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Welcome to the Everyday PM 
Podcast, the podcast where we 

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discuss project management 
principles for your everyday 

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life. 
My name is Anne Campia, I'm the 

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host and founder of The Everyday
PM, and I'm excited to connect 

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with all of you about Lost in 
Translation, Communications, 

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Pitfalls and Solutions from The 
Big Dig. 

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I have with us a regular guest 
actually, that some of you may 

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be familiar with Donna Gregorio,
who has graced our podcast in 

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the past talking about various 
topics, project management 

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related. 
So Donna, I'm so excited to 

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welcome you back to the podcast.
You actually came to me with 

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this topic and it's a very 
interesting topic and we'll get 

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into that in just a minute. 
But for folks who haven't met 

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you through some of the other 
episodes you've guested on, 

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please take a brief moment to 
introduce yourself to the 

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audience. 
All right, great. 

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Well, Ian, it's a pleasure to be
back. 

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Thanks so much for having me. 
My name is Donna Gregorio. 

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I am an experienced IT 
department head and a seasoned 

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project manager, project 
manager, published author on the

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topic. 
Right now I'm an adjunct adjunct

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professor teaching project 
management at Northeastern 

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University. 
And I'm also the vice president 

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of professional development at 
the PMI Mass Bay chapter. 

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So all kinds of project 
management related activities 

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going on and, and I'm happy to 
be here to talk about this, this

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new topic that I've recently 
been researching that's really 

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been rather interesting for me 
to learn about. 

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Me too, me too. 
I'm super excited. 

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I do know about this project, 
which we'll get into in just a 

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second. 
But what I will highlight is 

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Donna, you are like my life Peg,
in that I don't know if you ever

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heard that term life Peg, but 
you're no, I haven't. 

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OK. 
Your professional journey is 

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something that I would want to 
emulate. 

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And I think I've told you that 
time and time again, the times 

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that we have gotten to meet is 
that it feels like you've got 

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the career a few steps ahead of 
me that I kind of eventually 

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want to get into myself. 
And so for the years of 

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experience you've spent in 
project management and 

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technology, as well as the years
that you've spent in the project

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management community, I just 
want to commend you and thank 

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you again for taking time to 
talk to our audience today. 

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So let's dig in to the Big Dig, 
no pun, maybe pun intended here,

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but let's start with what's the 
Big Dig. 

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Now I know what it is just 
because it's been used countless

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times in my project management 
upbringing as a example of a 

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project that we can use as a use
case. 

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But why don't you explain to our
audience what the Big Dig is? 

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Yes. 
So thanks. 

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I I think that using the Big Dig
as a backdrop for this 

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discussion on project management
techniques and modern project 

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management techniques is a great
way for us to really see what 

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can happen, both positive and 
negative, if we don't succeed. 

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And that's really why we're 
here. 

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We really want to be 
irreplaceable as project 

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managers. 
And I believe that the Big Dig 

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did have some successes, but 
experienced A tremendous number 

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of failures as well. 
So this is not intended to be a 

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history lesson. 
It's really a lens to really see

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the power of good project 
management and the danger of 

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getting it wrong. 
So the Big Dig was the most 

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complex and controversial 
infrastructure project in U.S. 

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history. 
There was a Central Artery that 

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and a elevated Hwy. that ran 
through Boston back in the 

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1950s. 
It was built and in the 1990s 

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there was a decision that it 
needed to either be upgraded or,

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or or replaced with a series of 
tunnels and bridges. 

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And that's in fact what the Big 
Dig was. 

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And the idea to to get rid of 
that central artery that ran 

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right through the middle of 
Boston and really was such an 

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eyesore. 
I again, I remember it being 

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born and raised in Boston, 
started in 1991, ended in 2006. 

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So it was a 15 year project that
cost $14.8 billion. 

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That's a huge number. 
The project was seven years late

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and $12 billion over budget. 
So you can see the schedule and 

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the and the cost factors and the
public was very upset about it 

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at the time because there were 
some significant failures. 

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In particular, a woman died 
going through the through one of

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the tunnels when the ceiling 
panel collapsed on her car. 

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And certainly there was 
significant project 

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mismanagement that came out 
around that time. 

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But the good part that came from
it was that there is now, for 

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those of you who are familiar 
with Boston, the Rose Kennedy 

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Greenway is a beautiful 
replacement for the space that 

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was taken up by the Central 
Artery and it really did 

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transform the Boston cityscape. 
The Zakim Bridge is also part of

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the Big Dig, beautiful bridge 
that is really iconic now in the

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Boston landscape that was never 
there before. 

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So lots of good things came 
about the Seaport, South Boston,

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areas of the city that were 
never even considered to be part

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of the vibrant city that Boston 
was, because it really broke 

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that Central Artery, broke the 
city in half. 

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So we're here really today to 
talk about what went wrong and 

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really, was the project a 
failure or a success or, or was 

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it both? 
I, I don't really know, but I 

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think that with the backdrop of 
the Big Dig, we could talk about

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a lot of these positive things 
that we could have done had we 

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been in their shoes. 
And I want to put a little 

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personal touch on this. 
I listened to a podcast recently

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that really got me revved up 
about the Big Dig. 

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And for those of you who are 
podcast listeners, check out 

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WGBH was it, which is a local TV
station in Boston that created 

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this podcast. 
It's a six episode podcast all 

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about the Big Dig and very 
interesting, very, very well 

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done and really jazzed me up 
about the whole topic. 

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And that's why I'm here today. 
I love, I love this for so many 

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reasons. 
I love that we're going to give 

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our audience an opportunity to 
think through whether or not 

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this was a success or failure as
well. 

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And just to ground us before I 
get to my first question with 

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you, Donna, it's interesting 
that that you called out right 

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at the beginning, it was over 
budget and it was overtime. 

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And so traditional project 
management foundational thinking

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is that we're built around, but 
the Iron Triangle, right of are 

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we on time? 
Are we on cost and of quality or

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resources, whichever 1 you want 
to swap out for that third 

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element here. 
And as we get into 2025, the 

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idea of how project management 
value is assessed now has 

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evolved as well. 
And I think it's important to 

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call that out for project 
managers and those that aren't 

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close to the profession to 
understand there's metrics that 

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we have to be accountable to in 
this position. 

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And I think during that time 
frame, obviously things like 

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cost, things like time are all 
going to spin your project out a

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side of that scope outside of 
that delivery and that value. 

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But now bringing this 
conversation into this light, 

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into this current environment 
where Project Management 

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Institute Institute has come out
and said value is realized a 

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different way now. 
It's not necessarily just all of

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the iron triangle elements. 
There's a little bit more around

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how that value comes back to the
organization. 

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I think it's interesting to 
consider what you're about to 

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present to us today in the 
context of what were we being 

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measured upon as project 
managers back then versus how do

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we see value and the benefit 
realization of projects in 

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today's landscape and how does 
the Big Dig fit into that? 

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So all of that to say, I think 
my first question to you is 

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around, I think we want to talk 
about what the potential 

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pitfalls are of the project. 
So if you could walk us through 

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the most critical communication 
failures that occurred during 

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the project and how they 
specifically contributed to the 

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delays and cost overruns? 
So I think there was a major 

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player in this, and that was the
Bechtel Parsons Brinkerhoff 

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organization that was contracted
to run the project, and they 

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were the project managers. 
They did not have a lot of 

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oversight by the government 
entities in Massachusetts at the

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time, the Mass Turnpike 
Authority and the Mass Highway 

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that were really running this 
project and coordinating with 

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the federal government to get 
funding for this project. 

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So basically they got the 
funding and then they handed it 

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off to Bechtel Parsons, 
Brinkerhoff to run the project. 

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And they, they kept their 
fingers crossed and hoped that 

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all would go well. 
Many times the, the, the various

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government entities would 
present about the project and 

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they'd say, oh, everything's 
great and we're on schedule and 

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this project is going to cost us
X amount of money, which was 

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always less than what it ended 
up costing. 

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They're very positive and 
always, always trying to shine a

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bright light on the project as 
being a great project for 

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Boston. 
And at the same time, Bechtel 

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was cycling project managers 
through every six months. 

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So they never had a consistent 
project manager running on the 

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projects throughout. 
And, and we didn't find out 

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about this until when there was 
some investigation done. 

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There was a lawsuit brought 
against Bechtel Process 

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Brinkerhoff at the end of the 
project in 2006, because when 

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the woman died, someone had to 
be blamed and they turned to 

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Bechtel and sued them not only 
for the ceiling tile falling on 

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the car, but also there were 
tunnel leaks. 

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Right after the tunnel opened, 
one of the tunnels opened, there

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was a major leak that there was 
a flood in the tunnel that that 

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was caused by in incorrect and 
insufficient concrete that was 

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poured to to form the tunnel. 
So they were sued for both of 

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those things and they settled 
for $458,000,000. 

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So you can imagine how much 
money we're talking about. 

