1 00:00:07,840 --> 00:00:10,840 Welcome to Flight Global Focus, your essential podcast for 2 00:00:10,840 --> 00:00:13,200 trusted aviation insight. Hello. 3 00:00:13,240 --> 00:00:15,760 I'm Dominic Perry, Flight Global's European Aerospace 4 00:00:15,760 --> 00:00:18,400 Editor in London. And as it's our first podcast of 5 00:00:18,400 --> 00:00:21,440 2026 today, we're obviously going to be looking backwards, 6 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:24,840 not forwards, and dissecting last year's order and delivery 7 00:00:24,840 --> 00:00:27,760 performance for the big two commercial air framers, Airbus 8 00:00:27,760 --> 00:00:30,960 and Boeing. Now before we start digging into 9 00:00:30,960 --> 00:00:33,640 the numbers, it's with pointing out that we aren't here to say 10 00:00:33,640 --> 00:00:36,320 which side won and that's inverted commas around that 11 00:00:36,760 --> 00:00:40,360 looking at an arbitrary 12 month snapshot is just too simplistic. 12 00:00:40,840 --> 00:00:43,160 But perhaps we can offer a little deeper context and 13 00:00:43,160 --> 00:00:46,600 analysis on the figures. Joining me to do just that are 14 00:00:46,600 --> 00:00:49,760 John Hemmerdinger, Flight Global's US based Aerospace 15 00:00:49,760 --> 00:00:53,360 Managing Editor and our official Boeing Watcher and David 16 00:00:53,360 --> 00:00:57,160 Kaminski Morrow, our European Air Transport Editor and our all 17 00:00:57,160 --> 00:00:59,960 round Airbus expert. Hi Dom, thanks for having me 18 00:00:59,960 --> 00:01:02,240 today. Thanks Domlick, it's good to see 19 00:01:02,240 --> 00:01:04,239 you again. You are more than welcome. 20 00:01:07,680 --> 00:01:13,640 In broad terms, Airbus out delivered Boeing by 793 to 600 21 00:01:13,640 --> 00:01:16,920 last year, but it was always going to do so given the state 22 00:01:16,920 --> 00:01:19,800 of its rivals production system, particularly on the narrow body 23 00:01:19,800 --> 00:01:22,040 side. That output was capped at 38 24 00:01:22,120 --> 00:01:23,960 aircraft per month for most of the year. 25 00:01:24,760 --> 00:01:27,720 But on the sales side the roles were reversed with Boeing 26 00:01:27,720 --> 00:01:30,440 comfortably trumping. And yes, that pun is deliberate 27 00:01:30,800 --> 00:01:35,320 to lose with 1175 orders against 1000. 28 00:01:36,320 --> 00:01:39,120 So, David, you've been covering Airbus for more years than 29 00:01:39,120 --> 00:01:41,960 either of us can. Care to remember away from all 30 00:01:41,960 --> 00:01:44,440 this immediate noise? What's your take on the figures? 31 00:01:44,960 --> 00:01:48,200 I think I'd highlight three interesting points from the 32 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:53,720 Airbus figures that the first is that it delivered 607-A320 neo 33 00:01:53,720 --> 00:01:57,800 family aircraft last year. And sometime in September, one 34 00:01:57,800 --> 00:02:02,160 of those handovers meant the A320 finally overtook the Boeing 35 00:02:02,160 --> 00:02:05,480 737 in terms of all time deliveries. 36 00:02:05,480 --> 00:02:07,840 And that's taken 37 years to achieve. 37 00:02:07,840 --> 00:02:11,800 And it would probably have taken much longer if it hadn't been 38 00:02:11,800 --> 00:02:15,640 for some recent unfortunate events, namely the grounding in 39 00:02:15,640 --> 00:02:20,240 the 737 Max in 2019, the problems caused by the pandemic 40 00:02:20,240 --> 00:02:23,520 and the capping of 737 Max production two years ago. 41 00:02:23,800 --> 00:02:27,200 So that's one point. I think the second observation 42 00:02:27,200 --> 00:02:31,760 is that there's a continuing extraordinary popularity with 43 00:02:31,840 --> 00:02:36,040 the A321 neo. Half of last year's 1000 gross 44 00:02:36,040 --> 00:02:38,040 orders were for the aircraft alone. 