1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:02,400 Hi, and welcome to the Neil Ashton Podcast. 2 00:00:03,080 --> 00:00:05,920 In each episode, we explain some of the fascinating ways 3 00:00:05,920 --> 00:00:09,080 that science and engineering are changing the world around us. 4 00:00:09,800 --> 00:00:12,760 We talk to leading engineers from elite level sports like 5 00:00:12,840 --> 00:00:16,880 cycling and Formula One to some of the world's top academics to 6 00:00:16,880 --> 00:00:20,450 understand how fluid dynamics, machine learning and 7 00:00:20,450 --> 00:00:23,000 supercomputing are bringing in a new era of discovery. 8 00:00:23,960 --> 00:00:27,080 We also hear some of their life stories, their career advice, 9 00:00:27,640 --> 00:00:30,080 the lessons they've learned on the way that I hope will be 10 00:00:30,080 --> 00:00:33,800 helpful to you too. So sit back and enjoy this 11 00:00:33,800 --> 00:00:41,160 episode. Hi, and welcome back to the Neil 12 00:00:41,160 --> 00:00:44,440 Ashton Podcast. So today's guest is Professor 13 00:00:44,440 --> 00:00:47,600 Russ Cummings. He is the director of the 14 00:00:47,600 --> 00:00:50,840 Hypersonic Vehicle Simulation Institute as part of the United 15 00:00:50,840 --> 00:00:56,080 States Air Force Academy and has had an amazing career over the 16 00:00:56,080 --> 00:01:00,880 past 40 years. He turned 70 later this year and 17 00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:04,080 he's well known for well, actually many things. 18 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:08,520 He has one of the most popular textbooks, aerodynamics for 19 00:01:08,520 --> 00:01:11,040 engineers. There's a new version coming out 20 00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:14,040 this year which just come out, which we we talk about briefly. 21 00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:19,920 But he's he's had this amazing career where he's gone from 22 00:01:19,920 --> 00:01:23,400 being, you know, in academia. He went into industry, he was a 23 00:01:23,400 --> 00:01:25,640 professor, professor for a long time. 24 00:01:25,920 --> 00:01:29,200 He's been key in terms of collaborations with the rest of 25 00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:31,320 the world. Notably, we talk about his links 26 00:01:31,320 --> 00:01:35,120 with with Oxford. And I got to, I guess know of 27 00:01:35,120 --> 00:01:39,360 his work more recently through the United States Air Force 28 00:01:39,360 --> 00:01:43,174 Academy and his work in terms of leading the resurgence, I 29 00:01:43,174 --> 00:01:46,190 guess of hypersonics research into hypersonics, CFD, 30 00:01:46,190 --> 00:01:50,000 something that is very topical and very challenging. 31 00:01:50,680 --> 00:01:58,480 And so we go through his, his motivations, his early days at, 32 00:01:58,520 --> 00:02:02,680 at university in California, we talk about him going into 33 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:06,360 industry. We spend some time dwelling, 34 00:02:06,680 --> 00:02:09,600 which I really love. You know, the time at NASA Ames. 35 00:02:09,960 --> 00:02:12,320 This is a bit of a common theme in a lot of the people that I 36 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:15,960 interview. They've often been there, some 37 00:02:15,960 --> 00:02:18,520 of his overlap with some key figures. 38 00:02:18,920 --> 00:02:23,480 I will try and post a, a, a picture if I can on YouTube in 39 00:02:23,480 --> 00:02:26,960 the, in the, in the comments, because there was a picture that 40 00:02:27,240 --> 00:02:29,320 he shared of 50 years of NASA Ames. 41 00:02:29,320 --> 00:02:32,320 And I think he was in that photo on the, on the on the field 42 00:02:33,320 --> 00:02:36,280 there. And, and yeah, so he, he 43 00:02:36,280 --> 00:02:38,840 interacted with a lot of people with, with Mike Giles, who, 44 00:02:38,840 --> 00:02:42,440 who's in this season of the of the podcast, talks about the 45 00:02:42,440 --> 00:02:44,160 great time coming over to Oxford. 46 00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:47,000 Like I said, the, the college environment, collaborating 47 00:02:47,000 --> 00:02:49,760 people, the difference in working habits between the, the 48 00:02:49,760 --> 00:02:53,200 UK and the US, some funny stories along that. 49 00:02:53,640 --> 00:02:56,880 And then towards the latter part of the episode, we talk more 50 00:02:56,880 --> 00:03:00,480 about hypersonics in particular and some of the challenges 51 00:03:00,480 --> 00:03:04,880 compared to low speed, some of the cyclical nature of funding. 52 00:03:05,040 --> 00:03:10,000 And really how I have observed him to really have changed that 53 00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:14,880 to some extent and pioneered and pushed for a renewed focus on 54 00:03:14,880 --> 00:03:19,040 hypersonics research for CFD. I Got to know him partially 55 00:03:19,040 --> 00:03:22,720 through that through the, the program that he runs with the 56 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:27,000 DoD High Performance Computing Modernization Program, this HVSI 57 00:03:27,120 --> 00:03:30,520 that we talk about, which is combining experimental and 58 00:03:30,520 --> 00:03:34,600 computational research, applied research to solve some of the 59 00:03:34,600 --> 00:03:37,040 great challenges of of hypersonic CFD. 60 00:03:37,240 --> 00:03:41,240 So we talk a little bit through that and then we go towards the 61 00:03:41,280 --> 00:03:45,760 end really advice that he has for for people and, and he's 62 00:03:45,760 --> 00:03:50,760 very inspiring figure actually somebody's very easy to get 63 00:03:50,760 --> 00:03:53,720 along with. You see him at, you know, AIAA 64 00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:57,520 conferences like that and he is really genuinely, I think 65 00:03:57,520 --> 00:04:02,800 being an influential person in in the community, that someone I 66 00:04:02,800 --> 00:04:08,000 personally, you know, really do look up to now. 67 00:04:08,120 --> 00:04:15,066 We should say that because of of his role, we wanted to make 68 00:04:15,066 --> 00:04:18,160 sure that there were certain things that people understand 69 00:04:18,160 --> 00:04:22,640 in terms of, you know, just his opinion essentially. 70 00:04:23,440 --> 00:04:28,080 So I did want to I put a little note in the YouTube comments 71 00:04:28,360 --> 00:04:33,360 around what around what can be said, but I wanted to just read 72 00:04:33,360 --> 00:04:37,902 out a little bit of, I guess, a disclaimer because we don't 73 00:04:37,902 --> 00:04:41,000 want to get in trouble. So basically the disclaimer is 74 00:04:41,000 --> 00:04:43,880 that the views expressed in this interview are those of the 75 00:04:43,880 --> 00:04:46,619 author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or 76 00:04:46,619 --> 00:04:48,800 position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air 77 00:04:48,800 --> 00:04:51,360 Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 78 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:54,041 Government. So it's just his opinion and I 79 00:04:54,049 --> 00:04:57,960 thought it was a very good and very interesting opinion and I 80 00:04:57,968 --> 00:05:01,934 hope you do too. So please sit back and enjoy 81 00:05:01,934 --> 00:05:04,250 this episode with Professor Russ Cummings. 82 00:05:04,258 --> 00:05:07,720 Yeah, well, firstly, thank you very much for for coming to 83 00:05:07,728 --> 00:05:09,290 talk. You know, your name is 84 00:05:09,298 --> 00:05:10,880 synonymous with CFD and aerodynamics. 85 00:05:10,888 --> 00:05:16,740 Everybody knows who you are, but I still think maybe not 86 00:05:16,748 --> 00:05:20,690 everybody knows your full sort of story and and your opinions 87 00:05:20,698 --> 00:05:21,870 on things. So it's. 88 00:05:21,878 --> 00:05:23,744 Yeah, great opportunity to speak to you. 89 00:05:23,752 --> 00:05:29,624 So thank you very much. And yeah, you've, you've had an 90 00:05:29,624 --> 00:05:33,995 amazing career spanning, you know, decades with so many 91 00:05:34,003 --> 00:05:36,702 notable achievements. But maybe we could start by 92 00:05:36,710 --> 00:05:40,100 winding back the clock a little bit to your early motivations, 93 00:05:40,108 --> 00:05:43,448 aspirations, You know, did you always want to be an engineer? 94 00:05:43,456 --> 00:05:45,934 When you're growing up. Yeah. 95 00:05:45,942 --> 00:05:48,344 So, well, first, thanks for having me Neil. 96 00:05:48,352 --> 00:05:52,549 It's great to see you and it's great to have this opportunity. 