1 00:00:05,300 --> 00:00:08,500 Welcome back everyone. I am Caspian Sea and I'm joined 2 00:00:08,500 --> 00:00:11,500 as usual by my partner in crime. Mr. Bennett Tomlin, how are you 3 00:00:11,500 --> 00:00:13,200 today? I'm doing will kiss. 4 00:00:13,200 --> 00:00:16,800 How are you doing? Alright, we have a few crazy 5 00:00:16,800 --> 00:00:18,500 updates. I mean, not that crazy in the 6 00:00:18,508 --> 00:00:25,400 world of cryptocurrency 200 million dollar tax one for the 7 00:00:25,500 --> 00:00:29,500 finance, smart chain. And the other being about mango 8 00:00:29,500 --> 00:00:33,700 markets, which is A decentralized trading platform, 9 00:00:33,700 --> 00:00:37,500 right? So yeah, but just to I'm going 10 00:00:37,500 --> 00:00:40,800 to quickly just let people help people understand what by Nancy 11 00:00:40,800 --> 00:00:43,300 smart chain is because that's going to be the first one that 12 00:00:43,300 --> 00:00:46,300 we're going to dive into Finance, Mart chain. 13 00:00:46,700 --> 00:00:52,300 Basically is a I don't know how to explain this as its there. 14 00:00:52,300 --> 00:00:56,300 Defy platform its finances like supposed decentralized Finance 15 00:00:56,300 --> 00:01:00,300 platform where you can build all these things on it. 16 00:01:00,800 --> 00:01:05,200 But it isn't decentralized and the reason we were able to find 17 00:01:05,200 --> 00:01:08,300 that out was because of this 100 million dollar hack. 18 00:01:08,300 --> 00:01:12,700 That ultimately could have been valued at roughly nearly half a 19 00:01:12,700 --> 00:01:17,400 billion or more but because just because the finance smart chain 20 00:01:17,700 --> 00:01:20,300 BSC is not actually decentralized. 21 00:01:22,200 --> 00:01:26,500 Well they were able to Halt the blockchain and stop the hacker 22 00:01:26,500 --> 00:01:29,400 from stealing all that money. But Bennett, why don't you give 23 00:01:29,400 --> 00:01:32,800 a more detailed? Explanation of what exactly went 24 00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:36,900 down the technical details. I think are not super important 25 00:01:36,900 --> 00:01:39,100 for how this hack was pulled off. 26 00:01:39,100 --> 00:01:42,500 They took advantage of the fact that Finance Mart chain was 27 00:01:42,500 --> 00:01:45,800 using an old pre-compiled version of a library that had a 28 00:01:45,800 --> 00:01:48,000 slight flaw in the way it verified proofs. 29 00:01:48,100 --> 00:01:50,700 And so, because of that, they were able to withdraw things 30 00:01:50,700 --> 00:01:53,100 they weren't supposed to be able to, the piece of the 31 00:01:53,100 --> 00:01:55,000 infrastructure. They were targeting, is the by 32 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:58,900 Nance, smart chain token Hub, which is the bridge that allows 33 00:01:58,900 --> 00:02:02,900 for assets to be moved. And onto and off of the finance 34 00:02:02,900 --> 00:02:06,100 smart chain. And so that was targeted. 35 00:02:06,100 --> 00:02:08,000 Like, bridges are often targeted. 36 00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:10,800 We talked about the Wormhole Bridge hack a few months ago 37 00:02:11,400 --> 00:02:14,500 where jump ended up having to step in and what happened in 38 00:02:14,508 --> 00:02:18,500 this case is the hacker was able to pretty quickly move. 39 00:02:18,600 --> 00:02:22,500 As you mentioned about 100 million off of this chain onto 40 00:02:22,500 --> 00:02:26,700 other chains and start liquidating it, but Finance was 41 00:02:26,700 --> 00:02:30,400 able to get ahold of all of The validators Who Run the banks. 42 00:02:30,500 --> 00:02:34,100 It's smart chain and convince them that it would be in there. 43 00:02:34,100 --> 00:02:38,100 And the users of Finance, smart chains, best interest for them 44 00:02:38,100 --> 00:02:42,900 to Halt it until they could come up with a way to hard fork and 45 00:02:42,900 --> 00:02:47,000 return those assets to the bridge, right? 46 00:02:47,700 --> 00:02:55,900 So this makes you question the Reality of I'd we've discussed a 47 00:02:55,908 --> 00:02:57,200 lot of. I don't know if we've discussed 48 00:02:57,200 --> 00:02:59,500 it here necessarily, but there's a lot of claims about 49 00:02:59,500 --> 00:03:04,500 blockchains and decentralization in the cryptocurrency industry 50 00:03:04,600 --> 00:03:06,800 in general. And a lot of times what you just 51 00:03:06,800 --> 00:03:12,100 have is like six people or eight people or 10 or 15 or whatever 52 00:03:12,100 --> 00:03:16,000 it is and they try to claim this is decentralized that there's 53 00:03:16,400 --> 00:03:20,500 you know maybe there's some way of electing these nodes and 54 00:03:20,500 --> 00:03:26,700 who's going to run them within the In the ecosystem and maybe 55 00:03:26,700 --> 00:03:31,900 it's by voting with through how many tokens you hold or whatever 56 00:03:31,900 --> 00:03:35,400 it may be. But a lot of the times these 57 00:03:35,400 --> 00:03:38,500 things just are not decentralized and the reason 58 00:03:38,500 --> 00:03:40,400 they're not like one of the benefits of not being 59 00:03:40,400 --> 00:03:43,000 decentralized. It turns out is for security 60 00:03:43,000 --> 00:03:43,900 reasons. Yeah. 61 00:03:43,900 --> 00:03:47,800 It's certainly like it gave them the ability to stop this and I 62 00:03:47,800 --> 00:03:51,500 think that is more notable than some people have recognized, 63 00:03:51,500 --> 00:03:53,100 right. Because they've been comparisons 64 00:03:53,100 --> 00:03:55,200 made. Ed to like the etherium hard 65 00:03:55,200 --> 00:04:02,400 Fork after the Dow hack, or the Bitcoin, overflow roll back, but 66 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:06,100 in both those cases, it was not possible to actually like hope 67 00:04:06,100 --> 00:04:08,500 the chain and stop it from progressing. 