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So for you that don't know what 
a rescue task force is, it's 

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usually a group of firefighters 
or paramedics teamed up with one

3
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to two law enforcement. 
That team then can go into warm 

4
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zone type scenes where there's 
been a shooter, there's no 

5
00:00:13,440 --> 00:00:16,000
active threat, where there's no 
shots being fired currently, 

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maybe the shooter's been 
already, he's deceased, been 

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under arrest, has fled. 
We can insert these, what they 

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call RTF teams into those areas 
to go take care of the wounded. 

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The reason we have law 
enforcement with them is because

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most first responders are not 
armed. 

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They have no way to defend 
themselves, so it's it'd be 

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unsafe to send parametric 
firefighters just into a scene 

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with no type of protection 
because if the actor was to come

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back they could be attacked 
themselves and having a way to 

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defend themselves. 
So the RTF is a group of 

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firefighters and paramedics or 
EMTs, any type of medical 

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personnel being LED into a scene
by some type of security force. 

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All interviewers have their own 
style and my style is to try to 

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get to the point and to be 
intensely curious. 

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00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:00,800
And the key to. 
Is listening. 

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00:01:01,480 --> 00:01:04,280
Take a look behind the curtain 
with a real whistle blower, an 

22
00:01:04,280 --> 00:01:06,680
American patriot. 
Prepare to embrace the 

23
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uncomfortable truth because this
program has no time for 

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00:01:10,120 --> 00:01:12,560
comforting lies. 
Here is civil liberties 

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enthusiast, Second Amendment 
defender, and recovering FBI 

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agent Kyle Seraph. 
Well, my friends, welcome to the

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Sunday. 
Sit down. 

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I appreciate you joining me. 
Today's going to be a little bit

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00:01:24,280 --> 00:01:25,560
different. 
We're going to be doing a panel 

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discussion. 
It's not something I've done 

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before, so I hope you'll bear 
with me on the editing on it. 

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I got together a group of 
people, CIA targeting officer, 

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former security officer, veteran
of Benghazi, my buddy Peter 

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Johnson, who does tactical 
training around the country, 

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military veteran, law 
enforcement veteran, and a SWAT 

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00:01:45,640 --> 00:01:49,080
medic from the local area. 
What we wanted to do is talk 

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about an emerging terrorist 
threat that's not being 

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discussed. 
We talked about a little bit 

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00:01:52,160 --> 00:01:55,960
during the week and the question
is, is what do you do if 

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something like that happens? 
So we have a discussion about 

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readiness, nature of threat, 
proper responses, what you might

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00:02:04,120 --> 00:02:06,200
be able to do as an individual 
citizen, what you might do if 

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00:02:06,200 --> 00:02:08,560
you happen to be a law 
enforcement officer and you need

44
00:02:08,560 --> 00:02:10,759
to motivate your chain of 
command to go do something about

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00:02:10,759 --> 00:02:11,560
it. 
If you work in the fire 

46
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department or if you're a medic,
if you work in the emergency 

47
00:02:13,960 --> 00:02:17,320
room, if you're a hospital 
person, just as a person in the 

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community, we should be aware 
that we got to take care of 

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00:02:20,240 --> 00:02:21,800
ourselves. 
At the end of the day, our 

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00:02:21,800 --> 00:02:23,640
government's not going to do it.
So that's what we're going to be

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00:02:23,640 --> 00:02:25,400
talking about today. 
And I think you guys will find 

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some value, if not a significant
amount of value right up front. 

53
00:02:28,960 --> 00:02:31,640
Let me just tell you, you can 
cut any piece of this. 

54
00:02:32,640 --> 00:02:35,680
Take it if you can, if it value,
if there's any value that is 

55
00:02:35,680 --> 00:02:41,360
added for your department or for
your your area, I'm going to 

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00:02:41,360 --> 00:02:44,080
tell you right up front, you can
take any piece of this, clip it,

57
00:02:44,240 --> 00:02:48,160
cut it, do anything you like. 
I do not have any issues with 

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00:02:48,160 --> 00:02:49,680
people sharing this around and I
hope you do. 

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00:02:49,680 --> 00:02:52,280
If there's something in here 
that is a value for you, whether

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00:02:52,280 --> 00:02:56,240
it be at a roll call, whether it
be at A at a shift change 

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00:02:56,240 --> 00:02:59,200
meeting or something to that 
effect, by all means take it, 

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00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:01,800
use it, brief your folks. 
Let's get things. 

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Let's get things moving so that 
we are not left flat footed in 

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this country. 
There's something that's 

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happening with food supplies 
here in the United States. 

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It's not getting a lot of 
attention. 

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The Chinese have been buying up 
farmland by the hundreds of 

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thousands of acres. 
They've taken control of 

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critical supply chains, things 
like fertilizer, animal feed, 

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farming equipment. 
Why? 

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It's pretty clear they're 
tightening up their grip on 

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global food production. 
So if things go South, you need 

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00:03:25,440 --> 00:03:26,800
to be ready. 
I need to be ready. 

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00:03:26,800 --> 00:03:28,640
And that's why I trust my 
Patriot Supply. 

75
00:03:29,640 --> 00:03:32,440
They are America's largest 
emergency preparedness company. 

76
00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:34,440
Right now. 
You can get their four week 

77
00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:37,400
emergency foods kit and it's 
going to come with four free 72 

78
00:03:37,400 --> 00:03:40,720
hour food kits, an additional 12
days of free food, absolutely 

79
00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:42,480
free. 
That's four weeks of delicious 

80
00:03:42,480 --> 00:03:46,160
meals last you up to 25 years, 
delivering 2000 calories per 

81
00:03:46,160 --> 00:03:47,760
day. 
It's shipped fast. 

82
00:03:47,760 --> 00:03:49,800
It's shipped free. 
We can't control what the 

83
00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:52,120
Chinese are going to do. 
What we can control is how 

84
00:03:52,120 --> 00:03:55,160
prepared we are. 
Go to prepare like kyle.com 

85
00:03:55,160 --> 00:03:57,240
today. 
Get your 12 days of free 

86
00:03:57,240 --> 00:03:59,760
emergency food along with that 
four week emergency food kit. 

87
00:03:59,880 --> 00:04:01,960
Again, it's prepare like 
kyle.com. 

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00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:05,560
Prepare like kyle.com. 
We're talking about terrorism 

89
00:04:05,560 --> 00:04:07,000
today. 
These are things that can 

90
00:04:07,000 --> 00:04:09,840
interrupt things as you know it.
They can disrupt your status 

91
00:04:09,840 --> 00:04:11,720
quo. 
If you want to be prepared, make

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00:04:11,720 --> 00:04:12,960
sure you check it out. 
The link is in the show 

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00:04:12,960 --> 00:04:15,440
description. 
Prepare like kyle.com. 

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00:04:15,640 --> 00:04:19,440
Let's get right into this 
interview today with my guest 

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00:04:19,440 --> 00:04:25,680
panel. 
All. 

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00:04:28,000 --> 00:04:29,920
Right, ladies and gentlemen, So 
this is going to be kind of an 

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00:04:29,920 --> 00:04:32,280
interesting experiment for the 
Kyle Serafin show. 

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00:04:32,280 --> 00:04:35,800
We are doing a live and remote 
panel at the same time. 

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Got a handful of really 
competent commentators. 

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I hate the word experts, but 
people who know what they're 

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00:04:41,000 --> 00:04:43,200
talking about when it comes to 
medical, when it comes to 

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tactical, when it comes to the 
threat that faces this country. 

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We're going to get into kind of 
a freewheeling discussion 

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starting with Sarah Adams, who 
you guys have seen on the Sean 

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Ryan show and other places as 
well, former CIA targeter. 

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We're going to be talking with 
Boone, who is formerly with the 

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with the CIA and the Global 
Response Service. 

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We're talking to Peter Johnson, 
who's the previous guest here. 

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And Kevin, no further 
information currently on the job

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00:05:06,040 --> 00:05:09,040
in the tactical and medical 
world, an EMS professional and a

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paramedic. 
So we can talk about the nature 

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of what the threat looks like in
this country and why we are not 

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seeing local law enforcement 
even close to prepared for it. 

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Maybe we can get a couple of you
guys moving the needle in your 

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own departments, within your own
agencies to do that. 

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So I want to start with Sarah, 
if you want to do a just a quick

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background on, you know, maybe a
2 minute intro for people who 

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are not familiar with your 
background. 

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Yeah, I mean, just really quick,
you know, I spent about a decade

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at the CIA. 
I was an analyst and then a 

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targeter. 
Really just simply what that job

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was. 
I would locate threats, right? 

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And we would usually capture 
them, or I would help find 

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people to focus on, to recruit, 
right, to fill intelligence 

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gaps. 
I got recruited out to go to the

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Select Committee on Benghazi. 
So up on the Hill, when I was 

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there, I realized that the CIA 
and FBI weren't actually hunting

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down the terrorists who actually
attacked us, you know, in 2012 

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in Benghazi. 
And so that time me and Boone 

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got together and we did our own 
investigation into the 

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terrorists. 
So for the last 10 years, we've 

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actually been running an 
investigation starting in Libya.

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As you can imagine, it moved to 
places like Turkey. 

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And now since the fall of 
Afghanistan, it's moved to 

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Afghanistan. 
And so we have a lot of inside 

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information on Afghanistan 
because a lot of Libyans have 

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moved there in the last few 
years, among with thousands of 

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other terrorists from different 
groups. 

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So that's kind of a quick down 
and dirty in my background. 

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Love it. 
Let's let's move on to boones 

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that you're sitting right there 
as well. 

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Yeah, spent some time in the 
military, spent time in law 

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enforcement on the SWAT team, 
spent some time with the 

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Diplomatic Security Service, 
spent 12 years with the CIS 

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Global Response staff, currently
teach farmers and tactics full 

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time. 
And obviously, I support Sarah 

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in our investigation and then I 
wipe her eyebrow carrier water, 

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things like that. 
He's my sidekick. 

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Outstanding what? 
What? 

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What is the clientele of the 
people that you're currently 

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training? 
So we have open enrollment where

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we teach law abiding citizens, 
but then we also teach law 

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enforcement, SWAT teams, regular
patrol guys and other government

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agencies as well. 
Excellent. 

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All right. 
And Mr. Johnson? 

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Peter Johnson with Archway 
Defense before got into this six

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years with military, two years 
part time in a municipal PD 

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Wallace finished on my undergrad
in criminal justice, law 

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enforcement, then got into the 
Air Marshall program. 

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So as an Air Marshall team 
leader of the New York field 

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office for five years, woke up 
one day, didn't want to be part 

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of the Fed anymore, so got into 
the private sector. 

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Similar to Boone. 
We've actually met a couple 

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times on the road training cops.
I'm actually at a SWAT 

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conference again right now. 
I just broke away for this 

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filming. 
Appreciate it, buddy. 

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And Kevin, you want to give 
people just a broad overstroke 

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of your background? 
So Kevin, I started out, dabbled

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in the fire department for a few
years, and the last 28 years 

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I've been a paramedic and about 
20 of those years I've been on 

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the SWAT team as their tech 
medic for numerous local, state 

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and federal SWAT teams. 
Outstanding. 

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All right, So that's, that's who
the panelists folks, it's just 

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general bona fides. 
Like I said, nobody here is 

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going to be claiming that they 
know everything, but I think 

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everyone here knows something 
and we can have a good 

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discussion about it. 
So Sarah, let's talk about the 

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threat most broadly, if you 
would and what we see facing 

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maybe the the evolution of it, 
how far back it goes and maybe 

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proximity and timeline if you 
could about what we're getting 

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we got coming our way. 
Yeah, I mean, to keep it really 

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simple, obviously after the fall
of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was 

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able to reclaim its base in 
Afghanistan. 

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It started planning a series of 
events, right? 

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Some we've seen already. 
They're involved in the attacks 

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in Israel, You know, on October 
7th, they supported training to 

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prepare for the Syrian 
blitzkrieg that happened last 

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November. 
And this homeland attack is just

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a piece of the plotting. 
They also have similar attacks 

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plan in Europe. 
We'll just focus on the homeland

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for today when it comes. 
The homeland is really 

192
00:09:02,400 --> 00:09:04,280
interesting. 
There's multiple phases of the 

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00:09:04,280 --> 00:09:05,960
attacks. 
The two phases that matter the 

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most is 1. 
They've actually joined forces 

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00:09:08,720 --> 00:09:12,600
with the Islamic State and 
that's going to be kind of like 

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00:09:12,600 --> 00:09:15,880
community level attacks, very 
similar to what we saw in New 

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Orleans on New Year's. 
The interesting part, the people

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00:09:21,160 --> 00:09:24,320
forget in that attack, the bombs
didn't go off right. 

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So it was a multi modal attack, 
just the bombs failed. 

200
00:09:27,760 --> 00:09:30,720
Thankfully for the citizens 
there. 

201
00:09:30,960 --> 00:09:34,400
Now these attacks will be 
basically in communities like we

202
00:09:34,400 --> 00:09:36,840
saw in New Orleans. 
We do think they'll be multiple 

203
00:09:36,840 --> 00:09:39,160
phases, right? 
There could be vehicle rammings,

204
00:09:39,760 --> 00:09:43,800
bombings using weapons, for 
example, that their worst 

205
00:09:43,800 --> 00:09:47,560
training in certain groupings, 5
to 7 and 8 to 10 man teams, 

206
00:09:47,560 --> 00:09:48,680
right? 
That'll be a little different 

207
00:09:48,680 --> 00:09:51,960
than the single active shooters 
we usually see. 

208
00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:55,920
I mean, like even though one in 
Vegas obviously had devastating 

209
00:09:55,920 --> 00:09:59,440
impacts and then there is a 
large scale for the second 

210
00:09:59,560 --> 00:10:02,320
phase. 
What would be the 9/11 attack? 

211
00:10:02,320 --> 00:10:05,080
We've been calling it the 9/11, 
2 point O, and then that goes 

212
00:10:05,080 --> 00:10:08,720
back to another airline plot. 
It's very similar, we think to 

213
00:10:08,720 --> 00:10:10,800
Bojinka. 
That was 30 years ago. 

214
00:10:10,800 --> 00:10:13,600
It was a thwarted plot. 
And then there's going to be 

215
00:10:13,600 --> 00:10:15,840
basically an attack on 
government institutions. 

216
00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:19,280
When we say that, we're talking 
like the Department of Defense, 

217
00:10:19,440 --> 00:10:22,560
the Intel community, those type 
of government facilities. 

218
00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:26,160
Would it be fair to say that a 
lot of the things you're seeing 

219
00:10:26,160 --> 00:10:28,560
are kinetic? 
These are not cyber. 

220
00:10:28,560 --> 00:10:32,080
These are not people who are 
trying to do information or, or 

221
00:10:32,080 --> 00:10:34,320
psyop type attacks. 
These are directly, you know, 

222
00:10:34,360 --> 00:10:37,440
explosives, firearms, vehicle 
rammings. 

223
00:10:37,440 --> 00:10:39,320
Is that kind of the nature of 
the threat you're talking about?

224
00:10:39,840 --> 00:10:42,600
That's the nature of the threat 
you'll experience. 

225
00:10:42,600 --> 00:10:46,960
There are some what you might 
call psyops involved a little 

226
00:10:46,960 --> 00:10:50,400
bit of there is some influence 
campaigns out there. 

227
00:10:51,000 --> 00:10:53,640
We've seen them around a couple 
different topics, ones of FIA 

228
00:10:53,640 --> 00:10:57,560
Siddiqui, obviously some is 
around the Hamas protesters and 

229
00:10:57,560 --> 00:11:00,520
we even saw Al Qaeda get 
involved a little bit in some 

230
00:11:00,520 --> 00:11:04,960
messaging around the gentleman 
who is executed in in Saint 

231
00:11:04,960 --> 00:11:07,880
Louis, for example, trying to 
bring in the communities around 

232
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him. 
So that's really interesting. 

233
00:11:09,880 --> 00:11:13,440
Another thing, it's not exactly 
psyops, but it's the fact that 

234
00:11:13,440 --> 00:11:17,800
the terrorists are considering 
going at first responders the 

235
00:11:17,800 --> 00:11:20,920
way they want to sideline them 
is to maybe also look like them.

236
00:11:21,160 --> 00:11:24,800
So that is something obviously a
little different than a 

237
00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:26,720
terrorists coming straight out 
with you a gun. 

238
00:11:26,720 --> 00:11:28,400
And you know that's a terrorist,
right? 

239
00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:31,480
If he's a police officer, I 
might not assume that right 

240
00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:34,400
away. 
So you you laid out kind of a 

241
00:11:34,400 --> 00:11:35,880
strategy there that I just 
heard. 

242
00:11:35,880 --> 00:11:39,800
And it sounds like that it's 
coordinated by some overarching 

243
00:11:39,800 --> 00:11:42,600
group, but then has like a bunch
of sort of semi autonomous or, 

244
00:11:42,600 --> 00:11:45,760
or cell based kind of actors. 
Is that kind of the way you 

245
00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:47,080
think it's taking central 
direction? 

246
00:11:47,080 --> 00:11:49,280
But then once people are kind of
set in motion that they're, 

247
00:11:49,760 --> 00:11:51,800
they're, they're set off on 
their own path of, you know, 

248
00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:53,760
probably not making it, but 
doing as much damage as 

249
00:11:53,760 --> 00:11:55,240
possible. 
Exactly. 

250
00:11:55,240 --> 00:11:57,440
So this is a plot directed by Al
Qaeda. 

251
00:11:57,680 --> 00:12:00,520
It has Bayern from ISIS, senior 
Shura. 

252
00:12:00,760 --> 00:12:03,600
And when we talk about those 
localized community attacks, 

253
00:12:03,600 --> 00:12:06,720
yes, those attackers know the 
city they're supposed to attack,

254
00:12:07,000 --> 00:12:09,760
but they have freedom to choose 
the targets. 

255
00:12:10,240 --> 00:12:12,640
The aviation plot is a lot more 
detailed. 

256
00:12:12,640 --> 00:12:15,640
They have to work go on certain 
airlines at certain times. 

257
00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:18,000
As you could imagine, that's a 
lot more coordinated planning. 

258
00:12:18,240 --> 00:12:22,400
So, so it is different things. 
They're basically taking the 

259
00:12:22,400 --> 00:12:24,400
thought process from the Mumbai 
attacks. 

260
00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:27,480
The Mumbai attackers, you know 
what, 15 years ago now have 

261
00:12:27,480 --> 00:12:30,280
freedom of choice. 
You know when they went, you 

262
00:12:30,280 --> 00:12:34,320
know, into the city and you 
know, went to the, the train 

263
00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:37,560
station in the hotel and they 
could choose how they did their 

264
00:12:37,560 --> 00:12:39,960
tactics and, and even what type 
of tactics they used. 

265
00:12:39,960 --> 00:12:42,680
So. 
We're talking like a choose your

266
00:12:42,680 --> 00:12:45,600
own adventure once you start of 
launch onto the path kind of 

267
00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:48,240
deal. 
Yeah, just so you can have. 

268
00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:51,600
There are other attacks. 
You know, so if your target, if 

269
00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:54,320
they told you your target let's 
say was this hotel and you go to

270
00:12:54,320 --> 00:12:57,040
the hotel and there's not much 
going on there, you're not going

271
00:12:57,040 --> 00:12:59,800
to have much impact. 
Will the attacker gets a choice,

272
00:12:59,800 --> 00:13:02,880
Let me choose another target 
where I could have more impact 

273
00:13:02,880 --> 00:13:05,480
or cause more fatality. 
So it's a very interesting 

274
00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:08,760
concept. 
And, and that's the the entire 

275
00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:10,080
goal. 
This is not like a tactical 

276
00:13:10,080 --> 00:13:11,760
mission. 
There's not, I guess that's the 

277
00:13:11,760 --> 00:13:14,400
question I have too. 
Is it in fact something that 

278
00:13:14,400 --> 00:13:19,000
we're trying to see a movement 
of just terror just keep people 

279
00:13:19,000 --> 00:13:20,920
and Americans like sort of on 
their back foot? 

280
00:13:21,080 --> 00:13:23,760
Or is there some sort of 
political goal 'cause I grew up 

281
00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:26,600
in an era when when terrorism 
was supposed to actually inspire

282
00:13:26,680 --> 00:13:29,400
some sort of action Like, you 
know, get the United States out 

283
00:13:29,400 --> 00:13:32,120
of fill in the blank country or 
leave us alone or, you know, 

284
00:13:32,240 --> 00:13:33,880
reduce sanctions or some garbage
there. 

285
00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:37,560
Is this just 100% just, you 
know, sort of like violence and 

286
00:13:37,560 --> 00:13:41,280
mayhem? 
No, those localized ISIS style 

287
00:13:41,280 --> 00:13:45,040
attacks are actually to divert 
law enforcement's attention to 

288
00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,920
look focus on ISIS, focus on 
smaller attacks. 

289
00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:52,360
So they missed the large 9/11 
2.09 eleven. 2.0 has multiple 

290
00:13:52,360 --> 00:13:56,680
aims. 1 is obviously in honor of
the death of Osama bin Laden. 1 

291
00:13:56,680 --> 00:14:01,760
is basically to honor all the 
terrorists that they felt were 

292
00:14:01,760 --> 00:14:04,560
impacted by the US intelligence 
or law enforcement. 

293
00:14:04,560 --> 00:14:07,320
So like the people detained like
a Gitmo or across prisons in the

294
00:14:07,320 --> 00:14:11,200
United States. 
And then the last piece is 

295
00:14:11,200 --> 00:14:16,520
basically to bring failed plots 
and to honor failed plots and 

296
00:14:16,520 --> 00:14:19,560
bring them to fruition. 
So those are their goals now, 

297
00:14:19,560 --> 00:14:21,720
their goals on the community 
levels. 

298
00:14:21,720 --> 00:14:24,600
They want to bring in an 
audience like which what 

299
00:14:24,600 --> 00:14:27,840
happened in the Hamas attacks 
where people said, yeah, let's 

300
00:14:27,840 --> 00:14:30,800
take it to the America, yeah, 
this is a resistance, yeah, 

301
00:14:30,800 --> 00:14:33,200
bring down this government 
that's causing all these 

302
00:14:33,200 --> 00:14:37,080
problems overseas, impacted all 
these people, detained them for 

303
00:14:37,080 --> 00:14:39,360
these 20 years, didn't give them
from justice. 

304
00:14:39,640 --> 00:14:42,800
So it does have that political 
piece that we usually look for. 

305
00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:45,680
And I imagine it's probably a 
recruiting tactic too. 

