, it like 
whatever the reasoning is, I 

447
00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:36,760
don't know, but it to me that 
was the reason that it worked so

448
00:23:36,760 --> 00:23:40,400
well that maybe I don't, I guess
I haven't checked the data, but 

449
00:23:40,400 --> 00:23:45,880
I, I would assume that there was
probably less return and less 

450
00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:49,120
risk also. 
But also like, yeah, you had 

451
00:23:49,120 --> 00:23:52,800
people straight out of college 
at Stanford getting jobs. 

452
00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:55,640
You had them working for 
Lockheed, you had them working 

453
00:23:55,640 --> 00:23:57,800
for, you know, government 
contractors. 

454
00:23:57,800 --> 00:24:01,240
You had, but also Fairchild, you
had them working for a bunch of 

455
00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:03,520
different people. 
You had a bunch of options. 

456
00:24:03,680 --> 00:24:07,480
Everyone was is working together
and now everyone is not working 

457
00:24:07,480 --> 00:24:11,160
together and everyone is pushing
for someone else's failure. 

458
00:24:11,440 --> 00:24:15,400
And again, this is like, I don't
know how sustainable these 

459
00:24:15,640 --> 00:24:18,280
trends are. 
Well, if you think about so 

460
00:24:18,280 --> 00:24:20,480
there's this thing in software 
called Conway's Law. 

461
00:24:20,640 --> 00:24:25,000
It is this observation that a 
product, the will will begin to 

462
00:24:25,000 --> 00:24:26,800
mirror the org structure that 
created it. 

463
00:24:26,920 --> 00:24:28,960
It's fascinating stuff. 
I think there's something sort 

464
00:24:28,960 --> 00:24:32,760
of analogous here, which is that
if you you know, the good old 

465
00:24:32,760 --> 00:24:35,200
days of venture capital that 
we're being nostalgic about, 

466
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:37,760
nostalgia always has an element 
of like rose colored glasses. 

467
00:24:37,760 --> 00:24:39,440
But let's roll with it. 
You know, the venture capital we

468
00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:41,720
want where it's a little more, 
it's more a little more 

469
00:24:41,720 --> 00:24:44,720
cooperation. 
I think part of that is that if 

470
00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:48,240
you got, if you have an 
ecosystem that is pursuing huge 

471
00:24:48,360 --> 00:24:52,600
high Tam stuff, there is just 
kind of room for everybody. 

472
00:24:52,720 --> 00:24:54,320
Like what you're basically 
betting on, you're trying to 

473
00:24:54,320 --> 00:24:57,200
ride this wave of disruption. 
You know, you're about 

474
00:24:57,200 --> 00:24:59,960
disruption a lot. 
Disruption is sort of like when,

475
00:25:00,200 --> 00:25:02,880
you know, I don't know, personal
computing was great, sort of the

476
00:25:02,880 --> 00:25:05,200
cloud was is a good disruptive 
example, right? 

477
00:25:05,480 --> 00:25:07,720
So you have all of this, you 
have these legacy providers who 

478
00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:10,400
are doing software installs and 
a cloud provider comes along as 

479
00:25:10,400 --> 00:25:13,680
like, man, I can make way better
software and I can build it on 

480
00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:16,600
multi tenant architecture and I 
can get it to people, you know, 

481
00:25:16,600 --> 00:25:19,760
a day after they buy instead of 
after a month long install. 

482
00:25:20,080 --> 00:25:22,720
And so all of the people who are
creating these cloud companies, 

483
00:25:23,080 --> 00:25:26,000
they don't really feel like 
they're maybe they're 

484
00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,280
competitors in strict sense, but
there's enough room for 

485
00:25:28,280 --> 00:25:31,800
everybody to play. 
Now, if you are the the more you

486
00:25:31,800 --> 00:25:37,960
get into properly killing an an 
idea that already exists to just

487
00:25:37,960 --> 00:25:42,280
sort of replace it with 
something that that's not really

488
00:25:42,280 --> 00:25:45,360
a creative to the customer and 
doesn't really lower the overall

489
00:25:45,360 --> 00:25:47,400
unit economics. 
Tech should be deflationary, 

490
00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:48,760
right? 
We should make everything 

491
00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:50,280
cheaper. 
But the more you get into 

492
00:25:50,280 --> 00:25:54,000
something where you're doing 
this sort of is it is it, you 

493
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:57,600
know, these models like Uber or 
Lyft where it's like, is that 

494
00:25:57,600 --> 00:26:01,840
really tech or is it just sort 
of Labor regulation arbitrage? 

495
00:26:01,840 --> 00:26:04,360
I don't think we know yet. 
You know, I think those things 

496
00:26:04,360 --> 00:26:07,000
would get a little bit, they get
a little bit stranger. 

497
00:26:07,160 --> 00:26:10,800
And I think that the IT changes 
the competitive dynamic because 

498
00:26:10,800 --> 00:26:13,760
it's no longer a bunch of people
building the future, which is 

499
00:26:13,760 --> 00:26:16,960
this huge open field that we can
all go snag a piece of. 

500
00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:20,120
And now it's like, no, we 
actually have to like, you know,

501
00:26:20,360 --> 00:26:22,640
get rid of the taxi union in New
York to grow. 

502
00:26:22,640 --> 00:26:24,840
That's just like, that's a 
little weird. 

503
00:26:25,120 --> 00:26:28,280
I guess it's interesting to me 
like what you're what you're 

504
00:26:28,280 --> 00:26:31,200
talking about here because a 
friend of mine, I was talking to

505
00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:33,400
a friend of mine about this 
topic just 'cause I was trying 

506
00:26:33,400 --> 00:26:35,560
to prepare myself for this 
discussion. 

507
00:26:36,240 --> 00:26:40,240
And one of the things my friend 
said to me that gave me pause 

508
00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:46,080
was that for instance, in China,
like they want to push EVs, they

509
00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:51,400
want to have WeChat where like 
on, on WeChat, right? 

510
00:26:51,680 --> 00:26:55,120
They do everything on WeChat. 
It's every single thing is done 

511
00:26:55,160 --> 00:26:57,840
on WeChat. 
And we have nothing like that 

512
00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:01,560
here in America. 
And the way they got WeChat, 

513
00:27:01,680 --> 00:27:04,160
whether we like it or not here 
in America, like I'm not 

514
00:27:04,160 --> 00:27:06,840
suggesting we do need a WeChat. 
Maybe we don't. 

515
00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:10,800
But the reason they have that 
and the reason they have such 

516
00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:14,160
insane EV production right now 
and solar production and all 

517
00:27:14,160 --> 00:27:17,320
this stuff is because the 
government has told them this is

518
00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:19,560
what we are going to pursue. 
We're going to work with you on 

519
00:27:19,560 --> 00:27:20,680
this. 
We're going to support you on 

520
00:27:20,680 --> 00:27:22,200
it. 
We're going to subsidize it. 

521
00:27:22,440 --> 00:27:24,320
Let's do this and then they do 
it. 

522
00:27:24,360 --> 00:27:28,440
And that gave me pause because I
was like, damn, maybe that is a 

523
00:27:28,440 --> 00:27:33,480
good point in that that is more 
of what I want to see when I 

524
00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:37,200
talk about venture capital. 
Maybe it is that I do kind of 

525
00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:40,280
want to see venture capital 
sponsored companies and stuff 

526
00:27:40,840 --> 00:27:43,680
trying to land government 
contracts with the innovation 

527
00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:45,280
that they're building and 
getting support from the 

528
00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:48,280
government like they used to, 
which is things like, you know, 

529
00:27:48,280 --> 00:27:50,920
you brought up Theranos earlier.
I mean, that's a terrible 

530
00:27:50,920 --> 00:27:54,080
example because they they did 
try to get government 

531
00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:56,280
sponsorships and subsidies and 
stuff. 

532
00:27:57,120 --> 00:28:01,280
But I like, it would be great to
see the government push this 

533
00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:06,080
tech and this innovation and 
instead of fighting it. 

534
00:28:06,160 --> 00:28:08,880
But I think that they're 
fighting it for good reason. 

535
00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:12,720
Like the the there is no 
cooperation from anyone anymore,

536
00:28:12,880 --> 00:28:13,680
you know? 
Yeah. 

537
00:28:13,680 --> 00:28:19,200
I mean, you know, First off, I'd
note that people that, you know,

538
00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:21,400
there are companies out there 
that are getting large 

539
00:28:21,400 --> 00:28:24,680
government grants and they're in
the public, you know, Tesla got 

540
00:28:24,680 --> 00:28:27,440
a ton of grants. 
I think that there is there is 

541
00:28:27,440 --> 00:28:31,480
government money flowing toward 
a bunch of these initiatives. 

542
00:28:31,640 --> 00:28:33,680
There's government might flow 
into it's, you know, rooftop 

543
00:28:33,680 --> 00:28:37,680
solar. 
There is there is a fair bit of 

544
00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:41,480
that. 
What tends to the problem there 

545
00:28:41,480 --> 00:28:45,480
is that it it changes the 
competitive dynamic in that part

546
00:28:45,480 --> 00:28:48,560
of what you have to get good at 
the front, you have to get good 

547
00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:50,320
at competing on is sort of like 
politicking. 

548
00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:53,960
And so there's a there's an open
question for me about whether we

549
00:28:53,960 --> 00:28:56,640
want to to do it that way or 
not. 

