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Welcome back to the Deep Dive. 
Our mission today is pretty 

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specialized, but absolutely 
critical. 

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If you're prepping for a Con law
final or, you know, staring down

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the bar exam, you know the 
toughest questions are always 

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right there at the intersection 
of state and federal power. 

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That's right. 
And today we're doing a really 

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focused deep dive. 
Think of this as your ultimate 

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prep session. 
We are going to connect the dots

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between foundational black 
letter law, things like due 

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process, and the huge modern 
shifts from cases like NFIB 

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Murphy and the big one, National
Pork Producers Council V Ross. 

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Our. 
Goal is simple. 

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We want to extract the key 
rules, nail the tests, and 

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really clarify the doctrinal 
fights that define federalism 

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today. 
This whole balance between 

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federal supremacy and state 
sovereignty, it's classic exam 

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territory. 
We're here to give you the 

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shortcut straight to the winning
argument. 

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To do that you have to start at 
the foundation. 

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I mean, you have to start with 
individual rights. 

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No matter what the government 
wants to do, its power is always

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limited by the rights of the 
person. 

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OK, so let's unpack that with a 
quick but deep refresher on the 

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due process clauses. 
We're talking about the Fifth 

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Amendment for the feds and the 
14th for the states. 

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Right, and the core rule sounds 
simple. 

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Governments can't deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or 

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property without due process of 
law. 

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But that one sentence, well, it 
splits constitutional law into 

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two massive fields that you 
absolutely have to keep separate

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on an exam. 
First up is procedural due 

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process. 
This is all about fair process. 

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It's the how of a deprivation. 
So if the government wants to 

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take away a protected interest, 
say your public benefits or a 

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professional license, what steps
does it have to take to make it 

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fair? 
Exactly. 

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And the analysis is a three-step
process. 

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First you ask is there a 
protected interest, life, 

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liberty or property? 
Second, was there a deprivation 

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by the government? 
And 3rd, and this is the key 

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part, what procedures are 
required? 

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And to answer that, you have to 
apply the Matthews V Eldridge 

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factors. 
The classic balancing test? 

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Let's name those factors because
this is pure Xan gold. 

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What are the three things the 
court has to balance? 

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OK. 
So first, the private interest 

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that's affected, I mean how 
important is this thing to the 

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individual? 
Second, you look at the risk of 

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an erroneous deprivation through
the procedures they're currently

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using and what value you know 
additional safeguards might 

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have. 
Could a hearing prevent a 

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mistake? 
And the third. 

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The third is the government's 
interest. 

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That includes the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the 

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extra procedures would create. 
You're balancing the person's 

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need against the government's 
burden to figure out what 

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process is due. 
So that's procedural due 

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process, but then you have the 
really contentious area, 

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substantive due process. 
This isn't about the how, it's 

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about the what. 
It says. 

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There are some fundamental 
rights the government can't 

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interfere with at all, no matter
how good the procedures are. 

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And this is where the standard 
of review is everything, and 

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it's totally binary. 
If a law infringes on a 

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fundamental right, and we're 
talking about rights deeply 

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rooted in history, like 
marriage, contraception, 

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parental rights, the government 
has to satisfy strict scrutiny. 

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The law have to be necessary for
a compelling government 

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interest. 
Which is almost always fatal for

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the law. 
Almost always, but for non 

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fundamental rights, which is 
basically all economic and 

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social regulation, you just 
apply rational basis review. 

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The law only has to be 
rationally related to a 

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legitimate government purpose. 
And here's where you have to 

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know about the Lochner era. 
Historically, we think of 

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rational basis as super 
differential now, but it wasn't 

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always. 
Back in the day, the court used 

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a really muscular version of 
substantive due process to 

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protect a freedom of contract. 
Exactly. 

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They used it to strike down all 
sorts of state laws, maximum 

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hours, minimum wage. 
It was really about a judicial 

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distrust of progressive 
legislation. 

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So when the court abandoned 
Lochner, it was this huge move 

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toward judicial restraint in 
economic matters. 

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The court basically said, look, 
debates about the minimum wage 

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belong in the Legislature, not 
here. 

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So when you see a modern 
rational basis case on an exam, 

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you should immediately think 
this is the anti locker rule. 

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If it's economic, the court's 
going to uphold it. 

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The real action and substantive 
due process today is all about 

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those personal fundamental 
rights. 

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OK, so now let's make that shift
you mentioned. 

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We're moving from protecting 
individuals from government to 

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managing the boundaries between 
governments. 

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This is all about the Supremacy 
Clause. 

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Federal law preempts contrary 
state law. 

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And preemption has two basic 
slavers, express and implied. 

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Let's start with express. 
That's when Congress just comes 

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out and says in the statute, we 
are preempting state law. 

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Right. 
But what's funny is that even 

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when it's explicit, the fight is
never over. 

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The litigation just shifts to 
the scope of that preemption. 

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Did Congress mean to wipe out 
the whole field, or just this 

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one little corner of it? 
The courts spend a ton of time 

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trying to figure out what 
Congress actually intended. 

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And then there's implied 
preemption, where you have to 

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infer Congress's intent. 
And that breaks down into two 

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main types. 
The 1st is field preemption. 

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This is where Congress has 
legislated so comprehensively in

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a particular area that you can 
just infer they intended to 

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leave no room for the states to 
act. 

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What are some classic examples 
of that fields where it's just 

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assumed to be all federal? 
The classic examples are areas 

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where the federal interest is 
just overwhelming. 

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Think foreign affairs, 
immigration, nuclear safety. 

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You know, if a state tried to 
pass its own stricter safety 

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rules for a nuclear power plant,
that law would almost certainly 

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be preempted. 
Federal government has occupied 

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that entire field. 
The second type of implied 

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preemption is conflict 
preemption, and this one shows 

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up in 2 critical ways. 
First, you have impossibility. 

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This is the cleanest one. 
It's when it is physically 

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impossible to comply with both 
the state law and the federal 

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law. 
And for an exam you need to 

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remember that means literally 
impossible. 

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And this is where we have to 
talk about the drug labeling 

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cases. 
The difference between Wyeth and

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PLIVA is such a high yield 
distinction. 

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It's a perfect example. 
In Wyeth, a brand name drug 

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maker was sued under state tort 
law for not having strong enough

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warnings. 
The Supreme Court said the state

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claim could go forward because 
federal FDA regulations actually

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allowed the manufacturer to 
strengthen its label 

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unilaterally, so it wasn't 
impossible to comply with both. 

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But then came PLIVA, the generic
drug case. 

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Right. 
And in PLIV, the court found 

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that generic manufacturers are 
under completely different 

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federal rules. 
Federal law requires their 

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labels to be identical to the 
brand name drugs label. 

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They are prohibited from 
changing it on their own. 