306
00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:47,760
If you have success, then you 
can get more people to sign up 

307
00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:51,960
for your terrible ideas. 
Yes, they they luckily have. 

308
00:14:52,120 --> 00:14:53,400
They're the largest they've ever
been. 

309
00:14:53,400 --> 00:14:55,320
They have no recruitment 
problems right now, as you can 

310
00:14:55,320 --> 00:14:58,480
imagine, because of the success 
of taking Afghanistan and now 

311
00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:01,400
taking Syria. 
Fair enough. 

312
00:15:02,320 --> 00:15:04,880
Mumbai was mentioned. 
Can we do a refresher for those 

313
00:15:04,880 --> 00:15:06,720
people that do not follow 
international events, The 

314
00:15:06,720 --> 00:15:09,560
classic American problem that we
think everything ends when you 

315
00:15:09,560 --> 00:15:12,520
get to the tip of Florida or you
know, ends at Seattle. 

316
00:15:12,600 --> 00:15:15,720
Let's talk about what Mumbai was
and what lessons were learned 

317
00:15:15,720 --> 00:15:17,800
and the response from it and 
what was successful and what 

318
00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:19,840
wasn't maybe and we can maybe 
open this thing up a little bit.

319
00:15:20,480 --> 00:15:23,160
Yeah, I mean, Mumbai was 
basically like 10 terrorists. 

320
00:15:23,360 --> 00:15:25,640
There was a high level selection
process. 

321
00:15:25,680 --> 00:15:28,120
You know, they were all chosen 
for a reason and basically nine 

322
00:15:28,120 --> 00:15:29,560
of them fought to the death, 
right? 

323
00:15:29,840 --> 00:15:32,400
They held down a very large 
city. 

324
00:15:32,400 --> 00:15:35,720
I'm not sure, Mumbai is 2030 
million maybe for days. 

325
00:15:36,080 --> 00:15:38,040
It was basically they held 
ground. 

326
00:15:38,040 --> 00:15:42,040
So they held ground in like a, 
in a famous hotel called the Taj

327
00:15:42,040 --> 00:15:44,280
Mahal. 
And the really interesting thing

328
00:15:44,280 --> 00:15:46,840
is they had communications among
the attackers and they were 

329
00:15:46,840 --> 00:15:50,440
watching how the police were 
responding on the ground, 

330
00:15:50,440 --> 00:15:52,760
sharing the information and 
making different movements in 

331
00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:54,520
the hotel, which made it last 
longer. 

332
00:15:54,800 --> 00:15:57,800
Another thing that was really 
interesting in that attack is 

333
00:15:57,800 --> 00:15:59,880
like when they went to the train
station, they were supposed to 

334
00:15:59,880 --> 00:16:01,480
plant bombs. 
They said this is going to take 

335
00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:03,360
too long, There's so many people
here, let's just shoot them, 

336
00:16:03,360 --> 00:16:05,320
we'll kill more people, right? 
They have that freedom of 

337
00:16:05,320 --> 00:16:07,240
choice. 
Another thing that was really 

338
00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:09,200
interesting is how they 
infiltrated the city. 

339
00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:12,360
They actually came via boat. 
So there's just a lot of 

340
00:16:12,360 --> 00:16:14,640
creative things used in that 
tack. 

341
00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:18,840
We did see some of it go roll 
over into October 7th. 

342
00:16:18,840 --> 00:16:22,600
A lot of people don't know the 
terrorist group that plan 

343
00:16:22,600 --> 00:16:26,000
Mumbai, Lashbay Taiba. 
They actually are the ones who 

344
00:16:26,000 --> 00:16:29,720
designed the paraglider 
cross-border plan. 

345
00:16:29,840 --> 00:16:32,280
They did it years ago. 
They never got to put their 

346
00:16:32,280 --> 00:16:35,720
attack into motion, but then 
obviously was taken on and used 

347
00:16:35,720 --> 00:16:38,400
very successfully in Israel. 
So there's a lot of these things

348
00:16:38,400 --> 00:16:42,680
from over time among these 
groups they decided to share now

349
00:16:42,680 --> 00:16:45,000
that they're working together, 
especially they're Co located in

350
00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:46,360
Afghanistan. 
So we're seeing a lot of 

351
00:16:46,360 --> 00:16:49,480
interesting tactics among the 
groups start to crossover and 

352
00:16:49,480 --> 00:16:51,680
it's making them more successful
in these attacks. 

353
00:16:52,800 --> 00:16:54,880
Is that a product of social 
media, Internet 

354
00:16:54,920 --> 00:16:56,600
interconnectivity? 
Because I don't remember people 

355
00:16:56,600 --> 00:16:59,600
sharing, you know, this didn't 
work for us, but maybe we can 

356
00:16:59,600 --> 00:17:01,920
shelve this plan and reuse it 
later on. 

357
00:17:01,920 --> 00:17:04,160
That didn't seem like something 
I grew up hearing about people 

358
00:17:04,160 --> 00:17:06,480
doing. 
Yeah, it actually is basically 

359
00:17:06,480 --> 00:17:09,440
because they're Co located in 
Afghanistan and now even Al 

360
00:17:09,440 --> 00:17:12,280
Qaeda has put some of these 
terrorists in the military 

361
00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:15,480
Commission and in the Shura. 
So like Lashkar E Taiba's 

362
00:17:15,480 --> 00:17:21,280
leader, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, 
he's a senior advisor in the 

363
00:17:21,280 --> 00:17:25,000
homeland plot. 
So they're Co located together 

364
00:17:25,000 --> 00:17:27,560
now in Afghanistan. 
So they weren't Co located 

365
00:17:27,560 --> 00:17:29,960
previously there in different 
locations. 

366
00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:33,440
So a lot of that's changed as 
this new terrorist camp 

367
00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:35,760
infrastructure has been rebuilt 
in Afghanistan. 

368
00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:39,360
It's become the base of multiple
groups and al Qaeda has invited 

369
00:17:39,360 --> 00:17:42,120
multiple groups. 
Come here Headquarter will build

370
00:17:42,120 --> 00:17:43,840
new camps for you. 
You'll be safe here. 

371
00:17:45,720 --> 00:17:48,360
OK, I want to break it real 
simple. 

372
00:17:48,360 --> 00:17:50,600
And then I'm going to go to the 
the the gens sitting here to try

373
00:17:50,600 --> 00:17:53,760
to talk about maybe what the 
tactic looks like to address 

374
00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:56,240
this thing. 
So very simply a phase one. 

375
00:17:56,240 --> 00:17:59,080
What kind of targets are we 
looking at and sort of numbers 

376
00:17:59,080 --> 00:18:00,800
of, of teams. 
You have a a sense of that. 

377
00:18:01,280 --> 00:18:04,200
We know they trained in five to 
seven man teams and eight to 10 

378
00:18:04,200 --> 00:18:08,160
man teams and we know at least 
four of the items they trained 

379
00:18:08,160 --> 00:18:09,760
on. 
They trained on basically like 

380
00:18:09,760 --> 00:18:15,160
supermarkets or shopping 
complexes, nightclubs, churches,

381
00:18:15,680 --> 00:18:19,200
and then kind of like public 
transportation, that type of 

382
00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:21,920
infrastructure. 
Have you heard anything about 

383
00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:24,400
hospitals, which I'm hearing 
people telling me about 

384
00:18:24,400 --> 00:18:27,680
hospitals as potential targets? 
Yeah, they actually also trained

385
00:18:27,680 --> 00:18:31,800
on hospitals. 
The interesting part is there is

386
00:18:31,800 --> 00:18:34,760
some threat reporting coming out
of a couple of the ISIS camps. 

387
00:18:35,480 --> 00:18:38,280
Obviously it came out via via 
human intelligence. 

388
00:18:38,560 --> 00:18:41,560
But yeah, there is some 
targeting against hospitals and 

389
00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:44,520
we look at it a little bigger 
than hospitals is actually 

390
00:18:44,640 --> 00:18:47,200
sidelining first responders as 
the goal. 

391
00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:51,360
Now will the attacker decide the
hospital is the first responder?

392
00:18:51,360 --> 00:18:54,880
Will they attack a police 
station like they did in Israel?

393
00:18:55,080 --> 00:18:59,280
And also in Israel they 
basically set up on the roads 

394
00:18:59,280 --> 00:19:02,160
and waited for first responders 
to come and attack them while 

395
00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:05,200
responding, right? 
So it's basically an attack on 

396
00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:07,680
1st responder. 
So it's kind of a lot broader 

397
00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,080
than just the hospitals. 
OK. 

398
00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:13,560
So phase one, small units, we'll
call it small unit tactics, 

399
00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:15,840
whether it's 4 or 10, I don't 
think the response is 

400
00:19:15,840 --> 00:19:18,120
significantly different other 
than you need people who know to

401
00:19:18,120 --> 00:19:21,680
handle multiple, you know, 
attacking targets coordinated 

402
00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:26,160
against those types of targets. 
And then how many would we 

403
00:19:26,160 --> 00:19:28,680
imagine that those would happen.
And then also, if you don't mind

404
00:19:28,680 --> 00:19:31,840
the, the degree of confidence 
that you have that this is, you 

405
00:19:31,840 --> 00:19:33,440
know that your Intel is solid on
it. 

406
00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:36,120
Yeah. 
So we're pretty confident that 

407
00:19:36,120 --> 00:19:38,240
al Qaeda made this deal with 
ISIS, right? 

408
00:19:38,240 --> 00:19:41,640
We're pretty confident these 
attackers will know their cities

409
00:19:41,640 --> 00:19:44,720
and have choice. 
We feel that it's about a 

410
00:19:44,720 --> 00:19:48,120
handful of them. 
That's kind of the level of what

411
00:19:48,120 --> 00:19:52,680
we feel to know the exact 
targeting of those mid tier city

412
00:19:52,680 --> 00:19:55,480
localized attacks. 
We are have a lot more 

413
00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:58,720
confidence on the 9/11 2.0 
attack because that is the big 

414
00:19:58,720 --> 00:20:00,800
attack. 
All these other ones are almost 

415
00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:05,440
like a tease or a diversionary, 
or they're waste law enforcement

416
00:20:05,440 --> 00:20:09,160
resources but still cause harm. 
Got it. 

417
00:20:09,680 --> 00:20:12,120
I, I had a Green Beret I was 
talking to who referred to it as

418
00:20:12,200 --> 00:20:15,120
a tactically achievable goal, 
but wasn't necessary for the 

419
00:20:15,120 --> 00:20:16,800
final mission. 
To be able to achieve is like 

420
00:20:16,800 --> 00:20:18,880
some of the things you might do.
It's a distractionary kind of 

421
00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:21,360
thing where yes, they can go out
there and have great effect and 

422
00:20:21,360 --> 00:20:24,320
at the same time, whether 
they're successful or not, they 

423
00:20:24,320 --> 00:20:26,360
actually are still fulfilling 
the goal for what needs to be 

424
00:20:26,360 --> 00:20:27,520
done. 
In other words, drawing people 

425
00:20:27,520 --> 00:20:29,800
away. 
Yeah, if they all those attacks,

426
00:20:29,800 --> 00:20:31,720
they could still do the big 9/11
1, right? 

427
00:20:31,720 --> 00:20:34,720
It's they're not. 
They don't rely on each other. 

428
00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:37,920
If that makes sense. 
And then OK, so we'll get to the

429
00:20:38,120 --> 00:20:39,600
the bigger one first. 
Let's talk about, let's talk 

430
00:20:39,600 --> 00:20:42,640
about the issues that exist. 
Boone, you're doing training 

431
00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:44,080
right now, Peter, you're both 
doing training. 

432
00:20:44,440 --> 00:20:47,000
You guys are dealing with law 
enforcement and and folks all 

433
00:20:47,000 --> 00:20:50,240
around the country. 
What is the level of readiness 

434
00:20:50,240 --> 00:20:51,840
for something like this at the 
moment? 

435
00:20:52,400 --> 00:20:53,920
And I'll let either one of you 
take it over. 

436
00:20:54,280 --> 00:20:57,760
Boone go first. 
So from what I'm seeing, the 

437
00:20:57,760 --> 00:21:01,880
level of readiness is extremely 
low, not that they're not 

438
00:21:01,880 --> 00:21:05,160
capable. 
One thing you run into is budget

439
00:21:05,160 --> 00:21:07,440
and time. 
And then 2A, lack of 

440
00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:11,320
imagination. 
Law enforcement historically is 

441
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:15,600
reactionary and they don't 
change until something happens. 

442
00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:17,280
Policies usually written in 
blood. 

443
00:21:17,680 --> 00:21:21,480
So right now everyone's focusing
on traditional law enforcement 

444
00:21:22,520 --> 00:21:24,680
problem sets. 
But then when it comes to like 

445
00:21:24,680 --> 00:21:28,760
active shooters, they're dealing
with that one shooter, it's 

446
00:21:28,760 --> 00:21:31,680
usually someone unstable, some 
whack a doodle. 

447
00:21:31,800 --> 00:21:34,920
They kill as many people as they
can, law enforcement shows up, 

448
00:21:35,120 --> 00:21:37,920
they either kill themselves, law
enforcement kills them or they 

449
00:21:37,920 --> 00:21:40,200
give up. 
And that's the extent. 

450
00:21:40,520 --> 00:21:43,720
But there's no real training. 
And I and I can't say everybody 

451
00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:46,880
because there have been some 
very squared away teams, but for

452
00:21:46,920 --> 00:21:49,560
the, for the majority of law 
enforcement, they're not 

453
00:21:49,560 --> 00:21:54,680
training with imagination and 
preparing for multiple attackers

454
00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:58,120
in multiple locations all at the
same time. 

455
00:22:01,240 --> 00:22:05,760
Yeah, and to echo that Boone, 
I'm literally I've been to three

456
00:22:05,800 --> 00:22:09,640
SWAT conferences in the past 
month and I'm asking people I'm 

457
00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:12,640
like, hey, talk to me about 
mission planning. 

458
00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:16,080
Are you guys even table topping 
Mumbai style attacks, multiple 

459
00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:20,360
attackers ambushes on cops, like
the cop counter ambush thing. 

460
00:22:20,440 --> 00:22:24,400
That's generally one person, an 
anti police person shooting at a

461
00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:26,440
cop. 
That's quite a bit different 

462
00:22:26,440 --> 00:22:30,280
than a small team tactic lane 
waste to a police station. 

463
00:22:30,560 --> 00:22:35,280
So in all the travel, I mean 
past couple 100 cops I've 

464
00:22:35,280 --> 00:22:37,800
trained and the couple thousand 
I've come in contact with the 

465
00:22:37,800 --> 00:22:41,280
trade shows. 
To your point, there's a couple 

466
00:22:41,480 --> 00:22:44,960
teams that are locked on, but 
they're such a rarity. 

467
00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:52,440
It's they're not ready for this 
scale if this happens that most 

468
00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:56,440
PDS, most teams are not ready 
for this scale by any. 

469
00:22:57,240 --> 00:22:59,720
Would it be fair on both your 
ends to say that the readiness 

470
00:22:59,720 --> 00:23:02,120
level for local law enforcement 
is low? 

471
00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:03,920
Nationally, we're pretty 
comfortable with that 

472
00:23:03,920 --> 00:23:06,160
assessment. 
I, I would say not only on the 

473
00:23:06,160 --> 00:23:09,120
local level, but to include the 
federal level as well, correct. 

474
00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:13,160
And I know the federal guys have
a way more resources and they're

475
00:23:13,160 --> 00:23:17,600
generally head and shoulders 
above some of the local 

476
00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:20,360
agencies. 
But even on a local level, 

477
00:23:20,400 --> 00:23:23,000
they're not taking this type of 
threat, or even on the federal 

478
00:23:23,000 --> 00:23:25,200
level, they're not taking this 
type of threat serious. 

479
00:23:26,480 --> 00:23:28,280
Sure. 
And and and even best case 

480
00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:30,560
scenario, you're still limited 
on the federal resources. 

481
00:23:30,560 --> 00:23:33,080
I mean, you look at my old 
agency FBI, you got 14,000 

482
00:23:33,080 --> 00:23:35,800
agents, you got 100 that are in 
the tactical, you know, full 

483
00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:38,560
time tactical, only one team is 
up at any given time, another 

484
00:23:38,560 --> 00:23:41,360
one in a training scenario. 
So you got 30 plus guys and 

485
00:23:41,360 --> 00:23:43,840
maybe they can deploy, but 
that's probably one to two sites

486
00:23:43,840 --> 00:23:45,920
tops in a in a small geographic 
area. 

487
00:23:46,160 --> 00:23:47,880
And even. 
The ability to do that, you're 

488
00:23:47,880 --> 00:23:49,480
always resource landed. 
Right. 

489
00:23:49,480 --> 00:23:52,320
And even best case scenario, how
long is it going to take them to

490
00:23:52,320 --> 00:23:54,600
respond? 
Well, this was, yeah, this was 

491
00:23:54,600 --> 00:23:56,760
one of the the situations I 
brought up with the, with the 

492
00:23:56,760 --> 00:23:59,360
current director right now. 
It's like, why are we not doing 

493
00:23:59,360 --> 00:24:02,720
the same mission idea where we 
set people up in, in time zones?

494
00:24:02,720 --> 00:24:05,920
Why would you not try to move 
your mission and, and say in the

495
00:24:05,920 --> 00:24:09,040
same way that you have, you 
know, teams that are in the, the

496
00:24:09,040 --> 00:24:11,880
SF model where you look at some 
people are focused on certain 

497
00:24:11,880 --> 00:24:13,680
types of threats. 
So you've got an airborne team, 

498
00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:16,200
you've got your dive team, your 
amphibious type stuff, you've 

499
00:24:16,200 --> 00:24:19,000
got your cold focused, you've 
got your, you know, different 

500
00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:21,480
terrain functions, whether it be
a high altitude or, you know, 

501
00:24:21,480 --> 00:24:23,320
different types of approach in 
law enforcement, you're not 

502
00:24:23,320 --> 00:24:26,120
going to have quite the same 
thing, but you might have a land

503
00:24:26,120 --> 00:24:28,600
mission, you might have a water 
based amphibious mission for the

504
00:24:28,880 --> 00:24:31,360
for the coastal cities. 
And wouldn't you want to locate 

505
00:24:31,360 --> 00:24:33,120
them geographically? 
So they actually have access 

506
00:24:33,120 --> 00:24:36,120
like a nullus Air Force Base, 
you know, a Kansas City or 

507
00:24:36,120 --> 00:24:37,920
something to that effect or a 
tinker Air Force Base. 

508
00:24:37,920 --> 00:24:39,760
And then you could obviously 
still have something close to 

509
00:24:39,760 --> 00:24:42,840
the national Capital Region. 
But the fact that we basically 

510
00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:45,560
throw all of our resources where
the big federal government 

511
00:24:45,560 --> 00:24:49,040
dollars are, it turns out to 
make it ultimately ineffective 

512
00:24:49,040 --> 00:24:51,240
to to respond to anything in 
real life, it seems like. 

513
00:24:51,520 --> 00:24:54,240
So we've got a solution and 
you've checked the box at the 

514
00:24:54,240 --> 00:24:56,360
management level, but is it a 
functional solution? 

515
00:24:56,560 --> 00:24:59,360
And then more importantly, has 
it ever been tested to your to 

516
00:24:59,360 --> 00:25:01,600
your awareness, gentlemen, 
either one of you, do you know 

517
00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:05,920
of a single like I know they 
created the hostage rescue team 

518
00:25:05,920 --> 00:25:08,360
for the FBI and a lot of the 
tactical models come out of the 

519
00:25:08,400 --> 00:25:12,280
idea that they were going to try
to stop something like they saw 

520
00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:14,640
now why is it why can I remember
the German? 

521
00:25:16,040 --> 00:25:17,480
The Olympics. 
The Olympics, Yeah. 

522
00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:20,400
Munich, Munich, Munich. 
Thank you. 

523
00:25:20,440 --> 00:25:21,320
Yeah. 
It's like sitting right there. 

524
00:25:21,320 --> 00:25:23,880
I'm like, it's not Berlin. 
You know, we, they they 

525
00:25:23,880 --> 00:25:27,360
basically were doing a response 
to Munich and they, and with the

526
00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:29,440
the Los Angeles games 
approaching, and I want to say 

527
00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:31,800
it was in 1982 and they thought,
OK, we're going to be ready for 

528
00:25:31,800 --> 00:25:34,200
that. 
But that never materialized. 

529
00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:36,920
And there's never been a real 
stress test of that particular 

530
00:25:36,920 --> 00:25:39,440
animal to deploy nationally, as 
far as I know, like, not for a 

531
00:25:39,440 --> 00:25:42,640
big counterterrorism threat. 
And you would know better than I

532
00:25:42,640 --> 00:25:44,320
would, but not for a 
counterterrorism threat. 

533
00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:47,360
But that unit is very proven, 
you know, in other hostage 

534
00:25:47,360 --> 00:25:50,360
rescues and in no doubt. 
That you note about, about what 

535
00:25:50,360 --> 00:25:53,360
I'm getting at is more like if 
as the mission evolves, and I 

536
00:25:53,360 --> 00:25:55,560
think we've kind of gone to an 
evolved mission, we're not going

537
00:25:55,560 --> 00:25:59,840
to see a bunch of American 
hostages on US soil at a big 

538
00:25:59,840 --> 00:26:02,120
Olympic Games or at a sporting 
event or something. 

539
00:26:02,120 --> 00:26:03,920
That's just, that's just the not
the nature of the threat. 

540
00:26:03,920 --> 00:26:05,080
Tell me if I'm wrong there, 
Sarah. 

541
00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:07,200
But that's just not what people 
are looking to to do. 

542
00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:09,080
That's a 1970s Nineteen 80s 
model. 

543
00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:10,000
Right. 
Yeah. 

544
00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,280
And we haven't even seen a focus
on the stadiums. 

545
00:26:12,280 --> 00:26:15,040
Like they sell it like ISIS did 
a lot of it during the Olympics.

546
00:26:15,040 --> 00:26:17,880
But there wasn't really good 
planning to actually do 

547
00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:20,040
something. 
You know, in this last Olympics 

548
00:26:20,040 --> 00:26:23,480
in Paris, it was more trying to 
inspire people to do something. 

549
00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:27,680
It would be a much faster mobile
animal. 

