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Hello and welcome to the 
Decipher Podcast. 

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My name is Dennis Fisher. 
I'm joined as always by my 

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colleague Lindsay O'Donnell 
Welch. 

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And this is a podcast about 
roots and shells and outages and

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just absolute chaos. 
Linds. 

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We should do a vibe check. 
How? 

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How are you doing in all of 
this? 

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And to our listeners, how are 
people doing? 

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I don't know. 
It's we're in one of those 

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periods where we always joke 
about like your relatives or 

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your non tech friends texting 
you or calling you and just 

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being like what the hell is 
going on? 

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This last 10 days has been and 
even just this week has been 

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that times like 100. 
You know, just everyone I know 

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who knows what I do is just 
like, what's with the air 

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traffic control thing? 
Is that a cyberattack? 

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OK, settle down. 
No, what the hell is going on 

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with Outlook? 
Is a cyber attack? 

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Nope, just incompetence. 
What the hell is going on with, 

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you know, all these other 
outages like United and Marriott

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and now the banks and all of 
this stuff? 

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Is this all connected? 
Is this China? 

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Is this Russia? 
You guys? 

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Like we cannot just take all of 
these things and squish them 

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into one ball and say they're 
all connected or correlated 

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because they're not. 
Like they're all caused by 

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computers, but everything is 
caused by computers now, so. 

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Yeah, the. 
Conspiracy. 

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Theories have been rampant. 
And yeah, and I, I mean, we've 

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got Thanksgiving coming up next 
week. 

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I I feel like we all need to 
mentally prepare ourselves for 

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just the onslaught of questions 
that's going to come from that. 

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It's going to be so rough just 
this this week alone. 

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So we had the Java for shell 
thing, We had the nginx to root.

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I think I have that that right, 
a Ruby, Ruby on Rails one. 

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And as we're recording this, 
we're waiting for another PHP 

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critical update to come out 
today, which doesn't seem to 

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have like the level of panic 
around it that PHP to shell did.

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It's just a critical PHP update.
So people are always kind of on 

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edge about those because of 
because PHP is everywhere. 

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That's the last three days. 
That's that doesn't even count 

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all the outages or anything like
that. 

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It's just those bugs that have, 
you know, in our little infosec 

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bubble have everybody just like 
kind of whipped up to a frenzy. 

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But then you also have the other
people that are, you know, like,

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hey, hey guys, everybody calm 
down. 

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Like are any of these things 
actually being mass exploited? 

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No, they're not. 
Like that's the good news. 

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There's lots of cool research, 
some really sick bugs being, you

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know, published, but nothing is 
like on fire in, in, in that 

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way. 
You know, there's no huge worms,

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there's no massive exploitation 
activity. 

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I went and looked yesterday at, 
at the Gray noise dashboard for 

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one of these bugs. 
I think it was the Java one. 

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They had like 3 IP addresses 
that were probing for it that 

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like that's nothing. 
Just, you know, some normal like

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Microsoft Word bug will have 
hundreds or thousands, you know,

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looking for it on a exploit 
Wednesday. 

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But it's just, I think we're 
just seeing one of those, one of

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those time periods, just 
everything's coming at you 100 

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miles an hour. 
Yeah, it's, it's so crazy. 

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I feel like I agree with you 
that there needs to be a shift 

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in focus about the priority of 
some of these things and 

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understanding which ones are 
actually translating to 

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exploitation. 
I mean, with PHP to shell like 

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that, we didn't see anything, 
any sort of mass exploitation 

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from that. 
And I almost feel like the way 

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that these are being named for 
shell is it's just log for 

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shell. 
It's reminiscent of the bit, you

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know, log for JA couple years 
ago. 

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And so people hear that and 
maybe feel a little panicked 

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because of that. 
But like this is not the same. 

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And like I, I do not feel 
panicked about about this even 

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though I'm just like, what is 
going on? 

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It's crazy. 
We were. 

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My wife and I were watching the 
Country Music Awards last night,

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trying not to think about the 
Internet or computers or 

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anything. 
And part of the opening 

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monologue was they did like this
parody song that talked about 

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Outlook and the air traffic 
control outages and all that 

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kind of stuff. 
And I just looked at my wife. 

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I was like, what the hell? 
Can we just like I just like I'm

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going to I got to go downstairs 
and watch some like bad college 

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football game from like, you 
know, South Texas. 

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I can't, I mean, this can't this
can't be happening. 

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I don't need Laney Wilson 
telling, you know, singing to me

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about like, outlook outages. 
It's so crazy. 

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Yeah, they're that's just one of
those things where it was 

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impacting like normal non 
cybersecurity normies, as I call

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them, like and so I think people
are seeing the impact of that. 

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And then, you know, if if you 
don't know any better, you're 

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probably like cyberattack maybe 
like. 

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So I think it's just crazy and 
there's a lot of opportunity to 

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educate about, you know, what 
actually is a cyberattack versus

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just like, you know, broken, 
broken systems or like. 

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Fragile infrastructure like is 
the answer to almost all of this

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stuff. 
You know, like the air traffic 

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control outage, the general 
answer almost always is it's not

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a cyber attack until you show me
evidence. 

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You need to show me some 
evidence that you know of a 

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compromise. 
I need some artifacts. 

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I need to see something that is 
telling you that this is a cyber

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attack before you run around 
saying, oh, I'm just asking the 

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question is this that's not 
helpful. 

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That that that's such a cop out.
Get out of here with that. 

