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Take a look behind the curtain 
with a real whistleblower, an 

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American patriot. 
Prepare to embrace the 

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uncomfortable truth, because 
this program has no time for 

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comforting lies. 
Here is civil liberties 

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enthusiast, Second Amendment 
defender, and recovering FBI 

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agent Kyle Serafin. 
Hello, my friends, and welcome 

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to the Kyle Serafin Show. 
Today is Friday. 

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It is September the eighth and 
we are rock'n'roll and we have a

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special guest for you today. 
I think you're going to very 

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much enjoy it. 
We kind of alluded to this on 

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Wednesday. 
This is going to be a topic that

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most Americans are going to be 
very interested in. 

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And so with you all's 
permission, we're going to push 

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Steve Friends just a little bit 
later into the show. 

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Our buddy the, the famous cohost
and guest host that was there 

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just a minute ago and we're 
going to be bringing on our 

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guest right now. 
We're going to push our sponsors

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even to the middle because I 
think we're going to take all 

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the minutes that we can. 
Tom, if you want to jump on the 

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screen here with me and Ryan got
us all squared away. 

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Tom, I I phonetically sounded 
out your name. 

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It looks like it's got like a 
Polish connotation to it. 

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Is it Kubeneic? 
In Poland, in the Covinius in 

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here it's Kubernek. 
Kubernek, it's it's even less 

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churched up than I gave it. 
Tommy is the founder and the CEO

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of Secured Storage which is a 
company that I've been using for

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several years now. 
It was well when I made my 

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investment in in gun storage 
this is where I went. 

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So my listeners were have been 
kind of asking me hey, you know 

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who do we use now that we know 
that Liberty has decided to take

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their name and swap it with 
tyranny, kind of the the 

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ultimate Bud Light move this, 
this week for a company that was

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kind of pitching themselves as 
something else. 

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So before we get into the 
security aspect of it, I want to

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talk about you specifically and 
just kind of get to know who you

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are as a person because you 
found it a safe company and that

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is not something that everybody 
does. 

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Could you tell us where you grew
up, where where you're from and 

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kind of what kind of family you 
came out of? 

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I grew up in Western New York 
from a just basic middle class 

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family and you know, one car, 
two dogs, a cat, and. 

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I was a professional guitar 
player as it it when I was 

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young. 
I played guitar when I was 13, 

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played in bands in high school 
and turned that pursued that as 

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a career, ending up in Hollywood
as a heavy metal guitarist. 

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Tendonitis ended my career. 
I got into took a job, 

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telemarketing because I had no 
other. 

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I had no skills and they would 
hire anybody and instead of 

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practicing guitar for 8 hours a 
day, I just learned sales. 

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Built and I quit that job and 
started a telemarketing company 

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in my apartment. 
Built that up to a decent sized 

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company. 
Got into the Internet, started 

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selling laptop storage, tape 
racks, and just various products

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that I just could find, source 
and sell. 

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A guy called me and said, hey, 
can you store an MP5? 

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And I was like, sure, what's an 
MP5? 

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I had no idea, he goes. 
It's a little machine gun. 

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I started laughing and he this 
went from MP3. 

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We were listening to music MP4 
video and then it escalated 

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quickly to machine guns. 
I'm thinking this is a laptop 

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and this is a hospital calling 
me because of all the HIPAA 

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laws. 
And so I talked to him for about

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20 minutes and I said give me 
some time on this. 

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I'm just intrigued. 
And back then, this is before 

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Google, it was Yahoo was the 
main search engine. 

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I started doing research and 
there was a lot of information 

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about the military struggling as
a transition from the M16 

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standard battle rifle to the M4,
which is really a modular weapon

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system. 
And all the armories were not 

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designed for this, a modular 
fire weapon and all the optics, 

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all the high value gear that now
had to be stored in an Armory. 

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So I started pursuing weapon 
storage, knowing nothing about 

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it. 
And worked with a Canadian 

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company to design our first 
system. 

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We launched that in like 2003 
and we were on this huge 

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learning curve working with a 
Canadian firm and the design 

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wasn't right for the US 
military. 

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In 2008, I designed and patented
what became the Secure Tactical 

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Weapon storage platform, which 
is now we simply call Cradle 

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Grid. 
Patented in 2008, by 2011 we 

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were the primary supplier to the
US military for weapons storage 

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systems and you know secure it 
now is the global leader in 

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military weapons storage and 
Armory design. 

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In 2015, we went into consumer 
products really out of 

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frustration with what the safe 
industry was producing and our 

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consumer civilian that part of 
our business now is 85% of the 

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company. 
We still. 

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You know, we look at focus, we 
focus on the war fighter and 

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making sure these guys have what
they need. 

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But the bulk of our company is 
taking 25 years of military 

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experience in that in that world
and bringing that to the 

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consumer market because the 
transition that the military 

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went through in you know the 
Gulf War at that time. 

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The consumers, civilians go 
through the same transition and 

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it delays you know anywhere from
10 to 15 years or so. 

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But now civilian firearms are 
they're modular, everybody's got

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optics, the volume of gear 
coming into our space is growing

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exponentially. 
So our solution that really 

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changed the military and 
completely change the way they 

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think about armories is now 
doing the same thing in the 

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consumer market. 
It's We're bringing fast access,

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lightweight, modular storage, 
and. 

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And just a different mindset. 
We approach it the way we 

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approach an Armory, a military 
armor. 

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Your home is your Armory. 
And we try to look at it as a 

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turning it into a defendable 
fortress. 

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I like that idea a lot. 
My buddies always used to joke 

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that my my house should actually
be nicknamed Arsenal. 

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I don't know why they thought 
that was the IT wasn't Armory, 

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it was Arsenal. 
And so my Wi-Fi network for 

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years has always been known as 
arsenals. 

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If you're ever in my 
neighborhood, people, and you go

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looking around and you see FBI 
surveillance fan, that's not me.

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I'm Arsenal and I think it's 
really an interesting point 

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because I think the gun industry
has changed in the same way that

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the safe industry does. 
It's slow. 

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There's that sort of FUD I guess
that's kind of the Internet 

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slang for the guy who still has 
the hunting rifle and it's got 

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like an old Leopold, you know 
three to 10 on it or something 

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and or three to 9. 
And that's and that's the guy 

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that they're marketing to. 
That's the Cabela's and the and 

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the Bass Pro. 
But they're fast realizing that 

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there's a lot more guys like me 
out there who have a set of 

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night vision, you know, on a on 
a helmet and they've got a bunch

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of modular a Rs with lasers and 
and thermal and different things

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like that. 
So it's interesting that you 

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guys change. 
Why is the market so behind the 

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the consumer trends on the 
firearm side, the firearms are 

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there. 
People can buy them today. 

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They can go get, you know, they 
can go get a Sig Rattler, they 

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can go get, you know, a spear or
something like that that's 

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that's currently being fielded. 
And yet the safe still have like

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a 2 inch standoff and they're 
still trying to basically put up

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a bunch of Browning hunting 
rifles. 

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The the gun safe industry has 
never really gone through a 

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change. 
They've been doing the same 

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system since the mid 70s is when
the kind of the birth of the of 

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the boy called the modern gun 
safe industry. 

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I think the biggest driver of it
is when you look at gun safe 

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companies, they're not owned and
run by firearms enthusiasts or 

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even by people in the firearms 
community. 

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They're run by guys whose 
background is metal bending 

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cabinet making steel work. 
That's kind of where it all grew

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out of a company in in Utah. 
You know, Liberty came, they all

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came out of you know, Fort Knox,
all these comes came out of the 

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same little incubator and it was
around building metal boxes and 

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that's what they do and they 
focus on metal boxes. 

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But there's, you know, early on 
when we decided to go in the 

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retail, I met with the senior 
team at Liberty, they invited me

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out. 
One of their product development

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guys loved what I was doing and 
I went out there. 

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I didn't know the retail space, 
I figured. 

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Let me just partner with 
Liberty, license my technology 

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to them. 
They know the space and let them

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run with it. 
You know, meeting with their 

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senior team, not one of them 
owned an AR15 and more than half

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of them had never owned a gun. 
That seems like a big. 

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Failure. 
Yeah, well, they came to me to 

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say, Tom, your system in our 
safe only holds 12 guns. 

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We're looking at a fat boy, 
Junior and I said. 

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Well with all due respect your 
safe holds 12 guns. 

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He said, Tom, that's a 36 gun 
safe. 

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I said, I said there's no way 
you're going to hold 36 guns of 

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any kind in that safe. 
And their head of sales who I 

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believe now is there is their 
president. 

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I'm not sure but I think he is 
the same guy said well Tom 

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that's our industry's little 
white lie And right there this 

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my my switch turned off and I 
was like wow, you know that's 

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the industry. 
They don't. 

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I mean, I don't know how they 
view their customers. 

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Their customers are smarter than
they think, but their idea is, 

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hey, if they say 40 guns, we'll 
say 42. 

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The hell with the customer. 
The customer doesn't, doesn't 

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matter. 
It's what's what's the rest of 

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the industry doing? 
Because you've noticed every gun

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safe has basically the same 
interior, right? 

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And they're all marketed. 
They're all marketed the same 

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way. 
It's a number of guns that is 

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unreasonable for a real person, 
absolutely, unless you just 

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stack a bunch of handgun boxes 
in. 

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Yeah, I mean. 
We came into the space from a 

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world, you know, in the 
military. 

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I'm designing a system to hold 
1100 M fours. 

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You know, 200, two, 49 saw, you 
know, all the specific M tow 

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list of guns. 
If my system doesn't exactly 

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hold those guns, I don't get 
paid. 

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The other side of it is. 
I need to design a system where 

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all the guns are deployable. 
They're all you can issue the 

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weapons. 
Armies are active places, so we 

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use terms like straight line 
access with every safe we make. 

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Guns are never stacked behind 
guns. 

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You open the door with one hand,
grab a rifle with the other, 

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remove it, close and lock the 
door with your other hand. 

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You're never laying guns on the 
floor. 

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You're never dealing with the 
mess. 

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And that's what we bring to 
everything we do. 

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So, you know, we don't make a 40
gun safe. 

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If you got 40 guns, buy two or 
three four small modular safes 

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and then locate them in your 
home in areas that give you a 

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00:09:49,960 --> 00:09:51,800
tactical advantage. 
We have a whole area of our 

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00:09:51,800 --> 00:09:55,920
website that talks about 
decentralized storage and the 

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principles about storing guns in
locations that put you in a 

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00:10:00,640 --> 00:10:02,440
better position to defend your 
home. 

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00:10:02,600 --> 00:10:07,320
The beauty of it is, the most 
tactical positions in your home 

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to secure firearms are also some
of the safest. 

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When you look at somebody 
breaking into your home, thieves

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don't look in closets. 
They won't look in kitchens. 

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They don't. 
There's I mean they're very, 

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it's very specific what a thief 
does. 

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Master bathroom, master bedroom,
master bedroom, closet, Home 

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Office, dining room. 
And he leave the house. 

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00:10:26,520 --> 00:10:29,000
And that's pretty standard on, 
you know, I pull all that from 

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FBI crime data and that's what I
love most about watching your 

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00:10:32,520 --> 00:10:34,280
because I went to your website. 
I used to be a surveillance guy 

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00:10:34,280 --> 00:10:36,440
which means I got a lot of time 
sitting down waiting on a bad 

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00:10:36,440 --> 00:10:39,290
guy to move a lot of time on 
websites and I watched 

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everything you guys had in 2018 
and 2019. 

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00:10:41,410 --> 00:10:43,010
I think I ended up buying an 
early 2020. 

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00:10:43,010 --> 00:10:44,650
Maybe it was a little earlier 
than that. 

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00:10:44,650 --> 00:10:46,810
I have to double check. 
But I ended up going with the 

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the the cradle grid system that 
you have because this is the way

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I we're showing it on the screen
right now folks. 

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00:10:50,690 --> 00:10:52,490
This is the way I organize my 
things as well. 

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00:10:52,770 --> 00:10:54,210
I agree with you. 
I want to be able to open the 

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00:10:54,210 --> 00:10:56,370
safe grab my thing and move on. 
I don't want to lean it against 

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the safe and have it fall over 
and and break a $3000 optic or 

227
00:10:59,690 --> 00:11:04,160
or you know off off my 0 and 
your stuff started making a ton 

228
00:11:04,160 --> 00:11:06,040
of sense for a couple reasons. 
One, you talked about the 

229
00:11:06,040 --> 00:11:08,120
difference between what a real 
safe is and whatever like a 

230
00:11:08,120 --> 00:11:10,600
retail security container is. 
I think that's kind of the 

231
00:11:10,600 --> 00:11:12,520
differentiation. 
So maybe we can talk about that.

232
00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:15,720
And then the second one was 
this, the statistics on what 

233
00:11:16,000 --> 00:11:19,600
criminals do and who steals your
gun and what the purpose of your

234
00:11:19,600 --> 00:11:22,240
security system is and those all
are going to mean a lot of 

235
00:11:22,240 --> 00:11:24,840
things to my to my audience. 
So maybe you can break down 

236
00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:27,080
first of all what is that the 
difference between a safe and 

237
00:11:27,080 --> 00:11:34,390
sort of that that RSC? 
Yeah, the all. 99.9% of all gun 

238
00:11:34,390 --> 00:11:39,510
safes in America are UL class. 
RSCUL establishes safe ratings. 

239
00:11:39,910 --> 00:11:42,790
UL is run is run by the 
insurance industry so insurance 

240
00:11:42,790 --> 00:11:45,670
companies can properly assess 
risk and right insurance 

241
00:11:45,670 --> 00:11:48,590
policies. 
So they came up with the class 

242
00:11:48,670 --> 00:11:52,070
RSC when the gun safe industry 
came out and stands for 

243
00:11:52,070 --> 00:11:56,960
Residential Security Container. 
The word safe is not part of the

244
00:11:56,960 --> 00:12:00,400
designation because back when 
they created this it was their 

245
00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:04,240
position that these residential 
security containers did not meet

246
00:12:04,240 --> 00:12:06,280
the minimum performance to be 
called as safe. 

247
00:12:06,560 --> 00:12:10,360
What the standard is for ARSC, 
which is all of your liberties 

248
00:12:10,360 --> 00:12:14,880
you can all your safe sold is it
blocks access from a person 

249
00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:20,040
using a hammer of less than 
£3.00, a pry bar of less than 18

250
00:12:20,040 --> 00:12:23,400
inches and a small hand drill 
for 5 minutes. 

251
00:12:24,500 --> 00:12:28,340
That's a 1945 threat level, you 
know, if you really think about 

252
00:12:28,340 --> 00:12:31,340
it in the modern world, I'm 
going to come in. 

253
00:12:32,460 --> 00:12:35,100
If I want to break into a safe, 
I'm going to ignore the door. 

254
00:12:35,100 --> 00:12:36,500
I'm going to ignore all the 
bolts. 

255
00:12:36,500 --> 00:12:39,620
I'm going to ignore the plate 
steel on the door, the anti 

256
00:12:39,620 --> 00:12:42,700
drill, all the security stuff. 
I'm simply going to get a 

257
00:12:42,700 --> 00:12:44,740
circular saw, cheap circular 
saw. 

258
00:12:44,740 --> 00:12:47,540
I'm going to go to Home Depot 
and buy a carbide blade that's 

259
00:12:47,540 --> 00:12:50,340
used in the concrete industry to
cut rebar. 

260
00:12:51,030 --> 00:12:53,790
And I'm going to cut A2 by two 
hole, 2 foot by two foot hole on

261
00:12:53,790 --> 00:12:56,150
the side of the safe. 
It's going to take me about 

262
00:12:56,430 --> 00:12:58,710
between 20 and 30 seconds to cut
that hole. 

263
00:12:59,510 --> 00:13:02,830
I can cut a I can cut like I cut
a Liberty Fat Boy Junior 

264
00:13:02,830 --> 00:13:05,710
completely in half. 
Cut the whole top off it in a 

265
00:13:05,710 --> 00:13:07,910
minute, 8 seconds. 
I cut a hole in the side. 

266
00:13:08,150 --> 00:13:09,950
I'm good at it. 
About 18 seconds. 

267
00:13:10,750 --> 00:13:14,830
When you look at actual break in
data on safes it's hard to find.

268
00:13:14,830 --> 00:13:18,110
It's it's it's not public. 
But safes aren't pride. 

269
00:13:18,110 --> 00:13:20,790
They're not. 
You know, safes are cut open, 

270
00:13:21,110 --> 00:13:24,830
and we use the same steel as 
everybody else, and we're all 

271
00:13:24,830 --> 00:13:27,870
using the same gauge steel. 
We make the same boxes, and my 

272
00:13:27,870 --> 00:13:31,310
safes are as susceptible as saw 
blades as everybody else's. 

273
00:13:32,030 --> 00:13:35,310
But my safes are small, modular,
and they're shallow because we 

274
00:13:35,310 --> 00:13:39,550
do one row of guns. 
So my safes all fit in discreet 

275
00:13:39,550 --> 00:13:42,310
locations. 
A thief's enemy is time. 

276
00:13:42,630 --> 00:13:44,190
They don't have hours in your 
house. 

277
00:13:44,190 --> 00:13:46,310
The average thief is in a home 
for 9 minutes. 

278
00:13:47,020 --> 00:13:49,260
So they're moving quickly. 
The minute they find something 

279
00:13:49,260 --> 00:13:51,980
of value, they typically grab 
that they've won. 

280
00:13:52,460 --> 00:13:54,620
Now the clock is really ticking.
All they want to do is get out 

281
00:13:54,620 --> 00:13:57,620
of the house. 
Gun safes, you know, front hall 

282
00:13:57,620 --> 00:13:59,380
closet. 
Thieves don't look in closets, 

283
00:13:59,500 --> 00:14:02,980
kitchen pantry, great location. 
Thieves never go into kitchens. 

284
00:14:03,260 --> 00:14:05,460
If you got, you know if you got 
a lot of values, a big watch 

285
00:14:05,460 --> 00:14:09,060
collection or some high end 
jewelry, don't put it in your 

286
00:14:09,060 --> 00:14:11,940
master bedroom closet. 
That's that's the number two 

287
00:14:11,940 --> 00:14:13,900
location. 
Put it in. 

288
00:14:15,130 --> 00:14:17,330
Take your little jewelry box. 
Put it in your kitchen pantry. 

289
00:14:17,330 --> 00:14:20,130
You're safer there. 
Unlock nobody right next to your

290
00:14:20,130 --> 00:14:22,690
blender. 
Nobody wants to steal your Fruit

291
00:14:22,690 --> 00:14:24,610
Loops. 
You know, it's not how it works.

292
00:14:27,170 --> 00:14:30,130
Yeah, you know, we just, again, 
I didn't come from this 

293
00:14:30,130 --> 00:14:33,330
industry, you know, I didn't. 
I didn't come from the firearms 

294
00:14:33,330 --> 00:14:36,090
industry. 
I was a musician and I get into 

295
00:14:36,090 --> 00:14:38,610
storage. 
I've always been real big in the

296
00:14:38,610 --> 00:14:43,500
spatial relations and the. 
You know, I equate a lot of like

297
00:14:43,660 --> 00:14:46,660
being a musician. 
Spatial skills, understand 

298
00:14:46,660 --> 00:14:50,420
playing jazz, playing more 
advanced music, having really 

299
00:14:50,420 --> 00:14:53,740
good spatial relations allows 
you to frame things 3 

300
00:14:53,740 --> 00:14:56,020
dimensionally. 
And I think it really, I think 

301
00:14:56,020 --> 00:14:58,940
it really helps. 
And I think same thing with 

302
00:14:58,940 --> 00:15:01,300
computer programming, the 
ability to think 3 dimensionally

303
00:15:01,300 --> 00:15:04,620
in programming allows you to 
view databases differently and 

304
00:15:04,620 --> 00:15:09,380
gives you an advantage. 
So I came into this space and I 

305
00:15:09,380 --> 00:15:11,020
just think of it as common 
sense. 

306
00:15:12,090 --> 00:15:14,170
But I didn't have that 
background of how the gun is 

307
00:15:14,170 --> 00:15:16,770
supposed to be stored. 
I designed my first system 

308
00:15:16,770 --> 00:15:18,770
having never seen a military 
weapon rack. 

309
00:15:19,490 --> 00:15:22,730
And when we presented our Cradle
grid, our secured tactical 

310
00:15:22,730 --> 00:15:26,370
platform, we presented it to 
yousefic which U.S. 

311
00:15:26,370 --> 00:15:29,130
Army Special Forces Command, 
which is now just part of SOCOM.

312
00:15:29,650 --> 00:15:32,090
We walked and presented a system
and we didn't know if they're 

313
00:15:32,090 --> 00:15:34,370
going to love it, like it or or 
laugh at us. 

314
00:15:34,890 --> 00:15:37,970
And they just lit up with what 
we had done and. 

315
00:15:38,850 --> 00:15:41,050
And we were off to the races. 
I mean, it makes perfect sense 

316
00:15:41,050 --> 00:15:43,010
when you see it. 
Like, what's fun is you you talk

317
00:15:43,010 --> 00:15:44,890
about that sort of mindset that 
people get locked in because 

318
00:15:44,890 --> 00:15:46,410
they're in that industry. 
This is the way it's done. 

319
00:15:46,850 --> 00:15:49,090
In many ways, yours looks more 
like a Guitar Center. 

320
00:15:49,090 --> 00:15:51,130
The way that you'd go into a 
retail store and see all the 

321
00:15:51,130 --> 00:15:53,210
things laid out nicely where you
could access it. 

322
00:15:53,210 --> 00:15:54,370
I mean, that's how you'd store 
guitars. 

323
00:15:54,370 --> 00:15:56,330
You'd hang them all up in a 
place where you can grab them 

324
00:15:56,330 --> 00:15:58,250
off the rack, right? 
There's something to that. 

325
00:15:58,490 --> 00:16:02,630
My, my, my Home Office is. 
And I use Cradle Grid because it

326
00:16:02,630 --> 00:16:05,910
does hold guitars. 
I bet Lynch's Strat, couple of 

327
00:16:05,910 --> 00:16:08,470
Telecasters. 
I've got guitars and then long 

328
00:16:08,470 --> 00:16:12,590
range precision rifles all on a 
big wall and it's pretty funny. 

329
00:16:12,990 --> 00:16:14,270
I mean it makes it makes perfect
sense. 

330
00:16:14,270 --> 00:16:16,510
The other thing is, is it's got 
almost a Hollywood flair to it. 

331
00:16:16,510 --> 00:16:18,430
If people see these, we're 
throwing some images up from 

332
00:16:18,430 --> 00:16:21,350
your website and it's like what 
people would expect, a really 

333
00:16:21,350 --> 00:16:25,540
cool gun room, a gun vault would
look like and it's accessible, 

334
00:16:25,540 --> 00:16:27,420
you can take them off. 
It's great for retail, but man, 

335
00:16:27,420 --> 00:16:28,940
there's nothing better than 
being able to access your 

336
00:16:28,940 --> 00:16:31,500
firearm, take it, do a bolt 
check and then put it back down 

337
00:16:31,500 --> 00:16:34,220
and know that it's good to go 
and safe and where you can not 

338
00:16:34,220 --> 00:16:35,660
bang into other stuff when you 
grab it. 

339
00:16:36,420 --> 00:16:38,660
It's it. 
It it does look good. 

340
00:16:38,660 --> 00:16:41,580
I'll tell you what, we we do a 
lot of Hollywood sets. 

341
00:16:41,580 --> 00:16:43,860
We did John Wick. 
We did the Terminator movies. 

342
00:16:43,860 --> 00:16:47,740
We did Ben Affleck film there in
South America. 