550
00:28:56,680 --> 00:29:00,200
Like I'm going to I'm going to 
convert you from central 

551
00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:02,960
planning to like Adam Smith 
capitalism here in this in this 

552
00:29:03,120 --> 00:29:06,000
episode. 
I think that there are, there 

553
00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:08,480
are pros and cons that you can 
call out to each of these 

554
00:29:08,480 --> 00:29:09,640
approaches. 
At the end of the day, 

555
00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:12,760
Americans, we, we sort of seem 
to prefer that our 

556
00:29:13,040 --> 00:29:16,320
centralization comes in the form
of corporatism, which I find 

557
00:29:16,320 --> 00:29:18,200
hilarious that we don't even 
really see that. 

558
00:29:18,480 --> 00:29:19,880
You know, that can also be 
problematic. 

559
00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:23,000
You get these Titanic companies 
that like, let's take health 

560
00:29:23,000 --> 00:29:24,120
insurance. 
I love picking up health 

561
00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:25,960
insurance. 
You get these huge companies, 

562
00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:29,120
they get they, they get very 
established and then they create

563
00:29:29,120 --> 00:29:32,920
a sort of regulatory wave that 
means that the incumbents always

564
00:29:32,920 --> 00:29:35,680
win because it's just impossible
to get through those hurdles 

565
00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:39,200
when you're small. 
And to me, that is, that is how 

566
00:29:39,200 --> 00:29:43,760
we experience the downside of 
central planning equivalence, 

567
00:29:44,040 --> 00:29:46,320
right? 
Like that is sort of us not 

568
00:29:46,320 --> 00:29:48,960
doing a great job at capitalism 
in some sense. 

569
00:29:49,160 --> 00:29:52,920
And I, I generally find those 
structures to be distasteful 

570
00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:55,600
because of their downstream 
externalities. 

571
00:29:55,640 --> 00:29:58,040
But of course, I'm an American. 
I'm sort of wired to think of it

572
00:29:58,040 --> 00:30:00,040
that way. 
And so when I, when I think 

573
00:30:00,040 --> 00:30:03,800
about like, yeah, China has 
WeChat, but you know, is that 

574
00:30:03,800 --> 00:30:06,160
what I want here? 
Is that what I like? 

575
00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:08,560
Do I want the initiative to be 
driven in that way? 

576
00:30:08,960 --> 00:30:11,800
And is that better? 
Now, the downside of the way we 

577
00:30:11,800 --> 00:30:14,360
do it is that it's sort of what 
we're complaining about here. 

578
00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:17,160
Great Americans also do not like
proactive regulation. 

579
00:30:17,520 --> 00:30:19,880
We just don't like that. 
We would prefer that the 

580
00:30:19,880 --> 00:30:23,680
regulatory motion be a little 
bit more like, let the thing get

581
00:30:23,680 --> 00:30:26,840
big, let it fall over. 
And then you come by and sweep 

582
00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:29,880
up and it puts people in jail 
and, and, you know, after the 

583
00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:33,520
fact, you, you come in and you 
do a little bit of mop up so 

584
00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:35,480
that people know that we don't 
do that anymore. 

585
00:30:35,840 --> 00:30:39,320
And there is a story about why, 
because this big thing fellow I,

586
00:30:39,320 --> 00:30:43,280
I kind of favor that, frankly, 
you know, we've, we've all been 

587
00:30:43,280 --> 00:30:45,480
sort of inundated with a culture
that reinforces that. 

588
00:30:45,480 --> 00:30:49,080
Like we have these the mythology
around like precog and precogs 

589
00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:51,640
and and thought crime. 
That's very American. 

590
00:30:52,080 --> 00:30:55,040
It's woven pretty deeply into 
our understanding of how the 

591
00:30:55,040 --> 00:30:57,600
economy works. 
And it's hard for me to break 

592
00:30:57,600 --> 00:31:01,080
out of that conceptually because
I think that the, the, the 

593
00:31:01,080 --> 00:31:06,200
externalities of top down 
dictates can just be really bad 

594
00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:09,280
and make a lot of people feel a 
loss of an agency. 

595
00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:12,880
And that is I I just value that 
more I guess at the end of the 

596
00:31:12,880 --> 00:31:14,400
day. 
One thing I keep kind of 

597
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:16,520
thinking about him coming back 
to during this conversation 

598
00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:20,280
station is like you talked about
how a certain portion of venture

599
00:31:20,280 --> 00:31:25,160
capital investments are kind of 
a regulation dodge at this 

600
00:31:25,160 --> 00:31:26,680
point. 
And like we can look at 

601
00:31:26,680 --> 00:31:33,080
something like a Uber, Airbnb or
the like, or kind of classic 

602
00:31:33,080 --> 00:31:36,560
examples of certain types of 
regulation dodges billed as tech

603
00:31:36,560 --> 00:31:39,800
companies. 
And you talked about how like 

604
00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:43,120
the venture capital firms having
their own megaphones in the form

605
00:31:43,120 --> 00:31:46,880
of these media companies or 
sympathetic individuals who 

606
00:31:47,280 --> 00:31:50,440
collaborate with these venture 
capital firms to help them like 

607
00:31:50,440 --> 00:31:53,240
promote their messages and 
stuff, kind of amplify some of 

608
00:31:53,240 --> 00:31:58,000
the negative effects of the type
of person venture capital tends 

609
00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:00,120
to attract. 
And I think the other kind of 

610
00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:05,640
wrinkle that makes this even 
more complicated is the the goal

611
00:32:05,640 --> 00:32:09,160
of many venture capitalists and 
venture capital firms to also 

612
00:32:09,800 --> 00:32:12,200
influence the regulations. 
They're trying to like take 

613
00:32:12,200 --> 00:32:16,320
advantage of dodging, right is 
like that we said the dev should

614
00:32:16,320 --> 00:32:19,120
come in and patch these exploits
they're taking advantage of and 

615
00:32:19,120 --> 00:32:21,920
things like that. 
But there is a lot of the 

616
00:32:22,600 --> 00:32:25,480
capital being invested from 
these firms that make their 

617
00:32:25,480 --> 00:32:29,960
money from the dodge trying to 
ensure that those things don't 

618
00:32:30,000 --> 00:32:33,600
get patched or that they 
continue to have these 

619
00:32:33,960 --> 00:32:36,880
exploitable spaces. 
And so then when you end up with

620
00:32:36,880 --> 00:32:41,040
like the moneyed interest, like 
making the investment, promoting

621
00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:44,280
the investment through their own
megaphones and then investing so

622
00:32:44,280 --> 00:32:47,320
much of their own money, like 
both directly from the venture 

623
00:32:47,320 --> 00:32:50,600
capital firms and then having 
like their portfolio firms also 

624
00:32:51,040 --> 00:32:54,840
do lobbying as well to like 
influence the regulation of 

625
00:32:54,840 --> 00:32:57,360
those investments. 
And in those firms, I think you 

626
00:32:57,360 --> 00:33:00,600
end up in a place where like 
each of those things 

627
00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:05,280
exponentiates the potential like
power and influence of the like 

628
00:33:05,640 --> 00:33:12,600
venture capitalist and increases
the risk of deleterious societal

629
00:33:12,600 --> 00:33:17,480
consequences when the venture 
capitalists like, make mistakes,

630
00:33:17,640 --> 00:33:21,880
as they occasionally do. 
And like that dynamic is hard 

631
00:33:21,880 --> 00:33:25,680
for me to solve in my head. 
Yeah, I think, you know, for, 

632
00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:28,680
for me, I, I just sort of bite 
the bullet, which is that I 

633
00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:33,160
think regulatory capture is bad.
Like even if my industry is the 

634
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:34,880
one doing it, I just think it's 
sort of bad. 

635
00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:38,560
Like we, we should, you know, we
should not do it because what 

636
00:33:38,760 --> 00:33:42,040
happens is you, you know, First 
off it's anti capitalist. 

637
00:33:42,240 --> 00:33:45,120
Like it's just anti capitalist 
and I like capitalism. 

638
00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:48,800
I think that what you want is 
these little like the, the good 

639
00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:53,240
version of regulation would 
allow sort of little startups to

640
00:33:53,240 --> 00:33:55,520
come along and challenge stuff 
and like do things a little 

641
00:33:55,520 --> 00:33:57,720
differently, which you see in 
maybe an example of that. 

642
00:33:57,720 --> 00:34:00,440
You see it in like, you know, 
some, some labor law stuff. 

643
00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:03,120
Like nobody really looks at you 
and tell you're 50 people and 

644
00:34:03,120 --> 00:34:05,800
it's just because they don't 
want you to have to comply as a 

645
00:34:05,800 --> 00:34:09,120
small company with a bunch of 
like nickel dime regulatory 

646
00:34:09,120 --> 00:34:11,280
stuff like me. 
They're not going to hunt you to

647
00:34:11,280 --> 00:34:13,800
see whether you're allocating 
overtime properly or there's a 

648
00:34:13,800 --> 00:34:15,239
bunch of weird little stuff in 
there. 

649
00:34:15,239 --> 00:34:17,560
And then you get to 50 people. 
They're like, OK, now you're 

650
00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:19,960
like unemployed and you got to 
play by the rules. 

651
00:34:20,400 --> 00:34:21,960
I think that's a fairly healthy 
structure. 

652
00:34:22,120 --> 00:34:26,040
I think the the challenge is 
that any time in in a society, 

653
00:34:26,320 --> 00:34:30,000
you get a concentration of power
that bands together and just 

654
00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:33,520
throws its weight around. 
It doesn't really tend to work 

655
00:34:33,520 --> 00:34:35,880
for the whole. 
And this is, this is the thing 

656
00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:38,960
that Americans don't like about 
central planning in our 

657
00:34:38,960 --> 00:34:41,120
mythology. 
And I think we're, we're 

658
00:34:41,120 --> 00:34:46,400
curiously myopic about that when
it comes to the private sector. 