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That's every reporter on a 
national TV news program this 

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past week has been that like, 
and now, you know, we had the 

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Outlook outage and now this ATC 
outage and now this. 

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Could these all be connected? 
We're just asking like, how is 

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that helpful to anybody? 
Shut up. 

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I know. 
And it, well, it what doesn't 

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help is that also, you know, and
we've talked about this too, but

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the past few months, just with 
all the AI doomsday narrative 

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that has been circulating just 
in, in the atmosphere, like I 

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feel like there's been a lot of,
you know, talk about, yeah, 

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those doomsday types of things. 
And like the world is ending and

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AI is going to end humanity. 
We need to go, you know, buy 

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canned goods and take all our 
money out. 

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And like, it's just like, I 
think that like on top of these 

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just honestly fairly standard 
outages, like, maybe, you know, 

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led to a little bit of hysteria 
there, so. 

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There's no doubt about it. 
There was. 

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I saw by mistake, I walked past 
ATV in my house that was playing

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the news and it was the local 
NBC station I think here in 

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Boston. 
And they had on this guy from 

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MIT who's like a cybersecurity 
professor and they asked him 

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essentially the question. 
I just said, which isn't a 

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question of like we have this 
and this and this. 

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Could these all be connected? 
And is it an AI cyber attack by 

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China? 
Like that was literally the 

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question. 
And he just kind of stared at 

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the screen for like 4 seconds. 
It was like no, just kind of 

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like so resigned. 
He's like, you could see in his 

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head he was just like, how do I 
explain that? 

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Just like computers break all 
the time and like software is 

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kind of crappy and we're lucky 
any of it works. 

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And that's what we're seeing 
right now. 

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But that doesn't, that's not a 
sound bite. 

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So these people just kept coming
back to it. 

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And I was like, God, this poor 
guy, let him just just get out 

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of here. 
Like that guy, He didn't know 

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what he was saying for with this
but. 

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That's hysterical. 
Yeah, I felt so bad for him. 

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Like this is a respected guy at 
MIT and he's just like, tell us 

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it's AI inside in China. 
Tell us about the AI terrorists.

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Yeah, AI cyber terrorists. 
He's like, no software is kind 

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of a jumble. 
And we're lucky that like, your 

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computer turns on in the 
morning. 

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Like that's the answer. 
It's. 

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Yeah, it's chaos. 
I I like, I feel like those 

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conversations about resilience 
and all that are just being lost

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in when people 'cause they're. 
Boring. 

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Yeah, exactly. 
Yeah. 

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That's it. 
I had, we were visiting my son 

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at college last weekend and when
all this was happening, so we 

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got there like that, the outlook
outage was still happening and 

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then the ATC thing happened the 
next day, right? 

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And one of his friends is 
studying cybersecurity. 

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So we were having like this 
pretty good conversation about 

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all this stuff. 
And and you know, this is a 22 

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year old guy and he was just 
like, none of this looks like 

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cyber attacks to me. 
I was like, yeah, because it's 

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not, it's not at all. 
And you know that. 

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Warms my heart. 
Yes, very smart kid, but he was 

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like, I don't none of this makes
any sense is cyber attacks like 

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what would it what would be the 
goal of any of these? 

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And I was like, that's correct. 
These are not, no, these are 

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just outages from fragile 
infrastructure. 

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And that's what it is. 
And he's like, yeah, I kind of 

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love it. 
That outlook's down. 

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I was like, yeah, you and the 
rest of the world, everybody's 

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really happy. 
Except for people that are on 

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Google Workspace, but. 
Yeah, yeah, right. 

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Yeah, you and I, that's right. 
There's, there's a lot of panic 

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happening and I guess my other 
concern is that, well, there's 

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outages and then there's the 
vulnerability. 

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So there's two different camps 
of it, but like, you know, 

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actual security issues. 
This is just taking the 

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conversation away from like, 
what's actually a priority for 

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companies, like what's actually 
important. 

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Yeah, that's exactly right. 
I mean, these vulnerabilities, 

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the ones that we just named the 
Java, Ruby, Nginx, like all 

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three of those are really widely
deployed. 

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And you know, everybody knows 
what Java is. 

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Most people know what Ruby on 
Rails is. 

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Nginx, unless you're, I mean, 
most people have seen references

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to that. 
They may not know that it 

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literally is on like hundreds of
millions of web servers and is 

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used in a lot of load balancing 
situations. 

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It's in a lot of cloud 
infrastructure, that kind of 

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stuff. 
So a serious bug in engine X is 

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a real problem, but it's not 
easy to exploit it. 

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It's not going to be one of 
those like warmable everything 

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is going to fall down things we 
would have already seen that 

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probably. 
You know, I'm sure there will be

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some targeted exploitation for 
sure. 

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But I do think you're right, 
Linson, that these named bugs 

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and sort of like the we get not 
we, but like the royal we get 

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everybody sort of wound up about
these things and it distracts 

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from like, well, OK, but have 
you patched the stuff from six 

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months ago that's being 
exploited? 

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Do you like did you finish that 
MFA roll out? 

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Like have you, you know, 
upgraded this or that like it? 

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It definitely distracts from 
what the real priorities are and

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what corporate security teams 
should be focused on. 

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And they know that it's just 
when these things make their way

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into the mainstream news and 
there's just a series of them, 

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one after the other after the 
other, you know, that management

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and execs get all fired up and 
like, what are we doing about 

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this shell in this route? 
I don't know because I have like

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42 things on my priority list 
before I get to that. 