550
00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:30,760
OK. 
I want to also address the 

551
00:26:30,760 --> 00:26:33,120
capabilities of EMS, which is 
why we have Kevin sitting on 

552
00:26:33,120 --> 00:26:34,360
here. 
So I'm going to ask him real 

553
00:26:34,360 --> 00:26:37,640
quickly if he can kind of 
address what he's seen in let's 

554
00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:40,560
say Texas, which I think is a 
pretty forward thinking area 

555
00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:42,960
when it comes to EMS. 
You want to talk about maybe 

556
00:26:42,960 --> 00:26:45,000
readiness if you guys have table
topped anything like this before

557
00:26:45,000 --> 00:26:46,640
Kevin? 
Sure. 

558
00:26:46,640 --> 00:26:50,160
I mean there are some local 
agencies that train for active 

559
00:26:50,160 --> 00:26:53,680
shooter, but like Boone and 
Peter said, we're usually 

560
00:26:53,680 --> 00:26:57,840
training for one to three 
patients, pretty small groups 

561
00:26:58,040 --> 00:26:59,960
because that's what we've seen 
in most active shooters we've 

562
00:26:59,960 --> 00:27:02,800
seen there's very small groups 
of people that are injured, 

563
00:27:03,320 --> 00:27:06,760
normally less than 5 patients. 
So we don't train for the big 

564
00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:09,160
events when it comes to 
explosives. 

565
00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:11,440
We don't train around explosives
hardly at all. 

566
00:27:11,840 --> 00:27:17,480
So you add that into the picture
and it, it really hamstrings 

567
00:27:17,480 --> 00:27:21,440
almost all EMS because we don't 
go around those type of places. 

568
00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:25,640
So we'd be left, you know, mile,
2 miles away waiting to be 

569
00:27:25,640 --> 00:27:27,520
cleared by a bomb squad or 
something like that. 

570
00:27:28,200 --> 00:27:31,280
The other problem with a lot of 
the local EMS is, is I think 

571
00:27:31,280 --> 00:27:33,960
about 30% of all EMS is run by 
private ambulances. 

572
00:27:34,440 --> 00:27:37,200
Private ambulances are there, 
they're there to make a profit. 

573
00:27:37,520 --> 00:27:39,440
And when it's you're there to 
make a profit, you're not going 

574
00:27:39,440 --> 00:27:42,680
to spend extra money for vests 
and training and stuff like that

575
00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:45,760
for attacks like this, it may or
may not happen. 

576
00:27:46,040 --> 00:27:48,480
So they look at it as they're 
not going to train for it until 

577
00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:51,000
these events happen. 
And like I think Boone said, 

578
00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:54,680
it's always we're reactionary. 
It happens. 

579
00:27:54,680 --> 00:27:56,760
So now let's plan for it if it 
ever happens again instead of 

580
00:27:56,760 --> 00:27:58,560
pre planning for it the first 
time. 

581
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:01,600
So with EMS, as I'd say, you 
know, the ones that are 

582
00:28:01,600 --> 00:28:04,000
government agencies that have 
the funding, they do do some 

583
00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:07,720
training, but not extensive. 
And it's usually a small group 

584
00:28:07,720 --> 00:28:11,080
of patients and not a big vast, 
you know, attack with multiple 

585
00:28:11,080 --> 00:28:13,720
attackers. 
When we talk about like mass 

586
00:28:13,720 --> 00:28:15,960
casualty events, I don't think 
I've ever seen a mass cache 

587
00:28:15,960 --> 00:28:18,560
simulation with multiple sites. 
You'll see multiple patients, 

588
00:28:18,560 --> 00:28:20,840
like you said, the five or more 
whatever where it's going to 

589
00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:23,400
exhaust all your resources. 
But have you ever seen a multi 

590
00:28:23,400 --> 00:28:27,000
site, you know, progressive sort
of event training that went like

591
00:28:27,000 --> 00:28:29,080
that? 
We have done a few that are 

592
00:28:29,080 --> 00:28:32,120
multi site but within a like A1 
block area. 

593
00:28:32,280 --> 00:28:35,120
So like two or three houses in 
the general area, but not like 

594
00:28:35,120 --> 00:28:37,680
two or three different sites 
across the city where you're 

595
00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:41,520
you're draining the entire city 
of resources at once. 

596
00:28:41,760 --> 00:28:44,960
Usually it's a localized in just
a couple different buildings. 

597
00:28:45,560 --> 00:28:47,080
That checks out. 
OK. 

598
00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:49,640
So that's the scope of the 
problem for people to understand

599
00:28:49,640 --> 00:28:53,320
what it is, which is tremendous.
It's essentially a complete, a 

600
00:28:53,320 --> 00:28:57,000
complete dart board of random 
locations. 

601
00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:58,440
What you said, small to mid 
sized cities. 

602
00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:00,280
Is that what I heard Sarah? 
Is that kind of the thought? 

603
00:29:00,800 --> 00:29:03,200
Yeah. 
For the for the first phase or 

604
00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:06,120
whatever you want to call it, 
those type of ones. 

605
00:29:06,120 --> 00:29:12,920
And that was actually chosen to 
be impactful because they want 

606
00:29:13,080 --> 00:29:15,680
you to feel it if you served in 
the US military. 

607
00:29:15,680 --> 00:29:18,600
And they think those are the 
type of cities U.S. military 

608
00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:23,440
people settled in and retired to
vice, like New York City, which 

609
00:29:23,440 --> 00:29:27,440
is a very interesting concept. 
So they want the military who 

610
00:29:27,440 --> 00:29:31,000
served in Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan to feel in their 

611
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:33,840
cities what they felt like they 
felt in there. 

612
00:29:33,840 --> 00:29:35,560
It was a very interesting 
concept. 

613
00:29:36,520 --> 00:29:39,440
OK, I can at least understand 
that motivation. 

614
00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:40,880
I guess that makes a lot of 
sense of why. 

615
00:29:40,880 --> 00:29:43,160
Give me some examples of what's 
what is a small to mid sized 

616
00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:45,760
city from the folks that you 
know what your Intel base would 

617
00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:47,800
call that because maybe we have 
different animals that we're 

618
00:29:47,800 --> 00:29:53,560
looking at. 
So it's like Albany, NY, Tulsa, 

619
00:29:53,560 --> 00:29:59,800
OK, Tempe, AZ and then we have 
seen some very strange things in

620
00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:01,720
other places like in Arlington, 
VA. 

621
00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:04,040
We do think there is a Virginia 
targets in this. 

622
00:30:04,040 --> 00:30:05,920
We do think there's New Jersey 
targets in this. 

623
00:30:06,120 --> 00:30:09,320
We think there's New York, but 
it's not the city targets in 

624
00:30:09,320 --> 00:30:12,840
these. 
So, and then obviously it was a 

625
00:30:12,840 --> 00:30:16,200
little larger, but New Orleans 
was a little bit of the feel as 

626
00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:18,440
well. 
How about Montana? 

627
00:30:18,440 --> 00:30:21,120
Any Montana targets? 
Nothing that we heard. 

628
00:30:22,160 --> 00:30:23,960
Peters laughing, 'cause I just 
want to move to Montana. 

629
00:30:23,960 --> 00:30:25,960
I just, you know, the rest of 
the country, you're on your own.

630
00:30:25,960 --> 00:30:27,560
We're going to get out. 
We're going to get out and be 

631
00:30:27,560 --> 00:30:28,400
safe. 
Nobody wants to. 

632
00:30:28,400 --> 00:30:30,280
What about Texas targets? 
I'll tell you is. 

633
00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:34,520
There likelihood of. 
So we have not heard Texas. 

634
00:30:34,520 --> 00:30:38,480
The interesting part though with
Texas is they want the 

635
00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:43,240
terrorists to settle and have 
attacks near locations where 

636
00:30:43,240 --> 00:30:46,840
they blend. 
Obviously we have had large 

637
00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:50,400
immigrant populations from some 
of the nationalities we think 

638
00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:53,280
are in the homeland attacks 
settle, especially like Houston 

639
00:30:53,280 --> 00:30:55,040
example. 
So we aren't ruling it out 

640
00:30:55,040 --> 00:30:57,720
because it's going to probably 
be one of the bases where some 

641
00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:01,200
of the terrorists live prior to 
doing the attacks. 

642
00:31:02,800 --> 00:31:05,600
So blending becomes part of the 
the ability so that they can get

643
00:31:05,600 --> 00:31:07,440
longer planning. 
So having a native community, 

644
00:31:07,560 --> 00:31:10,240
we're seeing a lot of movement 
and I think people in Texas have

645
00:31:10,240 --> 00:31:13,360
been very, let's say, tuned into
this. 

646
00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:16,920
There have been purchases of 
large tracts of property and 

647
00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:18,640
building of mosques and, and 
communities. 

648
00:31:18,640 --> 00:31:21,040
Somebody showed me recently a 
map of all the mosques that 

649
00:31:21,040 --> 00:31:23,880
exist in the Dallas area. 
I've seen the same thing in the 

650
00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:26,360
Houston area and so on. 
So there certainly are some 

651
00:31:26,360 --> 00:31:29,120
places where people might blend 
in more, but nothing like what 

652
00:31:29,120 --> 00:31:32,080
they would do on the on the East
Coast, especially like, I can't 

653
00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:33,480
tell you. 
People would tell me stuff like,

654
00:31:33,560 --> 00:31:35,960
oh, you know, I know this guy at
this mosque and I'm like, yeah, 

655
00:31:35,960 --> 00:31:38,200
I know where to sit to watch 
that mosque because I've been 

656
00:31:38,200 --> 00:31:41,040
outside of all of them when it 
comes to anything that's in like

657
00:31:41,240 --> 00:31:44,080
the what's called the Eastern 
seaboard where my team used to 

658
00:31:44,080 --> 00:31:46,320
operate. 
Peter, I want to open up and 

659
00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:48,440
kind of give you an opportunity 
to respond to what you think 

660
00:31:48,440 --> 00:31:50,680
this you, you've been 
fantasizing about a training 

661
00:31:50,680 --> 00:31:55,160
opportunity to try to, to push 
to local law enforcement and to 

662
00:31:55,160 --> 00:31:57,440
motivate their command 
structures with not just like 

663
00:31:57,440 --> 00:31:59,320
here's the problem, which I 
think we've addressed that there

664
00:31:59,320 --> 00:32:01,680
is a problem and there's a, 
there's a gap there. 

665
00:32:01,840 --> 00:32:04,600
You want to talk about what that
solution might look like and and

666
00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:07,480
how you start going about even 
taking apart this this animal. 

667
00:32:08,320 --> 00:32:10,840
Yeah. 
And as anybody who's been in the

668
00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:18,040
combat arms role, just to hear 
this possibility of an attack in

669
00:32:18,040 --> 00:32:22,800
the States, you can imagine very
quickly how resources to Kevin's

670
00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,520
point would just be drained 
instantaneously. 

671
00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:29,120
So the my biggest concern is 
again, going around training law

672
00:32:29,120 --> 00:32:33,840
enforcement on firearms and all 
the other stuff we do is having 

673
00:32:33,840 --> 00:32:37,480
these conversations, which kind 
of prompted this, this round 

674
00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:42,240
table was I'm not hearing 
anybody mean have any meaningful

675
00:32:42,240 --> 00:32:45,080
discussions on what they can 
actually do. 

676
00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:48,560
I mean, even the concept of zone
coverage where you have your 

677
00:32:48,560 --> 00:32:52,920
patrol cars and if there is a an
event, having whoever the unseen

678
00:32:52,920 --> 00:32:54,840
commander is. 
And that can be just whoever 

679
00:32:54,840 --> 00:32:57,480
takes charge. 
Making sure that you're not 

680
00:32:57,480 --> 00:33:00,520
overwhelming the scene with 
unnecessary resources. 

681
00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:05,600
Once you have a pulse on it and 
start pushing squads out into 

682
00:33:05,600 --> 00:33:08,840
the region so that you don't get
sucked in and you have the 

683
00:33:08,840 --> 00:33:15,040
classic 500 patrol cars all from
every mutual agency on scene, 

684
00:33:15,200 --> 00:33:19,680
which at certain point somebody 
has to be an adult and say, do 

685
00:33:19,680 --> 00:33:23,200
we need more people or do we? 
Is there a chance something 

686
00:33:23,200 --> 00:33:25,480
bigger is going on? 
And how do we deploy those 

687
00:33:25,480 --> 00:33:27,920
resources to a zone coverage, if
you will? 

688
00:33:28,120 --> 00:33:34,160
So from a high level, just that 
conversation, I'll, Boone and 

689
00:33:34,160 --> 00:33:36,680
Kevin. 
Yeah, I was going to say, Kevin,

690
00:33:36,800 --> 00:33:38,520
did we not create this with 
NIMS? 

691
00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:41,160
I imagine you're a NIMS like 
commander or you have a high 

692
00:33:41,160 --> 00:33:44,760
level NIM certification. 
Yeah, that's The thing is, is 

693
00:33:45,520 --> 00:33:48,080
I'll start with it. 
Fire department EMS usually do 

694
00:33:48,080 --> 00:33:49,720
good at command. 
But when you throw law 

695
00:33:49,720 --> 00:33:53,200
enforcement in there, when you 
start talking IC to commit in 

696
00:33:53,200 --> 00:33:56,520
command to law enforcement, it's
a whole different conversation 

697
00:33:56,520 --> 00:33:58,160
because they do it a totally 
different way. 

698
00:33:58,560 --> 00:34:01,960
And a lot of their command is 
actually on scene in the event 

699
00:34:02,280 --> 00:34:06,240
and they're not a true IC in the
outskirts where they can blend 

700
00:34:06,240 --> 00:34:08,400
with fire and EMS. 
So we've always had those 

701
00:34:08,400 --> 00:34:11,480
issues. 
And I mean, it's, it's just part

702
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:13,679
of it because a lot of these law
enforcement agencies, they only 

703
00:34:13,679 --> 00:34:17,000
have 3 or 4 patrolmen on at an 
at night in the smaller cities. 

704
00:34:17,480 --> 00:34:21,120
Well, that means your, your 
senior officer that's going to 

705
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:23,520
be in command has to be on 
scene. 

706
00:34:23,920 --> 00:34:27,760
So blending the, the command is 
very difficult and it overwhelms

707
00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:30,639
these small departments. 
Then they need help. 

708
00:34:30,639 --> 00:34:33,000
So they call basically for 
anybody that can come. 

709
00:34:33,320 --> 00:34:35,639
Well, that point in time you're 
getting every law enforcement 

710
00:34:35,639 --> 00:34:38,080
agency, any guy that's ever had 
a gun in the last 10 years shows

711
00:34:38,080 --> 00:34:40,280
up on scene, some in uniform, 
some not. 

712
00:34:40,560 --> 00:34:42,360
So then you start getting 
confused on is that law 

713
00:34:42,360 --> 00:34:43,400
enforcement? 
Is it not? 

714
00:34:43,560 --> 00:34:45,960
Is he undercover? 
And it it really does. 

715
00:34:45,960 --> 00:34:49,639
It overwhelms the scene and you 
end up with 5060 police cars 

716
00:34:49,639 --> 00:34:52,480
there when it really ends up 
being a non event. 

717
00:34:53,480 --> 00:34:55,520
Is there a practical way to 
practice this sort of thing to 

718
00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:58,920
to try to to try to knock the 
dust off this idea? 

719
00:34:59,080 --> 00:35:01,080
I know a lot of the local 
agencies we deal with have 

720
00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:04,080
really been harping on it that 
if you're not asked personally 

721
00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:07,360
to respond, to stay out of the 
call because they've noticed it.

722
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:10,520
Certain agencies, you'll just 
hear the call broadcast it did 

723
00:35:10,520 --> 00:35:13,040
not even be requested. 
And they'll start responding 

724
00:35:13,040 --> 00:35:15,160
because, I mean, it's the nature
of the beast. 

725
00:35:15,160 --> 00:35:16,680
Everybody wants to help. 
I mean, they want to get in 

726
00:35:16,680 --> 00:35:19,240
there. 
And so they've been trying to 

727
00:35:19,240 --> 00:35:21,600
preach that, hey, if you're not 
needed, please do not come. 

728
00:35:21,600 --> 00:35:24,800
And they do their best to get 
people to leave the scene, but 

729
00:35:25,560 --> 00:35:27,400
we're all about the same. 
Once we're there, we're kind of 

730
00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:30,320
stuck and everybody wants to see
and get all the details before 

731
00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:33,240
they they clear the scene. 
So it it's hard. 

732
00:35:34,320 --> 00:35:37,880
Sarah, does that not open up 
like a an opportunity for follow

733
00:35:37,880 --> 00:35:39,920
on kind of attacks as as you 
were kind of saying that the law

734
00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:43,120
enforcement attack piece? 
Yeah, it's very concerning, 

735
00:35:43,120 --> 00:35:46,440
right, because part of the plot 
is to sideline first responders.

736
00:35:46,440 --> 00:35:48,960
We haven't exactly figured out 
what their intent is. 

737
00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:51,440
But as you know, if you've 
especially we're talking about 

738
00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:53,800
Afghanistan where they train, 
they will do this right. 

739
00:35:53,800 --> 00:35:57,480
They will set off a bomb, first 
responders come and then they do

740
00:35:57,480 --> 00:36:01,080
a follow on attack. 
So, so it is very concerning and

741
00:36:01,680 --> 00:36:04,360
we need it to be clear to law 
enforcement. 

742
00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:08,480
Like, you know, he was just 
saying people may show up and 

743
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:10,320
you assume they're law 
enforcement and they're not the 

744
00:36:10,360 --> 00:36:13,480
attackers, right. 
And we've recently had cases of 

745
00:36:13,480 --> 00:36:15,400
this, of al Qaeda doing this in 
Somalia. 

746
00:36:15,400 --> 00:36:17,400
I don't know if you saw the 
video a couple weeks ago, but 

747
00:36:17,600 --> 00:36:20,680
the senior commander was giving 
the rally call to his troops, 

748
00:36:20,680 --> 00:36:21,520
right? 
They're going to go out and 

749
00:36:21,520 --> 00:36:24,200
fight al Shabaab. 
And one of his own soldiers 

750
00:36:24,200 --> 00:36:25,360
walked over and shot him in the 
head. 

751
00:36:25,360 --> 00:36:27,680
Well, it wasn't a soldier. 
It was just a man in one of his 

752
00:36:27,680 --> 00:36:30,400
soldiers uniforms. 
If they had looked closely, he 

753
00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:33,080
didn't have even the right 
weapon that they were issued. 

754
00:36:33,080 --> 00:36:34,760
But nobody really was paying 
attention. 

755
00:36:35,040 --> 00:36:38,280
And those little things matter, 
right in these situations. 

756
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:42,120
One of the other problems we've 
been seeing locally is I mean 

757
00:36:42,120 --> 00:36:45,960
social media is sometimes our 
worst nightmare is some of the 

758
00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:49,000
school stuff is when it hits 
social media every parent shows 

759
00:36:49,000 --> 00:36:50,480
up. 
They gridlock on call the 

760
00:36:50,480 --> 00:36:51,720
streets. 
So not reality. 

761
00:36:51,720 --> 00:36:54,120
Even if we wanted to clear the 
scene we can't because of all 

762
00:36:54,120 --> 00:36:56,160
the follow on people that heard 
about the call. 

763
00:36:56,160 --> 00:36:59,680
They block all the streets. 
Not terrorism, but the West 

764
00:36:59,680 --> 00:37:03,040
fertilizer explosion in West TX 
when it blew up. 

765
00:37:03,040 --> 00:37:05,000
That's The thing is everybody 
came to help, but they 

766
00:37:05,000 --> 00:37:08,120
gridlocked every street in this 
small town where nobody could 

767
00:37:08,120 --> 00:37:10,040
get in or out. 
And most of the patients 

768
00:37:10,040 --> 00:37:11,680
actually had to be flown out 
because there's no way to get 

769
00:37:11,680 --> 00:37:15,040
them out by streets. 
Yeah, there's another concerning

770
00:37:15,040 --> 00:37:16,760
issue too. 
If you're talking about cities, 

771
00:37:16,760 --> 00:37:18,880
it's this concept of walkaways, 
right? 

772
00:37:19,120 --> 00:37:22,000
Like an attack happens, people 
get paralyzed, they abandoned 

773
00:37:22,000 --> 00:37:24,920
their vehicles and it blocks the
road even if they weren't 

774
00:37:24,920 --> 00:37:27,920
intending to get in the way. 
And so we have to keep that in 

775
00:37:27,920 --> 00:37:29,520
mind too and have a plan for 
that. 

776
00:37:32,280 --> 00:37:33,600
What do we think this plan looks
like, gents? 

777
00:37:34,920 --> 00:37:38,280
I think it starts with table 
tops, mutual aid table tops 

778
00:37:38,280 --> 00:37:42,320
between EMS, fire and police 
with mutual aid. 

779
00:37:42,320 --> 00:37:46,640
And that just takes egos to be 
dropped at the table to say that

780
00:37:46,640 --> 00:37:51,680
if this happens, no one of us, 
no one entity can handle if it 

781
00:37:51,680 --> 00:37:55,280
happens in our jurisdiction 
mutually because they all have 

782
00:37:55,280 --> 00:37:58,600
mutual aid agreements where city
one and City 2, if something 

783
00:37:58,600 --> 00:38:00,840
happened, City 2 will come in 
and help city one. 

784
00:38:01,320 --> 00:38:03,800
So getting all of your mutual 
aid partners together and 

785
00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:07,560
literally just starting on a 
very high level and Kevin Boone 

786
00:38:07,680 --> 00:38:09,840
chime in. 
But I think getting that 

787
00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:13,480
tabletop because that's nothing 
happens until you get all the 

788
00:38:13,480 --> 00:38:17,760
egos to drop and say if this 
happens, what can we actually 

789
00:38:17,760 --> 00:38:20,360
manage with the resources and 
time we have? 

790
00:38:21,960 --> 00:38:24,400
Now you're absolutely true. 
I mean, we've worked really hard

791
00:38:24,400 --> 00:38:27,280
on getting all the neighboring 
cities and departments around us

792
00:38:27,440 --> 00:38:30,120
to work together. 
And it's, it's crazy how many 

793
00:38:30,120 --> 00:38:32,640
years that takes. 
But some of this I've been 

794
00:38:32,640 --> 00:38:35,560
working on for 1015 years. 
Just to get people to talk about

795
00:38:35,560 --> 00:38:39,360
the time you get to where you 
think you haven't solved a chief

796
00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:43,160
of retire City Council changes 
over its mayor's change. 

797
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:45,560
Then you almost have to start 
some of the talks over and 

798
00:38:45,560 --> 00:38:47,640
convince them of what you're 
trying to achieve. 

799
00:38:48,000 --> 00:38:50,600
It's just it's kind of this 
constant rolling plan that you 

800
00:38:50,600 --> 00:38:54,040
never can quite get to succeed 
because of just turnover. 

