1 00:00:00,200 --> 00:00:03,500 Prepare to hear the truth from a real whistleblower, an American 2 00:00:03,500 --> 00:00:07,100 Patriot, here's civil liberties, enthusiasts, Second Amendment, 3 00:00:07,100 --> 00:00:10,500 Defender and indefinitely suspended FBI agent. 4 00:00:10,500 --> 00:00:16,800 Kyle seraphin. Hello, my friends and welcome to 5 00:00:16,800 --> 00:00:19,700 the Kyle Serafin show for Friday March. 6 00:00:19,700 --> 00:00:24,200 The 17th 2023. We are in a perilous time and 7 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:27,400 nothing could be more important than our privacy, and our 8 00:00:27,400 --> 00:00:30,000 freedom to think speak and associate with those. 9 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:33,200 With whom we choose in this contentious time, we have 10 00:00:33,200 --> 00:00:36,000 government entities, like CC declaring, our thoughts are part 11 00:00:36,000 --> 00:00:39,500 of the federal government's cognitive infrastructure and our 12 00:00:39,508 --> 00:00:42,800 Communications are potential cyber attacks on the Homeland. 13 00:00:43,700 --> 00:00:45,900 So with that in mind. And our Congress is facing a 14 00:00:45,908 --> 00:00:48,900 decision to renew the foreign intelligence surveillance act or 15 00:00:48,900 --> 00:00:53,500 fisa and specifically section 702 of the fisa yet on the 16 00:00:53,500 --> 00:00:57,000 opposite, side of privacy are so-called woke Bettors are 17 00:00:57,000 --> 00:00:59,700 constantly bombarding us with messaging about their sexual 18 00:00:59,700 --> 00:01:02,900 orientation, their racial diversity and how we must have 19 00:01:02,900 --> 00:01:05,900 these so-called minority groups over-represented in political 20 00:01:05,900 --> 00:01:10,300 and public life. Quote-unquote, diversity is our 21 00:01:10,300 --> 00:01:12,900 strength. We hear over and over again. 22 00:01:13,400 --> 00:01:16,200 I'm going to show how perhaps The left is interested in 23 00:01:16,200 --> 00:01:19,300 crushing our privacy because it allows them to continue to 24 00:01:19,300 --> 00:01:22,400 flaunt these absurd claims about diversity. 25 00:01:22,900 --> 00:01:24,800 And once we cover these topics, I'm going to have a short 26 00:01:24,800 --> 00:01:27,800 session with my buddy, Steve friend coming in to call some 27 00:01:27,800 --> 00:01:30,700 balls and Strikes on some of the information that has come out of 28 00:01:30,700 --> 00:01:33,300 the proud boys trial. So stick around for that. 29 00:01:33,300 --> 00:01:36,500 But first just a quick word from our sponsor. 30 00:01:37,100 --> 00:01:39,600 We want to thank Patriot coolers for sponsoring the Kyle, serif 31 00:01:39,600 --> 00:01:41,800 and show this month. 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Again, use promo code k. 53 00:02:36,600 --> 00:02:41,800 Yl e for 10% off and shipping over $50 is always free. 54 00:02:41,900 --> 00:02:43,100 Thanks for checking them out y'all. 55 00:02:45,500 --> 00:02:48,000 All right, so let's talk about section 702. 56 00:02:48,000 --> 00:02:51,400 There is nothing more boring, but nothing more scary than the 57 00:02:51,400 --> 00:02:54,900 fisa section 702. And when I say it was boring, I 58 00:02:54,900 --> 00:02:57,500 mean I spent two years dealing with this thing. 59 00:02:57,700 --> 00:03:00,900 It is an awful entity and it is very difficult for most people 60 00:03:00,900 --> 00:03:04,000 to Fathom. One of the things that we know 61 00:03:04,000 --> 00:03:08,200 about 702 is that it is a tool that is almost impossible for 62 00:03:08,200 --> 00:03:12,000 law enforcement to use in a law enforcement way and making that 63 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:14,300 available to the FBI is the reason. 64 00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:18,200 I've made some whistleblower disclosures about how it 65 00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:21,800 shouldn't be a tool that's available to folks in that sort 66 00:03:21,800 --> 00:03:26,200 of that venue. It's not a new topic to be 67 00:03:26,200 --> 00:03:28,600 contentious Senator. Mike Lee has been someone who 68 00:03:28,600 --> 00:03:32,800 was called for its abolition. And luckily representative Jim, 69 00:03:32,800 --> 00:03:35,000 Jordan is actually doing the same thing at this point, 70 00:03:35,400 --> 00:03:37,500 hopefully, because of some of the information that I've shared 71 00:03:37,500 --> 00:03:39,500 with this staff. So I want to bring up a quick 72 00:03:39,500 --> 00:03:42,800 article here and we're going to discuss how and why it cannot be 73 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:44,500 used in a way that is even remotely. 74 00:03:44,700 --> 00:03:48,500 Appropriate. This is one from company or a 75 00:03:48,600 --> 00:03:51,000 website called cyber scoop.com. I'm not familiar with them 76 00:03:51,000 --> 00:03:54,100 before but I was reading about it and the stuff I read in there 77 00:03:54,100 --> 00:03:57,300 is is worth reporting on. This is an older article coming 78 00:03:57,300 --> 00:03:59,700 back from about two weeks ago and it says the White House 79 00:03:59,700 --> 00:04:03,800 faces deep deeply, skeptical Congress as it advocates, for 80 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:07,300 controversial, surveillance tool section 702 of the foreign 81 00:04:07,300 --> 00:04:10,000 intelligence, surveillance act expired, December. 82 00:04:10,200 --> 00:04:11,900 Perhaps the most precarious position. 83 00:04:11,900 --> 00:04:14,500 It's been in yet. Thank God for that by the way. 84 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:16,700 Way, it should be in a precarious position because it 85 00:04:16,700 --> 00:04:19,700 can't be used in a way that is a remotely appropriate. 86 00:04:20,399 --> 00:04:24,000 So this article this is written by Tanya Riley again at Cyber 87 00:04:24,000 --> 00:04:27,100 scoop, and it says, the by demonstration begins its 88 00:04:27,100 --> 00:04:29,900 campaign to urge Congress to renew a controversial 89 00:04:29,900 --> 00:04:32,300 surveillance provision that authorizes. 90 00:04:32,300 --> 00:04:35,200 Intelligence agencies, carry out warrantless data collection. 91 00:04:35,200 --> 00:04:37,000 This is going to be the real thing that we're talking about 92 00:04:37,000 --> 00:04:40,800 here warrantless, it will face a skeptical Congress, where the 93 00:04:40,800 --> 00:04:43,200 distrust of government spying runs deep. 94 00:04:44,500 --> 00:04:47,500 Fisa 702, which was safe in the brink of sun setting by Congress 95 00:04:47,500 --> 00:04:50,800 twice before isn't perhaps its most precarious position yet. 96 00:04:50,800 --> 00:04:53,700 As we said, leading House Republicans including house, 97 00:04:53,700 --> 00:04:57,600 Judiciary chairman Jim Jordan Republican Ohio have singled 98 00:04:57,600 --> 00:05:00,500 strong opposition to renewing this surveillance. 99 00:05:01,200 --> 00:05:03,800 Meanwhile of course the Democrats have to just contest 100 00:05:03,800 --> 00:05:06,700 everything that they're doing so House minority leader Hakeem 101 00:05:06,700 --> 00:05:09,400 Jeffries Democrat of New York voted against reauthorization in 102 00:05:09,400 --> 00:05:13,300 2018 while other Democrats made it clear that it would be 103 00:05:13,300 --> 00:05:18,600 something that they Port. Look, the 702 is one of those 104 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:21,100 things that most people have no idea what they're talking about. 105 00:05:21,100 --> 00:05:23,000 I'm fairly confident people in Congress. 106 00:05:23,000 --> 00:05:24,400 Don't really understand how it works. 107 00:05:24,400 --> 00:05:27,400 So I'm going to try to explain it to you in a way that makes 108 00:05:27,400 --> 00:05:28,500 sense. And then I'm going to give you 109 00:05:28,500 --> 00:05:31,500 an analogy that should make you very uncomfortable with how it 110 00:05:31,500 --> 00:05:36,300 works. So 702 is a kind of a bizarre 111 00:05:36,300 --> 00:05:39,900 entity where it's collected by the NSA, but it's used by the 112 00:05:39,900 --> 00:05:44,600 FBI when we request access to it when I Saw it it was in a 113 00:05:44,600 --> 00:05:48,000 position or was coming out of a software that was called DWS. 114 00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:50,400 I don't know if it's the same one anymore, it doesn't really 115 00:05:50,400 --> 00:05:53,100 matter. It grabbed, whatever it could 116 00:05:53,100 --> 00:05:57,000 anything that touched American phone lines and wires with 117 00:05:57,000 --> 00:05:59,500 something that we had the potential of having access to 118 00:06:00,000 --> 00:06:02,900 now, rarely did we get phone calls on it? 119 00:06:02,900 --> 00:06:05,900 That wasn't very common. What we got oftentimes was 120 00:06:05,900 --> 00:06:08,900 email, we got Skype calls, anything that was kind of a 121 00:06:08,907 --> 00:06:12,800 digital nature but the primary thing that I saw were emails and 122 00:06:12,800 --> 00:06:18,000 the way that 70 to Is you have to nominate a potential foreign 123 00:06:18,000 --> 00:06:20,400 adversary? Someone who is either connected 124 00:06:20,400 --> 00:06:24,500 to a foreign intelligence surveillance or rather a foreign 125 00:06:24,500 --> 00:06:27,900 intelligence state sponsored entity. 126 00:06:27,900 --> 00:06:30,300 You know, whether they are a spy or whether they're co-opted by 127 00:06:30,300 --> 00:06:32,500 this group, they have to come from one of our threat 128 00:06:32,500 --> 00:06:35,500 countries. And then they have to not be in 129 00:06:35,500 --> 00:06:38,300 the United States. So that's a really big and 130 00:06:38,300 --> 00:06:41,000 important part of it. If I had, for example, a spy 131 00:06:41,000 --> 00:06:43,900 from Russia and that person had been nominated for seven. 132 00:06:43,900 --> 00:06:47,300 No to coverage and we were collecting on them using fill in 133 00:06:47,308 --> 00:06:49,500 the blank email services that are based in the United States, 134 00:06:49,500 --> 00:06:52,300 really matter which ones. And then that person were to get 135 00:06:52,300 --> 00:06:56,400 on a plane from Moscow and fly and land at Dulles the minute. 136 00:06:56,400 --> 00:06:58,900 That I knew that they were in US airspace or that they touch down 137 00:06:58,900 --> 00:07:02,500 in Dulles, I would have to discontinue the collection of 138 00:07:02,500 --> 00:07:05,800 702 and I'd have sort of a blank spot now, they could use their 139 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:07,900 email, all they wanted inside the United States and we 140 00:07:07,900 --> 00:07:12,000 wouldn't have access to it in theory and then when they left 141 00:07:12,000 --> 00:07:15,800 then we could but Screw you think about that when you're in 142 00:07:15,800 --> 00:07:19,000 the United States, doing your emails on let's say Gmail or 143 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:22,700 something like that they stay on Gmail like I guess they could 144 00:07:22,700 --> 00:07:26,400 delete them but mostly people just archive and leave stuff 145 00:07:26,400 --> 00:07:28,100 because they don't know they're nominated for this type of 146 00:07:28,100 --> 00:07:30,500 coverage so they would come the United States. 147 00:07:30,500 --> 00:07:32,300 We wouldn't be able to look at it and then they would leave and 148 00:07:32,308 --> 00:07:34,200 then we'd be able to look at it. We see what they did while they 149 00:07:34,200 --> 00:07:35,600 are in the United States, that's problem. 150 00:07:35,600 --> 00:07:38,600 Number one, I don't know how to fix that, or if we should fix 151 00:07:38,600 --> 00:07:42,200 it, but it is something that is difficult to handle under the 152 00:07:42,200 --> 00:07:46,600 way that the regulations work. The second part of it is, who 153 00:07:46,600 --> 00:07:49,400 will be most interested in. Do I really care? 154 00:07:49,700 --> 00:07:51,300 What? Let's say a Russian businessman 155 00:07:51,300 --> 00:07:53,800 is doing that has some sort of connections to the intelligence 156 00:07:53,800 --> 00:07:57,100 Services, FSB, or Gru, or whatever. 157 00:07:57,600 --> 00:07:59,500 Do I really care what that person is doing? 158 00:07:59,500 --> 00:08:01,400 If they're going to be in Russia, and they're going to be 159 00:08:01,400 --> 00:08:04,400 working out of Russia and I'm not going to be able to see them 160 00:08:04,500 --> 00:08:06,100 in the United States or do anything about it. 161 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:09,200 Well, as a law enforcement officer in the United States, 162 00:08:09,200 --> 00:08:11,900 I'm most interested in people who are betraying my country and 163 00:08:11,900 --> 00:08:13,800 doing things that are active in my country. 164 00:08:14,300 --> 00:08:17,000 So, if they're sharing information or trying to gain 165 00:08:17,000 --> 00:08:20,400 information or by intelligence information from someone here 166 00:08:20,700 --> 00:08:22,300 that's far more interesting to me. 167 00:08:23,000 --> 00:08:25,600 So that's what I would be looking for in that type of 168 00:08:25,600 --> 00:08:28,000 coverage. At least that's what a logical, 169 00:08:28,400 --> 00:08:31,400 you know, route to conclude the value of that intelligence 170 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:36,299 collection would be And yet, if I go looking for Americans, 171 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:40,299 specifically, that's called reverse targeting and reverse 172 00:08:40,299 --> 00:08:44,800 targeting is actually outlawed inside federal law and I cannot 173 00:08:44,800 --> 00:08:46,800 do it. It's expressly forbidden to use 174 00:08:46,800 --> 00:08:48,800 the tool, the way that it is most valuable to law 175 00:08:48,800 --> 00:08:52,400 enforcement. So that makes you wonder, what 176 00:08:52,400 --> 00:08:54,900 is the purpose of it? And I don't know, I don't know 177 00:08:54,900 --> 00:08:57,200 the answer and I used it for two straight years and I'm a pretty 178 00:08:57,200 --> 00:09:01,200 bright guy when I ask people what our job was and why we 179 00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:03,700 gathered intelligence. The information that I got from 180 00:09:03,700 --> 00:09:06,800 the assistant special agent in charge of counterintelligence 181 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:10,500 that I answer to in Washington DC, which is the flagship of 182 00:09:10,500 --> 00:09:12,300 counterintelligence in the United States. 