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This is a huge project. 
As I said, billions of dollars 

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were being spent, taxpayer money
and for them to settle for 458, 

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they didn't want to have to get 
dragged through any sort of 

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lawsuit that would expect audit 
and look at all the materials 

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that they had put together. 
So they just settled. 

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But you know, really, why did 
this happen and why, why these 

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problems occurred? 
So first of all, I think there 

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was significantly poor 
stakeholder communication. 

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There were so many stakeholders 
involved, so complex, so many 

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contractors, mass highway, mass 
Turnpike authority, government, 

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the governor changed so many 
times throughout the time that 

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this project was running, you 
know, and, and the governor was 

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very involved in what was 
happening. 

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The reporting, I'm I mentioned 
the reporting, everything was 

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always try to be positive and, 
and especially with the public 

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who was living this every every 
day, the construction right 

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under their feet. 
There was minimal oversight. 

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As I said, there were no, no 
performance metrics at all that 

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were created and I don't think 
there was there was even a thing

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back then with the Institute of 
PMI, introduction of PMI and all

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of the and people say, oh, we 
have to follow all these things.

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But you know, there's a reason 
why all these things are put in 

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place, metrics and objectives 
and key results and all that. 

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So I think the objectives and 
key results are really the first

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key piece that we'll talk about 
today. 

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What could they have done in 
terms of that to make things 

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better? 
So that's number one. 

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The second piece is when they 
had technical issues, they had 

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problems resolving them largely 
because they didn't have a, a 

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very good organizational 
structure. 

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So there was no place, one place
to go if there was a problem. 

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Who do I, who do I talk to? 
Do I go to the governor? 

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Do I go to the mass highway? 
Do I go to mass Turnpike or who 

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do I talk to? 
And, and, and there's 

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construction engineers and 
there's inspectors that are out 

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at the field. 
And so there's so many people 

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involved, it's almost hard to 
get through all that red tape to

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figure out who to speak to. 
They also had inconsistent 

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status reporting, again, saying,
oh, yeah, everything's going 

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well, when in reality, it 
wasn't. 

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And how many times have you 
experienced that? 

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I know I have. 
When I hear in the hallway a 

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project is going South. 
Yet when I'm in a status 

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reporting management meeting, 
everyone says, oh, it's green, 

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everything is green, and all is 
well. 

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And you know, that is not the 
way that we want to be as 

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project managers. 
We need to be transparent. 

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We need to have this project 
charter in place that says this 

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is what we're building and why 
this is the reason we're 

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building it. 
And if there are problems, we'll

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raise those up at at whenever we
can at these gates, what that we

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put in place, these milestones 
that we put in place, I don't 

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think they had milestones of any
kind. 

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I think they didn't have any 
gates that they had to go 

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through to make sure that things
were going well. 

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So that the second piece of this
is around problem framing and 

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what do you do when you run into
a problem and, and there are 

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00:13:18,360 --> 00:13:21,680
quite a few people involved that
need to solve that problem, but 

235
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you're in charge. 
You need to make that, you need 

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to make that decision that some 
sort of brainstorming session 

237
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needs to take place and you need
to run that meeting. 

238
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And how do you do that? 
So we'll talk about that. 

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And then the third thing is the 
overly optimistic schedules, not

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just the status reports, but the
schedules that people put 

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together. 
And so when you, when you have a

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00:13:42,240 --> 00:13:46,000
problem framing activity that 
that results in actions, those 

243
00:13:46,000 --> 00:13:47,920
actions need to be put in a 
plan. 

244
00:13:48,120 --> 00:13:51,840
And that's really why we're, 
we're here as project managers 

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00:13:51,840 --> 00:13:54,840
is to develop a plan that can be
executed. 

246
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And if you can't develop a plan 
that can be executed, then then 

247
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you're, you become irrelevant. 
You become just part of the 

248
00:14:02,840 --> 00:14:05,400
landscape and, and not the 
leader that you really, really 

249
00:14:05,400 --> 00:14:08,280
should be. 
So I think in general that that 

250
00:14:08,280 --> 00:14:11,640
there's so many issues and I 
tried, I'm trying to simplify 

251
00:14:11,640 --> 00:14:15,520
things because there's so much 
to talk about with this topic. 

252
00:14:15,520 --> 00:14:19,480
But I think that's where we'll 
really focus our energies on 

253
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objectives and key results, 
problem framing and then also 

254
00:14:23,440 --> 00:14:26,840
the road mapping that is the 
result of the actions that we 

255
00:14:27,000 --> 00:14:28,960
developed. 
It sounds good to me, Donna. 

256
00:14:28,960 --> 00:14:30,880
I mean, let's let's get into the
first one. 

257
00:14:30,880 --> 00:14:34,280
So object objectives and key 
results. 

258
00:14:34,280 --> 00:14:39,400
So for those project managers 
who may not understand what that

259
00:14:39,400 --> 00:14:43,320
means for an organization, can 
you just briefly describe how 

260
00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:49,360
you've used OK Rs in the past? 
So, OK, Rs in my organization 

261
00:14:49,360 --> 00:14:52,840
were critical when you're 
proposing and starting a 

262
00:14:52,840 --> 00:14:56,960
project, it's part of the 
project planning activity. 

263
00:14:57,160 --> 00:15:01,560
So we put these objectives 
together that says here's what 

264
00:15:01,560 --> 00:15:06,240
we're planning to build and and 
here's here is how we will 

265
00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:09,480
measure our progress. 
So these are not tasks. 

266
00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:12,600
This is really a key point I 
want to make is that objectives 

267
00:15:12,600 --> 00:15:16,440
and key results are not tasks to
be placed on a schedule. 

268
00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:21,440
They are measurements that 
you're putting in place to track

269
00:15:21,440 --> 00:15:24,960
your progress. 
So for example, in the case of 

270
00:15:24,960 --> 00:15:29,160
building a huge tunnel that's 
miles and miles long, imagine 

271
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:32,000
that you're building a tunnel 
of, of, let's just say that's 5 

272
00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:35,000
miles long. 
Did you finish the first mile? 

273
00:15:35,000 --> 00:15:37,600
Did you finish the second mile? 
Did you finish the third mile? 

274
00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:41,800
Did you finish, et cetera. 
That's a very, very basic, very,

275
00:15:41,800 --> 00:15:44,760
very basic metric to track your 
progress. 

276
00:15:44,760 --> 00:15:46,480
Well, where are we? 
Are we, are we done? 

277
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Have we finished the fifth mile 
or are we still on mile one? 

278
00:15:49,480 --> 00:15:52,720
Because when you're building a 
tunnel, especially at this this 

279
00:15:52,720 --> 00:15:57,280
kind, you're not digging the 
whole trench and then you're not

280
00:15:57,480 --> 00:16:01,000
laying the whole thing and 
you're not putting in the pieces

281
00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:05,040
once you know you're doing it a 
little at the time, one mile at 

282
00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:07,280
a time, one half a mile at a 
time or whatever. 

283
00:16:07,960 --> 00:16:11,000
So I think that that's an 
example of, you know, extreme 

284
00:16:11,000 --> 00:16:15,920
example of a metric that gives 
you an idea of some transparency

285
00:16:15,920 --> 00:16:18,040
into the progress of the 
project. 

286
00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:19,600
If you're building an 
application and you're 

287
00:16:19,600 --> 00:16:22,400
developing it, you know, writing
code, how many lines of code 

288
00:16:22,400 --> 00:16:25,920
have you written? 
Did you do 5 or did you do 500? 

289
00:16:26,240 --> 00:16:28,840
And how many tests have you run?
If you're doing 25 tests, have 

290
00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:32,680
you done 2 or have you done 20 
and you're almost done, You 

291
00:16:32,680 --> 00:16:34,680
know, so these are the metrics 
that we're talking about. 

292
00:16:34,680 --> 00:16:38,480
This is not tasks that we're 
putting on a schedule, and 

293
00:16:38,480 --> 00:16:41,720
they're the most effective when 
you're at the initiative or the 

294
00:16:41,720 --> 00:16:44,960
work breakdown structure level. 
So if you said in this an 

295
00:16:44,960 --> 00:16:47,360
example of the Big Dig, oh, 
we're going to take the Central 

296
00:16:47,360 --> 00:16:49,200
Artery, we're going to knock it 
down, we're going to build the 

297
00:16:49,200 --> 00:16:51,960
tunnel to replace it. 
That is way too big of an 

298
00:16:51,960 --> 00:16:54,560
objective. 
That's not measurable. 

299
00:16:54,720 --> 00:16:58,920
There's so many pieces to that. 
So you need to talk about how to

300
00:16:58,920 --> 00:17:01,640
build the tunnel, the various 
parts, pieces and parts of 

301
00:17:01,640 --> 00:17:04,200
building the tunnel. 
And then once the tunnel is 

302
00:17:04,200 --> 00:17:07,359
completed, how do you connect 
that tunnel to other roadways? 

303
00:17:07,599 --> 00:17:10,839
And then once that's completed, 
how do you actually dismantle 

304
00:17:11,079 --> 00:17:12,720
the essential artery that's 
existing? 

