Donald Trump loves that phrase, you know.
Oh, the Iranians don't have any of the cards.
You begin to wonder how many cards Donald Trump has.
And if he does have cards, he just seems to throw them all up
in the air every day or every other day, and we just see where
they land. It's basically no peace, no war,
and that's likely to have spikes in in escalation like we had
last night when the US and Israel struck at Iranian
targets. The deal that's being spoken
about right now is a very temporary, very limited deal,
which means that we're right back where we started.
As long as you have the threat, you have power.
But once you've used the threat and it doesn't work out, well,
then you've got nothing, have you?
Hello and welcome to Trump World.
I'm Anoushka Astana in Washington DC Matt is still
away, but I am delighted about who we've got for you in London.
I'm Lindsay Hilson, the international editor of Channel
4 News Lovely to talk to you, Anushka.
So lovely to talk to you. And on a day that we are back
speaking about Iran, although I do feel a little bit like we're
going round in circles here, like each morning I wake up, I
look at a tweet by Axios's Barack Ravid.
I feel like we're a step closer and then there are self defence
strikes like we've seen overnight.
What do you think's going on, Lindsay?
Well, self defence strikes, that's what the Americans are
calling them. It seems as if it's possible
that the Iranians were reconstituting their ballistic
missiles and also manoeuvres very near the Strait of Hormuz.
So the Americans went in and and took those out.
Now, is that a breach of the ceasefire?
Strictly speaking, yes. And at the same time, you have
this sort of tumult of contradictory things from
President Trump. So he says, oh, we're very, very
near a deal. And then he says, oh, take your
time. And then he suddenly says, oh,
and by the way, everybody involved in negotiating this
deal, Pakistan, Qatar and so on, you also have to sign up to the
Abraham Accords. Those are the accords in which
Bahrain and the UAE agreed to recognise the the state of
Israel a few years back. And so he throws all of these
different elements in. And if it's hard for you and me
to keep up, I think it's pretty hard for the Pakistanis, the
Qataris and the Iranians to keep up, too.
And the impression that it gives, you know, Donald Trump
loves that phrase. You know, oh, the Iranians don't
have any of the cards. You begin to wonder how many
cards Donald Trump has. And if he does have cards, he
just seems to throw them all up in the air every day or every
other day. And we just see where they land.
I mean, it feels to me like what we do know is that he
desperately wants out of the war.
It's extremely unpopular here in the US.
He still has good support among Republicans, but among
independents and everyone else, there has been this really sharp
shift away from him, not least because every time you fill up
your car here, you really feel it in the petrol pump and oil
prices have really affected things day-to-day for Americans
here. And, and now it's just finding
out a way out that feels graceful to him, I guess.
And particularly, I always feel like this is like a real driving
desire for Donald Trump that feels like it's something better
than Barack Obama got back in 2015 with the JCPOA, the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was Iran Deal.
It feels like to me what we're edging towards here is not a
deal, but a extended ceasefire in which we negotiate a deal.
Do you think for the Iranians, they're getting closer to a
point where they are desperate for a way out of this?
I don't think that the Iranians are desperate, no, not in the
same way. They don't have, you know,
electoral problems. They repress their their people
and they just keep them where they are as much as they can, I
think. Look, Donald Trump is all
tactics and no strategy. And the Iranians are all
strategy. They have been working on this
for 47 years. They have known that there is a
danger of being attacked by the US and Israel.
So they have worked out what to do and they have found that they
did a lot better under fire than they were expecting.
So they take the control of the of the Strait of Hormuz and find
out. I mean, they always knew they
had leverage, but oh, they have a lot more leverage than they
really thought that they did. And for Trump, I think that came
as a bit of a surprise. Now, I think we know that Trump
is not AI don't think he's a student of history, and I
certainly don't think he's a student of Greek mythology.
But you know, you remember the sword of Damocles.
It hangs over Damocles head by a horse hair, but it never falls.
And yet he's terrified. He feels the onus of power and
what he can and can't do because the sword is always there.
But that's what it was like for Iran.
It was always hanging over their head, but now it's fallen.
All it did was a few cuts here and there.
So they're no longer afraid of the sword of Damocles.
So I think that they end up in a much stronger position, even
though tactically they have lost out because of course they have
been damaged militarily. And As for the JCPOA, yeah, that
was, you know, negotiated. The, the, the final negotiations
were two years. The whole thing was 13 years.