183 00:09:12,600 --> 00:09:15,300 There are more embassies and consulates and so on more 184 00:09:15,300 --> 00:09:17,900 foreign actors in Washington, d.c. than anywhere else that 185 00:09:17,900 --> 00:09:22,400 matters with the exception of maybe New York and if they 186 00:09:22,400 --> 00:09:25,300 didn't know how to answer it, other than say, if we were 187 00:09:25,300 --> 00:09:27,100 looking for intelligence, what are we going to do with it? 188 00:09:27,100 --> 00:09:29,500 Well, then we'll know more things and I said, no, that's 189 00:09:29,500 --> 00:09:31,800 not what we're going to do. That's what we're going to have. 190 00:09:31,800 --> 00:09:34,000 That's what we're going to know. Are we going to do with the 191 00:09:34,000 --> 00:09:37,000 information and they said we're going to use it to get more 192 00:09:37,000 --> 00:09:39,500 information. Now, if you're an action 193 00:09:39,500 --> 00:09:43,200 oriented person and most special agents in the FBI are there, 194 00:09:43,200 --> 00:09:46,200 sort of operations driven? They're not analytical types per 195 00:09:46,200 --> 00:09:47,500 se. Although there's a fair number 196 00:09:47,500 --> 00:09:50,000 of those growing. I would say in that Cadre now 197 00:09:50,400 --> 00:09:53,100 but most of them come out of a background of wanted to do 198 00:09:53,100 --> 00:09:55,600 investigations of wanting to find out, who's the bad guy, 199 00:09:55,600 --> 00:09:57,800 who's betraying our country, and how do we stop them. 200 00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:01,600 And yet, we're not allowed to use that tool in that way that 201 00:10:01,600 --> 00:10:04,400 should trouble you in. Many, many respects. 202 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:06,100 And here's the analogy that I like to use. 203 00:10:06,400 --> 00:10:10,700 Imagine if you were a TSA officer and let's say you were 204 00:10:10,700 --> 00:10:13,600 good at your job and you were really interested in protecting 205 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:17,000 the American Homeland from another 9/11 and no one's going 206 00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:21,000 to sneak anything like a weapon onto an aircraft on your watch. 207 00:10:21,800 --> 00:10:23,700 Okay. So that's a fair thing that you 208 00:10:23,700 --> 00:10:26,500 could do and you're given some tools and some of those tools 209 00:10:26,500 --> 00:10:30,400 are an x-ray to go through all the bags and one of them is a 210 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:32,800 metal detector or a body scan that all the people. 211 00:10:32,900 --> 00:10:35,100 To walk through. So let's say you're on the body 212 00:10:35,100 --> 00:10:39,300 scan and your job on any particular day is to make sure 213 00:10:39,300 --> 00:10:44,400 that no people walk through your checkpoint with a weapon that 214 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:48,100 they're going to put on a plane. And you're going to use the body 215 00:10:48,100 --> 00:10:52,100 scan tool, but what you're told is that you cannot use the body 216 00:10:52,100 --> 00:10:55,800 scan tool to look for weapons. It's only to scan for scan 217 00:10:55,800 --> 00:10:58,800 people's bodies. No further information, what its 218 00:10:58,800 --> 00:11:01,700 actual purposes, you're just doing it because that's the job, 219 00:11:02,300 --> 00:11:04,200 but you're also tasked with making sure there's no weapons 220 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:06,500 on the plane. What are the odds that you're 221 00:11:06,500 --> 00:11:10,000 going to be able to ignore the weapons that you see that show 222 00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:13,700 up on the body scan. And if that rhetorical question, 223 00:11:13,700 --> 00:11:16,000 sounds absurd, that's how absurd. 224 00:11:16,100 --> 00:11:19,900 Section 702 is when it comes to allowing the FBI to use it. 225 00:11:20,300 --> 00:11:24,600 It doesn't make any sense to give them a tool and tell them. 226 00:11:24,600 --> 00:11:27,600 It can only be used for information purposes and not to 227 00:11:27,600 --> 00:11:31,000 identify not to identify potential subjects. 228 00:11:31,200 --> 00:11:33,900 So you should be very concerned about what that looks like. 229 00:11:33,900 --> 00:11:37,900 And why that is a thing that is available out there, this has 230 00:11:37,900 --> 00:11:39,000 got some additional coverage here. 231 00:11:39,000 --> 00:11:41,600 I found another article that comes from Slate magazine. 232 00:11:41,600 --> 00:11:43,600 I don't want you to think, I only look at right-wing sources 233 00:11:43,600 --> 00:11:47,200 although I often do, they're the ones that seem Have more in 234 00:11:47,200 --> 00:11:49,600 common with my perspective, but let's hear what other people 235 00:11:49,600 --> 00:11:51,800 have to say as well. This is another article that's 236 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:54,200 written by a guy named Fred Kaplan, knowing what, you just 237 00:11:54,200 --> 00:11:55,700 know. Now, that I've explained to you 238 00:11:55,700 --> 00:11:59,400 about 70 to and let's, let's take a look at this article, 239 00:11:59,400 --> 00:12:03,200 which is entitled why Biden wants to keep that the law that 240 00:12:03,200 --> 00:12:06,000 allows nsa's Mass surveillance and why Republicans want to kill 241 00:12:06,000 --> 00:12:07,200 it. Like why is this even a public? 242 00:12:07,700 --> 00:12:10,800 A partisan issue is beyond me, but again, Fred Kaplan, 243 00:12:10,800 --> 00:12:13,300 reporting, couple days ago. This was just at the beginning 244 00:12:13,300 --> 00:12:16,400 of the month, March 1st and it says a debate is a Erupting in 245 00:12:16,408 --> 00:12:19,900 Congress over whether to renew or repeal a law that officials 246 00:12:19,900 --> 00:12:23,000 say is vital to combating terrorism cyber crime and 247 00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:26,300 disruptive foreign Espionage, but others to cry as a violation 248 00:12:26,300 --> 00:12:27,800 of the Americans civil liberties. 249 00:12:28,400 --> 00:12:32,300 Now once again we can't use it to actually Target people who 250 00:12:32,300 --> 00:12:35,500 are involved in Espionage and the Espionage only works. 251 00:12:35,900 --> 00:12:38,400 If there's two parts to the coin, one is a foreign actor 252 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:40,800 that's incentivizing somebody and to is the person that 253 00:12:40,800 --> 00:12:43,000 actually has the information to get to them. 254 00:12:43,100 --> 00:12:46,500 We can't go after number two, we can only identify number On and 255 00:12:46,500 --> 00:12:48,400 track what they're doing. And then we're supposed to 256 00:12:48,400 --> 00:12:50,000 imagine that the other part doesn't exist. 257 00:12:50,000 --> 00:12:53,400 It's completely antithetical to any realistic understanding of 258 00:12:53,400 --> 00:12:55,000 how to use this tool but so be it. 259 00:12:55,400 --> 00:12:58,400 So continuing on to the PC or the law section, 702 of the 260 00:12:58,400 --> 00:13:00,200 foreign intelligence, surveillance act allows the 261 00:13:00,200 --> 00:13:02,600 National Security Agency to intercept Communications of 262 00:13:02,600 --> 00:13:04,700 foreigners. Even if that means tapping into 263 00:13:04,700 --> 00:13:06,900 Network, or servers that are based on us, soil, without a 264 00:13:06,908 --> 00:13:08,900 warrant. That's the big piece it goes on 265 00:13:08,900 --> 00:13:11,200 and talks about Edward Snowden revealing, some of the stuff in 266 00:13:11,200 --> 00:13:15,300 2013, next paragraph, down here, subsequent analysis revealed 267 00:13:15,300 --> 00:13:17,400 that the program was really aimed at foreigners on foreign 268 00:13:17,400 --> 00:13:20,900 soil but that some Americans did get swept up in the gigantic 269 00:13:21,100 --> 00:13:24,900 data suck and this occurred mainly as an unavoidable 270 00:13:24,900 --> 00:13:27,800 consequence internet technology, although it was sometimes the 271 00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:30,700 result of bureaucratic overstepping, not so much by the 272 00:13:30,700 --> 00:13:34,100 NSA, here it is. But rather by the FBI, we 273 00:13:34,100 --> 00:13:38,400 learned that there were about 3 million queries of this database 274 00:13:38,600 --> 00:13:42,000 that were not authorized under law. 275 00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:45,500 And yet there was no request for them to be authorized after the 276 00:13:45,500 --> 00:13:48,500 fact We found that out a little bit later on, I think that 277 00:13:48,500 --> 00:13:49,800 should be a big problem for people. 278 00:13:50,100 --> 00:13:52,100 People should understand that. This is not how it's supposed to 279 00:13:52,100 --> 00:13:54,700 work, but there's no real way to use it in a mate. 280 00:13:54,700 --> 00:13:57,200 Like in way, that makes sense as an FBI agent and so they're 281 00:13:57,200 --> 00:13:59,900 given this tool and they don't know how to use it legally. 282 00:13:59,900 --> 00:14:01,600 And so, of course, they're going to use it in a way that's 283 00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:03,900 inappropriate that should bother you. 284 00:14:04,800 --> 00:14:07,700 But it's not necessarily an indictment of the people that 285 00:14:07,700 --> 00:14:09,900 are doing the tool because I don't know how to train someone 286 00:14:09,900 --> 00:14:11,200 to do that, in a way that makes sense. 287 00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:15,400 So it says the revelations of FBI Blues abuse have turned many 288 00:14:16,100 --> 00:14:18,200 Public ins against the program in keeping with her General. 289 00:14:18,200 --> 00:14:20,800 Hostility towards the FBI for its investigations which they 290 00:14:20,800 --> 00:14:24,600 see as politically motivated. They are politically motivated. 291 00:14:24,600 --> 00:14:27,100 That shouldn't surprise. Anybody here a former President 292 00:14:27,100 --> 00:14:29,100 Trump. It's not about trump, it really 293 00:14:29,100 --> 00:14:32,400 isn't Trump the investigation and the mirror logger rate were 294 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:35,900 symptoms of a much broader problem with the FBI which is 295 00:14:35,900 --> 00:14:39,600 that it is not being run in a way that is constitutional and 296 00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:42,000 it's not being run in a way that is a political. 297 00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:45,400 If you follow this podcast, you already know much about that. 298 00:14:46,100 --> 00:14:48,900 Unless Congress votes to extend section 702 by the end of the 299 00:14:48,908 --> 00:14:51,300 year it expires. So we're going to have a kind of 300 00:14:51,300 --> 00:14:54,600 a hard-fought discussion about this for a while. 301 00:14:54,700 --> 00:14:57,100 It sounds like The Binding ministration is pushing hard for 302 00:14:57,100 --> 00:15:00,000 its renewal it's really strange. Why would they want to maintain 303 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:02,100 this thing that they were against a little while ago? 304 00:15:02,100 --> 00:15:05,100 And that their House minority leader was against and it's 305 00:15:05,100 --> 00:15:07,800 because it's about power. I think it's a lot about power 306 00:15:07,800 --> 00:15:10,000 and it gives you a lot of ability to Target people 307 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:11,300 including your political enemies. 308 00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:15,100 So it says this week, attorney general Merrick Garland and the 309 00:15:15,108 --> 00:15:16,700 Director of National Intelligence Intelligence also 310 00:15:16,700 --> 00:15:19,200 known as the dni Avril. Haines, we're going to be 311 00:15:19,208 --> 00:15:20,700 hearing more about Avril. Haines for a while. 312 00:15:20,700 --> 00:15:23,300 I'm pretty sure sent a letter to Congress or the urging the 313 00:15:23,308 --> 00:15:27,100 reauthorization as a top legislative priority and 314 00:15:27,100 --> 00:15:29,700 offering classified briefings to anyone who doubts. 315 00:15:29,700 --> 00:15:33,500 It Haynes will be testifying an open hearings before the House 316 00:15:33,500 --> 00:15:35,500 and Senate intelligence committees that already 317 00:15:35,500 --> 00:15:37,500 happened. This is obviously written, like 318 00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:41,400 I said, two weeks ago, so then they talk about prism which is 319 00:15:41,400 --> 00:15:44,000 some of the stuff that came out from Snowden, the implications 320 00:15:44,000 --> 00:15:45,800 of intelligence gathering more profound ever. 321 00:15:46,100 --> 00:15:49,100 Digital devices, supplanted telephones, radio signals and 322 00:15:49,100 --> 00:15:52,100 microwave transmission CNS a it's been having a hard time 323 00:15:52,400 --> 00:15:55,200 monitoring foreign Communications which is and was 324 00:15:55,200 --> 00:15:57,800 the nation of the agency's primary Mission. 325 00:15:58,300 --> 00:16:01,700 I may actually do another little segment at some point in the 326 00:16:01,700 --> 00:16:05,400 near future with my friend, George Hill, FBI whistleblower, 327 00:16:05,400 --> 00:16:08,500 who has gone forward and testify in front of Congress and will 328 00:16:08,500 --> 00:16:12,100 specifically focus on 702 and what it does and what it doesn't 329 00:16:12,100 --> 00:16:14,200 do. But I think that you'll find 330 00:16:14,200 --> 00:16:15,900 that my analysis have it is pretty accurate. 331 00:16:16,000 --> 00:16:18,800 Age had more time with it and he also had time at the NSA. 332 00:16:18,800 --> 00:16:21,300 So maybe he can shed light on some of the value that it can 333 00:16:21,300 --> 00:16:25,300 add in the true and purely intelligence function. 