97 00:05:52,549 --> 00:05:56,000 So the the quick answer to your 98 00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:58,720 question is did I always want to be an engineer is no. 99 00:05:59,840 --> 00:06:03,280 I grew up in Santa Cruz, CA. Which is a. 100 00:06:04,600 --> 00:06:08,440 Almost like a resort community about 70 miles South of San 101 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:12,920 Francisco, right on the coast. So beaches, mountains with 102 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,720 Redwood forests, wonderful place to live and grow up. 103 00:06:18,080 --> 00:06:20,120 And I was taking full advantage of that. 104 00:06:20,120 --> 00:06:27,000 I was a very busy kid with sports, mainly baseball and Boy 105 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:33,160 Scouts and church and music and all kinds of activities, none 106 00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:37,200 of them specifically about airplanes. 107 00:06:38,400 --> 00:06:44,160 And so that that was was not there and certainly not, you 108 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:47,080 know, I wasn't there were kids in my neighborhood who grew up 109 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:51,760 tinkering with cars, making go karts and things like that. 110 00:06:52,040 --> 00:06:57,840 That wasn't me. I, I just wasn't that kid until 111 00:06:59,240 --> 00:07:01,600 I reached the ripe old age of 12. 112 00:07:03,200 --> 00:07:09,120 My uncle was a master Sergeant in the Air Force, and I'm going 113 00:07:09,120 --> 00:07:15,720 to date myself here now. He was on his way to serve a 114 00:07:15,720 --> 00:07:18,920 tour in Vietnam during the Vietnam War. 115 00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:24,280 So this is in the late 1960s. So I'm now you can put it 116 00:07:24,280 --> 00:07:25,680 together. How old is this guy? 117 00:07:26,360 --> 00:07:31,680 I was 12. He decided on his way, he was 118 00:07:31,680 --> 00:07:36,080 going to Danang. On his way there, he was going 119 00:07:36,080 --> 00:07:39,360 to stop and visit us. He was he was stationed in Ohio 120 00:07:39,760 --> 00:07:42,120 and his family was in Ohio near Columbus. 121 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:47,342 And he decided to come see us on the way for a couple weeks 122 00:07:47,342 --> 00:07:50,218 since he was going to have to fly, I think, to Travis Air 123 00:07:50,218 --> 00:07:52,520 Force Base, which is in the San Francisco Bay Area. 124 00:07:52,880 --> 00:07:57,760 And then from Travis to, you know, eventually to Vietnam. 125 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:06,840 So he came to visit and he started almost immediately going 126 00:08:06,840 --> 00:08:11,800 down with me to the local hobby shop and buying models of Air 127 00:08:11,800 --> 00:08:15,920 Force fighters. And at that time that was like 128 00:08:15,920 --> 00:08:17,920 the Century series of fighters. 129 00:08:17,928 --> 00:08:23,960 And then into the F-4. So the the F-100, the F-102, the 130 00:08:23,960 --> 00:08:30,463 F-103, the F-104, the F-105. And every day it felt like while 131 00:08:30,463 --> 00:08:37,120 he was there, he would buy a model and we would sit on the 132 00:08:37,128 --> 00:08:42,128 the kitchen table at night and build those models together. 133 00:08:42,135 --> 00:08:45,788 And he would tell me stories about those airplanes. 134 00:08:45,796 --> 00:08:49,360 And it was just like a light went off. 135 00:08:49,368 --> 00:08:54,587 I want to do something related to airplanes that that has been 136 00:08:54,587 --> 00:08:58,428 there ever since. It's interesting. 137 00:08:58,436 --> 00:09:03,112 When I when I worked, my first job was at Hughes Aircraft 138 00:09:03,120 --> 00:09:06,679 Company in Los Angeles. And we can talk about that more 139 00:09:06,679 --> 00:09:11,085 later, but everybody I worked with in the aerodynamic design 140 00:09:11,093 --> 00:09:15,095 department loved airplanes. That was the common thread. 141 00:09:15,103 --> 00:09:18,865 It wasn't that I knew how to fix engines. 142 00:09:18,873 --> 00:09:23,380 It wasn't that I grew up doing one thing or the other. 143 00:09:23,388 --> 00:09:26,968 It was there's something about airplanes that I just love. 144 00:09:26,976 --> 00:09:33,750 And that bug hit me when I was 12 because of my uncle. 145 00:09:33,758 --> 00:09:40,472 And so even though he then eventually had to leave, those 146 00:09:40,480 --> 00:09:45,086 airplanes started finding their ways onto the ceiling of my 147 00:09:45,094 --> 00:09:47,664 bedroom. And every night I would look up 148 00:09:47,664 --> 00:09:50,328 at at them. And now my bedroom ceiling was 149 00:09:50,336 --> 00:09:53,820 pretty full of airplanes. There were, there were many 150 00:09:53,828 --> 00:09:58,685 airplanes that we'd built models for and, and I knew I wanted to 151 00:09:58,685 --> 00:10:04,280 do something related to that. Probably initially to be a 152 00:10:04,288 --> 00:10:11,266 pilot, but not completely sure. That kind of shifted slowly, 153 00:10:11,274 --> 00:10:16,374 kind of evolved as I went through middle school and high 154 00:10:16,382 --> 00:10:18,215 school. We called it junior high. 155 00:10:18,223 --> 00:10:21,228 Some places in the US they call it middle school. 156 00:10:21,236 --> 00:10:26,250 And then through high school, I had some good advice from, from 157 00:10:26,250 --> 00:10:30,215 high school teachers, math and, and science teachers who who 158 00:10:30,223 --> 00:10:34,264 told me, well, if you want to be a pilot or you want to do 159 00:10:34,272 --> 00:10:35,896 something related to engineering, you better be 160 00:10:35,904 --> 00:10:38,840 taking all the math and science courses you can. 161 00:10:38,848 --> 00:10:43,320 So I signed up and made sure I was enrolled in what we called 162 00:10:43,328 --> 00:10:45,582 college prep. So, so the the track that was 163 00:10:45,590 --> 00:10:49,960 going to lead you to go to university and then spend time 164 00:10:49,968 --> 00:10:54,610 thinking about where that would lead me, which university I 165 00:10:54,618 --> 00:10:59,350 would go to. There were many options for that 166 00:10:59,350 --> 00:11:02,242 in California. Certainly I also looked out of 167 00:11:02,250 --> 00:11:07,904 state, so places like Purdue and the University of Colorado at 168 00:11:07,912 --> 00:11:14,834 Boulder, but primarily so that I wouldn't break my parents Piggy 169 00:11:14,834 --> 00:11:18,636 Bank. I chose to go to Cal Poly 170 00:11:18,644 --> 00:11:24,766 because it was in state, very low tuition and and very, very 171 00:11:24,774 --> 00:11:28,916 affordable. It was also a three hour drive 172 00:11:28,924 --> 00:11:31,896 away which I thought was the perfect distance. 173 00:11:31,904 --> 00:11:36,080 Not too close. If you were closer than that, 174 00:11:36,088 --> 00:11:39,462 your parents could just show up for lunch, but if you were 175 00:11:39,470 --> 00:11:43,600 farther than that, it was harder to go home on a weekend and do 176 00:11:43,608 --> 00:11:44,570 your laundry. Right? 177 00:11:44,578 --> 00:11:48,200 So I I thought 3 hours was perfect. 178 00:11:48,208 --> 00:11:53,802 So that's about 3 hours South of Santa Cruz and San Luis Obispo, 179 00:11:53,802 --> 00:11:56,440 again on the coast in a beautiful. 180 00:11:56,448 --> 00:12:00,645 Place. And Cal Poly was just the 181 00:12:00,653 --> 00:12:05,035 perfect place to to go. Cal Poly's motto is to learn by 182 00:12:05,035 --> 00:12:08,340 doing. They're very big on a hands on 183 00:12:08,348 --> 00:12:11,300 education. So it was like with every 184 00:12:11,308 --> 00:12:16,180 course, with every topic, there were lab experiences, if not 185 00:12:16,188 --> 00:12:18,378 outright full laboratory courses. 186 00:12:18,386 --> 00:12:24,478 So you we had a hangar and an airstrip on campus at that time. 187 00:12:24,478 --> 00:12:27,320 For example, at one point when I 188 00:12:27,320 --> 00:12:30,440 was a senior, Burt Rutan flew one of his aircraft in from 189 00:12:30,440 --> 00:12:34,120 Mojave and just landed it there and came and talked to the AIAA 190 00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:36,920 student branch and then flew out again. 191 00:12:39,560 --> 00:12:46,880 So, so it was pretty exciting to to be there, to be learning 192 00:12:46,880 --> 00:12:48,272 about aeronautical engineering. 193 00:12:48,280 --> 00:12:54,016 And at that time then the, the pilot evolution kind of 194 00:12:54,024 --> 00:12:59,860 concluded and, and I realized I want to be an engineer. 195 00:12:59,868 --> 00:13:04,230 That happened sometime in my first or second year at the 196 00:13:04,238 --> 00:13:07,506 university, where I shifted from I want to be a pilot to I want 197 00:13:07,514 --> 00:13:11,256 to be an engineer. I went to school with many. 198 00:13:11,264 --> 00:13:16,098 Kids who became pilots. So it that was definitely a 199 00:13:16,106 --> 00:13:18,805 possibility. Probably a third of my 200 00:13:18,813 --> 00:13:22,934 graduating class in aeronautical engineering at Cal Poly became 201 00:13:22,934 --> 00:13:28,020 pilots. In fact, I just saw some of them 202 00:13:28,020 --> 00:13:34,100 recently and, and now they're, they're retired pilots, but 203 00:13:34,108 --> 00:13:40,254 their careers spanned many decades of, of first flying for 204 00:13:40,254 --> 00:13:45,912 local regional airliners. Many of went back in that 205 00:13:45,920 --> 00:13:48,989 deregulation days, went bankrupt and then they got a job at 206 00:13:48,997 --> 00:13:50,287 another one and it went bankrupt. 