343
00:16:48,350 --> 00:16:51,510
So Hollywood, we used to have a 
whole collection of racks that 

344
00:16:51,510 --> 00:16:53,390
we'd ship the Hollywood and 
they'd ship them back because 

345
00:16:53,390 --> 00:16:55,430
they don't want new stuff, they 
don't want armories to look 

346
00:16:55,430 --> 00:16:58,550
used. 
So we had a whole like 26 big 

347
00:16:58,550 --> 00:17:02,150
cabinets that we would send to 
movie sets and during the 

348
00:17:02,150 --> 00:17:06,030
Terminator movie The the their, 
their production crew bought all

349
00:17:06,030 --> 00:17:07,569
the cabinets and kept them. 
Nice. 

350
00:17:07,569 --> 00:17:09,290
So we never got them back after 
that checks out. 

351
00:17:09,290 --> 00:17:10,650
I I would too. 
All right. 

352
00:17:10,650 --> 00:17:12,930
So that's this is the product. 
I didn't mean for this to be a 

353
00:17:12,930 --> 00:17:14,970
promo as much as anything else, 
but we might as well because 

354
00:17:14,970 --> 00:17:16,569
it's like I said, it's something
I use every day. 

355
00:17:16,569 --> 00:17:18,290
I love it. 
I'm able to get into my guns and

356
00:17:18,290 --> 00:17:20,690
and mess with them all the time 
and people know that I'm kind of

357
00:17:20,730 --> 00:17:22,050
a gun guy. 
I've got one of your safes right

358
00:17:22,050 --> 00:17:24,329
now that I'm actually dealing 
with your with your customer 

359
00:17:24,329 --> 00:17:25,849
service. 
This is how this all came about 

360
00:17:25,849 --> 00:17:28,349
for me the day before the 
Liberty debacle. 

361
00:17:28,349 --> 00:17:29,830
This is very fortuitous and 
interesting. 

362
00:17:29,870 --> 00:17:31,950
I've got four of your Agile 
boxes. 

363
00:17:32,150 --> 00:17:34,670
The idea behind it made sense. 
I can cut them open if I really 

364
00:17:34,670 --> 00:17:37,230
had to, and I know that it's 
it's accessible to a thief that 

365
00:17:37,230 --> 00:17:39,510
way. 
And yet no one's going into one 

366
00:17:39,510 --> 00:17:41,230
of my weird bedrooms. 
That doesn't make sense, where 

367
00:17:41,230 --> 00:17:43,430
there's a cradle and a crib and 
these kind of things, and 

368
00:17:43,430 --> 00:17:45,030
they're going to go in and try 
and pull the thing that we're 

369
00:17:45,030 --> 00:17:47,520
showing on the screen right now.
So I reached out to you guys and

370
00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:49,000
I said, hey, I'm in the middle 
of a move. 

371
00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:50,160
I've got, like, some stuff in 
boxes. 

372
00:17:50,160 --> 00:17:52,840
And somewhere I have misplaced 
my keys and one of my four 

373
00:17:52,840 --> 00:17:55,480
batteries is no longer working. 
Do you guys have a key set? 

374
00:17:55,480 --> 00:17:57,840
If I give you my order number 
and all my backup information, 

375
00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:00,120
can you send me another key? 
And they said, no, you're, you 

376
00:18:00,120 --> 00:18:02,680
know, buy a new lock set and you
have to know the combination of 

377
00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:04,680
your own safe. 
And I went, that's great. 

378
00:18:04,680 --> 00:18:06,440
I actually felt really good 
about that, that it was going to

379
00:18:06,440 --> 00:18:08,400
be difficult because I knew it 
was my own bonehead mistake. 

380
00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:10,520
And if I had to tear the safe 
part, it's my own fault. 

381
00:18:10,520 --> 00:18:13,480
I I knew that or I had to put, 
you know, tear the box apart. 

382
00:18:13,880 --> 00:18:16,200
And then we see right 
afterwards, Liberty is 

383
00:18:16,640 --> 00:18:21,080
surrendering A backdoor access 
to the FBI, which is my former 

384
00:18:21,080 --> 00:18:23,360
employer. 
And I have a lot of distrust for

385
00:18:23,360 --> 00:18:25,040
the government because I worked 
in the government and I know 

386
00:18:25,040 --> 00:18:26,640
better. 
You just don't give things to 

387
00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:28,760
the government. 
So maybe you can talk about the 

388
00:18:28,760 --> 00:18:31,280
mindset that you guys had going 
into your lock set and the way 

389
00:18:31,280 --> 00:18:33,440
you have it set up. 
And then if you were surprised 

390
00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:35,680
to find out that Liberty was 
holding on the backdoor keys. 

391
00:18:36,680 --> 00:18:38,440
Well, I knew that. 
I knew that they had that 

392
00:18:38,440 --> 00:18:41,400
capacity. 
Our secured locks, our 

393
00:18:41,400 --> 00:18:44,520
proprietary locks have no 
capacity for additional codes. 

394
00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:46,000
They just we didn't program that
way. 

395
00:18:46,240 --> 00:18:49,360
Now we do use Securum locks, 
which is the same lock that 

396
00:18:49,360 --> 00:18:51,960
Liberty uses on a few of our 
products and it's not a bad 

397
00:18:51,960 --> 00:18:55,000
lock. 
In our case, when we started the

398
00:18:55,000 --> 00:18:57,760
relationship with Securum, they 
presented the locks to us that 

399
00:18:57,760 --> 00:19:00,440
this is what it is and this is 
the user code and this is the 

400
00:19:00,440 --> 00:19:02,800
master code. 
The master code is the one the 

401
00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:07,410
manufacturer keeps and. 
And I had at the time, my two my

402
00:19:07,410 --> 00:19:10,610
#2 and my, my and #2 in the 
company and my head of OPS. 

403
00:19:11,450 --> 00:19:16,290
We all looked at each other and 
I'm like, I don't want to manage

404
00:19:16,290 --> 00:19:20,490
a database of codes to my safes,
my, you know, my #2 in the 

405
00:19:20,490 --> 00:19:23,090
company looked at me, says I 
don't want that liability. 

406
00:19:23,170 --> 00:19:26,010
The OPS guy's like, wait a 
minute, you want me to build a 

407
00:19:26,010 --> 00:19:27,370
database? 
No. 

408
00:19:27,490 --> 00:19:29,250
And we just said, why would we 
do this? 

409
00:19:29,530 --> 00:19:32,810
And we really weren't thinking 
about like safety and security. 

410
00:19:32,810 --> 00:19:35,010
We're thinking about just 
liability of. 

411
00:19:35,460 --> 00:19:38,180
Why do why would we want to be 
able to access one of our 

412
00:19:38,180 --> 00:19:41,620
customers safes like FBI. 
This never occurred to us. 

413
00:19:41,620 --> 00:19:44,220
We just said the simple answer 
is don't do it. 

414
00:19:44,220 --> 00:19:46,180
I mean we weren't thinking down 
range. 

415
00:19:46,180 --> 00:19:50,020
We were just thinking right now 
we're a young fast growing small

416
00:19:50,020 --> 00:19:52,700
company we don't want this 
responsibility. 

417
00:19:52,700 --> 00:19:57,300
We don't want this liability. 
And in hindsight it was a it was

418
00:19:57,300 --> 00:20:01,980
the right decision, but now and 
I posted a few videos recently 

419
00:20:02,340 --> 00:20:06,480
calling out the industry. 
And I looked at some websites 

420
00:20:06,520 --> 00:20:10,680
and it appears that most of the 
the big safe manufacturers are 

421
00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:11,800
keeping access codes. 
That's. 

422
00:20:12,240 --> 00:20:15,760
So crazy when you read, when you
read into their websites. 

423
00:20:15,760 --> 00:20:20,560
Like I was posing the question, 
why am I required to register a 

424
00:20:20,560 --> 00:20:24,120
safe to get a warranty? 
I don't register my guns. 

425
00:20:24,480 --> 00:20:28,640
But all the safe manufacturers 
want you to register your safe. 

426
00:20:28,640 --> 00:20:32,180
And and they're asking for a lot
of personal information that's 

427
00:20:32,180 --> 00:20:33,580
secure. 
Well, there's no registration 

428
00:20:33,580 --> 00:20:35,620
policy. 
We honor our warranty. 

429
00:20:35,660 --> 00:20:37,180
We don't ask. 
Hey, where'd you get this? 

430
00:20:37,180 --> 00:20:39,100
We just say what's what's wrong?
Let's fix it. 

431
00:20:39,100 --> 00:20:42,020
Warranty claims are so rare, and
I think they're rare for 

432
00:20:42,100 --> 00:20:46,900
everybody. 
Why worry about whether this 

433
00:20:46,900 --> 00:20:48,700
person is the original buyer or 
not? 

434
00:20:49,020 --> 00:20:51,260
This guy's got guns. 
He's got a safe. 

435
00:20:51,340 --> 00:20:53,660
Something's up. 
Solve the problem. 

436
00:20:53,860 --> 00:20:56,020
Get this guy back. 
You know, get this guy back. 

437
00:20:56,020 --> 00:20:59,220
And that's kind of our comes 
from our military heritage of 

438
00:20:59,930 --> 00:21:01,850
what's best for the war fighter,
what's best for the home 

439
00:21:01,850 --> 00:21:04,290
defender. 
Fix the problem that cost me 100

440
00:21:04,290 --> 00:21:05,210
bucks. 
I don't care. 

441
00:21:06,570 --> 00:21:10,010
These claims are so rare. 
And the goodwill I get when 

442
00:21:10,010 --> 00:21:13,210
somebody buys my maybe somebody 
buys my safe at a garage sale 

443
00:21:13,210 --> 00:21:14,810
from somebody who didn't need it
and they get it. 

444
00:21:14,810 --> 00:21:17,610
Maybe they can't afford to spend
the money for a new one. 

445
00:21:17,610 --> 00:21:19,730
You know what? 
He's got a problem. 

446
00:21:19,730 --> 00:21:21,770
I want to solve it because you 
know, he's going to go his 

447
00:21:21,770 --> 00:21:23,650
friends and say, tell you what, 
I bought it used and I called 

448
00:21:23,650 --> 00:21:25,850
these guys. 
They took care of everything. 

449
00:21:26,290 --> 00:21:30,680
This is old school sales basics.
It is, it's you know, I look at 

450
00:21:30,680 --> 00:21:33,840
you know we use it's the the old
Orvis or the old Land's annual 

451
00:21:34,080 --> 00:21:38,120
those early catalog companies 
that ruled the world because of 

452
00:21:38,120 --> 00:21:40,760
customer service. 
And that's kind of how we look 

453
00:21:40,760 --> 00:21:42,360
at it. 
And you look at our social media

454
00:21:42,360 --> 00:21:45,400
posts and people talking about 
our team, we have a small 

455
00:21:45,400 --> 00:21:48,240
customer service team and 
they're rock stars. 

456
00:21:48,760 --> 00:21:53,890
And I gave them the authority 
early on just say, look, it's 

457
00:21:53,890 --> 00:21:57,290
not about the cost, it's about 
the customer and solve, solve 

458
00:21:57,290 --> 00:21:59,290
the problem, solve the problem 
as quickly as you can. 

459
00:21:59,290 --> 00:22:02,450
We're talking about firearms. 
We'll deal with the cost later, 

460
00:22:02,850 --> 00:22:04,770
just get, get the problem 
solved. 

461
00:22:04,810 --> 00:22:08,090
And we do that all the time. 
And you know, sometimes people 

462
00:22:08,090 --> 00:22:10,570
can't get into a safe and we've 
had some situations where some 

463
00:22:10,570 --> 00:22:12,490
of our bigger safes had to be 
cut open. 

464
00:22:14,050 --> 00:22:18,010
It's very, very rare. 
And in those cases, we had 

465
00:22:18,010 --> 00:22:20,530
scratch and debt product in our 
warehouse. 

466
00:22:21,010 --> 00:22:23,410
We were able to remove a door 
and send it to the customer at 

467
00:22:23,410 --> 00:22:25,570
no charge. 
Now, can we do that all the 

468
00:22:25,570 --> 00:22:27,410
time? 
No, But the opportunity was 

469
00:22:27,410 --> 00:22:29,650
there. 
And for us, we put customer 

470
00:22:29,650 --> 00:22:31,890
service into a bubble. 
When there's a problem, you 

471
00:22:31,890 --> 00:22:35,130
focus on that problem and you 
solve that problem. 

472
00:22:35,370 --> 00:22:38,090
Meaning if I got to go back in 
the warehouse, hey, you guys get

473
00:22:38,090 --> 00:22:40,130
the safe off that old thing, 
we're going to throw it away, 

474
00:22:40,330 --> 00:22:42,010
box it up and ship it to this 
guy. 

475
00:22:42,530 --> 00:22:44,530
Just just get it done, OK? 
And they stop what they're 

476
00:22:44,530 --> 00:22:47,490
doing, solve the problem. 
And it's worked. 

477
00:22:47,610 --> 00:22:51,400
It's worked for us. 
The goodwill that I see coming 

478
00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:53,600
from people, when I talk to 
people, I have so many people 

479
00:22:53,600 --> 00:22:57,640
come up to me and with stories 
about they had a problem and 

480
00:22:57,640 --> 00:23:00,480
they just say thank you guys. 
Your customer service guys just 

481
00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:03,000
got me out of a jam. 
And they answered the phone. 

482
00:23:03,000 --> 00:23:05,240
I just talked to Steven 
yesterday and I was like I 

483
00:23:05,240 --> 00:23:07,280
reached out, I dialed the 
number, I pushed the button, 

484
00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:09,800
whatever it is for customer 
service or Technical Support, I 

485
00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:11,080
get somebody on the phone right 
away. 

486
00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:12,800
I think there was a guy named 
either Brian or Brandon that I 

487
00:23:12,800 --> 00:23:14,680
spoke to the day before that 
and. 

488
00:23:15,280 --> 00:23:17,760
Both great guys knowledgeable, 
understood their product. 

489
00:23:17,760 --> 00:23:20,000
That's what you could hope for. 
They don't speak with an accent 

490
00:23:20,000 --> 00:23:22,800
from the Philippines, which was 
nice for me because because I 

491
00:23:22,800 --> 00:23:24,680
used to work for Dell, I used to
sell computers too. 

492
00:23:24,680 --> 00:23:26,040
I I know exactly what that's 
about. 

493
00:23:26,040 --> 00:23:29,400
It's like, oh man, it's, you 
know, language barriers are 

494
00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:30,560
tough. 
And I'll tell you what, Steven 

495
00:23:30,560 --> 00:23:33,840
is a rock star in the company. 
He is my oldest employee. 

496
00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:36,800
He's been with me longer than 
any he's been with me for a long

497
00:23:36,800 --> 00:23:39,800
time And he didn't come out of 
the firearms community. 

498
00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:43,240
He came out of a research lab. 
He's a he's a retired former 

499
00:23:43,240 --> 00:23:47,640
military and yeah I'm not sure 
he wanted to work for us 

500
00:23:47,640 --> 00:23:49,800
initially he came and 
interviewed and we talked and he

501
00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:55,160
started working and he's one of 
my best employees and to us this

502
00:23:55,160 --> 00:23:57,560
is his best job. 
So it just you know we have a 

503
00:23:57,560 --> 00:23:59,280
lot that that's kind of how our 
crew is. 

504
00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:03,200
We're for your for your viewers.
We're not a big corporate firm. 

505
00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:06,120
You know I refer to our company 
as a band of misfits out to 

506
00:24:06,120 --> 00:24:07,960
change the world and we're a 
small company. 

507
00:24:08,080 --> 00:24:11,480
We're a group. 
I mean, managers, my CMO is in 

508
00:24:11,480 --> 00:24:15,440
the head of the department was 
on social media for, you know, 

509
00:24:15,480 --> 00:24:19,320
20 hour St. answering, answering
comments, answering people's 

510
00:24:19,320 --> 00:24:21,960
questions. 
We don't throw things off. 

511
00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:25,720
What's that? 
Including mine, Yeah, exactly. 

512
00:24:25,720 --> 00:24:31,120
But that's what it takes the gun
safe community, regardless of 

513
00:24:31,120 --> 00:24:34,120
the size of our whole community,
it still is a small group. 

514
00:24:34,560 --> 00:24:37,480
It's I mean we all view 
ourselves as you go to the range

515
00:24:37,480 --> 00:24:39,240
and you're shooting with guys 
whether you know them or not. 

516
00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:41,760
It's a small group of guys and 
you all work together to 

517
00:24:41,760 --> 00:24:44,440
maintain that basic range safety
when you're shooting. 

518
00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:48,760
When you're going to go hunting.
It's always comes down to a 

519
00:24:48,760 --> 00:24:51,480
small group of people trying to 
achieve a goal and that's kind 

520
00:24:51,480 --> 00:24:53,600
of how we look at regardless of 
the size of the company. 

521
00:24:53,720 --> 00:24:58,240
We're always going to maintain 
that we all believe in our 

522
00:24:58,240 --> 00:24:59,800
cause. 
We all we're all on the same 

523
00:24:59,800 --> 00:25:01,560
path and we're all working 
together. 

524
00:25:01,880 --> 00:25:05,520
But we don't make corporate big 
decisions because there isn't 

525
00:25:05,520 --> 00:25:07,920
one. 
You know I'm the guy that owns 

526
00:25:07,920 --> 00:25:11,310
the company and I spend very 
little time looking at a 

527
00:25:11,310 --> 00:25:13,710
computer. 
You know I'm bouncing I'm I'm 

528
00:25:13,710 --> 00:25:15,710
out in the warehouse with a 
welder with wood. 

529
00:25:15,710 --> 00:25:18,510
I make all the prototypes I make
them out of wood and on metal I 

530
00:25:18,510 --> 00:25:21,990
make you know I come Frank in 
brackets I I make the form that 

531
00:25:21,990 --> 00:25:24,870
I want the function I want then 
we send it out to somebody to 

532
00:25:24,870 --> 00:25:28,150
make it actually look good. 
But that's, I mean, we're very 

533
00:25:28,150 --> 00:25:32,910
much hands on and it's a it's a 
really fun place to work because

534
00:25:32,910 --> 00:25:37,400
it's a we thrive on allowing 
creativity to flow across all 

535
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:39,240
departments. 
Which makes a lot of sense. 

536
00:25:39,240 --> 00:25:41,360
If you come from outside of it, 
will you tell people a little 

537
00:25:41,360 --> 00:25:42,600
bit about the true safe, too, 
with the OR? 

538
00:25:42,600 --> 00:25:43,960
I think that's what the line is 
called. 

539
00:25:44,080 --> 00:25:46,080
So you know, you obviously have 
the lightweight versions. 

540
00:25:46,080 --> 00:25:47,840
That's what I've used. 
I'm a mover right now. 

541
00:25:47,840 --> 00:25:50,000
When I get my my final home, I'm
going to invest in something a 

542
00:25:50,000 --> 00:25:51,920
little more durable. 
People want to know, hey, I want

543
00:25:51,920 --> 00:25:53,200
to, I'm going to vault the 
sucker in. 

544
00:25:53,320 --> 00:25:54,360
I want this thing to stay with 
the house. 

545
00:25:54,360 --> 00:25:57,520
What does that look like, the 
true safe we made? 

546
00:25:58,360 --> 00:26:00,720
I've been at the time early in 
our retail. 

547
00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:04,470
I was kind of hitting the gun 
safe industry pretty hard and I 

548
00:26:04,470 --> 00:26:07,350
got a lot of pushback and 
rightfully so. 

549
00:26:07,590 --> 00:26:09,790
Truly, truly, I really, I came 
out a little too strong 

550
00:26:09,790 --> 00:26:11,870
probably. 
So we decided that I kept 

551
00:26:11,870 --> 00:26:13,590
talking about the safe 
industries not really making 

552
00:26:13,590 --> 00:26:16,030
safes. 
So we decided to make the true 

553
00:26:16,030 --> 00:26:19,710
safe. 
The true safe is made per the 

554
00:26:19,710 --> 00:26:23,350
original patent of Silas Herring
who designed and patented the 

555
00:26:23,350 --> 00:26:27,550
first real fireproof safe. 
It's double walled steel filled 

556
00:26:27,550 --> 00:26:30,390
with a concrete composite. 
It's very heavy. 

557
00:26:30,390 --> 00:26:33,730
I think it's around 1200 pounds.
It's 4 inches thick. 

558
00:26:33,730 --> 00:26:36,330
I think it's 3 inches of 
concrete between slabs of steel 

559
00:26:36,330 --> 00:26:43,050
on the door and it is a true 
safe now. 

560
00:26:43,210 --> 00:26:45,210
People are getting getting riled
up in the chat that I've got. 

561
00:26:45,210 --> 00:26:46,810
I've got a live chat now. 
Looking at it, they're going 

562
00:26:46,810 --> 00:26:51,050
like, oh man, it's a big safe. 
It holds 8 guns because that's 

563
00:26:51,050 --> 00:26:53,730
all that fits in a true safe. 
It's a lot of thickness, a lot 

564
00:26:53,730 --> 00:26:56,210
of steel, a lot of weight. 
Now, the reason for the true 

565
00:26:56,210 --> 00:26:59,060
safe. 
And it's not the true gun safe. 

566
00:26:59,100 --> 00:27:02,620
It's the true safe. 
It is a safe that will hold 

567
00:27:02,620 --> 00:27:04,700
guns. 
But you buy this because you 

568
00:27:04,700 --> 00:27:08,780
want a true, safer valuables for
precious metals, for for for 

569
00:27:08,780 --> 00:27:10,820
things that you really want to 
protect. 

570
00:27:11,420 --> 00:27:12,940
Now, I'm not talking about fire 
rating. 

571
00:27:13,100 --> 00:27:16,540
The gun safe industry thrives on
90 minutes, 60 minute, one hour,

572
00:27:16,540 --> 00:27:20,140
2 hour fire ratings. 
We don't give any of our 

573
00:27:20,140 --> 00:27:22,780
products a fire rating. 
The true safe doesn't have a 

574
00:27:22,780 --> 00:27:25,180
fire rating. 
It has a graph showing the 

575
00:27:25,180 --> 00:27:29,220
performance in a fire test. 
We tested it and the fire 

576
00:27:29,220 --> 00:27:32,580
testing process is you're safe 
goes in an oven. 

577
00:27:32,860 --> 00:27:35,780
Heat probes go in the safe. 
They turn the oven up to 13 or 

578
00:27:35,780 --> 00:27:39,700
1400 degrees and you wait when 
the temperature probes in the 

579
00:27:39,700 --> 00:27:42,500
safe break 350 degrees. 
Boom. 

580
00:27:42,740 --> 00:27:45,060
That's how long your safe will 
last in a fire. 

581
00:27:45,220 --> 00:27:48,140
As per the test, our safe went 
into the oven. 

582
00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:51,440
We broke 350 at 2 hours 20 
minutes. 

583
00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:54,800
Our safe had been sitting in the
sun in the back of a truck. 

584
00:27:55,520 --> 00:27:58,200
We went into the oven. 
Our safe was 99 degrees when it 

585
00:27:58,200 --> 00:27:59,800
went in. 
So probably is longer. 

586
00:28:00,200 --> 00:28:02,440
What would I consider a fire 
rating on that? 

