If you look at the 10 point plan and the 15 point plan from the
Americans, I mean, you know, there's no landing strip there.
They seem to be oceans apart. You know, I wonder whether it is
just Trump's rhetoric and the the prospect of Armageddon in
the region that has brought them to the table of sorts to have a
kind of pause in the fighting. But fundamentally, nothing much
has shifted. You know, ultimately that means
that I just can't see this, this ceasefire lasting for much
longer unless the threat of Armageddon is always there as
the cloud in the background and they just keep rolling it over
on a two week basis. Hello, I'm Matt Frye in London
and welcome to Trump world. Well, Donald Trump certainly
knows how to keep our attention and he held our attention very
much most of the night actually, depending on where you were
living on this planet. There was the famous deadline
that was set for 8:00 Eastern Time.
That was one in the morning, I think, in London, and we were
all waiting to see whether he would come good on his dire
threats of raining Armageddon down on Iran, bombing them back
to the Stone Age, you know, killing their civilization never
to come back again. I mean, the kind of language
that was both unprecedented and pretty unpresidential, to be
honest. And that seemed to have
concentrated some minds, or perhaps it was the, you know,
message he was getting from the markets.
We'll discuss all that later. But anyway, just after midnight
London time, it became obvious that there was a deal, that
there would be a A2 week ceasefire, that the Iranians and
the Americans had agreed to this, that it was broken by
Pakistan. Now there's a lot we don't know.
We don't know exactly what the Americans agreed to because if
you look at the 10 point plan that was issued by the Iranians,
there's a lot of stuff in there, frankly, that America would
never have agreed to in the past.
Like for instance, the removal of American troops from bases in
the Gulf, like for instance, continued enrichment of uranium.
Now this was something interestingly that was mentioned
in a Farsi version of the 10 point plan, but not then in the
later English version as published by Tehran.
That's just one of the points. We also don't really know
exactly what's going to happen to the reason why we have this
ceasefire, which is the Strait of Hormuz.
Now in the 10 point plan, it says the, the some I'm
paraphrasing here, the Iranian military will have some kind of
jurisdiction over who is allowed through the Strait of Hormuz and
who isn't. This will be administered by
Iran and by Oman. And so we we're kind of
wondering, does this mean that there'll be a $2,000,000 fee at
the toll booth administered by Tehran every time a tanker goes
through, or will it be $1,000,000 or half, $1,000,000
or 10,000 bucks? We have no idea.
But what we probably know is that the Gulf states will be
very unhappy about this because one of the things that was not a
reality before February the 28th when the war started was that
the Strait of Hormuz was virtually closed.
It was always open. In fact, it remained open for
the 47 years of conflict between Tehran and Washington.
So why is open meaning it partially now a massive
achievement again, something else to be discussed.
The other thing we don't know this morning, the other really
massive question, which I'm sure you've asked yourself is where
on earth is Anushka? Well, I guess what Anushka is
doing her job. She's flitting around
Washington, DC from home to White House, probably dropping
the kids off on school and then going to the Department of War,
as they like to call it. Now to listen to one Secretary
of War, Pete Heck says give a press conference and in in this
incredibly hectic morning schedule, she has managed to
find a little bit of time to keep us up to date.
So let's just listen to what she has discovered, Manushka.
So it's obviously been an incredibly consequential 12
hours. At the beginning of it, there
was this threat of hitting power plants, of hitting bridges, of
basically causing a civilization to die.
We then saw that announced ceasefire within 90 minutes to
go. And this morning the Secretary
of War and General Dan Kane have been putting out what they say
is an absolute victory here. Operation Epic Fury was a
historic and overwhelming victory on the battlefield, A
Capital V military victory by any measure, Epic Fury decimated
Iran's military and rendered it combat ineffective for years to
come. In reality, Donald Trump is
talking about negotiating on the Iranians 10 points, which
doesn't really sound like AUS victory.
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is the reopening of a
Strait that was open anyway. And you know, Pete Hegseth in
here, he had a map really of which questions he was going to
take. He took questions from largely
supportive outlets. He was listening to questions
being shouted from the back, but he refused to take any of them.