207 00:13:50,295 --> 00:13:54,199 And eventually they, they caught on with one that got bought up 208 00:13:54,207 --> 00:13:58,320 by a larger airline, which started to happen like in the 209 00:13:58,328 --> 00:14:00,904 1980s. And they all eventually became 210 00:14:00,912 --> 00:14:05,642 pilots for American or United or Delta, you know, the, the big, 211 00:14:05,650 --> 00:14:09,768 the big US airlines and then spent the rest of their career 212 00:14:09,776 --> 00:14:13,882 flying around the world. So that certainly was an option. 213 00:14:13,882 --> 00:14:15,600 But the engineering part of it 214 00:14:15,960 --> 00:14:19,260 was what started to attract me. 215 00:14:19,268 --> 00:14:26,790 And maybe one of the clinchers was during the junior year, we 216 00:14:26,798 --> 00:14:32,024 had our first course in aerodynamics, which perfect 217 00:14:32,032 --> 00:14:35,095 didn't know. That's what I wanted to do. 218 00:14:35,103 --> 00:14:37,685 I was still wasn't sure. You know, all these topics, 219 00:14:37,693 --> 00:14:41,460 structures and propulsion and aerodynamics and design, 220 00:14:41,468 --> 00:14:44,288 etcetera. Which thing are you going to 221 00:14:44,296 --> 00:14:48,192 spend your career doing? I, I, I wasn't sure, but I knew 222 00:14:48,192 --> 00:14:51,782 one thing. While most of the teachers at 223 00:14:51,790 --> 00:14:55,224 Cal Poly were pretty good, the guy who taught us aerodynamics, 224 00:14:55,224 --> 00:14:57,568 it wasn't that he didn't know it. 225 00:14:57,576 --> 00:15:00,400 He he knew it. He he had. 226 00:15:00,408 --> 00:15:04,300 This philosophical belief that it was his responsibility to 227 00:15:04,308 --> 00:15:08,636 make you figure everything out and not for him to teach it to 228 00:15:08,644 --> 00:15:11,796 you. I, I, I hope when I teach that 229 00:15:11,804 --> 00:15:13,994 it's a little bit of both, right? 230 00:15:14,002 --> 00:15:17,387 I, I'm explaining and you're, you're trying to absorb and 231 00:15:17,395 --> 00:15:20,135 learn. He wasn't that way at all. 232 00:15:20,143 --> 00:15:24,845 And so I remember coming out of our classroom one day with these 233 00:15:24,845 --> 00:15:28,547 other students and saying, I could teach this better than 234 00:15:28,555 --> 00:15:30,360 him. And I don't even know the 235 00:15:30,360 --> 00:15:33,122 subject matter. I could just read ahead in the 236 00:15:33,130 --> 00:15:38,350 book and and do a better job. And little did I know it was 237 00:15:38,358 --> 00:15:43,948 kind of prophetic that that that I was going to spend my entire 238 00:15:43,956 --> 00:15:47,570 career doing aerodynamics. I just didn't know that at the 239 00:15:47,578 --> 00:15:51,260 time. So Cal Poly was was a perfect 240 00:15:51,268 --> 00:15:57,815 place for me. I then stayed there and got my 241 00:15:57,823 --> 00:16:03,082 master's degree and then did the worst thing that as I was 242 00:16:03,090 --> 00:16:05,214 growing up that I could ever imagine doing. 243 00:16:05,222 --> 00:16:10,168 And that was to move to Los Angeles to get a job because I I 244 00:16:10,168 --> 00:16:12,178 grew up in in Northern California. 245 00:16:12,186 --> 00:16:16,181 And for those of you in the rest of the world, you might not know 246 00:16:16,181 --> 00:16:19,767 this, but there is a a fairly intense rivalry between Northern 247 00:16:19,767 --> 00:16:23,500 California and Southern California that plays out in 248 00:16:23,508 --> 00:16:26,954 sports. For example, I grew up a San 249 00:16:26,962 --> 00:16:30,742 Francisco Giants baseball fan. We were trained from a very 250 00:16:30,750 --> 00:16:34,506 young age to hate the Los Angeles Dodgers and in fact, 251 00:16:34,514 --> 00:16:38,726 forget the, but just the Dodgers hate anything to do with Los 252 00:16:38,734 --> 00:16:43,094 Angeles. So moving to LA to, to go to 253 00:16:43,102 --> 00:16:48,952 work was almost like a sin. You just couldn't believe what 254 00:16:48,960 --> 00:16:52,715 people thought of me. What are you doing moving to Los 255 00:16:52,715 --> 00:16:55,210 Angeles? It's like you're moving to the 256 00:16:55,218 --> 00:17:01,374 enemy's territory. And so I, I moved to LA and to 257 00:17:01,382 --> 00:17:03,960 start work at Hughes Aircraft Company. 258 00:17:03,968 --> 00:17:09,210 That was interesting. When I started at Cal Poly, 259 00:17:09,218 --> 00:17:14,556 everybody, and I mean everybody told me I was making the biggest 260 00:17:14,556 --> 00:17:17,720 mistake of my life, not because I was going to Cal Poly, 261 00:17:17,720 --> 00:17:19,900 but because I was majoring in aeronautical engineering. 262 00:17:19,907 --> 00:17:22,836 And that was because of the timing. 263 00:17:22,844 --> 00:17:27,773 I started at Cal Poly as a, as a freshman in 1973. 264 00:17:27,781 --> 00:17:34,408 That's the wind down of Vietnam War, the wind down of the 265 00:17:34,416 --> 00:17:40,022 defense industries kind of golden era you could say, and 266 00:17:40,030 --> 00:17:46,023 also a number of other factors. There was the oil crisis in 267 00:17:46,031 --> 00:17:50,039 1973. And so oil prices shot up and, 268 00:17:50,047 --> 00:17:53,200 you know, gas prices therefore shot up. 269 00:17:53,208 --> 00:17:59,222 And so people were just telling me that I was making the worst 270 00:17:59,230 --> 00:18:03,950 decision of my life in enrolling in aeronautical engineering. 271 00:18:03,958 --> 00:18:08,234 I, I, I didn't care. It was the airplane thing, 272 00:18:08,242 --> 00:18:09,100 right? It didn't matter. 273 00:18:09,108 --> 00:18:15,030 It was the airplane thing. And so by the time I graduated, 274 00:18:15,030 --> 00:18:21,020 so that's 77, I couldn't have made a better choice because 275 00:18:21,028 --> 00:18:24,680 nobody was majoring in aeronautical engineering then, 276 00:18:24,688 --> 00:18:29,648 relatively speaking. And now by the late 70s, defense 277 00:18:29,648 --> 00:18:33,401 and aerospace industry is ramping back up. 278 00:18:33,409 --> 00:18:39,720 And I literally had people just throwing job offers at me as I, 279 00:18:39,720 --> 00:18:44,840 as I graduated, I had about nine job offers from all the 280 00:18:44,848 --> 00:18:49,080 companies you could imagine you get job offers from, from 281 00:18:49,088 --> 00:18:53,238 government labs, from from the Navy, from the Army, whatever. 282 00:18:53,246 --> 00:18:58,615 I'll never forget the offer I got from Boeing was to work in 283 00:18:58,623 --> 00:19:03,395 the group doing the Boeing 767 wing loads and flutter, which 284 00:19:03,403 --> 00:19:05,949 that's pretty cool. Right. 285 00:19:05,957 --> 00:19:13,034 Yet I didn't take that job because of the job offer I got 286 00:19:13,042 --> 00:19:17,629 from Hughes Aircraft Company, which was to be a missile 287 00:19:17,637 --> 00:19:22,048 aerodynamicist. Not for one missile, not for one 288 00:19:22,048 --> 00:19:26,120 part of one missile like the offer I got from other 289 00:19:26,128 --> 00:19:29,802 companies, like 1 airplane, one part of 1 airplane, one thing 290 00:19:29,810 --> 00:19:33,525 about one part of 1 airplane. And then you wonder, well, what 291 00:19:33,525 --> 00:19:36,752 happens when that's over and what happens next? 292 00:19:36,760 --> 00:19:43,110 I wanted to be somewhere where I was going to learn as as much as 293 00:19:43,110 --> 00:19:47,770 I could about aerodynamics and more than that, it was the 294 00:19:47,778 --> 00:19:52,540 perfect place. Hughes was a unique aerospace 295 00:19:52,548 --> 00:19:56,607 defense contractor, to put it mildly. 296 00:19:56,615 --> 00:20:02,680 Howard Hughes wholly owned the company back in the the 30's, 297 00:20:02,688 --> 00:20:07,455 the 40's, the 50s and then eventually donated the company 298 00:20:07,463 --> 00:20:12,165 to the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, which he controlled. 299 00:20:12,165 --> 00:20:14,720 It took the government decades 300 00:20:14,720 --> 00:20:18,350 to prove that that was illegal, but it didn't matter while 301 00:20:18,350 --> 00:20:21,320 while I was there. And of course, Howard Hughes had 302 00:20:21,320 --> 00:20:25,560 passed away. But we were a nonprofit defense 303 00:20:25,560 --> 00:20:28,720 contractor, which that doesn't make sense. 304 00:20:31,000 --> 00:20:35,760 We. Hughes was known among the other 305 00:20:35,760 --> 00:20:39,600 aerospace companies as the Country Club of the aerospace 306 00:20:39,600 --> 00:20:42,520 industry. That wasn't true. 307 00:20:42,680 --> 00:20:47,960 We did not have hot tubs in our building, as some people 308 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:52,200 thought, but it was, it was very flexible. 309 00:20:52,200 --> 00:20:55,880 It was very open. Hughes had you know, you could. 310 00:20:55,960 --> 00:20:58,680 You could sense this from the people who had been there since 311 00:20:58,680 --> 00:21:00,160 the days of Howard. Hughes. 312 00:21:01,040 --> 00:21:04,680 When it was time to work, you worked. 