587
00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:06,520
30 to 45 minutes Max. 
And the reason I say that is 

588
00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:13,230
that test is a static test. 
Real fires are dynamic, and the 

589
00:28:13,230 --> 00:28:15,950
way to look at that is if you're
making a pizza in an oven, you 

590
00:28:15,950 --> 00:28:19,590
got the oven up to 500 degrees 
or 450, you're going to put your

591
00:28:19,590 --> 00:28:22,150
pizza in to cook it. 
You can put your hand in that 

592
00:28:22,150 --> 00:28:25,710
oven and hold it in there. 
I'll bet you can hold it in that

593
00:28:25,710 --> 00:28:29,070
oven at 4 and 50 degrees for 
probably 3 minutes, maybe longer

594
00:28:29,070 --> 00:28:31,670
until your hand gets to a heat 
point where you got to pull it 

595
00:28:31,670 --> 00:28:32,590
out. 
That's going to burn. 

596
00:28:33,710 --> 00:28:36,270
Heat transfers very slowly in a 
static environment. 

597
00:28:36,510 --> 00:28:40,370
Now take a small jet engine 
mounted on a bench with a jet 

598
00:28:40,370 --> 00:28:44,250
exhaust that's 450 degrees 
coming out at 60 miles an hour. 

599
00:28:44,250 --> 00:28:45,810
Put your hand in that exhaust 
stream. 

600
00:28:46,010 --> 00:28:49,050
It'll burn the skin off your 
bone in probably less than a 

601
00:28:49,050 --> 00:28:51,250
second. 
When you look at a fire in a 

602
00:28:51,250 --> 00:28:55,370
home, the convective force of 
that fire has air moving in 

603
00:28:55,370 --> 00:28:58,810
excess of 60 miles an hour. 
And when you look at actual, you

604
00:28:58,810 --> 00:29:01,970
know, Google up gun safes and 
fires, yeah, there's a few hero 

605
00:29:01,970 --> 00:29:04,810
stories out there, but gun safes
don't survive fires. 

606
00:29:04,810 --> 00:29:06,730
The big fires that roared 
through California, there were 

607
00:29:06,730 --> 00:29:08,810
articles about none of the gun 
safes survived. 

608
00:29:09,300 --> 00:29:13,380
We cooked off a Liberty 90 
Minutes safe last summer out of 

609
00:29:13,380 --> 00:29:15,780
the Secured ranch. 
We built a big burn box and set 

610
00:29:15,780 --> 00:29:20,340
up a fire at 18 Minutes. 
This the 90 Minutes safe broke 

611
00:29:20,340 --> 00:29:23,540
400 degrees. 
What's more important, though, 

612
00:29:23,540 --> 00:29:26,700
is you don't want a fire rating 
with your gun safe. 

613
00:29:26,980 --> 00:29:29,980
If it's in a fire, you're never 
going to shoot the guns again. 

614
00:29:29,980 --> 00:29:33,220
Because here's what happened. 
We put the fire out and we're 

615
00:29:33,220 --> 00:29:35,780
like, wow, you know, 20 Minutes.
I was really quick. 

616
00:29:35,780 --> 00:29:37,420
We're all like, wow, that's 
really surprising. 

617
00:29:37,790 --> 00:29:39,390
Well, Steven, of course, was 
with us. 

618
00:29:39,670 --> 00:29:42,270
He had his grill, so he's 
grilling up sausages and we sit,

619
00:29:42,270 --> 00:29:46,430
took a little break, have some 
lunch and came back to the safe.

620
00:29:46,430 --> 00:29:51,790
The internal temperature had 
gone up to 720 degrees, so the 

621
00:29:51,790 --> 00:29:57,790
hot metal transfer hardened 
steel breaks down at 380 to 400 

622
00:29:57,790 --> 00:30:00,390
and Neal steel breaks down at 
680 degrees. 

623
00:30:00,510 --> 00:30:02,030
That's your barrel and your 
action. 

624
00:30:02,270 --> 00:30:04,070
The guns in that safe should 
never be fired. 

625
00:30:04,510 --> 00:30:09,530
So you know that safe does have 
a fire component to it. 

626
00:30:09,530 --> 00:30:11,410
It it. 
It is quite secure in a fire, 

627
00:30:11,410 --> 00:30:15,410
but most of our folks we built 
it for that purpose only. 

628
00:30:15,770 --> 00:30:19,090
Our core focus is fast modular 
access, fast access modular 

629
00:30:19,090 --> 00:30:23,290
safes, and allowing people to 
live with gun safes. 

630
00:30:23,290 --> 00:30:25,650
The average American moves every
6.3 years. 

631
00:30:26,250 --> 00:30:28,970
The most left behind thing when 
people move is a hot tub and a 

632
00:30:28,970 --> 00:30:31,540
gun. 
Safe With our product, they can 

633
00:30:31,540 --> 00:30:33,020
easily move it. 
In many cases they can 

634
00:30:33,020 --> 00:30:35,820
disassemble it and move it. 
I've taken mine from Virginia to

635
00:30:35,820 --> 00:30:37,780
New Mexico to Arizona and now to
Texas. 

636
00:30:37,780 --> 00:30:40,020
So mine's move with me in the 
very short space. 

637
00:30:40,020 --> 00:30:42,540
A lot of times it does happen. 
People who know I really love 

638
00:30:42,540 --> 00:30:43,460
that you guys are science 
driven. 

639
00:30:43,460 --> 00:30:44,340
I know you got another 
interview. 

640
00:30:44,340 --> 00:30:45,420
I just want to thank you for 
your time. 

641
00:30:45,420 --> 00:30:48,180
We'll plug the, the socials for 
the company and the website will

642
00:30:48,180 --> 00:30:51,100
be available in our show notes. 
But I think that gives people 

643
00:30:51,100 --> 00:30:52,820
really good insight about what's
out there. 

644
00:30:52,820 --> 00:30:55,100
And and Steve and I might, my 
guest next is going to talk 

645
00:30:55,100 --> 00:30:56,740
about lawful access. 
So we'll talk about that FBI 

646
00:30:56,740 --> 00:30:59,460
list a little bit later. 
But we do really appreciate it. 

647
00:30:59,460 --> 00:31:01,260
Tom, thanks for jumping on with 
me this morning on last minute. 

648
00:31:01,340 --> 00:31:02,660
Notice. 
All right. 

649
00:31:02,660 --> 00:31:03,860
Thank you very much. 
Have a great day. 

650
00:31:03,940 --> 00:31:06,860
Yeah, I enjoyed it. 
Okay. 

651
00:31:06,860 --> 00:31:09,900
Ladies and gentlemen, here he is
the real Steve friend and he's 

652
00:31:09,900 --> 00:31:11,340
going to jump on. 
And we're going to talk a little

653
00:31:11,340 --> 00:31:13,620
bit about Doj's policy. 
We're going to talk about what 

654
00:31:13,620 --> 00:31:16,220
DOJ has been trying to do, which
is to break access to things 

655
00:31:16,220 --> 00:31:18,900
that are secure, whether they be
your gun safe, whether it be 

656
00:31:18,900 --> 00:31:21,100
your end to end encryption, 
whether it be the things that 

657
00:31:21,100 --> 00:31:24,140
you think that you do, you have 
that the government cannot 

658
00:31:24,140 --> 00:31:25,660
access. 
We're going to talk about all 

659
00:31:25,660 --> 00:31:26,540
those things. 
How you doing, Steve? 

660
00:31:27,100 --> 00:31:28,860
I'm doing good, man. 
I'm excited for a friendly 

661
00:31:28,860 --> 00:31:30,020
Friday. 
Very good. 

662
00:31:30,020 --> 00:31:32,220
I am also excited. 
I'm gonna do our ad reads right 

663
00:31:32,220 --> 00:31:33,380
now. 
If you don't mind, if you'll 

664
00:31:33,540 --> 00:31:34,620
bear with me just a few more 
moments. 

665
00:31:34,620 --> 00:31:37,060
It looks like you're ready to go
PT with the Marine Corps right 

666
00:31:37,060 --> 00:31:38,100
now. 
Like this shirt. 

667
00:31:38,820 --> 00:31:40,780
Give me two seconds. 
So we're gonna say thanks first 

668
00:31:40,780 --> 00:31:44,870
of all to my buddies over at. 
Caredo Boyle's House. 

669
00:31:44,870 --> 00:31:48,310
This is the Suspendables Merch. 
This is the Dash Suspendables 

670
00:31:48,390 --> 00:31:50,390
with an S on theend.com. 
You can go there. 

671
00:31:50,390 --> 00:31:52,430
Find our merch store. 
Guys, if you're looking for any 

672
00:31:52,430 --> 00:31:53,950
of our gear, this is how you go 
get it. 

673
00:31:54,030 --> 00:31:56,470
We'll say another thank you as 
well to my friends at Catholic 

674
00:31:56,470 --> 00:31:57,870
Vote. 
You guys know who they are. 

675
00:31:57,870 --> 00:32:00,310
You know what they're about. 
This is Catholic vote in the 

676
00:32:00,310 --> 00:32:02,670
fight for faith, family and 
freedom. 

677
00:32:03,300 --> 00:32:05,980
Things that you may need and the
other pieces you might need to 

678
00:32:05,980 --> 00:32:08,260
have your firearm secured so the
government doesn't come in and 

679
00:32:08,260 --> 00:32:10,500
take them. 
But catholicvote.org can go and 

680
00:32:10,500 --> 00:32:12,140
sign in with the e-mail address 
there. 

681
00:32:12,140 --> 00:32:13,820
You'll see the loop. 
They've got some interesting 

682
00:32:13,820 --> 00:32:16,940
stuff on there. the VA promoting
trans treatments and an 

683
00:32:16,940 --> 00:32:18,220
abortion. 
That's lovely. 

684
00:32:18,220 --> 00:32:21,140
Our government funded stuff. 
On that mayor, New York, NY 

685
00:32:21,140 --> 00:32:23,500
Mayor Adams. 
Eric Adams is talking about how 

686
00:32:23,500 --> 00:32:25,140
migration is going to destroy 
New York City. 

687
00:32:25,300 --> 00:32:27,420
If you haven't seen that video, 
I'll make sure I repost it. 

688
00:32:27,620 --> 00:32:30,380
I sent it to my motherinlaw who 
is a New Yorker and I told him 

689
00:32:30,380 --> 00:32:32,140
this is a self-inflicted wound. 
Kind of funny. 

690
00:32:32,300 --> 00:32:35,180
Tommy Tuberville still. 
Fighting the the military right 

691
00:32:35,180 --> 00:32:37,860
now when it comes to giving 
promotions and trying to hold it

692
00:32:37,860 --> 00:32:40,340
up based on abortion funding, A 
lot of good stuff going on in 

693
00:32:40,340 --> 00:32:41,900
today's loop to definitely check
them out. 

694
00:32:42,100 --> 00:32:45,740
And then lastly our OG sponsor. 
You guys know them and Ryan and 

695
00:32:45,740 --> 00:32:47,300
I are sporting them. 
I have to send them to the other

696
00:32:47,300 --> 00:32:49,780
suspendables. 
This is Patriot Coolers. 

697
00:32:49,940 --> 00:32:53,340
Patriot Coolers at dot com is 
where you go to find the Patriot

698
00:32:53,340 --> 00:32:56,140
Coolers products, whether it be 
hard coolers, soft packs, day 

699
00:32:56,140 --> 00:32:57,910
packs. 
Parts for their coolers. 

700
00:32:57,910 --> 00:33:00,430
If you have to go and find they 
actually sell new lids for their

701
00:33:00,430 --> 00:33:01,990
OG products. 
If you have like some of the old

702
00:33:01,990 --> 00:33:06,310
ones like I do, use promo code 
Kyle, Kyle, 10% off when you buy

703
00:33:06,310 --> 00:33:10,350
them promo code Kyle, Kyle get 
you that 10 percent 50 bucks or 

704
00:33:10,350 --> 00:33:14,390
more, you get free shipping. 
So check them out and whoa, 

705
00:33:14,510 --> 00:33:15,590
there we go. 
There I am. 

706
00:33:15,830 --> 00:33:17,590
I'm back here. 
Now let's talk to Steve. 

707
00:33:17,590 --> 00:33:20,350
Steve, did you ever hear about 
the Going Dark initiative when 

708
00:33:20,350 --> 00:33:24,310
you're working for the Bureau? 
A little bit, but I was just 

709
00:33:24,310 --> 00:33:27,990
kind of focusing in on Indians 
on reservation, so it wasn't too

710
00:33:27,990 --> 00:33:30,430
too center stage for me. 
Well, this is an interesting 

711
00:33:30,430 --> 00:33:32,070
little piece here. 
I've got an article pulled up 

712
00:33:32,070 --> 00:33:34,510
and I think, Ryan, let me see if
I can find what number it is. 

713
00:33:34,510 --> 00:33:37,990
I think it's going to be #3, if 
you have that, the topics up 

714
00:33:37,990 --> 00:33:39,390
there. 
This is the Pittsburgh Post 

715
00:33:39,590 --> 00:33:42,070
Gazette. 
It's an Oped that was written by

716
00:33:42,230 --> 00:33:45,710
Scott Brady, the US Attorney for
the Western District of PA And I

717
00:33:45,710 --> 00:33:48,030
know when you're on the Indian 
Reservation, Facebook and 

718
00:33:48,030 --> 00:33:50,190
Facebook Messenger is kind of 
like the default thing because 

719
00:33:50,190 --> 00:33:51,510
nobody has minutes on their cell
phone. 

720
00:33:52,050 --> 00:33:55,450
This is an article written about
how Facebook should try to 

721
00:33:55,450 --> 00:33:58,770
destroy the encryption and how 
it's really dangerous and and 

722
00:33:58,770 --> 00:34:01,930
people are seeing here the the 
the legal policy for the DOJ. 

723
00:34:02,410 --> 00:34:04,490
It's an entire section called 
Lawful access. 

724
00:34:05,290 --> 00:34:08,610
Talk a little bit about how 
maybe the expectation of privacy

725
00:34:08,610 --> 00:34:10,130
you can find it and your 
interactions. 

726
00:34:10,130 --> 00:34:11,810
You know, doing warrants and 
stuff with Facebook if you 

727
00:34:11,810 --> 00:34:14,770
would. 
Well, I mean, I think it kind of

728
00:34:14,770 --> 00:34:16,530
depends on who you're going 
after. 

729
00:34:16,610 --> 00:34:19,810
From Facebook's perspective, if 
it's my wife, they probably 

730
00:34:19,810 --> 00:34:24,610
would just give everything over 
to the to the FBI, correct? 

731
00:34:24,610 --> 00:34:26,010
I mean, they wouldn't even need 
process. 

732
00:34:26,010 --> 00:34:27,889
There would be a confidential 
human source that would just 

733
00:34:27,889 --> 00:34:29,770
hand it over, probably a former 
Bureau employee. 

734
00:34:30,929 --> 00:34:33,650
But when you are communicating, 
I think Mark Zuckerberg has even

735
00:34:33,770 --> 00:34:36,210
talked about that that those 
messages are supposed to be 

736
00:34:36,489 --> 00:34:38,810
encrypted. 
You're not supposed to be able 

737
00:34:38,810 --> 00:34:41,850
to be intercepted without the 
proper legal authority you would

738
00:34:41,850 --> 00:34:44,179
need to have. 
Well, first of all, you'd have a

739
00:34:44,179 --> 00:34:46,179
preservation request. 
You would, you would submit to 

740
00:34:46,179 --> 00:34:48,739
Facebook and say, hey, look, 
we're looking at this account. 

741
00:34:49,260 --> 00:34:52,699
Within the next few weeks, I'm 
going to intend to send you a 

742
00:34:52,699 --> 00:34:56,219
search warrant or subpoena. 
You need to basically preserve 

743
00:34:56,219 --> 00:34:57,980
everything you have. 
You're not allowed to be 

744
00:34:57,980 --> 00:34:59,180
deleted. 
And I'm. 

745
00:34:59,180 --> 00:35:00,500
Going to time you out right 
there, because I want you to 

746
00:35:00,500 --> 00:35:01,620
actually explain what that looks
like. 

747
00:35:01,740 --> 00:35:04,060
So most people have never served
a preservation letter. 

748
00:35:04,060 --> 00:35:06,100
They have no idea what this 
process looks like or the 

749
00:35:06,100 --> 00:35:07,900
portals and things that exist. 
Can you? 

750
00:35:08,480 --> 00:35:09,800
Break it down step by step for 
people. 

751
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:12,160
I've done it a number of times. 
I haven't done it nearly as many

752
00:35:12,160 --> 00:35:13,520
times as you have, I'm I'm sure 
of that. 

753
00:35:14,560 --> 00:35:18,000
Yeah, I mean, so Facebook and 
all these sites have have built 

754
00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:21,520
a law enforcement portal. 
So you would go into it, you 

755
00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:24,000
know, you would authenticate 
that you are actually a 

756
00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:26,200
representative of law 
enforcement by your e-mail 

757
00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:27,720
address and your your bona 
fides. 

758
00:35:28,040 --> 00:35:30,560
So you would get access to it, 
get a password and set up an 

759
00:35:30,560 --> 00:35:32,280
account. 
Essentially like you are setting

760
00:35:32,280 --> 00:35:35,720
up a Facebook account, you would
go in and you'd be able to. 

761
00:35:36,220 --> 00:35:39,500
Put the unique identification 
number for like a Facebook 

762
00:35:39,500 --> 00:35:42,460
account and say this is the 
account I'm looking at. 

763
00:35:42,820 --> 00:35:45,340
This is the time range that I'm 
looking at it for. 

764
00:35:45,540 --> 00:35:49,380
Here is the document that you 
require by your policy to 

765
00:35:49,380 --> 00:35:52,620
preserve those documents or 
eventually when it comes time to

766
00:35:52,620 --> 00:35:54,500
submit a search warrant or 
something to that effect. 

767
00:35:54,740 --> 00:35:58,100
Here is the search warrant for 
this account for this time range

768
00:35:58,420 --> 00:36:00,380
and they are unable to look at 
it. 

769
00:36:00,380 --> 00:36:02,660
They get a time frame to to 
respond to it because it's a 

770
00:36:02,660 --> 00:36:04,780
legal authority it's it's signed
by federal judge. 

771
00:36:05,260 --> 00:36:08,340
And then they respond back to 
you in that timely fashion and 

772
00:36:08,340 --> 00:36:13,260
you get, you know, a zip file of
the all the contents of postings

773
00:36:13,260 --> 00:36:16,260
and messages and pictures and 
everything that you're able to 

774
00:36:16,340 --> 00:36:19,180
kind of click through. 
It'll be thousands of pages for,

775
00:36:19,180 --> 00:36:20,900
especially for some of these 
people that are very active in 

776
00:36:20,900 --> 00:36:23,700
their social media account. 
You get to look sort of a 

777
00:36:23,700 --> 00:36:25,820
snapshot of their history of 
their account. 

778
00:36:27,140 --> 00:36:30,620
And then the exploit of it, what
is that like you're you're going

779
00:36:30,620 --> 00:36:32,420
through you guys have what 
analysts or something go through

780
00:36:32,420 --> 00:36:34,380
and try to? 
People always think that there's

781
00:36:34,420 --> 00:36:36,380
like a I tools that are crawling
across all this stuff. 

782
00:36:36,380 --> 00:36:38,260
It's it's usually more like 
grunt work, right? 

783
00:36:38,700 --> 00:36:41,060
Yeah, it's total grunt work. 
And I mean is if we're on the 

784
00:36:41,060 --> 00:36:43,780
reservation, I did it myself. 
I mean I would just sit there 

785
00:36:43,780 --> 00:36:48,780
with a PDF of 6000 pages and I 
would just do term search. 

786
00:36:48,860 --> 00:36:53,780
Be like drugs and then anything 
fucked up or guns or you know a 

787
00:36:53,780 --> 00:36:56,820
certain person's name or you 
would be able to 0 in on 

788
00:36:56,820 --> 00:36:59,700
conversations of because you 
would ask people what their 

789
00:36:59,700 --> 00:37:01,600
Facebook account was. 
So you could look at 

790
00:37:01,600 --> 00:37:05,920
correspondences between folks 
and then and try to 0 in on it 

791
00:37:05,920 --> 00:37:09,280
and then you you would always be
surprised because people assume 

792
00:37:09,280 --> 00:37:12,120
that it's it's private and they 
would share things in there that

793
00:37:12,160 --> 00:37:14,840
were criminal in nature and you 
could use them as evidence to 

794
00:37:14,840 --> 00:37:17,560
that they've tried to further 
their their their crime or 

795
00:37:17,560 --> 00:37:19,480
evidence that they'd even 
admitted to a crime. 

796
00:37:19,840 --> 00:37:22,400
And I had assaults where people 
after the fact were saying, 

797
00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:25,920
yeah, I did it and because of 
this reason, and basically have 

798
00:37:25,920 --> 00:37:28,360
them memorializing their 
confession without having to 

799
00:37:28,360 --> 00:37:30,530
actually talk to me. 
And that's that. 

800
00:37:30,530 --> 00:37:33,770
And then maybe jail phone calls 
are like your two baby's Mama or

801
00:37:33,770 --> 00:37:36,130
girlfriend, or like the two best
sort of tools you can use. 

802
00:37:36,450 --> 00:37:39,290
Yeah, and then now, since I'm 
like hardcore against the FBI, 

803
00:37:39,890 --> 00:37:43,850
anybody who gets who gets 
arrested, just, just just Take 

804
00:37:43,850 --> 00:37:46,850
Me Out here. 
We can't listen to your 

805
00:37:46,850 --> 00:37:49,330
conversations with your attorney
unless you're January 6th. 

806
00:37:50,970 --> 00:37:55,140
But don't call your baby Mama. 
The second after you have your 

807
00:37:55,140 --> 00:37:57,500
conversation with your attorney,
because you're not going to be 

808
00:37:57,500 --> 00:38:00,060
able to resist the temptation 
and say, hey, I had this 

809
00:38:00,060 --> 00:38:02,580
conversation with my attorney 
and this is what we said, 

810
00:38:02,580 --> 00:38:03,820
that's. 
Exactly right. 

811
00:38:03,860 --> 00:38:06,340
That is exactly what goes on. 
Those are the like, you don't 

812
00:38:06,340 --> 00:38:08,740
have to find the call. 
Ooh, there's my lighting. 

813
00:38:08,900 --> 00:38:12,540
You don't have to find the call 
that that was to the attorney. 

814
00:38:12,540 --> 00:38:14,980
You just go find the next one 
and find out who you just called

815
00:38:14,980 --> 00:38:17,140
or mom. 
Mom is always a good mom, right?

816
00:38:17,550 --> 00:38:19,910
Calling mom, Calling that woman 
in your life that you feel like 

817
00:38:19,910 --> 00:38:21,910
you have to share all the things
you just talked to the attorney 

818
00:38:21,910 --> 00:38:23,870
about. 
And you have to listen to some 

819
00:38:23,870 --> 00:38:26,070
conversations, man. 
And I mean, look, it's look, I 

820
00:38:26,110 --> 00:38:28,870
if I had to listen to my 
conversations with my wife and 

821
00:38:28,870 --> 00:38:31,630
I'm sure it'd be pretty mundane 
and just people having regular 

822
00:38:31,710 --> 00:38:33,990
talks. 
But it seems like 90% of the 

823
00:38:33,990 --> 00:38:37,150
call was you need to put money 
on my books so that I can call 

824
00:38:37,150 --> 00:38:37,910
you. 
Right. 

825
00:38:37,910 --> 00:38:40,110
And then call the other baby 
Mama or the other girl. 

826
00:38:40,190 --> 00:38:42,190
Do the same exact thing. 
You're my only one. 

827
00:38:43,220 --> 00:38:46,140
Yeah, I I I would say the The 
worst thing I ever saw though 

828
00:38:46,140 --> 00:38:50,780
was the the woman who was using 
her child support from one guy 

829
00:38:50,780 --> 00:38:53,740
to put money in the books of 
another guy in in jail. 