659
00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:49,400
I'm a huge fan of the private 
sector, but I would like to see,

660
00:34:49,560 --> 00:34:53,679
you know, dozens of little 
companies all competing, not 

661
00:34:53,679 --> 00:34:57,520
sort of this, these large 
conglomerates that band together

662
00:34:57,520 --> 00:35:00,800
and like act almost like a, a 
corporate version of a, of a 

663
00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:02,760
union. 
And, and when you take the, the 

664
00:35:02,760 --> 00:35:05,880
already powerful corporation and
then you aggregate that into a 

665
00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:08,800
ball or all of these companies 
are sort of forming this, this 

666
00:35:08,800 --> 00:35:12,520
economic phalanx. 
I'm just not sure that's good 

667
00:35:12,520 --> 00:35:15,320
for us. 
Yeah, I think that it's more, 

668
00:35:15,320 --> 00:35:18,720
it's more this it's for me, it 
starts conceptually with this 

669
00:35:18,720 --> 00:35:22,840
idea of how do we feel about 
concentration of power over 

670
00:35:22,840 --> 00:35:24,880
time. 
And I and for me, the answer 

671
00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:27,720
there is like the reason I like 
capitalism is it's sort of not 

672
00:35:27,720 --> 00:35:31,680
that it's in favor of smaller, 
you know, localism and all that.

673
00:35:31,680 --> 00:35:35,000
So that variant of capitalism 
and then the second layer is 

674
00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:38,080
like, how honest do we want to 
be about that in, in light of 

675
00:35:38,080 --> 00:35:40,600
our other values and, and how 
should we go about enforcing 

676
00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:41,640
that? 
And this is where it gets really

677
00:35:41,640 --> 00:35:44,840
challenging because the 
government is a large 

678
00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:48,200
concentration of power and it is
positioned against this 

679
00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:52,320
increasingly self aggregating 
private sector concentration. 

680
00:35:53,080 --> 00:35:55,160
And I just don't know that we 
have an answer for that as a 

681
00:35:55,160 --> 00:35:57,400
society yet. 
Personally, I, I like the idea 

682
00:35:57,400 --> 00:36:00,320
that the private sector should 
be this much more distributed 

683
00:36:00,320 --> 00:36:04,880
high agency environment. 
Like it's similar to why I mean,

684
00:36:04,880 --> 00:36:06,600
you just did a great episode on 
community banking. 

685
00:36:06,880 --> 00:36:09,640
It's similar to why I like the 
idea of having a lot of 

686
00:36:09,640 --> 00:36:12,400
community banks because you 
know, I can go down the street 

687
00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:15,480
here and, and talk to my local 
bank and they can underwrite me 

688
00:36:15,680 --> 00:36:18,240
for a house because I've lived 
through my whole life. 

689
00:36:18,480 --> 00:36:21,520
They kind of know me, They know 
the house, they know the 

690
00:36:21,520 --> 00:36:24,160
neighborhood that you're just 
never going to be able to 

691
00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:26,880
underwrite with that level of 
finesse through Zillow. 

692
00:36:27,320 --> 00:36:30,400
Yeah, I mean, I think a large 
part of what you you're talking 

693
00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:33,400
about not liking, Jen, feel free
to stop me if I'm wrong, but a 

694
00:36:33,400 --> 00:36:35,640
large part of what you're 
discussing not liking about 

695
00:36:35,640 --> 00:36:38,720
venture capital is this 
regulatory arbitrage, regulatory

696
00:36:38,720 --> 00:36:40,680
capture. 
But I would, I've been thinking 

697
00:36:40,680 --> 00:36:43,920
about regulatory capture and 
arbitrage like a lot lately. 

698
00:36:44,200 --> 00:36:47,840
And it's really interesting to 
me because obviously this does 

699
00:36:47,840 --> 00:36:51,800
not just affect tech or even 
finance for that matter, right? 

700
00:36:51,800 --> 00:36:55,160
Like, oh, sure, there's 
regulatory capture at the SEC 

701
00:36:55,160 --> 00:36:58,760
and, and, and the CFTC or 
whatever. 

702
00:36:58,760 --> 00:37:03,480
But like, let's talk about the 
FAA and the NTSB and let's, 

703
00:37:03,480 --> 00:37:07,400
let's go into all of these 
regulators who are so the CFPB, 

704
00:37:07,400 --> 00:37:12,000
like these, these regulators 
don't have or they do have a 

705
00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:15,600
concentration of power. 
They do not utilize that power 

706
00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:22,480
to help the retail consumer and 
one of the only regulators, I 

707
00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:24,080
guess I don't know. 
I don't know if this I I think 

708
00:37:24,080 --> 00:37:26,160
this is the right term. 
One of the only regulators that 

709
00:37:26,160 --> 00:37:28,880
I can think of that hasn't 
suffered from arbitrage or 

710
00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:35,600
capture, and this is not a big 
one, is like the DMV where where

711
00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:40,360
like everyone can agree that you
need rules and regulations to be

712
00:37:40,360 --> 00:37:44,760
allowed to go onto the, the road
with a, with like a two ton 

713
00:37:45,120 --> 00:37:48,680
metallic thing that's going 60 
miles an hour. 

714
00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:52,200
Like you need to be able to be 
certified for that. 

715
00:37:52,360 --> 00:37:56,240
We all agree on it and the rules
of getting your driver's 

716
00:37:56,240 --> 00:37:58,080
license. 
We all accept that. 

717
00:37:58,080 --> 00:38:00,680
And no one's trying to like 
drastically change it. 

718
00:38:00,880 --> 00:38:03,040
Nobody wants to be like, 
actually I would like to 

719
00:38:03,040 --> 00:38:05,440
privatize the DMV. 
Like nobody is talking about 

720
00:38:05,440 --> 00:38:07,800
that stuff, right? 
This is a regulator that we all 

721
00:38:07,800 --> 00:38:09,920
can agree on is doing a good 
job. 

722
00:38:10,280 --> 00:38:13,800
Why can't we do that for other 
regulators? 

723
00:38:14,160 --> 00:38:17,400
Well, we should we should get a 
little more detailed nuance here

724
00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:19,320
about what we mean by regulatory
captures. 

725
00:38:19,320 --> 00:38:23,640
So if we, if we take at face 
value by theory here that 

726
00:38:23,640 --> 00:38:26,560
Americans like regulation in 
arrears, meaning we like the 

727
00:38:26,560 --> 00:38:28,840
thing to fall over and then we, 
the regulars come in, they're 

728
00:38:28,840 --> 00:38:30,080
like, all right, and nobody do 
this. 

729
00:38:30,080 --> 00:38:34,840
Again, I don't think we want 
proactive action on the part of 

730
00:38:34,840 --> 00:38:37,240
regulators. 
And in fact, I think that is one

731
00:38:37,240 --> 00:38:40,600
of the signs that regulatory 
capture is sort of creeping in 

732
00:38:40,680 --> 00:38:43,480
is this proactive thing. 
And second, I think we want, if 

733
00:38:43,480 --> 00:38:46,040
we're going with that structure 
where things get to a certain 

734
00:38:46,040 --> 00:38:48,640
size, they fall over. 
I, I think it is when things get

735
00:38:48,640 --> 00:38:52,720
to a certain size and we don't 
let them fall over that, that we

736
00:38:52,720 --> 00:38:56,240
run into the moral hazard stuff.
So let's take it outside of tech

737
00:38:56,240 --> 00:38:59,520
again and look at, you know, 
more the mortgage crisis that 

738
00:38:59,520 --> 00:39:01,680
happened in OA. 
We're like, OK, so we've got 

739
00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:03,560
this country, we're like, oh, 
you know, everybody wants 

740
00:39:03,560 --> 00:39:05,920
affordable housing. 
Houses start to become more 

741
00:39:05,920 --> 00:39:08,240
affordable. 
And we're like, whoa, OK, we 

742
00:39:08,240 --> 00:39:11,120
don't want that. 
We don't, we want them to be 

743
00:39:11,120 --> 00:39:13,520
more affordable, like 
conceptually, but we don't want 

744
00:39:13,520 --> 00:39:15,880
them to be cheaper because 
everybody's so levered up that 

745
00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:17,360
that would actually ruin the 
mortgage industry. 

746
00:39:17,960 --> 00:39:21,040
And So what you have is you have
a bunch of you have a bunch of 

747
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:24,880
like underwriters and bankers 
who are holding this debt on 

748
00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:29,320
their books and stuff who when 
the system gets so big that it 

749
00:39:29,320 --> 00:39:33,640
starts to collapse in on itself,
approach the regulators to save 

750
00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:35,280
them. 
And they make very compelling 

751
00:39:35,280 --> 00:39:37,560
arguments, right? 
They're like, oh, well, you 

752
00:39:37,560 --> 00:39:39,480
know, the average, this is what 
will happen to the average 

753
00:39:39,480 --> 00:39:41,480
household. 
Their people are storing their 

754
00:39:41,480 --> 00:39:44,240
savings in their homes. 
And like those arguments are 

755
00:39:44,360 --> 00:39:48,560
they're good arguments, but it's
very challenging for us to both 

756
00:39:48,560 --> 00:39:52,520
have a society that does this 
regulation in arrears thing and 

757
00:39:52,520 --> 00:39:57,240
also dive in and not let these 
large incumbents fall when it's 

758
00:39:57,240 --> 00:40:00,440
time for that to happen. 
You know, like I think we we got

759
00:40:00,440 --> 00:40:03,560
to pick a path there. 
And my path is. 