68 00:04:08,900 --> 00:04:11,900 In the case of etherium, a bunch of white hat. 69 00:04:11,900 --> 00:04:14,900 Hackers took advantage of the same vulnerability that the 70 00:04:14,900 --> 00:04:19,500 black hat hacker had taken advantage of moved the funds to 71 00:04:19,800 --> 00:04:23,900 their own, little child Dows inside the Dow and then They 72 00:04:23,900 --> 00:04:27,800 forked it away removing the hackers access to the part of 73 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:29,200 etherium. He's still here. 74 00:04:29,800 --> 00:04:33,300 The difference here is that CZ was able to call up the 75 00:04:33,300 --> 00:04:36,100 validators, or get in touch with the validators. 76 00:04:36,200 --> 00:04:37,900 However, he did, and let them know. 77 00:04:37,900 --> 00:04:40,900 Hey, we think it would be best if this chain no longer 78 00:04:40,900 --> 00:04:42,800 progressed until we figure this out. 79 00:04:42,900 --> 00:04:46,900 Is there any idea about who the hackers were or are yet? 80 00:04:47,000 --> 00:04:51,400 I don't know that there is for the finance chain hack. 81 00:04:51,700 --> 00:04:55,900 There is some other information for some of the other hacks like 82 00:04:56,200 --> 00:04:59,100 I was talking about the Dow hack and that's from 2017, so it's 83 00:04:59,100 --> 00:05:01,500 not news. But earlier this year, Laura 84 00:05:01,500 --> 00:05:04,100 Shin, the host of Unchained did figure out when she was 85 00:05:04,100 --> 00:05:07,700 publishing, her book, crypto paeans that, Toby Hornish the 86 00:05:07,700 --> 00:05:10,300 co-founder of 10x was the DOW hacker. 87 00:05:10,900 --> 00:05:15,300 Yeah. 10x which we don't need to get into but also a Really 88 00:05:15,300 --> 00:05:17,700 stupid, stupid, nothing. 2017 scam? 89 00:05:17,700 --> 00:05:20,400 Yeah. Do you think this will over the 90 00:05:20,400 --> 00:05:23,900 course of any amount of like, extended timeline? 91 00:05:23,900 --> 00:05:26,200 Besides, just the moment of, do you think this will have any 92 00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:31,600 real lasting effect on by Nance smart chain or on B&B or on 93 00:05:31,600 --> 00:05:35,300 Finance in general? Who the fuck knows? 94 00:05:35,300 --> 00:05:39,000 Right Finance. Smart chain doesn't make sense 95 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:43,600 as a concept, A centralized way to do defy a chain, that's this 96 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:46,000 controlled Old doesn't serve a purpose. 97 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:48,700 The only reason cryptocurrencies are ever useful as for 98 00:05:48,700 --> 00:05:51,900 censorship resistance and we're showing here why this chain is 99 00:05:51,900 --> 00:05:54,500 not that meaningfully censorship resistant, right? 100 00:05:54,500 --> 00:05:57,900 So the only reason it's ever existed is as a way for people 101 00:05:57,900 --> 00:06:03,000 to profit from copycat schemes and like Ponzi schemes, and 102 00:06:03,100 --> 00:06:07,500 these weird games and scams and stuff that propagate in this 103 00:06:08,400 --> 00:06:11,800 alternative chain. All the while driving value to 104 00:06:11,800 --> 00:06:14,300 be in be the token that Finance created. 105 00:06:14,700 --> 00:06:17,700 Rate that derives its value primarily from the efforts of 106 00:06:17,700 --> 00:06:20,800 finance. And so, what's it going to do to 107 00:06:20,800 --> 00:06:23,200 finance chain? Why does by Nance chain fucking 108 00:06:23,200 --> 00:06:25,800 exist? I mean, what it does is shows 109 00:06:25,800 --> 00:06:29,100 any Regulators we're looking at protocols on finance chain and 110 00:06:29,100 --> 00:06:32,100 think, hey, that looks like a Ponzi scheme or hey, that looks 111 00:06:32,100 --> 00:06:34,500 like you're offering unregistered margin trading. 112 00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:37,700 They can now say, so why don't you stop the chain? 113 00:06:37,700 --> 00:06:40,900 And make them remove that because you just proved, you can 114 00:06:40,900 --> 00:06:43,100 stop the chain and remove things. 115 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:46,100 That's what you did. And so now you might have people 116 00:06:46,100 --> 00:06:49,500 asking you to do that. Laura Shane had CZ on her 117 00:06:49,500 --> 00:06:55,700 podcast, maybe it was two three, four years ago. 118 00:06:56,000 --> 00:07:00,100 And that was when B&B had just begun and she had specifically 119 00:07:00,100 --> 00:07:03,300 asked him is is this a security, right? 120 00:07:03,300 --> 00:07:05,000 Right. So the, so the way I view it is 121 00:07:05,000 --> 00:07:08,100 basically just because multiple people around the world have a 122 00:07:08,100 --> 00:07:10,300 view, doesn't mean that we all agree. 123 00:07:11,300 --> 00:07:14,300 So, but there's there's no legal definition. 124 00:07:14,400 --> 00:07:18,200 That a certain coins at least - cries Nellie's not defined 125 00:07:18,200 --> 00:07:22,100 legally by anybody as a security, many people may think 126 00:07:22,100 --> 00:07:25,000 themselves or they maybe even a comment or PNA email me. 127 00:07:25,008 --> 00:07:27,800 And I'll be like, I think for every person that you find that 128 00:07:27,800 --> 00:07:30,300 who thinks that way I can find more people who are not, I can't 129 00:07:30,300 --> 00:07:32,400 find him people who thinks otherwise. 130 00:07:32,900 --> 00:07:35,900 So I think it's a difference in opinion but it's definitely not 131 00:07:35,900 --> 00:07:39,300 classify legally or anywhere as far as I know. 132 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:42,400 And to be honest, even if it's classified legally in some 133 00:07:42,400 --> 00:07:44,200 countries probably classified differently. 134 00:07:44,300 --> 00:07:48,100 In other countries and the whole discussion about whether coins 135 00:07:48,100 --> 00:07:52,100 as security or not only came some within the last. 136 00:07:52,100 --> 00:07:54,800 I don't know, six month or so before that there wasn't there 137 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:57,500 wasn't any discussion about whether it could do coin or URC 138 00:07:57,500 --> 00:08:00,300 20 coin is or is not a security. Nobody cared. 