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Right. 
And some of some of those things

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are being actively exploited 
too, so. 

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Definitely. 
Yeah, that's that's what sticks 

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out to me is I feel like 
exploitation is make something a

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priority. 
We have like the SIS, a cab and 

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we have all these other, you 
know, indicators of 

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exploitation. 
And I think there's, I would say

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an increased focus on these 
vulnerabilities, but maybe not 

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the exploitation at 1st. 
And then there is a focus on 

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exploitation attempts, but still
not actual exploitation. 

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So that's, that's kind of an 
interesting thing in all of this

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too. 
And I actually saw that, yeah, 

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Andrew Morris with Gray Noise 
posted that Gray Noise is going 

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to be looking, you know, at 
quantifying successful 

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exploitation, you know, because 
Green Noise tracks all that and 

227
00:13:19,360 --> 00:13:21,880
including exploitation attempt. 
So I thought that was 

228
00:13:21,880 --> 00:13:24,560
interesting that, you know, 
they're going to be looking 

229
00:13:24,560 --> 00:13:27,960
specifically at how to really 
help people to navigate through 

230
00:13:27,960 --> 00:13:30,080
some of these vulnerabilities 
and the impacts of them. 

231
00:13:30,560 --> 00:13:32,960
Like I feel like there's going 
to be need to be more efforts 

232
00:13:32,960 --> 00:13:36,000
like that to really try to 
understand like what is a 

233
00:13:36,000 --> 00:13:39,000
priority because there's so much
more noise now. 

234
00:13:39,560 --> 00:13:41,040
Right, There's no doubt about 
it. 

235
00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:45,280
Like if you when was the PHP to 
shell thing? 

236
00:13:45,280 --> 00:13:46,880
That was probably a month ago 
now right? 

237
00:13:46,880 --> 00:13:49,280
Like 4 weeks. 
Ago, I think it was like 3 weeks

238
00:13:49,280 --> 00:13:53,040
ago, yeah. 
OK, at the time, and it's still 

239
00:13:53,040 --> 00:14:00,880
there, Census put up this 
dashboard of here's how many PHP

240
00:14:00,960 --> 00:14:04,120
services were vulnerable at the 
time of the release. 

241
00:14:04,400 --> 00:14:05,800
Here's how many have been 
patched. 

242
00:14:05,800 --> 00:14:08,920
Here's how many are vulnerable. 
Now, I haven't looked at it 

243
00:14:09,040 --> 00:14:13,760
probably this week, but it was 
1010s if not hundreds of 

244
00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:16,400
thousands at the beginning. 
And you know, you could see the 

245
00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:19,800
patching goats going, you know, 
over time. 

246
00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:24,160
I guarantee you there's still 
10s of thousands of vulnerable 

247
00:14:24,160 --> 00:14:26,360
services on that dashboard right
now. 

248
00:14:26,680 --> 00:14:29,840
But we've had like 6 other named
bugs between then and now. 

249
00:14:30,280 --> 00:14:34,720
So everybody sort of swept that 
under the rug and forgotten 

250
00:14:34,720 --> 00:14:39,000
about it. 
And probably a lot of enterprise

251
00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:42,480
security teams still haven't 
gotten to all of those services 

252
00:14:42,480 --> 00:14:48,360
on their network obviously, you 
know, so it's just, it's really 

253
00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:51,920
hard when when you're in a time 
like this and we were talking 

254
00:14:51,920 --> 00:14:54,840
about this before we started 
recording. 

255
00:14:56,360 --> 00:15:00,480
I've been at this a long time. 
I can't remember, you know, two 

256
00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:04,040
week period like this or even a 
month period like this. 

257
00:15:05,000 --> 00:15:08,360
The closest thing I can kind of 
remember in this, I would have 

258
00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:10,640
to go back and look at how long 
this time period was. 

259
00:15:10,640 --> 00:15:13,520
I think it was probably more 
than a year, maybe even 2 years 

260
00:15:14,080 --> 00:15:21,280
of when all of the big worms 
were happening like Code Red and

261
00:15:21,280 --> 00:15:25,440
Slammer and the I love You 
virus. 

262
00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:30,480
And that's like I'm probably 
describing A4 year period, 

263
00:15:30,720 --> 00:15:35,440
probably from like 2001 to 2005.
I don't remember when each of 

264
00:15:35,440 --> 00:15:40,560
those worms were, but I think 
I'm almost positive Code Red was

265
00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:45,560
2006 or no it was 2001. 
God, what am I talking about? 

266
00:15:45,840 --> 00:15:49,600
I know that for a fact because 
this is 25 years ago, but in 

267
00:15:49,600 --> 00:15:53,320
Slammer might have been O3 or 
something like that, but that 

268
00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:58,400
was years of time and it seemed 
like an absolute crisis at the 

269
00:15:58,400 --> 00:16:02,400
time because all of those things
were hitting Microsoft products 

270
00:16:02,840 --> 00:16:07,520
and that turned the company's 
attention to security and Bill 

271
00:16:07,520 --> 00:16:11,360
Gates, right, that wrote the 
trustworthy computing memo and 

272
00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:15,240
all all of that kind of stuff 
happened as a result and 

273
00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:17,480
partially as a result of those 
things. 

274
00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:22,840
Compress all of that into this 
past summer and fall or even the

275
00:16:23,000 --> 00:16:27,360
last month, and you get what you
get now. 