I remember those 13 years because I, I followed every
twist and turn of it. And it it did stop Iran from
developing a nuclear weapon for a period of time.
But, you know, it didn't really work out for Iran because the
Americans never lifted the sanctions.
The Europeans tried, but they couldn't really do it because
other American sanctions remained.
So Iran actually has very little incentive to go back into any
kind of deal, even one like the JCPOA.
And we all know with Donald Trump, once again, he pulled out
of that deal because it was negotiated by Obama, not because
he had any understanding of what it did.
And again, that was tactics. He had no strategy, no idea what
to do instead. And and you point out how many
years it took to negotiate, perhaps then it would be
optimistic to think that in a 60 day period, for example, of
ceasefire to negotiate that we're going to solve all the
problems that we have. Although just one thing on the
Iranian mentality, I think we all understand now that that
kind of desire to survive, that instinct to survive is
overwhelming. And they will fight to the
bitter end. However much they're being
pummelled, there must come like a moment where the leadership is
taken out layer by layer by layer, where the people in
charge, and we've seen a bit of this, haven't we, are fragmented
that there are differing objectives, there's the harder
line side of what's going on, and there are those who are
keener to make a deal. Is there a moment at which those
fragmentations lead to a point where America regains its
advantage? Look, I don't know.
I'm, I'm not a prophet and it's a while since I was in Iran, but
I would say that the Revolutionary Guard, the IRGC is
nowhere near as ideological as the former supreme leader and
probably as the current supreme leader, his son.
And so I think that the IRGC, if it wants to do a deal or it
comes to a point where it thinks it's to its advantage to do a
deal, we'll do that because they don't have any ideological
reason to say no, We, we can't do that.
We can't deal with the the Great Satan, so on.
So I think that what the Iranians are much more
concentrating on now is relationships within the region
because obviously they have totally alienated the Gulf Arab
countries. And I was talking to somebody
very senior in Saudi Arabia the other day and he was absolutely
clear that the the Iranians, they had to reopen the Strait of
Hormuz. It was unacceptable to have to
pay anything. This would have to be have to be
dealt with. He was, he described the Iranian
position as a maximalist. But having said that, there is
talk at the moment about there being some kind of arrangement
between Gulf Arab countries and Iran which would in which they
would sort all that stuff out between them, some kind of non
aggression pact, some kind of way forward.
So if that is possible, I can see a way in which both Israel
and the US get cut out of that, and then both Israel and the US
have their position thoroughly weakened in the region because
they can't pit the Gulf Arab countries against Iran if the
Gulf Arab countries have come to their own deal with Iran.
One thing that's really interesting is you mentioned the
Abraham Accords, which were of course signed previously as a
kind of defence pact almost with Israel.
And Donald Trump just the other day seemed to have suggested to
other countries maybe they could all join it, which apparently
was met by silence. And you know, what's really
interesting is speaking to sources, diplomatic sources here
in the US from those particular Gulf countries.
Is that absolutely clear that they're not going to sign up to
anything that doesn't recognize a Palestinian state?
And Israel clearly is nowhere near a position where they're
going to acknowledge a Palestinian state, in which case
it is an absolute no go for some of the countries we're talking
about, like Qatar, like Saudi, to try and sign up to, you know,
some sort of agreement for Israel within that.
And, and that dynamic between Donald Trump and Benjamin
Netanyahu is really interesting because it is very clear that
Benjamin Netanyahu doesn't want out in anything like the same
way Donald Trump wants out. And in the meantime is
continuing with the conflict in Lebanon, where you've obviously
spent a lot of time. I mean, how do you think that
impacts on the wider conversations here?
Both Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu are believers in
military force. They think that military force
solves problems, whereas most senior soldiers officers you
speak to say no, no, no, it doesn't solve problems.
It puts you in a different place or it creates different
problems, but it doesn't solve an issue.
Issues like this between countries are solved in the end
if they are solved diplomatically or they are
parked and they are left there in order to either dissolve if
it's a question of enemy, you know, enmity and hatred, or to
be solved when the situation differs.
And Benjamin Netanyahu is a great believer in this.
He's this was his war. He said this will do it.