305
00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:15,520
And there's so many parts within
each of that. 

306
00:17:15,520 --> 00:17:20,200
So it's really the important 
part of an OK R is that it needs

307
00:17:20,200 --> 00:17:22,800
to be developed at the 
initiative level so that it 

308
00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:26,400
makes sense to the people that 
you're working with. 

309
00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:30,920
So you need to be quantifiable 
numbers, especially important, 

310
00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:34,720
you need to stretch the team so 
you know as quickly as you can 

311
00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:37,640
complete these 25 tests. 
Did you do them in a month? 

312
00:17:37,640 --> 00:17:39,640
Did you do them in two months? 
Did you do them in six months? 

313
00:17:39,640 --> 00:17:43,440
That should be part of your OK R
And then they can be used as 

314
00:17:43,440 --> 00:17:46,120
early warning signals, which 
there were no early warning 

315
00:17:46,120 --> 00:17:48,560
signals in the Big Dig. 
Everything was good. 

316
00:17:48,640 --> 00:17:51,720
We're all good, everything's 
fine, you know, leave us alone. 

317
00:17:51,720 --> 00:17:54,720
We're doing just great. 
And then all these problems come

318
00:17:54,720 --> 00:17:58,520
out at the end, and 
unfortunately someone has to die

319
00:17:58,840 --> 00:18:04,040
because of it to really make us 
pay attention and say, you know,

320
00:18:04,040 --> 00:18:05,480
something really went wrong 
here. 

321
00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:10,240
So you, you, I I know you've 
done a lot of thinking around OK

322
00:18:10,240 --> 00:18:13,920
Rs and how effective an OK R 
would have been for the Big Dig.

323
00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:19,840
Do you have a specific OK R you 
would have written in hindsight?

324
00:18:19,840 --> 00:18:21,720
Yes, you do. 
I knew you would. 

325
00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:22,720
OK. 
So two. 

326
00:18:23,040 --> 00:18:24,280
OK, go for it. 
Yeah. 

327
00:18:24,320 --> 00:18:29,000
So the first one is objective. 
The objective would be to ensure

328
00:18:29,000 --> 00:18:32,600
the structural integrity and 
safety of all tunnel components 

329
00:18:33,320 --> 00:18:36,600
to prevent failures and ensure 
public confidence. 

330
00:18:36,680 --> 00:18:39,520
And public confidence was a 
piece that was really lacking. 

331
00:18:40,560 --> 00:18:43,640
And that that was definitely 
proven true many times 

332
00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:45,680
throughout. 
But you know, imagine if they 

333
00:18:45,680 --> 00:18:49,040
had a key result that said, 
inspect 100% of the ceiling 

334
00:18:49,040 --> 00:18:52,440
panels, the anchor systems that 
are holding those ceiling panels

335
00:18:52,440 --> 00:18:55,560
in place, and the critical 
hardware across all tunnel 

336
00:18:55,560 --> 00:19:01,120
segments within within 90 days, 
miles of tunnels, thousands of 

337
00:19:01,120 --> 00:19:02,960
ceiling tiles that are being 
installed. 

338
00:19:02,960 --> 00:19:04,600
How many tiles have been 
installed? 

339
00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:07,120
Where are we with respect to 
percentage? 

340
00:19:07,120 --> 00:19:10,080
Or if we have 100% of tiles, are
we 30% done? 

341
00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:13,760
Are we 75% done? 
All of those things around 

342
00:19:13,760 --> 00:19:17,280
integrity and safety, a 
communications plan, maybe a 

343
00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:20,200
website, which of course that 
didn't exist in the 90s, but 

344
00:19:20,560 --> 00:19:23,920
could there have been a website 
for public consumption that kept

345
00:19:23,920 --> 00:19:27,040
people up to date on regular 
basis of what significant 

346
00:19:27,040 --> 00:19:29,440
actions were happening? 
All of those things could have 

347
00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:33,120
helped in tracking and, and you 
notice those things are not 

348
00:19:33,520 --> 00:19:35,480
activities. 
Those things are measures. 

349
00:19:35,480 --> 00:19:39,800
Those things are ways to be 
transparent and ways to keep 

350
00:19:39,800 --> 00:19:43,200
track of the progress. 
And these can be used, you know,

351
00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:47,520
as gates as you go through. 
So imagine they said, you know, 

352
00:19:47,520 --> 00:19:50,560
when we're when we're at 50% of 
the ceiling tiles, we're going 

353
00:19:50,560 --> 00:19:52,600
to get together, we're going to 
have a meeting and we're going 

354
00:19:52,600 --> 00:19:54,960
to walk through lessons learned.
We're going to have a 

355
00:19:54,960 --> 00:19:57,360
retrospective, right? 
We do those today 

356
00:19:57,360 --> 00:19:59,760
retrospectives. 
What have we learned? 

357
00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:02,960
How, what can we apply going 
forward to the remaining 50% of 

358
00:20:02,960 --> 00:20:05,000
the tiles? 
What could we, what should we 

359
00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:07,400
fix? 
What's what's worked well, what 

360
00:20:07,400 --> 00:20:09,080
didn't work well? 
You know, all those things that 

361
00:20:09,080 --> 00:20:13,520
we've learned in the last 20 
years and we've gotten very good

362
00:20:13,520 --> 00:20:16,360
at. 
You can see on a project of this

363
00:20:16,360 --> 00:20:21,080
size how important those kinds 
of questions would be if we had 

364
00:20:21,080 --> 00:20:24,840
those questions at the time. 
And maybe Bechtel, Parsons, 

365
00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:28,240
Brinkerhoff did some of that. 
But they certainly didn't 

366
00:20:28,240 --> 00:20:31,640
communicate it well with their 
government entities and didn't 

367
00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:36,960
want to, you know, raise any red
flags for fear of of people 

368
00:20:36,960 --> 00:20:39,040
panicking. 
And then they didn't want the 

369
00:20:39,040 --> 00:20:42,160
public certainly to panic over 
what was being built. 

370
00:20:42,160 --> 00:20:45,840
So I think that was one example.
A second example is around the 

371
00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:49,400
leaky tunnels. 
I mentioned that part of the the

372
00:20:49,400 --> 00:20:52,040
lawsuit involved the tunnel 
leaks. 

373
00:20:52,640 --> 00:20:56,040
The second objective could be 
eliminate water infiltration in 

374
00:20:56,040 --> 00:20:59,120
all tunnel systems by improving 
construction quality assurance 

375
00:20:59,640 --> 00:21:02,840
and material integrity. 
And the material integrity 

376
00:21:02,840 --> 00:21:05,800
specifically that was a problem 
here was around the concrete 

377
00:21:05,800 --> 00:21:09,440
that they were using to pour the
tunnel walls. 

378
00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:12,920
Some of the some of the concrete
was dirty. 

379
00:21:12,920 --> 00:21:16,240
In other words, it was mixed in 
with concrete not on purpose, 

380
00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:20,040
but by accident because of the 
way the soil was and the way 

381
00:21:20,040 --> 00:21:23,360
they pour the concrete. 
It wasn't clean in many cases. 

382
00:21:23,720 --> 00:21:27,320
The other integrity problem was 
that you can't imagine how much 

383
00:21:27,320 --> 00:21:29,600
concrete was used to build these
tunnels. 

384
00:21:30,080 --> 00:21:34,760
And they often couldn't get 
enough concrete at the time that

385
00:21:34,760 --> 00:21:37,760
they needed to. 
So they just used old concrete 

386
00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:41,040
that was leftover from a 
previous job. 

387
00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:44,800
And they, again, they found this
out later, there was a 

388
00:21:44,800 --> 00:21:47,840
whistleblower. 
And again, I, I, you know, I've 

389
00:21:47,840 --> 00:21:49,840
had whistleblowers on my 
projects. 

390
00:21:50,200 --> 00:21:54,680
And because I'm approachable and
I'm empathetic and people come 

391
00:21:54,680 --> 00:21:58,200
to me and say, look, this person
isn't doing or that person isn't

392
00:21:58,200 --> 00:22:01,280
doing or this isn't working or 
that test failed or whatever, 

393
00:22:02,040 --> 00:22:05,080
which wouldn't necessarily come 
up in a big meeting with all of 

394
00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:10,000
these managers and VPS and CIOs,
you know, in a meeting, it 

395
00:22:10,040 --> 00:22:12,520
wouldn't come up. 
But they're willing to come to 

396
00:22:12,520 --> 00:22:15,560
me because they know that I'm 
part of that management chain, 

397
00:22:15,560 --> 00:22:17,800
right? 
So if there is no management 

398
00:22:17,800 --> 00:22:21,080
chain that's really well 
documented, people don't really 

399
00:22:21,080 --> 00:22:24,480
know who to go to. 
There was a whistleblower, but 

400
00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:27,640
they couldn't, they didn't know 
who to, who to really go to in 

401
00:22:27,640 --> 00:22:30,400
in this case. 
And, and so I think that that 

402
00:22:30,400 --> 00:22:33,680
can be a problem as well. 
The key result in that case, a 

403
00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:37,680
real time materials tracking and
verification system for all the 

404
00:22:37,680 --> 00:22:39,880
concrete pours. 
Again, miles of tunnels, 

405
00:22:39,880 --> 00:22:43,040
thousands of concrete pours. 
How many, how many trucks did 

406
00:22:43,040 --> 00:22:45,440
they have delivered? 
And I'm not a construction 

407
00:22:45,440 --> 00:22:47,520
expert, I'm not an 
infrastructure expert. 