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So for them it actually was 
impossible. 

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It was a physical legal 
impossibility. 

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They couldn't comply with a 
state tort judgment demanding a 

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stronger warning because federal
law forbade them from making 

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that change, so the state law 
was preempted. 

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The court itself even admitted 
the result makes little sense, 

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but felt bound by the technical 
regulation. 

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That's a huge point. 
The technical regulatory 

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structure creates a preemption 
shield for generics that brand 

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name drugs just don't have. 
It's a paradoxical result you 

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have to know. 
The second type of conflict 

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preemption is obstacle 
preemption. 

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This one's much broader, much 
murkier. 

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It's when a state law stands as 
an obstacle to the 

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accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives

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of Congress. 
That sounds incredibly vague. 

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How are you supposed to spot an 
obstacle on an exam? 

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You have to look at the purpose 
of the federal law. 

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In Heinz, the court struck down 
a Pennsylvania alien 

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registration law because 
Congress had already passed a 

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comprehensive federal one. 
The court said Congress wanted a

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single uniform national system, 
especially with World War 2 

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brewing, so the state law, even 
if it was trying to do the same 

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thing, was an obstacle to that 
uniformity. 

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It interfered with a national 
goal. 

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Exactly. 
The obstacle was non uniformity 

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itself. 
A modern example might be a 

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state trying to ban its 
government from contracting with

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companies that do business in a 
certain country. 

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If that interferes with a 
federal foreign policy 

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objective, you have to identify 
the federal purpose first. 

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And we should quickly reiterate 
the presumption against 

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preemption. 
The starting point is always 

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that state police powers, 
health, safety, welfare are not 

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preempted unless Congress had a 
clear and manifest purpose. 

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That's the first sentence of 
your analysis. 

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But you also have to be aware, 
you know, that many scholars 

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think that presumption doesn't 
always carry the day in 

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practice. 
You have to be ready to argue 

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both sides. 
OK, so we've covered how federal

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law limits state power. 
Now let's slip the whole thing 

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around. 
How does state sovereignty limit

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federal power? 
And that brings us right to the 

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10th Amendment and the anti 
commandeering doctrine. 

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The core idea is that the 
federal government cannot 

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commandeer or order state 
legislatures to enact laws or 

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state executive officials to 
enforce a federal regulatory 

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program. 
This comes from huge cases like 

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New York, the United States and 
Prince VUS. 

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And Murphy VNC AA the sports 
gambling case really laid out 

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the justifications for this 
doctrine. 

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It gave 3 super clear rationales
that are perfect for an essay. 

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They are fantastic points to 
make. 

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First, it protects liberty by 
keeping a healthy balance of 

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power. 
You know, it prevents all the 

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power from concentrating in 
Washington, DC 2nd and this is 

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the big one, it promotes 
political accountability. 

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Right, because if Congress 
forces a state to enact an 

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unpopular policy, who do the 
Vaders blame? 

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They blame the state officials, 
the governor, they're state 

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reps. 
The federal politicians who 

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wrote the law get to hide it. 
Totally warps the democratic 

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process. 
It lets Congress take credit for

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popular ideas, but forces the 
states to take the heat and pay 

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the administrative costs. 
Precisely. 

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And that's the third 
justification preventing 

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Congress from shifting the cost 
of federal programs on to the 

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states. 
Now, Congress isn't powerless. 

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If it wants states to do 
something, it has constitutional

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ways to get it done without 
commandeering. 

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What are its main tools? 
Well, the first is just straight

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up preemption. 
Congress can use its Commerce 

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Clause power to regulate private
actors, and if that displaces 

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state law, that's perfectly 
fine. 

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The 2nd and more common tool is 
the Spending Clause. 

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Congress can attach conditions 
to federal money to induce 

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states to adopt certain 
policies. 

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But, and this is a huge but, 
there's a limit, and that limit 

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was established in NFIB V 
Sebelius. 

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The Affordable Care Act case. 
This is where the court drew the

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line between a permissible 
inducement and unconstitutional 

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coercion. 
What did the ACA do that crossed

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that line? 
It was about the Medicaid 

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expansion. 
The law threatened to withhold 

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all of the state's existing 
Medicaid funding, which for some

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states was 10 or 20% of their 
entire budget, if they didn't 

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agree to the new expansion. 
And the court said that was a 

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gun to the head. 
Exactly. 

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It left states with no practical
choice. 

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It turned what was supposed to 
be a voluntary choice and 

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inducement into an 
unconstitutional command. 

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The key is that you can't 
threaten to take away huge 

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existing funds that states are 
already dependent on. 

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And there's one other way the 
federal government can regulate 

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states, right? 
The regulation of general 

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applicability. 
Correct. 

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The anti commandeering doctrine 
only applies when the federal 

238
00:11:01,480 --> 00:11:03,760
government is trying to regulate
the state as a state. 

239
00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:07,960
It does not apply when Congress 
just even handedly regulates an 

240
00:11:07,960 --> 00:11:11,120
activity that both States and 
private actors are involved in. 

241
00:11:11,560 --> 00:11:15,120
So a federal law regulating 
databases can apply to state 

242
00:11:15,120 --> 00:11:18,480
owned databases just like it 
applies to privately owned ones.

243
00:11:18,480 --> 00:11:21,120
So this all comes to a head in 
Murphy VNC AA. 

244
00:11:21,480 --> 00:11:25,120
The federal law passed PFA made 
it illegal for a state to 

245
00:11:25,120 --> 00:11:28,320
authorize sports gambling. 
And the court said that was a 

246
00:11:28,320 --> 00:11:30,280
direct command to the state 
legislature. 

247
00:11:30,400 --> 00:11:33,360
It was telling them what they 
could and could not legislate. 

248
00:11:33,680 --> 00:11:36,480
That's class classic 
unconstitutional commandeering. 

249
00:11:36,600 --> 00:11:39,680
But why couldn't the government 
just say it was preemption, that

250
00:11:39,680 --> 00:11:42,600
they had preempted the field of 
authorizing sports gamble? 

251
00:11:42,720 --> 00:11:46,520
Because Murphy laid down a 
really clear two-part test for a

252
00:11:46,520 --> 00:11:48,960
valid preemption. 
One, it has to be a valid 

253
00:11:48,960 --> 00:11:52,240
exercise of an enumerated power 
like the Commerce Clause, and 

254
00:11:52,240 --> 00:11:55,240
two, it has to regulate private 
actors, not the states 

255
00:11:55,240 --> 00:11:57,880
themselves. 
PCA failed that second part. 

256
00:11:58,280 --> 00:12:01,480
The anti authorization rule was 
only aimed at the state's act of

257
00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:03,800
legislating. 
It didn't put any restrictions 

258
00:12:03,800 --> 00:12:06,280
on a private person, so it 
wasn't a valid preemption. 