They were the more difficult questions, the questions that
would have asked what has actually been achieved here?
How much damage has taken place? And in the end, is Iran going to
have more power than it had at the beginning of this,
especially if, as seems to be the case, it goes ahead and
tries to charge people to cross through the Strait of Hormuz.
And then there is a question of Lebanon, of which there wasn't a
single question asked of him with Israel refusing to bat down
there. It comes after we heard
incredibly interesting stuff from the New York Times about
how they came to this decision, a decision that it sounds like
General Kane was very, you know, concerned about in some ways and
one in which Donald Trump pushed ahead, assuming the straight of
Hormuz wouldn't be closed and assuming that this would be a
quick victory. Instead, it looks like we're
about to enter very difficult negotiations.
Thank you very much. And Rushka, I hope you have a
fruitful day. Thanks for your attention to
this matter, as Donald Trump likes to sign off.
OK, let's go to our guest then. There's really no one better to
put all these extraordinarily breathless and hectic events
into constant context then. Suzanne Maloney.
She works for the Brookings Institution, but she also has
worked for Democrats, Democratic administrations and Republican
administrations as the expert on Iran.
She's also worked for ExxonMobil.
So she knows a lot about oil. She knows about the power of
oil. She'll know a lot about the
Strait of Hormuz. No one better to forensically
unpick what has just occurred in the last 24 hours.
OK. Susan Maloney, thank you very
much for coming to Trump World. There's a lot to discuss.
I wondered if you, you know, spent your evening.
I was already asleep last night or trying to get to sleep.
I wonder if you spent your evening waiting for Armageddon
to be unleashed at 8:00 Eastern Time, and how surprised you were
when Armageddon was then postponed for two weeks.
Well, like many people around the world, I absolutely was
watching and waiting to see how this would play out.
It was a little bit earlier in terms of Eastern Standard Time
in the United States. So it wasn't quite as onerous to
wait up. I, I was not in, you know,
wholly shocked that this off ramp was identified and secured.
About 90 minutes before the the promised threat of Armageddon
that President Trump had issued on social media.
There had been some signs of diplomatic progress over the
course of the day, but I think that there was a very real
threat on the part of the administration and it
particularly in the aftermath of the successful rescue operation
over the weekend in which an American airman was extracted
from Iran and an enormously complex and risky operation.
I think that the Trump administration, the president
himself, was primed for action. And we we really did come close
to something that would have been absolutely horrific.
So you think he meant it when he said that he would bomb them
back to the Stone Age or, you know, end their civilization,
never to come back again? Do you think that was he meant
that I was just Trumpian bluff? I I do think that the president
was prepared to take action and that he was prepared to commit
what I would believe would would have been war crimes under the
circumstances. You know, this was a tactic, of
course, because the military operation that would have been
necessary to reopen the Strait of Hormuz forcibly would have
taken an enormous amount of time to mobilize and would have left
the international system really still subject to Iranian
extortion over the course of weeks or even months.
And and that would have been a a costly operation in terms of
both, you know, US defense material, but also in terms
potentially of casualties. So I think that the president,
you know, used completely unacceptable rhetoric, but this
was a tactic intended to sort of drive the the the, the stand off
to some kind of a diplomatic off ramp.
And we'll see if they actually can sustain it.
I think that's a real question. That it's a massive question
amongst lots of other big questions.
So if that's true, if basically, you know, he used this very,
very strong rhetoric and and backed it up with, you know,
with bombing to persuade the Iranians.
At the same time, the kind of 10 point plan that they issued is
full of things that, you know, they could only have dreamt of
in the past and that may not be accepted at the end of the day.
But it doesn't look like a capitulation document, does it?