408
00:22:47,640 --> 00:22:51,880
My background is in IT, but I 
still found this fascinating 

409
00:22:52,600 --> 00:22:55,480
the, the size of the project, 
the complexity of the project. 

410
00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:59,000
I have never worked on anything 
even close to this level of 

411
00:22:59,000 --> 00:23:01,640
complexity. 
And, and I'm, I'm sure that many

412
00:23:01,640 --> 00:23:05,000
of your listeners also have not 
worked on a project of this 

413
00:23:05,000 --> 00:23:09,440
complexity, but, you know, take 
it down to your level and say, 

414
00:23:09,920 --> 00:23:13,320
where, where can I apply these 
to my project? 

415
00:23:13,560 --> 00:23:16,360
And how can I make these key 
results and metrics that we 

416
00:23:16,360 --> 00:23:18,760
know, we keep talking, we talk 
about metrics, we talk about, 

417
00:23:19,280 --> 00:23:21,760
you know, can we make the user 
happier? 

418
00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:24,040
How much happier can we make 
them? 

419
00:23:24,520 --> 00:23:29,720
How much can we improve our 
reaction time, our, our, 

420
00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:32,920
whatever it is we're building? 
I think that there's, sometimes 

421
00:23:32,920 --> 00:23:35,480
it's hard to measure those 
things, those kinds of things 

422
00:23:35,840 --> 00:23:38,120
almost, you almost think in a 
construction project, it's 

423
00:23:38,120 --> 00:23:40,360
easier to measure those, those 
kinds of things. 

424
00:23:40,360 --> 00:23:43,440
How many miles have we finished?
How many concrete pours have we 

425
00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:48,960
done in a software development 
activity in an IT organization? 

426
00:23:48,960 --> 00:23:52,320
It's, it's harder to measure, 
but still we have to, we have to

427
00:23:52,320 --> 00:23:56,120
dig, dig deep and find out how 
we can measure those things and 

428
00:23:56,160 --> 00:23:58,560
it can be done. 
So I mean, in general, I think I

429
00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:02,080
would say that OK, ours are very
powerful, helping to make your 

430
00:24:02,080 --> 00:24:06,840
goals measurable and making 
them, using them as early 

431
00:24:06,840 --> 00:24:11,400
warning signals to really help 
you in managing your project and

432
00:24:11,400 --> 00:24:14,040
measuring your, your, your 
progress as you go along. 

433
00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:16,480
It definitely takes. 
Oh, go ahead, Donna. 

434
00:24:16,520 --> 00:24:17,480
I. 
Was going to say it. 

435
00:24:17,520 --> 00:24:19,680
I think that, you know, as you 
go along and you run into 

436
00:24:19,680 --> 00:24:22,720
problems and your, your, your 
metrics are not coming out the 

437
00:24:22,720 --> 00:24:25,560
way that you expect them to, 
then you maybe have a problem. 

438
00:24:25,560 --> 00:24:28,280
And that's our next, the next, 
that's the segue into the next 

439
00:24:28,360 --> 00:24:30,240
section. 
Yeah, absolutely. 

440
00:24:30,240 --> 00:24:33,640
I know we're going to get into 
problem framing, but I, I, I 

441
00:24:33,640 --> 00:24:37,080
appreciate your summary of OK Rs
for those project managers or 

442
00:24:37,080 --> 00:24:40,080
those, again, casual listeners 
of the podcast who may not be 

443
00:24:40,080 --> 00:24:43,040
familiar with it. 
And the one thing you said that 

444
00:24:43,040 --> 00:24:46,360
I want to call out is all of 
this what Donna shared, even 

445
00:24:46,360 --> 00:24:49,720
though the Big Dig is such a big
project, this is certainly 

446
00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:51,440
scalable. 
I'm just going to reiterate that

447
00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:54,400
part of what Donna just 
mentioned, all of the things 

448
00:24:54,520 --> 00:24:59,440
that surround clear OK, Rs, you 
can create those for a project 

449
00:24:59,440 --> 00:25:03,840
as big as the Big Dig and as 
small as a daily project that 

450
00:25:03,840 --> 00:25:06,560
you might be working on. 
So just remember that this is 

451
00:25:06,560 --> 00:25:09,080
all scalable. 
So hopefully you're finding some

452
00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:14,520
value in understanding why even 
as difficult as it may be, as 

453
00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:18,440
Donna called out in her previous
profession of technology and 

454
00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:22,520
trying to put metrics around 
something as agile as like a 

455
00:25:22,520 --> 00:25:26,000
software or platform, it's still
all doable. 

456
00:25:26,480 --> 00:25:29,600
So you have to consider how that
applies to something that you 

457
00:25:29,600 --> 00:25:33,600
might be working on today. 
So let it let us transition 

458
00:25:33,600 --> 00:25:36,760
though to problem framing 
because this is actually a new 

459
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:40,200
term for me as well. 
So I'll be learning alongside 

460
00:25:40,200 --> 00:25:42,880
our audience here. 
So, Donna, why don't you walk us

461
00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:46,880
through what problem problem 
framing is and how this could 

462
00:25:46,880 --> 00:25:49,640
have been useful in the Big Dig 
project? 

463
00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:53,360
Yes. 
So I had a project recently that

464
00:25:53,360 --> 00:25:58,200
I worked on where we had a big 
problem and we had to pivot. 

465
00:25:58,520 --> 00:26:01,000
And how many of in your 
listening audience have probably

466
00:26:01,000 --> 00:26:04,480
had a similar situation where 
they've they've been on a 

467
00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:06,960
project? 
And you know, the project I was 

468
00:26:06,960 --> 00:26:09,760
on, we, I was working on it for 
a year and there were people on 

469
00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:12,440
it before that. 
So it, this project had gone on,

470
00:26:12,640 --> 00:26:17,360
we were moving our, our, our 
identity management system from 

471
00:26:17,360 --> 00:26:20,000
one technology to another. 
And I won't bore you with the 

472
00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:22,640
details of what we were going 
from one to another. 

473
00:26:22,960 --> 00:26:26,000
The fact of the matter is part 
way through, we decided we were 

474
00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:28,880
having too many issues and we 
needed to shift to a different 

475
00:26:28,880 --> 00:26:32,360
technology. 
And I'm not an expert in this 

476
00:26:32,360 --> 00:26:37,840
cybersecurity in logging in and,
and how to, how to make sure 

477
00:26:37,840 --> 00:26:40,680
people are, are getting 
identified correctly, multi 

478
00:26:40,720 --> 00:26:43,840
factor authentication. 
I, I'm not an expert in that at 

479
00:26:43,840 --> 00:26:46,360
all. 
So what I had to do was partner 

480
00:26:46,640 --> 00:26:51,000
with the technology experts and 
they look to me to run the 

481
00:26:51,000 --> 00:26:56,240
project and I look to them for 
their tech technology expertise 

482
00:26:56,240 --> 00:26:59,880
because how can I put a schedule
together or plan together if I 

483
00:26:59,880 --> 00:27:01,480
don't really know the 
technology? 

484
00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:04,320
I and I think that obviously in 
the big situation of the Big 

485
00:27:04,320 --> 00:27:07,160
Dig, I don't know anything about
construction, I don't know 

486
00:27:07,160 --> 00:27:10,520
anything about cybersecurity, 
but I'm supposed to be in charge

487
00:27:10,760 --> 00:27:13,880
and I'm supposed to be making 
decisions and people are looking

488
00:27:13,880 --> 00:27:18,120
to me to make those decisions. 
And so I feel very responsible 

489
00:27:18,440 --> 00:27:21,400
for my team to make sure 
they're, they're gainfully 

490
00:27:21,400 --> 00:27:25,200
employed and they're actively 
working on something every day. 

491
00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:28,160
And we're we're, we're working 
towards the same goals. 

492
00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:32,320
So problem framing is really a 
technique that people can use to

493
00:27:32,320 --> 00:27:35,440
ask the right questions so that 
you better understand the 

494
00:27:35,440 --> 00:27:37,640
problem before you jump to a 
solution. 

495
00:27:37,960 --> 00:27:42,800
And in the case of the Big Dig, 
for example, we can talk about 

496
00:27:42,840 --> 00:27:48,080
the issues that came about as a 
result of the ceiling panel 

497
00:27:48,080 --> 00:27:50,480
failure. 
So that's really where I want to

498
00:27:50,480 --> 00:27:53,880
give give you an example there. 
But we want to have a 

499
00:27:53,880 --> 00:27:56,400
brainstorming session that 
includes all the stakeholder 

500
00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:59,560
groups. 
And I did this in, in, in my, 

501
00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:01,920
when we had my problem that we 
talked about. 