45 00:02:38,440 --> 00:02:41,080 The increase in its capabilities, the passenger 46 00:02:41,080 --> 00:02:44,920 accommodation, the range have been very successful and it's 47 00:02:44,920 --> 00:02:48,480 really left the A320 neo behind. And bear in mind that the A320 48 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:51,760 neo was originally the Keystone model in Airbus's single hour 49 00:02:51,760 --> 00:02:54,960 range. And the third thing I think I'd 50 00:02:54,960 --> 00:02:59,720 mentioned is the 5050 split in a 350 orders between the 900 and 51 00:02:59,720 --> 00:03:04,480 the Dash 1000. And that's noticeable because 52 00:03:04,480 --> 00:03:08,320 the the Dash 1000, which was intended to challenge the Boeing 53 00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:13,200 777300ER has been a bit slow to to gain traction. 54 00:03:13,200 --> 00:03:16,200 There's been several years in which it's scored a duck in the 55 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:20,120 order figures, but last year, 82 orders for that 1000. 56 00:03:20,480 --> 00:03:23,280 So the big question there is whether that's an outlier or 57 00:03:23,280 --> 00:03:26,360 whether that momentum can be sustained, especially against 58 00:03:26,360 --> 00:03:29,080 777X. Of course, Airbus had its own 59 00:03:29,080 --> 00:03:32,040 supply chain struggles last year and crawled rather than raced to 60 00:03:32,040 --> 00:03:35,480 its revised delivery target. What does the airframer said 61 00:03:35,480 --> 00:03:38,760 about this recently? Well, Airbus stuck to its 62 00:03:38,760 --> 00:03:41,400 familiar script of being back loaded at the beginning of the 63 00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:45,040 year and then putting all hands to the pump in the last quarter 64 00:03:45,040 --> 00:03:47,240 to push everything it needs to push out the door. 65 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:51,040 Engines were a sticking point at the beginning of the year. 66 00:03:51,080 --> 00:03:54,760 A320 neo deliveries fell behind and that meant Airbus was having 67 00:03:54,760 --> 00:03:59,480 to park about 60 or so engine less aircraft at mid year and 68 00:03:59,480 --> 00:04:02,240 then burning through those deliveries as the engines became 69 00:04:02,240 --> 00:04:05,600 available. But the reason Airbus didn't 70 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:09,480 reach its original delivery forecast about 120 aircraft is 71 00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:13,880 the late emergence of a quality escape, as it's euphemistically 72 00:04:13,880 --> 00:04:18,360 called, which related to the thickness of some A320 neo 73 00:04:18,360 --> 00:04:20,079 fuselage panels from the supplier. 74 00:04:21,000 --> 00:04:24,600 Airbus managed to deliver 793 aircraft, which was more than 75 00:04:24,640 --> 00:04:28,920 previous year, but that's also three years out, last four in 76 00:04:28,920 --> 00:04:31,520 which it's missed its original target. 77 00:04:31,880 --> 00:04:35,240 It's not issued the 2026 forecast yet, but the Airbus 78 00:04:35,240 --> 00:04:38,680 commercial aircraft chief, Christian Shearer, he was 79 00:04:38,680 --> 00:04:40,680 speaking a briefing on full year results. 80 00:04:41,160 --> 00:04:44,440 He said that he'd rather aim high than be timid with the 81 00:04:44,440 --> 00:04:47,640 outlook, but of course it's not going to be his problem anymore 82 00:04:47,640 --> 00:04:50,440 anyway because he's just handed over the reins to his successor, 83 00:04:50,880 --> 00:04:53,440 Lars Wagner, who's going to be taking things from here. 84 00:04:53,960 --> 00:04:57,320 And David, did Airbus also touch on Spirit aero systems during 85 00:04:57,320 --> 00:04:59,800 it's briefing? Just as a reminder to our 86 00:04:59,800 --> 00:05:02,360 listeners, Spirit was an aero structure supplied to both 87 00:05:02,400 --> 00:05:05,560 Airbus and Boeing and has or had, I'm not sure if we're using 88 00:05:05,560 --> 00:05:09,320 the past tense yet, a whole raft of quality and financial issues 89 00:05:09,320 --> 00:05:11,440 which led Boeing to acquire most of the business. 90 00:05:11,560 --> 00:05:14,600 The rest went to Airbus and a deal that concluded late last 91 00:05:14,600 --> 00:05:17,480 year. Spirit was only mentioned in 92 00:05:17,480 --> 00:05:21,400 passing, but the crucial part of the Spirit deal for Airbus is 93 00:05:21,400 --> 00:05:25,640 the acquisition of the centrifuge, A large section work 94 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:29,360 on the A-350 because that's been a thorn in its side for a 95 00:05:29,360 --> 00:05:32,360 considerable time. Last year, Airbus delivered 96 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:37,760 57A-350. That's about five a month, only 97 00:05:37,760 --> 00:05:40,480 about half the rate it was achieving before the pandemic. 