830
00:38:53,740 --> 00:38:57,620
I was like, man, I almost 
understand domestic violence 

831
00:38:57,620 --> 00:39:00,500
now. 
Yeah, the the stories that come 

832
00:39:00,500 --> 00:39:04,140
out of just listening to jail 
calls is always it's it's always

833
00:39:04,140 --> 00:39:05,580
shocking. 
I think if people have never 

834
00:39:05,580 --> 00:39:07,020
been involved in it, they would 
have no idea. 

835
00:39:07,620 --> 00:39:09,780
I want to, I want to pivot away 
from the comedy part of it, sort

836
00:39:09,780 --> 00:39:11,700
of the the, the dystopian 
version of it. 

837
00:39:12,230 --> 00:39:16,150
The the concept of encryption, 
which I think you were, you were

838
00:39:16,590 --> 00:39:19,510
in the Bureau when they were 
trying to break down the iPhone 

839
00:39:19,510 --> 00:39:20,710
in San Bernardino, is that 
right? 

840
00:39:21,510 --> 00:39:22,630
I think it was just before I got
it. 

841
00:39:22,630 --> 00:39:23,950
Were you at the Academy then, or
was that? 

842
00:39:24,110 --> 00:39:26,790
Were you actually in the field? 
I was in the field then, yeah. 

843
00:39:26,830 --> 00:39:28,870
What do you recall the 
discussions being like about 

844
00:39:28,870 --> 00:39:30,390
that? 
It was all news media to you, 

845
00:39:30,390 --> 00:39:32,870
but it was something that you 
saw from that plus your water 

846
00:39:32,870 --> 00:39:35,950
cooler chatter. 
Yeah, It was just there's this 

847
00:39:35,950 --> 00:39:38,070
assumption of where the where 
the. 

848
00:39:38,710 --> 00:39:41,150
Force for good here. 
So why wouldn't we have this 

849
00:39:41,150 --> 00:39:44,150
ability that they need to give 
us this back door? 

850
00:39:44,150 --> 00:39:47,030
Because it's always using the 
most egregious example. 

851
00:39:47,030 --> 00:39:49,350
In that case, it was this, this 
terrorist attack. 

852
00:39:49,710 --> 00:39:52,150
It's similar to the way that you
look at the Marjory Stoneman 

853
00:39:52,150 --> 00:39:55,670
Douglas shooting in Parkland 
where it was if we can save just

854
00:39:55,670 --> 00:39:59,110
one life, then we need to remove
the rights of people. 

855
00:39:59,490 --> 00:40:02,570
And I remember at the time just 
even thinking that this was no, 

856
00:40:02,570 --> 00:40:04,850
this was a violation of people's
privacy rights. 

857
00:40:04,850 --> 00:40:06,610
And and we, we can't have this 
tool. 

858
00:40:06,850 --> 00:40:10,410
This is the ring of power or you
know, one of them, and it it 

859
00:40:10,410 --> 00:40:13,330
cannot be trusted in the hands 
of a fallen man. 

860
00:40:13,330 --> 00:40:17,530
And then the FBI, contrary to 
what they would have you 

861
00:40:17,530 --> 00:40:21,650
believe, they're not, they're 
not godly or perfect, and 

862
00:40:21,650 --> 00:40:24,090
they're definitely they 
shouldn't be entitled to have 

863
00:40:24,090 --> 00:40:25,790
that. 
About that they don't think that

864
00:40:25,790 --> 00:40:27,430
they aren't. 
I'm going to read something from

865
00:40:27,430 --> 00:40:29,830
the DOJ's website. 
This is from justice.gov folks. 

866
00:40:29,830 --> 00:40:31,470
This is, this is what it says 
issue. 

867
00:40:31,470 --> 00:40:32,870
This is talking about lawful 
access. 

868
00:40:32,870 --> 00:40:37,150
This is very specifically lawful
access to your encrypted 

869
00:40:37,150 --> 00:40:38,990
technology, which is where they 
are most fascinated. 

870
00:40:39,190 --> 00:40:42,350
So here's what it says issue. 
Law enforcement is increasingly 

871
00:40:42,350 --> 00:40:44,830
facing challenges due to the 
phenomenon of, quote UN quote, 

872
00:40:44,830 --> 00:40:47,970
warrant proof encryption. 
Service providers, device 

873
00:40:47,970 --> 00:40:50,410
manufacturers, and application 
developers are deploying 

874
00:40:50,410 --> 00:40:53,170
products and services with 
encryption that can only be 

875
00:40:53,170 --> 00:40:55,250
decrypted by the end user or the
customer. 

876
00:40:55,410 --> 00:40:57,730
Because of warrant proof 
encryption, now they don't use 

877
00:40:57,730 --> 00:41:00,210
the scare quotes again. 
The government often cannot 

878
00:41:00,210 --> 00:41:04,410
obtain the electronic evidence 
or intelligence necessary to 

879
00:41:04,410 --> 00:41:07,170
investigate and prosecute 
threats to public safety and 

880
00:41:07,170 --> 00:41:10,730
national security, even with a 
warrant or a court order. 

881
00:41:11,390 --> 00:41:13,870
This provides a quote, UN quote 
lawless space that criminals, 

882
00:41:14,030 --> 00:41:17,110
terrorists, and other bad actors
can exploit for their nefarious 

883
00:41:17,230 --> 00:41:18,310
ends. 
And then they do a case 

884
00:41:18,310 --> 00:41:21,190
spotlight talking about how a 
guy said that he was involved in

885
00:41:21,190 --> 00:41:23,230
child pornography. 
That's always the great example.

886
00:41:23,310 --> 00:41:25,710
It's always going to be 
criminals that are doing child 

887
00:41:25,710 --> 00:41:28,870
pornography, terrorists who want
to blow you up and kill you, or 

888
00:41:28,870 --> 00:41:30,590
bad actors who can exploit 
things. 

889
00:41:30,990 --> 00:41:32,470
Financial crimes is the other 
one. 

890
00:41:32,470 --> 00:41:35,350
They like to talk about why 
crypto is dangerous and why the 

891
00:41:35,350 --> 00:41:37,270
idea that they can't keep track 
of all your financial 

892
00:41:38,270 --> 00:41:41,240
transactions. 
Do you have this sense that I do

893
00:41:41,240 --> 00:41:44,520
that the the, the federal agents
think they have that right to 

894
00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:47,040
get into everything you have 
once they have that warrant like

895
00:41:47,040 --> 00:41:50,120
that's that's their business? 
Yes, we got a question. 

896
00:41:50,120 --> 00:41:53,040
They think that they there 
should never be a hindrance to 

897
00:41:53,040 --> 00:41:57,040
anything that they want to do if
they we saw it in the the video 

898
00:41:57,040 --> 00:41:59,360
of the Nathan Hughes arrest. 
I mean, it's just those guys 

899
00:41:59,360 --> 00:42:02,560
have no awareness of what 
people's constitutional rights 

900
00:42:02,560 --> 00:42:06,000
are to either to stand in a 
certain area in public, you 

901
00:42:06,000 --> 00:42:08,260
know, or. 
Be secure in their in their 

902
00:42:08,420 --> 00:42:13,140
personal facts and privacy. 
I like to take something like 

903
00:42:13,140 --> 00:42:16,020
this to a an absurd length to 
make sure the word 

904
00:42:16,020 --> 00:42:20,020
intellectually consistent. 
So you're a fan of spy novels 

905
00:42:20,020 --> 00:42:21,540
and then stories that you know 
you have like the Mission 

906
00:42:21,540 --> 00:42:23,980
Impossible, like this message 
will self destruct. 

907
00:42:24,020 --> 00:42:26,820
I'm a I'm a Robert Ludlum guy. 
Just saying, I go back to the 

908
00:42:26,820 --> 00:42:28,500
70s and read those. 
Go ahead, keep going. 

909
00:42:29,140 --> 00:42:34,260
But I mean by this logic, you 
and I shouldn't have access to 

910
00:42:34,260 --> 00:42:37,010
fire. 
Because if you sent me a letter 

911
00:42:37,010 --> 00:42:40,490
and I burned it, that deprives 
the government of the ability to

912
00:42:40,490 --> 00:42:43,050
read that letter. 
If they ever want to go and get 

913
00:42:43,050 --> 00:42:46,290
a search warrant for one thing 
or another, that that's the 

914
00:42:46,290 --> 00:42:47,970
same. 
That's intellectually, that's 

915
00:42:47,970 --> 00:42:49,930
the same argument here. 
That's true. 

916
00:42:49,930 --> 00:42:54,050
And then let's take it to a a 
step further, which is to say 

917
00:42:54,250 --> 00:42:58,130
that because that technology 
exists, they are presupposing 

918
00:42:58,210 --> 00:43:00,810
that you and I will have 
communications that they will 

919
00:43:00,810 --> 00:43:03,880
need to access at some point, 
that that it is a common enough 

920
00:43:03,880 --> 00:43:06,080
feature that most people will 
have to be engaged in that. 

921
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:10,360
I mean that or they're just 
deprived of that opportunity to 

922
00:43:10,360 --> 00:43:13,320
try to pin something on you. 
And like we know that the the 

923
00:43:13,320 --> 00:43:15,800
FBI and federal law enforcement 
is always looking for 

924
00:43:15,800 --> 00:43:18,560
opportunities to expand. 
They're they're not doing their 

925
00:43:18,560 --> 00:43:21,200
job if they're not expanding. 
Well, we just actually talked 

926
00:43:21,200 --> 00:43:23,160
about that with George Hill I 
think on Wednesday. 

927
00:43:23,160 --> 00:43:25,120
That was the discussion. 
It's like if government is not 

928
00:43:25,320 --> 00:43:28,680
moving to the point of being too
large, then it is not being 

929
00:43:28,680 --> 00:43:30,840
government. 
Let's let's talk about that. 

930
00:43:30,840 --> 00:43:32,240
I think it's called the fallacy 
of the converse. 

931
00:43:32,240 --> 00:43:34,240
I'm going to have to recall my 
logical fallacies here, which 

932
00:43:34,240 --> 00:43:35,200
I'll have to look up in a 
minute. 

933
00:43:35,240 --> 00:43:37,600
Maybe maybe Ryan will pull it up
and see if that's correct. 

934
00:43:37,800 --> 00:43:40,800
But essentially they're saying 
because encryption can be used 

935
00:43:40,800 --> 00:43:44,560
by, let's say, child 
pornographers, people who use 

936
00:43:44,560 --> 00:43:47,160
encryption are child 
pornographers or likely to be. 

937
00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:49,280
And that's what was that looking
up, Kyle? 

938
00:43:49,400 --> 00:43:51,120
We're looking for the fallacy of
the converse. 

939
00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:54,040
I think that's what it's called 
CONVERSE. 

940
00:43:54,500 --> 00:43:57,060
So one of the things that are. 
Effective. 

941
00:43:57,140 --> 00:43:59,620
It's it's an effective argument.
It's a scare tool for sure. 

942
00:43:59,820 --> 00:44:01,380
Yeah, I mean it. 
Think of it. 

943
00:44:01,380 --> 00:44:03,540
And you know, we're coming up 
into an election season and you 

944
00:44:03,540 --> 00:44:07,060
know, it's like David Duke 
supports this candidate. 

945
00:44:07,060 --> 00:44:09,060
So you shouldn't vote for that 
candidate, right? 

946
00:44:09,060 --> 00:44:10,740
Because you don't want to 
support people that the Klan 

947
00:44:10,740 --> 00:44:13,140
supports, do you? 
Correct, Correct. 

948
00:44:13,300 --> 00:44:17,180
So I actually had the FBI Agents
Association President use that 

949
00:44:17,180 --> 00:44:20,100
on me in the same way, affirming
the the consequence. 

950
00:44:20,100 --> 00:44:21,820
I think that might be slightly 
different, a fallacy of the 

951
00:44:21,820 --> 00:44:23,910
converse. 
If the lamp were broken, the 

952
00:44:23,910 --> 00:44:26,150
room would be dark. 
If the room is dark, the lamp 

953
00:44:26,390 --> 00:44:27,990
must be broken. 
Yeah, that that's exactly it. 

954
00:44:27,990 --> 00:44:29,870
So I actually do recall 
affirming the consequence. 

955
00:44:30,350 --> 00:44:34,550
It's it's a false, it's a false 
propositional logic. 

956
00:44:34,550 --> 00:44:37,190
It's a failure of using that 
statement because you're 

957
00:44:37,190 --> 00:44:40,030
basically confirming that the 
the the converse of it, which is

958
00:44:40,030 --> 00:44:42,110
to flip the part A and the Part 
B. 

959
00:44:42,270 --> 00:44:45,350
If the B, you know if A then B, 
if B then also A. 

960
00:44:45,350 --> 00:44:47,980
That's not always the case. 
So the thing that's really 

961
00:44:47,980 --> 00:44:50,300
interesting is this FBI 
president, I can't remember his 

962
00:44:50,300 --> 00:44:51,820
name right now, is the guy after
Tom O'Connor. 

963
00:44:51,820 --> 00:44:53,060
I think his name is Brian 
something or other. 

964
00:44:53,060 --> 00:44:55,340
He was in either Memphis or or 
Nashville. 

965
00:44:55,420 --> 00:44:57,140
And he called me up because I 
dropped out of the agents 

966
00:44:57,140 --> 00:44:59,980
Association because they were 
going and saying that the FBI 

967
00:44:59,980 --> 00:45:02,540
needed a backdoor tool to all 
endtoend encrypted apps. 

968
00:45:02,700 --> 00:45:05,180
And they were, you know, 
affirming that as a position 

969
00:45:05,180 --> 00:45:07,340
that they were lobbying Congress
about, which I found to be 

970
00:45:07,540 --> 00:45:10,300
atrocious. 
And he said, obviously you want 

971
00:45:10,300 --> 00:45:12,260
the child pornographers and 
terrorists to get away with it. 

972
00:45:12,260 --> 00:45:14,740
Then you've never had a 
terrorist get away with 

973
00:45:14,740 --> 00:45:16,420
something because you couldn't 
get into their phone. 

974
00:45:16,830 --> 00:45:19,070
And I was like, no, I just think
that you're the federal 

975
00:45:19,070 --> 00:45:20,550
government and you should have 
to work harder. 

976
00:45:20,590 --> 00:45:22,750
I'm sorry that your job is 
harder and you have to obey the 

977
00:45:22,750 --> 00:45:25,670
Constitution, which very 
specifically says the right of 

978
00:45:25,670 --> 00:45:29,510
the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and 

979
00:45:29,510 --> 00:45:32,110
effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not 

980
00:45:32,110 --> 00:45:34,350
be violated. 
And the idea that you would have

981
00:45:34,350 --> 00:45:36,870
that technology is an 
unreasonable search capability 

982
00:45:37,150 --> 00:45:38,430
that you would be able to abuse 
it. 

983
00:45:38,430 --> 00:45:39,630
I don't want you to do that. 
And that. 

984
00:45:39,630 --> 00:45:41,470
That's always my argument. 
I think you and I share this. 

985
00:45:41,790 --> 00:45:46,480
Citizens first, you know sort of
God fearing and and family 

986
00:45:46,480 --> 00:45:48,800
members first, husband and 
father first, citizen second I 

987
00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:50,760
guess. 
And then the third is whatever 

988
00:45:50,760 --> 00:45:53,600
that job is, whether it's a 
police officer or an FBI agent 

989
00:45:53,600 --> 00:45:55,320
or otherwise. 
And if you want to live in a 

990
00:45:55,320 --> 00:45:58,880
world where FBI agents that are 
not you, who don't have the same

991
00:45:58,880 --> 00:46:00,640
morals as you who seem okay with
this. 

992
00:46:00,640 --> 00:46:02,760
What we're going to show this 
video in a second If those 

993
00:46:02,760 --> 00:46:05,080
people are going to have access 
to be able to cracking end to 

994
00:46:05,080 --> 00:46:08,600
end encryption simply because it
exists and it's a lawless space 

995
00:46:08,920 --> 00:46:11,080
that scares the hell out of me. 
Like on every level I don't. 

996
00:46:11,280 --> 00:46:13,320
I don't think FBI agents should 
have access to that. 

997
00:46:13,830 --> 00:46:17,030
Anyway, this is Snowden. 
This is what PRISM presented. 

998
00:46:17,670 --> 00:46:20,710
And he exposed at the time. 
And just because technology 

999
00:46:20,710 --> 00:46:23,750
evolves, it's just gonna be the 
same story over and over again. 

1000
00:46:23,750 --> 00:46:26,470
And I don't know if it was 
connected to PRISM or if it was 

1001
00:46:26,470 --> 00:46:29,230
connected to San Bernardino. 
It's sort of in my memory. 

1002
00:46:29,230 --> 00:46:30,430
It's like all around the same 
time frame. 

1003
00:46:30,430 --> 00:46:31,710
And there was a debate about 
like this. 

1004
00:46:32,130 --> 00:46:34,850
Micro data that the whether or 
not they should, they could have

1005
00:46:34,850 --> 00:46:37,250
access to it. 
And I remember debating it with 

1006
00:46:37,250 --> 00:46:39,810
a counterterrorism agent and I 
said you shouldn't have it. 

1007
00:46:39,810 --> 00:46:42,210
And I know Rand Paul was banging
the lectern that you know that 

1008
00:46:42,210 --> 00:46:44,290
this is you should not be 
entitled to that and that's no 

1009
00:46:44,290 --> 00:46:47,410
surprise from him. 
And this CT agent was like, you 

1010
00:46:47,410 --> 00:46:49,650
know that you're going to put 
Americans at greater risk. 

1011
00:46:50,130 --> 00:46:53,530
And I just remember thinking 
like there's risk to freedom. 

1012
00:46:53,530 --> 00:46:56,660
That's. 
Implied you you can if you have 

1013
00:46:56,660 --> 00:46:59,860
total security, then you have a 
totalitarian state and that's 

1014
00:46:59,860 --> 00:47:02,260
not very safe to me either and 
that leads to this whole thing. 

1015
00:47:02,260 --> 00:47:04,900
This is why we brought on Tom 
earlier and talked about secure 

1016
00:47:04,900 --> 00:47:08,220
it, because I I really did 
actually incidentally uncover 

1017
00:47:08,220 --> 00:47:11,320
the fact that they don't have 
access to my safe and they can't

1018
00:47:11,320 --> 00:47:13,760
generate a set of keys. 
And my safe is not like the high

1019
00:47:13,760 --> 00:47:15,160
end version of it. 
It's it's what they call the 

1020
00:47:15,160 --> 00:47:16,960
agile safe. 
They have an agile. 

1021
00:47:17,080 --> 00:47:18,760
They have an answer that's the 
next step up. 

1022
00:47:18,760 --> 00:47:20,480
It's heavier and has more 
fireproof ratings. 

1023
00:47:20,480 --> 00:47:21,800
Mine has no fireproof rating at 
all. 

1024
00:47:22,040 --> 00:47:24,440
It's a it's just a, you know, a 
metal box that that keeps all my

1025
00:47:24,440 --> 00:47:26,120
guns in it. 
Because a little warming is 

1026
00:47:26,120 --> 00:47:27,800
going to get your guns now, man.
They're working on it. 

1027
00:47:27,800 --> 00:47:28,720
Yeah. 
The nice thing is there's 

1028
00:47:28,720 --> 00:47:30,360
ventilation in the back of it. 
There's actually holes in the 

1029
00:47:30,360 --> 00:47:32,160
back that back up. 
I've got a little standoff 

1030
00:47:32,160 --> 00:47:34,760
between the wall and my and my 
safe, so I can actually have 

1031
00:47:34,760 --> 00:47:36,680
airflow in there, which is 
really, really good for your 

1032
00:47:36,680 --> 00:47:38,360
guns. 
Static, humid air is one of the 

1033
00:47:38,360 --> 00:47:40,640
worst things you can have. 
So people who have ever tried to

1034
00:47:40,640 --> 00:47:42,600
do gun storage understand how 
this works in Florida. 

1035
00:47:42,600 --> 00:47:44,920
That's a big deal for you if you
had enough that you you wanted 

1036
00:47:44,920 --> 00:47:47,040
to stack a box up with, you 
know, like 8 or 10 guns. 

1037
00:47:47,400 --> 00:47:50,000
But anyway, long and short of it
is the idea that they would have

1038
00:47:50,000 --> 00:47:52,000
access to it is really scary 
because when you have access 

1039
00:47:52,000 --> 00:47:54,080
then you tend to abuse it. 
As I think we've seen with 

1040
00:47:54,080 --> 00:47:56,160
things like 702, they have 
access. 

1041
00:47:56,240 --> 00:47:59,800
It gets abused in like millions 
of times, literally millions of 

1042
00:47:59,800 --> 00:48:02,320
times a year. 
It's sort of shocking that 

1043
00:48:02,320 --> 00:48:04,760
that's the case, but it's true. 
Yeah, I mean millions of 

1044
00:48:04,760 --> 00:48:06,920
searches with FISA 702, I mean 
that's it's. 

1045
00:48:07,480 --> 00:48:10,600
It's unbelievable that they 
cannot, they're incapable of of 

1046
00:48:10,600 --> 00:48:14,080
handling any sort of power and 
any sort of justification. 

1047
00:48:14,080 --> 00:48:16,840
They say, well, we've taken 
measures to improve, improve, 

1048
00:48:16,840 --> 00:48:18,960
so, so you just failed a little 
bit less. 

1049
00:48:18,960 --> 00:48:21,080
We we violate the law less 
frequently than we used to 

1050
00:48:21,080 --> 00:48:22,640
violate the law, which was more 
frequently. 

1051
00:48:23,080 --> 00:48:23,760
Correct. 
Yeah. 

1052
00:48:23,760 --> 00:48:25,680
Now it's hundreds of thousands 
instead of 1,000,000. 

1053
00:48:26,290 --> 00:48:28,530
I mean it's like the argument 
about the the government debt. 

1054
00:48:28,570 --> 00:48:30,970
I mean it's like hey look we've 
reduced the deficits like so 

1055
00:48:30,970 --> 00:48:33,730
we're we're out overspending our
income by slightly less. 

1056
00:48:33,930 --> 00:48:35,610
That's right. 
We're still, we're still going 

1057
00:48:35,610 --> 00:48:37,770
to be in the red, but we're not 
going to be in the red as much. 

1058
00:48:38,050 --> 00:48:40,210
Aren't you proud of us? 
I actually had that experience 

1059
00:48:40,210 --> 00:48:41,810
running a business. 
I took a business that was 

1060
00:48:41,810 --> 00:48:47,050
losing $100,000 a month, and the
second month we lost $30,000, 

1061
00:48:47,290 --> 00:48:49,530
which was all part of the plan 
as they did the takeover. 

1062
00:48:49,840 --> 00:48:52,280
But it wasn't like a moment to 
celebrate, like we only lost 30 

1063
00:48:52,280 --> 00:48:54,400
grand. 
You're like, Oh no, we lost 30 

1064
00:48:54,400 --> 00:48:55,320
grand. 
We are still in it. 

1065
00:48:55,480 --> 00:48:57,160
And then? 
You ensure your reelection if 

1066
00:48:57,160 --> 00:48:58,720
you're in Congress with that 
one, I know it. 

1067
00:48:58,720 --> 00:49:00,600
It's so crazy, right? 
But then of course that by the 

1068
00:49:00,600 --> 00:49:03,040
third month, which was where 
this is way faster than a lot of

1069
00:49:03,040 --> 00:49:05,720
takeovers, we lost. 
I think we broke even. 

1070
00:49:05,720 --> 00:49:08,940
We were down like 5 bucks and 
then we burned our turned our 

1071
00:49:08,940 --> 00:49:10,260
first profit after the 4th 
month. 