502
00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:05,480
And you need to take 
responsibility and schedule this

503
00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:08,240
meeting yourself. 
And then you need to run the 

504
00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:11,760
meeting yourself. 
You can't sit back and expect 

505
00:28:12,320 --> 00:28:17,080
magic to happen without being a 
part of that magic and, and, and

506
00:28:17,280 --> 00:28:20,360
really stimulating that magic to
get it underway. 

507
00:28:20,720 --> 00:28:23,680
And, you know, a lot of project 
managers I've worked with over 

508
00:28:23,680 --> 00:28:26,440
the years, they, they wait for 
someone else to do it. 

509
00:28:26,480 --> 00:28:29,560
They think someone else will 
take the responsibility. 

510
00:28:29,920 --> 00:28:34,520
And, you know, I, I just want to
stress more, as more much as I 

511
00:28:34,520 --> 00:28:38,080
can, the fact that if you want 
to be irreplaceable as a project

512
00:28:38,080 --> 00:28:41,480
manager, then you need to make 
sure that you're doing these 

513
00:28:41,480 --> 00:28:44,240
kinds of things. 
You're setting up these meetings

514
00:28:44,240 --> 00:28:47,120
and you're, you're running them 
and making sure that you're 

515
00:28:47,120 --> 00:28:50,760
understanding, you know, and 
you're, you're evaluating any 

516
00:28:50,760 --> 00:28:53,000
issues and you're documenting it
all. 

517
00:28:53,200 --> 00:28:56,800
Otherwise, it's a missed 
opportunity and the actions 

518
00:28:56,800 --> 00:28:59,160
should be coming out of this 
problem framing situation. 

519
00:28:59,160 --> 00:29:02,600
So let's just talk about the 
ceiling panels for a moment. 

520
00:29:02,640 --> 00:29:04,760
You know, they were needed for 
air ventilation. 

521
00:29:05,720 --> 00:29:08,640
Imagine a big tunnel. 
They all have the ceiling that's

522
00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:10,000
on the top. 
Next time you go through a 

523
00:29:10,000 --> 00:29:12,720
tunnel, check it out. 
You'll see it. 

524
00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:15,400
It's for air ventilation. 
It's for fire safety. 

525
00:29:15,400 --> 00:29:17,560
So if there's a fire in the 
tunnel, then there's air that 

526
00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:20,000
comes in into the tunnel from 
outside. 

527
00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:24,280
It's for for sound dampening. 
So it could be really loud in a 

528
00:29:24,280 --> 00:29:27,360
tunnel. 
So that's that's also why it was

529
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:30,440
there. 
The issues came about because of

530
00:29:30,840 --> 00:29:32,400
the ceiling tiles were really 
heavy. 

531
00:29:32,400 --> 00:29:37,640
They were 3 tons each and they 
knew that when they put them in,

532
00:29:37,640 --> 00:29:39,840
they said, why are these 
tunnels, Why are these panels so

533
00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:41,960
heavy? 
We can we do this with lighter 

534
00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:45,000
panels? 
And they said, well, they've all

535
00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:47,000
been ordered. 
So you know, that's going to 

536
00:29:47,000 --> 00:29:50,680
delay the project if we have to 
reorder new tiles. 

537
00:29:50,680 --> 00:29:52,960
So let's just put these up. 
OK, we'll just put these up. 

538
00:29:53,480 --> 00:29:57,800
And then they use this epoxy 
that they tested and it held, 

539
00:29:58,200 --> 00:30:02,040
but over a period of time, the 
epoxy dried out and cracked and 

540
00:30:02,040 --> 00:30:05,920
it didn't hold. 
So that was what caused the the 

541
00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:08,400
problem. 
But so there were red flags, 

542
00:30:08,560 --> 00:30:12,160
there were warning signs, 
vectors saw that there were 

543
00:30:12,160 --> 00:30:14,960
problems. 
The construction people said 

544
00:30:15,000 --> 00:30:17,520
this is kind of stupid. 
Why are we doing it this way? 

545
00:30:18,200 --> 00:30:22,960
But yet they proceeded and there
were no, no whistleblowers 

546
00:30:22,960 --> 00:30:26,280
around at the time that could 
really, you know, raise a red 

547
00:30:26,280 --> 00:30:29,200
flag. 
And again, Vectel Parsons was 

548
00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:31,480
kind of running the show and 
they were left to their own 

549
00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:34,680
devices and they weren't raising
any red flags either. 

550
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:38,240
So imagine that they did have 
some sort of a problem framing 

551
00:30:38,240 --> 00:30:40,560
activity. 
The kinds of questions that they

552
00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:43,760
would ask include things like 
what's the problem that we have?

553
00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:48,440
Well, the heavy panels, they've 
got these epoxy anchor problems.

554
00:30:48,840 --> 00:30:51,600
There's not great oversight. 
So that's really what the 

555
00:30:51,600 --> 00:30:53,800
problem is. 
And how can we address that? 

556
00:30:54,120 --> 00:30:56,680
So why haven't we solved it yet?
That would be the second 

557
00:30:56,680 --> 00:30:59,840
question that you could ask. 
Well, we've, we've got 

558
00:30:59,840 --> 00:31:04,320
fragmented project ownership. 
We have resistance to revisiting

559
00:31:04,320 --> 00:31:08,160
core issues because we're under 
a stringent schedule and there's

560
00:31:08,160 --> 00:31:10,520
a lot of people paying attention
to our schedule. 

561
00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:15,200
Imagine the ceiling, the ceiling
panels went in last, of course, 

562
00:31:15,480 --> 00:31:18,600
after the tunnel was built. 
So now you're already over 

563
00:31:18,600 --> 00:31:20,200
schedule, you're already over 
budget. 

564
00:31:20,760 --> 00:31:23,840
And you really want to add more 
schedule and more budget to an 

565
00:31:23,840 --> 00:31:28,360
already troubled project so that
that you know, the chances of 

566
00:31:28,360 --> 00:31:32,440
that happening were unlikely. 
Who else has this problem? 

567
00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:34,880
So who else has a ceiling panel 
problem? 

568
00:31:34,880 --> 00:31:36,440
So we should look at other 
states. 

569
00:31:36,640 --> 00:31:39,560
Who else is building tunnels? 
It turned out that at one point 

570
00:31:39,880 --> 00:31:43,160
the team flew to Japan because 
there was a tunnel being built 

571
00:31:43,160 --> 00:31:46,920
in Japan similar to the one in 
Boston because it was on the 

572
00:31:46,920 --> 00:31:49,080
water on the waterfront in the 
harbour. 

573
00:31:49,560 --> 00:31:52,600
And they had similar problems. 
So they, they got some, some, 

574
00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:54,400
some tips from the people in 
Japan. 

575
00:31:54,640 --> 00:31:57,080
But that, you know, why didn't 
they do that earlier? 

576
00:31:57,240 --> 00:31:58,480
They should have done it 
earlier. 

577
00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:01,480
This was something that they 
should have done sooner. 

578
00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:05,440
How are we part of the problem? 
Well, we trust the contractors 

579
00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:08,920
to do the right thing. 
We also underestimate the risks.

580
00:32:09,080 --> 00:32:11,840
Are we doing risk management? 
Probably not with 

581
00:32:11,840 --> 00:32:15,320
deprioritizing, quality 
assurance and testing. 

582
00:32:15,880 --> 00:32:18,440
And there was not a lot of 
testing done on the epoxy. 

583
00:32:18,440 --> 00:32:20,640
I mentioned that they tested it 
immediately. 

584
00:32:20,640 --> 00:32:22,440
Yeah, it looks like it holds it.
It's good. 

585
00:32:22,760 --> 00:32:26,280
But they didn't do any long term
testing, especially for these 

586
00:32:26,480 --> 00:32:30,280
three ton ceiling tiles. 
What assumptions are we making? 

587
00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:33,360
We're assuming that the 
inspectors will catch problems 

588
00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:35,160
and they'll let us know about 
the problems. 

589
00:32:35,160 --> 00:32:37,480
Well, the inspectors probably 
did catch problems, but they 

590
00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:39,680
weren't speaking up for whatever
reason. 

591
00:32:40,320 --> 00:32:43,280
Oh, and once it's built, it's 
safe unless proven otherwise. 

592
00:32:43,600 --> 00:32:46,280
And why wouldn't you think that?
You spent billions of dollars to

593
00:32:46,280 --> 00:32:48,920
build these tunnels? 
Why wouldn't you think that? 

594
00:32:48,960 --> 00:32:51,720
Well, it must be OK, right? 
It's done. 

595
00:32:52,080 --> 00:32:53,120
Why do we need to? 
Why? 

596
00:32:53,240 --> 00:32:55,520
Right. 
And who's been left out? 