98 00:05:41,000 --> 00:05:43,360 The centre fuse largest built in North Carolina. 99 00:05:43,400 --> 00:05:47,560 That's being integrated following the Spirit deal into a 100 00:05:47,560 --> 00:05:50,600 new entity called Airbus Aero Systems Kingston. 101 00:05:51,120 --> 00:05:54,400 Airbus has a three-year plan to unjam the bottlenecks in order 102 00:05:54,400 --> 00:05:59,080 to raise a 350 production back to 10 and then up to 12 aircraft 103 00:05:59,080 --> 00:06:02,560 a month in 2028. And that's important because by 104 00:06:02,560 --> 00:06:06,680 the end, Airbus hopes to be building not only the two A-350 105 00:06:06,680 --> 00:06:10,320 passenger variants, but the A-350 freighter as well. 106 00:06:10,760 --> 00:06:13,760 And John Boeing had a better year on the delivery front, 107 00:06:13,840 --> 00:06:17,200 particularly on the 737 Max. What's changed there? 108 00:06:17,480 --> 00:06:20,560 And how critical is his purchase of spirit to maintaining that 109 00:06:20,560 --> 00:06:23,400 momentum? Yeah, Dom, good questions. 110 00:06:23,440 --> 00:06:28,520 What changed is I think first of all is 2025 was a year without 111 00:06:28,520 --> 00:06:31,320 any major quality problems for Boeing. 112 00:06:31,640 --> 00:06:36,080 If you compare it to 2024, you'll remember in January 2024 113 00:06:36,400 --> 00:06:41,360 was when that Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 suffered that blown 114 00:06:41,360 --> 00:06:43,440 out mid cabin door during a flight. 115 00:06:43,920 --> 00:06:47,840 No one was seriously injured, but that event really shown a 116 00:06:47,840 --> 00:06:50,680 spotlight on Boeing's production system and it's quality 117 00:06:50,680 --> 00:06:53,600 problems. It turned out in the end, what 118 00:06:53,600 --> 00:06:56,720 appears to have happened is that mid cabin door was not 119 00:06:56,760 --> 00:07:00,120 assembled, or rather some rivets weren't assembled correctly when 120 00:07:00,120 --> 00:07:03,760 the fuselage was shipped from Spirit and Boeing opened the 121 00:07:03,760 --> 00:07:07,520 door at its Renton site. And it appears workers just did 122 00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:11,080 not put back the four bolts that hold the door in place, the door 123 00:07:11,080 --> 00:07:15,040 plug, and that's why it failed. So a really major problem that 124 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:17,800 started the previous year. I was talking about 20, 24 and 125 00:07:18,000 --> 00:07:22,000 and that's why Boeing's delivery numbers were so really bad that 126 00:07:22,000 --> 00:07:24,480 year. What happened in 2025 was they 127 00:07:24,480 --> 00:07:27,800 didn't have that sort of issue. They didn't have really any 128 00:07:27,800 --> 00:07:31,880 major new quality issues. Nothing came up. 129 00:07:31,880 --> 00:07:36,000 Boeing wasn't in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons last 130 00:07:36,000 --> 00:07:40,080 year, and as a result of that 2024 blow out, their production 131 00:07:40,080 --> 00:07:44,920 system for the 737 was also capped, was capped at 38 for 132 00:07:44,920 --> 00:07:49,360 most of last year by the FAA. And So what Boeing did is they 133 00:07:49,360 --> 00:07:52,120 actually really did seem to improve their production numbers 134 00:07:52,120 --> 00:07:56,280 all through 2025. Sometime toward the back half of 135 00:07:56,280 --> 00:08:00,640 the year, the FAA cleared them to move to rate 42 a month on 136 00:08:00,640 --> 00:08:03,960 the 737, though they don't seem to probably don't seem to have 137 00:08:03,960 --> 00:08:08,040 hit that number, but they did significantly ramp production 138 00:08:08,040 --> 00:08:10,360 all through the year. At the same time, they they 139 00:08:10,360 --> 00:08:13,320 really did a great job of getting the 787 production 140 00:08:13,320 --> 00:08:16,680 system in Charleston, North Charleston, SC back on track. 