No, it absolutely doesn't. And I think that the Iranian
regime is convinced that it has not just achieved the upper
hand, but it has come out of this conflict potentially in a
stronger position, both in terms of its control of society and
its so it's regional stance and and most importantly perhaps in
terms of the economy. But I'm asking that question
because I just wonder whether there was something else at play
here. I mean, for instance, you know,
and I'm thinking out loud here, is it possible that Trump, in
the end back down because he was getting signals from his mates
on Wall Street that if he did go ahead with Armageddon, the
markets would go berserk and ultimately, you know, this would
wash up on his own doorstep? Is it also possible because
there's been a lot of, you know, restiveness in the Pentagon, in
the so-called Department of War, but maybe some generals went to
the Secretary of War, Pete Hexis, and said, I'm sorry, Sir,
but if you asked us to bomb these targets and this could be
a war crime, we're not going to go and follow your orders.
I think those are very interesting and important
questions. I'm sure that the president was
thinking of the markets, although it doesn't appear that
he took those markets into account in launching the war
itself. But clearly this had become an
economic crisis. And the expectation of any
escalation by the United States would have precipitated some
kind of escalation by the Iranians.
They would have targeted Saudi oil facilities and alternative
export routes through the Red Sea, and that would have
compounded the the shortages in the oil and gas markets.
It would have, you know, really, I think, produced an historic
crisis on top of what we're already experiencing for the
global economy. And so it wasn't, you know, it
wasn't going to be a short term fix in terms of the crisis
itself if the president were to try to unleash the bombing that
he had promised. You know, we haven't seen much
evidence of pushback within the administration even as the
president has undertaken this mission.
And I think the reporting on, you know, what drove the war and
the calculus and the deliberations that went in to
the decision to launch the war really reaffirm what we've been
given to understand about how decision making operates in this
administration. The president is the decider.
He is surrounded by people with considerable experience and who
are better informed than he is on many of the technicalities.
But they don't believe themselves to be in a position
to make those decisions. They believe themselves as
giving the president options, and he ultimately decides.
So it would be interesting to see if this was a case where
there was in fact, you know, some, some more serious
opposition that was going to constrain the the US response.
I would like to believe that that's true.
It certainly would would be consistent with what I know of
the professionalism of the US military.
But, you know, that hasn't been how the senior decision makers
in the administration thus far have operated.
Specifically on the 10 point plan that the Iranians have
issued. So I have a couple of questions
and maybe you can answer them. So the question of enrichment,
for instance. So apparently there's a Farsi
version that was put out in the middle of the night that or less
said we still want to enrich uranium.
That is not then the English language version.
Apparently. That seems to be a really
fundamental point. That's one of the reasons why
this war was started in the 1st place.
Then the other points are, for instance, no American troops in
bases in the Gulf. I mean, I find out kind of hard
to believe, even though many Gulf states have fallen out of
love with America's trust sharpishly in the last few
weeks. Another one was about, you know,
advanced proxies in the region have to be dismantled.
I mean, there's a lot of stuff there that seems like wishful
thinking from the Iranian side. So do we know how much America,
you know, how many of those points America, is signed off on
or is that subject to the negotiations that will start
apparently in Islamabad in Pakistan on Friday?
I think that is subject to the negotiation.
And of course the the Trump administration put out its own
15 point plan or set of criteria that they want the Iranians to
satisfy. And similarly, I don't think
that there's any acceptance of that criteria by Tehran.
So this is going to be a really tough negotiation.
It's not clear exactly what kind of a a compromise can be
achieved, and it may only be a brief interlude in between the
the the war itself. Because if you look at the 10
point plan and the 15 point plan from the Americans, I mean, you
know, there's no landing strip there.
They seem to be oceans apart. So, you know, I wonder whether
it is just Trump's rhetoric and the the prospect of Armageddon
in the region that has brought them to the table of sorts.
They have a kind of hold in the fighting.
But fundamentally, nothing much has shifted.
And you know, ultimately that means that I just can't see
this, this ceasefire laughing for much longer unless the
threat of Armageddon is always there as the cloud in the
background and they just keep rolling it over on a two week
basis. Well, I think from the Iranian
point of view, if they can lock in some of the gains they
believe they've achieved in this war, particularly the ability to
monetize their control of the Strait of Corpos, then that is a
huge net benefit for them. And you know, they, they were
prepared to make some compromises in the diplomacy
that took place in the days before President Trump launched
the war. They may recognize that there is
a, as I've heard described, a kind of shelf life to their
current upper hand. And they may wish to try to
achieve some durable gains rather than continue the fight,
potentially risk long term damage to the regime itself.