334 00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:27,600 But when it comes to law enforcement, it's incredibly 335 00:16:27,600 --> 00:16:29,800 dangerous. And the reason why the second 336 00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:31,900 piece of it that people are not familiar with and I was in a 337 00:16:31,908 --> 00:16:33,200 Twitter space. The other day, talking about 338 00:16:33,200 --> 00:16:37,200 this, there's a concept known as parallel construction and 339 00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:39,100 parallel construction. It was brought up and it was 340 00:16:39,100 --> 00:16:41,900 misunderstood by the individual who was talking about it on this 341 00:16:41,900 --> 00:16:44,900 face whose Name Escapes me at this point, but parallel 342 00:16:44,900 --> 00:16:49,100 Construction, Is the idea that you learn something in one way, 343 00:16:49,500 --> 00:16:53,400 and then you build the evidence of it in another way. 344 00:16:53,900 --> 00:16:56,600 Now, the problem is once, you know that something is there, 345 00:16:56,700 --> 00:17:00,600 you can almost always figure out a way to find it in a legal way. 346 00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:04,200 That is different. So, the examples, this, I find 347 00:17:04,200 --> 00:17:07,700 out that fill-in-the-blank person person X is involved in 348 00:17:07,700 --> 00:17:10,200 some sort of Espionage type activity or illicit. 349 00:17:10,200 --> 00:17:15,000 Foreign contact for cash and information and so on, all the 350 00:17:15,000 --> 00:17:16,599 sort of Hallmarks of a Espionage. 351 00:17:16,599 --> 00:17:20,000 And we find out that that person is involved in that through a 352 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:23,400 fisa through 702, for example, and it's coming in through 353 00:17:23,400 --> 00:17:25,800 emails, on a public server somewhere, blah, blah, blah, 354 00:17:25,900 --> 00:17:28,600 whatever that may be once that happens. 355 00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:30,600 Now, I know that person is identified. 356 00:17:30,900 --> 00:17:33,700 So first of all, I didn't even know who person X was until I 357 00:17:33,700 --> 00:17:35,800 had access to it. But now that I know who person X 358 00:17:35,800 --> 00:17:37,900 is, I can do a deep dive in person. 359 00:17:37,900 --> 00:17:40,900 X is finances. I can do things called national 360 00:17:40,900 --> 00:17:44,000 security letters. I can request bank records, toll 361 00:17:44,000 --> 00:17:46,300 records, and so on. Now all of these things, Be in 362 00:17:46,300 --> 00:17:48,400 the National Security realm, where I'm literally only 363 00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:51,400 building, an intelligence case, a counterintelligence case at 364 00:17:51,400 --> 00:17:54,200 that. But when I have them, and I know 365 00:17:54,200 --> 00:17:57,200 that they exist and I know that their damning I can turn around 366 00:17:57,200 --> 00:18:00,600 and I can bring a potential indictment to a grand jury, why 367 00:18:00,600 --> 00:18:02,100 going through and asking for subpoenas. 368 00:18:02,100 --> 00:18:04,400 So, if we go to the grand jury, we say, look, there's an 369 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:06,300 allegation that this person is involved in this thing. 370 00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:09,700 We can't tell you why blah blah and we go. 371 00:18:09,700 --> 00:18:11,200 And we said we'd like to see their Finance records. 372 00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:13,800 We like to see this because we like to try to establish whether 373 00:18:13,800 --> 00:18:15,600 or not they're receiving money and this and that, and then we 374 00:18:15,608 --> 00:18:17,400 can go. When we can rebuild all the 375 00:18:17,400 --> 00:18:20,000 national security letters, subpoenas on the other side of 376 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:21,700 the criminal side, which is a totally different animal. 377 00:18:21,700 --> 00:18:24,100 And we do it through legal process that we don't have to 378 00:18:24,100 --> 00:18:29,200 disclose the secret. And otherwise, non admissible, 379 00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:32,800 non, you know, warranted type searches and I can build it all 380 00:18:32,800 --> 00:18:33,600 up. That's parallel construction. 381 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:36,500 So I have a case over here on the Intel side, and I build it 382 00:18:36,500 --> 00:18:39,300 up in the same side, or in the same way on a criminal side. 383 00:18:39,300 --> 00:18:42,800 Once you've done that, you know, once you know something you 384 00:18:42,800 --> 00:18:45,800 can't unknow it as a criminal investigator, it's not like one. 385 00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:47,500 Side, does it? And they just say, hey, by the 386 00:18:47,500 --> 00:18:50,800 way, check out person X. It's the same person that can do 387 00:18:50,800 --> 00:18:53,500 the same cases. So, parallel construction is the 388 00:18:53,500 --> 00:18:55,400 danger. It's the thing that leaves us in 389 00:18:55,400 --> 00:19:01,800 a really sort of nasty spot, and We can't have 702 and still have 390 00:19:01,800 --> 00:19:03,900 this sort of sense of privacy and freedom. 391 00:19:03,900 --> 00:19:08,100 That most people have and 702 is not the ex parte Hearing in 392 00:19:08,100 --> 00:19:10,300 front of the fisa court that many people might be familiar 393 00:19:10,300 --> 00:19:12,200 with this is the sort of thing that we heard about with 394 00:19:12,200 --> 00:19:14,000 President Trump. People got out there and they, 395 00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:15,800 you know, they lied about it and all this kind of thing. 396 00:19:16,100 --> 00:19:20,900 No, 702 is written up very, very quickly and its proposed by 397 00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:22,600 special agent at the front lines. 398 00:19:22,800 --> 00:19:26,200 You know, if we want to cover somebody down I Ed nominate them 399 00:19:26,200 --> 00:19:29,000 and identify them as a Frontline gs-13 or a GST. 400 00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:32,100 Ten special agent and then it gets approved by a supervisor 401 00:19:32,100 --> 00:19:35,800 and it goes up and maybe like an like an, a sack, a gs-15, or 402 00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:40,000 maybe, the SES does, but it's not leaving the office and it 403 00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:41,200 comes back down and then we get it going. 404 00:19:41,200 --> 00:19:42,700 And it can happen in a couple of days. 405 00:19:42,800 --> 00:19:45,700 It can happen in shorter than that and it only takes maybe an 406 00:19:45,700 --> 00:19:47,900 hour or two to write up the justification for it. 407 00:19:47,900 --> 00:19:50,900 So it's a much lower burden than what we would call the full 408 00:19:50,900 --> 00:19:55,300 fisa, which is on, you know, a noted individual that's domestic 409 00:19:55,300 --> 00:19:58,300 and dealing with a foreign entity where you have to go in 410 00:19:58,300 --> 00:20:00,200 from a fisa. You have to argue the probable 411 00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:01,800 cause and actually get the warrant. 412 00:20:01,800 --> 00:20:03,800 This is not that sort of thing. This is a warrantless search. 413 00:20:03,800 --> 00:20:07,800 There's no doubt about it because we're theoretically 414 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:12,900 looking at, non US citizens, not on us soil and not therefore 415 00:20:12,900 --> 00:20:15,500 protected by a lot of the stuff that would otherwise, protect 416 00:20:15,500 --> 00:20:20,200 them, truly troubling. And so you wonder what in the 417 00:20:20,208 --> 00:20:21,900 world is the opposite side of that. 418 00:20:21,908 --> 00:20:24,900 For me and I'm making an interesting connection here but 419 00:20:24,900 --> 00:20:28,600 bear with me, I think there's an interesting connection to the 420 00:20:29,100 --> 00:20:31,900 Aleut opposite side of that coin, which is the sort of gross 421 00:20:31,900 --> 00:20:34,600 transparency about the most personal things that anybody 422 00:20:34,600 --> 00:20:38,000 could expose, which is sort of the leftist identity identity 423 00:20:38,000 --> 00:20:41,200 politics game. So maybe that makes some sense, 424 00:20:41,200 --> 00:20:44,500 maybe it doesn't, but when we start seeing people pushes the 425 00:20:44,500 --> 00:20:47,300 opposite side, well, why is this thing out there? 426 00:20:47,300 --> 00:20:50,400 Like is it because they want to remove our privacy and that's 427 00:20:50,400 --> 00:20:52,100 why they want to continually expose. 428 00:20:52,100 --> 00:20:53,600 Weird things about their own privacy. 429 00:20:53,700 --> 00:20:55,200 I don't know, but it's a thought process. 430 00:20:56,200 --> 00:20:59,200 Douglas Murray wrote a piece in the New York Post that I want to 431 00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:02,100 expose a little bit about. And like I said, the flip side 432 00:21:02,100 --> 00:21:05,200 of the coin of us being able to keep things secret is people who 433 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,400 are staring things about their sexual proclivities and their 434 00:21:08,400 --> 00:21:10,900 racial identities. The Grievances and their mental 435 00:21:10,900 --> 00:21:12,200 illness. I keep seeing people putting 436 00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:15,200 strange things like, you know, that they have PTSD out in 437 00:21:15,200 --> 00:21:16,900 public like this is nobody's business. 438 00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:19,900 This is not something that you need to be sharing with 439 00:21:19,900 --> 00:21:22,900 strangers on the internet. What are you thinking about 440 00:21:22,900 --> 00:21:24,200 where they'll tell you about their other? 441 00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:26,600 You know, the fact that they're bipolar like I saw a guy the 442 00:21:26,600 --> 00:21:28,400 other day who was listing this in his bio? 443 00:21:29,400 --> 00:21:31,500 What is the upside to that? Like are you warning me or are 444 00:21:31,500 --> 00:21:33,600 you just out there bragging about things that have nothing 445 00:21:33,600 --> 00:21:36,600 to do with anything? I can understand and I'm going 446 00:21:36,600 --> 00:21:38,000 to go with the it's probably the latter. 447 00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:41,900 So in this piece That Douglas Murray said this, he's blaming 448 00:21:41,900 --> 00:21:45,700 the diversity Equity pushes on what's starting to push and 449 00:21:45,700 --> 00:21:48,900 potentially crash our economy as many people are aware the 450 00:21:48,900 --> 00:21:52,300 Silicon Valley, Bank had a failure and the risk manager was 451 00:21:52,300 --> 00:21:54,800 more interested in whether or not she was promoting lesbian 452 00:21:54,800 --> 00:21:58,200 causes and you know racial and equity in these kind of things 453 00:21:58,500 --> 00:22:01,100 then looking for actual risk. So I'm gonna give you this piece 454 00:22:01,100 --> 00:22:02,600 a little bit of coverage and we're going to talk about a 455 00:22:02,608 --> 00:22:04,300 couple of the little strange things out there. 456 00:22:04,300 --> 00:22:07,200 Things that they are putting at risk that are Beyond just the 457 00:22:07,200 --> 00:22:11,300 financial system. In the FBI, of course, why not 458 00:22:11,800 --> 00:22:14,400 so putting diversity and Equity? First nearly crashed the 459 00:22:14,400 --> 00:22:16,300 economy. Again a piece by Douglas Murray 460 00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:18,800 and will quote, the piece here, several years back. 461 00:22:19,000 --> 00:22:22,100 I being Douglas asked, what it would take to Halt, the 462 00:22:22,108 --> 00:22:25,000 diversity inclusion, Equity Obsession and America. 463 00:22:25,500 --> 00:22:28,400 What would it take to get back to Excellence and competence as 464 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:32,000 the only criteria for employment the so called meritocracy? 465 00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:33,200 Right. What would it take for that? 466 00:22:33,200 --> 00:22:36,900 So he says, perhaps it would require the falling or Bridges 467 00:22:36,900 --> 00:22:40,200 to start falling down and then he suspects that that if they 468 00:22:40,200 --> 00:22:42,200 did certain people would claim that they had fallen because of 469 00:22:42,208 --> 00:22:44,000 structural racism. He's probably correct, that's 470 00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:47,700 pretty sad and funny and then in this week we got a good reminder 471 00:22:48,100 --> 00:22:50,900 of how over tolerant we have been of this insane anti 472 00:22:50,900 --> 00:22:54,300 Excellence agenda because although Bridges have not yet 473 00:22:54,300 --> 00:22:57,900 started to collapse, the banks have and one of the reasons that 474 00:22:57,900 --> 00:23:01,600 banks in question prioritized Equity over excellence. 475 00:23:02,600 --> 00:23:05,500 The D IE. I've always heard it called D 476 00:23:05,500 --> 00:23:07,800 EI. So, I don't know why he says it 477 00:23:07,800 --> 00:23:09,700 this way, but maybe there's a, there's a reason that he's 478 00:23:09,700 --> 00:23:14,000 saying it as the die again, de which is quite funny constitutes 479 00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:17,900 an absolute obsession with the exact representation or 480 00:23:17,900 --> 00:23:21,700 preferably over representation. As noted of women in senior 481 00:23:21,700 --> 00:23:24,500 positions, including board positions in American companies, 482 00:23:24,700 --> 00:23:28,300 this obsession with female representation is only an issue 483 00:23:28,300 --> 00:23:30,700 with high status jobs. Of course, board seats. 484 00:23:30,700 --> 00:23:35,000 Hollywood stars hype a Things. So on, there's a picture here of 485 00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:39,000 this. This woman, Jay, I'm going to 486 00:23:39,000 --> 00:23:42,500 put your her last name. So, her Sapa, who was the, the 487 00:23:42,508 --> 00:23:46,400 head of risk management read the and ran a program on pronouns 488 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:49,300 gender and a Blog. And then Isaac, emphasizing 489 00:23:49,300 --> 00:23:53,200 mental health, awareness lgbtq+ youth. 