141 00:08:16,680 --> 00:08:20,320 That had been slowed way down due to other production problems 142 00:08:20,320 --> 00:08:22,080 happening on the other side of the US. 143 00:08:22,400 --> 00:08:25,520 So the bottom line was Boeing last year delivered four, I 144 00:08:25,520 --> 00:08:29,600 think it was 447, seven, three sevens. 145 00:08:29,600 --> 00:08:35,799 That's an average of 37 per month and they delivered 8878 146 00:08:35,799 --> 00:08:39,600 sevens or seven monthly. Big improvement over the 147 00:08:39,600 --> 00:08:41,280 previous year. I, I just will say there's a 148 00:08:41,280 --> 00:08:44,720 sense that Boeing really did turn a corner last year. 149 00:08:45,480 --> 00:08:48,040 Well, remember not all of the problems that were affecting 150 00:08:48,040 --> 00:08:50,320 Boeing were specifically Boeing's problems. 151 00:08:50,360 --> 00:08:53,640 It's suppliers had troubles too and, and perhaps none more than 152 00:08:53,640 --> 00:08:56,840 what was its largest supplier, Spirit Aero Systems in Wichita. 153 00:08:57,200 --> 00:09:01,480 They produce 737 Max fuselages and many other components for 154 00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:03,240 all other Boeing commercial jets. 155 00:09:03,560 --> 00:09:07,440 But they had struggled for years with mistrilled holes, loose 156 00:09:07,440 --> 00:09:11,560 bolts and rudder assemblies, various things, and those were 157 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:14,560 delaying fuselage deliveries. And also Boeing was getting 158 00:09:14,560 --> 00:09:17,920 fuselages that then needed rework, and Boeing was having to 159 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:21,000 slow its production lines to accommodate that rework. 160 00:09:21,360 --> 00:09:23,640 As a result of those issues, Boeing actually decided to 161 00:09:23,640 --> 00:09:26,560 acquire Spirit, which closed at the end of last year and 162 00:09:26,560 --> 00:09:29,960 December last year. We will see whether Boeing is 163 00:09:29,960 --> 00:09:32,160 able to to address those quality problems. 164 00:09:32,160 --> 00:09:35,880 The transaction's still very new and we can't say for sure what 165 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:37,920 has been fixed and what has not been fixed. 166 00:09:38,360 --> 00:09:41,400 Yeah, I can imagine it's going to be a huge integration job, 167 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:44,160 and goodness knows how long that's going to last. 168 00:09:44,560 --> 00:09:47,560 But just to turn to the sales figures, it was clearly a very 169 00:09:47,560 --> 00:09:49,960 good year for Boeing. We've covered this before, of 170 00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:52,800 course, but it certainly appears to be benefiting from President 171 00:09:52,800 --> 00:09:54,960 Trump's tariff threats and trade agreements. 172 00:09:55,200 --> 00:09:58,600 What's your take on this? I think it's worth repeating the 173 00:09:58,600 --> 00:10:01,640 degree to which President Trump had an influence on Boeing's 174 00:10:02,120 --> 00:10:03,160 orders. Last year. 175 00:10:03,160 --> 00:10:08,360 You mentioned the number 11175 orders for Boeing, which was way 176 00:10:08,360 --> 00:10:12,520 up from 2024. And it seemed like every time 177 00:10:12,520 --> 00:10:16,360 President Trump or one of his cabinet members had a meeting, a 178 00:10:16,360 --> 00:10:19,840 trade deal meeting with a foreign nation, that the issue 179 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:23,960 of Boeing orders came up. It started or, or maybe the most 180 00:10:23,960 --> 00:10:28,720 notable one happened in Doha with Boeing Chief executive 181 00:10:28,720 --> 00:10:32,400 Kelly Ortberg was sitting at a table with Trump and with the 182 00:10:32,400 --> 00:10:35,560 CEO of Qatar Airways. And right then and there, the 183 00:10:35,560 --> 00:10:41,360 CEO signed for 160 Boeing jets while Trump sort of looked on 184 00:10:41,800 --> 00:10:44,920 and, and that just continued. the US was renegotiating all 185 00:10:44,920 --> 00:10:48,200 these trade deals and, and, and Boeing had become a point of 186 00:10:48,200 --> 00:10:49,560 leverage with, with the president. 