They obviously don't care about the Iranian people, but they
really do care about ensuring the regime remains in control.
If at the end of this war, the six week war, what a almost six
week war. Iran comes out hardened, you
know, ideologically committed, just as repressive at home, if
not more so. We're still 30% of its ballistic
missile capability intact, 440kg of enriched uranium somewhere
hidden in a bunker or under a, you know, a collapsed building
or who knows where. But crucially, they've managed
to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a toll booth.
It could make them up to, you know, $2,000,000 a tank, 150
tankers a day. You do the math, it says that's
a lot of money. That would be extraordinary,
wouldn't it? It would be, and I think that's
what the Iranians believe that they can achieve because of the
difficulties in reversing the current set of circumstances.
It can be done. the US militarily can retake control of
the Strait of Hormuz, but it's a really complex operation.
It would take a lot of time to undertake and, you know, there
is, I think, some recognition that the Iranians have been
demanding some kind of economic compensation.
United States is not going to pay reparations to Islamic
Republic of Iran. But a system in which Iran is
able to profit as a result of its control, control of the
Strait, might be the most tolerable end for all parties,
at least in the short term. Do you think the Gulf states
will put up with the Strait of Hormuz becoming a Tehran toll
booth? I think it would have to be
somewhat bilateral. And so some of the proposals
have suggested that the Omanis would also, given their their
geographic position, have some opportunity to benefit from
this. And that could be potentially A
reconstruction funds to offset the damages to economic and
energy infrastructure across the the Gulf Cooperation Council
states. This is, you know, it, it is not
a, a strategic victory for the Trump administration.
It's hard to see that this war, which has, you know, come at a
huge cost in terms of the the economic cost of waging war, but
also the opportunity cost and the depletion of US munitions
and the key interceptors that are necessary for the air
defense systems, not just in this part of the world, but
also, of course, for other ongoing conflicts in Ukraine as
well as as well as in potential future conflicts in the Indo
Pacific. So, you know, coming out of this
war with the Iranians in a stronger position with some
economic benefit to the regime is is a really catastrophic
outcome. But, you know, This is why,
where we have been really since the start of the war, the
president undertook this operation on the assumption that
decapitation would lead quickly to regime change.
He cannot stand, both politically and for some of the
other reasons we've been discussing, for this war to
continue indefinitely. It is, you know, it has a real
political consequence for him. And geostrategically, it is not
benefiting the United States to be locked down in this conflict
for the long term. You know, the Gulf states are
outraged and as as we are in Europe and in Asia about the
idea that the Strait of Hormuz will become a toll booth for
Tehran. But again, maybe Trump doesn't
mind that much. I mean, he's the guy who imposed
tariffs on his closest friends. Maybe he just thinks since we're
not relying on most of the stuff that comes through the straits,
it's OK if Tehran does this because that's what you do.
You have the power, you extract the money.
It's either a tariff or it's a toll.
I think that's an excellent point.
I think that from the president's perspective, the
United States isn't reliant on the Strait of Hormuz.
That's not entirely accurate, but at least that is his
mindset. And he is, you know, very much
convinced that might makes right.
He would would probably be very happy to have some kind of a
different relationship with the even a very autocratic military
regime in Tehran as long as he was able to projected as a
victory. And he would be less concerned
about the consequences for the rest of the world, even though
it will have would have tremendous impact on the global
economy. So you worked, I think in your
long career, you've also worked for ExxonMobil in a senior
position, if I'm not mistaken. I mean, the oil giants, you
know, who need the Strait of Hormuz to be as open and, and
uncostly as possible. How nervous today about this, if
this becomes a new normal because every time the Iranians
don't like something, they can just threaten to send a drone
towards the tanker and all it takes is 1 little drone and
suddenly insurance companies go first by berserk and and the
traffic stops. I mean, how nervous do you think
they are about this new normal? I think, you know, the corporate
world, but also the, you know, literal states, the the Persian
Gulf states. Everyone has to be extremely
unsettled by a scenario in which the Iranians continue to retain
some degree of leverage over passage through the Strait of
Hormuz, especially with this regime in power.
