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Welcome to the debate. 
Today we're looking at a 

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controversy that sits right at 
the bleeding edge of 

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transportation technology. 
It's a dispute that really 

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divides the engineering world 
right down the middle, and the 

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outcome is going to determine 
how and frankly if our vehicles 

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drive themselves in the next 
decade. 

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We are talking about the war 
between vision only systems and 

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sensor fusion, specifically 
regarding the use of Lidar. 

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And this isn't just a 
theoretical argument anymore, is

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it? 
We're looking at recent and, 

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well, quite alarming reports 
about the deployment of Tesla's 

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robo taxi fleet. 
The headline data suggests a 

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crash rate that's significantly 
higher than human drivers. 

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Some reports are saying up to 
four times higher. 

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It it just raises a very 
uncomfortable question. 

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Can a system that relies only on
cameras ever truly match the 

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reliability of a system that 
uses active laser sensors? 

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And that's really the core of 
it. 

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Can a computer see the world 
well enough with just video 

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feeds to navigate safely? 
Or does excluding depth sensing 

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hardware like Lidar resent an 
insurmountable barrier? 

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I'm the advocate. 
My position is that visual input

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is, well, theoretically 
sufficient because it mimics the

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biological model. 
It mimics us. 

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I also suspect the current crash
data is being heavily 

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misinterpreted because of some 
serious reporting biases. 

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And I'm the dissenter. 
My position is that abandoning 

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Lidar is a dangerous cost 
cutting measure that ignores the

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kind of redundancy you 
absolutely need for safety 

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critical systems. 
We're seeing higher crash rates 

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not because of a reporting bias,
but because of a fundamental 

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hardware deficit. 
When you take away the sensor 

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that tells you exactly how far 
away an object is, you are 

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introducing a level of risk that
just shouldn't be on public 

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roads. 
OK, so let's get into the 

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machinery of this. 
We really need to start with the

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first principles argument, 
because this is the hill the 

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vision only proponents are 
willing to die on. 

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There's a perspective shared by 
a contributor to our source 

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material, Retroviridae 6, that's
basically an existence proof. 

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Ah, the humans do it argument. 
Exactly. 

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It's the biological argument. 
You and I drove here today. 

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We navigated traffic. 
We merged. 

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We avoided pedestrians. 
We did all of that using two 

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passive optical sensors, our 
eyes, and a biological neural 

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network, our brain. 
We don't have lidar in our 

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foreheads, we don't emit laser 
pulses to measure time of 

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flight, we don't have radar. 
We rely entirely on optical flow

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and pattern recognition. 
Sure. 

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So Retrovira day six's point is 
that if a biological neural net 

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can drive a car using only 
passive optical sensors, then it

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is physically possible for a 
synthetic neural net to do the 

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same thing. 
The physics allows it. 

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Therefore, the argument that 
Lidar is required is just false.

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Lidar might be a shortcut, but 
it isn't a necessity. 

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The photons entering the camera 
contain all the information you 

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need to drive. 
I'm sorry but I just don't buy 

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that. 
Let me tell you why that is a 

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huge category error. 
Your conflating otential with 

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execution. 
Just because humans can drive 

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with their eyes doesn't mean 
robots should drive without 

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laser precision. 
But why not if the goal is to 

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replicate human capability? 
Theology is full of flaws we're 

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trying to engineer out of the 
system. 

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The promise of autonomy isn't to
drive as well as a distracted 

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ape, it's to drive perfectly. 
And to drive perfectly, you need

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data that the human eye simply 
cannot provide. 

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But we're not talking about 
fatigue. 

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We're talking about the sensory 
input required to build a model 

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of the world. 
But you cannot compete with 

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Lidar are using only visual 
cameras when it comes to what 

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I'd call ground truth. 
As another observer, Wiggly Worm

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pointed out in the materials, 
Lidar provides absolute depth 

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data. 
So maybe we should break that 

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down a bit for anyone who isn't 
a robotics engineer. 

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Right. 
A camera is a passive sensor. 

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It takes in light and it creates
a flat 2D image. 

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To figure out how far away a car
is, the software has to analyze 

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the size of that car in the 
image, compare it to what it 

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thinks a car looks like, and 
then infer the distance it's 

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guessing. 
It's a very educated guess, but 

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it is a guess. 
It's inference based on 

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perspective and parallax, yeah. 
Lidar is active, It shoots out a

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laser pulse, it hits a car, and 
it measures exactly how long it 

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takes for the light to bounce 
back. 

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It's simple physics. 
Distance equals time multiplied 

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by the speed of light. 
It doesn't guess, it knows. 