276
00:16:27,400 --> 00:16:35,080
Hysteria and sort of confusion 
and exhaustion and people being 

277
00:16:35,080 --> 00:16:37,200
overwhelmed, like you were 
saying, just how? 

278
00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:40,400
Like your brain is just fried 
from all of this. 

279
00:16:40,760 --> 00:16:43,160
Yeah, I know. 
I I completely agree. 

280
00:16:43,160 --> 00:16:47,200
And I there's always been an 
issue of burnout in this 

281
00:16:47,200 --> 00:16:50,960
industry, but I'm, I'm pretty 
concerned right now about just, 

282
00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:54,240
you know, that people are just 
going to get like you said, like

283
00:16:54,320 --> 00:16:57,080
they're brain fried with all 
this. 

284
00:16:57,120 --> 00:17:00,920
But that's interesting though, 
because you know that that was 

285
00:17:00,920 --> 00:17:05,000
something where one vendor, 
Microsoft, could then be like, 

286
00:17:05,280 --> 00:17:07,200
here's what we're going to do 
about this, but this is 

287
00:17:07,200 --> 00:17:09,800
something where this is 
everything. 

288
00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:13,400
I mean, this is like software 
security, the entire ecosystem 

289
00:17:14,000 --> 00:17:16,119
open source. 
Hardware, yeah. 

290
00:17:16,640 --> 00:17:19,760
Yeah, it's like everything is 
suddenly like, not suddenly, but

291
00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:24,000
like everything has been broken 
and now we're just, and we're at

292
00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:25,960
full tilt here, like. 
Right. 

293
00:17:26,440 --> 00:17:30,160
And the one piece of this that I
think is connected to the AI 

294
00:17:30,160 --> 00:17:35,920
thing is just the acceleration 
of vulnerability discovery with 

295
00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,600
AI models. 
Obviously, you know, we're 

296
00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:41,720
finding more and more and more 
of these bugs every day, every 

297
00:17:41,720 --> 00:17:48,600
week, every month. 
And that stuff piles up on the 

298
00:17:48,840 --> 00:17:51,640
vendors and the security teams 
trying to respond to them, 

299
00:17:51,640 --> 00:17:54,480
right? 
Like the at least two of those 

300
00:17:54,480 --> 00:17:58,880
named bugs this week were 
discovered using Frontier 

301
00:17:58,880 --> 00:18:03,960
models. 
And I think the Nginx one, if I 

302
00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:09,240
remember correctly is the yes, 
there were three or maybe even 4

303
00:18:09,240 --> 00:18:14,760
research teams that discovered 
those bugs basically 

304
00:18:14,760 --> 00:18:18,240
simultaneously, or at least one 
or two of them. 

305
00:18:18,440 --> 00:18:22,200
I think there's five bugs 
involved in that in the nginx to

306
00:18:22,760 --> 00:18:26,280
shell or root, whatever. 
But there was there was several 

307
00:18:26,280 --> 00:18:28,880
bug collisions in there because 
several security teams found 

308
00:18:28,880 --> 00:18:32,280
them at the same time or within 
days of each other and, you 

309
00:18:32,280 --> 00:18:34,320
know, reported them and they got
reported as dupes. 

310
00:18:34,440 --> 00:18:38,640
But that's the kind of thing 
that bug collisions like that 

311
00:18:38,640 --> 00:18:42,960
were relatively rare before 
Frontier models were widely 

312
00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:44,960
available. 
You would they would be rare 

313
00:18:44,960 --> 00:18:48,480
enough that you would hear 
researchers talking about them 

314
00:18:48,480 --> 00:18:51,520
at blackout. 
Like holy shit this guy found 

315
00:18:51,520 --> 00:18:55,760
the exact same bug I did in 
Chrome like within a month of 

316
00:18:55,760 --> 00:18:56,640
me. 
That's crazy. 

317
00:18:56,640 --> 00:18:58,680
What a weird thing, right? 
Yeah. 

318
00:18:59,200 --> 00:19:02,720
Now it's like, yeah, that just 
happens every literally every 

319
00:19:02,720 --> 00:19:05,040
day. 
Yeah. 

320
00:19:05,040 --> 00:19:08,360
And is that, I mean, I'm, I'm 
seeing some discourse that when 

321
00:19:08,360 --> 00:19:13,200
you use AI, maybe that's because
of that the the finding those 

322
00:19:13,200 --> 00:19:16,120
similar vulnerabilities like, 
yeah. 

323
00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:18,080
So that I mean, that's, that's 
interesting. 

324
00:19:18,520 --> 00:19:25,040
Yeah, I think usually when that 
happened before, before the AI 

325
00:19:25,040 --> 00:19:33,880
era, it was because some new bug
class became known or something 

326
00:19:33,880 --> 00:19:36,080
like that. 
So researchers started focusing 

327
00:19:36,080 --> 00:19:40,280
their attention on a specific 
portion of, say, the Chrome code

328
00:19:40,280 --> 00:19:43,760
base. 
So they were like, OK, there was

329
00:19:43,760 --> 00:19:48,040
one serious bug in this area. 
Bugs tend to cluster. 