It is by far the worst possible outcome for markets, for, for
energy supply, for all the other interests that we have.
And as well As for the kind of US relationship with those
states. But, you know, it's hard to see
an outcome that can extract that we will.
I do think, you know, in the long term, the regime stands.
It has gained from this conflict.
But, you know, wars have unpredictable consequences.
We know the Iranian people would like to see a very different
kind of leadership in their country over time in the
aftermath of of a war that, you know, the Iranian regime to some
extent has been waiting for and ready for for many years.
I, you know, I think there will be a push from within for some
kind of alternative governance within Iran, but it's not going
to happen in the short term. I was going to ask you about
that because of course, we've just in the last few days we've
seen executions of people who took part in the demonstrations
in January, Some, you know, yeah, I think in one or two
cases, some pretty high profile, you know, sporting
personalities, you know, a couple of well known artists, I
mean, the besieger, you know, and the Revolutionary Guard
Council, Paul rather have not backed off on tramping down on a
internal opposition. Do you think that will get worse
in the coming weeks if the fighting stops, I mean, with
America and Israel? And can you see the Iranian
people, you know, who may still hate the ayatollahs more than
they hate Donald Trump at this stage, come out onto the streets
and demand their freedom? I don't think that's going to
happen in the near term. I do think that the regime will
continue to reinforce through coercive means that it wants to
remain fully in control and it will not brook any kind of
dissent or opposition. They have been not just to
keeping up the pace of executions, but they've been
sending text messages to, you know, the population writ large
to warn them away from any kind of protest or dissent.
But we've also seen at least some possible cracks within the
system itself. And, you know, some of the more
moderate figures within the regime have suggested that this
is the end of the war should be an occasion for serious reform
of the system to ensure its durability.
You know what that looks like, how successful they are.
It's, it doesn't look good in the short term, but I would note
that in the in the aftermath of the Iran Iraq war, that was when
we really did see some push for reform and for gradual change
within the system that briefly appeared to have some traction
within the system in the late 1990s.
So this is a, a, a long haul. Iranians have been suffering
under this system for 47 years. They deserve an opportunity to
select their own government and and really be in a position not
to be dominated by this horrific region.
But you know, the war unfortunately has has not given
them much of an opportunity. Yes, because I mean, obviously
you've studied around, you know, almost for as long as they've
had revolutionary Iran since since 1979.
You've written books about it and all the rest of it.
I mean, and there've been so many full storms of opposition,
haven't there? And we so many times that we've
predicted regime change, including rather blithely and
mistakenly at the beginning of this year.
And every single time it's been frustrated.
Is there anything that you've seen that suggests that the
cracks within the regime between hardliners and reformers is more
serious than it's been in the past?
Or that the the the quorum of anger from the streets that we
saw in January might re emerge in a truly substantial and
decisive way this time. I am not optimistic in the short
term, but I would say, you know, the Iranian people have been
coming to the streets in larger numbers, more sustained and at
great risk to their own lives and livelihoods in, you know,
over the course of the past eight years in particular.
It's very clear that they want some kind of a different system.
The system has changed. We now see the military more
firmly in control. And for now, they appear to be
equally committed to the principles of the theocratic
state of revolutionary Iran. But that, too, may change over
time because they're going to have to govern a country which
has been ravaged by this war. They're going to have to rebuild
and reconstruct infrastructure across the board.
And they're going to need to be able to demonstrate to their own
population that there is some, you know, potential better
future. So, you know, this is not a, a
great, a good outcome for the Iranian people, but I, you know,
I think that there will be a need to continue to maintain
pressure. You know, one big issue that I
would hope would be addressed, at least symbolically in those
conversations that are going to take place around the ceasefire
would be the reopening of the Internet.