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It says there is an object 12.4 
meters away. 

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Wiggly Worm's point is that when
you remove that sensor, you're 

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forcing the computer to 
hallucinate death. 

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And when you look at the stats, 
Tesla's robo taxi is reportedly 

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crashing at a rate 4 times 
higher than humans. 

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That isn't just the learning 
curve, that is a failure of 

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perception. 
I think that statistic, the four

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times higher crash rate, is 
doing a lot of heavy lifting in 

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your argument, and I I want to 
contextualize it. 

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We need to be very careful about
comparing apples to oranges 

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here. 
A crash is a crash, isn't it? 

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Not necessarily. 
Another analyst, Eskrove 2 He 

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noted that this specific 
headline is based on a really 

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small sample size. 5 incidents 
in Austin in a single month. 

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But if you look at the 
granularity of those incidents, 

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the data includes really minor 
events like a tire touching a 

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parking sign or bumping A curb 
while parking. 5 incidents in a 

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month for a small fleet is still
high. 

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But think about human behavior. 
If I scrape my rim on a curb 

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while I'm parallel parking, or 
if I tap a plastic Bullard at 

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one mile per hour, do I call the
police? 

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Do I call my insurance company? 
No. 

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It never enters the statistical 
record. 

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It just vanishes. 
Right, it's unreported. 

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Exactly, but for a robo taxi, 
every single sensor reading is 

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logged. 
Every thump is a reported 

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incident. 
The system self-reports 

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everything. 
So you're comparing reported 

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autonomous incidents where every
scratch is scrutinized against 

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reported human accidents, which 
are usually only the the one 

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severe enough to require tow 
truck. 

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Ask contributors UX Test and 
Jerkletos pointed out you're 

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comparing A microscope to a 
telescope and then claiming the 

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microscope sees more dirt I. 
Understand the reporting bias 

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argument. 
It's valid to a point, but I 

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also think it's a convenient way
to wave away failure. 

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You call it rubbing a curb. 
I call it a failure of object 

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permanence. 
That feels like a bit of a 

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stretch for a scratched rim. 
Is it? 

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Contrast this with Waymo. 
We have user experiences from 

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San Francisco contributors like 
Turbo Encapsulator and Luda lol 

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who describe Waymo as flawless 
in the same complex urban 

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environments where these vision 
based systems are struggling. 

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Waymo uses Lidar. 
They have that spinning bucket 

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on the roof. 
They aren't scraping rims. 

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They aren't bumping signs. 
They're also driving in a 

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fishbowl. 
You're driving in San Francisco.

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That's hardly officiable. 
It's a Geo fenced pre mapped 

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environment that Waymo knows 
exactly where every curb is 

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because it has a high definition
map stored in its hard drive. 

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It's not seeing the curb, it's 
remembering it. 

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Tesla's vision approach is 
trying to do something much much

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harder. 
Drive anywhere on any road 

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without a map, just like a 
human. 

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Of course it's going to be 
clumsier in the beginning. 

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It's learning general 
intelligence, not just 

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memorizing a map. 
But that clumsiness has real 

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world consequences. 
The reports of these vision only

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cars hitting stationary objects 
like parking signs? 

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That indicates A fundamental 
flaw. 

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If a vision system cannot 
calculate the distance to a 

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concrete Bullard well enough to 
avoid hitting it, how can we 

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possibly trust it to calculate 
the velocity of a child running 

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into the street? 
Because the neural networks are 

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weighted differently for those 
tasks, the system is likely 

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hyper cautious around 
pedestrians, but has a higher 

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tolerance for static objects to 
facilitate, say, parking. 

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That is an assumption. 
Lidar solves the static object 

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problem instantly. 
It doesn't need to infer or wait

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anything. 
It hits the Ballard with a laser

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and it knows it's there. 
The fact that these vision based

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cars are hitting stationary 
objects suggests that the 

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software is hallucinating free 
space where there is solid 

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matter. 
That is terrifying. 

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It implies the car literally 
does not know the physical 

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boundaries of its own 
environment. 

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I will concede that static 
object detection is a hurdle 

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right now, but identifying these
edge cases is exactly how you 

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train the network. 
Every time it hits a parking 

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sign at 2 mph, it uploads that 
failure and the entire fleet 

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learns not to do it again. 
And this brings us directly to 

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the concept of systemic risk. 
We have to talk about the 

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multiplier effect. 
Explain how you view that. 

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This was articulated very well 
by the source contributor Becker

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Hollow. 
The argument is all about error 

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scaling. 
When a human makes a mistake, it

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causes 1 accident. 
Human error is stochastic. 