760
00:40:04,120 --> 00:40:06,880
My, my preferred path is the, 
the creative destruction thing. 

761
00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:09,440
Just because I, you know, I'm 
going to commit to the bit on 

762
00:40:09,440 --> 00:40:12,160
being a capitalist here. 
I think it works pretty well. 

763
00:40:12,360 --> 00:40:14,160
And I think a lot of the 
problems that we're running into

764
00:40:14,400 --> 00:40:19,200
the people ascribe to failures 
of capitalism are, are really 

765
00:40:19,200 --> 00:40:22,560
actually more of this thing 
where we're not allowing 

766
00:40:22,560 --> 00:40:26,880
capitalism to do to, to do it's 
sort of organic motion enough. 

767
00:40:27,240 --> 00:40:29,240
I mean, it's, it's, it's amazing
to me that you'll see our 

768
00:40:29,240 --> 00:40:31,920
politicians going on to, you 
know, go on Twitter and they're 

769
00:40:31,920 --> 00:40:33,920
like, oh, we got to build more 
houses to make it more 

770
00:40:33,920 --> 00:40:35,920
affordable. 
I'm like, well, how about we 

771
00:40:35,920 --> 00:40:39,920
stop making the decision that a 
housing, housing is an 

772
00:40:39,920 --> 00:40:42,640
investment is something that 
we're going to support as a 

773
00:40:42,640 --> 00:40:44,720
society. 
Like that seems weird because 

774
00:40:44,720 --> 00:40:46,880
what that's going to do is 
attract a ton of investment 

775
00:40:46,880 --> 00:40:49,440
money in housing and run the 
price of housing out. 

776
00:40:49,640 --> 00:40:53,480
I hear I hear your criticisms 
here, but I also look at it and 

777
00:40:53,480 --> 00:40:56,200
go like, what isn't the end game
for capitalism? 

778
00:40:56,200 --> 00:40:58,520
Like essentially the 
tokenization of error, like 

779
00:40:58,520 --> 00:41:01,200
everything should be constantly 
going up in value and making 

780
00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:04,880
everyone money Isn't like like 
I, I know that's not that isn't 

781
00:41:04,880 --> 00:41:07,920
what capitalism means, but I but
I do I like, I'm just saying 

782
00:41:08,120 --> 00:41:12,640
that the the concept is to 
always like the let the free 

783
00:41:12,640 --> 00:41:14,800
market speak. 
And if you're going to let the 

784
00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:17,920
free market speak, the best 
thing you can try to do is find 

785
00:41:18,080 --> 00:41:23,920
little things to make the market
in your like advantage you. 

786
00:41:24,040 --> 00:41:29,040
Now, I I understand that you 
shouldn't be able to make the 

787
00:41:29,040 --> 00:41:33,760
market advantage you in a purely
capitalistic society, but like, 

788
00:41:34,040 --> 00:41:36,680
that is we don't live in a 
utopia. 

789
00:41:36,840 --> 00:41:39,880
You cannot have a purely 
capitalistic society and 

790
00:41:39,880 --> 00:41:42,600
therefore there are gonna be 
market inefficiencies and 

791
00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:46,400
there's gonna be like you're 
saying people want rules and 

792
00:41:46,400 --> 00:41:50,040
regulations behind them, but 
then not always. 

793
00:41:50,080 --> 00:41:54,640
And like we, we see a Ponzi 
scheme and like you don't want 

794
00:41:54,640 --> 00:41:57,640
the proliferation of Ponzi 
schemes and the free market to 

795
00:41:57,640 --> 00:42:01,320
decide which Ponzi scheme gets 
to live or die like we we don't 

796
00:42:01,320 --> 00:42:02,760
want. 
Ponzi, I think I'm going to I'm 

797
00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:05,080
going to come off very pedantic 
in this whole thing, but 

798
00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:07,960
whatever, it's kind of no. 
So let's let's talk about the 

799
00:42:07,960 --> 00:42:11,320
free market thing for a second. 
There is this sort of toxic 

800
00:42:11,320 --> 00:42:14,280
hyper libertarian variant of 
that, which is basically, I 

801
00:42:14,280 --> 00:42:16,480
think just the Hobbesian state 
of nature, right? 

802
00:42:16,480 --> 00:42:20,800
Like, I don't know, whatever. 
So I, I think we, I think we 

803
00:42:20,840 --> 00:42:24,880
have to reject that and say that
what is the market? 

804
00:42:24,880 --> 00:42:28,120
What is the free market? 
The free market is the economic 

805
00:42:28,120 --> 00:42:32,240
activity that happens within the
boundaries of the rule of law 

806
00:42:32,240 --> 00:42:34,480
that we have constructed and 
continue to evolve. 

807
00:42:34,720 --> 00:42:38,320
And I'm a believer in that. 
I'm a believer in the rule of 

808
00:42:38,320 --> 00:42:40,000
law and the boundaries that we 
have set forth. 

809
00:42:40,000 --> 00:42:43,000
The free market is the, is the 
action of all those little 

810
00:42:43,000 --> 00:42:45,720
agents within that system, 
within that game that we've set 

811
00:42:45,720 --> 00:42:47,280
up, which has well defined 
rules. 

812
00:42:47,360 --> 00:42:50,800
And we, we largely want them 
within those defined rules that 

813
00:42:50,800 --> 00:42:53,600
are defined in advance, right? 
We have the laws written and all

814
00:42:53,600 --> 00:42:55,600
that stuff. 
We want them to be able to move 

815
00:42:55,600 --> 00:42:57,240
very freely. 
Now, occasionally what will 

816
00:42:57,240 --> 00:43:01,360
happen is someone will find a 
hole in the game like, you know,

817
00:43:01,640 --> 00:43:03,640
like you're playing, like 
imagine you're playing Monopoly 

818
00:43:03,640 --> 00:43:06,240
and somebody finds like an 
infinite money glitch within the

819
00:43:06,240 --> 00:43:08,040
rules. 
And, and what do you do? 

820
00:43:08,040 --> 00:43:11,040
You're like, OK, well, we can 
either stop playing this game 

821
00:43:11,040 --> 00:43:13,800
because it's not fun when people
play like that, it's super lame,

822
00:43:13,920 --> 00:43:17,360
or we can just like patch the 
rules and we, we end up patching

823
00:43:17,360 --> 00:43:18,920
the rules a lot. 
That's basically what the 

824
00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:23,000
justice system does. 
So I think the, I, I think the, 

825
00:43:23,440 --> 00:43:26,480
the, the challenge around these 
conversations about like free 

826
00:43:26,480 --> 00:43:28,960
market absolutism. 
Free market absolutism would 

827
00:43:28,960 --> 00:43:32,840
say, well, that infinite money 
glitch was part of the rules 

828
00:43:32,840 --> 00:43:36,600
when I started playing. 
And so therefore, I don't think 

829
00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:39,360
I should get in trouble for it. 
And you see this, this is trying

830
00:43:39,360 --> 00:43:41,360
to back into crypto. 
You see this a lot in crypto, 

831
00:43:42,040 --> 00:43:43,920
right? 
Like code is law and all this 

832
00:43:43,920 --> 00:43:45,800
other stuff. 
I was sort of following the 

833
00:43:45,800 --> 00:43:48,600
constraints of the system. 
And it's like, yeah, that's 

834
00:43:48,600 --> 00:43:52,640
fine. 
But one of the overlays on the 

835
00:43:52,640 --> 00:43:57,160
system as defined rigidly by law
is also don't hurt people. 

836
00:43:57,360 --> 00:43:59,720
And like, you should kind of 
know that too. 

837
00:43:59,920 --> 00:44:02,520
And there is a level at which 
you can be held accountable for 

838
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:06,200
knowingly hurting people. 
And then we, we come back and 

839
00:44:06,520 --> 00:44:10,320
we, we define the rules of, of 
the game after people get hurt 

840
00:44:10,600 --> 00:44:12,920
such that that's a little bit 
more explicit, just as a 

841
00:44:12,920 --> 00:44:15,880
courtesy to our future selves 
and for posterity. 

842
00:44:16,080 --> 00:44:19,920
And for me, that is when you 
read Adam Smith, like he talks 

843
00:44:19,920 --> 00:44:22,120
about some of this stuff like 
that is the free market. 

844
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:24,520
The founding fathers had this 
idea about, you know, an 

845
00:44:24,520 --> 00:44:27,640
evolving structure of, of how 
society works. 

846
00:44:27,640 --> 00:44:30,960
It wasn't this this sort of, you
know, they sat down at the IT 

847
00:44:31,440 --> 00:44:33,880
was at the Green Dragon. 
What was the name of the tag you

848
00:44:33,880 --> 00:44:36,560
guys from the name of the Tavern
anyway, there's some Tavern. 

849
00:44:36,560 --> 00:44:39,080
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. 
They sit down and like we solved

850
00:44:39,080 --> 00:44:42,760
it, you know, after 8 pints or 
whatever, they're all in their 

851
00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:44,040
20s. 
They're like, we did it. 

852
00:44:44,040 --> 00:44:47,240
We created the perfect society. 
They have the self-awareness to 

853
00:44:47,240 --> 00:44:50,280
literally not do that and talk 
about other not doing that. 