490 00:23:53,600 --> 00:23:56,700 Again, I don't, I don't know why the mental health is always 491 00:23:56,700 --> 00:23:58,600 thrown in there, but they act like this is like, a new 492 00:23:58,600 --> 00:24:02,100 minority group, like, it's strange because it certainly 493 00:24:02,100 --> 00:24:05,500 doesn't Not seem to affect their interest in including veterans, 494 00:24:05,700 --> 00:24:08,700 who suffer from, you know, at least the normal amount of 495 00:24:09,000 --> 00:24:12,400 mental health issues after dealing with the military for a 496 00:24:12,400 --> 00:24:14,300 number of years. But that's not what they're 497 00:24:14,308 --> 00:24:15,800 about. So it says there's no movement 498 00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:16,800 that I'm aware of. This is again. 499 00:24:16,800 --> 00:24:19,400 Douglas Murray speaking. That is pushing for equal, 500 00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:22,200 female representation, among Road layers in America. 501 00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:27,000 But for at least, 15 years, diversity has been everything 502 00:24:27,300 --> 00:24:29,500 goes on to talk about how this woman J. 503 00:24:29,500 --> 00:24:33,800 Is the head of this risk management 4S Be didn't do her 504 00:24:33,800 --> 00:24:36,900 job and then she would talk about what it was like to be a 505 00:24:36,908 --> 00:24:39,800 queer person of color and a first-generation immigrant on a 506 00:24:39,800 --> 00:24:42,100 working-class background. That was working for this major 507 00:24:42,100 --> 00:24:44,900 Bank. Apparently what it was was about 508 00:24:44,900 --> 00:24:48,300 incompetence and do its job so be it. 509 00:24:48,600 --> 00:24:51,200 So she spends all this time, sort of interested in her 510 00:24:51,200 --> 00:24:58,100 preferred causes and the result is a pretty, you know, pretty 511 00:24:58,100 --> 00:25:00,600 predictable which is that she wasn't doing the job of risk 512 00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:02,800 management. And then we watched a basically, 513 00:25:02,800 --> 00:25:05,600 I fail in front of our eyes, kind of a funny story, to is one 514 00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:08,100 of my best buddies, who I grew up with his Dad. 515 00:25:08,100 --> 00:25:12,700 I think is the longest-serving federal employee at the FDIC and 516 00:25:12,800 --> 00:25:15,100 hasn't had a solid bank failure in a while. 517 00:25:15,100 --> 00:25:16,400 At least not one of those priority. 518 00:25:17,000 --> 00:25:18,900 He's kind of like the most senior guy and I think he's been 519 00:25:18,900 --> 00:25:21,300 out of the field for a little bit and but when we were kids, 520 00:25:21,300 --> 00:25:22,300 he used to run around all the time. 521 00:25:22,300 --> 00:25:24,900 And we'd always wonder where the heck did where did Bob go off 522 00:25:24,900 --> 00:25:26,500 to? And he would always tell us he 523 00:25:26,500 --> 00:25:29,800 was a spy because he's a funny guy and he's looks like a tall 524 00:25:29,800 --> 00:25:32,200 kind of nerdy accountant. He's one of my favorite people. 525 00:25:32,300 --> 00:25:36,700 All he's incredibly lovable and very, very funny and he wears a 526 00:25:36,700 --> 00:25:41,000 little round glasses and has a beard and he's tall kind of 527 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:43,500 athletic guy, but but it doesn't necessarily look. 528 00:25:43,500 --> 00:25:46,000 He looks like an accountant and he was sort of a man who did 529 00:25:46,000 --> 00:25:48,500 that sort of work. So anyway, he got shipped off to 530 00:25:48,500 --> 00:25:51,700 Boston to go look at the Silicon Valley bank failure and some of 531 00:25:51,708 --> 00:25:54,100 the branch work out there and anyway he got called into action 532 00:25:54,100 --> 00:25:57,400 because of this, he was a priority because Bob unlike the 533 00:25:57,400 --> 00:25:59,400 people that were running, this bank is a high-level 534 00:25:59,400 --> 00:26:02,100 professional at the thing that he does he is. 535 00:26:02,500 --> 00:26:05,600 Probably one of the best in that sphere and sure enough. 536 00:26:06,600 --> 00:26:08,300 You bring out the best when people start failing and 537 00:26:08,300 --> 00:26:11,400 breaking things down. So it is an interesting sort of 538 00:26:11,400 --> 00:26:14,100 issue that we're dealing with but it's not. 539 00:26:14,100 --> 00:26:16,900 The only sphere where I feel like this Administration is 540 00:26:16,900 --> 00:26:19,500 trying to over represent people that have no business being in 541 00:26:19,500 --> 00:26:22,400 positions. And obviously, Silicon Valley 542 00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:26,400 has been quite woken and and been very focused on these 543 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:29,300 things for quite a long time. We're hearing that the B 544 00:26:29,300 --> 00:26:32,900 Administration has the most representation of LGBT You plus 545 00:26:32,900 --> 00:26:35,400 people, whatever that is 14 plus percent of the cabinet. 546 00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:38,600 Now, and high-level political appointed positions are in 547 00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:40,700 there. That clearly is an over 548 00:26:40,700 --> 00:26:43,900 representation of who these people are in the general 549 00:26:43,900 --> 00:26:45,700 population. But that doesn't stop buying 550 00:26:45,700 --> 00:26:49,900 from getting involved in that and it's also not the only 551 00:26:49,900 --> 00:26:51,800 Spectrum where they're willing to push these people for it. 552 00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:54,400 So I'm going to talk about the FAA which I think is interesting 553 00:26:54,400 --> 00:26:57,200 that affects probably more of us than Silicon Valley Bank. 554 00:26:57,200 --> 00:26:59,300 Not many of us probably were invested in there, had money 555 00:26:59,300 --> 00:27:01,800 there. If you are a.com startup type 556 00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:03,900 and You happen to listen to this podcast. 557 00:27:03,900 --> 00:27:06,300 Feel free to hit us up in the comments and tell us otherwise 558 00:27:06,300 --> 00:27:08,600 that you are also deeply offended that I was not 559 00:27:08,600 --> 00:27:11,800 considering you as one of my audience but unlikely I think 560 00:27:11,800 --> 00:27:14,200 what's also interesting though is that it doesn't just matter 561 00:27:14,200 --> 00:27:15,600 to that. So this is a little bit more 562 00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:17,000 recent. This is actually coming from 563 00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:21,700 yesterday on Fox News and they're talking about a the 564 00:27:21,700 --> 00:27:24,800 number of GOP pilots in Congress, which is a fair 565 00:27:24,800 --> 00:27:26,900 number. I think it's like 14 different 566 00:27:26,900 --> 00:27:29,500 aviators of the 50% of the house. 567 00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:34,900 Our concern that Administration and Joe, Biden particular has 568 00:27:34,900 --> 00:27:39,500 nominated a director of the FAA, the Federal, Aviation 569 00:27:39,500 --> 00:27:42,500 Administration, who they described as quote unquote 570 00:27:42,500 --> 00:27:46,300 entirely unqualified, the gentleman's name is Phil 571 00:27:46,300 --> 00:27:49,100 Washington, and there's a little picture of him here. 572 00:27:49,100 --> 00:27:51,200 If you're looking on the rumble Channel, you can see says he's 573 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:53,800 the chief executive officer of the Denver International 574 00:27:53,800 --> 00:27:55,100 Airport. Well, that sounds like somebody 575 00:27:55,100 --> 00:27:57,600 who has something to do with Aviation, but only 576 00:27:57,600 --> 00:28:02,000 superficially, because he has no Aviation experience. 577 00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:03,600 What? So ever, he served 24 years in 578 00:28:03,600 --> 00:28:06,700 the United States Army. He was an enlisted guy and left 579 00:28:06,700 --> 00:28:13,800 and retired as a sergeant major. So, fair play there, but he's 580 00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:15,800 not a pilot, his 0 Aviation experience. 581 00:28:15,800 --> 00:28:19,600 He was never tied to an aviation unit in the Army and they claim 582 00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:21,700 that he's entirely unqualified to leave a federal agent 583 00:28:21,800 --> 00:28:24,700 Aviation agency, that's responsible for keeping our 584 00:28:24,700 --> 00:28:28,200 public safe and flying. Now, I think I remember at one 585 00:28:28,200 --> 00:28:31,000 point, there's hundreds of millions of people that fly in 586 00:28:31,000 --> 00:28:32,500 the United States. Every year it's probably A lot 587 00:28:32,500 --> 00:28:35,000 of the same people turns out especially if you're used to 588 00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:37,600 doing these commuter flights. You see the same faces are going 589 00:28:37,600 --> 00:28:40,300 the same places but unless you're Chris wragge Chris, 590 00:28:40,300 --> 00:28:43,500 right? He just flies private but it is 591 00:28:43,500 --> 00:28:46,600 a thing that many people expect that if you jump on a plane that 592 00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:48,700 you were going to be dealing with and Aviation 593 00:28:48,700 --> 00:28:50,900 Administration, that's funded by our federal government, that's 594 00:28:50,900 --> 00:28:52,900 going to maintain safety and they're certain standards and 595 00:28:52,900 --> 00:28:56,300 qualifications including air traffic control and their 596 00:28:56,300 --> 00:29:00,400 standards for pilots and so on. So it's interesting that we're 597 00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:02,700 going to have a nomination for this guy. 598 00:29:02,700 --> 00:29:05,800 And this is the thing that the the aviators in Congress wrote, 599 00:29:05,800 --> 00:29:08,800 they said quote, the FAA cannot afford to be led by someone who 600 00:29:08,800 --> 00:29:11,200 needs on-the-job training, especially at a time when our 601 00:29:11,200 --> 00:29:14,200 Aviation system is facing tremendous safety challenges, 602 00:29:14,400 --> 00:29:16,500 such as multiple near misses by airliners. 603 00:29:16,700 --> 00:29:21,300 And the first Nationwide ground stop of aircraft since 9/11. 604 00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:23,500 They are having a difficult time. 605 00:29:23,500 --> 00:29:25,500 Staffing, air traffic controllers, they're having a 606 00:29:25,500 --> 00:29:28,400 difficult time, getting Pilots because of the mandates that 607 00:29:28,400 --> 00:29:31,800 went out in a number of Pilots are both health conscious and 608 00:29:32,300 --> 00:29:33,800 Interested in their own medical Freedom. 609 00:29:34,100 --> 00:29:36,900 There's an entire group that I joined up with that that does 610 00:29:36,900 --> 00:29:39,200 that off kind of full-time. Now it's called move freely 611 00:29:39,200 --> 00:29:42,500 America and they bring up all the issues about do you know for 612 00:29:42,500 --> 00:29:44,400 flight crew? This is not just the pilots but 613 00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:48,200 also the crew that are in there. So why are we trying to put 614 00:29:48,200 --> 00:29:49,800 somebody out there that has no experience? 615 00:29:49,900 --> 00:29:52,900 And for those of you who are not watching on the rumble Channel, 616 00:29:52,900 --> 00:29:55,800 I'm going to read you from them remarks as they were talking 617 00:29:55,800 --> 00:29:58,900 about who was ready to lead. This says, this is remarks that 618 00:29:58,900 --> 00:30:03,300 were from the Commerce dot. Senate.gov this is Senator Maria 619 00:30:03,300 --> 00:30:05,800 cantwell's opening remarks talking about the confirmation 620 00:30:05,800 --> 00:30:09,100 hearing or at least the questioning hearing of this 621 00:30:09,100 --> 00:30:11,600 gentleman Philip Washington. So she talks about three years 622 00:30:11,600 --> 00:30:14,500 ago, Congress said there needs to be some Aviation process 623 00:30:14,500 --> 00:30:15,900 ravana. There needs to be some FAA 624 00:30:15,900 --> 00:30:18,300 oversight and I worked with my colleagues and blah blah blah 625 00:30:18,300 --> 00:30:20,600 blah, blah blah. We worked with the tragedies, 626 00:30:20,600 --> 00:30:24,100 the 737 Max and try to help figure out what's going to be 627 00:30:24,100 --> 00:30:26,900 Landmark safety. You know, legislation, we are 628 00:30:26,900 --> 00:30:29,400 going to try to keep everything safe. 629 00:30:29,400 --> 00:30:32,100 The FAA is very complex group. They have 45,000 employees. 630 00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:34,500 Fleas and different lines of business day in and day out. 631 00:30:34,500 --> 00:30:37,800 It goes on and on and on and we're like, okay, so who is this 632 00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:39,800 guy? And why is it relevant? 633 00:30:40,900 --> 00:30:42,900 And then you get to the point where it says after he retired 634 00:30:42,900 --> 00:30:47,800 from the military 24 years in. Here you go he said he had a 635 00:30:47,800 --> 00:30:49,200 great career and we appreciate that. 636 00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:51,700 He was a 24 veteran. 24-year veteran of the United States 637 00:30:51,700 --> 00:30:54,400 Army where he rose to the rank of command sergeant major. 638 00:30:54,400 --> 00:30:58,600 So he was the top noncommissioned officer rank 639 00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:02,000 that enlisted Soldier can get to and that he would be the first 640 00:31:02,000 --> 00:31:07,000 African-American to serve as the FAA administrator. 641 00:31:08,700 --> 00:31:10,300 What does that have to do with anything you wander? 