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It's random. 
You might get distracted by a 

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text. 
I might drop my coffee. 

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It's isolated. 
Sure, individual variants. 

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But when a vision based software
has a flaw in its programming, 

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say a specific inability to 
distinguish a white truck 

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against a bright sky, that error
is replicated across every 

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single device on the road. 
The centralized bug. 

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Exactly. 
If the software misinterprets a 

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specific shadow or glare, 
thousands of cars become 

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dangerous simultaneously in the 
exact same way. 

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You aren't dealing with one bad 
driver, you're dealing with a 

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fleet of clones all sharing the 
same blind spot. 

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That is a systemic risk profile 
that we have never, ever dealt 

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with in automotive history. 
That's an interesting point, 

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though I would frame it 
differently. 

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That logic flips both ways. 
It's actually the strongest 

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argument for autonomous systems.
Yes, an error is distributed, 

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but so is the solution. 
If they catch it in time. 

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Think about it, when a human 
driver is bad at merging, 

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they're usually bad at merging 
forever. 

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You can't patch their brain, but
if you solve the edge case in 

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software, if you fix that white 
truck against the sky bug, you 

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instantly fix every car on the 
road. 

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You can upgrade the safety of 
the entire fleet overnight with 

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an over the air update. 
The multiplier effect applies to

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safety even more than it applies
to error. 

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You're leveraging the collective
learning of millions of miles. 

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But. 
Until that fix arrives, the risk

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is distributed to the public 
without their consent. 

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The public roads are becoming a 
beta testing environment. 

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We're seeing a move fast and 
break things mentality applied 

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to two ton metal projectiles. 
Beckerhollow's logic holds the 

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error rate is a normal human 
error multiplied by the number 

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of devices using the program. 
If the program is flawed, the 

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carnage is scalable. 
I see why you think that, but 

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let me give you a different 
perspective on the technical 

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reliability piece. 
You keep going back to Lidar as 

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this source of truth, but Lidar 
has its own failure modes. 

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It does, but they are different 
from cameras. 

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Lidar struggles with heavy rain.
The laser pulses scatter off the

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water droplets. 
It struggles with fog. 

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It can get confused by 
interference from other lidar 

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units. 
It's not magic. 

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And this is where the whole 
sensor fusion argument gets 

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tricky. 
Go on. 

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When you have a camera an A 
lidar, they will often disagree.

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The camera sees a plastic bag 
blowing across the road and 

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thinks it's nothing. 
Lidar sees an object and says 

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obstacle emergency brake. 
Now the computer has to decide 

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which sensor to trust. 
This is the sensor fusion 

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conflict. 
By removing Lidar, Tesla is 

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arguing that you remove the 
noise. 

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You force the neural net to 
resolve the visual data just 

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like a human does, without 
getting confused by conflicting 

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signals. 
That sounds like a very 

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convenient engineering 
rationalization for saving 

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money. 
Cameras are cheap, Lidar is 

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expensive. 
It's definitely cheaper, but 

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retroverted Z6 mentioned. 
We went from the horse and buggy

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to the moon in just a few 
decades. 

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Assuming that computer vision 
can't bridge the gap just 

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because it hasn't yet is 
premature. 

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The issue isn't that the camera 
is blind, it's that the 

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processing isn't yet 
sophisticated enough. 

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But processing power is scaling 
exponentially. 

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Software cannot conjure photons 
where there are none. 

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That's the physics problem. 
But it can interpret context. 

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Let's talk about those photons. 
Cameras are passive. 

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They need light. 
What happens when you drive 

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directly into the sunset? 
We've all done it. 

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The visor goes down. 
You squint. 

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You can barely see. 
Cameras get blinded by sun 

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glare. 
They get obscured by mud. 

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We have reports that Tesla is 
having to employ trailing chase 

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cars with human safety monitors 
for their autonomous taxis. 

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If the system is so 
theoretically sound, why does it

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need a human babysitter in a 
separate vehicle? 

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Every developmental technology 
has safety protocols during 

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testing, but. 
This is being sold as a future 

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that is just around the corner. 
The reliance on cameras 

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introduces A fragility that 
Lidar solves. 

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Lidar cuts through sun glare. 
It works in total darkness. 

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It is a second layer of truth. 
If the camera sees a shadow and 

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thinks it's a hole in the road, 
the Lidar says no, the ground is

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flat. 
Removing that sensor removes a 

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layer of survival. 
It's engineering hubris to 

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believe you can derive 100% 
certainty from a sensor that is 

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susceptible to optical 
illusions. 