854
00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:53,840
And and so I think we just sort 
of have to reject the rhetoric 

855
00:44:53,920 --> 00:44:57,120
of, of, of the free market 
absolutists who, who will say 

856
00:44:57,120 --> 00:45:00,160
things like we should let the 
free market to its then and, and

857
00:45:00,160 --> 00:45:02,480
be like, that's not the free 
market is man, like the free 

858
00:45:02,480 --> 00:45:06,440
market is. 
It's a set of rules that we have

859
00:45:06,440 --> 00:45:10,640
defined to the best of our 
ability to create a society that

860
00:45:11,000 --> 00:45:13,840
incentivizes people to like, you
know, innovate and all this 

861
00:45:13,840 --> 00:45:16,080
other stuff. 
And occasionally people will 

862
00:45:16,080 --> 00:45:17,640
figure out a way to break those 
rules. 

863
00:45:17,680 --> 00:45:20,160
And then we got to patch it. 
And that is also part of the 

864
00:45:20,160 --> 00:45:23,240
free market. 
So having said all that, Travis,

865
00:45:23,240 --> 00:45:27,880
why do you think that most of 
the public venture capitalists 

866
00:45:27,880 --> 00:45:31,520
that we end up hearing from are 
such reprehensible people? 

867
00:45:33,960 --> 00:45:36,640
So first of all, I don't, I just
think, I just think there's a 

868
00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:40,160
lot of loud voices out there 
that are, they're sort of 

869
00:45:40,160 --> 00:45:45,320
advocating ideas that are not in
keeping with that, that more 

870
00:45:45,320 --> 00:45:49,160
nuanced free market is like, you
know, I read Peter Thiel 0 to 

871
00:45:49,160 --> 00:45:51,240
one. 
It's a, it's an interesting 

872
00:45:51,240 --> 00:45:52,960
take. 
Like there's some value to be 

873
00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:55,320
derived from it, especially if 
you're in business. 

874
00:45:55,360 --> 00:45:59,160
I think ultimately I, I reject 
the idea that monopolies are the

875
00:45:59,160 --> 00:46:01,320
goal for reasons we've already 
talked about. 

876
00:46:01,640 --> 00:46:04,600
And I sort of reject that entire
line of thinking like what I 

877
00:46:04,600 --> 00:46:07,400
want is to be, I think they're 
the right way to approach 

878
00:46:07,400 --> 00:46:11,520
ventures like be fast and be 
first and have that define your 

879
00:46:11,520 --> 00:46:14,240
destiny to just sort of like a 
constant competition. 

880
00:46:14,240 --> 00:46:16,560
If you want to be on market 
first, you want to have a six 

881
00:46:16,560 --> 00:46:18,800
month lead on your fast 
followers and you just want to 

882
00:46:18,800 --> 00:46:21,720
push, push, push. 
And that speed is what the 

883
00:46:21,720 --> 00:46:23,600
money's for when people invest 
in you. 

884
00:46:23,840 --> 00:46:28,160
It's not to like ladder pull and
try to like snipe people who are

885
00:46:28,160 --> 00:46:30,120
coming, who are nipping at your 
heels and just like don't 

886
00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:32,760
believe in any of that. 
And so when I, when I hear 

887
00:46:33,120 --> 00:46:35,640
people advocating for those 
types of beliefs, as you're well

888
00:46:35,640 --> 00:46:39,280
aware on Twitter and more 
recently on threads, I just kind

889
00:46:39,280 --> 00:46:42,600
of they got to speak out and say
like, that's not, that's not the

890
00:46:42,600 --> 00:46:44,560
fine. 
That's not the society we want. 

891
00:46:44,760 --> 00:46:47,760
I think there are RVCS that do a
good job of that, You know, I 

892
00:46:48,200 --> 00:46:51,080
mean, you know, Logan Bartlett 
did a great job. 

893
00:46:51,080 --> 00:46:53,520
He saw the crypto stuff coming. 
He's like, yeah, I don't really 

894
00:46:53,520 --> 00:46:55,160
know. 
He's like discussing stuff on 

895
00:46:55,160 --> 00:46:57,360
the merits. 
My direct experience with a lot 

896
00:46:57,360 --> 00:46:59,280
of VCs is a little more early 
stage. 

897
00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:03,200
So it's not these Titans who are
running a $5 billion fund as 

898
00:47:03,200 --> 00:47:07,480
much as it is the the like up 
close and personal VCs who are 

899
00:47:07,480 --> 00:47:09,680
doing like seed investing in 
Series A series. 

900
00:47:10,320 --> 00:47:13,640
Like, I know that there was, it 
was mostly a joke what Bennett 

901
00:47:13,640 --> 00:47:17,440
was saying, but I do want to, I 
do want to actually say that. 

902
00:47:17,440 --> 00:47:20,480
Like I hear, I hear your, I hear
your response to that, Travis. 

903
00:47:20,480 --> 00:47:23,080
And I'm like, that makes sense. 
Of course, Like there's 

904
00:47:23,400 --> 00:47:27,480
thousands of venture capitalists
like we're we're talking about. 

905
00:47:27,720 --> 00:47:30,600
At least. 
At there's there's thousands for

906
00:47:30,600 --> 00:47:33,360
sure, like across the globe, 
there are thousands and 

907
00:47:33,360 --> 00:47:35,640
thousands of of venture 
capitalists, no doubt about it. 

908
00:47:35,640 --> 00:47:39,520
But like the idea, I think 
there's validity to what Bennett

909
00:47:39,520 --> 00:47:41,960
is saying. 
Like the loudest ones are the 

910
00:47:41,960 --> 00:47:44,960
biggest, worst motherfuckers 
ever. 

911
00:47:45,200 --> 00:47:47,760
All all of them. 
You know, like almost all of 

912
00:47:47,760 --> 00:47:53,480
them, the ones who were hyper, 
hyper loud, the all in crew A16Z

913
00:47:53,480 --> 00:47:56,600
folks and their partners. 
And like those are the ones who 

914
00:47:56,600 --> 00:47:58,200
were front facing venture 
capital. 

915
00:47:58,240 --> 00:48:01,880
They're the ones who were 
defining how venture capital is 

916
00:48:01,880 --> 00:48:05,960
perceived publicly by the 
regulators, by Congress, who 

917
00:48:05,960 --> 00:48:07,800
you're talking about. 
Like we don't want these people 

918
00:48:07,800 --> 00:48:10,400
deciding like they're 85. 
They shouldn't be talking about 

919
00:48:10,400 --> 00:48:11,480
tech. 
They don't know what the fuck 

920
00:48:11,480 --> 00:48:12,840
they're talking about. 
I agree. 

921
00:48:12,840 --> 00:48:17,760
And yet, like when you have the 
worst people causing like bank 

922
00:48:17,760 --> 00:48:20,640
runs and shit, like, how do you 
counter that? 

923
00:48:20,640 --> 00:48:23,840
You know, like, how do you 
change the public perception of 

924
00:48:23,840 --> 00:48:26,800
what venture capital is? 
And and you know, like that is 

925
00:48:26,800 --> 00:48:30,880
why, that's why I have such 
animus for venture capital. 

926
00:48:30,880 --> 00:48:33,760
It is because of those guys. 
Well, it's because, see, you're 

927
00:48:33,760 --> 00:48:36,560
a capitalist, you're against the
concentration of power and it's 

928
00:48:36,960 --> 00:48:41,760
deleterious side effects. 
I, I really do like to me, I, I 

929
00:48:41,760 --> 00:48:45,480
try to fit this stuff into some,
you know, some way I can think 

930
00:48:45,480 --> 00:48:49,160
about things that is coherent 
across the chaos that is 

931
00:48:49,160 --> 00:48:53,520
happening in society. 
And I think it's just, you know,

932
00:48:53,800 --> 00:48:57,520
American culture at least tends 
to be happier when there's like 

933
00:48:57,760 --> 00:48:59,400
more opportunity. 
We like that. 

934
00:48:59,480 --> 00:49:03,680
And the more you get these, 
these entrenched power bases, 

935
00:49:03,760 --> 00:49:07,800
the more challenging it is for 
us to find those little pockets.

936
00:49:07,800 --> 00:49:09,400
I don't, I don't think it's 
limited to venture. 

937
00:49:09,400 --> 00:49:12,400
I think your critiques are, I 
think your critiques are fair. 

938
00:49:12,640 --> 00:49:15,760
I mean, I'm, I'm here to sort of
advocate for the, the venture 

939
00:49:15,760 --> 00:49:18,560
capitals that I've met who are 
like not doing that, who are 

940
00:49:18,560 --> 00:49:20,600
still funding our industry and 
funding innovation. 

941
00:49:20,600 --> 00:49:24,240
And I'm like an astonish ally of
theirs, despite being brought up

942
00:49:24,240 --> 00:49:26,120
by my father to never trust a 
banker. 

943
00:49:27,320 --> 00:49:31,000
Working, working with good 
venture has sort of brought me 

944
00:49:31,000 --> 00:49:32,240
around on that. 
Like I think there are 

945
00:49:32,240 --> 00:49:35,840
financiers out there that help 
help run everything, help run 

946
00:49:35,840 --> 00:49:39,080
my, you know, my life wouldn't 
be the same because you have to 

947
00:49:39,080 --> 00:49:41,640
fund these start-ups. 
Every software service is this 

948
00:49:41,640 --> 00:49:44,520
like capital hole that you then 
have to like climb out of. 

949
00:49:44,720 --> 00:49:47,440
We just wouldn't have the cool 
stuff we have without venture 

950
00:49:47,840 --> 00:49:51,280
without the venture model. 
Now, I think in addition to 

951
00:49:51,280 --> 00:49:55,440
that, we need to look at a bunch
of stuff like politics, term 

952
00:49:55,440 --> 00:49:57,080
limits. 
It's people who just get into a 

953
00:49:57,080 --> 00:50:00,120
chair and sit there until 
they're sit there for 50 years 

954
00:50:00,120 --> 00:50:02,120
right in legislation. 
You know, I'm like, I don't know

955
00:50:02,120 --> 00:50:04,760
about that, that maybe we should
mix it up a little more. 