801
00:38:55,920 --> 00:38:59,800
We, we've been, Sarah and I, 
along with Scott man, we've been

802
00:38:59,800 --> 00:39:03,000
looking at it from a bottom up 
approach, starting with the 

803
00:39:03,000 --> 00:39:06,640
community and having the 
community support each other and

804
00:39:06,640 --> 00:39:09,720
then going up to the local and 
the county guys supporting each 

805
00:39:09,720 --> 00:39:11,360
other. 
Then going up to the state 

806
00:39:11,360 --> 00:39:12,840
level. 
The state's being 

807
00:39:12,840 --> 00:39:17,040
self-sufficient until federal 
resources can get to them. 

808
00:39:17,280 --> 00:39:20,720
So we're looking at it more of a
bottom up approach and starting 

809
00:39:20,720 --> 00:39:22,840
with that community and then 
going outwards. 

810
00:39:23,600 --> 00:39:28,600
But to your point, there is a 
lot of egos, if you will, within

811
00:39:28,600 --> 00:39:31,120
the law enforcement first 
responder community. 

812
00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:33,240
And that's always going to be a 
big hurdle. 

813
00:39:33,240 --> 00:39:35,840
Like hey, who's in charge? 
Well, it's in my city, I'm in 

814
00:39:35,840 --> 00:39:37,000
charge. 
No, it's the county. 

815
00:39:37,200 --> 00:39:40,160
You know, it's our problem. 
We're not going to have time for

816
00:39:40,160 --> 00:39:44,040
things like that. 
Even like Nims, it's awesome for

817
00:39:44,400 --> 00:39:47,600
a long term huge incident. 
These are going to be 

818
00:39:47,600 --> 00:39:53,240
fast-paced, multiple incidents 
over long geographical 

819
00:39:53,240 --> 00:39:55,080
distances. 
So we're going to have to be 

820
00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:59,800
much leaner and have 
decentralized command where we 

821
00:39:59,800 --> 00:40:02,240
can just take small little 
groups, hey, you guys are going 

822
00:40:02,240 --> 00:40:04,760
to handle this. 
Hey, that group go over there. 

823
00:40:04,920 --> 00:40:08,320
So we really need a cultural 
shift when it comes to the law 

824
00:40:08,320 --> 00:40:12,720
enforcement first responder 
mentality, if you will, in my 

825
00:40:12,720 --> 00:40:16,080
opinion. 
So for folks that are not 

826
00:40:16,080 --> 00:40:18,600
familiar with it, NIMS is the 
National Incident Management 

827
00:40:18,600 --> 00:40:19,960
System. 
I think it's what it's called. 

828
00:40:19,960 --> 00:40:22,920
It's a, it's a incident command 
idea that was that was launched 

829
00:40:22,920 --> 00:40:26,080
after 9-11 to try to get people 
on the same frequencies, to get 

830
00:40:26,080 --> 00:40:29,360
people on the same sort of 
terminologies, to try to get 10 

831
00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:32,880
codes and some of these sort of 
obscure ways of communicating. 

832
00:40:32,880 --> 00:40:34,880
So it was more plain speak over 
the radio. 

833
00:40:35,040 --> 00:40:37,800
So if you had to have your 
newest dispatcher on, they 

834
00:40:37,800 --> 00:40:40,200
weren't trying to figure out 
what some guy from 25 years ago 

835
00:40:40,200 --> 00:40:43,040
used to call something else. 
And every single department 

836
00:40:43,040 --> 00:40:45,120
might have a slightly different 
code for what these for 

837
00:40:45,120 --> 00:40:47,280
incidents look like. 
So you just have to call them as

838
00:40:47,280 --> 00:40:48,480
they are. 
If you got to go to attack 

839
00:40:48,480 --> 00:40:49,960
channel, so be it. 
You go to something that's 

840
00:40:49,960 --> 00:40:51,280
encrypted so the public can't 
hear. 

841
00:40:51,600 --> 00:40:55,040
But the idea was to try to to 
make something functional. 

842
00:40:55,520 --> 00:40:58,000
And the problem is, is that's a 
really great system and it's a 

843
00:40:58,000 --> 00:41:01,160
really great solution, like you 
just said, except nobody 

844
00:41:01,160 --> 00:41:03,320
practices it. 
The only time that you ever dust

845
00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:05,560
out that dance is when 
everything just kind of goes to 

846
00:41:05,560 --> 00:41:07,120
shit. 
And then you realize like 

847
00:41:07,120 --> 00:41:09,080
exactly how little practice you 
have at it. 

848
00:41:09,240 --> 00:41:11,840
So it's like trying to go out 
there and run the most 

849
00:41:11,840 --> 00:41:14,880
complicated play that you have 
in the entire playbook with the 

850
00:41:14,880 --> 00:41:17,840
most the most number of players.
And you're going to do it 

851
00:41:17,840 --> 00:41:19,720
without ever having even seen 
each other. 

852
00:41:20,240 --> 00:41:22,920
It sounds like, and you guys 
correct me if I'm wrong, Kevin, 

853
00:41:22,920 --> 00:41:25,120
you may be a good sort of piece 
on this one. 

854
00:41:25,360 --> 00:41:27,320
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it 
sounds like what we need to see 

855
00:41:27,320 --> 00:41:32,080
is our the, the people in the 
communities going to community 

856
00:41:32,080 --> 00:41:33,840
meetings. 
They need to go to City Council 

857
00:41:33,840 --> 00:41:35,360
meetings. 
This is the, the community kind 

858
00:41:35,360 --> 00:41:38,880
of appeal and saying we see that
there is this problem. 

859
00:41:38,920 --> 00:41:42,080
I heard it on a podcast, I read 
the newspaper, I'm following it 

860
00:41:42,080 --> 00:41:44,000
on fill in the blank news 
program, whatever it may be. 

861
00:41:44,600 --> 00:41:46,040
We would like to hear our city 
do it. 

862
00:41:46,040 --> 00:41:47,640
And by the way, this is what 
we're recommending. 

863
00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:52,040
Our Fire Chief, our EMS 
captains, our folks in the the 

864
00:41:52,040 --> 00:41:53,680
Police Department and the 
Sheriff's Office all get 

865
00:41:53,680 --> 00:41:56,520
together and talk about what 
those resources look like. 

866
00:41:56,800 --> 00:41:59,080
Kevin, does that sound like 
something that would ever 

867
00:41:59,080 --> 00:42:00,280
happen? 
Oh absolutely. 

868
00:42:00,280 --> 00:42:02,720
I mean, we all know that 
politics drives a lot of the 

869
00:42:02,720 --> 00:42:04,840
stuff we do. 
So when the politicians hear 

870
00:42:04,840 --> 00:42:08,920
about it, they pressure the 
local law enforcement, EMS and 

871
00:42:08,920 --> 00:42:12,360
fire to solve the problem. 
So until they think there's a 

872
00:42:12,360 --> 00:42:17,040
problem, they don't pressure us 
to do, you know, fill our plans.

873
00:42:17,040 --> 00:42:21,880
But luckily we, we've been doing
our best to train for, like I 

874
00:42:21,880 --> 00:42:24,080
said, the last 10-15 years for 
stuff like this. 

875
00:42:24,360 --> 00:42:27,800
But obviously we don't train for
a huge events, which is what's 

876
00:42:27,880 --> 00:42:30,080
might be coming. 
We train for the smaller events.

877
00:42:30,080 --> 00:42:33,440
But they said we've been lucky 
to have the support that we do 

878
00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:35,960
and where where I work. 
But there's a lot of departments

879
00:42:35,960 --> 00:42:38,160
that don't have that support. 
And I think Boone, you said it 

880
00:42:38,160 --> 00:42:42,640
right with the NIM stuff, it is 
great for large events, long 

881
00:42:42,640 --> 00:42:44,440
events. 
But when you come to these short

882
00:42:44,440 --> 00:42:48,080
events, if you try to fill all 
the roles and Nims, you run out 

883
00:42:48,080 --> 00:42:50,840
of people before you even have 
anybody to go and do any of the 

884
00:42:51,280 --> 00:42:54,000
actual patient care because 
everybody's filling a role in 

885
00:42:54,000 --> 00:42:56,240
command and you don't have 
anybody, you don't have any 

886
00:42:56,240 --> 00:42:57,960
soldiers to go do do what you 
need them to do. 

887
00:42:57,960 --> 00:43:00,800
So Nims is great for wildfires, 
huge events. 

888
00:43:01,000 --> 00:43:03,840
But for these smaller attacks, 
we would, we don't even really 

889
00:43:03,840 --> 00:43:06,440
get the Nims. 
It's all local IC. 

890
00:43:06,880 --> 00:43:10,160
And I said unless there's a long
event, it just doesn't really 

891
00:43:10,160 --> 00:43:12,880
come into play. 
But like I said, until we get 

892
00:43:13,160 --> 00:43:16,760
pressure to train on Dems, we're
not going to do it. 

893
00:43:20,400 --> 00:43:23,000
Peter, you're in the, the 
training space and one of the 

894
00:43:23,000 --> 00:43:24,920
ways that you, one of the things
that you illuminated to me, 

895
00:43:24,920 --> 00:43:27,040
which made a lot of sense is 
that everybody's got money for 

896
00:43:27,040 --> 00:43:30,160
gear and gadgets and, and they 
have budgets for equipment, but 

897
00:43:30,160 --> 00:43:33,160
they have no money for training.
You found an interesting end 

898
00:43:33,160 --> 00:43:34,840
around on that. 
Are there any other people that 

899
00:43:34,840 --> 00:43:36,640
are doing these kind of 
trainings that can, you know, 

900
00:43:36,640 --> 00:43:39,320
offer resources to law 
enforcement or even to fire and,

901
00:43:39,320 --> 00:43:42,520
and EMS? 
I mean, Boone's doing training 

902
00:43:42,560 --> 00:43:46,880
also his guys. 
There are a lot of good training

903
00:43:46,880 --> 00:43:49,960
companies out there. 
And I mean, part of getting this

904
00:43:49,960 --> 00:43:55,040
group together is simply saying 
what can we put down and give 

905
00:43:55,040 --> 00:43:59,440
away is like a white paper on 
how to pull your head out of 

906
00:43:59,440 --> 00:44:03,080
your ass for a terrorist attack.
Pardon me, but like here are 

907
00:44:03,080 --> 00:44:06,600
some easy steps that you can 
take charge of your to Boone's 

908
00:44:06,600 --> 00:44:11,200
point, it's a local, the local 
solution fast because the Fed's 

909
00:44:11,200 --> 00:44:13,680
not going to push this down. 
By the time the Fed figures it 

910
00:44:13,680 --> 00:44:18,640
out, we'll be on the next phase 
of Homeland 3 point O and it's 

911
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:21,680
they're never going to move as 
fast as local. 

912
00:44:21,720 --> 00:44:26,560
So motivating your local 
Sheriff's Department, your local

913
00:44:26,560 --> 00:44:30,160
fire department, your local city
to take charge. 

914
00:44:30,160 --> 00:44:34,120
I think that's that's going to 
be the fastest way to make any 

915
00:44:34,120 --> 00:44:36,680
impact in this, especially to 
Sarah's point. 

916
00:44:38,360 --> 00:44:41,960
If the expectation is that this 
possible attack could be within 

917
00:44:41,960 --> 00:44:45,000
the next 12 months, Sarah, is 
that reasonable? 

918
00:44:45,760 --> 00:44:47,840
Yes. 
OK. 

919
00:44:47,840 --> 00:44:53,160
Which is Kevin, you know, right?
Yeah, nothing. 

920
00:44:53,160 --> 00:44:56,080
Nothing moves fast in EMEA. 
Yeah, at all reality with it 

921
00:44:56,080 --> 00:44:58,640
when it comes to stuff like 
that, if I was going to need 

922
00:44:58,640 --> 00:45:00,880
something for next year, I 
should have put it in budget 

923
00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:03,000
last year. 
So you're looking at two to 

924
00:45:03,000 --> 00:45:06,240
three years to get training 
budget if you and even 

925
00:45:06,240 --> 00:45:09,320
equipment, so like 12 months, 
we're already behind the curve. 

926
00:45:09,320 --> 00:45:11,880
If we don't have the equipment 
now and the training in budget 

927
00:45:11,880 --> 00:45:15,000
now, then we're behind the curve
because like I said, we can say 

928
00:45:15,000 --> 00:45:17,880
today, I need this training, I 
need this equipment, it'll go 

929
00:45:17,880 --> 00:45:19,480
into budget next year. 
So it would get approved in 

930
00:45:19,480 --> 00:45:22,840
2027. 
So we're we're behind the curve 

931
00:45:22,840 --> 00:45:24,320
if you haven't already started 
the process. 

932
00:45:24,320 --> 00:45:27,120
But like I said, never too late 
to start because you never know.

933
00:45:27,120 --> 00:45:29,560
But you got to start as soon as 
possible. 

934
00:45:31,600 --> 00:45:33,000
Yeah, you. 
Have concrete steps. 

935
00:45:33,080 --> 00:45:35,360
You have concrete steps, though.
Let's start with like the law 

936
00:45:35,360 --> 00:45:37,400
enforcement end of it. 
What does that look like from 

937
00:45:37,400 --> 00:45:39,720
let's, let's talk about a basic 
like somebody who's working as a

938
00:45:39,720 --> 00:45:41,880
patrol officer or they're 
working as, you know, a 

939
00:45:41,880 --> 00:45:43,040
frontline. 
If they're a detective or 

940
00:45:43,040 --> 00:45:45,800
something in that, then we'll do
management and then we can step 

941
00:45:45,800 --> 00:45:48,480
into like what we can see 
pressure for police chiefs and, 

942
00:45:48,480 --> 00:45:50,320
and leadership and, and 
management at that level. 

943
00:45:51,120 --> 00:45:53,280
Yeah. 
And Boone, jump in, But I would 

944
00:45:53,280 --> 00:45:56,680
say if we're going to do 
concrete patrol officer, if they

945
00:45:56,680 --> 00:46:00,000
listen to this, first step is 
bring more awareness. 

946
00:46:00,360 --> 00:46:03,440
Literally start opening your 
mouth and your PD and talk about

947
00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:06,920
like have we looked into this? 
Is this something that we're 

948
00:46:06,920 --> 00:46:10,320
even ready for? 
Starting with that, Boone, if 

949
00:46:10,320 --> 00:46:13,480
you want to jump in? 
Yeah, I think if you don't have 

950
00:46:13,480 --> 00:46:17,760
the resources, like like you 
already mentioned, just starting

951
00:46:17,760 --> 00:46:21,480
the conversation and playing the
what if game, like, hey, I don't

952
00:46:21,480 --> 00:46:24,000
have the resources, but what if 
this did happen? 

953
00:46:24,480 --> 00:46:27,520
What type of solutions can we 
come up with that's better than 

954
00:46:27,520 --> 00:46:32,560
nothing and, and starting there?
But I, I, I don't want to sound 

955
00:46:32,560 --> 00:46:34,880
too bad because I've been a law 
enforcement officer myself, but 

956
00:46:35,120 --> 00:46:39,200
there's a lack of personal 
responsibility when it comes to 

957
00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:42,120
law enforcement. 
If I'm not on duty, if the 

958
00:46:42,120 --> 00:46:45,480
agency is not paying for it, I'm
not going to training. 

959
00:46:45,840 --> 00:46:48,960
And you can't do that. 
You have an obligation to the 

960
00:46:48,960 --> 00:46:52,680
public to make sure that you 
yourself personally are prepared

961
00:46:52,920 --> 00:46:55,800
to serve the public and 
yourself, you know, and your 

962
00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:58,360
partners. 
So some of this responsibility 

963
00:46:58,360 --> 00:47:00,640
goes back to the individual 
officers as well. 

964
00:47:01,040 --> 00:47:03,600
They might have to take some 
vacation time to get the proper 

965
00:47:03,600 --> 00:47:05,560
training. 
They might have to take some of 

966
00:47:05,560 --> 00:47:08,360
that hard earned money which 
they don't make enough of in the

967
00:47:08,360 --> 00:47:10,840
1st place to pay for their own 
training. 

968
00:47:11,160 --> 00:47:16,680
But a lot of this training 
honestly doesn't cost money 

969
00:47:16,960 --> 00:47:19,720
there. 
There's guys who might be in 

970
00:47:19,720 --> 00:47:22,480
that agency who have the 
training and they can share it 

971
00:47:22,480 --> 00:47:25,320
for free. 
Just a couple guys getting 

972
00:47:25,320 --> 00:47:29,320
together and I hate to say 
looking on YouTube, but there is

973
00:47:29,320 --> 00:47:34,360
a lot of good information, good 
how to videos on the Internet. 

974
00:47:34,360 --> 00:47:37,160
It's hard to sift through what's
good and what's not, but there's

975
00:47:37,160 --> 00:47:40,160
some good stuff out there to 
where you can just watch a video

976
00:47:40,400 --> 00:47:42,920
and then give it your squad and 
say, hey, let's think about 

977
00:47:42,920 --> 00:47:45,880
this, let's try some of these 
things and and just start doing 

978
00:47:45,880 --> 00:47:48,920
things on your own, even though 
you don't have that budget. 

979
00:47:49,160 --> 00:47:52,800
So I think a lot of personal 
responsibility has to be put on 

980
00:47:52,800 --> 00:47:55,840
the individuals as well, not 
only the agency. 

981
00:47:56,960 --> 00:47:59,680
So one of the ways that somebody
can go just individually take 

982
00:47:59,680 --> 00:48:01,480
ownership of the problem. 
And I think that's exactly 

983
00:48:01,480 --> 00:48:03,920
right. 
I, I saw it in local and state 

984
00:48:03,920 --> 00:48:06,320
and federal, you know, federals,
feds are probably the worst at 

985
00:48:06,320 --> 00:48:07,520
it. 
You know, if nobody pays for it,

986
00:48:07,520 --> 00:48:09,320
I'm not going to do it. 
I'll wait three months or three 

987
00:48:09,320 --> 00:48:11,760
years to get a belt because I 
don't want to, you know, spend 

988
00:48:11,760 --> 00:48:14,400
$80.00 out of my own pocket kind
of thing, which is a terrible 

989
00:48:14,400 --> 00:48:16,760
mentality. 
But you can go out there for 

990
00:48:16,760 --> 00:48:19,120
free while you're sitting on a 
surveillance shift, while you're

991
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:20,480
on a patrol and you're riding 
around. 

992
00:48:20,480 --> 00:48:23,520
You can listen to a podcast on 
how to deal with explosives. 

993
00:48:23,920 --> 00:48:26,280
Specifically, how do you deal 
with explosive wounds and 

994
00:48:26,280 --> 00:48:28,600
injuries, which is not something
that you're going to necessarily

995
00:48:28,600 --> 00:48:30,960
know if you're a, if you're a 
street cop somewhere, it's not 

996
00:48:30,960 --> 00:48:32,040
something you're going to 
experience. 

997
00:48:32,040 --> 00:48:35,120
If you don't have like a major 
chemical plant nearby, you may 

998
00:48:35,120 --> 00:48:37,080
not know what to do about 
explosive injuries and how to 

999
00:48:37,080 --> 00:48:39,000
deal with those things. 
So you can listen to things 

1000
00:48:39,000 --> 00:48:40,360
credible. 
I know off the top of my head 

1001
00:48:40,360 --> 00:48:43,800
the PJ Med cast is very good and
it's educated by a lot of 

1002
00:48:43,800 --> 00:48:47,360
wartime experience of guys going
in, grabbing people in the worst

1003
00:48:47,360 --> 00:48:50,440
case scenario and, and doing 
some really, really ugly 

1004
00:48:50,440 --> 00:48:53,520
medevac, you know, sometimes 
even, you know, under fire and 

1005
00:48:53,520 --> 00:48:55,280
so on. 
So you can go out there and get 

1006
00:48:55,400 --> 00:48:58,840
some real world experience from 
guys who are high level medics 

1007
00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:01,600
and trauma physicians from the 
Air Force and so on. 

1008
00:49:01,600 --> 00:49:03,640
That was out transporting some 
of our our worst wounded in the 

1009
00:49:03,640 --> 00:49:07,720
G Watt and get that for free. 
It's free, it's dry, you can 

1010
00:49:07,720 --> 00:49:09,720
listen to it in 2X. 
You got to listen to it about 10

1011
00:49:09,720 --> 00:49:12,720
times before you grab it all 
because you know, Kevin knows if

1012
00:49:12,720 --> 00:49:14,560
you just listen to something 
without actually putting hands 

1013
00:49:14,560 --> 00:49:15,480
on, it's not quite the same 
thing. 

1014
00:49:15,560 --> 00:49:17,600
But you can take ownership of 
that at the individual level. 

1015
00:49:17,800 --> 00:49:19,720
And while you're doing it, 
you're doing the second thing, 

1016
00:49:19,920 --> 00:49:21,440
which I think you guys both just
mentioned. 

1017
00:49:21,800 --> 00:49:23,680
You're thinking about a 
potential scenario. 

1018
00:49:23,680 --> 00:49:27,120
And when you put yourself in the
mindset like, oh, if something 

1019
00:49:27,120 --> 00:49:29,840
happened, what is my response? 
You're already going to be less 

1020
00:49:29,840 --> 00:49:32,720
flat footed than if you were 
going to go, hey, I'm just 

1021
00:49:32,720 --> 00:49:35,800
sitting here, I'm drinking 
coffee, I'm peeing in a bottle, 

1022
00:49:35,920 --> 00:49:38,400
I got binoculars. 
And then one day something crazy

1023
00:49:38,400 --> 00:49:39,560
happens. 
Like someone puts a gun to the 

1024
00:49:39,560 --> 00:49:41,520
back of your head and you've 
never thought, what's your 

1025
00:49:41,520 --> 00:49:43,400
response to that? 
When you're thinking through 

1026
00:49:43,480 --> 00:49:44,640
what happens if there's an 
explosion? 

1027
00:49:44,640 --> 00:49:46,920
What happens if there's a train 
wreck or gets derailed? 

1028
00:49:47,080 --> 00:49:49,880
What happens if somebody runs 
into a bus and knocks it over or

1029
00:49:49,880 --> 00:49:52,760
someone shoots up a school? 
You already are going down that 

1030
00:49:52,760 --> 00:49:54,800
mindset of like, OK, well, these
are going to be the things that 

1031
00:49:54,800 --> 00:49:57,080
I have to do, but these are the 
things I don't have. 