330
00:19:48,240 --> 00:19:51,560
Let's focus our attention here 
and see if there's any other 

331
00:19:51,560 --> 00:19:53,720
bugs there. 
So then sometimes you would find

332
00:19:53,720 --> 00:19:58,000
see those bug collisions where 
two or more researchers found 

333
00:19:58,000 --> 00:20:03,160
the same bug. 
Now I think, and I would have to

334
00:20:03,160 --> 00:20:08,400
ask people smarter than me about
this, but I think that research 

335
00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:11,200
teams that are using these 
Frontier models are sort of 

336
00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:16,280
doing the same thing. 
In in a way where they're 

337
00:20:16,280 --> 00:20:20,760
saying, OK, they're pointing a 
model at a specific code base, 

338
00:20:20,760 --> 00:20:25,000
say Java. 
And Java has been, you know, 

339
00:20:25,000 --> 00:20:27,680
researched and attacked and 
fuzzed for decades. 

340
00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:31,680
Like it is one of the most 
audited and inspected code bases

341
00:20:31,680 --> 00:20:34,800
that we have. 
So there's not a lot of places 

342
00:20:34,800 --> 00:20:37,120
that you can look that would 
have obvious bugs. 

343
00:20:37,400 --> 00:20:42,560
So the models tend to go and 
look in the same places even if 

344
00:20:42,560 --> 00:20:44,160
there's different teams using 
them. 

345
00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:48,800
That would be my sort of, you 
know, somewhat educated theory 

346
00:20:48,800 --> 00:20:51,720
on it. 
That's why I had seen people 

347
00:20:51,880 --> 00:20:54,240
talking about. 
I think that's interesting. 

348
00:20:54,240 --> 00:20:58,600
There's a lot of impacts of all 
this, even beyond that, just 

349
00:20:58,600 --> 00:21:02,400
like the slew of vulnerabilities
that are being disclosed that, 

350
00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:04,120
you know, I worry about a little
bit. 

351
00:21:04,120 --> 00:21:07,880
First of all, when when anyone 
finds any sort of vulnerability,

352
00:21:07,880 --> 00:21:11,600
then researchers will go prod 
and, you know, look into that 

353
00:21:11,600 --> 00:21:14,080
specific product or code base or
whatever. 

354
00:21:14,080 --> 00:21:17,120
And so it's kind of like a 
trickle down effect where more 

355
00:21:17,120 --> 00:21:19,320
vulnerabilities sometimes will 
be disclosed. 

356
00:21:20,280 --> 00:21:23,600
So that that's one thing, but 
then also like with with these 

357
00:21:23,600 --> 00:21:26,800
vulnerabilities, especially if 
they are for some of them 

358
00:21:26,800 --> 00:21:30,160
impacting things that are being 
used by so many vendors. 

359
00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:34,320
If patches are being rushed out 
or anything, like I get a little

360
00:21:34,320 --> 00:21:38,320
nervous about patches that are 
incomplete or just implications 

361
00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:40,840
of that there. 
And that and that can then lead 

362
00:21:40,840 --> 00:21:44,880
to, you know, continual hot 
fixes and going into down that 

363
00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:49,080
whole rabbit hole of just like 
mess that creates more work for 

364
00:21:49,080 --> 00:21:52,080
security defenders. 
It does. 

365
00:21:52,120 --> 00:21:55,640
And in a lot of cases when 
researchers find a new 

366
00:21:55,640 --> 00:21:59,080
vulnerability, they, you know, 
if they're going to go the the 

367
00:21:59,760 --> 00:22:03,480
full route, especially now, 
they'll develop an exploit for 

368
00:22:03,480 --> 00:22:07,120
it to prove that it's 
exploitable, submit that to 

369
00:22:07,120 --> 00:22:10,680
whoever the vendor is or the 
open source maintainers or or 

370
00:22:10,680 --> 00:22:13,560
whatever. 
And they'll also sometimes, you 

371
00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:16,200
know, write a patch or suggest a
fix for it. 

372
00:22:16,680 --> 00:22:20,080
And now I think a lot of that is
done with these AI models 

373
00:22:20,360 --> 00:22:23,320
because it's fast and efficient 
and they can move on to the next

374
00:22:23,320 --> 00:22:25,760
thing and they submit all that 
stuff to the vendor and they're 

375
00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:27,800
like, here, we, we did all this 
stuff for you. 

376
00:22:27,800 --> 00:22:29,960
I don't know how often vendors 
use this. 

377
00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:35,040
I I know that they develop their
own patches, but I also do think

378
00:22:35,040 --> 00:22:39,920
that a lot of the testing and 
patch development inside the 

379
00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:42,800
vendors is done in an automated 
way now. 

380
00:22:43,920 --> 00:22:47,520
So, yeah, I don't know, every, 
everybody's just overwhelmed and

381
00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:52,440
like kind of exhausted and 
they're, you know, can't really 

382
00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:57,400
take much more input. 
So I, I just, yeah, the burnout 

383
00:22:58,160 --> 00:23:02,000
thing is, you know, obviously 
we're not fighting a war like 

384
00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:04,000
working in, in an ER or 
something. 

385
00:23:04,000 --> 00:23:08,840
But your brain can only handle 
so much, you know, that if you, 

386
00:23:09,680 --> 00:23:14,040
you work in an organization that
does IR in some cases. 

387
00:23:14,040 --> 00:23:17,800
And we have lots of friends that
work in the IR world. 

388
00:23:18,480 --> 00:23:22,440
They're always sort of tired and
like exhausted. 

389
00:23:22,880 --> 00:23:30,280
And the last like month or two, 
everyone I've talked to says 

390
00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:32,840
that every single IR firm is at 
capacity. 