259
00:12:06,280 --> 00:12:08,680
It was just an unconstitutional 
command. 

260
00:12:09,120 --> 00:12:12,440
And this reinvigoration of the 
anti calm deering doctrine has 

261
00:12:12,440 --> 00:12:15,640
created a potential problem for 
a much older federal law right 

262
00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:19,560
Public law 86 to 72. 
This is a really sophisticated 

263
00:12:19,560 --> 00:12:22,840
point, a great one for an exam. 
For decades, this law has 

264
00:12:22,840 --> 00:12:25,680
limited a state's power to tax 
an out of state seller if 

265
00:12:25,680 --> 00:12:28,200
they're only connection to the 
state is soliciting orders. 

266
00:12:28,400 --> 00:12:31,720
But then came the 2018 case, 
South Dakota View Wayfair, which

267
00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:34,320
we'll get to later, But the 
short version is it said 

268
00:12:34,640 --> 00:12:37,640
physical presence is no longer 
required for a state to tax 

269
00:12:37,640 --> 00:12:38,440
someone. 
Exactly. 

270
00:12:38,440 --> 00:12:41,840
So post Wayfair, states now 
clearly have the sovereign power

271
00:12:41,880 --> 00:12:45,560
to tax remote sellers based on 
their economic activity in the 

272
00:12:45,560 --> 00:12:47,480
state. 
So the argument now is that 

273
00:12:47,480 --> 00:12:52,440
Public Law 86 to 72 is no longer
a valid regulation of commerce. 

274
00:12:52,560 --> 00:12:56,400
It's an unconstitutional command
to the states telling them you 

275
00:12:56,400 --> 00:12:59,480
must refrain from exercising 
your sovereign taxing power. 

276
00:12:59,520 --> 00:13:01,520
It looks a lot like the command 
in Murphy. 

277
00:13:01,560 --> 00:13:04,800
It looks exactly like it, and it
sets up this fascinating and, as

278
00:13:04,800 --> 00:13:07,560
of now, unresolved 
constitutional showdown. 

279
00:13:07,560 --> 00:13:10,800
OK, let's pivot to the doctrine 
that police's state regulations 

280
00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:13,400
all on its own, the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 

281
00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:16,240
This comes from the idea that 
since Congress has the power to 

282
00:13:16,240 --> 00:13:19,840
regulate commerce, the states 
implicitly do not, especially 

283
00:13:19,840 --> 00:13:21,840
when it comes to discriminating 
against each other. 

284
00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:24,240
Right. 
Its whole purpose is to prevent 

285
00:13:24,240 --> 00:13:27,880
economic protectionism and keep 
a single, unified national 

286
00:13:27,880 --> 00:13:29,960
market. 
Again, you have to remember the 

287
00:13:29,960 --> 00:13:33,080
Lochner era context. 
Back then, the court used the 

288
00:13:33,080 --> 00:13:36,320
DCC really aggressively to 
strike down state laws it just 

289
00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:39,120
didn't like. 
But after the New Deal, the DCC 

290
00:13:39,120 --> 00:13:42,200
got a lot narrower. 
The modern doctrine is really 

291
00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:44,080
focused on rooting out 
discrimination. 

292
00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:47,440
And for your exam, you should 
think of the modern DCC as 

293
00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:49,240
having three analytical 
branches. 

294
00:13:49,240 --> 00:13:51,680
You have to figure out which 
branch applies because that 

295
00:13:51,680 --> 00:13:55,000
tells you what tests to use. 
Branch 1 is the anti 

296
00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:57,960
discrimination rule. 
This is the heart of the DCC. 

297
00:13:58,280 --> 00:14:01,160
It invalidates state laws that 
discriminate against out of 

298
00:14:01,160 --> 00:14:03,960
state goods or businesses, and 
that discrimination can be 

299
00:14:03,960 --> 00:14:06,800
facial right on the face of the 
law or it can be practical in 

300
00:14:06,800 --> 00:14:08,720
its effect. 
And because discrimination is 

301
00:14:08,720 --> 00:14:12,280
the cardinal sin here, the 
standard is the virtually per SE

302
00:14:12,280 --> 00:14:14,960
rule of invalidity. 
It's basically strict scrutiny. 

303
00:14:15,120 --> 00:14:17,840
And the only way a state can 
defend A discriminatory law is 

304
00:14:17,840 --> 00:14:21,080
to show one, that it has a 
legitimate local purpose that is

305
00:14:21,080 --> 00:14:23,960
not about economic 
protectionism, and two, that 

306
00:14:23,960 --> 00:14:26,840
there are no reasonable non 
discriminatory alternatives. 

307
00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:28,960
It's an almost impossible 
standard to meet. 

308
00:14:29,520 --> 00:14:34,080
The one case everyone points to 
is Maine V Taylor or Maine Band 

309
00:14:34,080 --> 00:14:37,520
imported bait fish. 
Right, and they won because they

310
00:14:37,520 --> 00:14:39,960
proved the out of state fish had
parasites that would have 

311
00:14:39,960 --> 00:14:42,800
devastated the local ecosystem 
and there was no other way, like

312
00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:46,600
inspection to solve the problem.
But that's a rare environmental 

313
00:14:46,600 --> 00:14:50,440
case, not an economic one. 
OK, Branch 2 is Pike balancing. 

314
00:14:51,200 --> 00:14:53,880
This applies when a state law is
non discriminatory. 

315
00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:57,840
It regulates even handedly, but 
it still imposes an incidental 

316
00:14:57,840 --> 00:15:01,200
burden on Interstate commerce. 
The test here is whether that 

317
00:15:01,200 --> 00:15:05,120
burden is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local 

318
00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:07,280
benefits. 
This is a much squishier 

319
00:15:07,280 --> 00:15:10,360
balancing test, and the burden 
often comes from one state 

320
00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:14,080
having a weird outlier rule that
messes everything up for 

321
00:15:14,080 --> 00:15:16,600
national companies. 
The perfect illustration of 

322
00:15:16,600 --> 00:15:19,560
this, even though it's not 
technically a Pike case, is Bib 

323
00:15:19,560 --> 00:15:22,680
V Navajo Freight Lines. 
Illinois decided to require 

324
00:15:22,680 --> 00:15:25,520
contoured mudflaps on trucks 
when pretty much every other 

325
00:15:25,520 --> 00:15:27,120
state required straight ones. 
So. 

326
00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:29,040
If you were a trucker, you'd 
have to literally stop at the 

327
00:15:29,040 --> 00:15:30,720
Illinois border and change your 
equipment. 