187 00:10:49,560 --> 00:10:54,000 Trump used he, of course, he's Boeing as one of the US as most 188 00:10:54,000 --> 00:10:57,360 important or most critical production manufacturing 189 00:10:57,360 --> 00:11:01,120 companies and you could call them Boeing's best salesperson. 190 00:11:01,360 --> 00:11:05,280 So I made a list and here, here's the countries that 191 00:11:05,280 --> 00:11:07,440 ordered Boeing jets are committed to them and the the 192 00:11:07,440 --> 00:11:10,080 all these deals are related to trade agreements with the USA, 193 00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:14,960 Bahrain, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Qatar, 194 00:11:14,960 --> 00:11:18,880 Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Tajikistan, Thailand, 195 00:11:19,280 --> 00:11:23,400 Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. It's pretty extensive. 196 00:11:23,400 --> 00:11:25,440 It's pretty remarkable, all those orders. 197 00:11:25,880 --> 00:11:28,640 That, of course, was largely on the wide body side. 198 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:32,200 But having said all that, we seem to be in the same situation 199 00:11:32,200 --> 00:11:35,200 we've been in for several years now where Boeing is strong in 200 00:11:35,200 --> 00:11:37,400 wide bodies and Airbus is strong in narrow bodies. 201 00:11:37,840 --> 00:11:39,880 What do you think is driving that split, David? 202 00:11:40,440 --> 00:11:43,800 Airbus started off in wide bodies with the A3 hundreds, but 203 00:11:43,880 --> 00:11:48,400 its subsequent ventures have been, I think, a little hit and 204 00:11:48,400 --> 00:11:51,000 miss. The A330 was obviously very 205 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:56,520 popular, the A340 much less so. And they were obviously burned 206 00:11:56,520 --> 00:11:59,280 with the A380 Fabulous aeroplane, not the one the 207 00:11:59,280 --> 00:12:02,280 airlines were looking for. And really, that's left Boeing 208 00:12:02,280 --> 00:12:08,800 to run riot with 777787. And that's why the the A-350 has 209 00:12:08,800 --> 00:12:14,600 become so important to Airbus. Boeing, to be fair, has also had 210 00:12:14,600 --> 00:12:18,600 strong selling narrow bodies. The 727 when I was a kid was the 211 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:22,360 world's most popular airliner until 737 took over. 212 00:12:22,720 --> 00:12:26,280 And don't forget that 757 was also a big hit. 213 00:12:26,760 --> 00:12:30,520 But Boeing stopped building the 757 and that's allowed the A320 214 00:12:30,520 --> 00:12:35,280 family and particularly as we've seen the A32 into one Neo to 215 00:12:35,280 --> 00:12:38,360 move into that space, as well as the 73 Sevens. 216 00:12:38,360 --> 00:12:42,760 And so the A320, which was originally expected only to sell 217 00:12:42,760 --> 00:12:46,600 in the hundreds, is now selling in the 10s of thousands and 218 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:48,480 counting. Right, that's enough looking 219 00:12:48,480 --> 00:12:50,520 backwards. Just to wrap up, let's look to 220 00:12:50,520 --> 00:12:52,640 the future. What are going to be the hot 221 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:54,920 topics for each airframer this year? 222 00:12:55,200 --> 00:12:57,160 So, John, what's bothering Boeing? 223 00:12:57,960 --> 00:13:00,080 Yeah, What's up? What's bothering Boeing is it 224 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:03,040 needs to keep up the momentum that it had last year. 225 00:13:03,040 --> 00:13:07,440 So the company that says it's at a production rate on the 737 of 226 00:13:07,440 --> 00:13:11,240 42 a month, that's its official stance of 42 a month. 