391
00:23:33,040 --> 00:23:37,680
If you don't have an existing 
contract with an IR firm, they 

392
00:23:37,680 --> 00:23:42,240
cannot help you right now. 
If you have an actual intrusion,

393
00:23:42,480 --> 00:23:45,680
you are up the Creek. 
You better have your own 

394
00:23:45,680 --> 00:23:49,560
internal IR team or you are way 
down a waiting list and you're 

395
00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:53,960
not going to get any help. 
Yeah, that and that anecdote is,

396
00:23:54,040 --> 00:23:58,920
is really interesting because it
makes me wonder if we're seeing 

397
00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:03,720
more attacks or if we're seeing 
more like people bringing in IR 

398
00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:08,800
firms to try to run the gambit 
of attacks or we're trying to or

399
00:24:08,800 --> 00:24:11,520
if there's more, you know, 
priority put being put in 

400
00:24:11,520 --> 00:24:13,640
cybersecurity or what's going on
there. 

401
00:24:13,640 --> 00:24:17,800
But. 
Yeah, probably some of it is 

402
00:24:18,560 --> 00:24:23,920
increased volume of intrusions, 
but I, I don't know the answer 

403
00:24:23,920 --> 00:24:27,040
to that. 
But the part that I do know is 

404
00:24:27,040 --> 00:24:30,400
that those especially the high 
end IR firms are just like 

405
00:24:30,920 --> 00:24:34,040
they're absolutely at capacity 
because most of them, most of 

406
00:24:34,040 --> 00:24:37,320
their capacity is taken up with 
standing contracts all the time 

407
00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:40,640
anyway. 
You know, you can think of the 

408
00:24:40,640 --> 00:24:43,960
ones that you know, off the top 
of your head, they have big 

409
00:24:43,960 --> 00:24:47,240
government contracts, they have 
big enterprise contracts that 

410
00:24:47,480 --> 00:24:52,120
they're on retainer. 
So if you know, Bank X gets 

411
00:24:52,560 --> 00:24:58,040
compromised, they send 50 people
and you know, they go 

412
00:24:58,160 --> 00:25:01,720
investigate it for you. 
If you're a small school 

413
00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:05,320
district and you need some help 
because you just got Ransom 

414
00:25:05,320 --> 00:25:07,960
wared, they ain't going to help 
you, you know? 

415
00:25:09,320 --> 00:25:11,480
It's. 
Tough times, but. 

416
00:25:12,320 --> 00:25:14,760
Yeah, I know everything's 
broken. 

417
00:25:15,160 --> 00:25:19,200
It's the conclusion that. 
Has broken and you know, kind of

418
00:25:19,200 --> 00:25:23,120
on the like related to all of 
the vulnerability research stuff

419
00:25:23,680 --> 00:25:29,280
is a couple of very large and 
important research teams this 

420
00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:35,120
week said they're changing their
disclosure timelines, Anthropic 

421
00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:38,800
and Project 0. 
Project 0 is probably the, I 

422
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:42,520
mean that's the big domino in 
that world, right? 

423
00:25:43,960 --> 00:25:51,120
So they for a long time have had
this 90 day disclosure timeline 

424
00:25:52,160 --> 00:25:59,440
where they would notify a vendor
of a finding, here's all the 

425
00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:04,600
information, the clock starts 
now you have 90 days to fix this

426
00:26:04,600 --> 00:26:09,520
or do whatever. 
And on day 91, we're disclosing 

427
00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:11,560
everything. 
And they do that all the time. 

428
00:26:11,560 --> 00:26:14,800
Like you see their, their blogs 
and their, their Twitter feed, 

429
00:26:14,800 --> 00:26:18,040
all that kind of stuff. 
And they don't do, you know, 

430
00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:22,080
minor stuff. 
Project 0 is the, you know, it's

431
00:26:22,080 --> 00:26:26,320
the absolute apex team of 
vulnerability researchers. 

432
00:26:26,920 --> 00:26:30,800
And they decided to change their
timeline for certain things this

433
00:26:30,800 --> 00:26:33,240
week. 
So they move it to 60 days. 

434
00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:35,480
Is that right? 
Or was it 30? 

435
00:26:35,480 --> 00:26:39,640
So, so they, yeah, they dropped 
it from 90 to 60 days in I think

436
00:26:39,640 --> 00:26:44,640
February and then they're going 
to drop it to 30 days in 2028 is

437
00:26:44,640 --> 00:26:47,480
what I had seen. 
OK, so that, yeah, there's 

438
00:26:47,480 --> 00:26:51,880
plenty of time there, but that's
still like a, that's still a 

439
00:26:51,880 --> 00:26:54,640
major development. 
It's nice that they're giving 

440
00:26:54,640 --> 00:26:59,440
people like a, you know, 12 
months to figure it out, but 

441
00:26:59,880 --> 00:27:03,600
that's not a trivial thing. 
You know. 

442
00:27:04,040 --> 00:27:08,640
Taking 60 days off the timeline.
Right, exactly. 

443
00:27:09,120 --> 00:27:13,280
And and then Anthropic is moving
to 30 days too, but they're the 

444
00:27:13,280 --> 00:27:18,120
disclosure window was effective 
January 2027. 

445
00:27:18,120 --> 00:27:21,320
So that's a little more of a 
tight one, but that's and that's

446
00:27:21,320 --> 00:27:23,080
for high and critical severity 
flaws. 