328
00:15:30,960 --> 00:15:35,160
Yes, it was a logistical 
nightmare, and the Supreme Court

329
00:15:35,160 --> 00:15:38,920
struck down the law because the 
supposed local safety benefit 

330
00:15:38,920 --> 00:15:42,560
was tiny compared to the massive
burden it placed on the free 

331
00:15:42,560 --> 00:15:46,600
flow of Interstate trucking. 
Finally, Branch 3 is the 

332
00:15:46,640 --> 00:15:50,560
extraterritoriality principle. 
This came from a line of cases 

333
00:15:50,560 --> 00:15:54,280
that struck down state laws that
tried to directly regulate 

334
00:15:54,280 --> 00:15:56,920
commerce happening entirely 
outside their borders. 

335
00:15:56,920 --> 00:16:00,640
Specifically, these were price 
control or price affirmation 

336
00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:02,440
statutes. 
Yes, that's right. 

337
00:16:02,680 --> 00:16:05,880
A state would pass a law saying,
for instance, that liquor 

338
00:16:05,880 --> 00:16:08,840
distillers couldn't sell their 
products in state for a price 

339
00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,600
any higher than the lowest price
they charged anywhere else in 

340
00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:13,920
the country. 
It was a way for one state to 

341
00:16:13,920 --> 00:16:16,920
project its economic policy 
across the entire nation, which 

342
00:16:16,920 --> 00:16:19,880
is a big no no. 
And this principle was a mess. 

343
00:16:19,880 --> 00:16:22,760
Before the Ross case. 
The circuit courts were split on

344
00:16:22,760 --> 00:16:25,440
whether it was a broad rule 
against any law with big out of 

345
00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:28,760
state effects or if it was just 
about these narrow price control

346
00:16:28,760 --> 00:16:31,360
situations. 
That ambiguity is exactly why 

347
00:16:31,360 --> 00:16:34,360
the Supreme Court had to take up
National Pork Producers Counsel 

348
00:16:34,360 --> 00:16:37,280
V Ross. 
OK, let's dive deep into Ross. 

349
00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:40,320
This is the case about 
California's Proposition 12, 

350
00:16:40,560 --> 00:16:44,200
which banned the in state sale 
of pork from pigs that were 

351
00:16:44,200 --> 00:16:47,360
confined in a cruel manner, 
essentially setting minimum 

352
00:16:47,360 --> 00:16:48,880
space requirements for the 
animals. 

353
00:16:49,160 --> 00:16:51,120
Right. 
And since California consumes a 

354
00:16:51,120 --> 00:16:54,680
ton of pork but produces almost 
none of it, the practical effect

355
00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:58,120
was that pork producers in Iowa,
North Carolina, all over the 

356
00:16:58,120 --> 00:17:01,280
country would have to change how
they raise pigs if they wanted 

357
00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:03,520
to sell in the massive 
California market. 

358
00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:07,160
The pork producers challenge 
this not as discriminatory, but 

359
00:17:07,160 --> 00:17:11,160
under those other two DCC 
doctrines, extraterritoriality 

360
00:17:11,160 --> 00:17:12,839
and Pike balancing. 
Let's take the 

361
00:17:12,839 --> 00:17:15,599
extraterritoriality argument 
first, the producer said. 

362
00:17:15,599 --> 00:17:18,880
Look, this law is forcing us to 
completely reconfigure our farms

363
00:17:18,880 --> 00:17:21,480
in Iowa just to sell a product 
in California. 

364
00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:24,400
That's an unconstitutional 
extraterritorial effect. 

365
00:17:24,520 --> 00:17:27,440
But the court unanimously 
rejected that broad argument. 

366
00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:29,160
Why? 
They basically said the old 

367
00:17:29,160 --> 00:17:32,760
extraterritoriality cases were 
all about preventing purposeful 

368
00:17:32,760 --> 00:17:35,680
economic protectionism. 
Like those price control laws, 

369
00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,320
they weren't a broad rule 
against any any law with 

370
00:17:38,320 --> 00:17:41,120
upstream effects. 
The key, the court said, is that

371
00:17:41,120 --> 00:17:44,480
Prop 12 only regulate sales that
happen inside California. 

372
00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:47,600
If an Iowa farmer doesn't want 
to comply, he just can't sell 

373
00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:50,520
his pork in California. 
The law doesn't reach out and 

374
00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:52,400
regulate his farm in Iowa 
directly. 

375
00:17:52,760 --> 00:17:57,000
So the big take away for your 
exam, the stand alone broad 

376
00:17:57,000 --> 00:18:00,320
extracurritoriality doctrine for
non discriminatory laws is 

377
00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:02,880
basically dead. 
The analysis now has to go 

378
00:18:02,880 --> 00:18:05,160
through Pike balancing. 
Which brings us to the Pike 

379
00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:07,640
claim. 
In Ross, the producers argued 

380
00:18:07,640 --> 00:18:11,000
that the massive compliance 
costs, a nearly 10% increase at 

381
00:18:11,000 --> 00:18:14,280
the farm level, were a clearly 
excessive burden on the 

382
00:18:14,280 --> 00:18:17,160
Interstate pork market, 
especially when weighed against 

383
00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:20,360
California's moral, not 
economic, interest in animal 

384
00:18:20,360 --> 00:18:21,720
welfare. 
And this is where the court 

385
00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:25,400
fractured 6 Justices thought 
Pike was the right test, but 

386
00:18:25,400 --> 00:18:26,720
they still threw out the 
challenge. 

387
00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:29,560
So what happened? 
Well, the Gorsuch plurality 

388
00:18:29,560 --> 00:18:32,720
opinion really focused on the 
idea that the dormant Commerce 

389
00:18:32,720 --> 00:18:36,040
Clause protects the Interstate 
market as a whole, not 

390
00:18:36,240 --> 00:18:39,440
particular firms or particular 
methods of operation. 

391
00:18:39,960 --> 00:18:42,720
So they reasoned that yes, 
compliance costs would go up, 

392
00:18:42,920 --> 00:18:45,320
and yes, some producers who use 
conventional methods would be 

393
00:18:45,320 --> 00:18:48,400
hurt, but the national market 
for pork would survive. 

394
00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:52,480
The DCC, he argued, doesn't 
guarantee any company a right to

395
00:18:52,480 --> 00:18:56,040
a specific business model or a 
certain profit margin, so the 

396
00:18:56,040 --> 00:18:59,080
challengers hadn't alleged A 
substantial burden on the market

397
00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:00,880
itself. 
So just showing it's more 

398
00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:03,680
expensive to do business isn't 
enough, you have to show it's 

399
00:19:03,680 --> 00:19:05,360
disrupting the entire national 
market. 

400
00:19:05,480 --> 00:19:08,480
That's the new very high bar, of
course. 