Iranians have been cut off for now 40 days, which is
unprecedented in the world. They have a national Internet
that they can essentially disconnect from the
international system. And that, in the current set of
circumstances, seems intolerable.
Indeed. And of course the Internet was
also shut down at the beginning of the year when they had the
demonstrations. So there's been probably most of
the beginning of this of 2026 in Internet darkness, which is, you
know, which is extraordinary. So just to get back to Donald
Trump, if, you know Trump will be crying about victory, you
know, in the next hours and days, what has he actually won?
What has he achieved in this 5 1/2 weeks of war?
I think the the president and those who support this war will
point to the extensive degradation of Iran's
conventional military capabilities over the course of
the past five weeks. It will also point to the
leadership decapitation and the erosion of an entire echelon of
military and security and political leaders as a result of
the air strikes. You know those are significant
accomplishments. But are they, I mean, if you, if
you, if the institutions are stronger than the individuals,
if you place replace 1 chap called Khamenei with his son,
who's also called Khamenei, the nepo Ayatollah who've not seen.
And if you, if they still have the ability to fire missiles at
Gulf states, as they were proving all day today, they're
still firing stuff and they still have their drones.
And I just wonder whether you know, and they can rebuild stuff
very quickly as they did after June last year when they learned
some lessons in that short war. And I mean, the weakness of the
regime is there, but it's not, it doesn't strike me as being
substantial. No, I, I, I think on balance,
you know, this is not a strategic victory for the Trump
administration in any way, shape or form.
I simply suspect that the president will disregard the
reality on the ground and he will point to some tactical
achievements which are meaningful, which are real, but
they don't offset the extent to which the regime has been
entrenched, potentially strengthened, potentially in a,
in a, in a better economic position, which is really
extraordinary. Exactly, especially if the oil
sanctions continue to be lifted and they're making money from
the toll booth on the straight. But the other thing that the
Iranians wanted and I think it's in the 10 point plan that they
profit is a guarantee that America won't break its word
again or is not for that matter and and surprise them with more
military action it seemed. Again, I'm very doubtful whether
that guarantee can be obtained even on paper frankly.
And if it is depend on paper with it can be trusted.
No, I don't think that the United States or Israel will
make that kind of a commitment. I don't think the Iranians can
secure that through the negotiating table.
But I do think that their ability to revert to strikes on
transit through the through the straight will be essentially a
new situation of mutually assured destruction.
The United States can come back and hit Iran.
Israel can as well. And that is something that, you
know, you see the extent to which the the United States
military had set up, as, you know, a, a temporary base within
Iran in order to extract the downed airmen last week.
And so, you know, that degree of operational control over Iran is
extraordinary. And I suspect that that, you
know, that will to some extent act as a kind of deterrence
against further efforts by the Iranians.
But you know, we are going to be, I think, in a very
precarious situation, one that will have a real hangover for
the global economy for quite some time.
And, and it looks as if America's military assets will
be in the region for the foreseeable future.
Is that right? I mean, they're they're keeping
everything there just in case it all falls apart.
They will have to do that. I think the idea of pivoting to
Asia has once again been distracted by events in the
Middle East and the president's decision to launch this war.
So if you're Xi Jinping and you have spent the last year and a
half ever since Trump came back into office, to to put yourself
up there as the designated driver of planet Earthy, the
designated adult of the new world disorder, call it what you
like. What are you doing with this,
with this situation? Is it an opportunity to try
something in Taiwan, or are you just going to rest on your
responsible Laurel for a bit? I think the Chinese are watching
and learning about the US military and US strategic
leadership because what they've seen is a military that is very
operationally capable. The the, again, this rescue
operation, I think points to the just the extraordinary skill and
capabilities of the US military. But what they've seen is, you
know, a leadership that has made disastrous decisions and
they're, you know, going to pocket that.
That simply is tremendous benefit in terms of the Chinese
presenting themselves as an alternative.
You know, I, I am guided by my colleagues who have studied the
issues of China and Taiwan far longer than I have.
And I think that, you know, a military operation is probably
the least likely outcome to try to take Taiwan.