447
00:27:24,120 --> 00:27:27,760
And you can imagine, I know a 
couple of the vulnerability 

448
00:27:27,760 --> 00:27:33,000
researchers there, very talented
people and they obviously have 

449
00:27:33,000 --> 00:27:37,880
access to like the absolute 
bleeding edge AI models. 

450
00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:43,400
So this the bugs that they're 
going to be finding or have been

451
00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:47,360
finding are, you know, crazy 
things. 

452
00:27:48,360 --> 00:27:53,040
They're not always like the mass
exploitation things, but they 

453
00:27:53,400 --> 00:27:58,760
often effects very widely 
deployed apps and services that 

454
00:27:59,920 --> 00:28:02,160
that are major concerns for most
enterprises. 

455
00:28:02,160 --> 00:28:07,080
So I don't know that we're 
already this week. 

456
00:28:07,080 --> 00:28:10,440
You know, the last couple of 
weeks we've seen sort of a 

457
00:28:10,440 --> 00:28:14,800
return of like not the 
disclosure discourse, but more 

458
00:28:14,800 --> 00:28:20,120
of like, oh, some, it seems like
every details of every one of 

459
00:28:20,120 --> 00:28:21,880
these name bugs tend to leak 
now. 

460
00:28:21,880 --> 00:28:25,520
I'm not totally sure why. 
Yeah, that's odd. 

461
00:28:26,440 --> 00:28:30,400
Yeah, funny how that happens. 
And it's it's hard when it's 

462
00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:32,480
multi party disclosure. 
Like we've talked to Katie in 

463
00:28:32,480 --> 00:28:35,200
service about this many times. 
That's a really difficult thing 

464
00:28:35,200 --> 00:28:39,720
to do. 
But leaking it for like cloud 

465
00:28:39,720 --> 00:28:41,560
points or whatever is just so 
dumb. 

466
00:28:41,560 --> 00:28:44,200
I'm so like what? 
Who does that help? 

467
00:28:44,520 --> 00:28:46,840
Why are you doing that? 
So you can have the first blog 

468
00:28:46,840 --> 00:28:48,120
post up there. 
Come on. 

469
00:28:48,920 --> 00:28:52,440
I know, I like that. 
Was it like Space Rogue who had 

470
00:28:52,440 --> 00:28:55,960
that vent? 
Basically, this is a pretty 

471
00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:58,880
tight knit community and if you 
do something like that, you're 

472
00:28:58,880 --> 00:29:02,520
going to burn a lot of you're 
just going to get burned because

473
00:29:02,520 --> 00:29:03,880
no one's going to trust you 
anymore. 

474
00:29:04,320 --> 00:29:07,080
No, that's exactly right. 
And if you don't know who Space 

475
00:29:07,080 --> 00:29:10,320
Rogue is, he's from the loft and
has been doing this for 30 

476
00:29:10,320 --> 00:29:11,440
years. 
He knows what the hell he's 

477
00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:16,520
talking about and has seen more 
vulnerability disclosure 

478
00:29:16,600 --> 00:29:21,200
arguments and discussions than 
basically anybody or as many as 

479
00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:24,000
anybody alive. 
So yeah, it doesn't help 

480
00:29:24,000 --> 00:29:26,960
anybody. 
And we're also seeing a lot of 

481
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:33,480
not a lot, but I've seen a few 
things of like, wait, well, we 

482
00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:36,120
discovered this bug too, but 
we're not credited in the in the

483
00:29:36,120 --> 00:29:39,480
advisory because, you know, we 
reported it, but we're told it 

484
00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:41,640
was a duplicate. 
But we reported it, you know, 

485
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:45,440
with on the same day and a bunch
of that sort of like petty 

486
00:29:45,440 --> 00:29:48,640
infighting stuff that also is 
like, what are we doing? 

487
00:29:49,800 --> 00:29:51,800
What? 
Are we doing? 

488
00:29:52,320 --> 00:29:55,280
What are we doing there? 
It is for those of you following

489
00:29:55,280 --> 00:29:59,960
at home, it does seem like a 
return to some of like the stuff

490
00:29:59,960 --> 00:30:06,320
from 15 or 20 years ago of the 
whining about disclosure 

491
00:30:06,320 --> 00:30:11,000
timelines and arguing about who 
gets credit for what, all that 

492
00:30:11,000 --> 00:30:12,520
kind of stuff. 
So I don't know. 

493
00:30:13,080 --> 00:30:17,880
Going back to these shortening 
disclosure windows, I think it's

494
00:30:17,880 --> 00:30:21,040
hard because that's going to put
pressure on software vendors 

495
00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:24,440
that need to remediate those 
vulnerabilities quicker. 

496
00:30:24,440 --> 00:30:28,720
But then also it's like, you 
know, you wanted to, you want to

497
00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:31,640
have that pressure because if 
attackers get the 

498
00:30:31,640 --> 00:30:34,000
vulnerabilities or like 
attackers are using the same 

499
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,520
models, it's a tough situation I
think all around. 

500
00:30:37,240 --> 00:30:41,800
That's always been the argument,
right, Is that we're disclosing 

501
00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:45,800
this or, you know, we're telling
you, the vendor about this 

502
00:30:45,800 --> 00:30:48,840
vulnerability. 
We're giving you a decent, you 

503
00:30:48,840 --> 00:30:50,880
know, a decent interval to fix 
it. 