1032
00:49:57,480 --> 00:49:59,200
I was joking with guys. 
You guys tell me what you think 

1033
00:49:59,200 --> 00:50:01,160
about this. 
This is like Kyle Seraphin's 

1034
00:50:01,160 --> 00:50:03,840
crazy ideas. 
I was doing an alert training 

1035
00:50:03,840 --> 00:50:06,160
and Kevin and I were talking 
about this before we went live 

1036
00:50:06,160 --> 00:50:08,720
about alert something. 
I trained how to do a lot of law

1037
00:50:08,720 --> 00:50:11,120
enforcement officers. 
This is the standard response to

1038
00:50:11,120 --> 00:50:13,480
active shooter and we got to do 
it in a school. 

1039
00:50:13,920 --> 00:50:16,080
And so we cleared a bunch of 
buildings really, really fast. 

1040
00:50:16,080 --> 00:50:18,120
You're doing what's called 
direct a threat to go through 

1041
00:50:18,120 --> 00:50:21,080
the door trying to find where's 
the shooter, who's causing the 

1042
00:50:21,080 --> 00:50:24,360
bloodshed and how do we stop it?
Most patrol officers are not 

1043
00:50:24,360 --> 00:50:26,320
armed with flash bangs. 
Is that your experience, 

1044
00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:28,800
gentlemen? 
100% it would be an extreme 

1045
00:50:28,800 --> 00:50:31,560
rarity if they were. 
OK, so nobody's got a flash 

1046
00:50:31,560 --> 00:50:34,800
bang, but what you could do is 
you could buy like a dozen super

1047
00:50:34,800 --> 00:50:39,280
bouncy 1 inch rubber balls for 
like 10 bucks or less on Amazon 

1048
00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:42,120
and put them in your dump pouch.
And if you had a bunch of rubber

1049
00:50:42,120 --> 00:50:45,160
balls, I can tell you this. 
If I threw a rubber ball through

1050
00:50:45,160 --> 00:50:48,160
the doorway in a, in a hallway 
that I was about to go in, if 

1051
00:50:48,160 --> 00:50:50,800
I'm in a school hallway and I 
sent the rubber ball in, that's 

1052
00:50:50,800 --> 00:50:55,040
going to hit chalkboards, bounce
off desks, you know, hit maybe a

1053
00:50:55,040 --> 00:50:57,600
person who makes a noise, that's
going to give you the same, you 

1054
00:50:57,600 --> 00:51:00,480
know, it's going to give you a 
not a superior distraction and 

1055
00:51:00,480 --> 00:51:02,560
it will give you a distraction. 
My buddy was like, you should 

1056
00:51:02,560 --> 00:51:04,360
carry chickens with you. 
I'm like, dude, if I could carry

1057
00:51:04,360 --> 00:51:06,600
a chicken, throwing a chicken 
through an open doorway would be

1058
00:51:06,600 --> 00:51:09,480
very distracting if you had to 
enter a room, you know, because 

1059
00:51:09,520 --> 00:51:11,440
all you're looking for is just a
little bit of a purchase where 

1060
00:51:11,440 --> 00:51:12,840
your training and your 
experience comes in. 

1061
00:51:13,160 --> 00:51:15,640
So thinking things like that 
outside the box, it's very 

1062
00:51:15,640 --> 00:51:17,320
inexpensive. 
Your department's never going to

1063
00:51:17,320 --> 00:51:19,920
pay for super bouncy balls, but 
you probably could buy like 10 

1064
00:51:19,920 --> 00:51:22,560
for everybody, you know, for 
like a couple of bucks if you 

1065
00:51:22,560 --> 00:51:25,040
lost a bet kind of thing, you 
know, at roll call. 

1066
00:51:25,200 --> 00:51:27,440
So something to that effect. 
I just want to kick that as a 

1067
00:51:27,480 --> 00:51:29,280
just one of those ideas that's 
kind of outside the box. 

1068
00:51:29,280 --> 00:51:31,320
We call it the Chuck E Cheese 
Flash Bang. 

1069
00:51:31,320 --> 00:51:38,960
I guess that's right. 
So individual ownership of the 

1070
00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:41,960
of the problem, yeah. 
So feel free to riff on that as 

1071
00:51:41,960 --> 00:51:44,000
much as you guys want, and then 
we'll try to step up the chain a

1072
00:51:44,000 --> 00:51:45,600
little bit and see what we think
for the next level up. 

1073
00:51:45,920 --> 00:51:50,800
From a aircraft analogy you 
brought up the Bojango spot with

1074
00:51:50,800 --> 00:51:54,680
that was Youssef, wasn't it? 
Yeah, yeah, it was Ramsey and 

1075
00:51:54,680 --> 00:51:55,520
Youssef. 
Yeah. 

1076
00:51:57,360 --> 00:52:00,320
Which as in the aviation world, 
right? 

1077
00:52:00,360 --> 00:52:02,880
Put your own mask on before you 
help someone else. 

1078
00:52:03,040 --> 00:52:06,400
Great analogy here. 
Clean your own house as an 

1079
00:52:06,400 --> 00:52:09,000
individual officer, as an 
individual firefighter, as an 

1080
00:52:09,000 --> 00:52:12,520
individual paramedic. 
Get yourself in the best shape, 

1081
00:52:12,520 --> 00:52:16,960
the right mindset, get 
competent, become better at a 

1082
00:52:16,960 --> 00:52:22,360
skill set on the lowest level 
and then inspire, help and help 

1083
00:52:22,360 --> 00:52:25,520
people up alongside of you have 
those conversations. 

1084
00:52:26,000 --> 00:52:28,680
I think if you put your own mask
on before you help anybody else,

1085
00:52:28,680 --> 00:52:31,800
and that by the way, that 
includes heaven forbid if it 

1086
00:52:32,040 --> 00:52:38,640
does go to October 7th style 
house to house in tight knit 

1087
00:52:38,640 --> 00:52:41,400
communities. 
Making sure that your actual 

1088
00:52:41,400 --> 00:52:44,440
family in your home is locked 
down so that you can have 

1089
00:52:44,440 --> 00:52:48,120
clarity of purpose in the field.
That you don't have to be 

1090
00:52:48,480 --> 00:52:51,280
checking your phone being like, 
is my family OK? 

1091
00:52:51,680 --> 00:52:55,880
Because you put the mask on, 
your mask on, their mask on, and

1092
00:52:55,880 --> 00:52:58,920
now you can actually go go do 
work and add value. 

1093
00:53:01,160 --> 00:53:03,360
Yeah, well, Kevin. 
Will you talk about rescue task 

1094
00:53:03,360 --> 00:53:04,920
force a little bit from the 
individual, let's say 

1095
00:53:04,920 --> 00:53:09,800
firefighter slash paramedic, EMS
type one, What they can do if 

1096
00:53:09,800 --> 00:53:12,160
they don't have rescue task 
force to what the rescue task 

1097
00:53:12,160 --> 00:53:14,800
force looks like maybe and and 
how they can advocate for that 

1098
00:53:14,800 --> 00:53:17,240
with their own either chain of 
command or they're they're 

1099
00:53:17,280 --> 00:53:18,560
politicians. 
Sure. 

1100
00:53:18,560 --> 00:53:21,960
So for you that don't know what 
a rescue task force is, it's 

1101
00:53:21,960 --> 00:53:26,480
usually a group of firefighters 
or paramedics teamed up with one

1102
00:53:26,480 --> 00:53:30,880
to two law enforcement. 
That team then can go into warm 

1103
00:53:30,880 --> 00:53:33,120
zone type scenes where there's 
been a shooter, there's no 

1104
00:53:33,160 --> 00:53:35,720
active threat, where there's no 
shots being fired currently, 

1105
00:53:36,200 --> 00:53:39,480
maybe the shooter's been 
already, he's deceased, been 

1106
00:53:39,480 --> 00:53:42,560
under arrest, has fled. 
We can insert these, what they 

1107
00:53:42,560 --> 00:53:45,560
call RTF teams into those areas 
to go take care of the wounded. 

1108
00:53:46,240 --> 00:53:48,240
The reason we have law 
enforcement with them is because

1109
00:53:48,240 --> 00:53:49,560
most first responders are not 
armed. 

1110
00:53:49,560 --> 00:53:50,880
They have no way to defend 
themselves. 

1111
00:53:51,160 --> 00:53:54,600
So it's it'd be unsafe to send 
paramedics and firefighters just

1112
00:53:54,600 --> 00:53:57,600
into a scene with no type of 
protection because if the actor 

1113
00:53:57,600 --> 00:54:00,200
was to come back, they could be 
attacked themselves and have no 

1114
00:54:00,200 --> 00:54:04,000
way to defend themselves. 
So the RTF is a group of 

1115
00:54:04,560 --> 00:54:07,120
firefighters and paramedics or 
EMT's, any type of medical 

1116
00:54:07,120 --> 00:54:11,080
personnel being LED into a scene
by some type of security force. 

1117
00:54:13,160 --> 00:54:14,760
We've seen it around the world 
before. 

1118
00:54:14,760 --> 00:54:17,320
Really. 
The RTF, the alert training, it 

1119
00:54:17,320 --> 00:54:20,640
was hours before they got EMS 
into some of the victims. 

1120
00:54:21,000 --> 00:54:23,280
These, you can watch some of 
them on video. 

1121
00:54:23,360 --> 00:54:26,920
These people bled out over 20-30
minutes and died while watching 

1122
00:54:26,920 --> 00:54:30,320
on security cameras. 
If we could have just got first 

1123
00:54:30,320 --> 00:54:33,360
responders and they're quicker 
to care for them, they possibly 

1124
00:54:33,360 --> 00:54:36,440
could survive. 
And so that's what the RTF model

1125
00:54:36,440 --> 00:54:38,960
is, is getting first responders 
into those scenes quicker. 

1126
00:54:39,520 --> 00:54:42,200
Yes, we train all the law 
enforcement to do medicine. 

1127
00:54:42,680 --> 00:54:45,480
But if it's you laying there 
bleeding out, would you rather a

1128
00:54:45,480 --> 00:54:48,720
cop that's done it once come to 
save you or firefighter permit 

1129
00:54:48,720 --> 00:54:50,480
that does it daily come to save 
you? 

1130
00:54:50,840 --> 00:54:53,000
And so that's the the model of 
the RTF is getting in there 

1131
00:54:53,000 --> 00:54:56,320
quickly with trained medical 
personnel and plus with law 

1132
00:54:56,320 --> 00:54:57,760
enforcement that's in one of 
those scenes. 

1133
00:54:57,960 --> 00:55:00,720
If it's an active scene, they 
really don't have the time to 

1134
00:55:00,720 --> 00:55:02,760
take care of all the injured 
people because they should be 

1135
00:55:02,760 --> 00:55:04,680
hunting down and securing the 
scene. 

1136
00:55:05,080 --> 00:55:08,200
So that's kind of RTF model. 
If you haven't already trained 

1137
00:55:08,200 --> 00:55:13,240
on it, Holly, you should really 
get, I mean, alert has training.

1138
00:55:13,480 --> 00:55:15,200
There's all kinds of agencies 
that are doing it. 

1139
00:55:15,200 --> 00:55:16,520
Reach out to some of those 
agencies. 

1140
00:55:17,000 --> 00:55:19,120
Get on the bandwagon is great 
training. 

1141
00:55:19,680 --> 00:55:22,960
It not only works for like 
active shooters, big threats, it

1142
00:55:22,960 --> 00:55:25,880
works on almost every scene. 
If you start getting used to use

1143
00:55:25,880 --> 00:55:29,720
an IC using these RTF models, 
any type of scene, you could use

1144
00:55:29,720 --> 00:55:32,560
it on a bus wreck. 
You get to a bus wreck, a couple

1145
00:55:32,560 --> 00:55:34,760
firefighters team up with a 
couple medics, they go in, they 

1146
00:55:34,760 --> 00:55:37,480
triage, they treat, they become 
an RTF. 

1147
00:55:37,600 --> 00:55:40,120
There's just not a threat. 
So you can use it day-to-day. 

1148
00:55:40,440 --> 00:55:44,040
You can use it, you know, on 
those active scenes, but it kind

1149
00:55:44,040 --> 00:55:47,400
of helps you your day-to-day 
business and you know for the 

1150
00:55:47,400 --> 00:55:49,200
big if it ever has happened in 
your area. 

1151
00:55:49,600 --> 00:55:52,720
So Kevin, what is the amount of 
equipment that's required for an

1152
00:55:52,720 --> 00:55:55,280
individual medic or a 
firefighter to have? 

1153
00:55:55,320 --> 00:55:57,880
And then what are the odds that 
it's actually getting funded? 

1154
00:55:57,920 --> 00:56:00,080
And then maybe I'll move to 
Peter, since I know he's got 

1155
00:56:00,080 --> 00:56:02,080
some gear background on if 
that's something that somebody 

1156
00:56:02,080 --> 00:56:03,920
could individually fund it and 
solve that problem too. 

1157
00:56:04,560 --> 00:56:05,920
Sure. 
So obviously I come from a 

1158
00:56:06,000 --> 00:56:09,160
governmental type agency that, 
you know, they, they have a 

1159
00:56:09,160 --> 00:56:10,840
budget and they try to stay 
under it. 

1160
00:56:11,160 --> 00:56:14,600
And so a lot of times getting 
equipment isn't always easy. 

1161
00:56:14,600 --> 00:56:17,400
Luckily we've, over the last few
years we've received lots of 

1162
00:56:17,400 --> 00:56:20,320
funds. 
So we've been able to provide 

1163
00:56:20,320 --> 00:56:23,760
every single paramedic and every
single firefighter in our area 

1164
00:56:23,920 --> 00:56:26,400
with a vest. 
So if they go in RTF they have a

1165
00:56:26,400 --> 00:56:28,640
ballistic vest on. 
How common is that, you think? 

1166
00:56:29,000 --> 00:56:32,520
That's becoming more common. 
But like I said, for private 

1167
00:56:32,600 --> 00:56:34,880
EMS, I can almost say that most 
of them probably don't have 

1168
00:56:35,720 --> 00:56:38,600
won't have one and don't have 
one because I said, why would a 

1169
00:56:38,600 --> 00:56:41,800
private agency spend $1000 to 
put a vest behind the seat of an

1170
00:56:41,800 --> 00:56:44,400
ambulance when they're trying to
make money? 

1171
00:56:44,560 --> 00:56:46,440
So that's just lost funds for 
them. 

1172
00:56:46,440 --> 00:56:49,360
So they don't want to spend that
money because they obviously 

1173
00:56:49,360 --> 00:56:51,720
they have hundreds of ambulances
like some of these private 

1174
00:56:51,720 --> 00:56:54,360
agencies do. 
That's 10s of thousands and 

1175
00:56:54,360 --> 00:56:56,480
hundreds of thousands of dollars
that they'll lose. 

1176
00:56:57,000 --> 00:57:00,960
So we keep it pretty simple. 
We send our medics in with very 

1177
00:57:00,960 --> 00:57:03,000
little equipment. 
We just send them in with stuff 

1178
00:57:03,000 --> 00:57:07,840
to stop bleeding, tourniquets, 
quick clot, chest seals, even 

1179
00:57:07,960 --> 00:57:10,440
some needle decompression stuff 
for if they have some type of 

1180
00:57:10,440 --> 00:57:12,760
tension pneumo. 
But minimal skills goes. 

1181
00:57:13,160 --> 00:57:16,160
Like I said, 10 years ago when 
we did this training, we sent 

1182
00:57:16,160 --> 00:57:17,920
our medics in with whatever they
wanted to take. 

1183
00:57:18,360 --> 00:57:21,720
So you get paramedic, all this 
tools they want, they take in 

1184
00:57:21,720 --> 00:57:23,360
monitors and airway bags and 
stuff. 

1185
00:57:23,680 --> 00:57:26,440
And we were seeing that it was 
taking 1015 minutes per patient 

1186
00:57:26,440 --> 00:57:29,840
for them to triage and treat 
these people and we'd have 5-6 

1187
00:57:29,840 --> 00:57:32,200
patients total. 
They'd take them over an hour to

1188
00:57:32,200 --> 00:57:35,000
get them off scene. 
So we took all the toys away. 

1189
00:57:35,360 --> 00:57:37,880
We get them very minimal toys 
wherever they get in there and 

1190
00:57:37,880 --> 00:57:41,040
they use what they have and 
every single person we send in 

1191
00:57:41,400 --> 00:57:42,680
has the same amount of 
equipment. 

1192
00:57:43,080 --> 00:57:46,760
So they have two tourniquets, 2 
chest seals, 2 quick lights. 

1193
00:57:46,800 --> 00:57:49,080
If they run out, they look to 
their buddy next to them who has

1194
00:57:49,080 --> 00:57:51,280
the exact same bag, the same 
numbers. 

1195
00:57:51,440 --> 00:57:54,560
So everybody going in has a 
small cache of equipment, but on

1196
00:57:54,560 --> 00:57:56,520
a big scale we have a bunch of 
equipment and there's just 

1197
00:57:56,840 --> 00:58:02,200
divvied out per person. 
Yeah, it makes a lot of sense. 

1198
00:58:02,360 --> 00:58:04,640
One of the things that I like to
also highlight to people too, 

1199
00:58:04,680 --> 00:58:07,200
which you guys may have heard 
this and maybe haven't, I 

1200
00:58:07,200 --> 00:58:09,040
remember sitting through an 
after action that was talking 

1201
00:58:09,040 --> 00:58:10,320
about the Pulse nightclub 
shooting. 

1202
00:58:10,840 --> 00:58:13,600
And there were what, 49 
casualties on there, 49 people 

1203
00:58:13,600 --> 00:58:16,480
that were killed during that 
attack, but seven of them 

1204
00:58:16,480 --> 00:58:20,800
actually died, not from their 
primary wound, but from 

1205
00:58:21,000 --> 00:58:23,480
positional asphyxia, which means
they were just stuck against a 

1206
00:58:23,480 --> 00:58:25,240
wall. 
They were crouched down. 

1207
00:58:25,440 --> 00:58:27,920
They ended up succumbing to 
shock and they, they basically 

1208
00:58:27,920 --> 00:58:30,880
just crushed their own Airways. 
And the, the salvation for those

1209
00:58:30,880 --> 00:58:33,640
people would have been literally
moving them and putting them in 

1210
00:58:33,640 --> 00:58:35,680
the recovery position and they 
would have actually ended up 

1211
00:58:35,680 --> 00:58:39,800
surviving that attack. 
And seven out of 49 is a huge 

1212
00:58:39,800 --> 00:58:42,360
number one in seven people could
have been saved by literally 

1213
00:58:42,360 --> 00:58:44,800
pulling them off the wall. 
You can imagine shots being 

1214
00:58:44,800 --> 00:58:46,440
fired, people trying to get very
small. 

1215
00:58:46,520 --> 00:58:48,760
And when they did so, they 
actually blacked out and then 

1216
00:58:48,760 --> 00:58:50,800
ended up just crushing their own
airway until they succumb to 

1217
00:58:50,800 --> 00:58:52,840
their injury. 
So all of that is kind of wild 

1218
00:58:52,840 --> 00:58:54,000
to think that it doesn't take a 
lot. 

1219
00:58:54,000 --> 00:58:57,000
I think Kevin's up point is very
well taken running in the more 

1220
00:58:57,000 --> 00:58:59,720
you give paramedics, the more 
they'll use, the less you give 

1221
00:58:59,720 --> 00:59:01,720
them, the more they're going to 
just treat life threats. 

1222
00:59:02,080 --> 00:59:04,720
And most people are used to 
what's what's the call? 

1223
00:59:04,720 --> 00:59:07,240
It's either grab and go or stay 
and play, right? 

1224
00:59:08,120 --> 00:59:10,480
Absolutely, and we want them to 
grab and go. 

1225
00:59:12,840 --> 00:59:15,160
It's a hard mindset to come 
sometimes push into people. 

1226
00:59:15,480 --> 00:59:19,640
What So if they're if, what do 
we think about the the idea that

1227
00:59:19,680 --> 00:59:23,720
local law enforcement Peter 
would be even capable of taking 

1228
00:59:23,920 --> 00:59:27,320
a, let's say a Sue Espante type 
of medic who who sourced their 

1229
00:59:27,320 --> 00:59:29,280
own problem, who works for 
private or maybe they're in a 

1230
00:59:29,280 --> 00:59:31,200
volunteer department, which I 
think there's a lot of those as 

1231
00:59:31,200 --> 00:59:34,160
well in this country. 
Volunteer department popped up 

1232
00:59:34,440 --> 00:59:37,120
and law enforcement officer gets
this guy says, Hey, I'm ready to

1233
00:59:37,120 --> 00:59:38,480
come with you. 
I'm willing to go into the hot 

1234
00:59:38,480 --> 00:59:40,840
zone or the warm zone, even 
though I'm not armed. 

1235
00:59:40,840 --> 00:59:43,080
Like Are you ready to do like a 
like an RTF type thing? 

1236
00:59:44,360 --> 00:59:47,360
I Again, the best time to have 
that conversation is before you 

1237
00:59:47,360 --> 00:59:51,520
need it. 
It's the the problem again with 

1238
00:59:51,520 --> 00:59:54,520
all of the law enforcement first
responder everything the private

1239
00:59:54,520 --> 00:59:56,720
sector. 
Obviously you can't compel the 

1240
00:59:56,720 --> 01:00:00,720
private sector private companies
that I mean, you probably won't 

1241
01:00:00,720 --> 01:00:03,120
even see them until you call the
scene cold. 

1242
01:00:03,560 --> 01:00:07,400
But for let's take firefighters.
You have a part time firefighter

1243
01:00:08,400 --> 01:00:13,720
or fire department and literally
this is a very easy thing to do 

1244
01:00:14,040 --> 01:00:18,560
when you're on patrol is go talk
to your firefighters and say. 

1245
01:00:19,520 --> 01:00:23,520
Just out of curiosity, what 
would it take us just to get 

1246
01:00:23,520 --> 01:00:26,920
this going? 
So if we're in a warm scene, I 

1247
01:00:26,920 --> 01:00:29,240
bring you up, we have somebody 
guarding you. 

1248
01:00:29,520 --> 01:00:31,880
You start working on people and 
we start pressing into the 

1249
01:00:31,880 --> 01:00:34,160
scene. 
You're not, this isn't the first

1250
01:00:34,160 --> 01:00:36,760
officer on scene. 
It might be the 10th officer on 

1251
01:00:36,760 --> 01:00:40,040
scene, 8 of them already 
pressing deep into the building.