313 00:21:05,280 --> 00:21:09,000 If that meant you went on a wind tunnel test in Tullahoma, 314 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:12,080 Tennessee, out in the middle of what felt like nowhere at the 315 00:21:12,080 --> 00:21:19,480 time, and had to be there for weeks, even possibly months, and 316 00:21:19,480 --> 00:21:24,240 at times working two or three shifts a day, you did it. 317 00:21:25,800 --> 00:21:30,680 But that also meant when you got home after that test and you 318 00:21:30,680 --> 00:21:34,640 were exhausted, fine, You know, you show up. 319 00:21:34,640 --> 00:21:38,560 But nobody's going to bug you about what time you arrived or 320 00:21:38,560 --> 00:21:42,240 what time you left or what you did at lunch or, or any of that. 321 00:21:43,600 --> 00:21:48,880 So it was a very professional. He's always got the job done. 322 00:21:49,560 --> 00:21:54,160 And, and I, I was really proud I got hired to work on AMRAAM. 323 00:21:54,920 --> 00:22:01,720 So it was the original development of AMRAAM, did all 324 00:22:01,720 --> 00:22:05,360 the wind tunnel testing for AMRAAM, created the aerodynamic 325 00:22:05,360 --> 00:22:11,400 modeling for AMRAAM, which was a completely new thing at the 326 00:22:11,400 --> 00:22:14,400 time. There was a guy there named Yoon 327 00:22:14,400 --> 00:22:19,560 O who had developed this mathematical approach to create 328 00:22:20,160 --> 00:22:23,800 a real time aerodynamic model that could be interrogated by a 329 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:29,040 six-DOF program, for example, using Fourier series and cubic 330 00:22:29,040 --> 00:22:34,040 splines and, and, and it was, it was just magical. 331 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:37,560 It was really amazing. I applied that to AMRAAM and 332 00:22:37,560 --> 00:22:42,240 created the first digital aerodynamic model for AMRAAM. 333 00:22:42,240 --> 00:22:45,320 Before that time, the aerodynamic model was a binder 334 00:22:45,320 --> 00:22:50,040 full of graphs that you handed to the controls guys. 335 00:22:51,480 --> 00:22:55,120 At this point we were handing them a digital model and that 336 00:22:55,120 --> 00:22:59,200 had never been done before. So all those things that I hope 337 00:22:59,200 --> 00:23:01,800 for when I, when I went to work at Hughes happened. 338 00:23:02,520 --> 00:23:06,600 So, you know, understanding wind tunnel testing and performance 339 00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:10,960 analysis and aerodynamic model development and aerodynamics 340 00:23:10,960 --> 00:23:16,920 itself. Our, our, our department, the 341 00:23:16,920 --> 00:23:20,440 aerodynamic design department was only about 50 people. 342 00:23:21,840 --> 00:23:25,600 We were working out in the San Fernando Valley in Canoga Park 343 00:23:27,040 --> 00:23:30,800 and that was Missile Systems Group for Hughes Aircraft 344 00:23:30,800 --> 00:23:32,840 Company. That was about 3000 people that 345 00:23:32,840 --> 00:23:36,240 worked there. So we're doing aerodynamics, 346 00:23:36,240 --> 00:23:41,560 propulsion, performance, stability and control and 347 00:23:41,560 --> 00:23:44,560 ordnance in our department. There was a sister department 348 00:23:44,560 --> 00:23:47,120 right next to us that was doing all the mechanical design. 349 00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:51,800 So you'd think, wait a minute, what's left you guys? 350 00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:56,800 Are you 2 departments of a total of about 100 people seem to be 351 00:23:56,800 --> 00:24:03,960 doing 90% of the missile. Well, the other whatever 2800 352 00:24:03,960 --> 00:24:06,360 people were doing all the electronics. 353 00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,680 So the autopilots and the seekers and and all of that 354 00:24:11,680 --> 00:24:13,520 stuff. And and it. 355 00:24:13,560 --> 00:24:18,080 Took it took the majority of people who work there to do 356 00:24:18,080 --> 00:24:23,160 those things, but that meant was like, I'm learning about all 357 00:24:23,160 --> 00:24:27,000 kinds of stuff and I loved it, absolutely loved it. 358 00:24:28,640 --> 00:24:33,920 Then then Hughes had by far the gold standard for educational 359 00:24:33,920 --> 00:24:37,040 programs in the aerospace industry called the Hughes 360 00:24:37,040 --> 00:24:41,582 Fellowship, where if you, it was almost like applying to go to 361 00:24:41,582 --> 00:24:47,440 to university, you applied for the fellowship. 362 00:24:47,880 --> 00:24:51,440 And if you were selected, you could either go full time or 363 00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:55,640 part time to either a local or a distant university. 364 00:24:55,640 --> 00:24:59,540 So I had a friend, a really good friend at Hughes who got 365 00:24:59,540 --> 00:25:02,893 chosen to go full time. He went to MIT and got his PhD. 366 00:25:02,893 --> 00:25:10,520 I wanted to do the local part time option and went to the 367 00:25:10,520 --> 00:25:12,640 University of Southern California in the aerospace 368 00:25:12,640 --> 00:25:15,640 engineering department and worked through and and 369 00:25:15,640 --> 00:25:20,720 eventually got my PhD. So so it was a industry applied 370 00:25:20,720 --> 00:25:23,760 PhD. Some of the faculty at USC 371 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:26,120 didn't like that. You know, it was like, yo, you 372 00:25:26,120 --> 00:25:27,920 should be doing, you know, fundamentals. 373 00:25:28,720 --> 00:25:32,520 You know, turbulence, which was a big topic at the time there 374 00:25:33,520 --> 00:25:36,880 the, the department head was John Laufer, who was a big 375 00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:39,720 turbulence guy. Most of the faculty were in 376 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:48,160 turbulence, not all, but I, I was in this high speed CFD thing 377 00:25:48,400 --> 00:25:51,480 that very few of them understood at the time. 378 00:25:51,880 --> 00:25:55,720 That's another thing that Hughes gave me the opportunity to do 379 00:25:56,240 --> 00:26:02,584 was essentially being on not the ground floor of CFD, but 380 00:26:02,584 --> 00:26:07,400 almost just behind people like Jameson, right, who were on the 381 00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:13,600 ground floor and and learn all of the different computational 382 00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:17,320 simulation approaches that existed. 383 00:26:17,600 --> 00:26:21,640 So all the way from semi empirical codes, which there 384 00:26:21,640 --> 00:26:26,200 were many of and still are some, to supersonic hypersonic 385 00:26:26,200 --> 00:26:30,000 arbitrary body program. That's been around since the 60s 386 00:26:30,000 --> 00:26:36,920 and the 70s. To the initial potential codes 387 00:26:37,880 --> 00:26:43,760 using CFD methods and then eventually Euler codes and RANS 388 00:26:43,760 --> 00:26:48,360 codes. All of those things were just 389 00:26:48,360 --> 00:26:52,440 happening as I was at Hughes and then also at USC. 390 00:26:53,920 --> 00:27:00,320 So, so it was, it was the perfect time for that and I just 391 00:27:00,320 --> 00:27:02,600 kind of absorbed as much as I could. 392 00:27:03,400 --> 00:27:07,560 There were lots of really great and very intelligent people at 393 00:27:07,560 --> 00:27:13,120 Hughes and very gracious with their time and mentoring and, 394 00:27:13,120 --> 00:27:19,360 and I just, I just love that. So I never regretted going to 395 00:27:19,360 --> 00:27:27,840 Hughes and, and even years later after I, I left Hughes, I went 396 00:27:27,840 --> 00:27:29,680 to Cal Poly as a, as an academic. 397 00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:36,600 I received an AIAA award and the AIAA president at the time 398 00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:41,080 was Malcolm Currie, who was the president and CEO of Hughes 399 00:27:41,080 --> 00:27:47,200 Aircraft Company. And I was, I was sitting at the 400 00:27:47,200 --> 00:27:49,440 table with him, right, having lunch. 401 00:27:49,440 --> 00:27:52,920 And it turned out that I was sitting right next to him having 402 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:55,840 lunch. And here I was a Hughes Fellow 403 00:27:55,840 --> 00:28:01,320 who had worked at Hughes, so worked for him, who left after 404 00:28:01,320 --> 00:28:04,120 he got his PhD. There was no requirements in the 405 00:28:04,120 --> 00:28:08,240 fellowship program of, of staying at the company after you 406 00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:11,600 graduated. Not one minute was required. 407 00:28:12,800 --> 00:28:16,200 And I asked him. So first of all, I told OK I I 408 00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:19,800 was at Hughes and went to USC and got my PhD and now I'm at 409 00:28:19,800 --> 00:28:24,440 Cal Poly. Why did you let me do that? 410 00:28:25,480 --> 00:28:28,600 His answer was fantastic, he said. 411 00:28:30,000 --> 00:28:32,880 That and that that happens probably to the majority of 412 00:28:32,880 --> 00:28:35,200 people who go through the Hughes Fellowship program. 