642 00:31:10,800 --> 00:31:13,100 First of all, are we still keeping track of these firsts 643 00:31:13,200 --> 00:31:16,000 like does it? Is there any reason why anybody 644 00:31:16,000 --> 00:31:19,300 should care about whether you are the first black guy to do 645 00:31:19,300 --> 00:31:21,400 anything at this point? Like all the things that are 646 00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:22,900 important to be done, I'm pretty sure. 647 00:31:23,300 --> 00:31:26,800 And now we've got this and they said here's this here's his 648 00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:29,200 history of Y so since 2000 when he retired. 649 00:31:29,200 --> 00:31:33,100 So this guy retired in 2000 after 24 years, he was probably 650 00:31:33,100 --> 00:31:35,700 18 when he enlisted so that put him at like 42 years old. 651 00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:40,900 He joined the Denver Regional. Channel District RTD and then 652 00:31:40,900 --> 00:31:44,900 that was a rapid transit sort of situation where they had annual 653 00:31:44,900 --> 00:31:47,800 ridership over 40 million and in Denver he implemented the 654 00:31:47,808 --> 00:31:51,400 nation's first and only 2.2 billion dollar public transit 655 00:31:51,700 --> 00:31:55,500 private public Equity partnership called Eagle P3. 656 00:31:56,800 --> 00:31:59,500 The basic connection that he has to the aviation world, is that 657 00:31:59,500 --> 00:32:02,300 in 2021? He became the CEO of the Denver 658 00:32:02,300 --> 00:32:05,400 International Airport, which may be the third business airport in 659 00:32:05,400 --> 00:32:09,800 the world. But What does it have to do with 660 00:32:09,800 --> 00:32:11,400 flying? It actually turns out that 661 00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:14,300 running the airport has almost nothing to do with flying 662 00:32:14,300 --> 00:32:17,400 because the flying is actually managed by Air Traffic Control 663 00:32:17,500 --> 00:32:20,100 by the pilots by the airline's by the people that actually do 664 00:32:20,100 --> 00:32:22,300 Aviation. You know, his thing is that he's 665 00:32:22,300 --> 00:32:24,000 got a bunch of people that come in and out. 666 00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:27,600 They've got a security protocol they've got baggage, which used 667 00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:30,700 to actually chop baggage up and end of the day. 668 00:32:30,900 --> 00:32:34,100 You know, the man was responsible for doing something 669 00:32:34,100 --> 00:32:38,400 that is like running a business but it's not running an airline 670 00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:41,800 and it's not running Aviation. So when we're worried about this 671 00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:44,900 sort of thing, it makes me nervous that we are just 672 00:32:44,900 --> 00:32:47,600 interested in the color of his skin, that he's a political 673 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:49,400 Democrat. He's in a, you know, a blue 674 00:32:49,400 --> 00:32:51,700 State at this point, which Denver has become that or at 675 00:32:51,700 --> 00:32:55,600 least Colorado is because it's controlled by Denver and his 676 00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:57,700 qualifications have nothing to do with Aviation what solar? 677 00:32:58,100 --> 00:33:01,500 I'm actually a better qualified person for fa a-- director 678 00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:04,500 because I'm actually a credentialed air traffic 679 00:33:04,500 --> 00:33:07,400 controller and I have no business running the FAA. 680 00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:11,100 But I would be a more more appropriate pick and probably 681 00:33:11,100 --> 00:33:13,800 have less at least on the Republican side who care about 682 00:33:13,800 --> 00:33:15,800 safety. I at least know what the safety 683 00:33:15,800 --> 00:33:18,800 issues are. I've run radar, I've run visual 684 00:33:19,700 --> 00:33:22,700 I've done Tower controls so that is what it is. 685 00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:25,400 The last little thing we're going to talk about here is of 686 00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:28,000 course, the diversity and Equity push that happens in the FBI 687 00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:31,400 because we can't have anything without the FBI. 688 00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:34,600 Also jumping into the game. And so let's talk about it 689 00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:38,700 today, or yesterday, rather it is We did have this sort of 690 00:33:38,700 --> 00:33:40,700 horrible picture and I'm going to share it with you right now. 691 00:33:40,700 --> 00:33:41,600 Because what are you going to do? 692 00:33:43,700 --> 00:33:47,800 This is a picture that was sent to me and I know it's a real 693 00:33:47,800 --> 00:33:52,200 picture because I know people that have sent it before. 694 00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:56,400 But it was just recently sent to me again by an ATF agent because 695 00:33:56,600 --> 00:33:59,700 we have this chat group where we are constantly trying to decide 696 00:33:59,900 --> 00:34:03,800 who is the worst, and I'll tell you who the worst is, it's 697 00:34:03,800 --> 00:34:07,600 almost always the FBI. Now it's just that's what it is. 698 00:34:07,800 --> 00:34:11,100 So the FBI is trying to run to the bottom and people started 699 00:34:11,100 --> 00:34:13,699 asking me because it's gotten 40 plus thousand views at this 700 00:34:13,699 --> 00:34:15,800 point, I think Dinesh D'Souza may have retweeted it. 701 00:34:15,800 --> 00:34:18,199 People are trying to find out. Hey is this the real thing? 702 00:34:18,199 --> 00:34:22,300 Like is this a real picture? You know and then the most 703 00:34:22,300 --> 00:34:24,100 Salient question came up that I thought was the most important. 704 00:34:24,100 --> 00:34:25,800 So if you're not seeing the picture right now it's a bunch 705 00:34:25,800 --> 00:34:29,000 of FBI Personnel. Wearing shirts that say FBI on 706 00:34:29,000 --> 00:34:32,000 the back in rainbow lettering, carrying an enormous American 707 00:34:32,000 --> 00:34:35,900 flag done, with rainbow Colours, and so the question popped up 708 00:34:35,900 --> 00:34:38,300 and it made me consider this. Someone asked me The question, I 709 00:34:38,300 --> 00:34:42,400 don't have an answer. Did the FBI ever Force employees 710 00:34:42,500 --> 00:34:46,400 to show up, wearing American flied, flag, Pride t-shirts, you 711 00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:49,699 know, with the American flag, striped across the logo of the 712 00:34:49,699 --> 00:34:53,500 FBI for President's Day, for Fourth of July, for Veterans Day 713 00:34:53,500 --> 00:34:56,000 for any of the American holidays that we would all understand to 714 00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:58,200 be pretty nondenominational issues. 715 00:34:58,600 --> 00:35:01,600 And as far as I know, I've never heard of an FBI agent being 716 00:35:01,600 --> 00:35:02,700 forced to go to any of those things. 717 00:35:02,700 --> 00:35:05,700 At least not in a uniform. I have had to work them in 718 00:35:05,700 --> 00:35:09,500 covert fashion and I've had to work them in overt fashion, but 719 00:35:09,500 --> 00:35:12,800 I've never I've been told show up in March in a parade of any 720 00:35:12,800 --> 00:35:16,400 kind to be proud of America, but we are sending people out to be 721 00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:19,600 part of these Pride, parades. And it's not. 722 00:35:19,600 --> 00:35:21,300 This is not the only instance that happened. 723 00:35:21,400 --> 00:35:22,900 So someone asked me is this even real? 724 00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:25,000 And the answer is, of course, it is, and that means that they're 725 00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:26,900 not following some of the things that I've been putting out. 726 00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:31,400 So here's some more stuff that's coming out, this is from a FBI 727 00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:35,700 training. This person tweeted a gif of a 728 00:35:35,700 --> 00:35:37,600 cat that is saying I can't even process. 729 00:35:37,600 --> 00:35:39,900 This this is an FBI training that was put out in. 730 00:35:40,100 --> 00:35:43,600 I want to say April 20-21, they actually pulled it down because 731 00:35:43,600 --> 00:35:46,500 it was so tragically bad and it was poorly reviewed by FBI 732 00:35:46,500 --> 00:35:48,900 Personnel at the time. And this one is a slide that 733 00:35:48,900 --> 00:35:51,900 says personal beliefs focus on appropriate behavior, and not 734 00:35:51,900 --> 00:35:55,400 your beliefs refer to, the FBI's non-discrimination policy core 735 00:35:55,400 --> 00:35:57,500 values and the mission to protect the American people. 736 00:35:57,500 --> 00:36:00,100 And uphold the Constitution focus on accomplishing the 737 00:36:00,100 --> 00:36:02,500 mission. And the picture is a bunch of 738 00:36:02,500 --> 00:36:04,400 sort of like tubby looking people. 739 00:36:04,900 --> 00:36:07,500 Different color skin like that matter as I'm sure that's part 740 00:36:07,500 --> 00:36:10,300 of the reason why they did it. They're all holding like Rainbow 741 00:36:10,300 --> 00:36:13,000 stuff at a table that has the FBI logo. 742 00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:17,000 FBI jobs, dot-gov and Fidelity bravery and integrity on it 743 00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:19,100 there on some Waterfront. I don't know what city this is, 744 00:36:19,100 --> 00:36:21,600 it doesn't really matter. They're out there promoting the 745 00:36:21,800 --> 00:36:23,600 diversity equity and agenda issue. 746 00:36:23,700 --> 00:36:26,800 Here's where it got really spicy in that training knowledge. 747 00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:30,000 Check number three, this is 52, slides long by the way there. 748 00:36:30,700 --> 00:36:33,400 If you want to go and try and dig it up, it's in either the 749 00:36:33,400 --> 00:36:36,700 Daily Caller, the New York Post, maybe in October, something like 750 00:36:36,700 --> 00:36:39,900 that, I exposed it to them. It says, quote G is new to the 751 00:36:40,000 --> 00:36:44,400 Gin and use the pronouns, they them there and then the answer 752 00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:46,400 that somebody filled in, for this one was wrong and it says 753 00:36:46,400 --> 00:36:48,400 incorrect FBI. Employees, should always use the 754 00:36:48,400 --> 00:36:51,200 name and pronoun. That transgender person uses 755 00:36:51,400 --> 00:36:55,300 repeated intentional refusal to use an individual's chosen name 756 00:36:55,300 --> 00:36:58,300 and pronoun could be considered harassment as contrary to the 757 00:36:58,300 --> 00:37:00,700 goal of the FBI treating all employees with dignity and 758 00:37:00,700 --> 00:37:05,000 respect such conduct should be reported in accordance with the 759 00:37:05,008 --> 00:37:08,700 existing FBI policy and you go. Is that enough? 760 00:37:08,700 --> 00:37:10,100 No it's not an up. Where can I find Find more 761 00:37:10,107 --> 00:37:13,100 information, maybe you are listener, maybe you are Rumble. 762 00:37:13,100 --> 00:37:15,900 Viewer would like more information about this as well. 763 00:37:15,900 --> 00:37:17,000 Well, here's where you can find it. 764 00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:21,000 You can email the bureau equality program which is Bureau 765 00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:24,800 equality at fbi.gov on unit which is the unclassified email. 766 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:26,300 So feel free. If you feel like you want to 767 00:37:26,308 --> 00:37:29,100 reach out and know more about the diversity equity and 768 00:37:29,100 --> 00:37:35,300 inclusion agenda for the lgbtq plus IA, whatever groups, within 769 00:37:35,300 --> 00:37:37,300 the FBI, by all means. And if you're a government 770 00:37:37,300 --> 00:37:39,800 employee and you want to know more and you have access to the 771 00:37:40,100 --> 00:37:46,400 December net side, you can go be0 Bravo, Echo at fbi.gov, 772 00:37:46,500 --> 00:37:48,500 dot-gov. Those people who know how to use 773 00:37:48,500 --> 00:37:51,400 that, know how to use that tells you that there's many all kinds 774 00:37:51,400 --> 00:37:54,600 of local chapters and issues and that you can use those and they 775 00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:57,800 can be apparently accessed while you're at work, why not? 776 00:37:58,100 --> 00:38:00,500 There's another thing on here, it's a slide that says the extra 777 00:38:00,500 --> 00:38:03,600 mile make your support visible. Continue self-educating 778 00:38:03,700 --> 00:38:07,900 participate in Regional Pride events and support field office 779 00:38:07,900 --> 00:38:10,300 lgbtq+. Ants. 780 00:38:10,900 --> 00:38:14,100 I thought we had a separation of church and state. 781 00:38:14,500 --> 00:38:17,800 I thought that we weren't supposed to be forcing a 782 00:38:17,800 --> 00:38:21,800 specific secular religion on the employees but we are doing this 783 00:38:21,800 --> 00:38:23,900 thing. And if you're not watching on 784 00:38:23,908 --> 00:38:26,600 Rumble again, there is a picture on this Slide. 785 00:38:26,900 --> 00:38:31,400 The extra mile that shows again a bunch of very unimpressive 786 00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:33,500 people. Most of them women, some of them 787 00:38:33,500 --> 00:38:36,900 with multicolored hair, some of them with significant extra body 788 00:38:36,900 --> 00:38:42,300 weight and they are Marching any Pride Parade Strewn with rainbow 789 00:38:42,300 --> 00:38:46,200 Flags, including stickers on their bodies and rainbow socks 790 00:38:46,200 --> 00:38:49,200 and FBI t-shirts and a couple of them are carrying a banner that 791 00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:54,300 says Federal Bureau of Investigation www.fbi.gov. 792 00:38:54,900 --> 00:38:59,000 And then, the most fun part for me is the hashtag unexpected 793 00:38:59,000 --> 00:39:04,900 agent. Unexpected agent is the is the 794 00:39:04,900 --> 00:39:08,100 the push that they're having in order to recruit people who 795 00:39:08,100 --> 00:39:10,900 think that they would not otherwise qualify as FBI agents? 