597
00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:59,080
Well, the public has been left 
out because they have no voice 

598
00:32:59,080 --> 00:33:01,920
in safety concerns. 
They're just recipients of 

599
00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:05,160
whatever they're being told. 
And then who benefits if the 

600
00:33:05,160 --> 00:33:07,200
problem is solved? 
Well, the public benefits 

601
00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:09,520
because they get a safer 
infrastructure system. 

602
00:33:09,960 --> 00:33:13,720
Taxpayers benefit because you're
spending less money if you're 

603
00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:17,800
doing it right the first time. 
So that's what that would be a 

604
00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:20,720
step by step process to go 
through a problem framing 

605
00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:22,960
exercise. 
And as you walk through these 

606
00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:26,040
questions and imagine you have 
them on the board somewhere and 

607
00:33:26,040 --> 00:33:28,440
you're filling out, you're 
you're filling out a template 

608
00:33:28,440 --> 00:33:31,800
maybe online or you're doing it,
you know, with yellow stickies 

609
00:33:31,800 --> 00:33:34,240
or however you decide to choose,
choose to do it. 

610
00:33:34,480 --> 00:33:37,520
You do breakout sessions, you 
have one group talk about each 

611
00:33:37,520 --> 00:33:40,040
problem and figure out, and 
we've done it different ways 

612
00:33:40,280 --> 00:33:44,480
whenever we have these storming 
sessions and you come out of it 

613
00:33:44,480 --> 00:33:48,280
with a set of actions. 
So we need more training. 

614
00:33:48,440 --> 00:33:50,360
We need to establish better 
governance. 

615
00:33:50,560 --> 00:33:52,960
We need a pet public statement 
and make sure we're 

616
00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:56,600
communicating with the public. 
We need to new tunnel safety 

617
00:33:56,600 --> 00:34:00,000
protocols or maintenance. 
Whatever the actions are, you 

618
00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:03,200
need to collect those actions 
and fold them back into the plan

619
00:34:03,480 --> 00:34:05,720
because that's a real missed 
opportunity. 

620
00:34:05,880 --> 00:34:09,400
If you skip that step, and I've 
been in meetings with that step 

621
00:34:09,400 --> 00:34:13,280
is skipped and, and that's, 
that's, that's kind of too bad. 

622
00:34:13,280 --> 00:34:16,120
We talk about it after the fact 
that say, did we come up with 

623
00:34:16,120 --> 00:34:19,760
any action items from that 
meeting or do we, do we document

624
00:34:19,760 --> 00:34:23,120
what we decided we wanted to do 
as a result of that session? 

625
00:34:23,480 --> 00:34:26,800
So and, and, and in fact, you 
may want to have these on your 

626
00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:30,080
calendar as you're going through
a big project like this. 

627
00:34:30,400 --> 00:34:33,960
So you say, where are the 
checkpoints along the way? 

628
00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:36,159
We're going to bring in a red 
team. 

629
00:34:36,520 --> 00:34:38,880
And we've done this. 
We'll bring in a red team to 

630
00:34:38,920 --> 00:34:44,199
examine the projects process and
how successful are we at this 

631
00:34:44,320 --> 00:34:47,960
checkpoint, especially for a 
project that's multi year, 

632
00:34:48,239 --> 00:34:51,639
that's the multi, you know, 
multi millions, millions of 

633
00:34:51,639 --> 00:34:54,320
dollars and even Bill this one 
is billions. 

634
00:34:54,320 --> 00:34:57,480
But even if it's a multi 
$1,000,000 project, you know, 

635
00:34:57,480 --> 00:35:01,240
let's let's put in some gates so
that we can check on ourselves. 

636
00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:05,240
I think an agile development 
process has those gates kind of 

637
00:35:05,240 --> 00:35:08,280
built in. 
But some of these projects that 

638
00:35:08,520 --> 00:35:11,920
this certainly wasn't an agile 
project, that's for sure back in

639
00:35:11,920 --> 00:35:14,720
the 90s. 
But imagine a big project that 

640
00:35:14,880 --> 00:35:19,040
is not an agile project because 
many big projects really cannot 

641
00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:22,360
be done using agile. 
It's just imagine a government 

642
00:35:22,360 --> 00:35:24,680
contract where you're building a
radar or you're building an 

643
00:35:24,680 --> 00:35:27,240
aircraft carrier or you're 
building a drone. 

644
00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:32,000
These are huge projects and the 
government has spending, you 

645
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:35,880
know, millions of dollars to 
build these things and agile 

646
00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:38,400
doesn't work. 
And, you know, not in all cases.

647
00:35:38,440 --> 00:35:41,640
I mean, so now you have to build
those, those checkpoints in 

648
00:35:41,640 --> 00:35:43,200
yourself. 
You're the project manager, 

649
00:35:43,200 --> 00:35:45,960
you're in charge. 
You have to be putting these 

650
00:35:45,960 --> 00:35:48,360
things in place. 
No one else will. 

651
00:35:48,760 --> 00:35:54,320
And if you don't do that, you 
know, you could be replaced. 

652
00:35:54,320 --> 00:35:57,360
And I've, again, I've been on 
projects where project managers 

653
00:35:57,360 --> 00:36:00,000
have been replaced. 
That's happened to me, that's 

654
00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:04,120
happened to colleagues of mine 
where they don't feel the 

655
00:36:04,120 --> 00:36:08,400
project is being managed 
carefully enough, with enough 

656
00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:12,240
rigor, with sometimes they put a
team of project managers in 

657
00:36:12,240 --> 00:36:14,280
place instead of just one 
person. 

658
00:36:14,280 --> 00:36:17,880
They put a group of people in 
place and, and they have a 

659
00:36:17,880 --> 00:36:21,640
Direct Line to, you know, the VP
that's in charge because it's a 

660
00:36:21,640 --> 00:36:24,960
high priority project. 
You know, imagine there's some 

661
00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:29,160
sort of a cyber event and you've
got to get your systems back up 

662
00:36:29,160 --> 00:36:34,360
and running and, and the CIO is 
being questioned by the CEO. 

663
00:36:34,360 --> 00:36:36,840
What's going on? 
Where are we, you know, that 

664
00:36:36,840 --> 00:36:39,840
might be a project where, you 
know, there's a daily meeting 

665
00:36:39,840 --> 00:36:43,080
and there's there's all kinds of
criticality and it's critical 

666
00:36:43,080 --> 00:36:45,760
issues and people are really 
scurrying around. 

667
00:36:45,760 --> 00:36:48,440
You could that's similar kind of
project to what we're talking 

668
00:36:48,440 --> 00:36:51,960
about here where it's like 
serious stuff. 

669
00:36:51,960 --> 00:36:54,920
If it doesn't, if it's not 
right, then there's a problem. 

670
00:36:54,920 --> 00:36:57,440
I imagine something in the 
healthcare industry, same thing 

671
00:36:57,680 --> 00:37:00,520
if it's not right that there 
could be a serious problem. 

672
00:37:00,760 --> 00:37:04,680
So these are the things that 
we're talking about that that 

673
00:37:04,840 --> 00:37:07,560
you really need to get outside 
of your comfort zone. 

674
00:37:07,800 --> 00:37:13,160
You really need to be looking at
yourself critically and how how 

675
00:37:13,160 --> 00:37:16,320
well you can, you know, run 
these projects. 

676
00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:18,160
Are you collaborating well 
enough? 

677
00:37:18,560 --> 00:37:20,680
Are you coordinating with all 
the players? 

678
00:37:20,760 --> 00:37:24,240
I mean, all the players, not 
just your favorites, all of 

679
00:37:24,240 --> 00:37:27,000
them. 
Are you, are you inviting third 

680
00:37:27,000 --> 00:37:30,800
party people in to critically 
examine what's happening? 

681
00:37:30,800 --> 00:37:33,080
And do you respect those people?
Not you're not just bringing 

682
00:37:33,080 --> 00:37:35,960
your buddy in who's gonna say, 
yeah, you're doing a great job. 

683
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:39,480
You know, you're looking for 
real criticism from people you 

684
00:37:39,480 --> 00:37:41,760
respect to come in and take a 
look at what you're doing. 

685
00:37:42,120 --> 00:37:45,800
And how well are you 
communicating with not only your

686
00:37:45,800 --> 00:37:48,840
team, 'cause I'm really good at 
communicating with my team. 

687
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:51,000
I'm a team builder. 
That's kind of my strength. 

688
00:37:51,440 --> 00:37:56,280
But how well am I communicating 
up to my management team and how

689
00:37:56,360 --> 00:37:58,920
well am I communicating with 
other parts of the project? 

690
00:37:58,920 --> 00:38:02,160
Because often there's more than 
one part of the project. 

691
00:38:02,680 --> 00:38:05,120
I know on the project I 
mentioned earlier where we were 

692
00:38:05,120 --> 00:38:08,440
doing multi factor 
authentication and all that, 

693
00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:11,960
there were multiple players and 
Infosec was one of them. 

694
00:38:12,400 --> 00:38:15,600
And I was really good with them 
and not as good with the 

695
00:38:15,760 --> 00:38:19,320
Microsoft Azure people of the 
cloud people, although I needed 

696
00:38:19,320 --> 00:38:22,000
to talk to them too because that
was part of what we were doing. 