956
00:50:05,040 --> 00:50:07,280
And you know, one of the things 
that's really fascinating on the

957
00:50:07,280 --> 00:50:10,000
on the venture front is the more
there's been a bunch of studies 

958
00:50:10,000 --> 00:50:14,480
around sizing of funds. 
Venture is healthier for itself 

959
00:50:14,760 --> 00:50:17,720
when you stay within a certain 
fun band that is like sub a bit.

960
00:50:18,760 --> 00:50:21,360
So when you raise a fund that 
is, I mean, I haven't looked at 

961
00:50:21,360 --> 00:50:23,200
the numbers in a few years, so I
don't want to throw something 

962
00:50:23,200 --> 00:50:25,160
out there. 
But when you the the optimal 

963
00:50:25,160 --> 00:50:27,440
venture fund is actually 
smaller, call it half a billion 

964
00:50:27,440 --> 00:50:30,240
or something, and then you go 
allocate that stuff, those funds

965
00:50:30,240 --> 00:50:34,760
outperform by a lot. 
And so I think that the, the, 

966
00:50:34,920 --> 00:50:37,200
the way to counter this is a 
combination of just like 

967
00:50:37,480 --> 00:50:40,760
bringing awareness, the fact 
that these monster funds, their 

968
00:50:40,760 --> 00:50:42,960
incentives change so that 
they're more about the care, the

969
00:50:42,960 --> 00:50:45,440
2% carry they get than the 20% 
upside. 

970
00:50:45,480 --> 00:50:47,960
And that's a little weird. 
And like maybe as an LP, you 

971
00:50:47,960 --> 00:50:50,720
should think about not putting 
your money in that and instead 

972
00:50:50,960 --> 00:50:53,240
spreading it around to a bunch 
of smaller funds. 

973
00:50:53,440 --> 00:50:55,920
And I think that the, the cure 
for a lot of the stuff we're 

974
00:50:55,920 --> 00:51:00,360
facing is this return to like 
the original idea of behind 

975
00:51:00,360 --> 00:51:02,320
localism. 
The original idea behind 

976
00:51:02,320 --> 00:51:05,800
localism is not like going out 
of that shop over there and buy 

977
00:51:05,800 --> 00:51:07,880
their food and they're getting 
it all from Cisco. 

978
00:51:08,080 --> 00:51:10,640
You know, like the hope is that 
they're also buying locally. 

979
00:51:10,800 --> 00:51:13,680
And what you really want to do 
is spread the economic activity 

980
00:51:13,800 --> 00:51:16,040
across the country so that it's 
more robust. 

981
00:51:16,480 --> 00:51:18,480
And I think you also want to do 
that in venture. 

982
00:51:18,640 --> 00:51:24,040
I think what you want to see is 
LP's allocating to these smaller

983
00:51:24,040 --> 00:51:27,360
funds that are more profitable, 
that don't have an incentive to 

984
00:51:27,360 --> 00:51:29,760
go build it. 
Monster megaphones so they can 

985
00:51:29,760 --> 00:51:33,360
just cream 2% off of, you know, 
multi billion dollar funds and 

986
00:51:33,360 --> 00:51:34,920
stuff. 
To me that's the solution. 

987
00:51:35,040 --> 00:51:38,040
It's so funny because again, 
that goes right back to this 

988
00:51:38,040 --> 00:51:40,600
where it's like I know I'm 
essentially taking the, I don't 

989
00:51:40,600 --> 00:51:43,440
know, anti capitalist stance or 
something like I am not, I am 

990
00:51:43,440 --> 00:51:46,440
not anti capitalist. 
I don't like I don't I as much 

991
00:51:46,440 --> 00:51:49,760
as I I have animus for the 
loudest venture capitalists. 

992
00:51:49,840 --> 00:51:51,560
I don't hate the idea of venture
capital. 

993
00:51:51,560 --> 00:51:55,240
And when I go back to the early 
parts of venture capital, it it 

994
00:51:55,240 --> 00:51:56,600
is local. 
It's localism. 

995
00:51:56,600 --> 00:51:57,960
It's what you're talking about, 
right? 

996
00:51:58,560 --> 00:52:03,080
Like you're, we're, we have 
Fairchild Semiconductors in 

997
00:52:03,080 --> 00:52:06,800
Mountain View, CA, working with 
students at Stanford and 

998
00:52:06,800 --> 00:52:12,080
Berkeley who are getting 
general, like general contracts,

999
00:52:12,240 --> 00:52:15,520
like getting contracts from the 
government through Lockheed 

1000
00:52:15,520 --> 00:52:18,040
Martin or whoever, right. 
And academia is working with 

1001
00:52:18,080 --> 00:52:20,680
private CAB. 
They're all working together to 

1002
00:52:20,680 --> 00:52:23,920
do something. 
And that is, that is localism. 

1003
00:52:23,920 --> 00:52:26,200
That is like they're all 
building something Better 

1004
00:52:26,200 --> 00:52:28,040
Together. 
And they're. 

1005
00:52:28,080 --> 00:52:30,520
Yeah, they're keeping it in 
their in their club, so to 

1006
00:52:30,520 --> 00:52:32,440
speak. 
But the club is large and it 

1007
00:52:32,440 --> 00:52:36,880
gives us things like DARPA and 
ARPA and the Internet, and 

1008
00:52:37,280 --> 00:52:41,080
that's what I like. 
I don't know, you know, again, 

1009
00:52:41,080 --> 00:52:44,600
going back to what you're 
saying, is Lyft and Uber a huge 

1010
00:52:44,600 --> 00:52:47,720
leap in innovation like DARPA 
and ARPA? 

1011
00:52:47,880 --> 00:52:52,880
Like, no, it isn't Like, I think
it's easy to say no to that. 

1012
00:52:53,200 --> 00:52:56,000
And if that's most of the 
innovation, sorry, go ahead, 

1013
00:52:56,040 --> 00:52:57,680
Bennett. 
I I just want to interject 

1014
00:52:57,680 --> 00:53:00,120
though, and cast and go like, 
and how much of that would like,

1015
00:53:01,200 --> 00:53:03,800
which direction is the arrow of 
causation running here, right? 

1016
00:53:03,800 --> 00:53:06,680
Because didn't like the 
Department of Defense initially 

1017
00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:11,720
creating DARPA kind of create 
the like set of contracts that 

1018
00:53:11,720 --> 00:53:15,320
the initial group of kind of the
Bunker Hill companies were 

1019
00:53:15,320 --> 00:53:16,960
competing for and stuff like 
that. 

1020
00:53:17,280 --> 00:53:20,920
And so like, it was like the 
direction wasn't like venture 

1021
00:53:20,920 --> 00:53:24,080
capital funded these things. 
These things then created DARPA,

1022
00:53:24,080 --> 00:53:28,080
which and then the Internet. 
It was that the DARPA project 

1023
00:53:28,080 --> 00:53:31,200
was created, which set up these 
contracts, which then companies 

1024
00:53:31,200 --> 00:53:33,800
wanted to compete for, for 
companies to compete for those 

1025
00:53:34,000 --> 00:53:36,760
they needed funding to get like 
projects off the ground. 

1026
00:53:36,760 --> 00:53:40,120
Things started things like that.
And so like the arrow there went

1027
00:53:40,120 --> 00:53:44,040
from like the the Department of 
Defense creating this government

1028
00:53:44,040 --> 00:53:47,720
contracting project, basically 
this collection of kind of 

1029
00:53:47,720 --> 00:53:51,400
ambiguous and large dollar 
amount government contracts is 

1030
00:53:51,400 --> 00:53:55,200
essentially kind of what it was 
led to then the rest of the 

1031
00:53:55,200 --> 00:53:58,120
stuff coming afterwards. 
I mean, I think I and I, I think

1032
00:53:58,120 --> 00:54:01,040
that's like, I do think that's 
not as uncommon as we might 

1033
00:54:01,040 --> 00:54:04,880
think it is, right? 
Like I do think here's a simple 

1034
00:54:04,880 --> 00:54:08,920
one that it doesn't have the 
same large scale effects that 

1035
00:54:08,920 --> 00:54:12,560
the Internet does. 
But like drones, obviously that 

1036
00:54:12,560 --> 00:54:15,440
was a military contract from the
very beginning, but now that has

1037
00:54:15,440 --> 00:54:18,880
been utilized by people to do 
all kinds of things. 

1038
00:54:18,880 --> 00:54:21,480
And some of it is great. 
Some of it is like, oh, you can 

1039
00:54:21,680 --> 00:54:24,920
scan the land and figure out 
like the proper place to put 

1040
00:54:24,920 --> 00:54:28,760
certain things or like there is 
actual great use cases for 

1041
00:54:28,760 --> 00:54:33,200
something like drones. 
Also, they're murdering people. 

1042
00:54:33,200 --> 00:54:35,880
So like, I like it's, you know, 
I, I get it. 

1043
00:54:36,000 --> 00:54:38,800
I guess that's kind of my worry.
I worry that if you set that up 

1044
00:54:38,800 --> 00:54:43,200
as like the desirable version of
venture capital, then the thing 

1045
00:54:43,200 --> 00:54:46,760
meant to inherit it is Andrell 
and Palantir, right? 