1072
00:49:10,420 --> 00:49:13,100
Now for a restaurant takeover 
that's pretty unusual and we had

1073
00:49:13,100 --> 00:49:15,140
a lot of corruption to deal with
and stuff but but you know this 

1074
00:49:15,140 --> 00:49:18,140
is this would be a huge victory.
This would be like a a mind 

1075
00:49:18,140 --> 00:49:22,220
numbing governmental victory to 
actually go from the red to the 

1076
00:49:22,220 --> 00:49:24,940
black and and like like you say 
they're cheering the lowest bar.

1077
00:49:25,140 --> 00:49:27,740
The bar is that we failed less 
and people are sort of like we 

1078
00:49:29,780 --> 00:49:31,740
have this like sort of sad clap 
for it. 

1079
00:49:32,120 --> 00:49:34,600
It's very disappointing to me. 
I want to do this video before 

1080
00:49:34,600 --> 00:49:36,880
we run too much out of time and 
it will maybe go over a little 

1081
00:49:36,880 --> 00:49:38,280
bit today. 
But Ryan, we got a video queued 

1082
00:49:38,280 --> 00:49:41,120
up #1 if you would I want to do 
about the 1st 2 minutes of it 

1083
00:49:41,120 --> 00:49:42,920
folks is colorful language. 
If you haven't heard this 

1084
00:49:42,920 --> 00:49:44,960
before, this is the arrest of 
Nathan Hughes. 

1085
00:49:44,960 --> 00:49:46,440
This was discussed a little bit 
earlier. 

1086
00:49:46,520 --> 00:49:49,120
This is why the Liberty Hill 
safe thing came into the focus. 

1087
00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:51,640
This is a new angle that the 
Hodge twins posted. 

1088
00:49:51,680 --> 00:49:54,760
This is obviously a very 
combative photographer, citizen 

1089
00:49:54,760 --> 00:49:57,360
journalist type guy who decided 
to get this on record and he is 

1090
00:49:57,360 --> 00:50:01,310
not having any of the FBI's BS. 
And I kind of, I kind of on the 

1091
00:50:01,310 --> 00:50:02,710
side of the guy. 
I've worked with you. 

1092
00:50:03,230 --> 00:50:06,790
I've been on both sides of this 
now I think and these agents 

1093
00:50:06,790 --> 00:50:08,470
we're going to, we're going to 
troubleshoot what their problems

1094
00:50:08,470 --> 00:50:09,390
are. 
We're going to probably go a 

1095
00:50:09,390 --> 00:50:11,110
little long on this, but bear 
with me. 

1096
00:50:11,110 --> 00:50:12,710
And if you need to turn it down,
if you're at work this, there's 

1097
00:50:12,710 --> 00:50:14,070
going to be a little bit of 
colorful language. 

1098
00:50:14,070 --> 00:50:15,550
So go ahead and send that 
whenever you're ready. 

1099
00:50:15,550 --> 00:50:17,950
Ryan. 
Where close to me? 

1100
00:50:18,070 --> 00:50:19,870
Sir, please don't get anywhere 
close to me. 

1101
00:50:21,390 --> 00:50:23,830
I'm not doing anything wrong. 
Get away from me. 

1102
00:50:23,830 --> 00:50:25,790
Don't get your fucking hands off
me. 

1103
00:50:26,390 --> 00:50:29,610
Get your hands off me. 
Get your hands off me. 

1104
00:50:31,210 --> 00:50:32,930
Sir, stop right there. 
It doesn't matter. 

1105
00:50:33,650 --> 00:50:36,050
I'm not doing it either. 
Get your way. 

1106
00:50:36,050 --> 00:50:38,650
You don't need to walk into your
hand by right now. 

1107
00:50:38,890 --> 00:50:40,850
It doesn't matter. 
Get your fucking hands off me. 

1108
00:50:41,410 --> 00:50:43,770
Don't touch me. yo-yo, come on, 
man. 

1109
00:50:43,770 --> 00:50:44,970
We're back here with me, man. 
Come on. 

1110
00:50:44,970 --> 00:50:46,610
Notice that they don't touch the
black guy who walks right 

1111
00:50:46,610 --> 00:50:47,450
through the scene. 
I got him, boss. 

1112
00:50:47,450 --> 00:50:48,210
He good. 
He good. 

1113
00:50:48,690 --> 00:50:51,540
We so good. 
That's so good. 

1114
00:50:51,540 --> 00:50:52,940
Please. 
Stop walking. 

1115
00:50:53,140 --> 00:50:54,980
Please stop walking forward. 
I got him. 

1116
00:50:55,180 --> 00:50:56,100
I got him. 
I got him. 

1117
00:50:56,180 --> 00:50:58,580
I got him. 
OK, Let's do a little pause 

1118
00:50:58,580 --> 00:51:01,860
right there, if you would. 
Ryan, we're going to keep 

1119
00:51:01,860 --> 00:51:02,860
coming. 
We're going to go right back to 

1120
00:51:02,860 --> 00:51:03,700
that same spot. 
OK. 

1121
00:51:03,700 --> 00:51:05,140
So what are you seeing right 
there, Steve? 

1122
00:51:05,140 --> 00:51:06,580
You've been on SWAT. 
You know what that is? 

1123
00:51:06,580 --> 00:51:08,260
Those guys are SWAT guys for the
most part. 

1124
00:51:08,590 --> 00:51:10,350
Oh yeah, there. 
I mean, it might be a squad 

1125
00:51:10,350 --> 00:51:11,430
arrest. 
And it makes sense. 

1126
00:51:11,430 --> 00:51:14,230
It's it's a CT squad because a 
lot of CT guys are on SWAT 

1127
00:51:14,230 --> 00:51:15,310
because you don't have to do 
that much. 

1128
00:51:15,390 --> 00:51:16,350
They don't have to do a lot of 
work. 

1129
00:51:16,630 --> 00:51:18,150
How do, how do you know that 
they're SWAT? 

1130
00:51:18,150 --> 00:51:20,870
I know how to, but let's let's 
break it out for the guests. 

1131
00:51:21,030 --> 00:51:23,790
I mean, well, the one guy has a 
SWAT hat on, but they have the 

1132
00:51:23,830 --> 00:51:29,790
this long M4 with the the well. 
It's got the OD green, right? 

1133
00:51:29,870 --> 00:51:31,950
So they've got green rifles. 
So these are heads ups, like 

1134
00:51:31,950 --> 00:51:33,310
normally black rifles are 
issued. 

1135
00:51:33,310 --> 00:51:35,670
The green anodized rifles are 
coming out. 

1136
00:51:35,670 --> 00:51:38,640
There's a swat, only they have a
sexy color scheme. 

1137
00:51:39,840 --> 00:51:42,960
Body armor change. 
Body armor is is, is multicam. 

1138
00:51:42,960 --> 00:51:48,000
So whoever is a son developed 
the multicam and then and then 

1139
00:51:48,000 --> 00:51:49,720
had a dad who was a general or 
something. 

1140
00:51:49,720 --> 00:51:52,000
I think that's billions of 
dollars because everybody wears 

1141
00:51:52,000 --> 00:51:53,840
Multicam, right? 
Well here's the thing. 

1142
00:51:53,840 --> 00:51:57,360
Those are the cry JPC's, the the
jump plate carriers that are the

1143
00:51:57,360 --> 00:51:59,680
the high speed stuff. 
Because what does Multicam mean?

1144
00:51:59,760 --> 00:52:01,720
Multicam is the the camouflage 
pattern. 

1145
00:52:01,720 --> 00:52:03,920
So your standard FBI is going to
be that OD green. 

1146
00:52:04,320 --> 00:52:06,280
It's that that solid green like 
you see a lot of sheriff's 

1147
00:52:06,280 --> 00:52:08,560
departments where that's what 
the FBI originally had. 

1148
00:52:08,920 --> 00:52:11,920
And then they went into those 
cry JPC's because everybody in 

1149
00:52:11,920 --> 00:52:13,920
the FBI needs a jumpable plate 
carrier. 

1150
00:52:14,080 --> 00:52:15,360
Did you know that they were 
supposed to be there, 

1151
00:52:15,360 --> 00:52:18,880
specifically made for jumping? 
No, I didn't know. 

1152
00:52:19,960 --> 00:52:22,240
Did you ever call him a JPC? 
No. 

1153
00:52:22,240 --> 00:52:24,760
Just plates, man. 
So the guys that are in the, 

1154
00:52:24,920 --> 00:52:28,360
the, the Bureau's bigger offices
all call them the JPC which is 

1155
00:52:28,360 --> 00:52:31,060
what they are because they're 
jumpable plate carriers which is

1156
00:52:31,060 --> 00:52:33,460
actually a modular difference 
than than the ones that the 

1157
00:52:33,460 --> 00:52:35,380
regular agents get issued which 
are not jumple. 

1158
00:52:35,380 --> 00:52:37,300
There's certain features on it 
that you have to have. 

1159
00:52:37,580 --> 00:52:40,420
So these guys have the the, the,
the cry version. 

1160
00:52:40,980 --> 00:52:42,900
You see some other guys out 
there that we know are new guys.

1161
00:52:42,900 --> 00:52:44,260
What do we know about the new 
guys, Steve? 

1162
00:52:44,500 --> 00:52:46,580
They're going to have very clean
body armor. 

1163
00:52:46,580 --> 00:52:50,420
It looks a very new because I 
know in my 8 years I did not get

1164
00:52:50,420 --> 00:52:52,300
new body armor, even though I 
was told it was going to be 

1165
00:52:52,300 --> 00:52:54,260
renewed every five years, right?
Exactly. 

1166
00:52:54,380 --> 00:52:56,940
So those guys are less than 
they're a couple years in. 

1167
00:52:57,380 --> 00:53:00,380
I think that body armor change 
happened in 2020 or 2021. 

1168
00:53:00,860 --> 00:53:03,220
Yep. 
And so those guys have 2-3 years

1169
00:53:03,220 --> 00:53:05,420
in on that body armor. 
They may have been an executive 

1170
00:53:05,420 --> 00:53:07,500
or a friend of somebody. 
They got like the new deal. 

1171
00:53:07,500 --> 00:53:09,580
Maybe they're firearms and. 
They went back to Quantico for 

1172
00:53:09,580 --> 00:53:11,860
some sort of training and they 
got some body armor issue to 

1173
00:53:11,860 --> 00:53:13,300
them or at least they the 
carrier. 

1174
00:53:13,620 --> 00:53:15,540
I mean some. 
I think I remember I seen one of

1175
00:53:15,540 --> 00:53:19,740
the guys had a had a pry bar and
that's definitely a SWAT thing. 

1176
00:53:19,820 --> 00:53:23,460
They they have the blowout pouch
on their on their duty belt and 

1177
00:53:23,500 --> 00:53:25,140
that's again, like that's a SWAT
thing too. 

1178
00:53:25,140 --> 00:53:27,710
Like most agents don't have that
except Kyle Seraphin, who you 

1179
00:53:27,710 --> 00:53:28,870
wouldn't be surprised to find 
out. 

1180
00:53:29,630 --> 00:53:32,710
Yes, because you are a better, 
Kier than the SWAT team. 

1181
00:53:32,710 --> 00:53:35,670
And then we're worse because I'm
a professional and I buy it 

1182
00:53:35,670 --> 00:53:37,150
myself. 
That being said, I would never 

1183
00:53:37,150 --> 00:53:39,350
wear that stuff on an arrest. 
I might have a gun belt on and 

1184
00:53:39,350 --> 00:53:41,510
AT shirt or something and it 
would be you and me going up 

1185
00:53:41,510 --> 00:53:42,030
and. 
Talking Can we? 

1186
00:53:42,030 --> 00:53:42,990
Yeah. 
Can we dig into that? 

1187
00:53:43,070 --> 00:53:43,710
Let's do it. 
Please. 

1188
00:53:43,870 --> 00:53:45,830
Let's do it. 
Let's talk about tactics. 

1189
00:53:46,390 --> 00:53:49,670
So this. 
Alleged crime, I mean he's he's 

1190
00:53:49,670 --> 00:53:52,470
been charged with occurred 
almost three years ago. 

1191
00:53:52,470 --> 00:53:54,830
Criminal complaint only I'm 
going to hit the the high points

1192
00:53:54,830 --> 00:53:56,670
on it just so people understand 
what we're talking about. 

1193
00:53:56,870 --> 00:53:58,190
This is from a criminal 
complaint. 

1194
00:53:58,190 --> 00:54:01,030
This is not an indictment. 
This is a criminal complaint 

1195
00:54:01,030 --> 00:54:03,830
with an arrest warrant And the 
fact pattern specifically says 

1196
00:54:04,310 --> 00:54:09,310
that what he was involved in is 
that he threw an elbow in the 

1197
00:54:09,310 --> 00:54:12,390
direction of a police officers 
riot shield. 

1198
00:54:12,630 --> 00:54:15,850
It says that he was in the 
tunnel, that he was looking. 

1199
00:54:15,970 --> 00:54:17,930
He was in the tunnel when the 
riders broke through to the 

1200
00:54:17,930 --> 00:54:20,170
mouth of the tunnel at 242. 
The riders broke the glass. 

1201
00:54:20,170 --> 00:54:23,730
Not him by the way, just riders.
They engaged in synchronized 

1202
00:54:23,730 --> 00:54:26,210
pushing and shoving against 
police officers, Not him 

1203
00:54:26,210 --> 00:54:27,690
specifically, but people around 
him. 

1204
00:54:28,090 --> 00:54:30,410
And then they said they 
identified him as an individual 

1205
00:54:30,610 --> 00:54:34,690
who pushed against police and 
aided other rioters in fighting.

1206
00:54:34,810 --> 00:54:37,530
He didn't fight necessarily. 
He aided in fighting. 

1207
00:54:37,530 --> 00:54:39,210
I don't know what that means. 
I don't know what the word 

1208
00:54:39,450 --> 00:54:43,250
aiding and fighting is, but he 
was physically in a place and 

1209
00:54:43,250 --> 00:54:46,410
they show that a white male was 
physically present who appeared 

1210
00:54:46,410 --> 00:54:48,290
to be him. 
And they were able to determine 

1211
00:54:48,290 --> 00:54:53,250
who he was based on gloves and 
the the the notches in his ears,

1212
00:54:53,450 --> 00:54:55,770
which we can identify even 
though he had a mask on and a 

1213
00:54:55,770 --> 00:54:58,810
face covering. 
And he also yelled come on, come

1214
00:54:58,810 --> 00:55:02,690
on, come on in the direction of 
the tunnel, which is a capital 

1215
00:55:02,690 --> 00:55:04,170
crime to say things like that 
apparently. 

1216
00:55:04,530 --> 00:55:07,090
And then like I said, he threw 
an elbow in the direction of you

1217
00:55:07,090 --> 00:55:09,090
can see him go like basically in
the mouth of the tunnel. 

1218
00:55:09,290 --> 00:55:11,780
So he's in this sort of place 
that he's not supposed to be and

1219
00:55:11,780 --> 00:55:13,420
that that was enough for them to
say. 

1220
00:55:13,500 --> 00:55:15,620
And his his mask fell down 
briefly. 

1221
00:55:16,420 --> 00:55:18,220
Doesn't mean he wasn't like a 
dude who was fighting cops. 

1222
00:55:18,220 --> 00:55:19,740
Doesn't mean that there might 
not be an assault charge. 

1223
00:55:19,900 --> 00:55:22,500
It looks like they can't prove 
it though, at least so far, and 

1224
00:55:22,500 --> 00:55:25,020
unless that he were to self 
incriminate, that'd be really 

1225
00:55:25,020 --> 00:55:26,460
difficult. 
So this is the guy that we're 

1226
00:55:26,460 --> 00:55:30,740
doing with a guy who two years 
ago got into a rumble in the 

1227
00:55:30,740 --> 00:55:34,540
tunnel. 2 1/2 years ago and we 
had to get a complaint too. 

1228
00:55:34,540 --> 00:55:36,900
We we couldn't go through the 
regular grand jury process. 

1229
00:55:36,900 --> 00:55:38,860
We have to actually get a 
judicial complaint to. 

1230
00:55:39,650 --> 00:55:42,010
To get it quickly because 
there's an exigancy here like 

1231
00:55:42,010 --> 00:55:43,810
there could be violence 
imminent. 

1232
00:55:43,810 --> 00:55:48,850
We have to like act now and send
an entire squad to arrest this 

1233
00:55:48,850 --> 00:55:54,130
guy who is obviously committed 
no crime since this happened. 

1234
00:55:54,250 --> 00:55:57,370
And he was this was, this was 
sworn out on the 18th of August 

1235
00:55:57,370 --> 00:55:58,690
by the way. 
So there's a two week lag 

1236
00:55:58,690 --> 00:56:01,770
between the swearing out of the 
exigent warrant and the service 

1237
00:56:01,770 --> 00:56:02,970
of it because it was served this
week. 

1238
00:56:03,700 --> 00:56:05,740
Okay. 
So again, what? 

1239
00:56:05,740 --> 00:56:08,420
What was the exigency that they 
had to get a complaint here? 

1240
00:56:08,420 --> 00:56:11,340
Why couldn't they go through the
regular grand jury process that 

1241
00:56:11,500 --> 00:56:13,100
because then they would have to 
get a summons for him. 

1242
00:56:14,340 --> 00:56:15,660
Correct. 
They they couldn't, they 

1243
00:56:15,660 --> 00:56:18,540
couldn't go out there with their
cool guy, you know, SWAT gear, 

1244
00:56:18,540 --> 00:56:20,940
slick. 
They didn't wear the cries, so 

1245
00:56:21,020 --> 00:56:23,220
the the women won't swoon quite 
as much. 

1246
00:56:23,580 --> 00:56:26,620
But I think if if this was a 
actual. 

1247
00:56:27,180 --> 00:56:29,340
Case that you and I had that we 
were going to go execute a 

1248
00:56:29,340 --> 00:56:32,540
lawful arrest warrant, I think 
that two people would be 

1249
00:56:32,540 --> 00:56:35,460
suitable. 
You would say, hey guy, why 

1250
00:56:35,460 --> 00:56:39,620
don't you meet me at this strip 
mall or somewhere else and you 

1251
00:56:39,620 --> 00:56:42,180
can you can surrender to us 
there and then we can pick you 

1252
00:56:42,180 --> 00:56:44,020
up and drive away. 
We won't have to stand there 

1253
00:56:44,020 --> 00:56:46,900
with some sort of like rolling 
perimeter that a citizen 

1254
00:56:46,900 --> 00:56:50,100
journalist can just penetrate 
through and then create a whole 

1255
00:56:50,100 --> 00:56:53,820
scene there because it just 
takes them logistically because 

1256
00:56:53,820 --> 00:56:56,900
there's 20 people to leave. 
It takes them a long time. 

1257
00:56:57,500 --> 00:57:00,180
And their their their whole 
issue too was they're trying to 

1258
00:57:00,460 --> 00:57:03,940
get his vehicle somebody so 
somebody could take control of 

1259
00:57:03,940 --> 00:57:05,660
his vehicle. 
Well if you call the guy ahead 

1260
00:57:05,660 --> 00:57:07,980
of time then he's going to make 
arrangements for somebody to 

1261
00:57:07,980 --> 00:57:09,500
take his vehicle or to drop him 
off. 

1262
00:57:09,660 --> 00:57:12,540
You don't encounter that that 
logistical problem. 

1263
00:57:12,780 --> 00:57:16,380
But they were they had to have 
their their FD888, their OPS 

1264
00:57:16,380 --> 00:57:19,100
plan I'm sure was all drawn up. 
They were going to take this guy

1265
00:57:19,100 --> 00:57:21,180
down outside of like some sort 
of. 

1266
00:57:21,570 --> 00:57:24,290
Run down outlet where there is 
no nobody parked. 

1267
00:57:24,290 --> 00:57:27,930
So I don't know what the plan 
was here, but it it certainly 

1268
00:57:27,930 --> 00:57:31,370
was not contrived by anybody 
with a functioning prefrontal 

1269
00:57:31,410 --> 00:57:33,410
cortex. 
So here's the here's the major 

1270
00:57:33,410 --> 00:57:35,850
issues I see with this 
particular operation. 

1271
00:57:35,850 --> 00:57:37,770
They've got a moving perimeter, 
which means we have people that 

1272
00:57:37,770 --> 00:57:39,810
don't know their legal 
authorities to hold a line and 

1273
00:57:39,810 --> 00:57:41,410
what that line should be, and 
they don't have enough 

1274
00:57:41,410 --> 00:57:43,170
experience doing it to make that
happen. 

1275
00:57:43,410 --> 00:57:46,330
They've got a dozen guys or a 
half dozen guys, and plus 

1276
00:57:46,330 --> 00:57:49,150
whoever else is there, we've got
six vehicles at least, that are 

1277
00:57:49,230 --> 00:57:51,470
meandering around with their 
backs to potential threats, if 

1278
00:57:51,470 --> 00:57:52,470
that's what they're going to 
call it. 

1279
00:57:52,630 --> 00:57:55,470
They have suppressed M fours. 
They don't have a hands team, 

1280
00:57:55,630 --> 00:57:57,990
right? 
And we'll dig into what a hands 

1281
00:57:57,990 --> 00:58:00,590
team is later, but they don't 
have somebody that's dedicated 

1282
00:58:00,590 --> 00:58:02,070
to having no rifle. 
Like even the guy who's doing 

1283
00:58:02,070 --> 00:58:03,510
the search has a freaking rifle 
slung. 

1284
00:58:03,510 --> 00:58:04,390
Have you see that? 
Like in the. 

1285
00:58:04,390 --> 00:58:06,190
Background Doing a terrible 
search. 

1286
00:58:06,190 --> 00:58:08,790
It's the worst you could do. 
Now the fact is, he's got really

1287
00:58:08,790 --> 00:58:10,670
like clothing, but as you're 
taught at the Academy, people 

1288
00:58:10,670 --> 00:58:12,190
can hide all kinds of wild stuff
and, well, they can. 

1289
00:58:12,230 --> 00:58:13,870
Secrete it. 
They can secrete it. 

1290
00:58:13,870 --> 00:58:16,630
FBI term. 
So either I thought it was 

1291
00:58:16,630 --> 00:58:20,880
secret, it it makes more sense 
to me, secrete it sounds like 

1292
00:58:20,880 --> 00:58:23,520
it's coming out of their skin. 
The most important thing is 

1293
00:58:23,520 --> 00:58:26,040
this, either you search everyone
like they might have a weapon 

1294
00:58:26,040 --> 00:58:27,880
and you're going to be serious 
about it, or you don't search 

1295
00:58:27,880 --> 00:58:30,080
everyone like a weapon, but then
you have this problem, it's 

1296
00:58:30,080 --> 00:58:31,640
like, well why wasn't he 
searched that way? 

1297
00:58:31,640 --> 00:58:34,320
And by the way, my friends have 
done bad searches or have been 

1298
00:58:34,320 --> 00:58:37,800
on the scene of bad searches. 
And they actually had a guy who 

1299
00:58:37,800 --> 00:58:40,730
they found a grenade on his body
and then they left him and they 

1300
00:58:40,730 --> 00:58:41,970
and they were like, oh, it's a 
grenade. 

1301
00:58:41,970 --> 00:58:43,490
So they got really excited and 
they found the grenade. 

1302
00:58:43,610 --> 00:58:46,130
And he sent me a text message. 
Probably our first year in the 

1303
00:58:46,130 --> 00:58:50,050
in the FBI, he said, pro tip, 
when you find a grenade on your 

1304
00:58:50,050 --> 00:58:52,010
subject, keep searching until 
you find his hidden gun. 

1305
00:58:52,010 --> 00:58:53,450
Because if there's a grenade, 
there's probably a gun. 