This will change the regime in Iran and Iran will no longer
threatened Israel. Well, didn't quite work out like
that, did it? And now there he is continuing
with the same policy on Lebanon. Now Lebanon is really
interesting because we're beginning to see the future of
warfare there in the same way as we have seen it in Ukraine.
And that is the use of drones. So apparently in the last 8
days, Hezbollah has fired 1000 drones into Israel and also into
places, you know, which the Israelis are occupying the
southern part of Lebanon. So at, at formations of Israeli
soldiers there. And they've killed about, I
think 10 soldiers in in, in the recent, you know, in the recent
months. And drones are now falling.
One fell in a house in Mutula that's in northern Israel, and
one on a bus shelter somewhere else in northern Israel, I think
over the weekend. And this is asymmetric warfare.
This is David and Goliath stuff. This is very difficult.
Your Iron Dome that doesn't deal with drones, as the Russians are
finding out with the Ukrainians. And these are fibre optic
drones, which you can't jam them either.
And so we're entering a whole new kind of warfare.
And so Netanyahu's idea that because Israel has the greater
military strength, which of course it does, it will in the
end prevail and this problem will be over.
No, it will not be over because the technology changes and
because every time you launch a war like this, the situation
changes and and a different kind of diplomacy is is needed.
So I think we've just ended up in a situation moment where
Trump and Netanyahu are in very different positions because it
didn't work. Trump thinks, oh, we can just
say that we changed the regime in Iran.
It worked. Look, the regime has changed.
The supreme leader has changed. Netanyahu knows that's not true.
He wants to have another go at Iran.
And I guess one thing we're now wondering is what does a deal
look like that Donald Trump thinks he can sell to Americans
as better than the Obama deal? The Obama deal did have
weaknesses, but it essentially, as you said, did an exchange in
which there were a lifting of sanctions for Iran in return for
them agreeing to massively limit the enrichment of uranium and to
allow inspectors to come into the country.
There are weaknesses because there were sunset clauses.
It didn't really deal with missiles.
I think the Americans and the Israelis would argue that they
have massively now degraded the military equipment and abilities
of Iran at the moment, and they will see that as they win.
They have clearly decimated the Navy.
Donald Trump talks a lot about the number of Iranian ships at
the bottom of the sea. But ultimately, if he wants to
have something that looks better than that, he needs a longer
time period in terms of an agreement on stopping nuclear
enrichment. He probably wants them to say
there's not going to be any enrichment at all.
He wants to remove the kind of material, the nuclear material
that exists after American and Israeli strikes last June
obliterated, or that's what they said obliterated the nuclear
facilities out of Iran and into another country.
At one point they were talking about Pakistan, but a lot of
other countries, including Israel, wouldn't be happy with
that. And, and the thing that Donald
Trump always talks about is this idea that Obama sent cash on
planes to Iran, so he needs to send less money.
Every kind of, you know, look at what a deal could end up like.
Feels to me very similar to that.
I mean, do you think it is likely that at this stage there
are wins that Donald Trump can get that would take you beyond
that JCPOA, which we should say was negotiated without any war?
I think that what we're initially talking about is just
a one page memorandum, isn't it, which is about the straight and
four moves and then the nuclear stuff would be negotiated
downline they say, within 60 days.
Well, that's for the birds. But I think we should look to
Gaza. So the Gaza war came sort of to
an end with a ceasefire and then there was supposed to be a
second stage and the third stage and a fourth stage.
There is no second, third and 4th stages and I can't really
see how there will be. I think that there is less
conflict. The Israelis are attacking Gaza
less. Hamas is doing very, very
little. It's just clinging on there.
But it's it's stuck. And I suspect we may well see
the same when it comes to Iran, because I don't think it is
possible to negotiate a nuclear deal from a weakened position
because the Americans are actually in a weaker position
now than they were when Obama was was negotiating it.
Because we've discovered the limits of military power.
And I think that, you know, you, it's also a question of who's
negotiating this stuff. Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner.
They are not people who have an intimate knowledge of all the
complexities of the technical details of Iran's nuclear
program, which Obama's negotiators did.
I mean, I would sit there and listen to this stuff, which
would just make my head spin because I don't understand a lot
about nuclear weaponry when it comes to all the technical
details. But of course, you have to know
all that. And Iran is sending people to
negotiations who know, who've been doing this for decades.