401
00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:11,000
The four dissenters, led by 
Chief Justice Roberts, 

402
00:19:11,000 --> 00:19:13,800
completely disagreed. 
They argued that forcing an 

403
00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:16,920
entire nationwide industry to 
change its production methods at

404
00:19:16,920 --> 00:19:19,840
a cost of hundreds of millions 
of dollars is a substantial 

405
00:19:19,840 --> 00:19:21,960
burden on the market, not just 
on a few firms. 

406
00:19:22,160 --> 00:19:25,880
So for exam purposes, the bottom
line is that the threshold for a

407
00:19:25,880 --> 00:19:29,280
Pike claim is now incredibly 
high, especially when you're 

408
00:19:29,280 --> 00:19:32,480
challenging a state's health, 
safety or moral regulation. 

409
00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:34,440
The courts are going to be 
extremely differential. 

410
00:19:34,640 --> 00:19:38,320
One last thing on Ross. 
The dissent, led by Roberts flag

411
00:19:38,320 --> 00:19:40,520
some other potential 
constitutional problems with 

412
00:19:40,520 --> 00:19:43,240
laws like this. 
He basically laid out a road map

413
00:19:43,240 --> 00:19:45,600
for future challenges. 
This is great for an issue 

414
00:19:45,600 --> 00:19:47,800
spotting essay. 
What other clauses did he bring 

415
00:19:47,800 --> 00:19:49,400
up? 
He mentioned the import export 

416
00:19:49,400 --> 00:19:52,240
clause, the Privileges and 
immunities clause, and most 

417
00:19:52,240 --> 00:19:54,240
interestingly, the Full Faith 
and Credit clause. 

418
00:19:54,720 --> 00:19:57,200
His point on full faith and 
credit was that some states, 

419
00:19:57,200 --> 00:20:01,200
like Ohio, have laws that 
explicitly authorized the very 

420
00:20:01,200 --> 00:20:03,840
pig confinement practices that 
Prop 12 bans. 

421
00:20:03,840 --> 00:20:07,560
So you have a direct conflict. 
Can California, through its 

422
00:20:07,560 --> 00:20:11,040
sales ban, essentially refused 
to give effect to Ohio's 

423
00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:14,080
sovereign public act? 
It's a really novel and 

424
00:20:14,080 --> 00:20:16,400
fascinating question that we 
might see the court take up 

425
00:20:16,400 --> 00:20:17,120
next. 
OK. 

426
00:20:17,120 --> 00:20:19,760
Let's pull all of this together 
and apply it to the high stakes 

427
00:20:19,760 --> 00:20:23,080
area of state taxation. 
This is a classic exam topic 

428
00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:26,560
because it forces you to 
synthesize due process, the DCC,

429
00:20:26,560 --> 00:20:27,600
all of it. 
Right. 

430
00:20:27,840 --> 00:20:31,080
And for any state tax question, 
your analysis has to start with 

431
00:20:31,080 --> 00:20:34,800
the four part test from the 1977
case Complete Auto. 

432
00:20:35,600 --> 00:20:38,440
A state tax is constitutional 
only if it meets all four 

433
00:20:38,440 --> 00:20:41,400
prongs. 
One, it's applied to an activity

434
00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:45,040
with a substantial Nexus to the 
state, 2 it's fairly 

435
00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:48,720
apportioned, 3 it does not 
discriminate against Interstate 

436
00:20:48,720 --> 00:20:53,160
commerce, and four, it is fairly
related to services the state 

437
00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:55,120
provides. 
Let's really focus on the two 

438
00:20:55,120 --> 00:20:57,040
trickiest parts, Nexus and 
apportionment. 

439
00:20:57,040 --> 00:20:59,960
OK, Nexus. 
For decades, the rule for sales 

440
00:20:59,960 --> 00:21:02,840
tax under cases like Quill was 
that a state could only tax a 

441
00:21:02,840 --> 00:21:05,280
business that had a physical 
presence in the state stores 

442
00:21:05,280 --> 00:21:08,680
where warehouses employees. 
This created a huge loophole for

443
00:21:08,680 --> 00:21:11,960
online and mail order retailers.
A massive loophole, and it was 

444
00:21:11,960 --> 00:21:14,640
based on this weird logic from 
Quill that even though a 

445
00:21:14,640 --> 00:21:16,920
business might have enough 
contact for due process 

446
00:21:16,920 --> 00:21:20,200
purposes, the Commerce Clause 
required physical presence as a 

447
00:21:20,200 --> 00:21:23,520
clear bright line rule to avoid 
burdening commerce. 

448
00:21:23,680 --> 00:21:26,040
A rule that became totally 
obsolete with the rise of the 

449
00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:29,200
Internet. 
Exactly, and that's why in 2018,

450
00:21:29,200 --> 00:21:31,800
South Dakota V Wayfair 
completely overruled Quill. 

451
00:21:32,320 --> 00:21:35,720
The court said the physical 
presence rule was artificial and

452
00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:39,120
anachronistic. 
The new rule is that economic 

453
00:21:39,120 --> 00:21:41,920
activity alone can create a 
substantial Nexus. 

454
00:21:42,240 --> 00:21:45,520
So if a remote seller meets a 
certain threshold of sales or 

455
00:21:45,520 --> 00:21:49,440
transactions in a stay, like 
South Dakota's $100,000 in sales

456
00:21:49,440 --> 00:21:53,080
or 200 transactions, that is 
enough to establish a Nexus. 

457
00:21:53,080 --> 00:21:54,560
It was a revolutionary change. 
OK. 

458
00:21:54,560 --> 00:21:57,120
So that's Nexus. 
What about fair apportionment? 

459
00:21:57,320 --> 00:21:59,720
This is to make sure states 
don't tax more than their fair 

460
00:21:59,720 --> 00:22:01,720
share of a company's income. 
Exactly. 

461
00:22:01,960 --> 00:22:05,320
For a multi state corporation, 
states have to use a formula to 

462
00:22:05,320 --> 00:22:08,400
apportion that company's income.
The traditional method is a 

463
00:22:08,400 --> 00:22:11,240
three factor formula based on 
the percentage of the company's 

464
00:22:11,240 --> 00:22:14,280
total property, payroll and 
sales that are in that state. 

465
00:22:14,800 --> 00:22:17,280
The goal is to only tax the 
income that's fairly 

466
00:22:17,280 --> 00:22:19,960
attributable to the economic 
activity happening within your 

467
00:22:19,960 --> 00:22:22,040
borders. 
OK, so now let's connect this 

468
00:22:22,040 --> 00:22:25,440
back to our DCC discussion. 
We know Pike balancing applies 

469
00:22:25,440 --> 00:22:28,200
to state regulations, does apply
to state taxes. 