1306
00:58:53,610 --> 00:58:56,450
The guy went into jail locked up
with his hands behind his back 

1307
00:58:56,450 --> 00:58:58,890
and a revolver down his pants up
in the front, and he was 

1308
00:58:58,890 --> 00:59:00,530
freaking out, as you can 
imagine. 

1309
00:59:00,730 --> 00:59:03,130
So stuff like this, you know, 
either you search people like 

1310
00:59:03,130 --> 00:59:05,520
you're serious or you don't. 
You've got a little bit of a 

1311
00:59:05,520 --> 00:59:07,600
crowd here, but this could have 
been a really quick meet. 

1312
00:59:07,720 --> 00:59:10,920
You and me go up, we tell them, 
look, we've got a warrant for 

1313
00:59:10,920 --> 00:59:12,240
your rest. 
We're going to pick you up and 

1314
00:59:12,240 --> 00:59:13,400
you can surrender and that'd be 
great. 

1315
00:59:13,400 --> 00:59:16,480
And we'll do it with no fanfare.
And you can make arrangements or

1316
00:59:17,120 --> 00:59:19,480
you can run and the United 
States Marshall Service will run

1317
00:59:19,480 --> 00:59:20,960
you down. 
And they do that for a living. 

1318
00:59:21,080 --> 00:59:22,760
And then you got to deal with 
whatever that looks like and 

1319
00:59:22,760 --> 00:59:24,400
they'll do a dynamic entry of 
your hotel room. 

1320
00:59:24,600 --> 00:59:26,920
So we would just, let's get this
squared away and we'll get you 

1321
00:59:26,920 --> 00:59:28,640
home by the end of the dinner 
after we get you booked in an 

1322
00:59:28,640 --> 00:59:30,600
initial. 
Let's make it easy on everybody.

1323
00:59:30,600 --> 00:59:32,600
And you can do that. 
And most people are amenable to 

1324
00:59:32,600 --> 00:59:35,060
that when they've abided by the 
law their whole life. 

1325
00:59:35,460 --> 00:59:37,300
Correct. 
And they're probably scooping 

1326
00:59:37,300 --> 00:59:41,060
this guy up too late to actually
get him to the magistrate that 

1327
00:59:41,060 --> 00:59:42,580
day. 
The sun is high in the sky at 

1328
00:59:42,580 --> 00:59:44,900
that point. 
So they're gonna ensure no 

1329
00:59:44,900 --> 00:59:47,620
matter what he's spending at 
least one night in lock up. 

1330
00:59:48,110 --> 00:59:50,550
That's that all is true too. 
Now you've got new guys that are

1331
00:59:50,550 --> 00:59:51,950
out there with a moving 
security. 

1332
00:59:51,950 --> 00:59:54,710
They don't know what their their
constitutional liberty line is. 

1333
00:59:54,710 --> 00:59:57,230
They don't know that they can't 
stop this guy's First Amendment 

1334
00:59:57,230 --> 01:00:01,150
ability to to walk up and film. 
And their their argument is why 

1335
01:00:01,150 --> 01:00:03,270
don't you be cool. 
Can we talk about the loss of 

1336
01:00:03,270 --> 01:00:06,030
the the prestige of the FBI and 
why that has created this 

1337
01:00:06,030 --> 01:00:08,150
dangerous problem? 
I think for for arrest like 

1338
01:00:08,150 --> 01:00:11,360
this? 
Yeah, I mean, look, if, yes, he 

1339
01:00:11,360 --> 01:00:13,200
has the right to to, you know, 
to walk around. 

1340
01:00:13,200 --> 01:00:15,360
He's got the free access to 
movement, but you just need to 

1341
01:00:15,360 --> 01:00:18,440
be respectful to to the person. 
If you have the reputation 

1342
01:00:18,440 --> 01:00:21,160
that's kind of supersedes you, I
think most people are willing to

1343
01:00:21,160 --> 01:00:23,320
honor that. 
And you say, hey, I, I know you 

1344
01:00:23,320 --> 01:00:26,160
can walk through here, but I 
would really appreciate it if 

1345
01:00:26,160 --> 01:00:28,400
you stood there. 
We'll make sure that you can get

1346
01:00:28,400 --> 01:00:29,920
access and you can film 
properly. 

1347
01:00:29,920 --> 01:00:31,600
We're not trying to impede you 
on your rights. 

1348
01:00:32,360 --> 01:00:35,080
And I think most people, if they
respected the FBI, would say 

1349
01:00:35,080 --> 01:00:37,560
okay, that's fine with me, but 
clearly this guy doesn't have 

1350
01:00:37,560 --> 01:00:40,100
that. 
No, I mean he's he's like I'm 

1351
01:00:40,100 --> 01:00:42,260
trying to be cool with you. 
And the other guy was like, this

1352
01:00:42,260 --> 01:00:44,940
is a crime. 
I saw it on CSI. 

1353
01:00:45,300 --> 01:00:47,300
It doesn't work here. 
It's not a crime scene so you 

1354
01:00:47,300 --> 01:00:48,780
can see the foolishness that's 
going on. 

1355
01:00:48,900 --> 01:00:50,860
Jigsaw in the chat just said 
they should have wrapped in from

1356
01:00:50,860 --> 01:00:53,780
a from a helicopter. 
The the Hilo Repel would get you

1357
01:00:53,780 --> 01:00:56,340
a definite promotion if you 
could have sold that to this to 

1358
01:00:56,340 --> 01:00:59,430
this take down yeah you just see
the dog kill team send in ahead 

1359
01:00:59,430 --> 01:01:00,590
of time right. 
That's. 

1360
01:01:00,670 --> 01:01:03,030
To take them and put them on the
ground and then yeah, then you 

1361
01:01:03,030 --> 01:01:04,710
got options. 
Or maybe a drone, a drone 

1362
01:01:04,710 --> 01:01:06,990
rolling in that's with an 
offensive explosive device. 

1363
01:01:07,270 --> 01:01:08,670
So we're we're being silly about
this. 

1364
01:01:08,670 --> 01:01:11,230
But the the argument is when you
have these civilians and I've, 

1365
01:01:11,230 --> 01:01:14,750
I've held perimeter for SWAT 
many times I've held perimeter 

1366
01:01:14,750 --> 01:01:16,950
for other engagements, it looks 
very simple. 

1367
01:01:16,950 --> 01:01:19,390
You go up to them and you have a
a very common idea. 

1368
01:01:19,390 --> 01:01:20,870
It's like, look, you have every 
right to film here. 

1369
01:01:21,230 --> 01:01:22,750
I'm not going to impede on your 
ability to do that. 

1370
01:01:23,030 --> 01:01:25,590
For your safety and for the 
safety of those inside, please 

1371
01:01:25,590 --> 01:01:28,110
stand behind this line because I
don't want you to catch a 

1372
01:01:28,110 --> 01:01:30,390
straight round if something 
breaks bad and I don't want to 

1373
01:01:30,390 --> 01:01:32,190
do this if you want to get 
access closer. 

1374
01:01:32,190 --> 01:01:33,350
We'll work on that in just a 
minute. 

1375
01:01:33,550 --> 01:01:35,790
Let them get this guy secure for
his safety as well. 

1376
01:01:35,790 --> 01:01:37,830
I don't want him to get hurt and
then I will bring in. 

1377
01:01:37,830 --> 01:01:39,550
If you want to talk to him 
afterwards, you can talk to him.

1378
01:01:39,550 --> 01:01:40,790
I don't care. 
We're going to take him away. 

1379
01:01:40,790 --> 01:01:42,270
I'll roll the window down. 
You can have a conversation, 

1380
01:01:42,270 --> 01:01:44,670
especially if you're trying to 
secure the vehicle or help us 

1381
01:01:44,670 --> 01:01:45,190
out. 
Okay. 

1382
01:01:45,230 --> 01:01:46,510
Is that cool? 
Is that amenable? 

1383
01:01:46,870 --> 01:01:48,710
And if you have that, what's he 
being arrested for? 

1384
01:01:48,710 --> 01:01:50,110
Look, this is January 6th 
related. 

1385
01:01:50,510 --> 01:01:52,150
I can't say much more about it. 
That's up to him. 

1386
01:01:52,270 --> 01:01:53,950
But if you guys want to have 
that conversation in a second, 

1387
01:01:54,030 --> 01:01:56,190
he can tell you all about it and
then we're going to get out of 

1388
01:01:56,190 --> 01:01:58,390
here. 
Another another option that 

1389
01:01:58,390 --> 01:02:00,390
clearly they didn't think out 
when they were drafting their 

1390
01:02:00,390 --> 01:02:03,190
FD888 was why don't you have a 
local law enforcement there? 

1391
01:02:03,190 --> 01:02:07,070
So if it is a disruptive 
citizen, you they can roll up on

1392
01:02:07,070 --> 01:02:09,270
them and say, hey, look, you're 
committing a state fraction 

1393
01:02:09,270 --> 01:02:12,270
right now by being disorderly or
you're committing some sort of 

1394
01:02:12,270 --> 01:02:15,080
city ordance violation. 
They can actually jam him up. 

1395
01:02:15,120 --> 01:02:16,800
Right. 
It's a right of way violation 

1396
01:02:16,800 --> 01:02:18,600
because you're standing in the 
middle of an active roadway or 

1397
01:02:18,600 --> 01:02:20,920
parking lot or whatever. 
The thing is, the cop knows that

1398
01:02:20,920 --> 01:02:22,320
code because they deal with it 
when they need to. 

1399
01:02:22,320 --> 01:02:24,520
The FBI doesn't have that, that 
authority. 

1400
01:02:25,560 --> 01:02:28,360
No, I mean that's he's he's 
saying this is a crime scene. 

1401
01:02:29,120 --> 01:02:33,120
Because he just doesn't know. 
No, that's a SWAT guy, man. 

1402
01:02:33,120 --> 01:02:34,960
It's it's a hammer looking for a
nail. 

1403
01:02:35,040 --> 01:02:36,040
That's it. 
Yeah. 

1404
01:02:36,040 --> 01:02:37,760
It's really troubling for me to 
see this kind of stuff. 

1405
01:02:37,760 --> 01:02:39,640
There's more of it too. 
They turn their back on them on 

1406
01:02:39,640 --> 01:02:41,360
a regular basis. 
So either you have a threat and 

1407
01:02:41,360 --> 01:02:42,760
you have a perimeter, or you 
don't. 

1408
01:02:43,190 --> 01:02:44,710
And if you're not going to be 
able to acknowledge this, the 

1409
01:02:44,710 --> 01:02:47,030
lackadaisical attitude walking 
around, I'll give you the top 

1410
01:02:47,030 --> 01:02:49,390
couple. 
I've had about 150 or 200,000 

1411
01:02:49,390 --> 01:02:52,070
views on Twitter of my comments 
on this, which is that the FBI 

1412
01:02:52,070 --> 01:02:54,150
are not police. 
And the questions have come up. 

1413
01:02:54,270 --> 01:02:55,590
Why are they dressed the way 
they are? 

1414
01:02:55,670 --> 01:02:57,630
Why is there a mixed bag of of 
armor? 

1415
01:02:57,630 --> 01:02:59,670
I think we've covered the armor 
piece at least that different, 

1416
01:02:59,910 --> 01:03:02,350
you know, different tenure in 
the Bureau and different teams 

1417
01:03:02,350 --> 01:03:04,470
will give you different access. 
But why are they wearing blue 

1418
01:03:04,470 --> 01:03:06,350
jeans and stuff like that? 
Is this a Merck team? 

1419
01:03:06,550 --> 01:03:08,950
You know, are they a bunch of 
PMC's, private military 

1420
01:03:08,950 --> 01:03:11,470
contractors? 
Can you dress the uniform thing 

1421
01:03:12,250 --> 01:03:15,250
I mean it's just just down man. 
It's it's an arrest operation. 

1422
01:03:15,290 --> 01:03:18,050
The FBI doesn't have a uniform 
unless it's a SWAT team. 

1423
01:03:18,050 --> 01:03:20,330
So everybody's just kind of 
throws on something that's going

1424
01:03:20,330 --> 01:03:23,450
to be a they can something can 
move around in. 

1425
01:03:23,450 --> 01:03:26,570
I mean and they're they're 
definitely not upholding the 

1426
01:03:26,570 --> 01:03:28,930
Steve Gray mindset of you have 
to wear a suit all the time 

1427
01:03:28,930 --> 01:03:30,410
anymore. 
I think that they've just 

1428
01:03:30,690 --> 01:03:34,130
devolved into a more casual and 
blue jeans are going to get a 

1429
01:03:34,130 --> 01:03:38,360
suffice here as long as I have 
my my badge on then that that 

1430
01:03:38,360 --> 01:03:41,040
should be enough. 
And you know, so it does it. 

1431
01:03:41,120 --> 01:03:43,040
It sort of has that like 
inconsistent look. 

1432
01:03:43,040 --> 01:03:46,920
But again, FBI is not police 
that there's not a uniform that 

1433
01:03:46,920 --> 01:03:49,760
they're expected to wear. 
There is a cool guy aspect to 

1434
01:03:49,760 --> 01:03:51,720
it, and I've done surveillance 
where we've done surveillance to

1435
01:03:51,720 --> 01:03:52,920
arrest. 
That is the way I would do an 

1436
01:03:52,920 --> 01:03:55,200
arrest if I was doing that. 
However, this is a planned 

1437
01:03:55,200 --> 01:03:57,440
operation where they may have 
two people in plain clothes like

1438
01:03:57,440 --> 01:03:59,390
looking like you and me. 
Sitting and watching and you 

1439
01:03:59,390 --> 01:04:01,430
could literally send two guys in
and suits they could drive up. 

1440
01:04:01,590 --> 01:04:03,990
Once you've ID the subject, you 
got a backup team that is low 

1441
01:04:03,990 --> 01:04:06,270
viz that could throw on plates 
if they needed, but you could 

1442
01:04:06,270 --> 01:04:08,750
have two guys walk up in suits. 
And the fun thing is everybody 

1443
01:04:08,750 --> 01:04:10,550
who's come out of Quantico, 
especially those guys with that 

1444
01:04:10,550 --> 01:04:13,350
new armor, they have the new 
Ultra low visibility armor which

1445
01:04:13,350 --> 01:04:16,710
is a pistol round kiss stopping 
super thin tshirt under. 

1446
01:04:16,750 --> 01:04:19,230
I've worn it under a tshirt by 
the way and nobody's seen it. 

1447
01:04:19,390 --> 01:04:21,630
And I would do that for Source 
Meets if it was necessary or if 

1448
01:04:21,630 --> 01:04:23,150
I was going to a bad 
neighborhood and I was going to 

1449
01:04:23,150 --> 01:04:24,750
get out and be on foot. 
It's great. 

1450
01:04:25,060 --> 01:04:27,340
And they could have easily 
walked in with body armor on 

1451
01:04:27,340 --> 01:04:30,180
wearing a suit if they were so 
concerned and still had that 

1452
01:04:30,180 --> 01:04:32,140
conversation with a guy. 
But once you've seen what that 

1453
01:04:32,140 --> 01:04:34,900
guy is capable of, he's 
obviously not concealing a rifle

1454
01:04:34,940 --> 01:04:37,420
in those clothes. 
I mean, he's wearing a tshirt. 

1455
01:04:37,460 --> 01:04:40,380
You would expect to be doing 
some amount of surveillance 

1456
01:04:40,380 --> 01:04:43,060
before you go to arrest him. 
I mean, obviously they knew he 

1457
01:04:43,060 --> 01:04:44,860
was going to be in that location
at that time. 

1458
01:04:44,860 --> 01:04:46,980
They had some advance 
information. 

1459
01:04:47,340 --> 01:04:50,260
So if you're watching him you 
see he doesn't have it, you know

1460
01:04:50,340 --> 01:04:53,960
an A case lung to his back like 
why are you rolling up on him 

1461
01:04:53,960 --> 01:04:57,720
with you know eight guys with 
slung M fours It it's just it's 

1462
01:04:57,720 --> 01:05:02,040
not awareness of the optics of 
the situation because the FBI is

1463
01:05:02,040 --> 01:05:05,680
clearly not concerned about what
the the the public thinks of it 

1464
01:05:05,880 --> 01:05:08,360
And there's this is again the 
process is the punishment and 

1465
01:05:08,360 --> 01:05:10,970
and we're good with it. 
Maybe going to the mindset you 

1466
01:05:10,970 --> 01:05:12,890
think of the of the actual 
individuals that are involved 

1467
01:05:12,890 --> 01:05:14,730
that we know the FBI is general 
does not care. 

1468
01:05:14,730 --> 01:05:15,690
They think they're the good 
guys. 

1469
01:05:15,690 --> 01:05:18,970
So they're serving truth justice
in the American way by running a

1470
01:05:18,970 --> 01:05:20,850
bunch of dudes with the 
suppressed M fours. 

1471
01:05:21,010 --> 01:05:22,690
Everybody has to have one, 
including the chick that was 

1472
01:05:22,690 --> 01:05:26,330
there, who I've seen very, very 
few women in the FBI who could 

1473
01:05:26,330 --> 01:05:28,650
handle an M4 in a way that made 
me comfortable with them having 

1474
01:05:28,650 --> 01:05:31,130
it just straight up. 
And and that's also true for 

1475
01:05:31,130 --> 01:05:35,410
most guys, but women as the one 
subset and then like guys who 

1476
01:05:35,410 --> 01:05:39,100
didn't grow up around rifles is 
the other subset which is. 80% 

1477
01:05:39,100 --> 01:05:41,460
of the Bureau I would say they 
just they're bad news with a 

1478
01:05:41,460 --> 01:05:42,380
rifle. 
They're scary. 

1479
01:05:42,380 --> 01:05:43,660
They don't know how to secure 
it. 

1480
01:05:44,060 --> 01:05:46,820
The guys who use it every day 
like me, which is unusual or 

1481
01:05:46,820 --> 01:05:49,620
guys who are on SWAT are the 
only ones that seem comfortable 

1482
01:05:49,620 --> 01:05:51,580
with it and they don't care. 
So. 

1483
01:05:51,580 --> 01:05:54,420
So what are the individuals that
are on that scene thinking about

1484
01:05:54,420 --> 01:05:56,180
you think as they're getting 
questions and and they're 

1485
01:05:56,180 --> 01:05:57,380
saying, hey, what's your badge 
number? 

1486
01:05:57,840 --> 01:05:59,640
Like you're getting that 
question, what do you think? 

1487
01:05:59,720 --> 01:06:01,400
And they're completely 
overwhelmed by that that 

1488
01:06:01,400 --> 01:06:04,560
situation, which is again like 
it's not trained that way. 

1489
01:06:04,560 --> 01:06:07,280
Because if you're a SWAT guy, 
you're just going doing close 

1490
01:06:07,280 --> 01:06:10,760
quarter battle drills in an 
empty house and then practicing 

1491
01:06:10,760 --> 01:06:12,920
your room clearing techniques. 
And very seldom do you have like

1492
01:06:12,920 --> 01:06:16,400
a role player who gets spun up 
and starts screaming at you and 

1493
01:06:16,400 --> 01:06:19,440
isn't like pulling out the, you 
know, a SIM gun that you have to

1494
01:06:19,440 --> 01:06:22,670
just tap two times in the chest 
and then they go down. 

1495
01:06:23,550 --> 01:06:27,910
This is nobody's ever thought 
out real world scenarios like 

1496
01:06:27,990 --> 01:06:30,950
what if you have an unruly 
citizen who's standing by that? 

1497
01:06:30,990 --> 01:06:34,550
That seems like a very higher 
likelihood as opposed to like 

1498
01:06:34,830 --> 01:06:38,350
you while training on SWAT, you 
got a hostage rescue call out. 

1499
01:06:38,350 --> 01:06:41,470
You have to go to this, you 
know, this this active shooter 

1500
01:06:41,470 --> 01:06:43,070
situation, which is going to be 
a very remote. 

1501
01:06:43,780 --> 01:06:45,700
It's more likely nowadays 
especially that you're going to 

1502
01:06:45,700 --> 01:06:48,420
have somebody with a cell phone 
who's kind of being a jerk. 

1503
01:06:48,500 --> 01:06:49,620
How are you going to address 
that? 

1504
01:06:49,620 --> 01:06:52,900
What are their rights and how 
are you going to mitigate that? 

1505
01:06:53,180 --> 01:06:56,340
And those guys, were they, they 
would rather have been engaged 

1506
01:06:56,340 --> 01:06:58,700
with a shooter than dealing with
that guy. 

1507
01:06:58,940 --> 01:07:01,540
For sure, 100%, yeah, because 
that was something that they're 

1508
01:07:01,540 --> 01:07:03,260
not capable of doing. 
Look, I used to work 

1509
01:07:03,260 --> 01:07:04,660
surveillance on the on the 
street. 

1510
01:07:04,660 --> 01:07:06,900
So you're out there every single
day you're idling in a car when 

1511
01:07:06,900 --> 01:07:08,740
it's 1000 degrees outside, you 
have your air conditioning 

1512
01:07:08,740 --> 01:07:09,780
running. 
You know you don't want to do 

1513
01:07:09,780 --> 01:07:10,980
that. 
That's no fun to sit and sweat 

1514
01:07:10,980 --> 01:07:12,100
it out. 
Although I've done that too. 

1515
01:07:12,420 --> 01:07:14,140
And I froze it out too. 
And it sucks. 

1516
01:07:14,340 --> 01:07:16,860
So mostly you're running an 
engine and people tend to notice

1517
01:07:16,860 --> 01:07:18,660
that on very, very small 
occasions. 

1518
01:07:18,660 --> 01:07:20,700
But when they do, you have an 
interaction with it, with a 

1519
01:07:20,820 --> 01:07:23,460
concerned citizen, and they have
every right to know what the 

1520
01:07:23,460 --> 01:07:24,940
heck you are doing. 
They have every right to at 

1521
01:07:24,940 --> 01:07:27,020
least bother you about why 
you're in their neighborhood. 

1522
01:07:27,420 --> 01:07:30,340
And I was always told you can 
never tell them who you are, 

1523
01:07:30,340 --> 01:07:33,380
what you're doing under any 
circumstances. 

1524
01:07:34,010 --> 01:07:36,490
And the fact the matter is, if 
you pull that shit in front of 

1525
01:07:36,490 --> 01:07:38,530
my house and I apologize for 
swearing, but there's no other 

1526
01:07:38,530 --> 01:07:40,610
way to say it. 
If you pulled out and we're like

1527
01:07:40,770 --> 01:07:43,170
idling outside of my house, 
watching the house down the 

1528
01:07:43,170 --> 01:07:46,730
street and I walked out to you, 
number one, I would be armed #2 

1529
01:07:46,730 --> 01:07:48,330
I don't know what you're doing 
there, but you're either law 

1530
01:07:48,330 --> 01:07:51,170
enforcement or a scumbag, and 
you better help me understand 

1531
01:07:51,170 --> 01:07:54,930
right away which one you are. 
And so you know, I would always 

1532
01:07:54,970 --> 01:07:57,970
mix at least a big grain of the 
truth with my story. 

1533
01:07:57,970 --> 01:08:00,330
I may not be telling you exactly
why I'm there, but I'm going to 

1534
01:08:00,330 --> 01:08:02,050
at least let you know that I'm 
part of team good guy. 

1535
01:08:02,860 --> 01:08:05,020
I don't have to flash a badge. 
I have to be articulate. 

1536
01:08:05,140 --> 01:08:07,380
I have to give you an A message.
One of my favorite ones is I 

1537
01:08:07,380 --> 01:08:10,180
would tell people I'm with the 
postal inspector and we've had a

1538
01:08:10,180 --> 01:08:13,460
lot of checks that have been 
stolen and washed out of your 

1539
01:08:13,460 --> 01:08:15,460
neighborhood and we are watching
mailboxes. 