They know all the insurance and outs.
Now, what is not clear to me is the extent to which the program
has been degraded by the 12 year, 12 day war.
And you know, they said Trump said it was obliterated.
Well, that's clearly not true. But the CIA reports and so on,
they haven't been made public. It's not clear to me exactly
what position Iran's nuclear nuclear deterrent is in.
But I suspect we are not going to see the kind of painstaking
negotiation that you need to come to a deal.
You may get some interim thing. There's a lot of money that Iran
has got in Qatar, which Qatar might release to the Iranians.
But I think you come back to the Strait of Hormuz because Iran
has found a method of sanctions relief and it's called the
Strait of Hormuz where you can be paid in cryptocurrency, which
doesn't go through the US system and so it doesn't is not
affected by sanctions. I think that enables them to
hold out for a very long time. And if things proceed as you're
suggesting, in the end, what will America have achieved with
this use of military force? Very little.
So I think you go back to 1993 when Madeleine Albright was the
US ambassador to the UN and she wanted to intervene in Bosnia
and Colin Powell was the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
And she said, what is the point of having this to be per
military if we can't use it? And the answer was the threat.
Always the threat. We're back to the Sword of
Damocles. As long as you have the threat,
you have power. But once you've used the threat
and it doesn't work out, well, then you've got nothing, have
you? Well, that feels like a perfect
point to have a listen to an interview I did earlier with
Dina Esfandiari, the Middle East lead for Bloomberg Economics.
Right now we're at a moment which feels a little bit
Groundhog Day, but also sort of ceasefire.
What ceasefire? How do you assess the current
situation? Well, it's basically no peace,
no war. That's how we view what's going
on right now in the region. And that's essentially a form of
protracted warfare. And that's likely to have spikes
in in escalation like we had last night when the US and
Israel struck at Iranian targets along the strate of hormones.
And then you may have at some stage a even a deal.
But The thing is, the deal that's being spoken about right
now is a very temporary, very limited deal which both sides
are calling an MOU. So it's unlikely to address the
fundamental differences between the US and Iran, which means
that we're right back where we started in this scenario of
protracted conflict. And when you say it's unlikely
to fix fundamentally what they want, I mean, we've been over
this over the weeks. But in your mind, what are the
most important factors for the US, which perhaps we know a bit
more publicly, but especially for Iran?
The most important factors is probably the first one will be
the Strait of Hormuz. I think it's clear that the US
wants a full opening and it's clear that Iran is willing to
entertain some resumption of shipping, a return to some form
of of free flowing shipping. But it won't be as free flowing
as it was before the war because I think Iran is likely to try to
impose some form of control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Now, whether that is in the form of a toll or an environmental
tax or any any kind of financial request for payment from Iran,
and of course, that is exactly what the US wants to avoid.
The second big issue I would say for the US is Iran's nuclear
program. They want a commitment that Iran
won't build a nuclear weapon, which Iran has already committed
to over the years, but they want to go further.
There was talk of no enrichment on Iranian soil.
That's now been scaled back a little bit and it's and, and
we're now at the stage where Iran is, is talking about a
moratorium on enrichment. So there's still a lot of back
and forth. And I would say the third main
sticking point is the timeline of all of this.
Iran wants upfront sanctions relief. the US wants an upfront
reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Neither side is is really agreeing on on what the timeline
of the implementation of a deal would look like.
And you've talked before about how Iran didn't want this war to
start, but that there were advantages to Iran of a long
war. I mean, do you still think that
at the moment, surely every country, however ideologically
determined it is to survive, has a breaking point?
No, I do think that Iran doesn't want the war, for sure, for
sure. As you say, no country wants to
have to deal with war. But it has made some gains.
It has learned some really valuable lessons as a result of
this war. Now, arguably, those lessons
have been learned. So it would be good for the war
to end now, but but still, it really has walked away with some
really, really valuable lessons. The first, I think, is that it's
threat to to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to impact
the global economy. Well, it turns out it's a
credible threat. Iran's been making it for many
years, but it never really acted out on it.