1252
01:00:40,040 --> 01:00:44,480
And there's easy people to get 
at the at the entrance of the 

1253
01:00:44,480 --> 01:00:47,000
building. 
This isn't unreasonable, but if 

1254
01:00:47,000 --> 01:00:49,080
you try to have that 
conversation on the scene, it 

1255
01:00:49,080 --> 01:00:51,640
will never happen. 
This stuff can. 

1256
01:00:51,960 --> 01:00:54,000
The fact that we're all talking 
right now, and if you're 

1257
01:00:54,000 --> 01:00:57,360
listening and it hasn't 
happened, this is the perfect 

1258
01:00:57,360 --> 01:01:00,640
time to start the conversation. 
And you're absolutely right, 

1259
01:01:00,640 --> 01:01:03,040
We've actually run into that on 
a couple calls in some of the 

1260
01:01:03,040 --> 01:01:07,960
very rural areas we run with is 
we didn't have enough medics and

1261
01:01:07,960 --> 01:01:10,600
they just picked up a volunteer 
at the time who thought they 

1262
01:01:10,600 --> 01:01:12,480
were out. 
They kind of trained them up on 

1263
01:01:12,480 --> 01:01:13,640
scene. 
They thought they were good for 

1264
01:01:13,640 --> 01:01:15,280
it. 
The minute the first shot fired,

1265
01:01:15,800 --> 01:01:18,480
they locked up because they got 
scared because probably the 

1266
01:01:18,480 --> 01:01:21,120
first time they've ever been 
around gunfire and they just, 

1267
01:01:21,120 --> 01:01:22,680
they locked up. 
Nothing on them. 

1268
01:01:22,680 --> 01:01:25,200
It's just it was new to them and
they got scared. 

1269
01:01:25,200 --> 01:01:29,040
So if you train it and you're 
around at least once or twice 

1270
01:01:29,040 --> 01:01:32,920
before the the event happens, 
leisure slightly prepared for 

1271
01:01:32,920 --> 01:01:38,320
the day when it happens. 
Boone, what do you think? 

1272
01:01:39,160 --> 01:01:40,480
Yeah. 
So there there's different 

1273
01:01:40,480 --> 01:01:43,440
components to this from a law 
enforcement perspective, 

1274
01:01:44,480 --> 01:01:49,120
obviously the teams need their 
their terms, you know, their 

1275
01:01:49,120 --> 01:01:50,920
tactical medics that go with 
them. 

1276
01:01:51,840 --> 01:01:55,880
I like the concept of the what 
you call the RTT where they're 

1277
01:01:55,880 --> 01:01:57,800
unarmed, but they still go into 
the hot zone. 

1278
01:01:57,800 --> 01:02:00,720
I like that concept. 
RTF yes, yes, I like that 

1279
01:02:00,720 --> 01:02:03,920
concept as well. 
But when we talked about from a 

1280
01:02:03,920 --> 01:02:06,920
bottom up approach or a 
community approach, we're 

1281
01:02:06,920 --> 01:02:11,640
looking at training as many 
people as you possibly can stop 

1282
01:02:11,640 --> 01:02:15,200
to be bleed, you know, TCCT, 
triple C, whatever you want to 

1283
01:02:15,200 --> 01:02:17,280
call it. 
That includes like on a high 

1284
01:02:17,280 --> 01:02:20,560
school level, you shouldn't be 
able to graduate high school if 

1285
01:02:20,560 --> 01:02:24,560
you don't know CPR, first aid 
and you know, stop the bleed. 

1286
01:02:24,560 --> 01:02:27,480
It should be a requirement. 
The more people on a community 

1287
01:02:27,480 --> 01:02:32,080
level that can provide as a 
force multiplier basic life 

1288
01:02:32,080 --> 01:02:37,520
saving skills, it relieves the 
burden for law enforcement, for 

1289
01:02:37,520 --> 01:02:42,800
first responders, EMS, 
firefighters to focus on other 

1290
01:02:42,800 --> 01:02:46,440
things. 
So if we look at it as something

1291
01:02:46,440 --> 01:02:49,560
we can make scalable, start with
the individual. 

1292
01:02:49,680 --> 01:02:51,760
And I know everyone's not going 
to run around with the first aid

1293
01:02:51,760 --> 01:02:54,360
kit, but just starting with 
those capabilities on a 

1294
01:02:54,360 --> 01:02:57,800
community level, then looking at
the first responders, you know, 

1295
01:02:58,040 --> 01:03:01,040
on the local level, county 
level, then the state level. 

1296
01:03:01,240 --> 01:03:04,080
So we're dealing with multiple 
problems and that's kind of how 

1297
01:03:04,080 --> 01:03:06,280
we have to look at it. 
Like from a law enforcement from

1298
01:03:06,280 --> 01:03:10,840
the first responder perspective,
yes if I'm law enforcement I 

1299
01:03:10,840 --> 01:03:14,600
want to stop that threat first, 
but I should have the ability to

1300
01:03:14,600 --> 01:03:18,600
save someone's life with the 
skill set and the kit on my 

1301
01:03:18,600 --> 01:03:24,640
body, not in my vehicle. 
From the fire and or EMS 

1302
01:03:24,640 --> 01:03:28,840
perspective, yes I need units 
that can go into that hot zone 

1303
01:03:29,040 --> 01:03:32,680
and deal with these situations 
while law enforcement is moving 

1304
01:03:32,680 --> 01:03:34,760
to contact to eliminate that 
threat. 

1305
01:03:34,960 --> 01:03:38,360
But then on the community level,
taking that individual 

1306
01:03:38,360 --> 01:03:42,640
responsibility, we need 
individual civilians to be able 

1307
01:03:42,640 --> 01:03:46,240
to provide life saving aid to 
each other. 

1308
01:03:47,880 --> 01:03:50,280
And to touch on that real quick,
we'll stop the bleed. 

1309
01:03:50,280 --> 01:03:53,480
We've done a big push of stop 
the bleeding in Texas. 

1310
01:03:53,480 --> 01:03:56,960
Actually, they passed some laws,
I believe is law that every 

1311
01:03:56,960 --> 01:04:00,960
student that goes to high school
should take stop the bleed. 

1312
01:04:01,160 --> 01:04:03,680
They're supposed to be, they 
have to or they found some 

1313
01:04:03,680 --> 01:04:06,520
loopholes because of obviously a
lot of kids didn't want to take 

1314
01:04:06,520 --> 01:04:07,960
it. 
They didn't want to be pressured

1315
01:04:08,200 --> 01:04:11,360
that instead of that they have 
to take it has to be offered. 

1316
01:04:11,760 --> 01:04:14,720
So every school that's offered, 
but most kids don't take it 

1317
01:04:14,720 --> 01:04:18,120
because they don't have to. 
And so the the bill got pushed 

1318
01:04:18,120 --> 01:04:20,400
through it. 
It was, you know, good intent, 

1319
01:04:21,120 --> 01:04:22,600
but you know, there's always a 
loophole and they found the 

1320
01:04:22,600 --> 01:04:24,880
loopholes and it's just got to 
be offered, not taken. 

1321
01:04:25,160 --> 01:04:29,040
But there was a push for every, 
I think you even started middle 

1322
01:04:29,040 --> 01:04:30,240
school. 
Middle school or high school age

1323
01:04:30,240 --> 01:04:33,440
students were supposed to have 
have to take stop the Bleed 

1324
01:04:33,760 --> 01:04:37,840
while in school, but it turned 
into a a choice instead of a 

1325
01:04:38,200 --> 01:04:39,880
have to. 
It's a step in the right 

1326
01:04:39,880 --> 01:04:41,520
direction. 
Absolutely. 

1327
01:04:42,680 --> 01:04:46,200
But to Boone's point, it's the 
other people have said it 

1328
01:04:46,200 --> 01:04:49,440
before. 
Be your own rescue, especially 

1329
01:04:49,440 --> 01:04:53,240
if you're have a family, if 
people are going to be looking 

1330
01:04:53,240 --> 01:04:55,680
to you. 
So do you have the capability as

1331
01:04:55,680 --> 01:05:00,320
an individual right now, today? 
Do you have the the training and

1332
01:05:00,320 --> 01:05:03,800
equipment to stop a critical 
bleed or at least slow it 

1333
01:05:03,800 --> 01:05:07,320
significantly until you can get 
professional medical care? 

1334
01:05:08,080 --> 01:05:12,680
If the answer is I don't know, 
or, umm, maybe it's time to take

1335
01:05:12,680 --> 01:05:15,360
a very inexpensive Stop the 
Bleed course. 

1336
01:05:15,360 --> 01:05:18,040
Learn how to use a tourniquet. 
Learn how to pack a wound. 

1337
01:05:18,040 --> 01:05:21,200
Learn how to use a chest seal. 
I mean those three together, 

1338
01:05:22,320 --> 01:05:25,560
Kevin, I mean, what else? 
Yeah, you had a touch on that. 

1339
01:05:25,560 --> 01:05:28,920
I mean, obviously we teach all 
our law enforcement stop the 

1340
01:05:28,920 --> 01:05:31,800
bleed and sulfate bloody aid 
because obviously you can bleed 

1341
01:05:31,800 --> 01:05:33,920
out from a femoral bleed in less
than 3 minutes. 

1342
01:05:34,600 --> 01:05:37,400
It's probably going to take me 3
minutes to get to you if I'm on 

1343
01:05:37,400 --> 01:05:40,120
scene already. 
So for the general public, if 

1344
01:05:40,120 --> 01:05:42,240
you have a significant bleed and
you're waiting for me, the 

1345
01:05:42,240 --> 01:05:45,080
paramedic, to show up in 8 
minutes, you possibly will be 

1346
01:05:45,080 --> 01:05:48,040
dead before I get there. 
So if you can't treat yourself, 

1347
01:05:48,040 --> 01:05:50,920
treat your family members, 
you're not giving me anything to

1348
01:05:50,920 --> 01:05:52,840
work with. 
I mean, obviously we have lots 

1349
01:05:52,840 --> 01:05:56,800
of tools to try to salvage 
bodies and salvage patients, but

1350
01:05:56,880 --> 01:05:58,080
I have to have something to work
with. 

1351
01:05:58,360 --> 01:06:01,120
If all the blood is already bled
out before I get there, I have 

1352
01:06:01,120 --> 01:06:03,800
nothing to work with. 
So those, those community 

1353
01:06:03,800 --> 01:06:06,800
projects are huge for us. 
I mean, that's why CPR is so 

1354
01:06:06,800 --> 01:06:08,760
important. 
If we run on a patient that 

1355
01:06:08,760 --> 01:06:12,720
there's active CPR before we get
there, there's such a greater 

1356
01:06:12,800 --> 01:06:14,680
chance of me getting that 
patient back. 

1357
01:06:14,920 --> 01:06:17,520
If there's zero CPR, there's 
almost a zero chance of that 

1358
01:06:17,520 --> 01:06:20,600
patient coming back. 
I. 

1359
01:06:28,420 --> 01:06:31,540
Was going to say it's very easy 
for folks to to find a March 

1360
01:06:32,880 --> 01:06:35,160
video. 
It cost you nothing to go out 

1361
01:06:35,160 --> 01:06:38,320
there and find something to do a
March assessment, which is the 

1362
01:06:38,320 --> 01:06:40,480
acronym that we teach for trauma
assessments. 

1363
01:06:40,480 --> 01:06:41,600
We're not talking about medical 
here. 

1364
01:06:41,600 --> 01:06:44,400
We're not talking about you come
home and there's a 75 year old 

1365
01:06:44,400 --> 01:06:45,920
person who's falling down the 
stairs and they're not 

1366
01:06:45,920 --> 01:06:47,160
breathing. 
Like that's a different animal 

1367
01:06:47,160 --> 01:06:48,240
altogether. 
You don't. 

1368
01:06:48,240 --> 01:06:49,960
There's all kinds of 
complications, but in a 

1369
01:06:49,960 --> 01:06:52,840
traumatic event where something 
happened and an otherwise 

1370
01:06:52,840 --> 01:06:56,320
healthy and otherwise functional
person is not functional today, 

1371
01:06:56,760 --> 01:06:58,240
there's a thing that you can go 
out there and do. 

1372
01:06:58,440 --> 01:07:01,760
And you know, I, I know Kevin 
will back me up on this one, but

1373
01:07:01,760 --> 01:07:04,240
what is the first thing they 
always teach you when you get on

1374
01:07:04,240 --> 01:07:05,480
scene? 
What is the number one thing? 

1375
01:07:05,480 --> 01:07:07,600
It's the number one fail for any
of the national registry. 

1376
01:07:08,240 --> 01:07:11,240
I don't know if you're talking. 
About scene safety, right. 

1377
01:07:11,560 --> 01:07:13,040
So scene safety is the number 
one thing. 

1378
01:07:13,040 --> 01:07:14,600
They always coach you. 
Yeah, you got to know scene 

1379
01:07:14,600 --> 01:07:16,080
safety. 
I always tell people that the 

1380
01:07:16,080 --> 01:07:18,000
first thing that happens is 
before you consider the scene 

1381
01:07:18,000 --> 01:07:21,280
safety, just go ahead and panic.
You might as well do it 'cause 

1382
01:07:21,280 --> 01:07:23,720
if things are really bad, if, if
you are in a, on a, on a 

1383
01:07:23,720 --> 01:07:25,760
situation where people have been
shooting, where there's an 

1384
01:07:25,760 --> 01:07:28,160
explosion, where something is on
fire, where a vehicle is 

1385
01:07:28,160 --> 01:07:30,360
flipped, if there are people 
that are their lives are in 

1386
01:07:30,360 --> 01:07:32,600
danger, you will eventually 
panic if you're a regular 

1387
01:07:32,600 --> 01:07:34,720
person. 
So you can do it before or 

1388
01:07:34,720 --> 01:07:37,000
during or after. 
And I choose to do it before and

1389
01:07:37,000 --> 01:07:38,960
get it out of the way. 
So I just look at it and go 

1390
01:07:39,240 --> 01:07:40,960
like, that's terrible. 
Like look what that, that's the 

1391
01:07:40,960 --> 01:07:43,520
craziest thing I've ever seen. 
There's a bus full of nuns and 

1392
01:07:43,520 --> 01:07:46,000
it's on fire. 
Like then what do I go do? 

1393
01:07:46,320 --> 01:07:48,280
And then you start going through
and if you have patience, you 

1394
01:07:48,280 --> 01:07:49,560
can go through the March 
assessment. 

1395
01:07:50,040 --> 01:07:53,200
There's the M is always massive 
hemorrhage, which is what Kevin 

1396
01:07:53,200 --> 01:07:54,400
was talking about for bleeding 
out. 

1397
01:07:54,400 --> 01:07:57,360
But I actually always add move 
as the number one thing. 

1398
01:07:57,360 --> 01:07:59,400
I do 2 Ms. which not everybody 
talks about. 

1399
01:07:59,600 --> 01:08:01,680
But again, it's the same story 
that would have saved people's 

1400
01:08:01,680 --> 01:08:03,640
lives at the Pulse nightclub, 
another terrorist event. 

1401
01:08:03,800 --> 01:08:07,040
It's the same thing that will 
let you not do CPR next to a 

1402
01:08:07,040 --> 01:08:10,400
toilet or make you deal with 
somebody who's bleeding out in 

1403
01:08:10,400 --> 01:08:12,600
the middle of an active roadway.
You can move your patient. 

1404
01:08:12,600 --> 01:08:14,200
You don't have to treat people 
where they lie. 

1405
01:08:14,440 --> 01:08:17,200
A lot of us forget that 'cause 
we get very, very focused in. 

1406
01:08:17,520 --> 01:08:21,120
So the first time that you've 
thought about helping somebody 

1407
01:08:21,240 --> 01:08:23,560
who's either bleeding or or 
trying to die on you and you're 

1408
01:08:23,560 --> 01:08:26,120
going to stop it, it shouldn't 
be the first time that you've 

1409
01:08:26,120 --> 01:08:27,680
ever thought about where you're 
going to do it and how you're 

1410
01:08:27,680 --> 01:08:29,800
going to do it. 
And so even just even just 

1411
01:08:29,800 --> 01:08:32,000
listen to a podcast. 
Like I said, the PJ Med cast is 

1412
01:08:32,000 --> 01:08:33,640
a really good one for the March 
assessment as well. 

1413
01:08:33,840 --> 01:08:35,800
It's very short. 
You can do it in like 15 minutes

1414
01:08:36,240 --> 01:08:37,640
and every patrol officer should 
do it. 

1415
01:08:37,640 --> 01:08:39,040
Everybody who has kids should do
it. 

1416
01:08:39,760 --> 01:08:41,040
You're a bad father if you 
haven't. 

1417
01:08:41,040 --> 01:08:42,960
I'm just going to go out there 
and say that you're, you're not 

1418
01:08:42,960 --> 01:08:45,720
doing, do you know justice to 
your family if they think that 

1419
01:08:45,720 --> 01:08:48,319
you're going to react to 
something dangerous if you have 

1420
01:08:48,319 --> 01:08:49,840
not actually thought about it 
before. 

1421
01:08:49,960 --> 01:08:52,720
And every one of us and every 
mom has done it to every single 

1422
01:08:52,720 --> 01:08:55,560
mom in the world has the worst 
fantasy of something terrible 

1423
01:08:55,560 --> 01:08:57,479
happening to their kids that 
keeps them awake at night. 

1424
01:08:57,479 --> 01:08:58,800
So what are you going to do 
about it? 

1425
01:08:58,800 --> 01:09:00,720
Are you going to just Daydream 
and, and think that it's 

1426
01:09:00,720 --> 01:09:01,960
terrible? 
Or are you going to go out there

1427
01:09:01,960 --> 01:09:04,640
and say, OK, well, I'm going to 
put some steps and some actions.

1428
01:09:04,640 --> 01:09:07,279
I'm going to go do some research
instead of watching, you know, 

1429
01:09:07,279 --> 01:09:10,279
Alex Clark's podcast about the, 
the new bread mill that's 

1430
01:09:10,279 --> 01:09:13,120
grinding up grains like my wife 
is, you go out there and figure 

1431
01:09:13,120 --> 01:09:15,479
out how to stop a bleed. 
It's something it cost you 

1432
01:09:15,479 --> 01:09:17,279
almost nothing except a few 
minutes of your time. 

1433
01:09:17,600 --> 01:09:20,040
And, and that's step one, which 
is showing that you actually 

1434
01:09:20,040 --> 01:09:21,279
care. 
Do you guys want to talk about 

1435
01:09:21,279 --> 01:09:22,520
like maybe the management 
concern? 

1436
01:09:22,520 --> 01:09:25,439
I think Kevin and and Boone and 
and Peter could probably weigh 

1437
01:09:25,439 --> 01:09:27,279
in on some of that and maybe 
Sarah, maybe some of the 

1438
01:09:27,279 --> 01:09:30,439
buzzwords that can, that can 
push people towards, hey, my 

1439
01:09:30,439 --> 01:09:31,920
command needs to make a bigger 
decision. 

1440
01:09:31,920 --> 01:09:34,560
I'm in the middle and I'm 
facilitating the frontline 

1441
01:09:34,560 --> 01:09:37,800
officers or medics concerns and 
I'm going to funnel it up in a 

1442
01:09:37,800 --> 01:09:40,160
meaningful way that actually get
some action if that's feasible 

1443
01:09:40,160 --> 01:09:42,359
even. 
Yeah. 

1444
01:09:42,359 --> 01:09:44,840
I mean, one thing I could bring 
up that would get some people 

1445
01:09:44,840 --> 01:09:47,560
paying attention is the fact 
that there is pieces of these 

1446
01:09:47,560 --> 01:09:51,279
plots with suicide bombers. 
We haven't had suicide attacks 

1447
01:09:51,279 --> 01:09:53,200
in the United States. 
That's one thing we're not 

1448
01:09:53,200 --> 01:09:55,320
prepared for. 
And another thing is within the 

1449
01:09:55,320 --> 01:09:58,200
suicide vest, there are 
reportedly chemicals. 

1450
01:09:58,800 --> 01:10:03,560
A lot of our agencies aren't 
even prepared to deal with the 

1451
01:10:03,560 --> 01:10:06,040
right hazmat situations when 
they respond to this. 

1452
01:10:06,040 --> 01:10:08,880
So they need to be prepared if 
they think maybe a suicide vest 

1453
01:10:08,880 --> 01:10:11,680
blew up. 
How do we respond in that case 

1454
01:10:11,680 --> 01:10:14,240
if we don't know what was in the
vest as we're rushing to the 

1455
01:10:14,240 --> 01:10:18,800
scene? 
And what sort of quantity could 

1456
01:10:18,800 --> 01:10:21,080
we even be talking about? 
If it's man born, it's got to be

1457
01:10:21,080 --> 01:10:24,600
a smaller kind of area, right? 
Yeah, these vests are very 

1458
01:10:24,600 --> 01:10:31,000
small, like, like the ground 
ones are just the one that 

1459
01:10:31,000 --> 01:10:36,000
airplanes are like, right? 
OK, so nothing like the Sri 

1460
01:10:36,000 --> 01:10:39,040
Lanka backpacks that they did? 
That were, yeah, these are 

1461
01:10:39,280 --> 01:10:41,840
pretty large, Yeah. 
This isn't going to put a huge 

1462
01:10:41,840 --> 01:10:45,280
crater in the ground. 
No, but we can't exclude those 

1463
01:10:45,360 --> 01:10:48,400
either though. 
Yeah, because TATP is too easy 

1464
01:10:48,400 --> 01:10:55,360
to make and they use it all the 
time actually. 

1465
01:10:55,640 --> 01:10:57,640
Yeah, So what what does that 
conversation look like going to 

1466
01:10:57,640 --> 01:10:58,600
management? 
OK, fine. 

1467
01:10:58,600 --> 01:11:01,560
The possibility of doing a 
hazmat plus explosive, that 

1468
01:11:01,560 --> 01:11:03,960
possibility of individual 
shooters or small teams. 

1469
01:11:04,320 --> 01:11:07,000
And you know, your medics need 
to work with your your cops. 

1470
01:11:07,000 --> 01:11:08,440
Your cops need to know that 
they're going to be able to 

1471
01:11:08,440 --> 01:11:10,040
bring a medic because otherwise 
you're going to have more 

1472
01:11:10,040 --> 01:11:11,480
casualties. 
How does that conversation 

1473
01:11:11,480 --> 01:11:12,760
happen at a mid management 
level? 

1474
01:11:17,160 --> 01:11:20,720
Again, the, the IT comes down to
a really easy conversation. 