139 00:08:01,100 --> 00:08:04,400 And he said no but he couldn't explain how it wasn't a security 140 00:08:04,400 --> 00:08:07,300 and you can hear her pushing back and being like, I don't 141 00:08:07,300 --> 00:08:08,900 know. I've spoken to a lot of lawyers 142 00:08:09,100 --> 00:08:11,600 spoken to a lot of people about this, and they all say sure. 143 00:08:11,600 --> 00:08:16,700 Looks, it looks like it quacks, like And it and everything about 144 00:08:16,700 --> 00:08:21,200 it seems to be a security and he just pushed back and said no. 145 00:08:21,600 --> 00:08:25,200 So I think we're testing the limits of that with with moves 146 00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:28,400 like this where you stop a hack from occurring by making some 147 00:08:28,400 --> 00:08:32,600 phone calls, one of the things like in the cftc settlement 148 00:08:32,600 --> 00:08:36,799 against Sookie do recently that they made note of in the order 149 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:40,299 was that b0x. LLC had these admin keys, that 150 00:08:40,299 --> 00:08:43,400 enabled them to stop the protocol and had used them like 151 00:08:43,400 --> 00:08:45,600 in this period before. For they handed those over to 152 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:49,100 the doubt. And so like the ability to stop 153 00:08:49,100 --> 00:08:52,600 conducting, the behavior is a thing that like we have seen 154 00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:54,500 considered in other cases, right? 155 00:08:54,600 --> 00:09:00,400 We've discussed B&B BSC. We discussed CZ and this. 156 00:09:00,400 --> 00:09:03,400 But what about mango markets? This happened a couple days ago 157 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:08,400 as of recording mango markets, decentralized exchange fact, for 158 00:09:08,400 --> 00:09:10,600 over a hundred million dollars or somewhere around a hundred 159 00:09:10,600 --> 00:09:14,000 million dollars. What what what happened here? 160 00:09:14,100 --> 00:09:19,400 I'm Not sure this one's a hack. Okay, in it, it's really more of 161 00:09:19,400 --> 00:09:23,000 a market manipulation, right? It's another one of those cases 162 00:09:23,000 --> 00:09:27,900 where they took advantage of how an oracle was programmed, ran up 163 00:09:27,900 --> 00:09:29,800 the price of an asset and in the. 164 00:09:29,800 --> 00:09:33,200 And then in this case, borrowed against that asset, with the 165 00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:35,800 intention of basically letting them seize the worthless 166 00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:38,900 collateral. It's a little bit similar to how 167 00:09:39,200 --> 00:09:42,600 Danny and seafood were accused of cashing out of Wonderland. 168 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:45,500 Right is taking is basically manipulating the price of time 169 00:09:45,500 --> 00:09:49,000 up, taking out these debts against it and then using those 170 00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:52,500 to liquidate with no intention of ever repaying because you 171 00:09:52,500 --> 00:09:56,800 don't want that collateral anymore and so they didn't 172 00:09:56,800 --> 00:10:00,000 really do anything. They weren't supposed to. 173 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:03,600 They just made the markets briefly irrational and took 174 00:10:03,600 --> 00:10:10,000 advantage of that irrationality. Now, having said afterwards, 175 00:10:10,000 --> 00:10:14,000 they are now going into the governance. 176 00:10:14,400 --> 00:10:18,000 Rooms and trying to make proposals and negotiate with the 177 00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:21,500 members of the Dow and how much they should have to return to 178 00:10:21,500 --> 00:10:25,600 avoid criminal charges whether or not that's going to work out 179 00:10:25,600 --> 00:10:28,500 for them. Especially since there is a 180 00:10:28,700 --> 00:10:33,000 people online claiming to have identified, the person who did 181 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:37,300 this hack is less, clear to me, but that is currently where 182 00:10:37,300 --> 00:10:40,800 we're at with the mango markets situation. 183 00:10:41,100 --> 00:10:45,100 What that it is saying here is that essentially, By having 184 00:10:45,100 --> 00:10:50,100 these these tokens that this this lad stole we're not stole 185 00:10:50,100 --> 00:10:53,900 that he made markets irrational. Like Benny was saying, you seen 186 00:10:53,900 --> 00:10:56,600 a lot of this there like flash loam type situation, right? 187 00:10:56,600 --> 00:11:00,000 Like this is similar. Yeah, so this isn't exactly a 188 00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:03,800 flash loan but that the concept being like you take out a giant 189 00:11:03,800 --> 00:11:08,600 loan move that money into some asset or whatever immediately 190 00:11:08,600 --> 00:11:11,700 profit from that position and then pay back the loan which is 191 00:11:11,700 --> 00:11:14,200 now probably valued of like a thousand times less. 192 00:11:14,400 --> 00:11:18,200 Than it was originally, and you've made a bunch of money. 193 00:11:18,200 --> 00:11:22,800 It's taking advantage of the parameters of these different 194 00:11:22,800 --> 00:11:28,900 protocols, and using Concepts that are perceived as being good 195 00:11:28,900 --> 00:11:32,600 for efficient markets and making an efficient markets out of it. 196 00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:35,300 So that's what we saw. And what what Bennett is saying 197 00:11:35,300 --> 00:11:38,800 is now that he controls all of these tokens, he's proposing 198 00:11:39,000 --> 00:11:42,300 things for the community to vote on, where they pay him a certain 199 00:11:42,300 --> 00:11:45,900 amount of money so that he He doesn't get in trouble but also 200 00:11:45,900 --> 00:11:49,500 they get all their tokens back. And this is a common like, this 201 00:11:49,500 --> 00:11:51,500 is a common thing in decentralized finance. 