Now that it has, it worked arguably better than it
expected, for cheaper than it expected and it was much easier
than it expected. And so that's going to be a
lasting lesson of the war, which isn't good for the international
community. The the second thing that it's
learnt, which is also a valuable lesson, is that this US threat
to hit Iran. Sure, it's credible the US can
hit Iran, but it's also learnt all of the things that the US
and Israel can't do to Iran. They can't topple the regime
with just air strikes. It would require much more.
They have limits to what they're able to do.
Their munitions are limited, their missile defenses are
limited, their ability to conduct military operations are
somewhat limited. And so Iran has learnt that for
the United States, the most powerful army in the world,
along with Israel, to be able to change the government in Iran or
to have a real impact on changing the behaviour of the
Islamic Republic, then it would have to commit a lot more at a
much higher cost, and likely with American lives on the line.
And that's a valuable lesson. Is it something that you can
ever see Foresee and U.S. President attempting?
Boots on the ground. I mean, I think on a small scale
perhaps, but I think generally, umm, the Trump administration
has umm, tried to really hook up, uh, the fact that it wants
to end forever wars, that it doesn't want American lives to
be on the line. Umm, so it would be a pretty
significant move for the Trump administration to go back on
some of those commitments. I mean, obviously it feels like
we're stuck at the beginning of another forever war.
Umm, but but it's, it's very different to, to conduct air
strikes from far than it is to really have boots on the ground
and put American lives at risk. Now, American allies and
American partners lives are clearly at risk at the moment.
And some US servicemen have obviously been affected by
Iran's retaliation attacks in the region.
But that's very different to really putting them in the line
of fire, to putting boots on the ground and to having those body
bags come home as a result. Let me ask you about some of
those dynamics with some of the other countries in the region,
First, US, Israel, I mean they have different objectives here,
don't they? And we are seeing a different
strategy, if you like, at the moment, particularly with what
is taking place in Lebanon as opposed to what Donald Trump is
clearly trying to achieve at the moment.
How do you think that is impacting on the possibility of
an actual deal? Well, it's really significant
because what's happening at the moment is negotiations between
the US and Iran. It's hard enough for them to
hash out their differences, but once you throw Israel in the mix
and the fact that it's not a part of these negotiations,
well, then it's a whole other ball game.
As you said, yes, US and Israeli objectives are different.
Although it's a bit difficult to pinpoint American objectives, I
would say that at the moment it's about Trump being able to,
to, to, to call this a win and extricate the US from the war
and perhaps reopen the Strait of Hormuz for Israel.
The objectives remain unchanged. It's about ensuring that Iran
remains weak so that it no longer poses a threat to Israel
in the future. That's very different to us
getting itself out of the war and reopening the Straits of
Hormuz, which is why you're seeing all these differences,
which is why you see President Trump trying to hold Benjamin
Netanyahu on a tight leash and and failing.
It was reported overnight that that Netanyahu called Trump and
said Israel retains the right to defend itself throughout the
region, including in Lebanon. It's why we have a ceasefire in
Lebanon. That's absolutely not being
respected right now and no ones really doing anything about it.
And it's likely to be a huge thorn in the backside of any
deal that that the US and Iran can reach.
Do you think there is no deal without a ceasefire in Lebanon?
I think that that's exactly what Iran is asking for.
Iran is being very pointed in asking for no deal, sorry, and
asking for a permanent end to to the war on all fronts, including
in Lebanon. It's hard to imagine that you
would see a ceasefire without Lebanon being included.
But at the same time, I think that if Iran were to get
everything else it wanted, then it might be able to accept
something that doesn't look like a permanent ceasefire in
Lebanon. Even though it's proxies in the
region, in Lebanon in particular, have led us to this
situation. Well, yeah, I mean, look,
Hezbollah is Irans perhaps one of its most significant proxies,
and it's key in terms of Iranian influence in the region, the
battle lines against Israel. So Iran wouldn't easily give up
on Hezbollah. In fact, I would argue it won't
give up on Hezbollah at all. But finding ways around a
permanent end to all wars, if that remains the only sticking
point in ensuring that the war ends with the USI think it might
be something that Iran might be willing to move on.
But at the end of the day, it still remains a really critical
point. I don't want to undersell that.
And and on the other side, we've got Gulf allies of the US who,
again, didn't want this war, but some of them, it seems, have
since argued for America to finish the job.