413 00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:39,760 But if you look at the upper echelons within Hughes Aircraft 414 00:28:39,760 --> 00:28:44,400 Company of the managers and the directors, they're almost all 415 00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:49,480 Hughes fellows. So we're creating the the future 416 00:28:50,520 --> 00:28:53,520 direction of the company, the future leaders of the company 417 00:28:53,520 --> 00:28:54,831 through the fellowship program. 418 00:28:54,839 --> 00:28:57,325 And then what about the rest of you? 419 00:28:57,333 --> 00:29:02,041 Because what did you say you do? You're a professor at Cal Poly, 420 00:29:02,041 --> 00:29:05,048 teaching undergraduates and graduate students and telling 421 00:29:05,056 --> 00:29:07,920 them how much you love Hughes Aircraft Company. 422 00:29:07,928 --> 00:29:11,392 What's wrong with that? That's a good thing. 423 00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:14,505 Very. Slow, Yeah, it it was, it was 424 00:29:14,513 --> 00:29:18,205 amazing. So I really enjoyed that time at 425 00:29:18,205 --> 00:29:21,184 Hughes. I I ended up being there a total 426 00:29:21,184 --> 00:29:23,790 of eight years. After AMRAAM. 427 00:29:23,798 --> 00:29:29,048 I worked on hypersonic IR&D projects, but then the. 428 00:29:29,056 --> 00:29:32,862 The. Possibility of going to back to 429 00:29:32,862 --> 00:29:37,860 Cal Poly as an academic came up and I applied for and got that 430 00:29:37,868 --> 00:29:42,088 job. And so I moved back up the coast 431 00:29:42,088 --> 00:29:48,805 to San Luis Obispo and became an academic and started then to 432 00:29:48,805 --> 00:29:51,680 teach that aerodynamics. Course that I had. 433 00:29:51,688 --> 00:29:56,221 Taken as a student. In fact, many of the faculty who 434 00:29:56,221 --> 00:29:59,096 had been there when I was an undergraduate were still there, 435 00:29:59,096 --> 00:30:01,667 including the guy who had taught me that course. 436 00:30:01,675 --> 00:30:06,060 I'd never told him that story. You know, you're a terrible 437 00:30:06,068 --> 00:30:12,590 teacher, but OK. And I hopefully, I hopefully did 438 00:30:12,590 --> 00:30:17,656 it better. I don't want to say anything bad 439 00:30:17,656 --> 00:30:23,519 about him, but I I hope that I instilled in the students kind 440 00:30:23,527 --> 00:30:28,135 of an enjoyment and a love of learning about aerodynamics 441 00:30:28,143 --> 00:30:35,508 because it's not a simple topic when when you come as an 442 00:30:35,516 --> 00:30:38,360 engineering student to university, maybe you grew up 443 00:30:38,368 --> 00:30:41,844 tinkering with cars, maybe you grew up doing electronics. 444 00:30:41,852 --> 00:30:45,596 You did not grow up doing fluid dynamics probably. 445 00:30:45,604 --> 00:30:50,927 And so it's a whole new thing for most students. 446 00:30:50,935 --> 00:30:54,876 And it's something that typically is like you can't see, 447 00:30:54,876 --> 00:30:58,692 you can't hold a wrench and and fix it. 448 00:30:58,700 --> 00:31:02,120 It's it's it's much more obscure. 449 00:31:02,128 --> 00:31:05,954 It's kind of hidden, but that also makes it kind of 450 00:31:05,962 --> 00:31:09,690 interesting. So that was a very long winded 451 00:31:09,698 --> 00:31:15,819 answer, but all those things tied back to my uncle coming as 452 00:31:15,819 --> 00:31:20,932 a master Sergeant and building me those models with me and, 453 00:31:20,940 --> 00:31:24,240 and, and I've been doing it ever since. 454 00:31:24,248 --> 00:31:26,156 Yeah, I know. It's incredible. 455 00:31:26,164 --> 00:31:30,540 And also the it's funny how your life takes you in certain 456 00:31:30,548 --> 00:31:33,730 directions and you know, you then sometimes come full circle. 457 00:31:33,730 --> 00:31:35,800 I mean, sounds like you always 458 00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:42,320 had a, a love for the sort of Northern California, Santa Cruz, 459 00:31:42,320 --> 00:31:44,760 San Luis Obispo area. I guess that's part of the 460 00:31:44,760 --> 00:31:47,320 desire to come back is you'd sort of spend your time, as you 461 00:31:47,320 --> 00:31:50,600 said, in the place where you know, the rivalries were and it 462 00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:53,960 was nice to come back. Did you miss that area? 463 00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:55,320 I guess a little bit. No. 464 00:31:55,320 --> 00:32:01,080 Oh, absolutely. So I would fly regularly up to 465 00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:06,400 San Francisco to see my parents, friends while I lived in LA. 466 00:32:07,880 --> 00:32:11,440 So LA is an additional 3 hour drive South of San Luis Obispo. 467 00:32:11,440 --> 00:32:17,606 So that's a six hour drive from LA from from Western LA to 468 00:32:17,606 --> 00:32:19,480 Santa Cruz. That's a little bit too much. 469 00:32:19,480 --> 00:32:21,760 So I would fly up. In fact, San Francisco, Los 470 00:32:21,760 --> 00:32:25,160 Angeles corridor is one of the big busiest flight corridors in 471 00:32:25,160 --> 00:32:28,720 the world. And so there were lots of 472 00:32:28,720 --> 00:32:33,640 flights and I would I would go up there quite a lot. 473 00:32:34,480 --> 00:32:37,120 That does not mean I hated LA the whole time I was there. 474 00:32:37,120 --> 00:32:39,840 I learned to love it to some, to some extent. 475 00:32:40,640 --> 00:32:44,120 It it's really funny in Los Angeles when somebody asks you 476 00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:50,080 how far is it to that place? They will answer in time. 477 00:32:50,800 --> 00:32:54,440 Not in distance, because distance is irrelevant. 478 00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:57,520 It only matters how long it takes you to drive there. 479 00:32:57,960 --> 00:33:00,080 It does not matter how far away it is. 480 00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:07,320 So, so you get used to a whole different perspective on life. 481 00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:14,040 Certainly it takes a while to gear up to the the fastness of 482 00:33:14,040 --> 00:33:17,040 the freeway system and and life in general. 483 00:33:17,240 --> 00:33:20,720 It was completely normal for someone to call up and say, hey, 484 00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:24,200 we're going to Westwood to watch a movie and not even think 485 00:33:24,280 --> 00:33:29,960 that's 30 miles away and will take me 45 minutes to get there. 486 00:33:30,840 --> 00:33:35,120 So that's just normal. And so perspectives changed, but 487 00:33:35,320 --> 00:33:38,360 I was kind of glad to go back when when I did. 488 00:33:39,320 --> 00:33:42,480 Yeah, yeah, yeah, I, I totally made that mistake recently. 489 00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:47,800 I was in Los Angeles or, you know, in the area thinking it's 490 00:33:47,800 --> 00:33:49,560 Los Angeles. It's like London, it's the city, 491 00:33:49,560 --> 00:33:50,760 you know, you can just get across. 492 00:33:51,080 --> 00:33:54,480 And I had a meeting over in Agoura Hills and I needed to get 493 00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:58,360 over to Orange County where. Yeah, that's for us. 494 00:33:59,240 --> 00:34:02,520 Yeah, I was stuck in a taxi for like 3 1/2 hours. 495 00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:05,200 Oh, you took a taxi? Oh my goodness, I thought. 496 00:34:05,200 --> 00:34:07,040 Well, how else do I do it? I mean. 497 00:34:08,440 --> 00:34:10,320 I don't think it was a train. Yeah, yeah, everybody. 498 00:34:10,320 --> 00:34:15,480 That's why everybody drives. So yeah, I was seeing like, OK, 499 00:34:15,480 --> 00:34:18,040 it's quite a big distance, it's quite a big area. 500 00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:22,080 It's crazy. It's 100 miles by 100 miles, the 501 00:34:22,520 --> 00:34:28,360 LA metropolitan area, and I worked with people at Hughes who 502 00:34:28,360 --> 00:34:31,480 lived so we were in the West San Fernando Valley, very close to 503 00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:36,320 Agoura Hills. People who lived 2 hour drive in 504 00:34:36,320 --> 00:34:39,080 almost every direction from where we were. 505 00:34:40,040 --> 00:34:44,159 And you couldn't, it couldn't be like Southwest because that 506 00:34:44,159 --> 00:34:50,760 would be the Pacific Ocean. We had people who lived all 507 00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:54,679 throughout that metropolitan area and commuted to work. 508 00:34:55,960 --> 00:35:02,200 I lived right next to our location, so I had like a 10 509 00:35:02,200 --> 00:35:04,080 minute drive. There was no way I was ever 510 00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:07,400 going to do that. People driving for one to two 511 00:35:07,400 --> 00:35:09,440 hours. Each way, each. 512 00:35:09,440 --> 00:35:12,120 Day was insane, but that was normal. 