697
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:24,920
I wasn't as good at talking with
them, but I was really good with

698
00:38:24,920 --> 00:38:27,160
Infosec. 
I was in, you know, in good with

699
00:38:27,160 --> 00:38:29,200
them. 
So you know, how well are you 

700
00:38:29,200 --> 00:38:32,440
and be critical of yourself. 
Like how, how, how am I doing 

701
00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:34,640
here? 
We're in a, we have a problem 

702
00:38:34,640 --> 00:38:36,200
situation. 
We need to solve it. 

703
00:38:36,520 --> 00:38:40,840
And it's that's, I always say, 
you know, when things are good, 

704
00:38:40,840 --> 00:38:43,200
things are good. 
But when the chips are down and 

705
00:38:43,200 --> 00:38:47,600
the chips are down, we really 
see who's the good player and 

706
00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:51,160
who's, who falls aside or who 
falls apart or who falls to the 

707
00:38:51,160 --> 00:38:53,640
wayside. 
And it goes in the background. 

708
00:38:53,880 --> 00:38:57,920
Who really comes to the front 
and says we need to fix this? 

709
00:38:57,920 --> 00:39:00,280
And how do we fix it? 
And I'm here to help and I'm 

710
00:39:00,280 --> 00:39:03,240
here and I can be a critical 
resource here. 

711
00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:07,040
And that should be you. 
Yeah, yeah, absolutely. 

712
00:39:07,240 --> 00:39:12,000
I can't help but go back to when
we started the conversation and 

713
00:39:12,000 --> 00:39:16,600
how you mentioned that project 
management on this particular 

714
00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:20,640
project turned over multiple 
times throughout the course of 

715
00:39:20,640 --> 00:39:23,920
the project. 
And how a lot of these potential

716
00:39:23,920 --> 00:39:28,560
solutions you brought forth, 
communication, clarity, the OK 

717
00:39:28,560 --> 00:39:33,080
Rs, the problem framing and 
sprinkling that throughout your 

718
00:39:33,480 --> 00:39:37,760
process flow, having those 
often, those conversations often

719
00:39:37,800 --> 00:39:42,320
and understanding who your 
stakeholders are, all of that. 

720
00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:51,200
I feel like the turnover of the 
PMS also carries weight into all

721
00:39:51,200 --> 00:39:54,880
of those potential solutions 
that you brought forward into 

722
00:39:54,880 --> 00:39:57,320
how this project could have been
executed a little bit 

723
00:39:57,320 --> 00:39:59,880
differently and maybe more 
successfully. 

724
00:40:00,400 --> 00:40:03,160
But have you had any thought as 
we kind of get to the main 

725
00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:07,440
takeaways of of what could have 
been better avoided or successes

726
00:40:07,440 --> 00:40:10,040
of the Big Dig? 
Have you had any thought, Donna,

727
00:40:10,040 --> 00:40:13,120
on how much of that played into 
it? 

728
00:40:13,120 --> 00:40:15,440
Was it A? 
Was it the perspective of the 

729
00:40:15,440 --> 00:40:18,440
companies that they just didn't 
understand the role of project 

730
00:40:18,440 --> 00:40:21,160
management and the value that it
was supposed to bring to this 

731
00:40:21,160 --> 00:40:24,800
project is I think that's what 
I'm more curious about and if 

732
00:40:24,800 --> 00:40:29,200
you've had any thoughts on that.
So, so Bechtel Parsons 

733
00:40:29,200 --> 00:40:32,720
Brinkerhoff is an organization 
that has built many huge 

734
00:40:32,720 --> 00:40:34,880
infrastructure projects for the 
government. 

735
00:40:35,520 --> 00:40:39,960
They built embassies, for 
example, and part of the lawsuit

736
00:40:39,960 --> 00:40:44,240
that they had against them was 
to disbar, disband the company. 

737
00:40:44,840 --> 00:40:48,040
And the government said that's 
that's a non starter. 

738
00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:50,920
We, we can't, we can't do 
without Bechtel. 

739
00:40:51,240 --> 00:40:55,920
They have too much history, too 
much knowledge of how to build 

740
00:40:55,920 --> 00:40:57,880
these huge infrastructure 
projects. 

741
00:40:58,240 --> 00:40:59,920
We can't, we can't live without 
them. 

742
00:41:00,000 --> 00:41:05,280
So I, I don't think that I don't
know that they took the big Dig 

743
00:41:05,280 --> 00:41:07,720
as seriously as they should 
have. 

744
00:41:09,040 --> 00:41:13,440
I, I think the, the original, so
the very first tunnel that was 

745
00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:15,000
built was the Ted Williams 
Tunnel. 

746
00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:19,760
And that is a tunnel that that 
connects South, southern, the 

747
00:41:19,760 --> 00:41:23,600
southern part of Massachusetts, 
Quincy, Braintree, the parts 

748
00:41:23,600 --> 00:41:28,320
South of Boston to the airport, 
which is in, in East Boston. 

749
00:41:28,760 --> 00:41:31,600
So the Ted Williams tunnel was 
the first tunnel that they 

750
00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:33,640
built. 
And it was the easiest, absolute

751
00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:35,520
easiest tunnel that they built 
because why? 

752
00:41:35,800 --> 00:41:39,400
There's nothing in the water 
between those two places. 

753
00:41:39,400 --> 00:41:43,080
Not there's no, no subway, 
subway tunnels. 

754
00:41:43,080 --> 00:41:48,200
There was no sewer, sewer pipes.
There was no electricity or 

755
00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:53,800
cable or, or any other 
infrastructure items underneath 

756
00:41:53,800 --> 00:41:57,520
that water at all. 
They built the tubes somewhere 

757
00:41:57,520 --> 00:41:58,880
else, They sunk them in the 
water. 

758
00:41:58,880 --> 00:42:01,320
They connected them together and
they had a big party because it 

759
00:42:01,320 --> 00:42:03,720
was on time, on schedule, and 
everybody was happy. 

760
00:42:04,000 --> 00:42:05,880
Problem was it wasn't connected 
to anything. 

761
00:42:07,440 --> 00:42:11,200
It was just laying in the bottom
of the of the water there and 

762
00:42:11,440 --> 00:42:14,400
you could drive in it, but you, 
it was not easy to get to like 

763
00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:16,480
you cut, you had to. 
I don't even know how they drove

764
00:42:16,480 --> 00:42:18,600
in it, to be honest. 
I think they probably put a car 

765
00:42:18,600 --> 00:42:19,800
in the water somehow. 
I don't know. 

766
00:42:20,200 --> 00:42:24,840
Anyway, it was building the 
connectors through these weird 

767
00:42:25,000 --> 00:42:29,200
spots that was the hard part. 
And I think when they saw how 

768
00:42:29,200 --> 00:42:31,600
easy it was to build the Ted 
Williams tunnel, I guess they 

769
00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:33,360
probably thought, oh, this is 
going to be easy. 

770
00:42:33,360 --> 00:42:38,720
But it was not interesting. 
One part of the tunnel. 

771
00:42:38,720 --> 00:42:42,120
And again, I could talk for 
hours about the Big Dig, but 

772
00:42:42,120 --> 00:42:44,640
there was one part of the tunnel
that was so hard. 

773
00:42:44,640 --> 00:42:47,120
It took, I think, five years to 
build this one stretch. 

774
00:42:47,120 --> 00:42:49,800
It takes you 10 minutes to drive
through that one particular part

775
00:42:49,800 --> 00:42:51,960
of the tunnel. 
It's a 10 minute thing that 

776
00:42:51,960 --> 00:42:55,360
caught, it's the most expensive 
tunnel in the United States, 

777
00:42:55,960 --> 00:42:58,960
that one little chunk, because 
it was so complicated because 

778
00:42:58,960 --> 00:43:02,040
there was a subway tunnel under 
it and there was another tunnel 

779
00:43:02,040 --> 00:43:03,760
somewhere. 
It was just very complex. 

780
00:43:03,760 --> 00:43:06,880
So anyway, the fact of the 
matter is, I think the fact that

781
00:43:06,880 --> 00:43:10,200
they turned over project 
managers over and over again is 

782
00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:13,440
largely because they probably 
said, well, we need someone who 

783
00:43:13,440 --> 00:43:16,920
has this, this domain expertise.
We need this, this domain 

784
00:43:16,920 --> 00:43:19,000
expertise. 
We need that domain expertise. 

785
00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:20,680
Oh, we now we need that domain 
expertise. 

786
00:43:21,200 --> 00:43:22,320
Do you know how to build a 
bridge? 

787
00:43:22,320 --> 00:43:25,880
OK, now we need a bridge person.
Oh, now we need a tunnel person.

788
00:43:26,120 --> 00:43:28,720
Oh, now we need a, a cement 
person. 

789
00:43:28,720 --> 00:43:31,680
So they maybe they were, they're
switching that around and, and 

790
00:43:31,680 --> 00:43:33,880
that I've seen that happen where
I work. 