202 00:11:51,500 --> 00:11:55,300 Again, you have like governance based on which, I mean. 203 00:11:55,300 --> 00:11:58,800 Wow, talk about going back to exactly the way things once were 204 00:11:59,300 --> 00:12:02,000 basically, if you have the most money, you've got the most 205 00:12:02,000 --> 00:12:04,800 votes. Most of the time, this is not, I 206 00:12:04,800 --> 00:12:08,800 that's not every single day our or defy protocol, but it 207 00:12:08,800 --> 00:12:14,200 certainly is most of them. And yeah, that's kind of being 208 00:12:14,500 --> 00:12:19,500 Fully taken advantage of right now which is a little bit funny. 209 00:12:19,600 --> 00:12:22,500 It's just a little bit silly in the vein of it being a little 210 00:12:22,500 --> 00:12:28,100 bit silly, the Carlstadt except stack, Chris brunette writing 211 00:12:28,100 --> 00:12:35,100 the piece revealed that they had Discord messages from the person 212 00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:40,400 who had been planning this and then executed it. 213 00:12:41,000 --> 00:12:45,900 And so the attacker of the Mango markets here. 214 00:12:46,200 --> 00:12:51,400 Allegedly avraham Eisenberg was not even being particularly 215 00:12:51,400 --> 00:12:55,300 cautious with their opsec or anything before engaging in this 216 00:12:55,600 --> 00:12:58,600 describing like exactly what they were thinking about doing 217 00:12:58,600 --> 00:13:04,100 and, what effects it was going to have in a Discord and then 218 00:13:04,100 --> 00:13:06,200 they did it. And now they're trying to 219 00:13:06,200 --> 00:13:10,500 negotiate to convince no one at the Dow to file criminal charges 220 00:13:10,500 --> 00:13:13,000 against them for manipulating it. 221 00:13:13,400 --> 00:13:16,500 Yeah, this is Similar to though, this time it was. 222 00:13:16,600 --> 00:13:18,800 Yeah, it's the same. We've spoken about this many 223 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:21,000 times. It feels like almost every week. 224 00:13:21,000 --> 00:13:26,900 We say, if you gonna do crime try not to like chat it up with 225 00:13:26,900 --> 00:13:29,400 a bunch of people about it, write it down in places, where 226 00:13:29,400 --> 00:13:32,400 it can be used as evidence against you not to say that I 227 00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:35,300 want to help criminals. I don't, it's just, you guys are 228 00:13:35,300 --> 00:13:38,800 really dumb, and I feel like, even this level of, hey, don't 229 00:13:38,800 --> 00:13:42,900 be this fucking dumb. I need to express to you because 230 00:13:42,900 --> 00:13:46,600 you're making everyone else. Else's life, very easy in trying 231 00:13:46,600 --> 00:13:51,800 to capture you and render Justice unless you want to get 232 00:13:51,800 --> 00:13:55,100 caught then maybe start taking more precautions. 233 00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:00,600 So that that's that's both of these, I guess. 234 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:07,200 At least the BSC hacker we don't know who that is yet and and it 235 00:14:07,200 --> 00:14:11,000 could be, it could be anybody and they they've done some level 236 00:14:11,000 --> 00:14:14,100 of decent, you know, operational security. 237 00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:17,400 But it is just, it is, it's laughable, how often this 238 00:14:17,400 --> 00:14:22,000 happens. That they do almost no like 239 00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:25,500 covering their foot to their Footprints and no due diligence. 240 00:14:25,500 --> 00:14:30,100 We talked about this about North Korea and Virgil Griffith where 241 00:14:30,100 --> 00:14:32,200 we specifically who also is in the news. 242 00:14:32,500 --> 00:14:37,800 Again, recently, it just all of it is absurd. 243 00:14:37,800 --> 00:14:41,400 I think total, I did the math, and it was something like eleven 244 00:14:41,400 --> 00:14:44,100 million dollars a day has been lost in the crypto. 245 00:14:44,200 --> 00:14:49,600 So currency industry this year, if we average it out and someone 246 00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:53,100 responded to that with like and yet the credit card industry 247 00:14:53,100 --> 00:14:58,000 loses 70 billion dollars a year. And I was like you know, the 248 00:14:58,000 --> 00:15:00,500 beauty of, I didn't respond to him because I'm just exhausted 249 00:15:00,500 --> 00:15:02,700 by that argument. But the beauty of the not to 250 00:15:02,700 --> 00:15:05,800 suggest that I'm a fan of credit cards and debit cards and Banks. 251 00:15:06,200 --> 00:15:09,300 But the beauty of those things is that you can charge back that 252 00:15:09,300 --> 00:15:12,500 you can get your money back and it's not gone forever that 11 253 00:15:12,500 --> 00:15:14,200 million dollars a day that's being lost in. 254 00:15:14,500 --> 00:15:18,300 The decentralized finance industry is gone and your odds 255 00:15:18,300 --> 00:15:21,200 of getting it back unless you're bringing criminal charges 256 00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:23,000 against somebody. And you figure out exactly who 257 00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:25,000 it is, and where they live are minimal. 258 00:15:25,400 --> 00:15:28,000 So I think it's apples to oranges. 259 00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:30,300 It's not the same fair comparison. 260 00:15:30,500 --> 00:15:33,900 But yeah, I guess this is 200 million dollar hacks in roughly. 261 00:15:35,200 --> 00:15:38,400 45 days. Separated from one another, it's 262 00:15:38,400 --> 00:15:40,000 getting to be a little bit taxing. 