513 00:35:13,280 --> 00:35:15,960 Yeah, it's, yeah, it's definitely a cultural thing. 514 00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:17,920 I guess you just have to get used to it just becomes that's 515 00:35:17,920 --> 00:35:20,680 why autonomous vehicles makes complete sense. 516 00:35:21,880 --> 00:35:23,920 Or you'd be told to, you know, jump across. 517 00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:29,040 There's one more step that's connected to all that. 518 00:35:30,160 --> 00:35:35,080 Shortly after I got to Cal Poly again for the second time, I 519 00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:39,760 started doing research with the people in NASA Ames Research 520 00:35:39,760 --> 00:35:45,480 Center up in the Bay Area. So and and found myself being 521 00:35:45,720 --> 00:35:51,040 asked to apply to be an NRC postdoc at NASA Ames. 522 00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:55,280 And Cal Poly graciously allowed me to take leave and go do 523 00:35:55,280 --> 00:35:57,872 that. And so I spent two years up at 524 00:35:57,880 --> 00:36:01,570 NASA Ames. I, I call that my the 525 00:36:01,578 --> 00:36:06,140 culmination of my CFD education to some extent, although it 526 00:36:06,148 --> 00:36:09,208 never stops it. It really took everything I had 527 00:36:09,208 --> 00:36:13,790 been doing up to that point and solidified it when I first got 528 00:36:13,798 --> 00:36:17,262 to Ames. The everybody in the chain of 529 00:36:17,270 --> 00:36:21,565 command, which they that's not a word they use, but I'm at a 530 00:36:21,573 --> 00:36:24,338 military institution now, was a CFD researcher. 531 00:36:24,346 --> 00:36:29,880 I was in the applied CFD branch. The branch chief was Terry 532 00:36:29,888 --> 00:36:33,332 Holst, who had developed many full potential methods. 533 00:36:33,340 --> 00:36:37,420 The fluid dynamics division director was Paul Kutler. 534 00:36:37,428 --> 00:36:41,440 He was now overseeing both experimental and computational, 535 00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:47,560 but he was a CFD guy. And the Ames Research Center 536 00:36:47,568 --> 00:36:51,879 director was Bill Ballhaus, who also was a CFD researcher. 537 00:36:51,887 --> 00:36:55,275 And then as I walked down the hall. 538 00:36:55,283 --> 00:36:59,892 As I first got there, the names on the office doors. 539 00:36:59,900 --> 00:37:04,380 Were people that I, all of them were people that I had studied 540 00:37:04,388 --> 00:37:06,545 as, as a graduate student at USC. 541 00:37:06,545 --> 00:37:11,640 I, had read their papers. I had, you know, so there were, 542 00:37:11,640 --> 00:37:13,440 there were multiple CFD branches. 543 00:37:13,440 --> 00:37:16,760 There was the basic, they just call it the CFD branch. 544 00:37:17,080 --> 00:37:19,560 That was the branch that Lomax started. 545 00:37:20,240 --> 00:37:24,320 I had Beam and Warming and Tom Pulliam and all. 546 00:37:24,320 --> 00:37:29,600 The people developing numerical methods, Tim Barth, though they 547 00:37:29,600 --> 00:37:32,640 were in that branch, I was in the applied CFD branch. 548 00:37:32,640 --> 00:37:40,344 So that was Terry Holst, Joe Steger, Dennis Chaussee, 549 00:37:40,344 --> 00:37:43,960 McCroskey Goorjian. It just goes. 550 00:37:44,000 --> 00:37:47,080 On and on and on. And I was there to do research 551 00:37:47,360 --> 00:37:49,960 with Lou Schiff in the High Angle of Attack research group, 552 00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:53,280 which also had some great people that I worked with. 553 00:37:54,000 --> 00:37:56,440 There were lots of students there in the summer. 554 00:37:57,680 --> 00:38:02,100 One of the people in our branch who was around in the summer 555 00:38:02,100 --> 00:38:06,720 was a guy named Eugene Tu, who was a intern from UC Berkeley. 556 00:38:06,800 --> 00:38:10,240 He was a student at Berkeley. He's now the NASA Ames Research 557 00:38:10,240 --> 00:38:14,840 Center director. The little Eugene is no thank 558 00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:18,240 Eugene. And then I started having 559 00:38:18,240 --> 00:38:21,920 graduate students who would come up with me to do research. 560 00:38:23,320 --> 00:38:26,440 And it's a long list, but the first one was Ken Gee and then 561 00:38:26,440 --> 00:38:31,720 Donovan Mathias, Scott Murman, Joseph Garcia. 562 00:38:31,720 --> 00:38:36,600 It just Goes on and on and on. And there are many of them are 563 00:38:36,600 --> 00:38:40,400 still at Ames, in, in, in Donovan's the head of the NASA 564 00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:43,760 division, which is where the supercomputers are, which is 565 00:38:43,760 --> 00:38:47,040 where I worked. Now you were in that building. 566 00:38:47,160 --> 00:38:50,400 Then I was in that building, yes, building 258. 567 00:38:51,200 --> 00:38:54,120 The the meaning of NAS has changed over the years. 568 00:38:54,160 --> 00:38:56,760 When I was there, it was Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation 569 00:38:57,320 --> 00:39:00,520 and, and that's where I got my first supercomputer. 570 00:39:01,600 --> 00:39:08,080 We when I arrived we had two Cray-2s and they were named 571 00:39:08,080 --> 00:39:11,880 Navier and Stokes and. So. 572 00:39:12,760 --> 00:39:17,960 Jameson talks about that in his talk that that connection 573 00:39:17,960 --> 00:39:21,520 between the growth of the computer capability and the 574 00:39:21,520 --> 00:39:25,920 growth of the CFD. So if you go back from the 70s. 575 00:39:25,920 --> 00:39:30,840 All the way back to like Murman and Cole in the early 70s doing 576 00:39:30,840 --> 00:39:38,760 transonic small disturbance CFD where it was essentially 1D and 577 00:39:38,760 --> 00:39:45,222 and their results were were just a graph to then as the 578 00:39:45,222 --> 00:39:48,092 computers grew then you go to two. 579 00:39:48,100 --> 00:39:51,920 D. And to 3D or you go from 580 00:39:51,920 --> 00:39:56,090 inviscid to viscous. So, so full potential came along 581 00:39:56,090 --> 00:39:59,820 and Euler methods and RANS methods and then you would apply 582 00:39:59,820 --> 00:40:02,126 it to more and more complicated geometries. 583 00:40:02,134 --> 00:40:06,570 So airfoils and then wings and then full aircraft. 584 00:40:06,578 --> 00:40:12,180 As that capability developed and that's when I was there for, for 585 00:40:12,180 --> 00:40:17,464 a portion of that, I call it like the, the, the golden age of 586 00:40:17,464 --> 00:40:21,162 CFD at NASA Ames. It was, it was amazing to be 587 00:40:21,170 --> 00:40:23,760 there and to take part in all that. 588 00:40:23,768 --> 00:40:28,479 Yeah, it it's really is. Seems almost everybody I speak 589 00:40:28,487 --> 00:40:33,390 to has some link to that NASA Ames NAS building. 590 00:40:33,398 --> 00:40:38,887 I I like the fact I did not know that the name the acronym 591 00:40:38,895 --> 00:40:40,148 changed. It did, sorry. 592 00:40:40,156 --> 00:40:42,395 The acronym stayed the same, but the definition. 593 00:40:42,403 --> 00:40:44,920 The the the meaning change, yeah. 594 00:40:44,928 --> 00:40:49,516 But did you, I mean, I guess notable figures in CFD who I 595 00:40:49,524 --> 00:40:54,934 believe if you were there in the late 80s, did you ever come 596 00:40:54,942 --> 00:40:57,460 across Philippe Spalart? Was he there? 597 00:40:57,468 --> 00:41:00,706 There was that. So he was at Stanford? 598 00:41:00,714 --> 00:41:04,352 There was a really close tie between NASA Ames and Stanford, 599 00:41:04,352 --> 00:41:07,355 as you might expect. It wasn't very far between the 600 00:41:07,363 --> 00:41:09,534 two. We were at Moffett Field, which 601 00:41:09,534 --> 00:41:12,378 was at the time a, a Naval Air station. 602 00:41:12,386 --> 00:41:16,008 It was great fun because P- 3s would be taking off and 603 00:41:16,016 --> 00:41:19,600 landing all the time. And, and so there were always 604 00:41:19,608 --> 00:41:22,292 airplanes to watch. And then NASA had its own 605 00:41:22,300 --> 00:41:24,390 aircraft. So we'd go out and watch the 606 00:41:24,398 --> 00:41:27,755 launches of the U-2, for example, which is quite a unique 607 00:41:27,755 --> 00:41:30,040 thing to watch when it takes off. 608 00:41:31,520 --> 00:41:37,600 So, so lots of airplanes and then lots of people who were 609 00:41:37,600 --> 00:41:42,760 grad students at Stanford. So Bob MacCormack was at 610 00:41:42,760 --> 00:41:44,320 Stanford. He had been at Ames. 611 00:41:45,240 --> 00:41:46,718 Joe Steger had been at Stanford. 612 00:41:46,726 --> 00:41:50,716 He was at Ames and then later went to UC Davis. 613 00:41:50,724 --> 00:41:55,304 Just a lot of inner interbreeding, I guess you could 614 00:41:55,304 --> 00:41:59,825 say, between the two. And so we would go over to 615 00:41:59,833 --> 00:42:04,008 Stanford on a regular basis. For example, NASA had a really 616 00:42:04,016 --> 00:42:06,050 great educational program as well. 617 00:42:06,058 --> 00:42:09,870 So a lot of the grad students that I brought in from Cal Poly 618 00:42:09,870 --> 00:42:13,960 ended up going to Stanford and getting their PhDs after they 619 00:42:13,968 --> 00:42:18,536 finished their research projects with their master's degrees. 