1046
00:54:47,080 --> 00:54:49,800
Is like the modern Silicon 
Valley funded companies which 

1047
00:54:49,800 --> 00:54:53,040
are competing for government 
contracts from the Department of

1048
00:54:53,040 --> 00:54:55,840
Defense, right? 
Yeah, I think that, you know, my

1049
00:54:55,920 --> 00:54:59,520
my with this topic and a lot of 
times they just circle back to 

1050
00:54:59,520 --> 00:55:03,760
this idea that what we what we 
want is a less incumbent centric

1051
00:55:03,760 --> 00:55:06,200
economy. 
Like that's the fix. 

1052
00:55:06,520 --> 00:55:10,720
The fix is not so much just to 
to, you know, steer away from 

1053
00:55:10,720 --> 00:55:11,960
capitalism. 
Like I actually just think 

1054
00:55:11,960 --> 00:55:14,760
that's absurd and, you know, 
continue to fight anybody on the

1055
00:55:14,760 --> 00:55:19,280
Internet who suggests, but I, I 
and I and I don't know that we 

1056
00:55:19,320 --> 00:55:22,960
and I don't know that we want to
even put this albatross around 

1057
00:55:22,960 --> 00:55:26,520
ventures neck, but we'd still 
want to call out the the sort of

1058
00:55:26,520 --> 00:55:30,760
like pro pro oligarch, 
whatever's these like neo 

1059
00:55:30,760 --> 00:55:33,000
oligarchs who just think like 
it's like, you know, let's take 

1060
00:55:33,000 --> 00:55:35,000
all the power. 
I think that it's important to 

1061
00:55:35,000 --> 00:55:37,320
push back again as soon as a 
societal duty there. 

1062
00:55:38,480 --> 00:55:41,080
And and I think part of this 
ties back into another one by, 

1063
00:55:41,320 --> 00:55:44,560
you know, pet topics. 
It's just sort of like the way 

1064
00:55:44,560 --> 00:55:49,360
that we conduct everything from 
monetary policy to to to 

1065
00:55:49,360 --> 00:55:52,280
legislation, like it just needs 
to be a little less incumbent 

1066
00:55:52,280 --> 00:55:54,080
centric. 
And what that means is we have 

1067
00:55:54,080 --> 00:55:56,280
to be OK with incumbents taking 
losses. 

1068
00:55:56,520 --> 00:55:59,560
But I do wanna push back on that
just I guess on 2 levels. 

1069
00:55:59,560 --> 00:56:04,840
So one, I know I personally am 
all for having term limits and 

1070
00:56:04,840 --> 00:56:08,560
stuff like that, but when it 
comes to people who are pro free

1071
00:56:08,560 --> 00:56:13,160
market, they say why would you 
take away someone's ability to 

1072
00:56:13,160 --> 00:56:15,760
vote for whoever they want? 
Like if I want to vote for the 

1073
00:56:15,760 --> 00:56:20,440
same guy to be senator for 2 1/2
decades, that is my right. 

1074
00:56:20,440 --> 00:56:22,400
That's my God-given right or 
whatever. 

1075
00:56:23,440 --> 00:56:26,440
So I want to put that out there.
But I also want to say this, 

1076
00:56:26,720 --> 00:56:31,400
that when it comes to business 
or finance or whatever, I don't 

1077
00:56:31,400 --> 00:56:34,480
actually have a huge issue with 
the concept of incumbency, 

1078
00:56:34,480 --> 00:56:37,240
right? 
Like the best example I can do 

1079
00:56:37,240 --> 00:56:39,320
for this is actually a 
restaurant. 

1080
00:56:39,560 --> 00:56:43,600
Because for me, I, when I worked
in restaurants, what I hated 

1081
00:56:43,600 --> 00:56:46,680
about it was I, I would go to 
these small restaurants that 

1082
00:56:46,680 --> 00:56:49,200
were well known or popular 
bakeries and they would be 

1083
00:56:49,200 --> 00:56:52,520
starting out, they'd be in their
first year or two or three of, 

1084
00:56:52,680 --> 00:56:54,920
of getting going. 
And they're like, we got to 

1085
00:56:54,920 --> 00:56:55,520
grow. 
We got to grow. 

1086
00:56:55,520 --> 00:56:57,680
We got to open up a second, 
third, fourth restaurant. 

1087
00:56:57,680 --> 00:57:01,800
And I'm like, why stop? 
Stop, You're already making 

1088
00:57:01,800 --> 00:57:03,400
money. 
You have enough employees. 

1089
00:57:03,600 --> 00:57:07,200
Stop, you're good. 
And in places like Paris or 

1090
00:57:07,200 --> 00:57:10,520
Oslo, when I went and visited 
them years ago, you have one 

1091
00:57:11,040 --> 00:57:16,200
patisserie or you know, bakery 
that's been around for 350 

1092
00:57:16,200 --> 00:57:18,440
years. 
There aren't 12 of them. 

1093
00:57:18,600 --> 00:57:22,480
There's one and that is like, I 
am fine with that. 

1094
00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:24,320
That's great. 
You have culture, you have 

1095
00:57:24,320 --> 00:57:27,480
history, you have one bakery 
that's had all this time there, 

1096
00:57:27,840 --> 00:57:31,320
fine. 
But I don't want one Amazon for 

1097
00:57:31,320 --> 00:57:33,240
150 years. 
You know that. 

1098
00:57:33,240 --> 00:57:38,120
That is where incumbency gets to
be when it gets into oligarchy 

1099
00:57:38,120 --> 00:57:40,960
is the problem. 
It's not incumbency itself that 

1100
00:57:40,960 --> 00:57:42,480
is the issue, I guess is what 
I'm saying. 

1101
00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:45,360
It's incumbency around power, 
you know, and they can always 

1102
00:57:45,360 --> 00:57:46,680
play us into that. 
Yeah. 

1103
00:57:46,680 --> 00:57:50,360
I mean, in, in an ideal world, 
we we run a society where like, 

1104
00:57:50,680 --> 00:57:54,120
we try a lot of different stuff.
And, and then over time and like

1105
00:57:54,120 --> 00:57:57,520
you're only going to, you know, 
people only have so many ideas. 

1106
00:57:57,640 --> 00:58:00,760
Like people get into their like 
30s and 40s, they get kind of 

1107
00:58:00,760 --> 00:58:03,560
typecast. 
So and then we've got, you know,

1108
00:58:03,600 --> 00:58:05,800
and then we just let them sit in
that chair until the end of 

1109
00:58:05,800 --> 00:58:07,440
time. 
Like we know we're going to get 

1110
00:58:07,440 --> 00:58:09,760
out of them. 
And so, you know, this, this 

1111
00:58:09,760 --> 00:58:11,840
idea of I have a right to vote 
for who I want. 

1112
00:58:12,120 --> 00:58:14,920
I'm not even sure that that is I
mean, to me, it's, it's almost a

1113
00:58:14,920 --> 00:58:18,120
pure straw man when people say 
stuff like that because, you 

1114
00:58:18,120 --> 00:58:21,320
know, you look at the the 
presidential candidates we've 

1115
00:58:21,320 --> 00:58:23,800
got now and like, how did those 
get to be the candidates? 

1116
00:58:24,000 --> 00:58:26,040
Like what? 
Like I'll tell you, I'll tell 

1117
00:58:26,040 --> 00:58:30,040
you who I want running stuff is,
you know, it's not them. 

1118
00:58:30,760 --> 00:58:33,560
Like let's just get some, let's 
just, let's get somebody in 

1119
00:58:33,560 --> 00:58:36,960
there who's like fresh, but it 
just has some fresh ideas. 

1120
00:58:37,200 --> 00:58:39,840
Let's put up to like, I, I just 
think it's a myth, this idea 

1121
00:58:39,840 --> 00:58:42,720
that we get to select whoever we
want. 

1122
00:58:42,840 --> 00:58:45,120
So stuff like that, I think we 
just reject it. 

1123
00:58:45,120 --> 00:58:48,640
Part of my issue with even like 
the presidential, like the two 

1124
00:58:48,640 --> 00:58:51,720
party system is a problem for me
just 'cause I'm like, it's 

1125
00:58:51,720 --> 00:58:57,000
almost, it's like a fallacy 
that's been concocted against 

1126
00:58:57,000 --> 00:59:01,960
ourselves that we are convinced 
is absolute, even though very 

1127
00:59:01,960 --> 00:59:04,960
explicitly you can always vote 
for whoever you want actually, 

1128
00:59:05,080 --> 00:59:06,160
right? 
You always can. 

1129
00:59:06,160 --> 00:59:09,800
You always can. 
Like anyone over the age of 35, 

1130
00:59:09,800 --> 00:59:12,960
you can vote for them to be 
president technically, right. 

1131
00:59:13,040 --> 00:59:16,760
But like we've decided that that
means there's two people that 

1132
00:59:16,760 --> 00:59:18,920
you can vote for. 
Well, three you can vote or the 

1133
00:59:18,920 --> 00:59:20,760
brain worm. 
You can vote for a brain worm or

1134
00:59:20,760 --> 00:59:24,520
two individuals. 
But yeah, like I do. 

1135
00:59:24,760 --> 00:59:28,360
But I do think that it it, it's 
unfortunate because it's a self 

1136
00:59:28,360 --> 00:59:31,640
perpetuating system. 
Like, oh, well then there's two 

1137
00:59:31,640 --> 00:59:34,200
parties and therefore there's 
always two parties and there's 

1138
00:59:34,200 --> 00:59:36,680
nothing we can do about it. 
I like, I don't know. 

1139
00:59:37,080 --> 00:59:40,520
I think the two party system can
can even, it can work well. 

1140
00:59:40,680 --> 00:59:42,600
You know, I would point the 
finger here more and we're 

1141
00:59:42,600 --> 00:59:44,480
getting off on a tangent and I 
love tangents. 