263 00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:43,400 I would say it's get it's almost like even for critics and 264 00:15:43,400 --> 00:15:46,200 Skeptics you just go like oh so another hundred million dollar 265 00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:50,100 hack, the numbers are almost like mind-numbing the mango 266 00:15:50,100 --> 00:15:51,900 markets. Hekkador was just referring to 267 00:15:51,900 --> 00:15:53,600 in the Discord when he was describing it. 268 00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:58,300 Someone asked him or said like unless it is highly illegal to 269 00:15:58,308 --> 00:16:00,300 be like are you sure you want to do this? 270 00:16:00,500 --> 00:16:03,500 And his response was, are there rules these days? 271 00:16:03,700 --> 00:16:06,800 It's very tricky though. Substantial Capital risk, like 272 00:16:06,900 --> 00:16:09,600 are there rules these days these things. 273 00:16:09,700 --> 00:16:15,700 These hacks are so commonplace and so mundane and rarely is it 274 00:16:15,700 --> 00:16:17,600 possible to phenotypically figure out? 275 00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:22,900 Who's responsible for them and many times, like the people who 276 00:16:22,900 --> 00:16:26,700 created these deeply flawed things who caused these people 277 00:16:26,700 --> 00:16:30,100 to lose their assets and get hurt or then immediately back 278 00:16:30,200 --> 00:16:32,400 doing another one. Yeah, well, I've seen that was 279 00:16:32,400 --> 00:16:37,300 sifu or Michael pattern. Pacioretty as we've spoken about 280 00:16:37,300 --> 00:16:42,200 before we've even do Quantrill. I was talking to Ben monster, I 281 00:16:42,208 --> 00:16:46,600 forgot that do Quan even launched Aluna to right after 282 00:16:48,500 --> 00:16:50,200 and that still exist. Of course it does. 283 00:16:52,600 --> 00:16:55,700 But he, he said, I don't remember who he is quoting, but 284 00:16:55,700 --> 00:16:59,000 the idea being that, like, after the failure of Lehman Brothers 285 00:16:59,100 --> 00:17:01,000 were bear Stearns. It would be as though. 286 00:17:01,000 --> 00:17:04,000 Those companies were like, oh, okay. 287 00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:07,599 So Lehman Brothers, 1.0 failed and bear Stearns 1.0 failed. 288 00:17:07,599 --> 00:17:11,800 But now, we're going to start bear Stearns 2.0 and like, no 289 00:17:11,800 --> 00:17:14,400 one wants that. No one wants that. 290 00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:18,400 I think even more troubling than that is often when those hex 291 00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:22,200 have defy protocols. There are accusations though, 292 00:17:22,300 --> 00:17:28,000 again, they're very often challenging to prove that It's 293 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:31,300 the developers themselves, who end up often hacking these 294 00:17:31,300 --> 00:17:34,600 protocols? Right is that they have been 295 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:36,100 working on it. Whilst not. 296 00:17:36,100 --> 00:17:41,900 Who else could the developers of other protocols who also like, 297 00:17:41,900 --> 00:17:44,600 read solidity and understand. I'm, he's called such a small 298 00:17:44,600 --> 00:17:47,100 pool. Such a small pool to begin with, 299 00:17:47,100 --> 00:17:48,100 you know? Yeah. 300 00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:54,100 And so, like often it feels as though, like they get it up to 301 00:17:54,100 --> 00:17:56,900 20 million in total value locked or something and then the 302 00:17:56,900 --> 00:18:00,000 protocols Calls out to their tokens starts Free Falling, and 303 00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:02,700 no new deposits are coming in and it slowly bleeding out. 304 00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:04,900 Then you'll see this protocol that you vaguely remember, 305 00:18:04,900 --> 00:18:08,300 hearing about months and months ago, but not since suddenly get 306 00:18:08,300 --> 00:18:12,000 hacked and the, and the developers behind it disappear. 307 00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:14,300 And are they disappearing because they're ashamed? 308 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:15,900 Maybe. Yeah. 309 00:18:15,900 --> 00:18:19,200 There's also been some questions recently, about like criminality 310 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:21,100 in the space. I think a lot of people are 311 00:18:21,100 --> 00:18:24,500 suggesting that it's easier to it's easier to push the 312 00:18:24,500 --> 00:18:27,500 narrative that like you were just experimenting. 313 00:18:27,500 --> 00:18:33,100 Ting with a protocol or whatever whether you're a criminal hacker 314 00:18:33,500 --> 00:18:40,200 or whether you're a failure of a Founder, like do Quan like how 315 00:18:40,200 --> 00:18:43,700 much it's almost like decentralized Finance makes this 316 00:18:43,700 --> 00:18:47,600 significantly more difficult to prove intent. 317 00:18:47,800 --> 00:18:50,400 Now, I'm not sure if that's actually true not suggesting 318 00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:53,900 necessarily that it is harder to prove intent because I think 319 00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:57,700 when I look at do Kwan's case for instance, it stinks of And 320 00:18:57,700 --> 00:19:02,200 ality and I don't think that the South Korean law enforcement 321 00:19:02,200 --> 00:19:06,200 agencies are going to be fooled by him being like, what? 322 00:19:06,400 --> 00:19:08,900 Just because I was the face of it and I made all the decisions. 323 00:19:08,900 --> 00:19:11,000 I'm not, the one who should be prosecuted and it's like, 324 00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:15,100 actually, you should. So, I don't think there's, I 325 00:19:15,100 --> 00:19:18,200 don't think there's much of a case to be made for him, but 326 00:19:18,200 --> 00:19:20,100 maybe there is for some of this other stuff. 