620 00:42:18,544 --> 00:42:25,664 And so that was just a long line of people going that route. 621 00:42:25,672 --> 00:42:33,423 So it, it, it was, it was just, I didn't know it at the time, 622 00:42:33,431 --> 00:42:36,400 but it was like you, you wanted to pinch yourself. 623 00:42:36,408 --> 00:42:39,254 I knew some of it, but you don't know. 624 00:42:39,262 --> 00:42:42,120 There's this whole layer of senior people who are very 625 00:42:42,128 --> 00:42:47,296 famous and well known. But then there were all those 626 00:42:47,304 --> 00:42:54,680 quote-unquote, young guys, so so Stu Rogers and. 627 00:42:54,688 --> 00:43:04,032 Tom Pulliam, Scott Lawrence doing hypersonic CFD, Tom 628 00:43:04,040 --> 00:43:08,730 Edwards. We not only work together, we. 629 00:43:08,738 --> 00:43:13,434 Played together. So for example, there was a NASA 630 00:43:13,434 --> 00:43:17,600 Ames CFD softball team. Tom Pulliam was on it. 631 00:43:17,608 --> 00:43:20,366 I. Was on it, Stu Rogers, all 632 00:43:20,374 --> 00:43:23,160 these. Guys were on the softball team. 633 00:43:23,160 --> 00:43:25,160 So we socialized as well. 634 00:43:25,160 --> 00:43:30,847 There was there was sort of like at Hughes again, work hard, 635 00:43:30,847 --> 00:43:33,880 play hard was was the name of the game. 636 00:43:33,880 --> 00:43:35,249 We played volleyball every day. 637 00:43:35,257 --> 00:43:39,770 At lunch out on the lawn of Building 258, weather 638 00:43:39,778 --> 00:43:45,112 permitting. So there was there was a lot of 639 00:43:45,112 --> 00:43:48,396 fun going on as well. Many of us were San Francisco 640 00:43:48,404 --> 00:43:53,372 Giants fans, so we'd go up to Giants games up in San Francisco 641 00:43:53,372 --> 00:43:58,010 and, and we, we, we didn't know who we were. 642 00:43:58,018 --> 00:43:59,320 Yeah. Yeah. 643 00:43:59,328 --> 00:44:02,544 Yeah. We didn't know I. 644 00:44:02,552 --> 00:44:06,956 Know I didn't know that, that that all these people would 645 00:44:06,964 --> 00:44:13,248 quote-unquote, grow up to become leaders in in CFD for the rest 646 00:44:13,248 --> 00:44:16,500 of their careers. Yeah, it's so nice. 647 00:44:16,508 --> 00:44:20,010 And I, I can't remember if I've said this before, but I really 648 00:44:20,018 --> 00:44:23,236 appreciate it. I was at Ames for a very brief 649 00:44:23,244 --> 00:44:27,692 time and Tom Pulliam was very kind and, you know, cycled with 650 00:44:27,692 --> 00:44:30,572 me through Palo Alto to find the place. 651 00:44:30,580 --> 00:44:34,570 And, you know, there was that. I think maybe he epitomized that 652 00:44:34,570 --> 00:44:38,610 work hard, play hard mindset. He was always such a gentleman 653 00:44:38,618 --> 00:44:41,984 and a very, yeah, just California cool. 654 00:44:41,992 --> 00:44:48,272 Tom was great. At some point a few years after 655 00:44:48,272 --> 00:44:53,552 I was there, he got a major NASA award, not an Ames award, 656 00:44:53,552 --> 00:44:57,212 but a NASA award. And their award ceremony was 657 00:44:57,220 --> 00:45:00,581 black tie. You had to wear what you would 658 00:45:00,589 --> 00:45:02,710 call a dinner jacket, we call a tuxedo. 659 00:45:02,718 --> 00:45:07,530 And he got told over and over and over again, you will wear. 660 00:45:07,538 --> 00:45:10,064 A tuxedo. So what does he do? 661 00:45:10,072 --> 00:45:13,355 He shows up at the award ceremony wearing a tuxedo and 662 00:45:13,363 --> 00:45:17,080 tennis shoes. There was always that part of 663 00:45:17,088 --> 00:45:21,110 Tom that was like, I don't care. I will find a way to rebel. 664 00:45:21,118 --> 00:45:24,620 You just better hope that it's not too bad. 665 00:45:24,628 --> 00:45:30,912 Yeah, that's that is funny. So one of the things I would, so 666 00:45:30,912 --> 00:45:33,784 then you essentially we're an academic, but an applied 667 00:45:33,792 --> 00:45:35,784 academic. You were interested in solving, 668 00:45:35,784 --> 00:45:37,680 you know, real engineering problems. 669 00:45:37,688 --> 00:45:39,950 Absolutely. You know, with CFD, one thing 670 00:45:39,958 --> 00:45:43,855 that, and I guess it's how I maybe got to know you a little 671 00:45:43,863 --> 00:45:45,632 bit was the the Oxford connection. 672 00:45:45,640 --> 00:45:48,026 How did that come? About yeah, yeah. 673 00:45:48,034 --> 00:45:53,186 So I had been at Ames, late 80s. I had grad students there all 674 00:45:53,194 --> 00:45:57,780 the way through the 90s. But I had my first sabbatical 675 00:45:57,788 --> 00:46:01,288 coming up. Being at Ames as a postdoc was 676 00:46:01,296 --> 00:46:05,897 not a sabbatical. I was just on a leave. 677 00:46:05,905 --> 00:46:10,760 And so I had started to look around many years before. 678 00:46:10,768 --> 00:46:13,792 What were some good opportunities for doing a 679 00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:16,542 sabbatical? I really wanted it to be. 680 00:46:16,550 --> 00:46:21,527 Outside the US if possible and and contacted quite a few 681 00:46:21,535 --> 00:46:26,615 people. Not just in in the UK, but but 682 00:46:26,623 --> 00:46:29,305 it various places around the world. 683 00:46:29,313 --> 00:46:35,308 And one of those places was with the Oxford University computing 684 00:46:35,308 --> 00:46:42,285 lab, which was headed up at the time by Bill Morton and included 685 00:46:42,285 --> 00:46:45,624 Mike Giles among many other people. 686 00:46:45,632 --> 00:46:51,344 Ian Sobey was there. They had a very vibrant 687 00:46:51,352 --> 00:46:56,072 numerical methods group, a numerical analysis group that 688 00:46:56,080 --> 00:47:00,774 did CFD, especially Mike Giles. It was interesting. 689 00:47:00,782 --> 00:47:04,860 There were two parts to the computing lab at the time. 690 00:47:04,868 --> 00:47:08,818 There was the parallel computing group and then the numerical 691 00:47:08,826 --> 00:47:11,680 analysis group. The CFD was in numerical 692 00:47:11,688 --> 00:47:14,396 analysis. The parallel computing were the 693 00:47:14,396 --> 00:47:19,480 computer scientists that that organization, the computing lab 694 00:47:19,480 --> 00:47:24,148 eventually split into two separate organizations. 695 00:47:24,156 --> 00:47:28,584 The The computer scientists became the Oxford Computer 696 00:47:28,592 --> 00:47:32,072 Science Department, which is one of the premier computer science 697 00:47:32,072 --> 00:47:35,838 departments in the world. And the Numerical Analysis Group 698 00:47:35,838 --> 00:47:40,520 became a group within the Maths Institute, which has since 699 00:47:40,520 --> 00:47:46,170 moved to a very nice location in Oxford with, with fantastic 700 00:47:46,170 --> 00:47:50,348 they were, they were in a pretty crummy old building when 701 00:47:50,348 --> 00:47:54,378 when I was there, but they're in a wonderful place now. 702 00:47:54,386 --> 00:48:01,415 So Mike Giles had a CFD group in collaboration with Rolls Royce 703 00:48:01,415 --> 00:48:10,120 at the time, developing codes and applications. 704 00:48:11,760 --> 00:48:19,480 For both Euler and RANS for Rolls-Royce and again I found 705 00:48:19,480 --> 00:48:23,640 myself in a place where people worked hard and played hard. 706 00:48:24,040 --> 00:48:26,200 Although when I first got there there was some culture shock. 707 00:48:26,200 --> 00:48:29,360 I'd been going to England since I was a teenager, so there was 708 00:48:29,360 --> 00:48:33,800 no general culture shock, but there was a workplace culture 709 00:48:33,800 --> 00:48:38,520 shock in that there was this very structured work day. 710 00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:45,520 You started at 9 and at 10:30 there was it. 711 00:48:46,080 --> 00:48:50,120 Coffee break and it wasn't optional. 712 00:48:51,920 --> 00:48:53,920 If you sat there, they would come get you and. 713 00:48:54,520 --> 00:48:57,240 Say. Come on down to the break room, 714 00:48:57,640 --> 00:49:01,640 to the tea room and get your biscuit and have some coffee or 715 00:49:01,640 --> 00:49:02,600 tea. So English. 716 00:49:02,720 --> 00:49:06,400 Then you had to go all right, and that lasted about 1/2 an 717 00:49:06,400 --> 00:49:09,600 hour. And then so from 11 to about 718 00:49:11,280 --> 00:49:15,720 half 12 or one, you'd work some more and then it was lunch. 719 00:49:16,600 --> 00:49:20,840 We had a great kind of tradition. 720 00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:25,640 We would try to take the CFD guys together for lunch to our 721 00:49:25,640 --> 00:49:27,860 colleges, the colleges we're at. 722 00:49:27,868 --> 00:49:30,632 So we would experience the different colleges. 723 00:49:30,640 --> 00:49:35,898 So for example, one of the guys was at was at was at Catz, which 724 00:49:35,898 --> 00:49:39,544 is a very modern college by Oxford standards. 