470
00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:31,200
Can a company argue a state tax 
is an excessive burden under 

471
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:33,680
Pike? 
This is a huge point, and the 

472
00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:37,240
answer is a clear no. 
The Supreme Court has never used

473
00:22:37,240 --> 00:22:40,560
Pike balancing to strike down a 
state tax that otherwise meets 

474
00:22:40,560 --> 00:22:42,440
the four complete auto 
requirements. 

475
00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:46,560
Your analysis for a tax must 
stay within the complete auto 

476
00:22:46,560 --> 00:22:47,720
framework. 
Why not? 

477
00:22:47,720 --> 00:22:50,320
I mean, a tax can definitely 
feel like a burden that falls 

478
00:22:50,320 --> 00:22:53,240
mostly on out of Staters. 
The court has given 2 main 

479
00:22:53,240 --> 00:22:55,880
reasons. 
First, on the issue of non 

480
00:22:55,880 --> 00:22:58,080
uniformity, like different 
states using different 

481
00:22:58,080 --> 00:23:01,240
apportionment formulas, the 
court has said the Constitution 

482
00:23:01,240 --> 00:23:04,400
is neutral. 
One state isn't responsible for 

483
00:23:04,400 --> 00:23:07,400
another state's tax system. 
If that creates a problem, it's 

484
00:23:07,400 --> 00:23:11,280
a problem for Congress to solve,
not the courts. 2nd, on the 

485
00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:14,200
issue of the burden being 
externalized to out of satyrs, 

486
00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:17,480
the court draws a bright line. 
Taxes are not just a fee for 

487
00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:19,840
services, they fund the 
government as a whole. 

488
00:23:20,080 --> 00:23:23,320
And a court has no way to judge 
how much is too much tax. 

489
00:23:23,440 --> 00:23:26,080
Exactly. 
The court has explicitly said 

490
00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:29,280
there's no constitutional way to
measure if a tax is excessive. 

491
00:23:29,480 --> 00:23:31,840
That is a fundamentally 
legislative political question. 

492
00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:35,360
If a tax is non discriminatory 
and fairly apportioned how high 

493
00:23:35,360 --> 00:23:37,160
it is, well, that's up to the 
voters and their 

494
00:23:37,160 --> 00:23:40,320
representatives. 
So bottom line for the exam, if 

495
00:23:40,320 --> 00:23:43,240
you get a state tax question, 
stick to the four prongs of 

496
00:23:43,240 --> 00:23:46,080
complete auto. 
Do not bring in pipe balancing. 

497
00:23:46,160 --> 00:23:49,480
We have covered a huge amount of
ground here, moving all the way 

498
00:23:49,480 --> 00:23:52,680
from individual rights to the 
complex rules of commerce and 

499
00:23:52,680 --> 00:23:54,680
tax. 
Let's do a quick final recap. 

500
00:23:54,680 --> 00:23:57,840
The most critical things to 
remember first due process 

501
00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:00,320
procedural is the three Matthews
factors. 

502
00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:04,240
Substantive is strict scrutiny 
for fundamental rights, rational

503
00:24:04,240 --> 00:24:07,160
basis for everything else. 
Second, preemption. 

504
00:24:07,760 --> 00:24:10,440
Know the difference between 
field preemption and conflict 

505
00:24:10,440 --> 00:24:14,320
preemption, especially the two 
types of conflict impossibility.

506
00:24:14,320 --> 00:24:19,040
Remember the YFPLIV paradox and 
obstacle, and always start with 

507
00:24:19,040 --> 00:24:21,560
the presumption against 
preemption. 3rd anti 

508
00:24:21,560 --> 00:24:23,840
commandeering. 
Know the three justifications, 

509
00:24:23,840 --> 00:24:27,000
liberty, accountability, cost 
and know the Murphy rule. 

510
00:24:27,560 --> 00:24:30,640
A valid preemption has to 
regulate private actors, not 

511
00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:33,800
just the state itself. 4th, the 
doorman Commerce Clause. 

512
00:24:34,080 --> 00:24:36,400
It's a decision tree. 
Is it discriminatory? 

513
00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:37,920
If yes, it's almost certainly 
dead. 

514
00:24:38,240 --> 00:24:40,920
If no, you apply Pike balancing,
which has a very high 

515
00:24:40,920 --> 00:24:42,840
substantial burden threshold 
after Ross. 

516
00:24:43,160 --> 00:24:45,280
And remember, 
extraterritoriality is now a 

517
00:24:45,280 --> 00:24:48,560
very narrow doctrine. 
And finally state taxes. 

518
00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:51,040
Use the four part complete auto 
test. 

519
00:24:51,680 --> 00:24:54,160
Remember, Wayfair killed the 
physical President's rule for 

520
00:24:54,160 --> 00:24:58,360
Nexus and do not do not apply 
Pike balancing to attacks. 

521
00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:01,600
So when you step back, you see 
these two really interesting 

522
00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:03,840
trends. 
On one hand, the court in Ross 

523
00:25:03,840 --> 00:25:06,880
gave states a huge amount of 
power to regulate for local 

524
00:25:06,880 --> 00:25:10,840
health and moral reasons, even 
if it has big national effects. 

525
00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:13,040
That looks like a win for state 
police power. 

526
00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:15,840
But at the same time, you have 
the court affirming the state 

527
00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:19,440
score sovereign power to tax in 
Wayfair, only to see that power 

528
00:25:19,440 --> 00:25:22,360
immediately run into the 
revitalized anti commandeering 

529
00:25:22,360 --> 00:25:23,280
doctrine. 
Right. 

530
00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:26,640
And that potential vulnerability
of a 60 year old federal law 

531
00:25:26,640 --> 00:25:31,440
like public law 86 to 72 after 
Murphy and Wayfair reminds us 

532
00:25:31,440 --> 00:25:34,160
that this whole balance of 
federalism is always in motion. 

533
00:25:34,440 --> 00:25:36,760
And it raises the final question
for you to think about what 

534
00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:39,440
other long standing federal 
statutes which have been on the 

535
00:25:39,440 --> 00:25:42,520
books for years might now be 
vulnerable to an anti 

536
00:25:42,520 --> 00:25:45,080
commandeering challenge? 
What other federal laws out 

537
00:25:45,080 --> 00:25:47,400
there are really just telling 
states what to do instead of 

538
00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:51,040
regulating private citizens? 
A very provocative thought, and 

539
00:25:51,040 --> 00:25:53,160
exactly the kind of 
forward-looking analysis that 

540
00:25:53,160 --> 00:25:56,680
will set you apart on an exam. 
That's all for this deep dive. 

541
00:25:56,840 --> 00:26:00,240
Now go master that material. 
All right, future counselors, 

542
00:26:00,240 --> 00:26:02,720
welcome. 
Today we are going to build your

543
00:26:02,720 --> 00:26:05,960
exam day toolkit for two 
absolutely critical 

544
00:26:05,960 --> 00:26:08,920
constitutional law doctrines. 
These are the ones that really 

545
00:26:08,920 --> 00:26:12,720
define that constant tug of war 
between federal and state power.