There are many other ways that they can secure control of the
island. And I I think they're gonna,
Beijing is going to be quite happy that the president will be
once again distracted by the Middle East and they're going to
be able to extend their influence.
They have also benefited in terms of the further alienation
of partners and allies, both because of the economic
consequences which have been felt more keenly in Seoul and
Tokyo than they have perhaps at this point in time by within the
United States. As well as the the strategic,
you know, sort of alienation of Europe and the the really
offensive rhetoric from the White House toward America's
NATO allies over the course of this conflict.
I think that will also have a very long tail.
Donald Trump came to power in America because he promised to
be, you know, as tough, you know, as a tough businessman,
the real estate tycoon from Manhattan who knows how to get
deals done. There's the famous book, The Out
of the Deal and all that. Have we discovered, and maybe
has he discovered in the last six weeks the limits of his kind
of appeal as a transactional leader, that there are
important, there are more important things than just
making money? You know, as the Iranians have
shown us, there is pride, there is history.
If you threaten to obliterate a civilisation that's five and a
half thousand 6000 years old, I can't count.
But they get upset, you know, and people who hate the
ayatollahs will hate you even more for making these
suggestions as you come against up against the limitations of
his own kind of philosophical mindset, let's call it that, as
a businessman trying to run a country.
I think what we're seeing is real splits within the
president's base over this war, both because the president
himself had long campaigned against the forever wars.
He was in some ways prescient on that within the Republican
Party, within the Washington establishment.
I don't think it was as fully appreciated when he first began
criticizing the the money and and lives lost in Iraq and
Afghanistan that that was such a salient issue for the American
public and to, you know, undertake this war without a
clear plan for not just the day after the war, but the second
date of the war. I think, you know, we've already
seen a a lot of dissent from within the mega sphere and, you
know, the the economic consequence are going to be
playing up just as Americans begin their summer holidays.
The the price of gasoline is going to remain elevated here.
Jet fuel obviously will also remain highly elevated.
That will impact, you know, voters as they approach the
midterm elections in November. And so I think, you know, what
this war has done, at least for the moment, has suggested that
the president is not invulnerable to the forces of
gravity and the forces of logic and reason.
And, you know, we may see a shift in not just his base, but
also in the Republican establishment, a greater
willingness to push back against some of the catastrophic and
outrageous decisions that he has been undertaking, not just
internationally but also here at home.
I mean, there are plenty of people in America who are
outraged by the language that the president has used in the
last week. And some Republicans also
outraged, although more quietly and less publicly than their,
you know, Democratic friends. I just wonder whether you think,
whether you know, if there's anyone at all in the White House
who can say to the president you can't use that language?
Is it Susie Wiles, you know, is it Marco Rubio?
Is it JD Vance? Is anyone telling him don't
tweet this stuff, don't post it? This is not presidential.
It's counterproductive, you know, it made the arrangement
stronger, you know, in the long run than than the opposite.
I think there are many people who could tell him that, and
they have chosen not to. And that is the the real fear,
the real, you know, sort of disaster that we're facing as a
country and across the world that the president is making
catastrophic decisions. And those he has surrounded
himself with may know better, but choose not to push back
sufficiently. Which is astonishing when you
consider that America, you know, for better or for worse, he's
always functioned quite well on a chief executive who has,
Lincoln famously said, had had a team of rivals backing him up.
You know some smart people who could say, Mr. President, with
all respect, Sir, you can't do this or you can't say that.
Yeah. That, I think is something that
we've seen play out over the course of this conflict.
And the reporting on how the decision was made to go to war
suggests that there were those, both from the Pentagon and
within the administration who had serious reservations about
the plan that was presented by the Israelis for this war and
the assumption of a very quick victory and quick regime change.
But they did not press that issue with the president.
We have seen in both Republican and Democratic administrations
in the past that Cabinet officials were prepared to
resign over decisions that they thought were wrong headed.