791
00:43:33,880 --> 00:43:36,880
So you, we need someone who 
knows a lot about HR, for 

792
00:43:36,880 --> 00:43:38,920
example, we're putting an HR 
system together. 

793
00:43:38,920 --> 00:43:41,960
We need that domain. 
Oh, we're doing in, we're doing 

794
00:43:41,960 --> 00:43:44,120
a networking system. 
Who knows about net? 

795
00:43:44,360 --> 00:43:47,400
What project management has 
manager has done a networking 

796
00:43:47,720 --> 00:43:49,480
project before. 
Let's put that person on there. 

797
00:43:49,920 --> 00:43:52,960
And so we, we start to develop 
like you start to develop some 

798
00:43:52,960 --> 00:43:55,760
domain expertise and then you're
known for that. 

799
00:43:55,760 --> 00:43:58,520
And so they put you on that 
until things don't go well and 

800
00:43:58,520 --> 00:44:01,760
they put somebody else on it. 
So I, I do think it's a problem 

801
00:44:01,760 --> 00:44:04,680
of turnover. 
But again, if you think about an

802
00:44:04,680 --> 00:44:07,120
agile project, you've got a 
scrum master, you have a 

803
00:44:07,120 --> 00:44:10,720
project, you have a product 
owner and you have, you know, a 

804
00:44:10,720 --> 00:44:13,600
lot of team members and you've 
kind of got each other's backs, 

805
00:44:13,600 --> 00:44:16,280
right. 
But in this case, you know, when

806
00:44:16,280 --> 00:44:19,560
you you're in charge of the 
whole thing, it's one what 

807
00:44:19,560 --> 00:44:22,680
person responsible for the 
success or failure. 

808
00:44:23,680 --> 00:44:27,360
It's a it's a heavy load and 
you've got to be up to the 

809
00:44:27,360 --> 00:44:33,280
challenge on it. 
I think this subject alone, 

810
00:44:33,600 --> 00:44:37,880
because you said there's a 
podcast that that's six episodes

811
00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:40,000
long. 
I agree with you, Donna. 

812
00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:43,640
I think this is fascinating for 
so many reasons, in particular 

813
00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:47,560
for project managers to listen 
to and learn from. 

814
00:44:47,560 --> 00:44:51,480
So do you have any other key 
takeaways that you want to share

815
00:44:51,480 --> 00:44:54,520
with the group before we say 
goodbye to everybody today? 

816
00:44:54,920 --> 00:44:58,080
Yeah, I mean, I just, if I were 
to summarize, I think the you, 

817
00:44:58,080 --> 00:45:00,760
you did a nice job of 
summarizing just a moment ago. 

818
00:45:00,800 --> 00:45:04,120
And you know, you've got the OK 
Rs to really define what success

819
00:45:04,120 --> 00:45:07,200
looks like. 
The problem framing techniques 

820
00:45:07,200 --> 00:45:11,440
that really should be put in 
place to uncover root causes and

821
00:45:11,440 --> 00:45:14,120
and establish some new actions 
as a result. 

822
00:45:14,520 --> 00:45:18,400
Those are almost a, a form of 
retrospectives, a form of 

823
00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:21,920
lessons learned. 
We are really digging into one 

824
00:45:22,040 --> 00:45:25,520
particular area and not doing 
those kinds of things can be a 

825
00:45:25,520 --> 00:45:28,920
missed opportunity. 
And then using Rd. maps and and 

826
00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:32,000
plans to put in place to really 
track all of those solutions and

827
00:45:32,000 --> 00:45:36,240
make it relatable and scalable. 
But you know, again, putting 

828
00:45:36,240 --> 00:45:39,560
myself in your shoes of the 
shoes of your audience members 

829
00:45:40,160 --> 00:45:44,360
and really trying to relate this
to their own work, what can we 

830
00:45:44,360 --> 00:45:47,200
learn? 
It's to be proactive and not 

831
00:45:47,200 --> 00:45:49,240
reactive. 
And, and you've heard that 

832
00:45:49,240 --> 00:45:53,080
before, but with the backdrop of
the big dig, it really it 

833
00:45:53,080 --> 00:45:57,000
really, you know, it really, it 
really is true that you really 

834
00:45:57,000 --> 00:45:59,680
do need to be proactive. 
You need to build systems of 

835
00:45:59,680 --> 00:46:02,680
transparency and accountability.
So when you get that phone call 

836
00:46:02,680 --> 00:46:06,640
from your VP and he says where 
are we with this project, you 

837
00:46:06,640 --> 00:46:10,240
can make data-driven decisions 
based on the fact that you're 

838
00:46:10,240 --> 00:46:13,160
collecting metrics, you're 
collecting data and you have 

839
00:46:13,160 --> 00:46:18,200
some, some, you have some sense 
of where you're at because as 

840
00:46:18,200 --> 00:46:21,120
the project manager, you're 
responsible and you're the one 

841
00:46:21,440 --> 00:46:23,840
who knows a little bit about 
what everyone's doing. 

842
00:46:24,080 --> 00:46:26,960
You don't know everything. 
You're not the cyber expert, 

843
00:46:27,240 --> 00:46:29,840
you're not the infosec expert, 
you're not the construction or 

844
00:46:29,840 --> 00:46:33,360
concrete expert, but you know a 
little bit about what everything

845
00:46:33,360 --> 00:46:36,800
everybody is doing and where we 
are with respect to percent 

846
00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:39,720
complete and where we are with 
respect to the schedule. 

847
00:46:40,120 --> 00:46:43,920
And then focus not just on 
delivering the project, but how 

848
00:46:43,920 --> 00:46:46,520
you deliver it. 
And the public is very 

849
00:46:46,520 --> 00:46:50,240
interested in that in this case.
And I think that makes a big 

850
00:46:50,240 --> 00:46:53,840
difference as well. 
I think ask better questions, 

851
00:46:53,840 --> 00:46:57,800
plan for quality and never 
assume success without 

852
00:46:57,880 --> 00:47:01,120
verification from someone that 
it's successful. 

853
00:47:01,640 --> 00:47:05,040
So I think that that's really 
the the real lesson from the Big

854
00:47:05,040 --> 00:47:09,560
Dig is do better with clarity, 
honesty and real structure 

855
00:47:09,560 --> 00:47:13,120
around your projects. 
This has been extremely 

856
00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:16,240
insightful, Donna, that was such
a great summary and can be 

857
00:47:16,240 --> 00:47:18,880
applied to almost any project, 
right? 

858
00:47:18,880 --> 00:47:22,040
So thank you for that. 
If folks want to continue the 

859
00:47:22,040 --> 00:47:25,560
conversation, I am itching to 
keep talking to you about this, 

860
00:47:25,560 --> 00:47:27,520
but I know we have limited time 
today. 

861
00:47:28,200 --> 00:47:30,760
If folks want to continue the 
conversation with you about the 

862
00:47:30,760 --> 00:47:34,040
Big Dig or just learn more about
what Donna's up to these days, 

863
00:47:34,040 --> 00:47:37,480
where can they find you online? 
Yeah, I have a great website, 

864
00:47:37,680 --> 00:47:42,520
itsdonnagregorio.com and reached
out to me and LinkedIn as well. 

865
00:47:42,520 --> 00:47:46,280
I'd be happy to continue the 
conversation with with anybody 

866
00:47:46,280 --> 00:47:49,400
that has any sort of project 
management questions at all. 

867
00:47:49,400 --> 00:47:54,120
And I want to say thank you to 
you Ann for continuing with your

868
00:47:54,120 --> 00:47:57,680
everyday PM podcast. 
It's a, it's a great resource 

869
00:47:57,680 --> 00:48:00,960
and I hope your audience 
recognizes it's a, it's a lot of

870
00:48:00,960 --> 00:48:05,400
effort to keep it going and I'm 
proud of you for all you do. 

871
00:48:05,400 --> 00:48:07,720
So thank you. 
Well, thank you so much, Donna. 

872
00:48:07,720 --> 00:48:10,400
I appreciate it. 
So definitely reach out to Donna

873
00:48:10,400 --> 00:48:12,120
if you want to chat with her 
further. 

874
00:48:12,440 --> 00:48:16,200
You can follow me on LinkedIn as
well at and Campia. 

875
00:48:16,200 --> 00:48:19,880
And I look forward to hearing 
your theories on how the Big Dig

876
00:48:19,880 --> 00:48:23,120
could have been more successful 
or maybe you found that it is 

877
00:48:23,120 --> 00:48:25,640
successful. 
I mean, it's, it's your take 

878
00:48:25,880 --> 00:48:27,280
based on what you've learned 
today. 

879
00:48:27,280 --> 00:48:30,720
So that will do it for Donna and
I for this installment of the 

880
00:48:30,720 --> 00:48:33,720
Everyday PM podcast. 
Thank you all for joining us and

881
00:48:33,720 --> 00:48:37,120
listening in. 
And until next time, take care.