1475
01:11:21,720 --> 01:11:25,800
If it happens here and you knew 
about the possibility of it and 

1476
01:11:25,800 --> 01:11:30,040
you did nothing, how are you 
going to be comfortable with 

1477
01:11:30,040 --> 01:11:32,120
yourself when you go to go home 
at night? 

1478
01:11:32,200 --> 01:11:36,320
Like let's, I'm not saying the 
sky is falling, but if you're 

1479
01:11:36,320 --> 01:11:39,520
going to, when you're in the, 
let's say you're a patrol 

1480
01:11:39,520 --> 01:11:42,960
Sergeant, you hear the podcast 
and you're like, I'd really like

1481
01:11:42,960 --> 01:11:48,840
to get something moving on this.
There is a duty in law 

1482
01:11:48,840 --> 01:11:53,760
enforcement to be like, OK, I 
know we don't want to change. 

1483
01:11:53,760 --> 01:11:56,600
Nobody likes change. 
But if there is a new attack 

1484
01:11:56,600 --> 01:12:02,040
methodology and it is plausible,
right, that it's happening all 

1485
01:12:02,040 --> 01:12:03,800
over the world, we know that 
it's the real thing. 

1486
01:12:03,800 --> 01:12:07,680
There's been, I mean, Farouk, 
the shoe bomber, Richard Reed, 

1487
01:12:08,040 --> 01:12:12,240
there's been suicide bombing 
attempts actually in the States 

1488
01:12:12,240 --> 01:12:16,040
quite a bit, but nothing to the 
large scale attack of multiple 

1489
01:12:16,040 --> 01:12:20,280
bombers intermingled with 
shooters and stuff like that. 

1490
01:12:21,320 --> 01:12:27,240
But what's what is the harm in 
simply saying, can we tabletop 

1491
01:12:27,240 --> 01:12:29,160
this? 
Like, let's say it never 

1492
01:12:29,160 --> 01:12:31,680
happens, great, everybody high 
5. 

1493
01:12:32,280 --> 01:12:34,760
But what's the harm in table 
topping it right now? 

1494
01:12:34,760 --> 01:12:39,120
Because Boone, you know, Kevin 
Kyle, you guys know there's 

1495
01:12:39,120 --> 01:12:42,080
always time at APDI. 
Don't care what PD it is. 

1496
01:12:42,080 --> 01:12:46,520
There is always time. 
Maybe not at any hour of the 

1497
01:12:46,520 --> 01:12:49,320
day, but there are plenty of 
times where there is literally 

1498
01:12:49,360 --> 01:12:53,600
nothing going on and you could 
find time for a tabletop. 

1499
01:12:54,440 --> 01:12:57,080
Or even if it's like 5-10 minute
online training, something you 

1500
01:12:57,080 --> 01:13:01,000
assign to your entire troop. 
If nothing else, people gives 

1501
01:13:01,000 --> 01:13:03,400
them a snippet of what they 
might see. 

1502
01:13:03,760 --> 01:13:07,520
And most people that are in the 
profession or professional, if 

1503
01:13:07,520 --> 01:13:09,120
they don't know the answer, 
they're going to go researches. 

1504
01:13:09,120 --> 01:13:11,720
So if nothing else, it triggers 
them to go research it further. 

1505
01:13:12,040 --> 01:13:14,520
And then you start those 
processes where you get middle 

1506
01:13:14,520 --> 01:13:16,680
management, the officers 
thinking about it. 

1507
01:13:16,880 --> 01:13:19,320
If you ask upper management 
enough times, nobody wants to be

1508
01:13:19,320 --> 01:13:21,760
the squeaky wheel. 
But in all reality, if you ask 

1509
01:13:21,760 --> 01:13:23,760
enough times, usually you'll get
permission to do it. 

1510
01:13:24,040 --> 01:13:25,880
And if you get enough people 
back in you, you'll get 

1511
01:13:25,880 --> 01:13:27,600
permission to do it. 
And so there's little 

1512
01:13:27,600 --> 01:13:30,320
educational bits. 
It gets strikes interest and 

1513
01:13:30,320 --> 01:13:32,800
people understand it gives them 
a little bit of education and 

1514
01:13:32,800 --> 01:13:34,640
hopefully they further their 
education somewhere else. 

1515
01:13:36,080 --> 01:13:39,000
Boone, what do you think? 
I think you guys have good 

1516
01:13:39,000 --> 01:13:41,760
points. 
Also think I agree with a 

1517
01:13:41,760 --> 01:13:46,360
delivered indifference or, you 
know, liability, the liability 

1518
01:13:46,360 --> 01:13:48,240
monster is always a good 
motivator. 

1519
01:13:48,520 --> 01:13:52,760
But, but going a little deeper, 
like if, if you can talk to the 

1520
01:13:52,760 --> 01:13:56,200
command staff, say, hey, this is
just leadership training. 

1521
01:13:56,560 --> 01:14:00,880
You know, if, if we can handle 
this, regular law enforcement 

1522
01:14:00,880 --> 01:14:04,040
problems are easy. 
So kind of selling it as 

1523
01:14:04,040 --> 01:14:06,640
leadership training too. 
It's like, hey, we're going to 

1524
01:14:06,640 --> 01:14:09,040
come up with this crazy 
elaborate plan. 

1525
01:14:09,560 --> 01:14:12,040
You guys as leaders, how would 
you solve this problem? 

1526
01:14:12,280 --> 01:14:14,200
You know, kind of push that 
angle as well. 

1527
01:14:14,640 --> 01:14:17,200
But I agree with you, it all 
starts with the conversation. 

1528
01:14:19,240 --> 01:14:21,240
So setting something up and 
selling it as a thought 

1529
01:14:21,240 --> 01:14:23,920
exercise, being able to 
demonstrate here's here's a 

1530
01:14:23,920 --> 01:14:26,480
topic for a management meeting. 
This is what we could do as a 

1531
01:14:26,480 --> 01:14:29,440
problem solving exercise. 
And then by the way, push it out

1532
01:14:29,440 --> 01:14:31,120
to your your frontline 
supervisors. 

1533
01:14:31,360 --> 01:14:34,160
And by the way, here's a couple 
of medical training podcasts we 

1534
01:14:34,160 --> 01:14:36,360
think are useful. 
Here's something that either our

1535
01:14:36,360 --> 01:14:38,760
frontline officer should be 
considering when it talks about 

1536
01:14:38,960 --> 01:14:41,120
how to troop wounds. 
We should be doing that anyway. 

1537
01:14:41,120 --> 01:14:42,720
We should have the ability to 
save ourselves. 

1538
01:14:42,880 --> 01:14:45,760
That's a good idea. 
Same thing your fire station, 

1539
01:14:45,760 --> 01:14:48,520
your guys that are doing shift 
change when A changes for B or B

1540
01:14:48,520 --> 01:14:50,920
for C, it's like, hey, this is 
something we're listening to. 

1541
01:14:51,160 --> 01:14:54,320
This is a tactical problem that 
we might have to find ourselves 

1542
01:14:54,320 --> 01:14:56,520
involved in. 
You know, who do you know over 

1543
01:14:56,520 --> 01:14:59,000
in the, in the, the Police 
Department that you met at the 

1544
01:14:59,000 --> 01:15:01,320
softball game where you guys all
call each other a bunch of wimps

1545
01:15:01,320 --> 01:15:03,520
or whatever it is that that the 
fire and police are always 

1546
01:15:03,520 --> 01:15:05,400
doing. 
You know, how do we take that 

1547
01:15:05,440 --> 01:15:08,400
that natural rivalry and turn it
into something that's productive

1548
01:15:08,400 --> 01:15:09,920
and the people that we have 
contact wise. 

1549
01:15:10,160 --> 01:15:12,880
And so everybody on every shift 
should, you know, especially the

1550
01:15:12,880 --> 01:15:14,440
smaller places. 
There's no reason that people do

1551
01:15:14,440 --> 01:15:17,760
not know officers even in my 
small time that I did working 

1552
01:15:17,760 --> 01:15:20,680
with fire departments like you 
know who the officers are that 

1553
01:15:20,680 --> 01:15:22,120
respond to the things in your 
area. 

1554
01:15:22,120 --> 01:15:24,000
And if you don't, then you 
should because this is not a 

1555
01:15:24,000 --> 01:15:26,200
difficult thing to do. 
Often times those sync, those 

1556
01:15:26,200 --> 01:15:28,880
shifts sync up enough times that
you can at least recognize some 

1557
01:15:28,880 --> 01:15:30,880
of them. 
So being able to make that kind 

1558
01:15:30,880 --> 01:15:32,880
of cross. 
So the first time, as I had a 

1559
01:15:32,880 --> 01:15:35,120
Ranger instructor one time who 
told me you never want to try 

1560
01:15:35,120 --> 01:15:37,760
out a new dance at the prom. 
It's a good way to look like a 

1561
01:15:37,760 --> 01:15:40,480
fool. 
And if you remember that as as 

1562
01:15:40,480 --> 01:15:43,560
the the worst case scenario is 
you're going to go out there and

1563
01:15:43,560 --> 01:15:45,600
try to do something that you've 
never done before and you think 

1564
01:15:45,600 --> 01:15:47,720
you're going to do it. 
Well, we all know anybody in the

1565
01:15:47,720 --> 01:15:51,240
training space talks about this.
You almost never rise to the 

1566
01:15:51,240 --> 01:15:53,160
occasion. 
You nearly always fall back to 

1567
01:15:53,160 --> 01:15:54,840
the level of your training and, 
and what you've actually 

1568
01:15:54,840 --> 01:15:56,840
considered and some of the 
things is just considering it. 

1569
01:15:57,120 --> 01:15:58,880
It's just a thought exercise. 
Like you just said. 

1570
01:15:58,880 --> 01:16:01,920
It's like, hey, what if we 
walked through this? 

1571
01:16:02,040 --> 01:16:04,680
How do we solve it so that when 
that problem comes up, you go, 

1572
01:16:04,680 --> 01:16:06,760
well, this is similar to that 
thing that we solved, except 

1573
01:16:06,760 --> 01:16:08,760
there's a couple of new parts 
and this is maybe how we handle 

1574
01:16:08,760 --> 01:16:10,640
that. 
Peter, you look like you're 

1575
01:16:10,640 --> 01:16:13,400
ready to chomp ahead and. 
Go the body can't go where the 

1576
01:16:13,400 --> 01:16:15,880
mind hasn't been. 
It's one of my favorite sayings 

1577
01:16:15,880 --> 01:16:19,040
that anybody who's been in the 
profession of arms or the 

1578
01:16:19,040 --> 01:16:22,120
profession of caring for people,
if you haven't been mentally 

1579
01:16:22,120 --> 01:16:26,240
table topping, you're before a 
convoy, you're like, what could 

1580
01:16:26,240 --> 01:16:29,240
all go wrong on this, right? 
If this happens, what do we do? 

1581
01:16:29,240 --> 01:16:32,120
If that happens, what do we do? 
And it's not always contact and 

1582
01:16:32,120 --> 01:16:35,800
maybe it's just a vehicle breaks
down, then what's our plan on 

1583
01:16:35,800 --> 01:16:39,520
that? 
Or flying, especially with 

1584
01:16:39,760 --> 01:16:44,400
terrorism in the aircraft is our
job was to get get the bad guy 

1585
01:16:44,520 --> 01:16:48,720
at altitude. 
So OK, if this guy doesn't get 

1586
01:16:48,720 --> 01:16:52,200
out of the lab and we know the 
timing is within this many 

1587
01:16:52,200 --> 01:16:55,720
seconds and this many seconds 
for the average build for a lab 

1588
01:16:55,720 --> 01:16:59,240
visit, If this guy doesn't get 
on the lab, what's my first 

1589
01:16:59,320 --> 01:17:01,480
course of action? 
What's my second course? 

1590
01:17:01,480 --> 01:17:02,920
When do I breach the door? 
Right. 

1591
01:17:03,160 --> 01:17:05,400
All these things. 
And as you start going through 

1592
01:17:05,400 --> 01:17:09,360
there, every time you put a 
mental Rep through, you are 

1593
01:17:09,800 --> 01:17:13,480
exponentially better than that 
person who's just a mouthpiece 

1594
01:17:14,360 --> 01:17:16,680
sucking down coffee and 
collecting a paycheck. 

1595
01:17:17,240 --> 01:17:19,960
Run the mental reps because the 
body can't go where the mind 

1596
01:17:19,960 --> 01:17:21,760
hasn't been. 
So put your mind there. 

1597
01:17:22,960 --> 01:17:24,240
Yeah. 
And another thing that's really 

1598
01:17:24,240 --> 01:17:27,040
important when we talk about 
suicide vests, but not being 

1599
01:17:27,120 --> 01:17:30,320
large vests is just a simple 
concept of standoff, right? 

1600
01:17:30,600 --> 01:17:33,480
It's really simple. 
You can implement it, do it 

1601
01:17:33,480 --> 01:17:35,840
right. 
It's it's going to save lives. 

1602
01:17:36,280 --> 01:17:39,680
Yeah, most people I was, I've 
been asking the bomb question. 

1603
01:17:39,680 --> 01:17:43,160
Most people outside of the bomb 
techs, right, the EOD guys are 

1604
01:17:43,160 --> 01:17:46,320
the, the explosive breachers. 
They know this stuff pretty 

1605
01:17:46,320 --> 01:17:49,680
well. 
But I'm like, let's let's assume

1606
01:17:49,680 --> 01:17:54,760
HE 5 lbs of HE, What is your 
minimum standoff just for blast 

1607
01:17:54,760 --> 01:17:58,760
over pressure, not primary, 
secondary, tertiary mechanisms 

1608
01:17:58,760 --> 01:18:01,200
of injury. 
And most people are like, I have

1609
01:18:01,200 --> 01:18:05,880
no idea. 
There's literally an ATF bomb 

1610
01:18:05,880 --> 01:18:08,000
chart. 
You can look it up and save a 

1611
01:18:08,000 --> 01:18:11,240
copy on your phone. 
Be like, if it's this big, be 

1612
01:18:11,240 --> 01:18:14,400
this far away. 
And this is something that, So 

1613
01:18:14,400 --> 01:18:16,240
what you're saying there, some 
of these resources are all in 

1614
01:18:16,240 --> 01:18:18,040
one place. 
And maybe that's what our, our, 

1615
01:18:18,400 --> 01:18:20,560
that's what our duty is here 
that we're providing a little 

1616
01:18:20,560 --> 01:18:22,600
bit of a talk through. 
This is a, this is a, you know, 

1617
01:18:22,600 --> 01:18:24,640
like a free spooling kind of 
idea. 

1618
01:18:25,040 --> 01:18:27,320
But I like the idea and I know 
Peter has the, the mentality to 

1619
01:18:27,320 --> 01:18:29,880
do so. 
We pull that one page because I 

1620
01:18:29,880 --> 01:18:33,000
know for a fact that medics get 
it in their hazmat section, 

1621
01:18:33,040 --> 01:18:35,320
which is not significant and 
they don't ever touch it again. 

1622
01:18:35,520 --> 01:18:37,760
But every time that they 
recertify it, every time they're

1623
01:18:37,760 --> 01:18:39,920
doing continuing education, they
get hit with a hazmat. 

1624
01:18:39,920 --> 01:18:41,920
But I don't know that every law 
enforcement officer has that. 

1625
01:18:42,280 --> 01:18:45,840
So this information does exist 
and it is spread about, but it's

1626
01:18:45,840 --> 01:18:48,400
most likely not in the 
individual that is going to 1st 

1627
01:18:48,400 --> 01:18:50,600
encounter that threat. 
But it can be available to 

1628
01:18:50,600 --> 01:18:51,840
somebody with a high school 
education. 

1629
01:18:51,840 --> 01:18:54,640
It doesn't require an advanced 
degree to know how far back to 

1630
01:18:54,640 --> 01:18:57,200
stand because of fill in the 
blank chemical to fill in, you 

1631
01:18:57,200 --> 01:18:59,520
know, because they let everybody
have this access. 

1632
01:18:59,520 --> 01:19:01,760
If you're a trucker and you 
drive with certain things you 

1633
01:19:01,760 --> 01:19:04,240
have knowledge set that maybe 
other people don't have and it 

1634
01:19:04,240 --> 01:19:07,280
is accessible. 
So dot has them, ATF has them 

1635
01:19:07,280 --> 01:19:09,960
when it comes to bombs and 
chemicals, having a one sheet on

1636
01:19:09,960 --> 01:19:12,520
each of these that wouldn't take
much to carry around a little 

1637
01:19:12,520 --> 01:19:15,800
flip book and it would cost 
almost nothing for some admin 

1638
01:19:15,800 --> 01:19:17,360
person to be able to do it on 
light duty. 

1639
01:19:17,480 --> 01:19:20,080
It's like, oh, cool, you, you, 
you, you hurt your knee. 

1640
01:19:20,080 --> 01:19:21,480
I got a buddy right now who's on
a hurt knee. 

1641
01:19:21,600 --> 01:19:23,400
You hurt your knee while you 
were chasing down a subject and 

1642
01:19:23,400 --> 01:19:24,600
get into a fight. 
No big deal. 

1643
01:19:24,720 --> 01:19:27,760
Your job is to print off this 
eight page little booklet and 

1644
01:19:27,760 --> 01:19:29,920
laminate it and put it on a 
little D ring for us so we can 

1645
01:19:29,920 --> 01:19:32,520
have it in the patrol cars. 
So that when something crazy 

1646
01:19:32,520 --> 01:19:35,520
happens and you find out like 
there's a dude and he's down at 

1647
01:19:35,520 --> 01:19:38,280
our school and he's threatening 
to blow himself up and you're 

1648
01:19:38,280 --> 01:19:40,160
like, holy crap. 
I've actually heard about this 

1649
01:19:40,160 --> 01:19:42,080
scenario before. 
This is not the first time I've 

1650
01:19:42,080 --> 01:19:43,320
thought about it. 
And it's not just because I 

1651
01:19:43,320 --> 01:19:45,480
watched it in a horror or a 
movie somewhere or some kind of 

1652
01:19:45,480 --> 01:19:48,360
an action movie, you know, where
John Wick goes and takes a pot 

1653
01:19:48,360 --> 01:19:51,760
shot with a handgun at 300 yards
and knocks him out because 

1654
01:19:51,760 --> 01:19:53,080
that's not how it happens in 
real life. 

1655
01:19:53,080 --> 01:19:56,480
In real life, that guy probably 
detonates if he if he's decided 

1656
01:19:56,480 --> 01:19:59,120
to do so in this country. 
But having that, that combined 

1657
01:19:59,120 --> 01:20:00,800
knowledge, maybe that's what 
our, our maybe not a white 

1658
01:20:00,800 --> 01:20:04,800
paper, maybe a, a walkable list 
of a couple of things sharing 

1659
01:20:04,800 --> 01:20:06,640
those skills. 
Kevin, do you, do you remember 

1660
01:20:06,640 --> 01:20:09,040
the last time that you did a 
hazmat and whether or not that 

1661
01:20:09,040 --> 01:20:12,120
stuff was included? 
I mean, we rarely do hazmats. 

1662
01:20:12,120 --> 01:20:14,480
I mean, there's so much 
protection in the trucking 

1663
01:20:14,480 --> 01:20:17,440
industry and stuff nowadays. 
Most of our hazmats are like a 

1664
01:20:17,440 --> 01:20:19,240
diesel leak. 
So there's not a whole lot of 

1665
01:20:19,640 --> 01:20:22,880
toxic chemicals out there just 
because they're protected pretty

1666
01:20:22,880 --> 01:20:26,360
well. 
We use apps, the Cameo app on 

1667
01:20:26,360 --> 01:20:28,040
our phones. 
You can look up any chemical 

1668
01:20:28,040 --> 01:20:30,760
that was ever made. 
So if you can get numbers, I 

1669
01:20:30,760 --> 01:20:32,960
think the biggest problem is a 
lot of our medics and stuff, 

1670
01:20:33,360 --> 01:20:35,320
when you tell them bomb making 
materials, they have no clue 

1671
01:20:35,320 --> 01:20:37,440
what you're talking about. 
All the different types, they 

1672
01:20:37,440 --> 01:20:39,240
wouldn't even know what to 
research because they just look 

1673
01:20:39,240 --> 01:20:42,440
up, OK, all bombs are the same, 
you know, they just think it's 

1674
01:20:42,440 --> 01:20:45,720
one chemical when we know 
there's tons of chemicals how to

1675
01:20:45,720 --> 01:20:47,320
make it. 
And I think that's a lot of the 

1676
01:20:47,320 --> 01:20:49,680
problem is just they don't have 
the initial knowledge to even 

1677
01:20:49,680 --> 01:20:54,880
know what to go look for. 
Yeah. 

1678
01:20:54,880 --> 01:20:59,160
I think the as far as on 
explosives that the easiest way 

1679
01:20:59,160 --> 01:21:02,520
to go is to take suspicious 
versus unattended items. 

1680
01:21:02,840 --> 01:21:05,360
Suspicious. 
If you're in one of these 

1681
01:21:06,760 --> 01:21:09,840
attacks, homeland attacks, 
whether it's an ISIS or Al Qaeda

1682
01:21:09,840 --> 01:21:15,320
or whatever it is, and you have 
blatantly out of place items 

1683
01:21:15,320 --> 01:21:18,280
that are at high traffic areas. 
Or it would be, it looks like it

1684
01:21:18,280 --> 01:21:23,360
could be at the rally point for 
where law enforcement is 

1685
01:21:23,520 --> 01:21:28,080
staging. 
Then simply look at the size of 

1686
01:21:28,080 --> 01:21:31,280
the object and then you can 
extrapolate that into a possible

1687
01:21:31,280 --> 01:21:35,360
yield because you can only fit 
the weight of explosives into a 

1688
01:21:35,360 --> 01:21:38,360
certain thing water bottle. 
I mean, you can't fit 20 lbs of 

1689
01:21:38,360 --> 01:21:40,000
explosives into this water 
bottle. 

1690
01:21:40,240 --> 01:21:44,280
You just you can. 
So you look at the object and 

1691
01:21:44,280 --> 01:21:48,080
then you equate the object to a 
size of possible HE yield. 

1692
01:21:48,280 --> 01:21:51,600
Now, if it's low explosive, 
you're better off because it's 

1693
01:21:51,920 --> 01:21:54,640
it's not going to do as much. 
But if you always assume high 

1694
01:21:54,640 --> 01:21:58,000
explosive, HE is high explosive,
then there's low explosive. 

1695
01:21:58,000 --> 01:22:01,040
Low explosive is like gunpowder 
kind of thing right? 

1696
01:22:01,640 --> 01:22:04,840
Or fireworks. 
High explosives is C4. 