And in this case, we're not even seeing the, the, the serious
debate that that should have been undertaken, not just within
the White House, within the administration, but, you know,
before going to war, the United States president should have
gone to Congress, should have gone to the American people to
make the case of why this was necessary, why the threat was
imminent, why it was worth the United States resources and
attention to undertake such a a risky operation.
The fact that the president didn't do that leaves him in a
much weaker position today, even if he will no doubt proclaim A
tremendous victory however this war ends.
And as they say, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely, even just if you have the impression that you've
got absolute power, which obviously the president still
doesn't, even if he wants it. I just want to finally, I mean,
if you're, if you're sitting in Denmark or in Greenland and you
know that there's a president of the United States who thinks
that by threatening civilizational Armageddon he can
get his way, are you safe? I mean, is he not going to?
Is there a possibility he might do the same thing to you in
Copenhagen or do that to his friends and allies in Europe who
he's been running for ever since he came back into office?
I mean, no one is entirely safe from the president's bluster
rhetoric, are they? Well, I do think what we saw
earlier this year was really affected pushback by European
leaders and of course, the signals that the president was
receiving from the market about his desire to take Greenland.
I would expect that he will revert to that again at some
point. But this war has to have been a
humbling experience. And as I said there, you know,
we're seeing the splits within the mega base.
There may be more pushback internally within the United
States on the president. And, you know, he after the
midterms, he may be more of a lame duck.
There will be a look toward who is the the future of the mega
movement, and that I think will will create some at least
effective pressure and dissuasion from further
adventures like this one. So we're looking for some relief
here. Do you think then that he might
stop his kind of 11 head on a poke every calendar, every
calendar month routine? Do you think he might layoff
Cuba for a bit? Maybe layoff Greenland for a
bit? Give it a rest, play some golf,
have a good time, enjoy the garden, smell the roses.
Well, he's got a construction site in the Rose Garden, so that
may be a little difficult. But I do think that the
president will probably not be fully tamed as a result of this,
particularly if he is able to depict it in his own mind as
some sort of great strategic outcome.
So he may be tempted to try to redeem himself through other
operations that may be perceived as potentially less complex,
such as Cuba, certainly Greenland.
I think, you know, he will talk about it.
I would be very surprised if, in the aftermath of this conflict
that he undertakes another risky and very costly effort such as
that. And having insulted, you know,
even his supposed best friend us, you know, on our little
island here, you know, the King's coming out in 2 weeks
time, I'm sure he'll give a very emollient speech and try and
paper over some of the cracks. But having insulted his friends
and allies, you think that those friends and allies should trust
America's words ever again? Or has this relationship
fundamentally broken? Are we living through the
rupture that Mark County talked about at Devil?
I think we're living through the rupture.
I hope it can be repaired in the future.
I don't think that that will happen within the next several
years. I don't see the president
changing to the extent that would be necessary to really
repair the damage that he has done to those partners and
allies. I do think that that's a
critical need for the rest of the establishment in the United
States to consider how we navigate a new world because we
know from past experience that, you know, without American
leadership that there are, you know, really negative outcomes.
We have not been a perfect country by any stretch of the
imagination. But, you know, the commitment to
try to advance prosperity and security around the world has
been a global good. And without it, we may see more
conflict. We may see more economic, very
negative economic competition. And and ultimately it will not
be our, no one will will will benefit from that other than our
adversaries. Sobering stuff.
Suzanne Maloney, it's a pleasure to talk to you.
Thank you very much for your insight.
Thank you. Well, that's it for this week.
I'll be back next week. Fresh from the Hungarian
elections which are taking place this weekend, Hungary is the
kind of Canary in the populist mine.
We'll see whether Viktor Orban survives some really dismal
opinion poll ratings and a legacy of corruption and
economic decline. And frankly, Hungary, now the
poorest state in the EU by many measures, can he still manage to
survive and be Donald Trump's favorite Prime Minister in
Europe? Let's see about that.
And of course, Anushka will give us all the latest from
Washington. And the big question next week
will be, can this ceasefire that is very fresh off the page hold
as long as you have to wait for the next edition of Trump World.
That's it from me in London. Hope you enjoyed it.
See you soon.