796 00:39:11,200 --> 00:39:14,100 They wouldn't qualify as FBI agents, probably only a few 797 00:39:14,100 --> 00:39:16,500 years ago and many of you would be disgusted to know that they 798 00:39:16,500 --> 00:39:20,200 are a last little piece here. I'll show is it from FBI jobs, 799 00:39:20,200 --> 00:39:23,300 March 15th you just you can't help it. 800 00:39:23,500 --> 00:39:27,200 The Jacksonville field office is holding yet another diversity 801 00:39:27,200 --> 00:39:30,500 agent recruiting event add our event. 802 00:39:30,600 --> 00:39:36,100 Aunt Dar and it shows a black lady in a white lady talking 803 00:39:36,100 --> 00:39:38,300 about I guess becoming FBI agents. 804 00:39:38,300 --> 00:39:42,500 Again this hashtag unexpected agents, pretty awful and pretty 805 00:39:42,500 --> 00:39:44,600 strange. But this is the thing that they 806 00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:47,400 want to do this is what they're going to be pushing on us. 807 00:39:47,600 --> 00:39:50,300 And so that is the thing that we have to deal with. 808 00:39:51,400 --> 00:39:56,000 Speaking of unexpected agents, speaking of people from the 809 00:39:56,200 --> 00:39:58,900 Jacksonville field office, I'm going to be bringing on the 810 00:39:58,900 --> 00:40:00,500 interview that I did with Stephen friend. 811 00:40:00,700 --> 00:40:02,400 We're going to be talking about the balls and Strikes when it 812 00:40:02,400 --> 00:40:05,000 comes to the proud boys, totally unrelated to this stuff. 813 00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:07,100 But at least a little bit more uplifting as you go into the 814 00:40:07,100 --> 00:40:10,300 weekend and stand by for a little interview, from our 815 00:40:10,300 --> 00:40:14,800 friend, Stephen friend. All right, I've got my guest, 816 00:40:14,800 --> 00:40:19,900 Steve friend here, and Steve has some experience with criminal 817 00:40:19,900 --> 00:40:22,700 process, as an FBI agent for eight years as a cop before 818 00:40:22,700 --> 00:40:25,300 that. But more than most FBI agents, 819 00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:29,400 he had the pleasure, the benefit, the experience of 820 00:40:29,400 --> 00:40:30,800 working in Indian country. Crimes. 821 00:40:30,800 --> 00:40:33,400 Which means he had close to what 200 criminal prosecutions. 822 00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:36,900 Is that correct Steve? Yeah, open about 200 cases about 823 00:40:36,900 --> 00:40:41,500 150, arrests, 150 arrest, 200 cases. 824 00:40:41,500 --> 00:40:44,900 And how many of those did you end up taking to trial? 825 00:40:44,900 --> 00:40:49,100 Do you think? Six or seven in my seven years, 826 00:40:49,300 --> 00:40:50,400 okay? That's one of year. 827 00:40:50,700 --> 00:40:52,900 And generally speaking, most people, plea in the federal 828 00:40:52,900 --> 00:40:55,000 system that's kind of the way. The system is set up. 829 00:40:56,100 --> 00:40:58,600 There's a couple things that came to light in some of the 830 00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:01,900 discovery that was turned over by the Washington field office 831 00:41:01,900 --> 00:41:04,500 in one of The Proud boy cases. Now, Julie Kelly has been pretty 832 00:41:05,100 --> 00:41:08,800 astute and accurate on analyzing a lot of this stuff and getting 833 00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:10,200 it out to the public. There's a few things I think 834 00:41:10,200 --> 00:41:13,100 that are a little bit Miskin misconstrued, maybe a little bit 835 00:41:13,100 --> 00:41:15,600 inaccurate. So I want to run this by you. 836 00:41:15,900 --> 00:41:18,800 One of the Is that people are getting really riled up about is 837 00:41:18,800 --> 00:41:22,800 the FBI destroying evidence. Does the FBI destroy evidence as 838 00:41:22,800 --> 00:41:27,600 a regular course of business. Not while the case is open, 839 00:41:28,200 --> 00:41:30,000 okay? But if you saw something on a 840 00:41:30,000 --> 00:41:32,400 link chat stating how, you know, the boss is telling me I got to 841 00:41:32,408 --> 00:41:35,700 go out and Destroy 338 items of evidence. 842 00:41:35,700 --> 00:41:37,400 What would your initial reaction to that be? 843 00:41:38,600 --> 00:41:40,600 I would hope that, that case was closed. 844 00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:44,900 And the sentence for the individual was was complete, or 845 00:41:44,900 --> 00:41:46,300 maybe there was no prosecution done. 846 00:41:46,400 --> 00:41:48,900 But if there was ever a situation where even the person 847 00:41:48,900 --> 00:41:53,200 was convicted of a crime and sitting in prison, the arrest 848 00:41:53,700 --> 00:41:56,600 eliminating evidence is a no-go. And why is that? 849 00:41:56,600 --> 00:41:59,600 What is the the process that sort of governs that interaction 850 00:42:00,400 --> 00:42:05,100 the justice for all act which essentially guarantees anybody 851 00:42:05,100 --> 00:42:08,100 that's convicted of crime, this opportunity to appeal. 852 00:42:08,500 --> 00:42:11,400 There's a there's a substantial amount of time that has to pass 853 00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:16,000 it elapsed before this appeal process window closes and then 854 00:42:16,000 --> 00:42:18,200 they They kind of have to just take their time. 855 00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:21,100 Alright. So if they served a sentence if 856 00:42:21,100 --> 00:42:23,000 they were convicted in the sentence is over we could 857 00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:23,900 destroy it. Correct. 858 00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:27,800 Yes. What about if the ausa declines 859 00:42:29,100 --> 00:42:32,600 Yes but there's also the question of is the evidence 860 00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:35,400 something that needs to be returned or if it's something 861 00:42:35,400 --> 00:42:38,700 that maybe we're going to have you know more about this than me 862 00:42:38,700 --> 00:42:40,600 if it's an intelligence-gathering case 863 00:42:41,100 --> 00:42:42,100 we're going to spin off about it. 864 00:42:42,100 --> 00:42:43,900 Maybe we're going to preserve it for that purpose. 865 00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:45,500 Sure. Yeah generally speaking I don't 866 00:42:45,500 --> 00:42:47,000 know that there's a lot of the stuff in there. 867 00:42:47,400 --> 00:42:49,900 Give people an example of one of the items that might be 868 00:42:50,300 --> 00:42:53,300 destroyed that nobody would think twice about destroying and 869 00:42:53,600 --> 00:42:55,800 it sounds like it's a big deal destroying evidence but the 870 00:42:55,800 --> 00:42:59,500 evidence might be something so invaluable or we Call de minimis 871 00:42:59,500 --> 00:43:02,400 that it doesn't matter. Well, I mean could be stuff that 872 00:43:02,400 --> 00:43:04,700 you created yourself. Like, if you took photographs 873 00:43:05,200 --> 00:43:08,200 had an audio recording, there's no sense in having a disk 874 00:43:08,300 --> 00:43:11,600 sitting around, you can just dispose of it that way, physical 875 00:43:11,600 --> 00:43:14,900 evidence. If you have a bloody sheet or a 876 00:43:14,908 --> 00:43:17,200 piece of clothing that after a certain amount of time, what are 877 00:43:17,200 --> 00:43:20,100 you gonna do return? A, an Old Sock to somebody 878 00:43:20,200 --> 00:43:22,300 doesn't make a whole lot of sense, you can destroy it. 879 00:43:22,500 --> 00:43:24,100 Okay. And so there's also some 880 00:43:24,100 --> 00:43:26,800 depending on the the field office I think, but they'll 881 00:43:26,800 --> 00:43:30,400 describe destroy things that are Biological tainted evidence. 882 00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:33,600 So if it's got biohazards or blood, or if it's got, you know 883 00:43:34,200 --> 00:43:35,600 some other kind of fluid on there. 884 00:43:35,600 --> 00:43:37,300 Sometimes I'll toss those things out to you. 885 00:43:38,000 --> 00:43:39,100 Yep. And drugs. 886 00:43:39,100 --> 00:43:41,100 Don't forget we have to have the big giant drug burn. 887 00:43:41,700 --> 00:43:43,800 Tell people about what that looks like because that that's 888 00:43:43,800 --> 00:43:46,200 another thing that is commonly destroyed, and they schedule 889 00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:48,800 every month or a lot of places will scheduled on a regular 890 00:43:48,800 --> 00:43:51,500 basis to do that. Yeah, it's controlled 891 00:43:51,500 --> 00:43:53,700 environment and they obviously have to make sure that there's 892 00:43:53,700 --> 00:43:56,600 no fumes going into anywhere, that's populated as we've seen. 893 00:43:56,600 --> 00:43:58,900 Some of these reporters that are standing outside the will Catch 894 00:43:58,900 --> 00:44:01,200 a whiff and then suffer the effects of it. 895 00:44:01,500 --> 00:44:03,800 But I never will be didn't know that happened. 896 00:44:04,800 --> 00:44:08,200 They will make sure that yet seen secure and they'll do a 897 00:44:08,207 --> 00:44:11,500 controlled burn. Make sure that those materials 898 00:44:11,500 --> 00:44:13,900 are destroyed properly, when you're working in Indian 899 00:44:13,900 --> 00:44:16,400 country, did you see people collecting things before your 900 00:44:16,400 --> 00:44:19,000 time that were completely illogical and then you were 901 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:20,500 burdened with getting rid of them. 902 00:44:20,600 --> 00:44:23,700 Like I remember seeing a case where there was like 50 903 00:44:23,700 --> 00:44:26,000 individual beer cans that have been collected for some reason 904 00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:29,200 and a piece of a screen door and then like the headliner From an 905 00:44:29,200 --> 00:44:33,100 88 Jeep Cherokee. And it's like we and a bag of 906 00:44:33,100 --> 00:44:34,900 glass from a windshield like stuff like that. 907 00:44:34,900 --> 00:44:38,300 Was that common in? Europe are a yes ight and I mean 908 00:44:38,300 --> 00:44:41,600 I was inheriting these cases or be contacting and the sentence 909 00:44:41,600 --> 00:44:45,000 will be done. I was actually given the knife 910 00:44:45,000 --> 00:44:49,100 that was used for a for a murder and was told to return it to the 911 00:44:49,100 --> 00:44:52,000 family of the victim because it was their kitchen knife. 912 00:44:52,700 --> 00:44:55,000 Did you reach out and see if they wanted that back or if they 913 00:44:55,000 --> 00:44:58,400 want to destroyed some people want to buy articulated? 914 00:44:58,700 --> 00:45:01,200 To my higher-ups. That might be a bad idea because 915 00:45:01,200 --> 00:45:03,600 the guy was out of jail and there might be some sort of like 916 00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:08,300 I do retribution, the emotional trigger, which he got my number 917 00:45:08,300 --> 00:45:12,400 with yeah. Okay, so so on its face, if 918 00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:17,900 somebody said we are going to be destroying a large number of 919 00:45:17,900 --> 00:45:20,100 items of evidence. There are plenty of plausible 920 00:45:20,100 --> 00:45:20,700 explanations. Why? 921 00:45:20,700 --> 00:45:24,500 That could be correct? It's not necessarily related to 922 00:45:24,500 --> 00:45:26,300 the same case when people were on link Jack. 923 00:45:26,300 --> 00:45:27,900 Can you explain what the link chat is? 924 00:45:27,900 --> 00:45:29,800 Because there's been a lot of I can for that I've seen at least 925 00:45:29,800 --> 00:45:32,200 on the Twitter sort of reporters, feared discussing 926 00:45:32,200 --> 00:45:34,000 what it is and they don't really know because they've never used 927 00:45:34,000 --> 00:45:37,600 it but you and I have yeah it's on the Secret side, on the red 928 00:45:37,600 --> 00:45:40,500 side, it's think of it as the old-school. 929 00:45:40,500 --> 00:45:43,900 AOL Instant Messenger were you have access to anybody who's 930 00:45:44,100 --> 00:45:48,600 happens to be active on that side of the computer systems and 931 00:45:48,600 --> 00:45:51,300 you can just chat back and forth with them and you can preserve 932 00:45:51,300 --> 00:45:55,400 those chats if you want and you can log them on to load them 933 00:45:55,400 --> 00:45:58,300 into a case File if they're relevant or continuous. 934 00:45:59,700 --> 00:46:01,100 You know, you just chatting with your buddy. 935 00:46:01,100 --> 00:46:04,100 Hey, how's your day going? And people use it to also have 936 00:46:04,200 --> 00:46:07,200 audio conversations with each other and you can also do video 937 00:46:07,200 --> 00:46:10,500 as that that sort of capability. And it's good for sort of 938 00:46:10,500 --> 00:46:12,700 teleconference calls where you don't actually have to get up 939 00:46:12,800 --> 00:46:15,100 off your desk and you can talk to a whole bunch of people same 940 00:46:15,100 --> 00:46:17,400 time. Alright, so basically the same 941 00:46:17,400 --> 00:46:18,900 thing people are using Skype for same. 942 00:46:18,900 --> 00:46:22,000 Like we're using here, there's a messaging for function and audio 943 00:46:22,000 --> 00:46:25,600 and visual let's say you know I didn't meet each other while we 944 00:46:25,600 --> 00:46:28,400 worked in the bureau, but if we did, I could hit you up on there 945 00:46:28,400 --> 00:46:30,900 and Ask you something about your kids sports? 946 00:46:31,100 --> 00:46:33,600 I could check in how your wife is doing sick. 947 00:46:33,600 --> 00:46:36,100 We could talk about that case that we were thinking about 948 00:46:36,200 --> 00:46:38,900 referring off to your office and it would all be in the same 949 00:46:38,900 --> 00:46:41,700 chat, right? Yeah, absolutely. 