1540
01:08:15,620 --> 01:08:17,460
So look, I really appreciate it.
If you don't kind of dime us 

1541
01:08:17,460 --> 01:08:19,460
out, we're going to be here for 
the next week or so. 

1542
01:08:19,460 --> 01:08:21,540
We're going to be in and out. 
You'll see different cars and 

1543
01:08:21,540 --> 01:08:23,100
stuff, but we're just trying to 
make sure that your neighbors 

1544
01:08:23,100 --> 01:08:24,819
are not getting financially 
scammed. 

1545
01:08:24,939 --> 01:08:26,740
You have some retirees in your 
neighborhood that we're looking 

1546
01:08:26,740 --> 01:08:28,359
out for. 
And that is plenty. 

1547
01:08:28,399 --> 01:08:30,160
I don't need to tell you that 
I'm looking for a member of the 

1548
01:08:30,160 --> 01:08:32,319
Asian boys gang who is wanted 
for homicide. 

1549
01:08:32,319 --> 01:08:33,840
That's not my job. 
I don't have to do that. 

1550
01:08:34,160 --> 01:08:36,000
But I will tell you that at 
least I'm part of a team doing 

1551
01:08:36,000 --> 01:08:38,200
something that is plausible, 
that is going to allay your 

1552
01:08:38,200 --> 01:08:42,120
fears because you pay my salary.
And these people don't seem to 

1553
01:08:42,120 --> 01:08:44,720
realize that the people that are
asking questions, it is their 

1554
01:08:44,720 --> 01:08:48,439
job to defend the civil 
liberties of that guy with the 

1555
01:08:48,439 --> 01:08:51,720
camera who's being a kind of a 
Dick at the same time as they 

1556
01:08:51,720 --> 01:08:54,319
are trying to enact this arrest 
warrant, which is mandated by 

1557
01:08:54,319 --> 01:08:56,560
the judge that they specifically
asked it so they can get an 

1558
01:08:56,560 --> 01:08:58,350
arrest warrant. 
Which we, you know, we, I think 

1559
01:08:58,350 --> 01:09:00,950
we've covered that well. 
But they they have a duty to the

1560
01:09:00,950 --> 01:09:04,670
guy with the phone that is part 
of their duty and it's lost. 

1561
01:09:04,870 --> 01:09:07,189
It's lost it is. 
I mean they they it's definitely

1562
01:09:07,189 --> 01:09:12,029
an us versus them mentality that
is now crept its way into the 

1563
01:09:12,029 --> 01:09:16,029
vast majority I think of the age
and it's it's disappointing. 

1564
01:09:16,310 --> 01:09:20,510
I mean I never I I didn't like 
cops when they had that 

1565
01:09:20,510 --> 01:09:22,870
mentality. 
I I never looked at my job being

1566
01:09:22,870 --> 01:09:24,109
that way. 
And that was always my 

1567
01:09:24,109 --> 01:09:27,510
objection. 
You know, I hated doing traffic 

1568
01:09:27,950 --> 01:09:30,229
as a cop. 
And one of the reasons was, was 

1569
01:09:30,229 --> 01:09:32,830
I thought it led you to a 
mentality where you were looking

1570
01:09:32,830 --> 01:09:35,830
for regular people that were 
just going to work or driving 

1571
01:09:35,830 --> 01:09:38,830
their kids to school and you're 
targeting them because you got 

1572
01:09:38,830 --> 01:09:40,790
to write a ticket because you're
hungry for write a ticket. 

1573
01:09:40,830 --> 01:09:43,109
And that that sort of mentality 
then would creep into the the 

1574
01:09:43,189 --> 01:09:45,350
other sort of work that you were
doing on a regular basis. 

1575
01:09:45,950 --> 01:09:48,870
And I think that because they're
now on the hunt and they're 

1576
01:09:48,870 --> 01:09:51,750
looking for targets of 
opportunity via January 6th or 

1577
01:09:51,750 --> 01:09:55,010
anything else that that is crept
into the regular aging 

1578
01:09:55,010 --> 01:09:56,530
population and it's very 
disturbing. 

1579
01:09:57,370 --> 01:10:00,090
I want to just put ourselves in 
the mindset of these guys. 

1580
01:10:00,170 --> 01:10:01,810
Like I said, we've been on these
operations. 

1581
01:10:01,810 --> 01:10:03,850
I've been on some that were much
sloppier than others. 

1582
01:10:03,850 --> 01:10:06,010
I've been on, some that were 
buttoned up and really, really 

1583
01:10:06,010 --> 01:10:07,850
tight. 
My, my favorite op we did. 

1584
01:10:07,850 --> 01:10:11,210
We arrested a convicted murderer
who we had. 

1585
01:10:11,450 --> 01:10:13,490
This is a wild one. 
We pulled a guy into custody. 

1586
01:10:13,490 --> 01:10:14,570
By the way, we used to have this
joke. 

1587
01:10:14,570 --> 01:10:16,370
Always look for the the orange 
Harley. 

1588
01:10:16,700 --> 01:10:18,860
We had this guy under 
surveillance for a couple weeks 

1589
01:10:19,060 --> 01:10:21,100
and he was a convicted murder, 
second degree murder. 

1590
01:10:21,100 --> 01:10:23,540
He was working for the city of 
DC at DCRA. 

1591
01:10:23,540 --> 01:10:26,060
People can look this up, but 
it's one of their consumer 

1592
01:10:26,060 --> 01:10:27,620
regulation association or 
something like that. 

1593
01:10:27,860 --> 01:10:32,340
So he worked every day in a 
shirt and tie, lived in Maryland

1594
01:10:32,380 --> 01:10:35,420
like they all did at the time, 
and he had like a Mercedes and 

1595
01:10:35,420 --> 01:10:36,540
something else. 
And we were surveilling the 

1596
01:10:36,540 --> 01:10:37,780
house and we're watching for 
that. 

1597
01:10:37,780 --> 01:10:40,300
And we actually choked back far 
enough away that we were not on 

1598
01:10:40,300 --> 01:10:41,860
the House where you could see 
that the driveway. 

1599
01:10:42,020 --> 01:10:44,380
So we were only looking for 
those two vehicles and the 

1600
01:10:44,380 --> 01:10:45,960
subject. 
Like I said, convicted of 

1601
01:10:45,960 --> 01:10:47,800
murder. 
He was a drug dealer. 

1602
01:10:47,800 --> 01:10:50,120
He was moving fentanyl around. 
The fentanyl that he sold was 

1603
01:10:50,120 --> 01:10:53,120
used and actually ended up 
killing another young, like 

1604
01:10:53,160 --> 01:10:56,800
college girl in Virginia. 
So now they had this, this Rico 

1605
01:10:56,800 --> 01:10:58,720
case that was going on and they 
were going to bring him down and

1606
01:10:58,720 --> 01:11:00,480
they were looking for the 
supplier of the chain, who was 

1607
01:11:00,480 --> 01:11:02,400
another murderer, by the way, 
who had gotten out on 

1608
01:11:02,400 --> 01:11:04,640
firstdegree murder charges after
serving like 30 years. 

1609
01:11:04,760 --> 01:11:06,880
And so he was also living in DC 
and he was selling it to his 

1610
01:11:06,880 --> 01:11:08,080
other buddy who probably met in 
prison. 

1611
01:11:08,320 --> 01:11:10,560
So these two black guys, like 
one of them's kind of older, 

1612
01:11:10,560 --> 01:11:12,080
one's kind of younger and well 
dressed, whatever. 

1613
01:11:12,080 --> 01:11:13,520
And he was a nice enough guy 
when we dealt with him. 

1614
01:11:13,520 --> 01:11:15,160
He was terrified. 
And his his biggest. 

1615
01:11:15,240 --> 01:11:16,880
Fear was that we were going to 
tell his wife that he was 

1616
01:11:16,880 --> 01:11:18,880
involved in selling drugs. 
That ended up killing somebody. 

1617
01:11:19,400 --> 01:11:22,440
She was going to find out. 
But the joke was you always look

1618
01:11:22,440 --> 01:11:24,480
for the, for the, for the orange
Harley, because we're looking 

1619
01:11:24,480 --> 01:11:26,600
for this Mercedes and this SUV, 
whatever the heck it was. 

1620
01:11:26,800 --> 01:11:29,120
And the guy comes riding out on 
this orange Harley and nobody's 

1621
01:11:29,120 --> 01:11:30,720
ready for it because we didn't 
know we had a Harley. 

1622
01:11:30,960 --> 01:11:33,520
We've never seen it before. 
But one day, the the day we 

1623
01:11:33,520 --> 01:11:35,640
decided to arrest him, he comes 
in riding in on a Harley. 

1624
01:11:35,760 --> 01:11:36,840
So we see him go by and we're 
like. 

1625
01:11:38,090 --> 01:11:40,650
I think that was our guy. 
I think he's on a motorcycle. 

1626
01:11:40,650 --> 01:11:42,250
Does he own a motorcycle? 
Nobody knows. 

1627
01:11:42,370 --> 01:11:44,170
So we start, you know, running. 
After we end up running him 

1628
01:11:44,170 --> 01:11:46,450
down, we catch him at work, we 
arrest him, We flip him right 

1629
01:11:46,450 --> 01:11:49,650
then and there and we decide to 
go in it and do a kind of a 

1630
01:11:49,650 --> 01:11:52,850
controlled meet with his 
supplier and we're going to 

1631
01:11:52,850 --> 01:11:55,490
bring that guy into custody. 
And so this is on the fly, like 

1632
01:11:55,490 --> 01:11:58,530
on a napkin style arrest plan. 
This is the way that real police

1633
01:11:58,530 --> 01:12:00,810
do operations. 
They're in the field, they flip 

1634
01:12:00,810 --> 01:12:02,730
a guy in real time. 
And if you have an investigative

1635
01:12:02,730 --> 01:12:04,930
team, you go out and do it. 
So my team was involved in 

1636
01:12:04,930 --> 01:12:08,400
bringing down the main subject. 
And the two guys met up and he 

1637
01:12:08,400 --> 01:12:10,560
was scared, you know he was 
scared out of his mind to go and

1638
01:12:10,560 --> 01:12:13,360
meet up with his buddy and he 
gets him on on tape and or he 

1639
01:12:13,360 --> 01:12:17,000
gets him to admit to whatever 
was going on and then we go in 

1640
01:12:17,000 --> 01:12:19,080
to roll them both up again. 
Now one of the guys is going to 

1641
01:12:19,080 --> 01:12:21,720
be in custody because he already
knows he's been arrested and we 

1642
01:12:21,720 --> 01:12:24,320
are basically letting him with a
little bit of leash and the 

1643
01:12:24,320 --> 01:12:27,040
other guy is going to have his 
first interaction with the 

1644
01:12:27,040 --> 01:12:28,960
Bureau. 
We had two man arrest teams on 

1645
01:12:28,960 --> 01:12:30,560
each of them. 
Both of them had been had done 

1646
01:12:30,560 --> 01:12:33,190
time for murder. 
Okay One had been searched, one 

1647
01:12:33,190 --> 01:12:34,870
was in the clear. 
We had no idea the most 

1648
01:12:34,870 --> 01:12:37,150
dangerous weapon he had was his 
baskin-robbins ice cream cone 

1649
01:12:37,150 --> 01:12:40,870
which he dropped. 
I will never see like a green 

1650
01:12:40,870 --> 01:12:43,790
and pink ice cream cone on the 
ground again and not think about

1651
01:12:43,790 --> 01:12:46,270
this moment because the guy ran 
and then we we pinned against 

1652
01:12:46,270 --> 01:12:48,630
the brick wall, one person in 
front, one person to the side. 

1653
01:12:48,630 --> 01:12:50,630
L shape grabbed him, searched 
him real quickly. 

1654
01:12:50,670 --> 01:12:52,270
That was it. 
No rifles need to be involved. 

1655
01:12:52,790 --> 01:12:54,430
Handguns only. 
It was exactly like you saw 

1656
01:12:54,430 --> 01:12:56,110
there. 
It was fast and we had these 

1657
01:12:56,110 --> 01:12:57,910
guys off the scene in like 3 
minutes or less. 

1658
01:12:58,350 --> 01:13:00,310
We did a search and then we put 
them in the car and we rolled 

1659
01:13:00,630 --> 01:13:02,830
and that's it. 
And so it's like, you can do 

1660
01:13:02,830 --> 01:13:05,630
stuff like that and be quick or 
you could be a mess. 

1661
01:13:05,630 --> 01:13:07,030
But here's the thing I want you 
to think about. 

1662
01:13:08,150 --> 01:13:11,350
What was that conversation at 
Denny's like, or that lunch at 

1663
01:13:11,350 --> 01:13:14,430
Chili's after those guys left 
the scene with that gal and they

1664
01:13:14,430 --> 01:13:16,670
sit down and they're all around 
the table high fiving. 

1665
01:13:16,750 --> 01:13:19,030
What were they talking about on 
that scene? 

1666
01:13:20,120 --> 01:13:22,200
Oh man, they they were very 
gregarious. 

1667
01:13:22,200 --> 01:13:24,920
First of all, there was a lot of
smoking and joking because they 

1668
01:13:24,920 --> 01:13:27,960
saved America right from this 
guy who threw an elbow in the 

1669
01:13:27,960 --> 01:13:30,240
direction of a shield or 
something. 

1670
01:13:30,280 --> 01:13:32,360
That's right. 
And I think that they probably 

1671
01:13:32,360 --> 01:13:35,680
were just MF ING this this guy 
and not actually using it as a 

1672
01:13:35,680 --> 01:13:39,560
teachable moment for, hey, what 
if we encountered this again? 

1673
01:13:39,560 --> 01:13:42,320
I highly doubt that they had a 
serious conversation about that 

1674
01:13:42,320 --> 01:13:45,560
because that's the riff raft 
that we're that's the other 

1675
01:13:45,560 --> 01:13:47,720
side. 
And maybe maybe we need to find 

1676
01:13:47,720 --> 01:13:51,820
out who that is, because he 
seems kind of sympathetic to 

1677
01:13:52,100 --> 01:13:55,980
this other subject that we've 
just arrested and and we can 

1678
01:13:56,180 --> 01:14:00,820
develop a case on him. 
I also can imagine how the guys 

1679
01:14:00,820 --> 01:14:05,100
who who were engaged with the 
photographer tough talked after 

1680
01:14:05,100 --> 01:14:07,900
they were done, don't you think?
Yeah. 

1681
01:14:08,060 --> 01:14:09,820
So, especially the. 
Man, did you see that guy? 

1682
01:14:09,820 --> 01:14:12,180
Like, I was telling him to get 
back and then now they were the 

1683
01:14:12,180 --> 01:14:13,700
hero of their own story when 
they retold it. 

1684
01:14:13,980 --> 01:14:16,700
Yeah, well, when he so the the 
guy wearing the SWAT hat, he's 

1685
01:14:16,700 --> 01:14:17,620
like, hey, what's your badge 
number? 

1686
01:14:17,620 --> 01:14:19,020
And he's like, I don't have to 
tell you anything. 

1687
01:14:19,180 --> 01:14:20,700
Did you see his? 
Neck twitch, by the way, from 

1688
01:14:20,700 --> 01:14:22,820
the nerves. 
Am I the only one who saw that? 

1689
01:14:24,060 --> 01:14:26,740
His heart jumped into his throat
when that happened and that was 

1690
01:14:26,740 --> 01:14:27,820
the only thing he could come out
with. 

1691
01:14:28,220 --> 01:14:31,180
Yeah, that was my one regret 
having watched that. 

1692
01:14:31,180 --> 01:14:33,740
I was like, I wish he knew to 
ask them for their credentials. 

1693
01:14:33,980 --> 01:14:35,060
Right. 
Which they wouldn't have given 

1694
01:14:35,100 --> 01:14:36,780
either, probably. 
No, no. 

1695
01:14:37,020 --> 01:14:38,460
This is a crime scene. 
It's a crime scene. 

1696
01:14:38,460 --> 01:14:41,430
We can't. 
We can't do that, you know, and 

1697
01:14:41,470 --> 01:14:42,750
but you know, I don't tell you 
anything. 

1698
01:14:42,750 --> 01:14:46,230
I'm sure when he retold it, it 
was like he put that guy in his 

1699
01:14:46,230 --> 01:14:47,390
place. 
The guy. 

1700
01:14:47,550 --> 01:14:48,870
That was like, give me your 
badge number. 

1701
01:14:48,870 --> 01:14:50,110
And I was like, go screw 
yourself. 

1702
01:14:50,110 --> 01:14:51,230
Like, I don't have to give you a
badge. 

1703
01:14:51,590 --> 01:14:53,590
FBI agent. 
Like, the tape is out there, 

1704
01:14:53,590 --> 01:14:55,510
bro. 
You don't look good and you and 

1705
01:14:55,510 --> 01:14:57,110
you look nervous. 
And then his buddy couldn't 

1706
01:14:57,110 --> 01:14:59,430
think of anything to say either.
And so he the guy who had 

1707
01:14:59,430 --> 01:15:02,990
nothing but but words for the 
photographer, right, who had 

1708
01:15:02,990 --> 01:15:05,390
nothing but like, you know, 
tough talk, suddenly he doesn't 

1709
01:15:05,390 --> 01:15:07,030
have anything to say to him 
because they're asking for a 

1710
01:15:07,030 --> 01:15:08,870
badge number. 
Because FBI agents don't have to

1711
01:15:08,870 --> 01:15:10,030
deal with that. 
Because they're not cops. 

1712
01:15:10,530 --> 01:15:12,690
Yeah. 
And how about, like, take your 

1713
01:15:12,690 --> 01:15:15,010
hands off me? 
And he, he kept saying that over

1714
01:15:15,010 --> 01:15:17,050
and over again, like they were 
touching him, Right. 

1715
01:15:17,050 --> 01:15:20,690
They had no right to touch him. 
And if we had a serious Justice 

1716
01:15:20,690 --> 01:15:22,890
Department, we would have a 
color of Law investigation that 

1717
01:15:22,890 --> 01:15:25,650
would go into that. 
And and we can't advocate for 

1718
01:15:25,650 --> 01:15:27,450
that because Merrick Garland is 
in charge and that's not going 

1719
01:15:27,450 --> 01:15:28,970
to happen. 
But the Civil Rights Division 

1720
01:15:28,970 --> 01:15:31,530
should be saying, well, were 
they actually doing something? 

1721
01:15:31,530 --> 01:15:34,090
Were they engaging with a 
citizen in a way that was a 

1722
01:15:34,090 --> 01:15:35,450
violation of his civil 
liberties? 

1723
01:15:35,850 --> 01:15:37,450
And I would argue that there's 
at least. 

1724
01:15:37,920 --> 01:15:39,280
But an investigation that would 
be worth having. 

1725
01:15:39,440 --> 01:15:41,560
If you can investigate me for 
having a conversation that was 

1726
01:15:41,560 --> 01:15:43,840
polite with a police officer, 
you could sure as hell wonder 

1727
01:15:43,840 --> 01:15:45,360
out why this guy is saying don't
touch me. 

1728
01:15:46,440 --> 01:15:47,840
Yeah. 
What authority did they have to 

1729
01:15:47,840 --> 01:15:49,120
lay hands on him? 
None. 

1730
01:15:49,200 --> 01:15:51,480
None whatsoever. 
I mean and and again we're back 

1731
01:15:51,480 --> 01:15:55,720
to like the no respect for the 
FBI that he clearly has because 

1732
01:15:56,200 --> 01:15:58,280
he this whole thing would have 
been avoidable if they if they 

1733
01:15:58,280 --> 01:16:01,360
had just done what you said and 
and they there had been like a 

1734
01:16:01,360 --> 01:16:03,720
mutual give and take like I will
guarantee that you're going to 

1735
01:16:03,720 --> 01:16:07,150
get anything that you want and 
then extra if you will just 

1736
01:16:07,150 --> 01:16:10,110
afford me some latitude right 
now because we have to make sure

1737
01:16:10,110 --> 01:16:12,310
everything's good here. 
I don't and we could explain it 

1738
01:16:12,310 --> 01:16:16,350
in any way we could like you're 
you'll be safe we'll be safe. 

1739
01:16:16,550 --> 01:16:20,150
There's not going to be a whole 
scene here, and I would think 

1740
01:16:20,150 --> 01:16:23,190
most people who are reasonably 
minded would have respected that

1741
01:16:23,190 --> 01:16:25,750
in a in a time when the FBI was 
worth respecting. 

1742
01:16:26,550 --> 01:16:28,630
I think you're correct. 
And like I say, I've, I've had 

1743
01:16:28,630 --> 01:16:30,390
those conversations. 
I've had them in the hood. 

1744
01:16:30,390 --> 01:16:32,630
I've had them in really, really 
bad neighborhoods and in West 

1745
01:16:32,630 --> 01:16:36,030
Baltimore and Southeast DC and 
and DC Northwest in the rougher 

1746
01:16:36,030 --> 01:16:38,310
parts of it as well where 
there's a lot of looky lose. 

1747
01:16:38,310 --> 01:16:40,030
There's a lot of people that 
want to come in and take a take 

1748
01:16:40,030 --> 01:16:41,030
an eyeball. 
What's going on? 

1749
01:16:41,150 --> 01:16:43,310
There's an FBI team here. 
There's a BearCat in the street.

1750
01:16:43,430 --> 01:16:44,830
It's blocking our access to 
work. 

1751
01:16:44,830 --> 01:16:47,190
What's going on? 
I've done crowd control and I've

1752
01:16:47,190 --> 01:16:49,470
done traffic control and move 
people along because I 

1753
01:16:49,470 --> 01:16:51,790
understand that just because the
FBI decided to park in 

1754
01:16:51,790 --> 01:16:54,550
somebody's driveway or their 
their front lawn today doesn't 

1755
01:16:54,550 --> 01:16:55,590
mean you don't have to get to 
work. 

1756
01:16:56,120 --> 01:16:58,720
And I can create a problem or I 
can create a solution. 

1757
01:16:58,720 --> 01:17:00,040
And it's like, okay, I need 
three cars. 

1758
01:17:00,040 --> 01:17:02,080
Like, go, go, go, go, go. 
All right, stop for a second 

1759
01:17:02,120 --> 01:17:03,440
Here. 
They're bringing somebody out. 

1760
01:17:03,480 --> 01:17:04,040
Okay. 
Go ahead. 

1761
01:17:04,040 --> 01:17:05,760
Let's go. 
Like, be smart about it. 

1762
01:17:06,200 --> 01:17:08,120
And also engage with people say,
look, here's what's going on. 

1763
01:17:08,120 --> 01:17:10,560
Here's the threat to you. 
This is the reason why I used to

1764
01:17:10,560 --> 01:17:11,840
always call it like the sales 
job. 

1765
01:17:12,520 --> 01:17:14,120
The sales job is what's in it 
for me? 

1766
01:17:14,720 --> 01:17:15,640
Why are you? 
Why? 

1767
01:17:15,680 --> 01:17:16,960
Why should I listen to what you 
say? 

1768
01:17:17,240 --> 01:17:19,440
And the answer is I don't want 
you to get shot. 

1769
01:17:19,970 --> 01:17:21,850
And I don't want one of these 
local police officers here, 

1770
01:17:21,850 --> 01:17:23,650
which we brought along because 
we're smarter than than that 

1771
01:17:23,810 --> 01:17:25,570
rest crew. 
I don't want one of these cops 

1772
01:17:25,570 --> 01:17:27,410
to arrest you for some minor 
infraction. 