1142
00:59:44,520 --> 00:59:47,640
I would point the finger here 
more at like when you think 

1143
00:59:47,640 --> 00:59:51,640
about in aggregate from a 
societal perspective, who are 

1144
00:59:51,640 --> 00:59:54,960
the power and money incumbents 
And like they're the boomers. 

1145
00:59:55,080 --> 00:59:57,480
You know, I got nothing against 
boomers generally. 

1146
00:59:57,480 --> 00:59:59,520
I like to sort of talk shit 
about them. 

1147
00:59:59,520 --> 01:00:03,400
This is fun. 
But they those are the people 

1148
01:00:03,400 --> 01:00:05,400
who are sitting in all of these 
shares and they're making a 

1149
01:00:05,400 --> 01:00:08,640
bunch of decisions that are very
like pro incumbent, right? 

1150
01:00:09,120 --> 01:00:11,160
Like, we can't let the housing 
prices fall. 

1151
01:00:11,160 --> 01:00:12,360
We can't. 
And then you look around and 

1152
01:00:12,360 --> 01:00:13,840
you're like, what's now what's 
the problem? 

1153
01:00:13,840 --> 01:00:17,200
Well, millennials and below are 
like, how many live where many 

1154
01:00:17,200 --> 01:00:18,640
live? 
And then the boomers turn around

1155
01:00:18,640 --> 01:00:20,000
like, well, you can't live at 
home. 

1156
01:00:21,480 --> 01:00:24,440
Like, so there's we're 
preventing this sort of turn 

1157
01:00:24,440 --> 01:00:26,520
churn in the economy around 
housing. 

1158
01:00:26,520 --> 01:00:28,880
That happens when people get 
rinsed because they make bad 

1159
01:00:28,880 --> 01:00:31,600
decisions. 
And now that we have the the the

1160
01:00:31,640 --> 01:00:34,360
up and comers who like can't 
really get a toehold in the 

1161
01:00:34,360 --> 01:00:38,320
economy because the the entirety
of the legislative body is 

1162
01:00:38,320 --> 01:00:42,440
dominated by socio political 
economic, however you want to 

1163
01:00:42,440 --> 01:00:45,440
frame it, incumbents like and 
they've just got this lie. 

1164
01:00:45,440 --> 01:00:49,160
I think it's a real it's a real 
demographic challenge in in some

1165
01:00:49,160 --> 01:00:52,120
ways, which I think will 
eventually clear here. 

1166
01:00:52,440 --> 01:00:55,840
But when we, as we look across 
the effects and like diagnose 

1167
01:00:55,840 --> 01:00:59,040
society, I'm I'm very wary of, 
I'm, I'm very aware of like the 

1168
01:00:59,360 --> 01:01:03,520
anything that ends with like, 
ergo, we must return to free 

1169
01:01:03,520 --> 01:01:07,800
market absolutism or ergo, you 
know, capitalism doesn't work. 

1170
01:01:07,800 --> 01:01:09,120
I'm like, I don't really think 
so. 

1171
01:01:09,120 --> 01:01:11,280
I think what we got to do is 
sort of just like clear out the 

1172
01:01:11,280 --> 01:01:13,200
Deadwood. 
And it's been a very long time 

1173
01:01:13,200 --> 01:01:15,720
since we did that. 
Any libertarian who's like 

1174
01:01:15,800 --> 01:01:19,200
telling you Adam Smith didn't go
far enough is probably not being

1175
01:01:19,200 --> 01:01:22,040
particularly serious, and you 
can probably ignore them. 

1176
01:01:22,440 --> 01:01:24,000
Oh, they probably haven't read 
Adam Smith. 

1177
01:01:24,240 --> 01:01:27,040
I mean, like, you can go, my 
favorite thing is just go pull 

1178
01:01:27,040 --> 01:01:29,960
quotes from Adam Smith and be 
like, OK, talk to me about this 

1179
01:01:29,960 --> 01:01:31,960
one. 
You know, reasonable boundaries 

1180
01:01:31,960 --> 01:01:34,560
are on around the game of the 
economy like that. 

1181
01:01:34,560 --> 01:01:37,320
It's just like there's not, you 
can't find an intellectual 

1182
01:01:37,320 --> 01:01:38,920
tradition that was arguing 
against that. 

1183
01:01:39,000 --> 01:01:41,560
You can misrepresent 1. 
I don't know, I've got some iron

1184
01:01:41,560 --> 01:01:43,880
ran books behind me if you want 
them. 

1185
01:01:45,640 --> 01:01:47,600
Everybody in them six. 
Times wasn't enough, huh, 

1186
01:01:47,680 --> 01:01:49,160
Bennett? 
Well, I mean, I'll probably read

1187
01:01:49,160 --> 01:01:50,840
them again at some kind of my 
life if I'm. 

1188
01:01:50,840 --> 01:01:52,400
Being Why do you hate yourself 
so much? 

1189
01:01:52,440 --> 01:01:56,960
What's wrong with you? 
I find lots of twisted things 

1190
01:01:56,960 --> 01:01:59,800
deeply fascinating. 
You don't need to read Ann Rand 

1191
01:01:59,800 --> 01:02:01,440
again. 
So yeah. 

1192
01:02:01,480 --> 01:02:03,800
Do you have, do you have 
anything else you want to you 

1193
01:02:03,800 --> 01:02:06,120
want to throw out there Bennett 
or Travis? 

1194
01:02:06,280 --> 01:02:09,600
I guess my, my, my parting words
here would be like with it, you 

1195
01:02:09,600 --> 01:02:13,120
know, as we, as we take back to 
the rough streets of the 

1196
01:02:13,120 --> 01:02:17,960
Internet here, when our tweeting
or whatever we're doing, like I,

1197
01:02:18,040 --> 01:02:20,760
I think there is this, there's 
sort of this dual mandate, much 

1198
01:02:20,760 --> 01:02:22,480
like the Fed. 
And the dual mandate is 

1199
01:02:22,480 --> 01:02:25,800
basically like when you see this
stuff that it feels kind of 

1200
01:02:25,800 --> 01:02:28,040
corrosive, you know, you got to 
go after it. 

1201
01:02:28,120 --> 01:02:31,440
But I think the, the other side 
of that is it's just important 

1202
01:02:31,440 --> 01:02:36,160
to avoid condemning the, the 
superstructure that that actor 

1203
01:02:36,160 --> 01:02:39,120
lives within. 
Like, you know, there are, there

1204
01:02:39,560 --> 01:02:41,640
are, I mean, there are startup 
entrepreneurs out there 

1205
01:02:41,640 --> 01:02:44,760
misbehaving, you know, and, and 
I'm a startup entrepreneur and 

1206
01:02:44,760 --> 01:02:47,280
I'm like, OK, well, I think we 
got to talk about this 

1207
01:02:47,280 --> 01:02:49,600
misbehavior because it's, you 
know, we kind of got to police 

1208
01:02:49,600 --> 01:02:51,520
our own here a little bit. 
But it doesn't really mean that 

1209
01:02:51,520 --> 01:02:55,600
like startup entrepreneurship is
a, is a, is a bad thing. 

1210
01:02:55,960 --> 01:02:59,320
And I think if anything, we're 
getting, we have the, the 

1211
01:02:59,320 --> 01:03:02,880
extremism of sort of social 
media echo chambers has the 

1212
01:03:02,880 --> 01:03:06,040
tendency to lead us down these 
little, these little sort of 

1213
01:03:06,040 --> 01:03:08,960
mind tunnels where we end up 
concluding like that entire 

1214
01:03:08,960 --> 01:03:12,400
institution needs to go. 
And I, I guess my call to action

1215
01:03:12,400 --> 01:03:16,280
is like, let's stop doing that. 
Let's keep talking about the the

1216
01:03:16,280 --> 01:03:18,680
stuff that we don't want and how
we need to like, you know, keep 

1217
01:03:18,680 --> 01:03:21,280
improving the rules of the game 
so that it works for everybody. 

1218
01:03:22,880 --> 01:03:28,280
But condemning these like an 
entire school of thought, even 

1219
01:03:28,280 --> 01:03:29,760
libertarianism. 
At the end of the day, there's 

1220
01:03:29,760 --> 01:03:32,880
some good stuff in there. 
You know, It's, yeah, human. 

1221
01:03:33,040 --> 01:03:36,480
Labs, though human labs, we can 
condemn that institution. 

1222
01:03:37,880 --> 01:03:39,400
Why? 
That guy became the main 

1223
01:03:39,400 --> 01:03:41,560
character pretty quick. 
All right, Well, awesome. 

1224
01:03:41,560 --> 01:03:44,800
Yeah, I think that's a good 
nuance note to go out on. 

1225
01:03:44,840 --> 01:03:48,560
And yeah, I if anyone wants to 
follow Travis, I guess he's 

1226
01:03:48,560 --> 01:03:50,960
spending more time on threads 
these days. 

1227
01:03:50,960 --> 01:03:54,000
So are you at Colorado, Trav 
there as well? 

1228
01:03:54,040 --> 01:03:57,760
Yes, at Colorado, Travis, I 
finally got my handle over 

1229
01:03:57,760 --> 01:04:00,440
there, my first time on Zuck 
platform. 

1230
01:04:00,600 --> 01:04:03,440
It's pretty good. 
I think there's a little bit of 

1231
01:04:03,920 --> 01:04:05,160
a little bit of a different 
group over there. 

1232
01:04:05,160 --> 01:04:07,360
I am still on Twitter like when 
I leave.