327 00:19:20,100 --> 00:19:24,000 I don't really know. Um, and, you know, we haven't 328 00:19:24,000 --> 00:19:26,600 heard much from 3 AC. So is it, is it easier to get 329 00:19:26,600 --> 00:19:29,600 away now? Today's with, with crime, I 330 00:19:29,600 --> 00:19:32,200 don't know the answer to that. Either that maybe that's true. 331 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:36,700 Maybe it's not, I don't know. Yeah, it's just, it's 332 00:19:36,700 --> 00:19:40,800 disappointing to see how commonplace these still are and 333 00:19:40,800 --> 00:19:45,400 I think they're all the time they hurt real people, it's very 334 00:19:45,400 --> 00:19:48,800 hard to get the people who did them and also that's the other 335 00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:52,500 thing we hear a lot about is like that, you know, not your 336 00:19:52,500 --> 00:19:54,900 keys, not your coin. If you're going to be doing 337 00:19:54,900 --> 00:19:59,700 stuff in this industry, like expect rug pulls expect exit 338 00:19:59,700 --> 00:20:05,000 scams, these moments are going to happen and I do like it's 339 00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:10,400 hard for me to feel bad for the decision makers at Celsius for 340 00:20:10,400 --> 00:20:17,100 putting money with 3, AC 3 Euros Capital like I were for tether 341 00:20:17,200 --> 00:20:23,800 for becoming, you know, Equity investors in that like I don't 342 00:20:23,800 --> 00:20:26,600 feel that bad for them. Do I feel bad for retail 343 00:20:26,600 --> 00:20:30,100 investors at Celsius though? Like, of course I do people who 344 00:20:30,100 --> 00:20:33,000 like normal people who put 50,000 dollars their life 345 00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:35,800 savings. Into Celsius. 346 00:20:36,300 --> 00:20:38,400 Of course, I feel bad for them. And I don't look at that and 347 00:20:38,400 --> 00:20:41,100 say, like, well I guess that's a lesson you're learning because I 348 00:20:41,100 --> 00:20:44,800 think that's a really shitty way of perceiving that concept like 349 00:20:45,500 --> 00:20:48,300 shouldn't just plowed it in front of retail Traders. 350 00:20:48,500 --> 00:20:52,100 But then you wonder like how much maybe Celsius had a lot of 351 00:20:52,100 --> 00:20:55,500 retail but you wonder like how much I have retail. 352 00:20:55,900 --> 00:20:59,900 And when we say retail, I guess, I mean dumb retail as in that's 353 00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:04,300 an unfair characterization. I say I say dumb retail meaning. 354 00:21:04,500 --> 00:21:07,200 Money, that doesn't understand what it's necessarily investing 355 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:10,900 in. So mango markets, like, like, 356 00:21:10,900 --> 00:21:12,800 for Celsius. I know, I know there's a lot of 357 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:16,200 quote, dumb money because it's like these people were assured. 358 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:19,900 A lot of, a lot of things from Alex Mission ski in the Celsius 359 00:21:19,900 --> 00:21:21,600 team. They were promised that this 360 00:21:21,600 --> 00:21:24,300 was, you know, that there were all this, like, nothing could 361 00:21:24,300 --> 00:21:26,000 ever happen to these investments. 362 00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:29,200 In these, these lending schemes, there was nothing that could 363 00:21:29,200 --> 00:21:31,200 possibly go wrong. They were assured that 364 00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:34,700 repeatedly over and over and over again that had You have 365 00:21:34,700 --> 00:21:37,500 done money. How much dumb money is in mango 366 00:21:37,500 --> 00:21:40,400 markets, right? Like, I don't really know. 367 00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:44,100 I doubt it's that. I doubt there's types of dumb 368 00:21:45,300 --> 00:21:46,400 but yeah. Sure. 369 00:21:46,400 --> 00:21:49,200 And I guess Matt my point I guess my point being a bit here 370 00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:56,300 that Perhaps, Perhaps the dumb, the quote dumb money in or let's 371 00:21:56,300 --> 00:21:58,700 say retail money, let's just say retail, let's go back to read to 372 00:21:58,700 --> 00:22:01,500 let's call it retail money. Again we go back to to retail 373 00:22:01,500 --> 00:22:04,100 money and we suggest that there's of this hundred million 374 00:22:04,500 --> 00:22:08,400 Is that was moved off of mango markets, hundred million dollars 375 00:22:08,400 --> 00:22:11,200 worth of tokens that Wings off of mango markets. 376 00:22:11,200 --> 00:22:14,300 How many of the people involved actually are just like yeah well 377 00:22:14,300 --> 00:22:18,300 we deserve this versus the people at Celsius who I would 378 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:20,700 assume a lot of them are like I never could have possibly seen 379 00:22:20,700 --> 00:22:23,300 this coming. The people of mango markets are 380 00:22:23,300 --> 00:22:26,900 probably more informed about the cryptocurrency industry, right? 381 00:22:27,200 --> 00:22:32,000 They should be. It's I guess I mean it's hard to 382 00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:35,300 it's harder to use to centralize Platforms in general. 383 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:39,300 Yes there's a higher barrier to entry anyone who's been trading 384 00:22:39,300 --> 00:22:43,100 and mango markets probably at a harder time getting started then 385 00:22:43,100 --> 00:22:46,800 someone depositing money into Celsius Journey yield and so you 386 00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:50,500 hope that that's going to filter out more of the most vulnerable. 