546
00:26:13,520 --> 00:26:15,400
So let's start with this 
question. 

547
00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:18,000
Can Congress just tell a state 
what to do? 

548
00:26:18,480 --> 00:26:21,360
This really gets to the heart of
state sovereignty, and it's the 

549
00:26:21,360 --> 00:26:23,400
core of the first doctrine we're
going to tackle. 

550
00:26:23,880 --> 00:26:26,440
Think of it as the ultimate 
power play in our federal 

551
00:26:26,440 --> 00:26:29,440
system. 
And then on the flip side, what 

552
00:26:29,440 --> 00:26:31,960
about this? 
Can one state, say California or

553
00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:35,400
Texas, pass a law that basically
wrecks the national market for, 

554
00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:39,040
I don't know, pork or cars? 
This question sets the stage for

555
00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:41,480
our second topic, a doctrine 
that's all about keeping our 

556
00:26:41,480 --> 00:26:44,520
national economy from shattering
into 50 little pieces. 

557
00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:47,920
OK, let's dive in. 
Here is our road map. 

558
00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:50,360
For the next few minutes, we're 
going to cover the clash of 

559
00:26:50,360 --> 00:26:53,520
powers, the anti commandeering 
role, the dormant Commerce 

560
00:26:53,520 --> 00:26:56,920
Clause, that famous Pike test 
balancing test, a really 

561
00:26:56,920 --> 00:26:59,480
fascinating modern case, and 
then we'll wrap it all up with 

562
00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:02,320
your exam attack plan. 
We're moving fast, so let's get 

563
00:27:02,320 --> 00:27:05,120
to it. 
So at its core, everything we're

564
00:27:05,120 --> 00:27:08,000
talking about today lives in the
tension between two parts of the

565
00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:10,440
Constitution. 
You've got the 10th Amendment on

566
00:27:10,440 --> 00:27:13,560
one side, which says powers not 
given to the feds are reserved 

567
00:27:13,560 --> 00:27:16,040
to the states. 
And on the other side you have 

568
00:27:16,040 --> 00:27:18,800
the Commerce Clause, which gives
Congress this massive power to 

569
00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:20,520
regulate commerce among the 
states. 

570
00:27:21,080 --> 00:27:22,800
The two doctrines we're covering
live right in that 

571
00:27:22,800 --> 00:27:26,560
constitutional friction zone. 
All right, let's jump into our 

572
00:27:26,560 --> 00:27:29,160
first key rule. 
This is the one that says the 

573
00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:31,880
federal government can't just 
turn state governments into its 

574
00:27:31,880 --> 00:27:33,960
puppets. 
It's all about protecting the 

575
00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:36,320
states from being forced into 
federal service. 

576
00:27:37,120 --> 00:27:39,040
Here it is. 
This is the black letter rule 

577
00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:41,880
you need to have memorized. 
The federal government cannot 

578
00:27:41,880 --> 00:27:45,280
treat state legislators or state
executive officials like they're

579
00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:49,280
just field offices for DCA. 
Big reason for this is political

580
00:27:49,280 --> 00:27:51,560
accountability. 
You know, if the feds want a 

581
00:27:51,560 --> 00:27:54,200
certain policy, they have to use
their own agents and their own 

582
00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:56,440
money. 
That way we the voters know 

583
00:27:56,440 --> 00:27:58,720
exactly who to praise or who to 
blame. 

584
00:27:59,440 --> 00:28:02,680
And the doctrines evolution is 
really illustrated perfectly by 

585
00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:05,680
these 3 landmark cases. 
You absolutely have to know 

586
00:28:05,680 --> 00:28:09,120
these. 1st, in New York, the 
United States, the Supreme Court

587
00:28:09,120 --> 00:28:11,600
said Congress can't force the 
state legislature to actually 

588
00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:14,840
enact a federal law. 
Then just five years later, in 

589
00:28:14,840 --> 00:28:18,040
Prince, they extended the rule. 
Now, Congress also can't press 

590
00:28:18,040 --> 00:28:21,320
state officials like local 
sheriffs into service to enforce

591
00:28:21,320 --> 00:28:23,640
federal law. 
And then most recently in 

592
00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:26,600
Murphy, the sports betting case,
the court took it even one step 

593
00:28:26,600 --> 00:28:29,520
further, saying Congress can't 
even prohibit a state from 

594
00:28:29,520 --> 00:28:32,560
repealing its own laws. 
It's a different flavor of 

595
00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:34,640
commandeering, but commandeering
nonetheless. 

596
00:28:35,400 --> 00:28:37,920
So for your exam, the crucial 
point for issue spotting is 

597
00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:40,080
being able to tell the 
difference between a direct 

598
00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:42,120
command, which is 
unconstitutional, and a 

599
00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:45,240
permissible federal action. 
For instance, if a federal 

600
00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:48,560
minimum wage law applies to both
state-run hospitals and private 

601
00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:51,080
hospitals, that's OK. 
That's a lot of general 

602
00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:53,240
applicability. 
And remember, Congress can 

603
00:28:53,240 --> 00:28:56,320
always use its spending power to
persuade states with money like 

604
00:28:56,320 --> 00:28:59,560
highway funds, but it can't 
cross the line into coercion. 

605
00:28:59,720 --> 00:29:02,680
That's the key distinction. 
OK, so we've covered what 

606
00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:05,840
Congress can't do to the states.
Now let's flip the script and 

607
00:29:05,840 --> 00:29:08,000
look at the limits on what 
states can do to each other's 

608
00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:10,720
commerce. 
This doctrine isn't actually 

609
00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:13,880
written in the Constitution, 
it's implied from the Commerce 

610
00:29:13,880 --> 00:29:16,400
Clause itself. 
The big idea here is that 

611
00:29:16,400 --> 00:29:19,160
because Congress has the power 
to regulate the national 

612
00:29:19,160 --> 00:29:22,280
economy, states can't just jump 
in and create their own little 

613
00:29:22,280 --> 00:29:25,200
protectionist schemes. 
It's what ensures we have one 

614
00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:28,680
unified national market, not 50 
separate little economies with 

615
00:29:28,680 --> 00:29:31,360
walls around them. 
Now when you see a state law 

616
00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:34,400
that affects commerce on an 
exam, this is your framework. 

617
00:29:34,560 --> 00:29:36,480
It's a clean 2 step decision 
tree. 

618
00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:39,760
First you ask, is the law 
discriminatory? 