504
00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:54,800
And if you don't, then we're 
going to disclose it so that at 

505
00:30:54,800 --> 00:30:56,680
least offenders have the 
information about the 

506
00:30:56,680 --> 00:31:00,400
vulnerability. 
And because we found it, we have

507
00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:04,360
to assume that somebody else 
could have or has found it. 

508
00:31:04,760 --> 00:31:08,880
That part of it was always a 
little more difficult for me to 

509
00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:12,680
believe, say 15 years ago, 
because bug collisions were so 

510
00:31:12,680 --> 00:31:15,360
rare. 
Now, I think that argument is 

511
00:31:15,360 --> 00:31:20,120
totally valid because there's a 
a significant chance that 

512
00:31:20,120 --> 00:31:21,520
somebody else has found the same
bug. 

513
00:31:23,160 --> 00:31:26,360
Right, You know, So, yeah, yeah,
we'll see where that goes. 

514
00:31:27,000 --> 00:31:28,680
Yeah, I can tell you where it's 
going to go. 

515
00:31:28,800 --> 00:31:31,200
It's going to go. 
It's going to go straight into a

516
00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:35,840
brick wall like it's like to 
everything else these days. 

517
00:31:36,800 --> 00:31:39,680
Yeah, I saw the Ruby to shell 
disclosure. 

518
00:31:39,680 --> 00:31:43,240
Like they mentioned that they're
going to publish the POC one 

519
00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:46,800
week after disclosure too. 
I think that's interesting, 

520
00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:49,640
like. 
It is curious, No, sometimes 

521
00:31:49,640 --> 00:31:53,840
like the especially researchers 
who, yeah, develop their own PO 

522
00:31:53,840 --> 00:31:57,840
CS, like the person who 
discovers the vulnerability, you

523
00:31:57,840 --> 00:32:00,480
know, develops the exploit, all 
that kind of stuff, will often 

524
00:32:00,480 --> 00:32:04,440
say we're not going to publish 
the exploit because this is 

525
00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:07,560
trivial or something like that. 
So we don't want to give any 

526
00:32:07,560 --> 00:32:15,320
more ammunition to the bad guys.
But the often now you'll see 

527
00:32:15,320 --> 00:32:21,120
offensive teams like, you know, 
Volcheck or Providian or 

528
00:32:21,120 --> 00:32:25,520
somebody like that Watchtower, 
they develop their own exploits 

529
00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:28,240
like really quickly. 
And, you know, those often just 

530
00:32:28,240 --> 00:32:30,080
go to their customers. 
Like, they don't typically 

531
00:32:30,080 --> 00:32:33,960
release those publicly, but 
doesn't take too long before 

532
00:32:33,960 --> 00:32:36,680
these things show up on GitHub 
these days. 

533
00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:42,720
Some of them might be, you know,
crappy AI exploits, but often 

534
00:32:42,720 --> 00:32:44,760
they're enough to like, crash 
the service or the app or 

535
00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:47,760
something like that, which is 
annoying in and of itself. 

536
00:32:47,760 --> 00:32:51,520
But yeah, there's a lot. 
Of moving parts and pieces to 

537
00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:54,120
all this so things are just 
changing quickly. 

538
00:32:54,120 --> 00:32:56,480
I would some things are 
changing, a lot of things are 

539
00:32:56,480 --> 00:32:59,520
staying the same. 
So other things are just kind 

540
00:32:59,520 --> 00:33:01,800
of. 
Going back to what they were 20 

541
00:33:01,800 --> 00:33:06,680
years ago, Yes, yeah. 
As it, it does seem like we're 

542
00:33:06,680 --> 00:33:09,120
in one of those kind of like 
cyclone. 

543
00:33:09,120 --> 00:33:13,360
It's just like going around and 
around and around and yeah, 

544
00:33:14,360 --> 00:33:17,920
it's, it's weird times, but very
weird times. 

545
00:33:17,960 --> 00:33:21,840
Yeah, so but. 
We are close to the Thanksgiving

546
00:33:21,840 --> 00:33:25,120
holiday here in the US, so 
hopefully we'll we'll get a 

547
00:33:25,120 --> 00:33:29,720
break for a few days. 
Hopefully just none of you 

548
00:33:29,720 --> 00:33:31,800
people like don't disclose 
anything next week. 

549
00:33:31,800 --> 00:33:35,480
Nobody needs that. 
We don't need any like new bugs 

550
00:33:35,480 --> 00:33:37,360
on like Tuesday or Wednesday 
next week. 

551
00:33:37,480 --> 00:33:39,800
You guys just chill. 
Not cool. 

552
00:33:40,080 --> 00:33:42,280
No, not cool. 
People do that play. 

553
00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:44,520
Like a touch football. 
Game with your cousins or 

554
00:33:44,520 --> 00:33:48,960
something like, you know, just. 
Yeah, you know, just give 

555
00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:49,960
everybody a break. 
Come on. 

556
00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:51,680
Yeah. 
Eat Turkey. 

557
00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:56,520
Lay on the couch, have a drink, 
watch some, you know, some, some

558
00:33:56,520 --> 00:33:59,280
of the Thanksgiving parade, Like
that's it, Yeah. 

559
00:33:59,720 --> 00:34:01,120
That's all you got to do. 
Yeah. 

560
00:34:01,920 --> 00:34:03,680
All right. 
Well, hopefully next week we'll 

561
00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:06,600
be chill and we'll see what 
happens. 

562
00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:08,520
Have a great weekend. 
You too. 

563
00:34:08,679 --> 00:34:09,320
Bye. 
See ya.