1697
01:22:05,560 --> 01:22:07,960
Maybe we wrap this thing up for 
people's attention span, but we 

1698
01:22:07,960 --> 01:22:11,360
do so in a way that maybe like a
a tight couple of minutes where 

1699
01:22:11,360 --> 01:22:14,320
people if that if I put this up 
front and and let them have 

1700
01:22:14,320 --> 01:22:18,240
something to grab onto. 
It's like I want to have in 

1701
01:22:18,240 --> 01:22:22,520
turn, Sarah hit the threat. 
Boone, if you'll, if you'll hit 

1702
01:22:22,520 --> 01:22:25,560
frontline officer stuff, Peter, 
you'll hit management and then 

1703
01:22:25,560 --> 01:22:27,240
I'll have Kevin kind of do like 
EMS. 

1704
01:22:27,480 --> 01:22:30,320
I'm looking for takeaways from 
from the gentleman as far as 

1705
01:22:30,320 --> 01:22:33,480
like action items for people to 
go out and do Sarah, if you can 

1706
01:22:33,480 --> 01:22:37,440
as as keenly and as tightly kind
of layout the thread that people

1707
01:22:37,440 --> 01:22:39,760
are going to see. 
I know the background of it is 

1708
01:22:39,760 --> 01:22:42,720
fascinating and there's plenty 
of talk on that, but I think I 

1709
01:22:42,720 --> 01:22:44,720
think a lot of people can't 
track networks. 

1710
01:22:44,760 --> 01:22:46,040
They don't know who you're 
talking about. 

1711
01:22:46,440 --> 01:22:50,200
And, and we've, we've proven 
that with people's attention 

1712
01:22:50,200 --> 01:22:52,520
span, they either have the 
ability to listen to three hours

1713
01:22:52,520 --> 01:22:55,840
of you going into the deep 
network or they've got no, no 

1714
01:22:55,840 --> 01:22:58,360
network ability at all. 
They can't, they can't fathom 

1715
01:22:58,400 --> 01:23:01,520
listening to any of it. 
So let's see if we can do threat

1716
01:23:02,080 --> 01:23:04,800
in phases one more time and then
we'll do reaction to it and 

1717
01:23:04,800 --> 01:23:06,080
we'll keep the two of you on 
screen for a SEC. 

1718
01:23:06,800 --> 01:23:08,360
Perfect. 
Yeah, When we're talking about 

1719
01:23:08,360 --> 01:23:10,040
the threat, it's very simple, 
right? 

1720
01:23:10,040 --> 01:23:13,120
There's two phases. 
You can one, we call it where 

1721
01:23:13,120 --> 01:23:15,560
you live, work and play, right? 
These are community level 

1722
01:23:15,560 --> 01:23:17,880
attacks. 
Small teams, let's say 5 to 10 

1723
01:23:17,880 --> 01:23:20,760
man attackers. 
They could be doing attacks in 

1724
01:23:20,760 --> 01:23:24,880
multiple locations, let's say, 
where there's a supermarket, 

1725
01:23:25,360 --> 01:23:27,680
where there's a hospital, 
etcetera. 

1726
01:23:27,680 --> 01:23:30,080
So you got to think through that
on public transportation. 

1727
01:23:30,280 --> 01:23:33,280
Then, you know, like we 
experienced on 9/11, the 

1728
01:23:33,280 --> 01:23:36,200
terrorists are focused on 
another attack at that 

1729
01:23:36,200 --> 01:23:38,320
magnitude, and it's going to be 
very similar. 

1730
01:23:38,320 --> 01:23:39,920
They're going to have the 
similar type of targets, 

1731
01:23:40,280 --> 01:23:43,240
aviation targets, right? 
So think through that. 

1732
01:23:43,520 --> 01:23:48,000
If there's another ground stop 
and you got separated from your 

1733
01:23:48,000 --> 01:23:50,280
family, you're stuck in Iowa, 
right? 

1734
01:23:50,280 --> 01:23:53,280
Taking a long leg home. 
Like, what was your plan with 

1735
01:23:53,280 --> 01:23:55,200
your family if you're not there 
for a few days? 

1736
01:23:55,440 --> 01:23:58,800
And then on the last pieces, the
tiers are going to target our 

1737
01:23:58,800 --> 01:24:01,160
government institutions and 
government facilities. 

1738
01:24:01,160 --> 01:24:04,360
And as you know, that's going to
freeze the entire system, right?

1739
01:24:04,360 --> 01:24:09,040
So so expect delayed responses 
is expect not having all the 

1740
01:24:09,040 --> 01:24:11,680
information you need. 
But you can still, you know, 

1741
01:24:11,680 --> 01:24:13,960
take care of yourself. 
Don't panic and have a plan all.

1742
01:24:15,440 --> 01:24:16,480
Right. 
Boone, I'm going to throw over 

1743
01:24:16,480 --> 01:24:19,600
to you individual parent or 
grandparent community level 

1744
01:24:19,600 --> 01:24:20,920
stuff. 
What are the action items you 

1745
01:24:20,920 --> 01:24:23,400
see people being able to walk 
forward and accomplish without 

1746
01:24:23,400 --> 01:24:26,520
any kind of special resources? 
Situational spatial 

1747
01:24:26,520 --> 01:24:30,480
environmental awareness. 
Having some type of plan, having

1748
01:24:30,480 --> 01:24:33,200
a plan for their family that 
doesn't involve the the the 

1749
01:24:33,200 --> 01:24:34,960
breadwinner or the leader of the
family. 

1750
01:24:35,280 --> 01:24:39,760
And then really refining their 
medical skills and integrating 

1751
01:24:39,760 --> 01:24:42,320
within the community, whether 
that be a be a face of 

1752
01:24:42,320 --> 01:24:47,240
faith-based organization, a 
Kiwanis Club, whatever that is. 

1753
01:24:47,360 --> 01:24:50,360
And start from the ground up to 
be resilient as a community. 

1754
01:24:52,600 --> 01:24:53,840
I like it. 
And then I'm going to go to 

1755
01:24:53,840 --> 01:24:55,680
Peter. 
We'll talk about individual 

1756
01:24:55,680 --> 01:24:57,720
officers, like the people you're
talking to and what you're 

1757
01:24:57,720 --> 01:24:59,960
advising those guys, since I 
know you're doing that every day

1758
01:24:59,960 --> 01:25:02,000
out there talking to cops, like 
what are you telling cops they 

1759
01:25:02,000 --> 01:25:04,360
need to do? 
And and then we'll go and do the

1760
01:25:04,400 --> 01:25:08,280
EMS access. 
First, first and foremost, look 

1761
01:25:08,280 --> 01:25:10,960
into what Sarah has been 
presenting. 

1762
01:25:11,720 --> 01:25:15,520
Except that evil is real. 
Except that the body can't go 

1763
01:25:15,520 --> 01:25:17,840
where the mind hasn't been. 
Start table topping. 

1764
01:25:17,840 --> 01:25:19,160
Start bringing awareness to 
this. 

1765
01:25:19,160 --> 01:25:22,080
You have a lot more power as an 
individual officer in your 

1766
01:25:22,080 --> 01:25:25,160
entity than you give a credit 
for by simply speaking up and 

1767
01:25:25,160 --> 01:25:28,280
saying, hey, have we actually 
looked into this? 

1768
01:25:28,360 --> 01:25:30,120
What do we do? 
If X? 

1769
01:25:30,280 --> 01:25:35,560
You can do that in roll call and
you can change a lot by just 

1770
01:25:35,560 --> 01:25:39,680
simply having the courage to 
step up and speak and say, are 

1771
01:25:39,680 --> 01:25:42,040
we prepared for this? 
And we all know the answer that 

1772
01:25:42,040 --> 01:25:46,320
no one is. 
That's perfect. 

1773
01:25:47,080 --> 01:25:48,400
All right. 
And I'm going to go to Kevin. 

1774
01:25:48,520 --> 01:25:51,480
Kevin, let's talk about what 
does it look like on your end to

1775
01:25:51,480 --> 01:25:53,440
your, your individual, let's say
St. 

1776
01:25:53,440 --> 01:25:56,000
Medic, your firefighter types 
and then I'm moving through the 

1777
01:25:56,000 --> 01:25:57,960
chain there. 
So if firefighters and 

1778
01:25:57,960 --> 01:26:00,320
paramedics, if you haven't 
already accepted the alert model

1779
01:26:00,320 --> 01:26:03,160
with the RTF type of training, 
please seek it out. 

1780
01:26:04,120 --> 01:26:08,240
Learn what it's about. 
Like I said go to your admin, a 

1781
01:26:08,240 --> 01:26:10,480
lot of classes are free, they're
state funded. 

1782
01:26:10,760 --> 01:26:12,840
If not, reach out to other 
agencies that are doing it and 

1783
01:26:12,840 --> 01:26:16,760
at least start the ball rolling.
All those RTF to like I said you

1784
01:26:16,760 --> 01:26:20,080
can transpire anything you learn
in one of those classes into 

1785
01:26:20,080 --> 01:26:21,840
live bombing, into a bus wreck, 
anything. 

1786
01:26:22,080 --> 01:26:26,120
So all those mass casualty type 
scenes, train on them. 

1787
01:26:26,920 --> 01:26:30,000
When it comes to chemicals, any 
type of chemical you can see in 

1788
01:26:30,000 --> 01:26:31,880
some type of attack. 
Research it. 

1789
01:26:32,520 --> 01:26:35,680
It's easy on your own. 
We all know we are busy running 

1790
01:26:35,680 --> 01:26:40,520
calls, but I think like Peter 
said, there's always time and 

1791
01:26:40,720 --> 01:26:42,200
take the time to research that 
stuff. 

1792
01:26:42,560 --> 01:26:45,720
If you haven't gone over blast 
injuries in a while, research 

1793
01:26:45,720 --> 01:26:47,440
them. 
Try to figure out what it's 

1794
01:26:47,440 --> 01:26:49,560
about. 
The like you saying the 

1795
01:26:49,560 --> 01:26:52,000
different size of bombs, what's 
your standoff? 

1796
01:26:52,440 --> 01:26:56,440
And on the community type level,
Boone hit it is go get your stop

1797
01:26:56,440 --> 01:26:58,200
the bleed training. 
Learn how to take care of 

1798
01:26:58,200 --> 01:27:03,000
yourself, become a stable person
that can handle your injuries 

1799
01:27:03,000 --> 01:27:05,400
yourself. 
So when I arrive I have 

1800
01:27:05,400 --> 01:27:09,080
something to work with. 
What are the the best websites 

1801
01:27:09,080 --> 01:27:11,120
that you would recommend for 
people to go and look at if they

1802
01:27:11,120 --> 01:27:12,840
want to refresh themselves? 
And obviously that the 

1803
01:27:12,840 --> 01:27:14,800
professional websites are one 
thing, but can, if you want to 

1804
01:27:14,800 --> 01:27:17,440
just refer people where they can
tell their community, especially

1805
01:27:17,440 --> 01:27:19,160
stuff like alert, things like 
that, you want to kind of just 

1806
01:27:19,160 --> 01:27:22,480
plug a couple of things. 
So Alert is a state of Texas. 

1807
01:27:22,680 --> 01:27:25,160
There should be a website. 
You go to the Alert and they 

1808
01:27:25,160 --> 01:27:27,560
have all different types of 
classes you can take Most of our

1809
01:27:27,560 --> 01:27:29,960
law enforcement and some of them
are for first responders. 

1810
01:27:30,200 --> 01:27:32,880
So for all the people in the 
field that are, you know, first 

1811
01:27:32,880 --> 01:27:36,240
responders, go to the Alert 
website, Stop the bleed is a 

1812
01:27:36,240 --> 01:27:38,400
national campaign. 
Go on the stop the bleed 

1813
01:27:38,400 --> 01:27:42,520
website, locate local 
instructors. 

1814
01:27:43,040 --> 01:27:46,560
There should be a list of them T
triple C classes, TEC classes, 

1815
01:27:46,960 --> 01:27:52,680
all those that's a NAEMT hostos.
You can go on their website and 

1816
01:27:52,680 --> 01:27:55,240
look for instructors in the area
that are offering those classes.

1817
01:27:55,480 --> 01:27:58,240
Those classes are, you know, 8 
to 16 hours. 

1818
01:27:58,240 --> 01:28:01,480
So they're they're a little more
expensive and they're a lot more

1819
01:28:01,480 --> 01:28:03,080
time consuming. 
But stop the bleeds. 

1820
01:28:03,080 --> 01:28:05,640
Most of those are free and 
you're looking at two to three 

1821
01:28:05,640 --> 01:28:09,200
hours of your time to get them. 
A lot of agencies are doing this

1822
01:28:09,200 --> 01:28:12,520
for free around just for 
community events, so reach out 

1823
01:28:12,520 --> 01:28:14,440
to those people in those 
websites and you should be able 

1824
01:28:14,440 --> 01:28:16,440
to find something. 
Outstanding. 

1825
01:28:16,680 --> 01:28:19,600
Peter, do you want to plug any 
resources and then let people 

1826
01:28:19,600 --> 01:28:21,400
know where they can find you if 
they've got questions and you do

1827
01:28:21,400 --> 01:28:23,080
stuff with faith-based 
communities as well and all 

1828
01:28:23,080 --> 01:28:24,480
that. 
So if you want to punch it out. 

1829
01:28:24,880 --> 01:28:28,720
Yeah, on our end, obviously 
anything from us at Archway 

1830
01:28:28,720 --> 01:28:30,840
Defense, any of the social 
media, reach out if we can help 

1831
01:28:30,840 --> 01:28:32,760
you. 
We have a ton of free resources.

1832
01:28:32,760 --> 01:28:36,280
Last time I was on we were 
talking about faith-based giving

1833
01:28:36,280 --> 01:28:40,560
away free PDF on how to spin up 
a safety and security team. 

1834
01:28:41,160 --> 01:28:44,640
We can't be everywhere. 
But if you take initiative like 

1835
01:28:44,640 --> 01:28:47,640
Boone was talking about, like 
just stand up and start taking 

1836
01:28:47,640 --> 01:28:51,160
the the self initiate your own 
protection. 

1837
01:28:51,160 --> 01:28:53,880
Archwaydefense.com Reach out to 
us anytime. 

1838
01:28:55,160 --> 01:28:57,120
Fantastic. 
Boone, Sarah, anything you guys 

1839
01:28:57,120 --> 01:28:59,160
want to plug in and resources 
you think people should know 

1840
01:28:59,160 --> 01:29:02,640
just. 
Yeah, The Gathering Storm book 

1841
01:29:02,640 --> 01:29:06,200
by Scott Mann, A lot of things 
we're talking about, he puts it 

1842
01:29:06,200 --> 01:29:09,760
in a book form where you can lay
it on, you know, your your 

1843
01:29:09,760 --> 01:29:12,480
lieutenant's desk and start that
conversation. 

1844
01:29:12,680 --> 01:29:15,680
And it guides a lot of these 
conversations and it doesn't 

1845
01:29:15,680 --> 01:29:18,080
really give answers. 
Those answers are up to you to 

1846
01:29:18,080 --> 01:29:20,160
figure out. 
But it does start that 

1847
01:29:20,160 --> 01:29:22,880
conversation and it gives you 
some of the things to think 

1848
01:29:22,880 --> 01:29:24,120
about. 
Yeah, and. 

1849
01:29:24,600 --> 01:29:27,200
That's it. 
It's called the Gathering Storm,

1850
01:29:27,200 --> 01:29:31,200
and it's at tfpineapple.org. 
It's the Task Force Pineapples 

1851
01:29:31,200 --> 01:29:33,320
putting it out. 
Very good. 

1852
01:29:33,640 --> 01:29:37,000
Can we order those by the cases?
I feel like I want to give them 

1853
01:29:37,000 --> 01:29:40,400
out as I drive around. 
I've already sent him a question

1854
01:29:40,400 --> 01:29:42,960
on that they're having. 
There's the it's faster to get 

1855
01:29:42,960 --> 01:29:44,800
the e-book right now. 
OK. 

1856
01:29:46,560 --> 01:29:47,400
OK. 
But that's something that's 

1857
01:29:47,400 --> 01:29:49,400
available by e-book. 
And as you said, that's not the 

1858
01:29:49,400 --> 01:29:50,640
solution. 
This is the question. 

1859
01:29:50,920 --> 01:29:52,600
The solution is going to be, it 
would it be fair to say 

1860
01:29:52,600 --> 01:29:56,360
individual to each individual's 
resources, their community, 

1861
01:29:56,360 --> 01:29:58,600
their terrain, their culture and
so on. 

1862
01:29:58,600 --> 01:30:00,640
It's going to be different 
depending on how dense your 

1863
01:30:00,640 --> 01:30:02,880
population is, your response 
times and everything else, what 

1864
01:30:02,880 --> 01:30:05,280
equipment you have. 
So everybody has to individually

1865
01:30:05,280 --> 01:30:07,200
inventory those. 
Is that more or less accurate 

1866
01:30:07,200 --> 01:30:11,040
guys? 
Absolutely. 100% all right. 

1867
01:30:11,720 --> 01:30:13,000
I think we're going to call that
right there. 

1868
01:30:13,000 --> 01:30:14,760
I think that's that's enough 
information for people to 

1869
01:30:14,760 --> 01:30:16,760
absorb. 
And if they have more questions,

1870
01:30:16,840 --> 01:30:18,120
we'll put links in the 
description. 

1871
01:30:18,120 --> 01:30:20,360
Anything that's been discussed 
as far as websites, folks will 

1872
01:30:20,360 --> 01:30:22,360
put them down below as well. 
So you guys can click through 

1873
01:30:22,760 --> 01:30:25,160
all the guests on all the social
media platforms if you like. 

1874
01:30:25,160 --> 01:30:27,840
And if there's something you 
want to clip out of this that is

1875
01:30:27,840 --> 01:30:31,240
valuable to you as a person, as 
a faith community, as a 

1876
01:30:31,240 --> 01:30:34,440
business, if it's valued to you,
if you are in a law enforcement 

1877
01:30:34,440 --> 01:30:37,440
or a, any kind of agency that's 
working in government, just take

1878
01:30:37,440 --> 01:30:38,280
it. 
Just take it. 

1879
01:30:38,360 --> 01:30:39,760
We don't care. 
That's not what this, you know, 

1880
01:30:39,880 --> 01:30:44,880
the idea is, is that less people
are left unaware of a potential 

1881
01:30:44,880 --> 01:30:46,560
threat out there. 
And you know, God willing, it 

1882
01:30:46,560 --> 01:30:49,360
never happens, but I don't think
God willing is a plan. 

1883
01:30:49,360 --> 01:30:50,760
I don't think hope is a good 
plan. 

1884
01:30:50,760 --> 01:30:52,240
I think you guys would all agree
with me on that. 

1885
01:30:52,640 --> 01:30:55,280
Having seen people say God 
forbid I have to do this. 

1886
01:30:55,280 --> 01:30:58,240
I always say God, God put me in 
the position to respond properly

1887
01:30:58,240 --> 01:31:00,520
when when something happens. 
So hopefully that's all of our 

1888
01:31:00,520 --> 01:31:02,800
prayer, our prayer of readiness.
Thanks to all the guests for 

1889
01:31:02,800 --> 01:31:04,200
joining us. 
Thank you, Peter, thank you, 

1890
01:31:04,200 --> 01:31:06,480
Boone, thank you, Sarah, thank 
you, Kevin for being here in the

1891
01:31:06,480 --> 01:31:08,640
studio with me. 
And God bless all of you guys. 

1892
01:31:10,440 --> 01:31:12,400
God, that's the Sunday sit down.
Thanks so much for joining me. 

1893
01:31:12,400 --> 01:31:14,560
I hope that was informative. 
I hope you took something away 

1894
01:31:14,560 --> 01:31:16,000
from it. 
And like I said, share it with 

1895
01:31:16,000 --> 01:31:17,520
anybody that will get them 
ready. 

1896
01:31:17,640 --> 01:31:20,160
The more people that are 
prepared for anything that may 

1897
01:31:20,160 --> 01:31:22,840
come their way, the better off 
we are as a nation. 

1898
01:31:22,840 --> 01:31:26,360
Thank you so much for listening.
Listen, if you guys are enjoying

1899
01:31:26,360 --> 01:31:28,440
what you hear, make sure you're 
subscribed to us over at 

1900
01:31:28,440 --> 01:31:30,800
rumbleitsrumble.com/kyle 
Seraphin. 

1901
01:31:30,800 --> 01:31:32,080
Make sure you've liked the 
video. 

1902
01:31:32,240 --> 01:31:34,400
Make sure you're subscribed to 
the channel if you're a rumbler,

1903
01:31:34,560 --> 01:31:38,120
if you are on YouTube and many 
of you are at youtube.com slash 

1904
01:31:38,240 --> 01:31:41,320
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You can find us on X at Kyle 

1905
01:31:41,320 --> 01:31:43,080
Serafin as well. 
Like us over there. 

1906
01:31:43,080 --> 01:31:45,800
Subscribe, set the notifications
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1907
01:31:45,960 --> 01:31:48,360
If you want to support the 
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1908
01:31:48,360 --> 01:31:49,880
locals. 
That's going to be Kyle 

1909
01:31:49,880 --> 01:31:53,960
serafin.com and you can actually
get this interview a day early. 

1910
01:31:54,280 --> 01:31:56,520
Also, you'll be part of our 
little, our little chat 

1911
01:31:56,520 --> 01:31:58,360
community there. 
And lastly, Spotify, it's Kyle 

1912
01:31:58,360 --> 01:31:59,960
serafinshow.com. 
If you want to share with a 

1913
01:31:59,960 --> 01:32:01,320
friend. 
We'd appreciate if you did. 

1914
01:32:01,520 --> 01:32:03,200
It's great stuff. 
That's the easiest way for us to

1915
01:32:03,200 --> 01:32:05,240
grow. 
Thank you for listening. 

1916
01:32:05,400 --> 01:32:08,400
I look forward to seeing you at 
0930 on Monday or whatever day 

1917
01:32:08,400 --> 01:32:09,640
of the week that you are 
watching us. 

1918
01:32:09,760 --> 01:32:11,000
We'll see you there in the live 
chat. 

1919
01:32:11,120 --> 01:32:13,120
Hope you have a fantastic day. 
God bless you and we'll see you 

1920
01:32:13,120 --> 01:32:16,880
again real soon. 
Thank you for listening to the 

1921
01:32:16,880 --> 01:32:19,680
Kyle Seraphin Show. 
Stream live weekdays on 

1922
01:32:19,680 --> 01:32:23,720
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1923
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