387 00:22:50,900 --> 00:22:53,800 This is part of why we got so upset about stable gains which 388 00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:56,800 was like taking deposits from regular people and putting them 389 00:22:56,800 --> 00:22:59,400 directly into anchor. Write that y combinator project. 390 00:22:59,600 --> 00:23:03,400 Checked because it's removing any of that filter and making 391 00:23:03,400 --> 00:23:05,900 it. So that potentially some of the 392 00:23:05,900 --> 00:23:09,700 most vulnerable and dip exposed to these most dangerous projects 393 00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:15,200 because the issue is there is a tiny bit of Truth in the, it's 394 00:23:15,200 --> 00:23:17,100 an experiment. It's untested. 395 00:23:17,100 --> 00:23:20,200 This is new and things might go wrong, right? 396 00:23:20,500 --> 00:23:25,200 The nature of crypto is that it's designed once a transaction 397 00:23:25,200 --> 00:23:28,500 happens to make it very hard to reverse that transaction. 398 00:23:28,900 --> 00:23:33,600 And so, So, hacks are going to have larger consequences because 399 00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:37,500 of that detail, right? And because of that, when you're 400 00:23:37,500 --> 00:23:40,200 deploying new Financial software, if you are not really 401 00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:44,900 confident about each and every piece of it, there are going to 402 00:23:44,900 --> 00:23:48,800 be more, harmful hacks exploits and problems. 403 00:23:49,100 --> 00:23:52,600 That's just the nature of what cryptocurrency is that? 404 00:23:52,600 --> 00:23:54,500 Part is true. The part that's less. 405 00:23:54,500 --> 00:23:58,900 True is the like there's still often like in the case of 406 00:23:58,900 --> 00:24:02,400 Finance, Change the issue is they had not stayed up to date 407 00:24:02,400 --> 00:24:06,600 with updates to the bridging system in Cosmos, they were 408 00:24:06,600 --> 00:24:09,600 using an older pre-compiled version because they hadn't 409 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:11,900 stayed up. It had this one vulnerability in 410 00:24:11,900 --> 00:24:17,100 it and so, we're like and they running this chain. 411 00:24:17,100 --> 00:24:20,100 That's like number three. In total value locked behind 412 00:24:20,100 --> 00:24:23,400 aetherium, intron they should be responsible enough to handle 413 00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:26,400 something like that, right? And like in the case of mango 414 00:24:26,400 --> 00:24:29,300 markets, your work will Design is known you. 415 00:24:29,500 --> 00:24:32,900 I've published it and you can to some extent model it. 416 00:24:32,900 --> 00:24:35,600 The hacker even talked about like creating models and 417 00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:37,700 simulations of how the Oracle worked. 418 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:40,600 The people who developed mango markets should have at least as 419 00:24:40,600 --> 00:24:44,400 much ability to simulate some of these more stressful situations 420 00:24:44,400 --> 00:24:47,400 for the protocol. And so there is still just a lot 421 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:51,500 of stress testing and a lot of hardening that goes undone in 422 00:24:51,500 --> 00:24:53,800 crypto. Yeah, I mean, you call that a 423 00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:56,400 lot of protocols for this, it's kind of crazy how much money 424 00:24:56,400 --> 00:25:01,400 gets invested in these Concepts. Whether it's I don't remember if 425 00:25:01,400 --> 00:25:04,700 it was Faye. There were a few years Fay, it 426 00:25:04,700 --> 00:25:06,700 was where the math did it out of. 427 00:25:06,700 --> 00:25:10,000 That was one. There was wasn't there. 428 00:25:10,000 --> 00:25:13,400 Another one more recently that you also called out that had bad 429 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:14,600 math? In the, in the white paper? 430 00:25:14,600 --> 00:25:17,200 I feel like there's been two or three, but it doesn't matter 431 00:25:17,200 --> 00:25:19,500 made it. But there's these people are 432 00:25:19,500 --> 00:25:23,000 able to collect hundreds of millions or billions of dollars 433 00:25:23,000 --> 00:25:25,000 from Venture Capital hedge funds. 434 00:25:25,000 --> 00:25:30,500 Angel Investors with unchecked Lawd, white papers. 435 00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:33,400 None of these Venture, capitalists know how to look at 436 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:37,200 that stuff and read it. Like it was, it was etherium, 437 00:25:37,200 --> 00:25:40,300 Prague pouch, just in Sun. So right workfolk of etherium, 438 00:25:40,500 --> 00:25:44,200 their white paper was blank, they had no white paper, right? 439 00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:48,400 And so if we think about that, I maybe we're seeing the end of 440 00:25:48,408 --> 00:25:50,100 that now. Like, maybe that was the Easy 441 00:25:50,100 --> 00:25:53,800 Money cryptocurrency industry, like everything's exploding in 442 00:25:53,800 --> 00:25:56,900 value, it's so easy. You can literally have a blank 443 00:25:56,900 --> 00:25:59,100 white paper and collect hundreds of millions of dollars type of 444 00:25:59,100 --> 00:26:01,600 thing. Maybe those days are now behind 445 00:26:01,600 --> 00:26:08,300 us hopefully but I doubt it I think these exploits and hacks 446 00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:13,300 are a great example of it's like more than not your keys, not 447 00:26:13,300 --> 00:26:18,300 your coins. It's showing the world that to 448 00:26:18,300 --> 00:26:23,500 really if you really want to be If you want to be on top of 449 00:26:23,900 --> 00:26:27,800 dealing with cryptocurrency and holding your coins, all the 450 00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:31,000 time, you have to be like technically Savvy. 