950 00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:43,900 Did you ever you didn't really deal with things that were that 951 00:46:43,900 --> 00:46:45,900 were classified in your case work. 952 00:46:46,000 --> 00:46:48,500 So you didn't probably have to deal with them showing up in 953 00:46:48,500 --> 00:46:50,400 your link. Is that more or less true? 954 00:46:50,900 --> 00:46:52,600 No, no, everything. I was deal with those 955 00:46:52,600 --> 00:46:56,700 unclassified and yeah, just, it didn't really wasn't really 956 00:46:56,700 --> 00:46:58,100 relevant to the cases that I was working. 957 00:46:59,000 --> 00:47:01,500 However, like every FBI employee, probably got the 958 00:47:01,500 --> 00:47:04,100 marking classified documents thing once a year on the Virtual 959 00:47:04,100 --> 00:47:06,700 Academy training. Yeah, the portion markings. 960 00:47:06,700 --> 00:47:09,500 Yep. Where they have to go through it 961 00:47:09,500 --> 00:47:11,500 to make sure that you know, what is a secret? 962 00:47:11,500 --> 00:47:14,600 No, foreign classified law enforcement sensitive. 963 00:47:14,700 --> 00:47:19,000 Yep, very familiar. So one of the, the pushbacks 964 00:47:19,000 --> 00:47:22,600 that the doj that the US attorney's office did in this 965 00:47:22,600 --> 00:47:25,100 probably weighs case had basically stated that the, you 966 00:47:25,100 --> 00:47:28,600 know, the agent incorrectly hid instead of deleted files. 967 00:47:28,700 --> 00:47:31,300 Select them properly for Discovery and therefore gave 968 00:47:31,300 --> 00:47:34,400 thousand lines of everyday conversation plus a bunch more 969 00:47:34,900 --> 00:47:37,500 that may or may not be related to the case and their argument 970 00:47:37,500 --> 00:47:41,000 to try to retrieve all. That was it's classified. 971 00:47:41,400 --> 00:47:43,700 What do you how do you, how do you sort that out? 972 00:47:43,700 --> 00:47:46,100 Like does that ring true to you that there's likely a bunch of 973 00:47:46,100 --> 00:47:49,400 classified material? This woman was discussing with 974 00:47:49,400 --> 00:47:54,400 her her peers, I doubt it. Because first of all there's no 975 00:47:54,400 --> 00:47:57,600 portion marking which would indicate that it's classified. 976 00:47:58,700 --> 00:48:02,300 Just enlightened, my experience, using that link system, you're 977 00:48:02,300 --> 00:48:05,800 not typically having super Secret Squirrel conversations 978 00:48:05,800 --> 00:48:07,700 via link. You would probably move that 979 00:48:07,700 --> 00:48:11,400 over into a more secure. Secure place to have this 980 00:48:11,400 --> 00:48:14,700 conversation, then you wouldn't necessarily be typing them out. 981 00:48:15,400 --> 00:48:18,000 And I think that it's yeah, I think that's the real thing. 982 00:48:18,000 --> 00:48:19,800 It's like, people are not necessarily typing them out 983 00:48:19,800 --> 00:48:22,000 although I did cut and paste occasionally but they would have 984 00:48:22,000 --> 00:48:24,200 portion marks from certain documents if we were trying to 985 00:48:24,200 --> 00:48:27,300 get like a linguist, like hey, what does this mean, or can you 986 00:48:27,300 --> 00:48:30,000 give me some context? You could see that being a thing 987 00:48:30,000 --> 00:48:33,400 but yeah. For every day at people can 988 00:48:33,400 --> 00:48:36,800 imagine the AOL chat that's not the way you do it usually send 989 00:48:36,800 --> 00:48:38,800 an email over and say hey did you get my email? 990 00:48:38,800 --> 00:48:41,300 Do you want to do a link call about it, you had link calls 991 00:48:41,300 --> 00:48:45,300 about policy and procedures and case determinations, I imagine 992 00:48:45,300 --> 00:48:47,100 right? Yeah yeah yeah. 993 00:48:47,100 --> 00:48:49,200 Definitely have those especially if you know you're covering a 994 00:48:49,207 --> 00:48:52,100 lead or something like that, you just will be sent to you by some 995 00:48:52,100 --> 00:48:54,900 individual, you had no relationship with and you just 996 00:48:54,900 --> 00:48:57,700 want to get some clarity on it and it's always just easier to 997 00:48:57,700 --> 00:48:59,500 have that. Calling that way. 998 00:48:59,500 --> 00:49:02,300 You're not trying to fight with cellphone receptions and you can 999 00:49:02,500 --> 00:49:05,500 look at the case together and sort of getting clarity. 1000 00:49:06,900 --> 00:49:08,900 Yeah, that's a good point. It's like a collaboration tool 1001 00:49:08,900 --> 00:49:11,200 between offices. So if someone in d.c. were to 1002 00:49:11,200 --> 00:49:13,100 send you a case or a lead saying, hey, would you go 1003 00:49:13,100 --> 00:49:15,400 interview this person and you get it and receive it, you could 1004 00:49:15,400 --> 00:49:18,400 look them up on the link system, dial them up on that, that 1005 00:49:18,400 --> 00:49:19,900 system. And then talk about things all 1006 00:49:19,900 --> 00:49:23,700 the way up to and including secret classifications. 1007 00:49:23,700 --> 00:49:28,000 So you're pretty covered on most most actions you would do in any 1008 00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:30,100 case you're not, you're going to be in a secured environment 1009 00:49:30,100 --> 00:49:31,700 where you're not trying to like walk around and have somebody 1010 00:49:31,700 --> 00:49:33,100 over here. What you're getting involved in? 1011 00:49:33,100 --> 00:49:36,200 Yeah yeah yeah. I mean there was always where 1012 00:49:36,200 --> 00:49:38,200 you You said you think you're the guy in the cube next, he was 1013 00:49:38,207 --> 00:49:40,200 just talking to myself and then you realize he had the headset 1014 00:49:40,200 --> 00:49:42,700 on and he was having a link called with somebody fair 1015 00:49:42,700 --> 00:49:45,100 enough. All right, so some of the things 1016 00:49:45,100 --> 00:49:47,400 that they mentioned, destroying the evidence, we don't really 1017 00:49:47,400 --> 00:49:50,100 think much about that. The, the possibility that doj 1018 00:49:50,100 --> 00:49:53,300 said that it was all classified. That's probably fall. 1019 00:49:53,300 --> 00:49:56,200 So now, we've got one kind of the attorneys are probably over. 1020 00:49:56,500 --> 00:49:59,800 Overreaching on one thing and then doj is probably 1021 00:49:59,800 --> 00:50:02,400 overreaching on the other, the last piece on there that Julie 1022 00:50:02,400 --> 00:50:06,700 Kelly reported and I think this one is probably the most Into 1023 00:50:06,700 --> 00:50:09,900 the government's case. In the case of The Proud boys is 1024 00:50:10,600 --> 00:50:14,000 there is interactions between the case agents. 1025 00:50:14,700 --> 00:50:16,500 And this case, it's Nicole Miller out of the Washington 1026 00:50:16,500 --> 00:50:18,100 field office. And then another agent who I 1027 00:50:18,107 --> 00:50:21,100 don't know that we've seen identified and they're 1028 00:50:21,100 --> 00:50:25,300 discussing the likely tactics that the defense is going to 1029 00:50:25,300 --> 00:50:29,800 employ, based on listening to jail, phone calls between the 1030 00:50:29,800 --> 00:50:34,800 attorney and the, and the client who's in jail, can you kind of 1031 00:50:34,900 --> 00:50:37,600 expand on your experience of Catching Jail phone calls, what 1032 00:50:37,600 --> 00:50:39,700 people do and do not have an like, kind of what's inbounds? 1033 00:50:39,700 --> 00:50:42,500 And what's not? Yeah, I mean, I've listed a lots 1034 00:50:42,500 --> 00:50:47,200 of jail phone calls and well, in my experience, I wasn't even 1035 00:50:47,200 --> 00:50:52,100 able to cheat to listen to a phone calls between an attorney 1036 00:50:52,100 --> 00:50:55,500 and a defendant. The the jail system would block 1037 00:50:55,500 --> 00:50:58,500 me from even accessing those they would if you put your hover 1038 00:50:58,500 --> 00:51:02,600 your mouse over that call, it would not be available to select 1039 00:51:02,600 --> 00:51:05,300 because those are privileged conversations the government's 1040 00:51:05,300 --> 00:51:07,100 not entitled to those. So ever. 1041 00:51:07,800 --> 00:51:11,200 But fortunately for us in a lot of these times, these guys would 1042 00:51:11,200 --> 00:51:15,700 talk to their attorney and then immediately call somebody and 1043 00:51:15,700 --> 00:51:17,800 give the details of their conversation with her attorney. 1044 00:51:17,800 --> 00:51:21,700 So if we wanted to develop some sort of strategy or insight into 1045 00:51:21,700 --> 00:51:25,700 what the defense was planning to do, we could, but I think that's 1046 00:51:25,700 --> 00:51:28,400 them just being irresponsible with with their phone calls 1047 00:51:28,400 --> 00:51:31,400 because you pick up that Jail phone call and it says this is 1048 00:51:31,400 --> 00:51:33,800 recorded and it's available to law enforcement. 1049 00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:35,900 So if you make that decision, that's on you. 1050 00:51:36,400 --> 00:51:38,500 All right, I'm gonna kind of Replay that back at you. 1051 00:51:38,600 --> 00:51:41,200 If somebody were to call and talk to their attorney, you 1052 00:51:41,200 --> 00:51:44,300 didn't have access to it at all. You could not listen to it under 1053 00:51:44,300 --> 00:51:46,400 any circumstances, it was not available to you. 1054 00:51:46,500 --> 00:51:48,900 However, if that person got off the phone with their attorney 1055 00:51:49,200 --> 00:51:52,100 turns around and calls baby's mama, which I'm sure is the the 1056 00:51:52,100 --> 00:51:54,400 number one call that that gets done. 1057 00:51:54,400 --> 00:51:56,700 And then you know, the attorney said this and I told him this 1058 00:51:56,700 --> 00:51:59,200 and all these things and then they do like a recap of it, 1059 00:51:59,200 --> 00:52:00,800 that's no longer privilege because they're no longer 1060 00:52:00,800 --> 00:52:03,000 talking to the attorney. That's how you correct pick that 1061 00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:07,400 up. But if the government Made the 1062 00:52:07,400 --> 00:52:11,000 argument that every single jail, call coming out of the January 1063 00:52:11,000 --> 00:52:14,100 6. Defendants system in DC has a 1064 00:52:14,100 --> 00:52:16,100 caveat in order to use that phone. 1065 00:52:16,100 --> 00:52:18,300 It looks like there's a kind of a terms of service on there. 1066 00:52:18,300 --> 00:52:20,500 It's three or four paragraphs, if you want to use this thing 1067 00:52:20,600 --> 00:52:23,300 and one of the lines in their states that you basically give 1068 00:52:23,300 --> 00:52:25,200 up your right to attorney-client privilege. 1069 00:52:25,700 --> 00:52:28,200 Do you know if there's ever been any case along that, does that 1070 00:52:28,200 --> 00:52:31,400 seem like a fair play by the government to be able to waive 1071 00:52:31,400 --> 00:52:33,400 your attorney-client privilege? Just in order to use a phone, 1072 00:52:33,400 --> 00:52:35,700 where your otherwise on covid, lockdown and isolation. 1073 00:52:36,700 --> 00:52:39,700 Yeah, it sounds completely completely extra-constitutional, 1074 00:52:39,800 --> 00:52:43,000 it does not sound legit. And especially when you have 1075 00:52:43,000 --> 00:52:45,100 this, this phone, hang over people's heads, and you're 1076 00:52:45,100 --> 00:52:47,300 saying, well, it must you agree to this. 1077 00:52:47,300 --> 00:52:49,100 Then you're not gonna be able to talk to your family. 1078 00:52:49,600 --> 00:52:54,000 I mean, that's just is gross disgusting and it's definitely, 1079 00:52:54,200 --> 00:52:55,700 I would question the legality of it. 1080 00:52:55,700 --> 00:52:57,400 I've never seen anything like that. 1081 00:52:57,900 --> 00:53:00,600 There's just certain rights that you can't simply just wave away. 1082 00:53:00,600 --> 00:53:03,700 Even if you wanted to, I mean, it, you can do the right to 1083 00:53:03,700 --> 00:53:05,100 Liberty. Well, I wave that I want to be a 1084 00:53:05,107 --> 00:53:08,100 Slave It doesn't work that way, right? 1085 00:53:08,100 --> 00:53:09,600 Can't waive your right to free speech. 1086 00:53:09,600 --> 00:53:12,500 You can't Rave your right to Due Process necessarily like it is 1087 00:53:12,500 --> 00:53:14,400 part of the due process that you could waive your right to a 1088 00:53:14,400 --> 00:53:18,000 trial and you could plea. But you can't say I'm fine with 1089 00:53:18,000 --> 00:53:20,800 the government infringing, upon my right to due process by doing 1090 00:53:20,800 --> 00:53:22,700 something else. Yes. 1091 00:53:22,700 --> 00:53:24,300 Yes. And that's just a dangerous 1092 00:53:24,300 --> 00:53:26,800 precedent, especially with the shore this privilege that you're 1093 00:53:26,800 --> 00:53:29,000 going to have me with the attorneys. 1094 00:53:29,000 --> 00:53:31,300 Because where does it stop? I mean, well, if you're going to 1095 00:53:31,300 --> 00:53:34,300 have a conversation with your attorney inside of an FBI 1096 00:53:34,300 --> 00:53:38,100 facility that we were, don't worry, Record that and we're 1097 00:53:38,100 --> 00:53:41,800 going to have access to it. Because you in order to have 1098 00:53:42,000 --> 00:53:45,000 access to space, you're gonna have to agree with that and we 1099 00:53:45,000 --> 00:53:47,800 invited you into the space. May be correct. 1100 00:53:47,800 --> 00:53:49,700 Correct. It's just completely completely 1101 00:53:49,700 --> 00:53:54,200 in traps these guys and if they did that they're going to can 1102 00:53:54,200 --> 00:53:56,800 have some consequences. I would I would hope we would 1103 00:53:56,800 --> 00:53:58,400 hope you. I maybe not in DC, but in 1104 00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:01,400 theory, they might have consequences somewhere in the 1105 00:54:01,400 --> 00:54:04,400 judicial system if they end up getting a change of venue, you 1106 00:54:04,400 --> 00:54:05,600 said, you wanted to drop something on me. 1107 00:54:05,607 --> 00:54:08,600 That was a little bit. I see sounds like it was written 1108 00:54:08,600 --> 00:54:12,000 about by Miranda Divine on Thursday afternoon, or Thursday 1109 00:54:12,000 --> 00:54:16,300 during the day. What is it that you found out 1110 00:54:16,400 --> 00:54:20,000 about your complaint? Because this evolving case of 1111 00:54:20,200 --> 00:54:22,300 I've been watching tiny bees feed as well and it says 1112 00:54:22,600 --> 00:54:24,200 cherry-picked is their favorite thing. 