619
00:29:40,080 --> 00:29:42,600
Does it treat out of state 
companies or people worse than 

620
00:29:42,600 --> 00:29:45,240
the local guys? 
If it's discriminatory on its 

621
00:29:45,240 --> 00:29:47,800
face, it is almost always dead 
on arrival. 

622
00:29:48,000 --> 00:29:50,600
Think of that classic case City 
of Philadelphia V New Jersey 

623
00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:56,080
where Jersey tried to ban out of
Only if the law is not 

624
00:29:56,080 --> 00:29:59,400
discriminatory do you then move 
on to Step 2, the balancing 

625
00:29:59,400 --> 00:30:02,280
test. 
OK, so let's drill down on Step 

626
00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:06,480
2, the Pike test. 
I call it the famous fuzzy test 

627
00:30:06,480 --> 00:30:09,320
because this is where the 
analysis gets really nuanced. 

628
00:30:09,720 --> 00:30:12,400
And honestly, it's where you can
score some major points on an 

629
00:30:12,400 --> 00:30:14,360
exam by showing you get the 
subtlety. 

630
00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:17,280
And here's the holding straight 
from the Pike case. 

631
00:30:17,560 --> 00:30:20,640
The magic words for your 
analysis are clearly excessive. 

632
00:30:20,960 --> 00:30:23,120
This is a really high bar for a 
challenger to meet. 

633
00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:25,680
The court isn't just putting 
things on a scale and seeing 

634
00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:27,640
which is heavier. 
They're looking for a burden 

635
00:30:27,640 --> 00:30:30,280
that is way out of proportion to
the local good. 

636
00:30:30,720 --> 00:30:32,800
And that's because of 
federalism, the idea that we 

637
00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:35,120
generally want to let states 
legislate for the health and 

638
00:30:35,120 --> 00:30:37,760
safety of their citizens as long
as they don't completely crush 

639
00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:39,120
Interstate commerce while doing 
it. 

640
00:30:39,800 --> 00:30:43,320
So breaking it down like this 
makes the test a lot less scary.

641
00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:46,000
On your exam, you have to walk 
through each of these steps. 

642
00:30:46,320 --> 00:30:49,560
First define the local interest.
Is the state trying to protect 

643
00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:53,120
public health, animal welfare? 
Then you detail the burden. 

644
00:30:53,480 --> 00:30:56,440
Does it mess up supply chains? 
Does it force a whole national 

645
00:30:56,440 --> 00:30:58,200
industry to change how it 
operates? 

646
00:30:58,680 --> 00:31:01,040
And finally, you do the weighing
and you make the call. 

647
00:31:01,520 --> 00:31:03,240
Is that burden clearly 
excessive? 

648
00:31:03,880 --> 00:31:06,800
So let's see how this classic 
kind of old school doctrine 

649
00:31:06,800 --> 00:31:10,200
actually applies today with a 
super recent, very high profile 

650
00:31:10,200 --> 00:31:12,800
Supreme Court case. 
OK, so this law was not 

651
00:31:12,800 --> 00:31:15,640
discriminatory on its face. 
It applied to California pig 

652
00:31:15,640 --> 00:31:18,360
farmers the exact same way it 
applied to farmers in Iowa or 

653
00:31:18,360 --> 00:31:20,560
North Carolina. 
And because of that, the whole 

654
00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:22,360
case got pushed into Pike 
territory. 

655
00:31:22,800 --> 00:31:24,920
The national Pork Producers 
argue that the burden on their 

656
00:31:24,920 --> 00:31:27,960
industry was absolutely massive.
They also made this interesting 

657
00:31:27,960 --> 00:31:31,200
extraterritoriality argument, 
basically saying that California

658
00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:33,800
was trying to control conduct 
that happens entirely outside 

659
00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:35,920
its borders. 
Because the California market is

660
00:31:35,920 --> 00:31:39,160
so huge, they argued, this law 
effectively forces the entire 

661
00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:40,800
country to play by California's 
rules. 

662
00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:44,040
Now, here's where things get 
really interesting and frankly, 

663
00:31:44,040 --> 00:31:45,480
a little messy. 
If you're looking for a clear 

664
00:31:45,480 --> 00:31:48,120
rule, just look at how fractured
the court was. 

665
00:31:48,240 --> 00:31:50,560
They upheld the law, but they 
did it for wildly different 

666
00:31:50,560 --> 00:31:52,640
reasons. 
Justice Gorsuch, writing for a 

667
00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:55,640
plurality, was just deeply 
skeptical of having judges try 

668
00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:58,840
to weigh a moral benefit like 
animal welfare against dollars 

669
00:31:58,840 --> 00:32:00,520
and cents. 
He thought, that's a job for 

670
00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:03,800
legislators, not the courts. 
Then you had Sotomayor and 

671
00:32:03,800 --> 00:32:05,920
Kagan, who said the pork 
producers just didn't even 

672
00:32:05,920 --> 00:32:08,840
allege a big enough burden to 
get the Pike balancing started. 

673
00:32:09,200 --> 00:32:11,800
But the dissenters, led by the 
Chief Justice, said, wait a 

674
00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:14,960
minute, this is exactly the kind
of massive nationwide market 

675
00:32:14,960 --> 00:32:16,960
disruption Pike was designed to 
prevent. 

676
00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:20,160
This chaos really shows you just
how contentious and difficult 

677
00:32:20,160 --> 00:32:23,320
the IC test is to alley in our 
modern, interconnected economy. 

678
00:32:24,120 --> 00:32:26,840
OK, let's bring this all home. 
Let's put this together into a 

679
00:32:26,840 --> 00:32:29,400
ractical framework that you can 
actually use when you sot these 

680
00:32:29,400 --> 00:32:32,880
issues on your final exam. 
All right, this slide right here

681
00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:36,200
is your exam day CHEAT SHEET. 
The very first question you must

682
00:32:36,200 --> 00:32:39,600
ask yourself when you read a 
fact pattern is who is acting? 

683
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:43,480
Is it Congress or is it a state?
That one question is the fork in

684
00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:45,240
the road. 
It tells you exactly which 

685
00:32:45,240 --> 00:32:48,160
doctrine to apply and it will 
guide your entire analysis from 

686
00:32:48,160 --> 00:32:49,960
issue spotting all the way to 
your conclusion. 

687
00:32:50,120 --> 00:32:52,400
If you get that first step 
right, you are well on your way 

688
00:32:52,400 --> 00:32:56,120
to a great answer. 
So that pork producers case 

689
00:32:56,120 --> 00:32:58,680
leaves us with this big 
provocative question. 

690
00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:01,680
It really proves that these 
centuries old doctrines about 

691
00:33:01,680 --> 00:33:05,280
federalism and commerce are more
relevant and more contested than

692
00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:06,840
ever. 
Keep that in mind. 

693
00:33:07,080 --> 00:33:08,000
Good luck with your studies.