451 00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:33,500 You have to code, you have to know how to read code. 452 00:26:33,500 --> 00:26:36,700 You have to know what changes are being made when and how they 453 00:26:36,700 --> 00:26:40,100 could affect you. Because ultimately, when a 454 00:26:40,100 --> 00:26:43,800 hundred million dollars or 500, possibly million dollars could 455 00:26:43,800 --> 00:26:45,900 be moved off this chain. If you have a bunch of money in 456 00:26:45,900 --> 00:26:51,700 that, The value of your money could depreciate significantly 457 00:26:51,700 --> 00:26:55,000 just because you didn't know about this hack at this exploit, 458 00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:56,400 that could be taken advantage of. 459 00:26:57,100 --> 00:26:59,800 So I think it's showing like another level of this, that 460 00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:05,500 we've never really discussed, which is how difficult it, it is 461 00:27:05,500 --> 00:27:09,700 to actually be protected, like, in any of these coins unless you 462 00:27:10,100 --> 00:27:13,300 are completely fluent when it comes to programming and coding 463 00:27:13,300 --> 00:27:15,600 and all of that. And I mean the reality is, I'm 464 00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:19,200 not, I'm not that I couldn't I couldn't possibly Sibley like 465 00:27:19,600 --> 00:27:22,700 confirm I'm trusting code. If I buy Bitcoin right? 466 00:27:22,700 --> 00:27:25,300 I'm not I don't own Bitcoin to clarify everybody. 467 00:27:25,300 --> 00:27:31,700 But like when I bought bit coin in 2017, I read the white paper 468 00:27:31,700 --> 00:27:35,100 and thought it was cool. I looked at the charts and was 469 00:27:35,100 --> 00:27:41,000 like, oh, this is interesting. I had no conceptual concept of 470 00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:46,800 like he had no concept of like what is if I go deep into this 471 00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:49,200 code, will I find any Errors or whatever. 472 00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:52,500 I couldn't have possibly told you that and I think that's most 473 00:27:52,500 --> 00:27:57,100 people who are involved in this industry and yeah like I 474 00:27:57,100 --> 00:28:00,100 couldn't I couldn't still couldn't tell you what the what 475 00:28:00,100 --> 00:28:05,200 exactly happened with like the bridge hack for finance and 476 00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:07,600 Cosmo Finance chain, smart chain in Cosmos. 477 00:28:07,600 --> 00:28:10,700 I couldn't tell you what the flash loan type procedure was 478 00:28:10,700 --> 00:28:13,100 for mango markets and the governance tokens and all of 479 00:28:13,108 --> 00:28:17,400 this stuff. No, and that's like such a crazy 480 00:28:17,900 --> 00:28:20,900 difficult. Old Nuance that most people are 481 00:28:20,900 --> 00:28:23,400 not going to be willing, it's like having to learn a language. 482 00:28:23,600 --> 00:28:30,600 It's like be you are your own bank, your own bank CEO, CTO 483 00:28:30,700 --> 00:28:34,600 Chief security officer Chief informatics officer and you are 484 00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:39,300 like the head of the exchange monitoring in the you're also 485 00:28:39,300 --> 00:28:42,400 the analyst for pricing, all the assets and yeah. 486 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,400 So that's just all you have fun. Yeah, yeah, right and I you 487 00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:49,300 know, people have purchased Ledger's Or Hardware wallets. 488 00:28:49,300 --> 00:28:52,000 And these are things that you think are like, well, that's 489 00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:53,900 secure, right? But then it's like then there's 490 00:28:53,900 --> 00:28:56,100 plenty of exploits in regard to those as well. 491 00:28:56,100 --> 00:29:00,700 And we've seen complete doxing of what was it Ledger? 492 00:29:02,100 --> 00:29:05,100 Ledger leak, their whole customer base that we got hacked 493 00:29:05,100 --> 00:29:09,900 or whatever. So, I think you can't so hard to 494 00:29:09,900 --> 00:29:13,500 be again, why we talk about the nice use cases of cryptocurrency 495 00:29:13,500 --> 00:29:17,200 and I think those still exist, but the niche keeps getting nice 496 00:29:17,200 --> 00:29:25,200 year and nice. Year and not nice', or although 497 00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:29,500 it may be that to anyway, think that's going to do it. 498 00:29:30,100 --> 00:29:32,100 We just wandered into 200 million dollars. 499 00:29:32,100 --> 00:29:33,900 I don't want to talk about how that happened. 500 00:29:34,200 --> 00:29:38,500 If you leave a like subscribe, comment will pass you, some VSC 501 00:29:38,500 --> 00:29:40,900 tokens some mango Market tokens. Will throw them your way. 502 00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:44,800 Not I mean, we will throw cryptocurrency or way. 503 00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:48,300 I shouldn't have been that specific about which tokens We 504 00:29:48,308 --> 00:29:50,900 were going to give you but we're very happy to have found this 505 00:29:50,900 --> 00:29:54,000 money and to be able to support ourselves if you can. 506 00:29:54,300 --> 00:29:56,900 You can hit that like And subscribe button. 507 00:29:56,900 --> 00:29:59,800 It'll make our lives easier because we can get rid of some 508 00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:02,600 of this cash that we've stumbled into these hundreds of millions 509 00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:05,300 of dollars. Sorry, I'm getting word that 510 00:30:05,400 --> 00:30:09,200 okay Vin it, I won't no problem man, I won't mention that we can 511 00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:11,200 cut that right out. You're gonna have your own red 512 00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:11,900 notice soon.