1773
01:17:27,770 --> 01:17:30,290
So work with me here real quick 
and then I'm going to and then 

1774
01:17:30,330 --> 01:17:32,090
and if they have a problem with 
you, I'm going to be like, no, 

1775
01:17:32,090 --> 01:17:33,610
no, I told him he could be 
there. 

1776
01:17:33,610 --> 01:17:35,970
I'm going to have your back to 
make an enforcement. 

1777
01:17:36,170 --> 01:17:38,530
Law enforcement is sales. 
It's not military. 

1778
01:17:38,530 --> 01:17:40,570
That's right. 
If you're selling jail for the 

1779
01:17:40,570 --> 01:17:42,570
most part to people, it's the 
worst product in the world. 

1780
01:17:42,690 --> 01:17:44,650
You're dealing with customers or
having the worst day they've 

1781
01:17:44,650 --> 01:17:47,250
ever had in their life. 
But you have to have the people 

1782
01:17:47,250 --> 01:17:50,670
skills and the reason 
rationality to to deal in cope 

1783
01:17:50,710 --> 01:17:54,950
and be nimble enough 
intellectually to to to handle 

1784
01:17:54,950 --> 01:17:58,110
the situation. 
And you cannot ever under any 

1785
01:17:58,110 --> 01:18:00,030
circuit there's there's, there's
some hard and fast rules. 

1786
01:18:00,830 --> 01:18:03,110
You don't ever make a promise to
a victim that you're going to 

1787
01:18:03,110 --> 01:18:06,990
get something done because you 
can never do that and you never 

1788
01:18:06,990 --> 01:18:11,140
say because I said so and point 
to your batch, which is I think 

1789
01:18:11,140 --> 01:18:13,220
what most of those guys were 
kind of leaning on there and 

1790
01:18:13,220 --> 01:18:15,420
they were, they're sort of 
nibbling around the edge, didn't

1791
01:18:15,420 --> 01:18:17,620
want to say it, but essentially 
that's what there's they. 

1792
01:18:17,620 --> 01:18:20,660
Were I'm an FBI agent and who 
are you correct that is the 

1793
01:18:20,660 --> 01:18:23,580
worst sales job that's called 
the argument to authority and 

1794
01:18:23,740 --> 01:18:25,940
and it and they don't accept 
your authority then then what's 

1795
01:18:25,940 --> 01:18:28,220
going on You're also selling 
another product which is delayed

1796
01:18:28,220 --> 01:18:30,780
gratification to all the looky 
loos and all the people on the 

1797
01:18:30,780 --> 01:18:33,860
outskirts whether it be a 
girlfriend a wife an instru 

1798
01:18:33,860 --> 01:18:36,260
party that's family member or 
someone who is just seeing the 

1799
01:18:36,260 --> 01:18:37,940
most interesting thing they're 
going to see today. 

1800
01:18:38,320 --> 01:18:40,000
It's the worst day of somebody's
life, and it's the most 

1801
01:18:40,000 --> 01:18:41,920
interesting thing that somebody 
else is going to see today. 

1802
01:18:42,120 --> 01:18:44,720
So I'm also selling you. 
I need you to hold off on your 

1803
01:18:44,720 --> 01:18:48,400
curiosity in a way that I may 
not have a legal authority to to

1804
01:18:48,520 --> 01:18:51,680
to offer, but I'm going to ask 
you to do so For your safety. 

1805
01:18:51,680 --> 01:18:53,560
I'm going to make it worth your 
while because of the following 

1806
01:18:53,960 --> 01:18:57,280
You don't get shot in the butt 
and I don't have to go do CPR on

1807
01:18:57,280 --> 01:18:59,000
you or your friend. 
That would be really good for 

1808
01:18:59,000 --> 01:19:01,760
me, and it might be good for you
as well, because I'm pretty good

1809
01:19:01,760 --> 01:19:05,120
at patching people up and I'm 
pretty good at stopping death. 

1810
01:19:05,560 --> 01:19:07,840
When someone has a non fatal 
gunshot wound, but you can take 

1811
01:19:07,840 --> 01:19:10,440
one in the chest, you're going 
to have a really, really rotten 

1812
01:19:10,440 --> 01:19:11,680
day. 
And if there's a stray round 

1813
01:19:11,680 --> 01:19:15,280
like and you went running past 
my barricade, I may or may not 

1814
01:19:15,280 --> 01:19:17,480
be responsible for it, but you 
sure as hell are because you're 

1815
01:19:17,480 --> 01:19:18,480
going to have some real 
problems. 

1816
01:19:18,600 --> 01:19:19,960
So you sell it and it's not 
hard. 

1817
01:19:19,960 --> 01:19:23,400
It's not a hard thing to do to 
have this reasonable interaction

1818
01:19:23,400 --> 01:19:25,720
with reasonable people, but we 
don't hire people skills in the 

1819
01:19:25,720 --> 01:19:27,720
FBI, it turns out. 
I saw that over and over in the 

1820
01:19:27,720 --> 01:19:30,350
interrogation room. 
We just don't. 

1821
01:19:30,350 --> 01:19:31,910
No, no. 
I mean, like we, we tried, 

1822
01:19:31,910 --> 01:19:33,270
tried, talked about this a 
couple weeks ago. 

1823
01:19:33,270 --> 01:19:36,150
Like the the phase two process 
of getting hired by the FBI is 

1824
01:19:36,150 --> 01:19:38,230
just assessing your ability to 
become the manager. 

1825
01:19:38,590 --> 01:19:42,270
Can you navigate the process of 
claiming responsibility and 

1826
01:19:42,270 --> 01:19:44,310
credit for things that you were 
not involved with? 

1827
01:19:45,070 --> 01:19:50,390
And yes. 
Or enhancing or misrepresenting 

1828
01:19:50,390 --> 01:19:53,190
what your involvement was in 
things to make yourself look 

1829
01:19:53,190 --> 01:19:54,710
good? 
That's phase two in the FBI. 

1830
01:19:55,350 --> 01:19:56,670
And phase two, for people's 
understanding. 

1831
01:19:56,670 --> 01:19:59,550
The first phase is a test to 
screen out the applicants, who's

1832
01:19:59,550 --> 01:20:02,030
qualified, who's not, who has 
the IQ enough to be, you know, 

1833
01:20:02,030 --> 01:20:04,150
do the job, whatever it is. 
And then the phase two is the 

1834
01:20:04,150 --> 01:20:06,750
actual, like, interview with 
other people. 

1835
01:20:06,750 --> 01:20:09,070
There's a writing assignment, 
things like that, and it 

1836
01:20:09,070 --> 01:20:11,910
actually assesses whether or not
you can write a decent report in

1837
01:20:11,910 --> 01:20:14,710
in coherent English that follows
logically. 

1838
01:20:14,710 --> 01:20:16,310
By the way, I probably wrote 
like one of the better ones 

1839
01:20:16,310 --> 01:20:18,670
they've probably ever seen. 
Having read a lot of FBI agents 

1840
01:20:18,670 --> 01:20:21,270
writing. 
I'm always like, Oh my God, just

1841
01:20:21,270 --> 01:20:23,700
like suboptimal. 
Yeah, I mean, it was police 

1842
01:20:23,820 --> 01:20:25,420
officers write more logical 
reports. 

1843
01:20:25,820 --> 01:20:29,060
Was yours the you're taking over
a terrorist case and you're 

1844
01:20:29,660 --> 01:20:32,140
drawing up ideas of like how you
would take it to the next? 

1845
01:20:32,140 --> 01:20:34,060
What would you do to investigate
recommendations. 

1846
01:20:34,180 --> 01:20:36,180
I don't remember it. 
I had no idea what I wrote. 

1847
01:20:36,300 --> 01:20:38,420
All I know is I was sitting in 
the New York field office on the

1848
01:20:38,420 --> 01:20:40,500
top of Federal Plaza. 
There I was on the, like the 

1849
01:20:40,500 --> 01:20:42,100
50th floor, whatever it is of 
the building. 

1850
01:20:42,100 --> 01:20:44,660
I was sitting there. 
It was like, I don't know, 40 

1851
01:20:44,660 --> 01:20:47,500
people around me. 
And I had one of the I I used 

1852
01:20:47,500 --> 01:20:50,630
all the time because I used to 
write reports as a paramedic and

1853
01:20:50,630 --> 01:20:53,430
the the paramedic narrative is 
legally admissible. 

1854
01:20:53,430 --> 01:20:55,670
It is a testimonial document 
that it's like these are the the

1855
01:20:55,670 --> 01:20:57,550
treatments I did at this time in
this logical order. 

1856
01:20:57,670 --> 01:21:00,070
This is why you articulate both 
what you did and why. 

1857
01:21:00,390 --> 01:21:01,590
And so I did that. 
I broke down. 

1858
01:21:01,590 --> 01:21:03,630
This is what I see in the case 
this is that, you know this is 

1859
01:21:03,630 --> 01:21:05,470
my reasons for it. 
And so I did all that writing. 

1860
01:21:05,470 --> 01:21:06,710
I have no idea what the case 
thing was. 

1861
01:21:06,870 --> 01:21:08,750
I just remember looking around 
and seeing like people were done

1862
01:21:08,750 --> 01:21:12,710
and I was thinking none of you 
are getting hired like this is 

1863
01:21:12,870 --> 01:21:15,750
this is a federal job where 
writing things is most of what 

1864
01:21:15,750 --> 01:21:16,790
you do. 
It turns out, probably they 

1865
01:21:16,790 --> 01:21:19,310
hired most of them. 
They couldn't. 

1866
01:21:20,030 --> 01:21:22,870
I talked to a guy afterwards and
I said, hey, had the writing 

1867
01:21:22,870 --> 01:21:25,430
segment go for you. 
And he was like, I got 

1868
01:21:25,430 --> 01:21:27,270
overwhelmed. 
I didn't write anything at all. 

1869
01:21:27,270 --> 01:21:30,990
I just left it blank. 
He was actually a lateral move. 

1870
01:21:30,990 --> 01:21:32,350
He was actually in the federal 
government. 

1871
01:21:32,350 --> 01:21:34,070
I'm like, that checks. 
That checks, yeah. 

1872
01:21:34,070 --> 01:21:35,670
They understand how the 
government works and the the 

1873
01:21:35,670 --> 01:21:38,230
level was very low. 
Who knew you and I thought we 

1874
01:21:38,230 --> 01:21:40,030
were joining the best. 
We we were like Will Smith 

1875
01:21:40,030 --> 01:21:42,630
walking into the Men in Black 
Interview and. 

1876
01:21:43,790 --> 01:21:45,310
Just watch. 
At least we got to keep our 

1877
01:21:45,310 --> 01:21:46,550
fingerprints, man. 
That's it. 

1878
01:21:46,830 --> 01:21:48,030
That's true. 
They didn't buzz off my 

1879
01:21:48,030 --> 01:21:48,950
fingerprints. 
I need those. 

1880
01:21:48,950 --> 01:21:50,150
Actually, I'm dealing with right
now. 

1881
01:21:50,190 --> 01:21:53,030
I because I'm a gun guy and we 
just talked about gun safes. 

1882
01:21:53,310 --> 01:21:55,390
I am. 
I'm literally installing a 

1883
01:21:55,390 --> 01:21:57,990
suppressor quick mount on one of
my rifles. 

1884
01:21:57,990 --> 01:22:01,110
And I have that fun thing that 
only pipe fitters and gun guys 

1885
01:22:01,110 --> 01:22:04,870
have where the threads on one of
my weapon systems slice my 

1886
01:22:04,870 --> 01:22:06,710
fingers in like perfect 
concentric circles. 

1887
01:22:06,710 --> 01:22:09,350
It's like like Fishkills and I'm
dealing with and has been 

1888
01:22:09,350 --> 01:22:11,070
bothering me all night. 
I'm just like, I can't believe I

1889
01:22:11,070 --> 01:22:12,990
did that dummy move where I 
grabbed the threads and tried to

1890
01:22:12,990 --> 01:22:14,790
turn really hard and slice 
myself up. 

1891
01:22:14,790 --> 01:22:16,350
But that is the thing. 
Yeah. 

1892
01:22:16,350 --> 01:22:17,630
I have a weird fingerprints 
right now. 

1893
01:22:17,630 --> 01:22:19,870
They look like gills. 
I want to I want to wrap this 

1894
01:22:19,870 --> 01:22:20,830
up. 
This has been a Good Friday. 

1895
01:22:20,830 --> 01:22:23,230
I I do appreciate you jumping on
like I'm 1/2 of it. 

1896
01:22:23,430 --> 01:22:25,990
And folks, I hope you enjoyed 
kind of hearing from Tom from 

1897
01:22:26,150 --> 01:22:27,870
from secure it. 
I didn't know that he was a 

1898
01:22:27,870 --> 01:22:29,750
professional musician before. 
I think that's really cool. 

1899
01:22:29,870 --> 01:22:31,550
If you ask people questions you 
find out. 

1900
01:22:31,750 --> 01:22:33,830
It turns out that's the thing 
that is the most fun about this 

1901
01:22:33,830 --> 01:22:36,110
job, and used to be the most fun
about being in the FBI. 

1902
01:22:36,110 --> 01:22:39,110
You could actually have back and
forth with a stranger and you 

1903
01:22:39,110 --> 01:22:40,190
would learn something about 
them. 

1904
01:22:40,550 --> 01:22:43,470
You find out why you have 
something in common, you know? 

1905
01:22:43,510 --> 01:22:46,190
And I don't know, I just don't 
see that those guys did that. 

1906
01:22:46,550 --> 01:22:48,470
Like, how are you going to 
establish your poor after that 

1907
01:22:48,470 --> 01:22:49,790
arrest which look like a shit 
show? 

1908
01:22:51,030 --> 01:22:53,910
You never can. 
I mean, that's look, I don't 

1909
01:22:53,950 --> 01:22:56,230
know, did they interview him 
even before they went and got 

1910
01:22:56,230 --> 01:22:58,070
the complaint? 
Or they just go straight off of 

1911
01:22:58,070 --> 01:23:01,070
like we saw a white guy with a 
mask on throw an elbow and this 

1912
01:23:01,070 --> 01:23:03,070
guy's wearing Multicam shorts. 
It's probably him. 

1913
01:23:03,760 --> 01:23:05,360
I mean, I just there was 
synchronized pushing. 

1914
01:23:05,600 --> 01:23:07,080
Synchronized pushing? 
That guys pushing. 

1915
01:23:07,080 --> 01:23:08,600
Yeah, I don't know what 
synchronized pushing is either, 

1916
01:23:08,600 --> 01:23:09,760
right. 
I saw you D have me that. 

1917
01:23:09,760 --> 01:23:11,080
I'm like, I don't. 
I don't know what synchronized 

1918
01:23:11,080 --> 01:23:12,840
pushing is. 
Everyone pushes that one heave 

1919
01:23:12,880 --> 01:23:14,720
ho. 
I want you to act it out. 

1920
01:23:14,760 --> 01:23:16,960
Would you We act it out for us 
and show us the synchronized 

1921
01:23:16,960 --> 01:23:18,720
pushing. 
I'm thinking more of like raise 

1922
01:23:18,760 --> 01:23:22,720
the roof that they're push, 
raise the roof. 

1923
01:23:22,720 --> 01:23:25,480
It's just so sad. 
It's so sad that you raise the 

1924
01:23:25,480 --> 01:23:27,720
roof together. 
This is what FBI agents are 

1925
01:23:27,720 --> 01:23:30,080
spending their time doing. 
And in the meantime, we're 

1926
01:23:30,080 --> 01:23:32,200
waiting for the next person 
who's coming across the border 

1927
01:23:32,440 --> 01:23:35,400
to come and blow something up or
one of those 100,000 Afghans 

1928
01:23:35,400 --> 01:23:37,600
that we didn't vet on the way 
in, which if you haven't 

1929
01:23:37,600 --> 01:23:40,480
listened to Double Trouble or 
our follow up with with Aaron 

1930
01:23:40,480 --> 01:23:42,240
Stevenson, go and listen who did
we let in? 

1931
01:23:42,240 --> 01:23:44,560
Was the name of the episode. 
It goes back in a couple months.

1932
01:23:45,150 --> 01:23:46,470
We we don't know who we brought 
in here. 

1933
01:23:46,470 --> 01:23:47,910
I don't we don't know who we 
brought in. 

1934
01:23:47,910 --> 01:23:51,230
So the FBI is letting people 
from Syria and from other you 

1935
01:23:51,230 --> 01:23:54,070
know Uzbekistan run around in 
this country and God knows what 

1936
01:23:54,070 --> 01:23:55,630
they're doing. 
In the meantime we're running 

1937
01:23:55,630 --> 01:23:58,950
after Jay Sixers who were doing 
a heave hoe and pushing on a 

1938
01:23:58,950 --> 01:24:00,510
fence. 
It's just pretty wild to me and 

1939
01:24:00,510 --> 01:24:02,590
sad Steve friend. 
Thank you Sir. 

1940
01:24:02,590 --> 01:24:03,790
I look forward to talking to you
again. 

1941
01:24:03,790 --> 01:24:06,230
We'll do it again next week, but
anything you have a parting 

1942
01:24:06,230 --> 01:24:09,910
shots that need to be addressed.
Thanks to the Sarah fans. 

1943
01:24:10,230 --> 01:24:13,150
The the true blue, my journey 
from beat cop to suspended FBI 

1944
01:24:13,150 --> 01:24:15,470
whistleblower. 
It hit number six last night on 

1945
01:24:15,470 --> 01:24:17,390
Amazon and the law enforcement 
category. 

1946
01:24:17,390 --> 01:24:19,350
So we're getting another surge. 
And it was enough for the 

1947
01:24:19,350 --> 01:24:21,310
publisher to order another 500 
books. 

1948
01:24:21,310 --> 01:24:24,030
So I will be able to go to my 
book events and not be empty 

1949
01:24:24,030 --> 01:24:26,790
handed. 
So thank you to everybody for 

1950
01:24:26,790 --> 01:24:29,030
their support on that and I 
appreciate it very much. 

1951
01:24:29,070 --> 01:24:31,190
Oh, that is fantastic news, man.
That's really, really good. 

1952
01:24:31,590 --> 01:24:32,390
I'm happy to it. 
There it is. 

1953
01:24:32,430 --> 01:24:35,470
Look at that. 
Number six making a new surge. 

1954
01:24:35,740 --> 01:24:37,340
So folks you can find that on 
Amazon. 

1955
01:24:37,340 --> 01:24:39,420
If you search Steve, friend 
book. 

1956
01:24:39,460 --> 01:24:42,740
If you search true blue Steve 
you will find all these things 

1957
01:24:42,740 --> 01:24:46,100
I've done all those looks. 
We got a We got a nice rumble 

1958
01:24:46,100 --> 01:24:48,390
rant here from K Quiet that says
10 bucks. 

1959
01:24:48,470 --> 01:24:50,670
Keep up the good work. 
We do appreciate all those and 

1960
01:24:50,670 --> 01:24:52,910
we appreciate Eric Jason who's 
been telling people smash the 

1961
01:24:52,910 --> 01:24:55,270
like button, push the like 
button, like the smash button, 

1962
01:24:55,270 --> 01:24:57,030
whatever you want to call it. 
There's a green thumbs up. 

1963
01:24:57,030 --> 01:24:59,470
If you can make it green when 
you leave it will add a number 

1964
01:24:59,470 --> 01:25:01,150
+1. 
We do appreciate those. 

1965
01:25:01,150 --> 01:25:04,230
It moves up our ranking with 
Rumble and that is where we find

1966
01:25:04,230 --> 01:25:06,790
you all every day. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you have 

1967
01:25:06,790 --> 01:25:09,870
heard you have been listening to
the Kyle Seraphin Show which is 

1968
01:25:09,870 --> 01:25:14,490
streamed live from Liberty Hill,
TX at 0930 every weekday. 

1969
01:25:14,730 --> 01:25:16,890
And that we are most 
appreciative of you all leaving 

1970
01:25:16,890 --> 01:25:19,370
five star reviews like this one 
here. 

1971
01:25:19,370 --> 01:25:22,050
Oh, I think you got yesterday's.
Can you pull up the the new one,

1972
01:25:22,050 --> 01:25:23,410
Brian? 
It's actually in Monday. 

1973
01:25:23,770 --> 01:25:24,570
Yeah. 
Give me one second. 

1974
01:25:24,570 --> 01:25:26,210
Yeah, give me one second too, 
because I'll have to pull it 

1975
01:25:26,210 --> 01:25:26,690
back up. 
Here it is. 

1976
01:25:26,850 --> 01:25:30,370
It's from a free patriot. 
Tim was dropped in on the 28th 

1977
01:25:30,370 --> 01:25:32,170
is congratulations. 
I'm sure that's about the baby. 

1978
01:25:32,330 --> 01:25:34,090
Congratulations on the new 
addition to your family. 

1979
01:25:34,090 --> 01:25:35,330
Big smiles for you and your 
family. 

1980
01:25:35,450 --> 01:25:39,190
May you and yours have a blessed
and peaceful be blessed with 

1981
01:25:39,190 --> 01:25:41,590
peace, love and joy. 
That's from free patriot Tim. 

1982
01:25:41,790 --> 01:25:43,310
Let's have a really nice message
on a Friday. 

1983
01:25:43,310 --> 01:25:45,870
We do appreciate that I'm 
actually about to go enjoy some 

1984
01:25:45,870 --> 01:25:51,050
baby time right now. 
She is healthy her her movements

1985
01:25:51,050 --> 01:25:52,650
are all working. 
All the parts are working. 

1986
01:25:52,650 --> 01:25:54,610
We got peas and poops which is a
big deal when you have a new 

1987
01:25:54,610 --> 01:25:57,890
baby as many of you guys know. 
And it's also a big deal that 

1988
01:25:57,890 --> 01:25:59,210
you guys are all joining us all 
the time. 

1989
01:25:59,210 --> 01:26:01,170
I know we had well over 700 in 
the live chat. 

1990
01:26:01,170 --> 01:26:03,170
So thank you for joining me. 
I hope you took something away 

1991
01:26:03,170 --> 01:26:05,930
from that conversation with Tom 
about residential security 

1992
01:26:05,930 --> 01:26:07,650
containers and you are making 
good choices. 

1993
01:26:07,930 --> 01:26:10,330
We may be working on something 
with a secure IT because I 

1994
01:26:10,330 --> 01:26:13,330
really do like them as a company
and I chose to spend my own 

1995
01:26:13,330 --> 01:26:14,770
money there. 
So that's one of the easy ways 

1996
01:26:14,770 --> 01:26:17,510
that we can have nice people 
come in and you guys can get a 

1997
01:26:17,510 --> 01:26:20,030
little access to some of the the
thoughts that happen behind 

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01:26:20,030 --> 01:26:21,310
people who are really into the 
kind of thing. 

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01:26:21,310 --> 01:26:23,510
If you're a new gun owner, check
out some of their stuff. 

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01:26:23,510 --> 01:26:25,790
I think it's worth it. 
We will put it in the show notes

2001
01:26:26,070 --> 01:26:29,510
And once again, hope you guys 
have a wonderful weekend and 

2002
01:26:29,510 --> 01:26:31,150
make sure you are subscribed to 
this channel because you will 

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01:26:31,150 --> 01:26:33,270
see us again on Monday and we 
will see you then. 

2004
01:26:33,550 --> 01:26:36,310
Thanks for listening to the Kyle
Seraphin Show streamed live 

2005
01:26:36,310 --> 01:26:39,350
weekdays on rubble.com/kyle 
Seraphin. 

2006
01:26:39,430 --> 01:26:43,590
Follow Kyle on Twitter, True 
Social and Instagram at Kyle 

2007
01:26:43,590 --> 01:26:47,250
Seraphin. 
Play all songs of Gandhi.