1113 00:54:24,300 --> 00:54:26,300 And hand-picked as their other favorite thing they were 1114 00:54:26,300 --> 00:54:29,400 hand-picked journalists and Cherry Picked and the so-called 1115 00:54:29,400 --> 00:54:32,100 journalist so-called whistleblowers is kind of a, the 1116 00:54:32,400 --> 00:54:35,300 meat of the Democrat argument against your legitimacy, you 1117 00:54:35,300 --> 00:54:38,700 found out something kind of Key about what's going on at the 1118 00:54:38,700 --> 00:54:41,000 what the office of the Inspector General, is that correct? 1119 00:54:41,200 --> 00:54:42,800 Yep. The doj is Office of the 1120 00:54:42,800 --> 00:54:45,300 Inspector General, you? So, I, that was one of the 1121 00:54:45,300 --> 00:54:48,200 offices that I submitted my whistleblower declaration to, 1122 00:54:48,900 --> 00:54:53,500 and I perceived in December, notice from them that they were 1123 00:54:53,500 --> 00:54:56,800 not going to be investigating the, the matter that I brought 1124 00:54:56,800 --> 00:55:00,400 for to them and kind of figured, well, that's that I'm all done. 1125 00:55:01,200 --> 00:55:04,500 And then that can February went through my in the middle. 1126 00:55:04,500 --> 00:55:08,000 February went to the deposition for The select committee and 1127 00:55:08,000 --> 00:55:10,900 then the Democrats had their strategic coordinated leaks with 1128 00:55:10,900 --> 00:55:13,100 a media. And one of the details that they 1129 00:55:13,100 --> 00:55:17,800 said, was that the, the oig was refusing to even look at the 1130 00:55:17,800 --> 00:55:20,800 veracity of my complaint. And that was sort of one of the, 1131 00:55:20,800 --> 00:55:24,300 the big, the big bombs that they threw in my direction. 1132 00:55:24,700 --> 00:55:28,900 Fortunately, for me, Jason Foster Bauer oversight has some 1133 00:55:29,000 --> 00:55:33,000 some contacts and has been pressuring the oig and finding 1134 00:55:33,000 --> 00:55:38,000 out and, and watch the Chagrin of the That's the oig. 1135 00:55:38,000 --> 00:55:43,400 Actually, before my deposition had agreed to investigate my 1136 00:55:43,400 --> 00:55:46,400 declaration to speak, to me about the details of that. 1137 00:55:46,400 --> 00:55:50,500 And also my retribution that I suffered as a whistleblower. 1138 00:55:50,500 --> 00:55:54,000 They want to schedule an interview with me but then they 1139 00:55:54,000 --> 00:55:57,200 interesting nugget that I have recently learned is that the 1140 00:55:57,200 --> 00:55:59,700 rejection letter that I initially receive seeing as how 1141 00:55:59,700 --> 00:56:02,400 that's very inconsistent with what the oig is telling me now 1142 00:56:02,800 --> 00:56:06,200 that is automatically generated by a computer. 1143 00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:09,000 System. How's that the oig that 1144 00:56:09,100 --> 00:56:13,600 regardless of what you send in, in order to avoid, being accused 1145 00:56:13,600 --> 00:56:20,100 of ignoring declaration from whistleblower, you get the the 1146 00:56:20,100 --> 00:56:22,000 rejection letter. And then I guess at a later 1147 00:56:22,000 --> 00:56:24,500 time, they can assess if they want to reopen it. 1148 00:56:25,000 --> 00:56:25,400 Okay. With. 1149 00:56:25,400 --> 00:56:27,500 So I'm gonna, I'm gonna pair it that back again because that 1150 00:56:27,500 --> 00:56:30,800 sounds craziness. You were told in deposition that 1151 00:56:30,900 --> 00:56:34,300 you had not been, your complaint had not been selected by the 1152 00:56:34,300 --> 00:56:36,200 oig, the office of the Inspector General to be in. 1153 00:56:36,400 --> 00:56:38,500 Estimated that was a period. You found out. 1154 00:56:38,500 --> 00:56:41,300 That was not the case. But that was at odds with what 1155 00:56:41,300 --> 00:56:44,000 you'd gotten in process because you'd gotten the letter stating 1156 00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:46,700 that they had rejected your investigation or your complaint 1157 00:56:46,700 --> 00:56:48,200 and thanks for trying kind of thing. 1158 00:56:48,700 --> 00:56:53,000 And you found out that that is a, a automatically generated 1159 00:56:53,100 --> 00:56:56,600 sort of compliance mechanism that comes out to every single 1160 00:56:56,600 --> 00:57:00,300 whistleblower and says, we're not interested in investigating 1161 00:57:00,400 --> 00:57:02,600 just in case they wanted to follow up on it, at least they 1162 00:57:02,600 --> 00:57:04,000 know that somebody wrote to them. 1163 00:57:04,700 --> 00:57:06,600 But they can still go back and investigate that thing. 1164 00:57:07,500 --> 00:57:10,600 Yes, there's, there's 400 Attorneys at the oig. 1165 00:57:11,000 --> 00:57:13,100 Obviously, you limited bandwidth, what you can do? 1166 00:57:13,100 --> 00:57:15,800 I mean that seems like a pretty healthy population but I don't 1167 00:57:15,800 --> 00:57:17,700 know what, you know, the quantity of complaints that they 1168 00:57:17,707 --> 00:57:22,100 get coming in, but if you don't have somebody who's an advocate 1169 00:57:22,100 --> 00:57:26,000 for you, who's has dogged as Jason Foster has been for me, I 1170 00:57:26,000 --> 00:57:28,900 can just see a situation easily arise where you bring a 1171 00:57:28,900 --> 00:57:32,600 legitimate and maybe a major accusation forward. 1172 00:57:32,600 --> 00:57:36,200 Nothing that's transient. And Small, but because you get 1173 00:57:36,200 --> 00:57:38,700 that letter, you think. Well, that's that. 1174 00:57:38,700 --> 00:57:42,800 I guess I have to find new pastures and your resign and 1175 00:57:42,800 --> 00:57:46,900 walk away and then maybe months or even years down, the Laura 1176 00:57:47,000 --> 00:57:50,000 lauro, the oig contacts you and says, hey, you know, you 1177 00:57:50,000 --> 00:57:53,200 remember that allegation about, you know, they're being major 1178 00:57:53,200 --> 00:57:55,800 Espionage it going on in the FBI we'd like, to talk to you about 1179 00:57:55,800 --> 00:58:00,500 that and now you've changed and disrupted your entire career 1180 00:58:00,500 --> 00:58:04,400 path and it's too late for you to really go back on that. 1181 00:58:04,600 --> 00:58:06,700 No, I think. Yeah, that's a wild is being a 1182 00:58:06,700 --> 00:58:11,000 potentially catastrophic problem with the oig. 1183 00:58:11,100 --> 00:58:13,700 Have you ever heard of anybody explaining this before or that? 1184 00:58:13,700 --> 00:58:15,700 Do you know, anybody that's ever heard this and going like, oh, 1185 00:58:15,707 --> 00:58:19,900 yeah, that makes sense. No, no, I blown away. 1186 00:58:19,900 --> 00:58:24,900 I'm just thinking about how many people that didn't have adjacent 1187 00:58:24,900 --> 00:58:29,600 working for them that this has happened to and and there's 1188 00:58:29,600 --> 00:58:33,200 there's a lot of serious allegations that have come out 1189 00:58:33,200 --> 00:58:36,000 and maybe they just Were never pursued because the person to 1190 00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:40,000 said like, Hey look, it's been a year, I got a new job, you know, 1191 00:58:40,000 --> 00:58:42,000 I moved. I'm not really interested, you 1192 00:58:42,000 --> 00:58:44,200 know, kind of f. Those guys, the government can't 1193 00:58:44,200 --> 00:58:45,600 be fixed. I'm just going to go onto the 1194 00:58:45,600 --> 00:58:47,800 private sector. How often is that happened as a 1195 00:58:47,800 --> 00:58:50,200 result of this? Yeah, probably a lot based on 1196 00:58:50,200 --> 00:58:52,400 what I mean. There's allegations going in if 1197 00:58:52,400 --> 00:58:54,400 they've got 400 attorneys work in there and you figure that 1198 00:58:54,400 --> 00:58:59,300 you've got ATF and DEA and the Marshal Service and the FBI and 1199 00:58:59,300 --> 00:59:01,800 people can make allegations from the inside of the agency but 1200 00:59:01,800 --> 00:59:05,100 also from the outside of the agency and can Can choose to 1201 00:59:05,100 --> 00:59:08,100 just abandon pushing these things like legal process. 1202 00:59:08,200 --> 00:59:11,500 ATF just makes you think what about like like a John Dodson 1203 00:59:11,700 --> 00:59:14,100 who comes forward with the Fast and the Furious accusation? 1204 00:59:14,100 --> 00:59:18,800 What if he just sends it to the oig and Jared rejected? 1205 00:59:19,500 --> 00:59:22,200 And yeah, how corrupt would that would that make you think 1206 00:59:22,200 --> 00:59:24,000 everything? Is it also probably explains why 1207 00:59:24,000 --> 00:59:27,100 some people choose to take their case to the media and because 1208 00:59:27,100 --> 00:59:30,500 what are the what is the way that you can do anything when 1209 00:59:30,500 --> 00:59:33,300 you're told that the the oig is not interested in following 1210 00:59:33,300 --> 00:59:34,600 down. You complain like you got No 1211 00:59:34,600 --> 00:59:37,300 other recourse other than either go public or shut your mouth and 1212 00:59:37,500 --> 00:59:38,600 go back. And as we used to say in the 1213 00:59:38,600 --> 00:59:42,000 military, shut up in color. Yeah, exactly. 1214 00:59:42,000 --> 00:59:45,000 I made and then if you go to the media, then that's not one of 1215 00:59:45,008 --> 00:59:50,700 those one through seven aspects to being a whistleblower. 1216 00:59:50,700 --> 00:59:54,100 That's a protected disclosure. No checked it out to that point. 1217 00:59:54,100 --> 00:59:55,200 Yeah. So then if they were to 1218 00:59:55,200 --> 00:59:58,300 terminate you then then you're definitely on Fairgrounds 1219 00:59:58,300 --> 01:00:00,600 probably probably like me. I'm on Fairgrounds to be 1220 01:00:00,600 --> 01:00:02,800 terminated this point. Doing my thing, I am the media I 1221 01:00:02,800 --> 01:00:04,300 guess cells. Right. 1222 01:00:04,500 --> 01:00:06,500 Or you them you during the investigation. 1223 01:00:06,600 --> 01:00:07,700 It is. Yes. 1224 01:00:07,700 --> 01:00:10,000 In me for sure, give me journalistic protections for my 1225 01:00:10,000 --> 01:00:13,600 sources which may or may not show up on my podcast but I 1226 01:00:13,600 --> 01:00:15,800 really appreciate you sharing this information with folks. 1227 01:00:15,800 --> 01:00:19,000 I appreciate you sharing your experience because I think it is 1228 01:00:19,000 --> 01:00:22,200 timely and it's necessary for people to know we're going to 1229 01:00:22,200 --> 01:00:24,200 call balls and Strikes. When the FBI has done something 1230 01:00:24,200 --> 01:00:26,100 we think is wrong, we're going to call it out. 1231 01:00:26,400 --> 01:00:30,300 But when there's something that is maybe a little bit more 1232 01:00:30,300 --> 01:00:32,600 innocuous like destroying evidence because that is 1233 01:00:32,600 --> 01:00:34,200 something that gets done in law enforcement. 1234 01:00:34,200 --> 01:00:36,200 They Don't just keep it forever and they don't have infinite 1235 01:00:36,200 --> 01:00:38,700 Warehouse spaces like Raiders of the Lost Ark. 1236 01:00:39,000 --> 01:00:41,600 It can't just keep it in the warehouse Forever at some point 1237 01:00:41,600 --> 01:00:42,900 is got to go away. So thanks so much for sharing 1238 01:00:42,900 --> 01:00:45,100 your experience been, you got it. 1239 01:00:46,700 --> 01:00:48,700 And it's always good to hear from Steve friend. 1240 01:00:48,700 --> 01:00:52,800 He brings truth and maybe a little bit more sober 1241 01:00:52,800 --> 01:00:55,900 perspective than some of the the nonsense that we've been talking 1242 01:00:55,900 --> 01:00:58,400 about ladies and gentlemen. You have been listening to the 1243 01:00:58,408 --> 01:01:00,500 Kyle Serafin show. Please consider, hitting the 1244 01:01:00,500 --> 01:01:03,100 Subscribe button. On rumble on Apple, on Spotify. 1245 01:01:03,100 --> 01:01:05,700 On, I heart radio or any of the other dozen places that you 1246 01:01:05,700 --> 01:01:07,900 could find podcast. We just added a couple more this 1247 01:01:07,900 --> 01:01:10,000 week. So please consider subscribing. 1248 01:01:10,600 --> 01:01:13,200 If you enjoyed what you heard, share it with a friend, you can 1249 01:01:13,200 --> 01:01:15,600 share it with 2, you can share it with 50, it does help us grow 1250 01:01:15,600 --> 01:01:17,200 the audience. And the number of people who 1251 01:01:17,200 --> 01:01:20,200 have access to this kind of first-hand information sources, 1252 01:01:20,200 --> 01:01:23,900 like Steve friend and others. And if you do like what you 1253 01:01:23,900 --> 01:01:26,600 hear, we'd appreciate a five star review on Apple podcast. 1254 01:01:26,600 --> 01:01:29,400 The link is always in the show descriptions and if you do send 1255 01:01:29,400 --> 01:01:31,500 one of those, we will read one on the show. 1256 01:01:31,700 --> 01:01:34,200 So Stand By and I will read one right here for you. 1257 01:01:34,200 --> 01:01:38,800 Now, here we go. This one says, it's from Sun 1258 01:01:38,800 --> 01:01:43,200 Drop 32, says excellent. Love your show. 1259 01:01:43,300 --> 01:01:45,600 I started following you after hearing you on the dark to 1260 01:01:45,600 --> 01:01:47,800 light, Right. That's Tracy beans podcast. 1261 01:01:47,800 --> 01:01:50,200 By the way, it's nice to hear a courageous trustworthy. 1262 01:01:50,200 --> 01:01:52,900 Truth teller, in an upside-down world of constant lies in 1263 01:01:52,900 --> 01:01:55,300 Scandal. I pray for our country, I pray 1264 01:01:55,300 --> 01:01:57,200 for you and your family stay strong Kyle. 1265 01:01:57,200 --> 01:01:59,400 You're doing a great service. Well, that's sort of 1266 01:01:59,800 --> 01:02:04,100 self-congratulatory for us, but we do appreciate you Sundrop 32. 1267 01:02:04,300 --> 01:02:06,600 And folks, if you want to have your review, read on the air, 1268 01:02:06,600 --> 01:02:08,600 send one. If you have a zany title, I like 1269 01:02:08,600 --> 01:02:10,400 those easier. They stand out to my eyes. 1270 01:02:10,700 --> 01:02:14,000 Again, you've been listening to the Kyle Surf and show and we 1271 01:02:14,000 --> 01:02:16,800 will see you again. Next time. 1272 01:02:19,700 --> 01:02:21,700 Thanks for listening to the Kyle Serafin. 1273 01:02:21,700 --> 01:02:25,600 Show be sure to follow him on Twitter and Truth at Kyle's 1274 01:02:25,600 --> 01:02:26,300 seraphin.