And that there appears to have been a moment where Donald Trump
is speaking to some of those allies like Saudi Arabia, like
Qatar, and suggested that perhaps more of them could join
the Abraham Accords, which is trying to essentially have a
deal between them and, and Israel or all of them inside,
you know, a kind of united peace pact.
And apparently he was met by silence.
Does that surprise you? Absolutely not.
It is a total misreading of the region to think that this is the
moment where the United States can ask more of its Gulf Arab
partners. It absolutely isn't.
This is a war they didn't want. It's a war they lobbied hard
against, and it's a war that they've felt the majority of the
brunt of. They've been the victims.
They've the one that's been. They've been the ones that have
been taught targeted by Iran quite significantly.
So to think that you could now ask of them to join the accords
to solidify their relations or to even begin to build relations
with one of the warring parties, with a, with a country that
they're increasingly viewing as a major threat and a country
that they're viewing in some instances almost as more of a
threat than Iran. Only because it is enabled in a
way that Iran is not enabled. It gets weapons, it gets the US
backing. So to to think that this is the
time to ask them for that I think is is crazy.
And can I ask you a couple of things about the mindset of
Iran? I mean, you've written before
that Iran's approach matches every strike with a counter
strike. What do you think that tells us
about their broader strategy? I think it tells us that Iran
wants two things. The first thing is to survive.
This is a war about Iran's survival.
It wants to outlast the United States.
It can't possibly imagine that it might win a war against the
strongest army in the war in the world, but it can outlast it,
and that in itself will be a win.
The second thing that Iran wants is to impose a cost so hefty on
the international community that no one will dare risk another
war with Iran. And that's why you're seeing a
very decisive retaliation on Iran's part, but also a
calibrated 11 where it gives the other time, time to back down
from its threats before Iran acts out on the threats that it
makes. Because ultimately, it doesn't
want to escalate this war needlessly.
It wants to end it, but it does want to impose that cost and it
does want to survive. Do you think there's a point at
which its own population is suffering to a degree that that
would be a motivation for them to stop?
I mean, it's undeniable that the Iranian government faces the
series of crises inside Iran that it was facing before the
war. And the only thing this war has
done is significantly exacerbate all of those crises, including
and in number one spot the Iranian economy.
And, and it's and it's pitiful state, to put it mildly.
So for sure Iranians are suffering.
For sure it's getting worse day by day.
Also the the instability of, of no, not knowing whether it's
peacetime or war time, none of that helps.
It doesn't help you mentally, it doesn't help you economically.
So it's a really, really dire situation inside Iran.
But the government believes that for as long as the war
continues, it has time, it has time to deal with this.
It has to focus its attention on ensuring the war ends, because
the population's attention really is focused on this war.
And then after the war, the government will deal with these
crises or will find some way to deal with these crises.
I think that's a little optimistic on their part, but I
do think that they think that for now they have breathing
space to deal with the war. Do you think that anyone can
force regime change in Iran? I think forcing regime change in
a country like Iran, which is made-up of over 90 million
Iranians with diverging views, which has no real viable
opposition inside the country because it's been quelled for
years. Diverging views, but, but from,
from what we understand, a strong majority against this
particular regime. Absolutely, absolutely.
But but fighting against something is very different to
fighting for something, which I think is the problem that many
Iranians have found inside the country, arguably even those
outside the country. So it's a, it's a difficult
situation. They are anti government, but at
the moment they're focused on ending a war that has proven to
be really difficult for them. There is no hope for regime
change in wartime, that is for sure.
People will be more focused on security, on safety, on ensuring
there's food on the table than on changing the government.
They'll be focused more on the US and Israeli airstrikes than
they will be on their own government.
So there is no space for regime change while the war is going
on. Once this war ends, if the
government is not able to address the crises that we were
just talking about, then I think they're going to have a real
problem on their hands. But again, and that change comes
from within, it doesn't come at the hands of US and Israeli
bombs. That was Dina Esfandiari, and we
will see what happens next, won't we?
Lindsay, do you feel like this is going to be a critical week?
I don't know. It's going to be a critical
week. I think this is going to go on
and on and on, and you and I are going to be here discussing
this. I don't know, next week, next
month. Oh, God, I hope not.
Next year. That's all we have time for from
Trump World. We will very much be back next
week. That's it from me in Washington,
DC. And that's it from me here in
London. Lovely to talk to you, Anushka.
Bye.