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I'm not convinced by that line 
of reasoning because it assumes 

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we can't solve optical illusions
with better AI. 

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But let's pivot to the 
consequences of this, because 

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the legal aspect is fascinating.
It's a nightmare. 

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This leads us to the inevitable 
question of accountability. 

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When these systems do fail, 
whether it's a clumsy bump or a 

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serious collision, who is 
responsible? 

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This is the question posed by 
Shifty Mennonite in our source 

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threads. 
Who is going to be held 

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accountable when these things 
mow people down? 

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It is a legal quagmire. 
Is it the driver, which in this 

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case is the software? 
Is it the manufacturer or is it 

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the limitations of the sensor 
suite itself? 

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I think we need to distinguish 
between a software bug and a 

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design choice. 
This is crucial. 

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If a car crashes because of a 
line of bad code, that's one 

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thing. 
But if a manufacturer knowingly 

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removes a safety sensor like 
Lidar, a sensor that is industry

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standard for competitors like 
Waymo, and that removal leads to

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a crash because the camera 
couldn't estimate depth, that 

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feels very distinct from a mere 
coding error. 

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You're suggesting negligence. 
I'm saying it borders on it. 

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There's this sentiment expressed
by User Beneficial Soup 3699 

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regarding blatant fraud. 
While that is, you know, strong 

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language, the core sentiment is 
valid. 

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If you claim a camera is 
sufficient and the physics 

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suggest it isn't, and the data 
shows it crashing, at what point

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does adherence to a vision only 
philosophy become liability? 

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But that assumes Lidar was 
prevented that specific crash. 

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We don't know that. 
Like I said, LIDAR isn't a magic

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bullet. 
It's not magic, it's redundancy.

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In aviation, we don't fly with 
one altimeter, we have three. 

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Why on earth should we drive 
with one type of eye? 

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If the camera fails due to glare
or a bug or mud, there's nothing

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to catch the car. 
It is a single point of failure 

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system. 
But there's an economic argument

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here too. 
If you require Lidar, you make 

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autonomous cars cost $100,000. 
They become toys for the rich. 

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If you can solve it with vision,
the hardware costs 500 $100. 

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You can put it in every car. 
A vision based system that's 99%

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safe and available to everyone 
might save more total lives than

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a lighter system that's 99.9% 
safe but only 1000 people can 

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afford it. 
That is a utilitarian calculus 

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that works on a spreadsheet, but
it doesn't work when you're the 

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one crossing the street. 
The public Rd. should not be a 

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testing ground for cost cutting 
measures, disguises innovation. 

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The experiences of users in San 
Francisco and Austin show a 

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clear divide. 
Waymo with Lidar is providing A 

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flawless service while vision 
only systems are struggling with

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basic static objects. 
But again, Waymo is on rails. 

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It's a local maximum. 
It's great for San Francisco, 

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but it doesn't scale to the rest
of the world. 

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I'd rather have a safe local 
maximum than a dangerous global 

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beta test. 
Until vision systems can match 

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the redundancy and depth 
accuracy of Lidar, the safety 

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consequences are real and they 
are statistically proven. 

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We cannot verify the safety of a
black box neural net without 

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ground truth sensors. 
It ultimately comes down to that

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00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:13,440
multiplier effect we talked 
about. 

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00:16:13,440 --> 00:16:15,600
It does. 
We are at a crossroads. 

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We can take the safe, expensive 
route with Lidar, which might 

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limit the scalability of the 
technology but provides that 

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warm blanket of redundancy. 
Or we can push for the vision 

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solution, which, if it works, 
multiply safety exponentially 

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across the globe and solves 
general intelligence. 

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But if it fails, it multiplies 
error. 

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It multiplies the risk of a 
single software blind spot into 

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a nationwide. 
Hazard, and that is the gamble. 

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Is the current risk worth the 
future reward? 

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I tend to believe that without 
taking that risk, we stagnate. 

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We'd still be driving horses if 
we waited for the perfect car. 

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00:16:55,800 --> 00:16:59,160
And I would argue that safety is
not a place for gambling when 

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you're moving 2 tons of steel at
60 mph. 

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00:17:02,320 --> 00:17:05,359
Pretty good isn't good enough. 
You need absolute truth and 

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00:17:05,359 --> 00:17:08,800
cameras just don't provide that.
A fundamental disagreement on 

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00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:12,280
the philosophy of engineering. 
Thank you for listening to the 

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00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:14,880
debate. 
We hope this exchange has 

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00:17:14,880 --> 00:17:17,440
illuminated the complexities 
behind the sensors. 

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Drive safe everyone, and watch 
out for the robots. 

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Goodbye.