227 00:13:11,480 --> 00:13:14,320 We don't necessarily think they're actually producing that 228 00:13:14,320 --> 00:13:17,080 many, but they're they're sort of running the production system 229 00:13:17,080 --> 00:13:21,160 broadly toward that rate. And what they need to do is to 230 00:13:21,160 --> 00:13:25,120 stabilise at that rate and get all the suppliers on board and 231 00:13:25,120 --> 00:13:26,680 get everything moving at that rate. 232 00:13:26,880 --> 00:13:30,480 And then they hope later this year to break to the next rate, 233 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:34,560 which is 4773 sevens a month. They will need the FAA's 234 00:13:34,720 --> 00:13:38,080 permission to do that. But the Boeing says it expects 235 00:13:38,080 --> 00:13:41,400 to receive that authority this year at some later time. 236 00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:44,480 Boeing hopes to get to 5273 sevens a month. 237 00:13:44,480 --> 00:13:46,200 I don't think we'll see that this year. 238 00:13:46,200 --> 00:13:49,760 But when Boeing does get there, it will largely have returned to 239 00:13:49,760 --> 00:13:53,720 the production rates on the on the 737 that it was at prior to 240 00:13:54,080 --> 00:13:57,880 all the problems that started with the 737 Max crisis back in 241 00:13:58,440 --> 00:14:02,040 2018. Starting in 2018, similarly, 242 00:14:02,040 --> 00:14:05,360 Boeing wants to get more 7-8 sevens out the door. 243 00:14:05,880 --> 00:14:10,760 It is right now at about 878 sevens monthly production. 244 00:14:11,160 --> 00:14:15,720 And before the end of this year, Boeing hopes to get to 1078 245 00:14:15,720 --> 00:14:18,920 sevens monthly. Remember that Boeing only 246 00:14:18,920 --> 00:14:22,920 produces 78 sevens at it's North Charleston site now, and 10 247 00:14:22,920 --> 00:14:26,560 monthly is the maximum that Boeing can produce there now. 248 00:14:26,680 --> 00:14:31,120 The company late last year also revealed that it is building a 249 00:14:31,120 --> 00:14:36,320 second 787 assembly facility in North Charleston right alongside 250 00:14:36,320 --> 00:14:39,800 the the first one. And that will allow Boeing to 251 00:14:39,800 --> 00:14:43,360 double its capacity, meaning eventually hitting 27/8 sevens a 252 00:14:43,360 --> 00:14:46,240 month. But that will that that second 253 00:14:46,280 --> 00:14:49,800 site will not open until 2028. So we're still a ways away from 254 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:52,000 that. Yeah, I, I suppose, John, 255 00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:54,840 somewhat critically, Boeing needs to do all that without 256 00:14:54,840 --> 00:14:57,000 suffering another high profile quality problem. 257 00:14:57,440 --> 00:15:01,200 Otherwise it's back to square 1. And David, just from your 258 00:15:01,200 --> 00:15:03,280 perspective, what's agitating Airbus? 259 00:15:03,840 --> 00:15:07,560 I think Airbus's concerns for this year will be the supply 260 00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:12,080 chain again, almost inevitably it's still discussing things 261 00:15:12,080 --> 00:15:16,200 like near term engine supply. It's not quite managed to settle 262 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:19,880 that down yet. The Spirit acquisition is going 263 00:15:19,880 --> 00:15:23,360 to be a priority because that's critical to its ramp up plans 264 00:15:23,360 --> 00:15:27,840 for, particularly for the A-350. And there's a lot riding on 265 00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:32,160 development the A-350 freighter, which is scheduled to fly for 266 00:15:32,160 --> 00:15:35,200 the first time this year. Well, thank you both for those 267 00:15:35,200 --> 00:15:36,880 insights. Thanks, Tom. 268 00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:38,880 Thanks, Tom. We're sure we'll speak soon. 269 00:15:42,520 --> 00:15:45,480 Flight Global Focus is your essential podcast for trusted 270 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:48,640 aviation insight. Join us for new episodes every 271 00:15:48,640 --> 00:15:51,440 week covering airlines, defence and aerospace. 272 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:54,520 Flight Global Focus is a production of Flight Global with 273 00:15:54,560 --> 00:15:58,400 audio editing by Lucy Johnson. 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