725 00:49:39,552 --> 00:49:44,488 And So what was what? Was it like being a grad student 726 00:49:44,488 --> 00:49:48,269 there at Saint Catherine's compared to I was at St. 727 00:49:48,277 --> 00:49:51,648 John's? What huge difference? 728 00:49:51,656 --> 00:49:57,474 But then a lot of of hard. Work and great things getting 729 00:49:57,482 --> 00:49:59,495 done. But my point during the work day 730 00:49:59,495 --> 00:50:01,950 was well, then there was an afternoon tea break as well. 731 00:50:01,958 --> 00:50:05,578 And I felt like when I first got there, how does anybody get 732 00:50:05,586 --> 00:50:08,980 anything done? You you're constantly taking 733 00:50:08,988 --> 00:50:15,030 breaks throughout the day. And then I realized first during 734 00:50:15,030 --> 00:50:19,184 the breaks, while we weren't officially working, we were 735 00:50:19,192 --> 00:50:21,864 working. That's when people's 736 00:50:21,872 --> 00:50:27,388 frustrations would come out. I've got this thing and it's not 737 00:50:27,388 --> 00:50:31,376 working, you know, And invariably somebody else there 738 00:50:31,384 --> 00:50:34,365 would say, oh, I know how to fix that. 739 00:50:34,373 --> 00:50:41,295 So you got work done even though we were having this social event 740 00:50:41,295 --> 00:50:45,756 called a tea break and and that that just continued the 741 00:50:45,756 --> 00:50:51,925 whole time I was there. So I came for 1/2 year 742 00:50:51,933 --> 00:50:57,682 sabbatical in 1995, came back the summers of 96 and 97. 743 00:50:57,690 --> 00:51:02,195 I learned that from Gil Strang. Gil Strang was a constant 744 00:51:02,195 --> 00:51:04,440 visitor to the numerical analysis group. 745 00:51:06,040 --> 00:51:09,760 He of course, very famous numerical methods professor at 746 00:51:09,760 --> 00:51:15,400 MIT who only recently retired. He kept teaching well into his 747 00:51:15,400 --> 00:51:21,678 80s and and he taught me that it was very enjoyable to spend 748 00:51:21,678 --> 00:51:25,480 your summer in Oxford and. That no matter where you worked 749 00:51:26,640 --> 00:51:30,531 during this the regular part of the academic calendar, you 750 00:51:30,531 --> 00:51:34,284 might want to find a way to be at Oxford at the summer and 751 00:51:34,284 --> 00:51:40,000 and I have taken his advice I I skipping to the present time. 752 00:51:40,000 --> 00:51:43,960 I'm going there in just a few days, no longer with the 753 00:51:43,960 --> 00:51:48,880 numerical analysis group, but with the hypersonics team there. 754 00:51:49,400 --> 00:51:53,520 I was there last summer for probably six weeks. 755 00:51:53,800 --> 00:51:57,720 I'll be there this summer for about four weeks and hopefully 756 00:51:57,720 --> 00:52:01,120 that continues. But anyway, back to Mike Giles. 757 00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:05,680 Mike was wonderful. He had, he was, he was English, 758 00:52:07,840 --> 00:52:10,280 but he'd gone to MIT to get his PhD. 759 00:52:10,280 --> 00:52:15,080 He had stayed there and worked on on coding and and 760 00:52:15,960 --> 00:52:17,835 aerodynamics for for many years. 761 00:52:17,843 --> 00:52:22,320 Brought that back with him to Oxford, had this vibrant 762 00:52:22,328 --> 00:52:27,315 research group while I was there and then later after that. 763 00:52:27,323 --> 00:52:32,656 Then he started to go off into computational finance, but also 764 00:52:32,656 --> 00:52:38,980 big time proponent of GPUs from from the very beginning. 765 00:52:38,988 --> 00:52:41,115 From the very beginning. So. 766 00:52:41,123 --> 00:52:45,220 If you go on his website, there's all kinds of information 767 00:52:45,220 --> 00:52:49,629 that he had developed about GPUs, how to use them, how to 768 00:52:49,637 --> 00:52:53,860 understand how they work, You know, it's all just freely 769 00:52:53,868 --> 00:52:56,215 available. He he just posted everything. 770 00:52:56,223 --> 00:53:01,126 And so Mike and I have kept in touch off and on through the 771 00:53:01,134 --> 00:53:02,800 years. He recently. 772 00:53:02,808 --> 00:53:07,460 Became the professor of numerical analysis in the Maths 773 00:53:07,460 --> 00:53:11,292 Institute, which meant he got moved to Balliol College that's 774 00:53:11,292 --> 00:53:15,795 Bill Morton's old position at at Balliol and was named a 775 00:53:15,795 --> 00:53:20,982 fellow of the Royal Society just about a a month or two ago 776 00:53:20,982 --> 00:53:24,340 when their announcements came out so Mike's. 777 00:53:24,348 --> 00:53:27,660 Still. There and heading up all 778 00:53:27,668 --> 00:53:33,108 numerical analysis in the Maths Institute and doing wonderful, 779 00:53:33,116 --> 00:53:37,301 wonderful things. Yeah, I can. 780 00:53:37,309 --> 00:53:40,940 Just very jealous. And also I think it's amazing 781 00:53:40,948 --> 00:53:43,846 time that you had those, you know, the 90s and the Oxford 782 00:53:43,854 --> 00:53:45,632 colleges. I mean, now people make movies 783 00:53:45,640 --> 00:53:47,600 about this, don't they? You know that. 784 00:53:47,608 --> 00:53:49,272 Exactly. It's like an American thing, 785 00:53:49,280 --> 00:53:51,345 isn't It's quite popular. American is coming to England 786 00:53:51,353 --> 00:53:53,812 for the summer and you lived it. You had that? 787 00:53:53,820 --> 00:53:57,184 That friend of mine who went to MIT to get his PhD when we were 788 00:53:57,184 --> 00:54:01,496 at Hughes came to visit while I was there and said this is your 789 00:54:01,496 --> 00:54:04,270 graduate experience, Graduate School experience, because I had 790 00:54:04,270 --> 00:54:08,030 been kind of part time at USC, he said. 791 00:54:08,038 --> 00:54:10,230 This is your real graduate student experience. 792 00:54:10,238 --> 00:54:15,085 The the MCR, the Middle Common Room graduate students at St. 793 00:54:15,093 --> 00:54:17,465 John's adopted me even though I wasn't. 794 00:54:17,473 --> 00:54:22,290 There as a student, I was there as a visiting academic, so the 795 00:54:22,298 --> 00:54:26,544 distance from the computing lab to my room at St. 796 00:54:26,552 --> 00:54:29,072 John's was about a 5 minute walk. 797 00:54:29,080 --> 00:54:34,137 You know, great commute. Invariably I would leave the lab 798 00:54:34,137 --> 00:54:39,965 and be walking back to my room and somebody from the MCR at St. 799 00:54:39,965 --> 00:54:42,280 John's would invite me to 800 00:54:42,280 --> 00:54:45,840 something that night because I would just see them as I was 801 00:54:45,840 --> 00:54:48,800 walking. Maybe I'd go to my pigeonhole in 802 00:54:48,800 --> 00:54:54,080 the college, you know, front rooms and, and check my mail and 803 00:54:54,080 --> 00:54:59,000 I would see somebody and there was a BBQ or there was we're 804 00:54:59,000 --> 00:55:02,080 going out for a bike ride or whatever it was. 805 00:55:02,640 --> 00:55:09,640 I probably in the, those initial six months only spent 4-5 806 00:55:09,640 --> 00:55:16,280 evenings alone at Oxford. Most of the nights something he 807 00:55:16,280 --> 00:55:21,160 came up and, and just got grabbed and, and brought into 808 00:55:21,240 --> 00:55:24,390 that, that lifestyle at Oxford. 809 00:55:24,398 --> 00:55:28,216 So you're right. It, it, it was like you were in 810 00:55:28,216 --> 00:55:32,100 a movie. I was there, like I said last 811 00:55:32,108 --> 00:55:34,800 summer and I noticed something that was kind of tragic. 812 00:55:34,808 --> 00:55:37,655 I was texting my wife who I happened to meet at St. 813 00:55:37,663 --> 00:55:43,026 John's as well. Had to go to England to meet 814 00:55:43,034 --> 00:55:47,682 somebody from Kansas that that I didn't see the the grad students 815 00:55:47,682 --> 00:55:50,200 hanging out doing things in the college. 816 00:55:50,208 --> 00:55:55,040 And she texted back one word, cell phones. 817 00:55:55,048 --> 00:56:01,024 And she was completely right that there. 818 00:56:01,032 --> 00:56:04,444 None of those things that happened to me when I was there 819 00:56:04,444 --> 00:56:08,680 were going on. I even talked to some of the MCR 820 00:56:08,680 --> 00:56:11,983 members and asked do you guys do activities together? 821 00:56:11,991 --> 00:56:15,503 Do you go, you know, like we would go to Stratford and go see 822 00:56:15,503 --> 00:56:19,430 a Shakespeare play or we'd go to London and see a play or we 823 00:56:19,430 --> 00:56:22,899 did things all the time. I remember going to Bournemouth 824 00:56:22,899 --> 00:56:27,484 once for a bike ride, which is kind of crazy and fun and all 825 00:56:27,492 --> 00:56:32,200 kinds of things. None of those things were 826 00:56:32,208 --> 00:56:36,082 happening last year because everyone's friends relations 827 00:56:36,090 --> 00:56:42,606 were through their phone and not through the person I live next 828 00:56:42,614 --> 00:56:46,336 to. And that's, that's sad because 829 00:56:46,344 --> 00:56:52,546 we both in the lab and in the college were, were very close 830 00:56:52,554 --> 00:56:59,134 and, and I really enjoyed that. Yeah, that is, it is, it really 831 00:56:59,134 --> 00:57:02,280 is incredible. And I guess it having that I'm a 832 00:57:02,280 --> 00:57:05,400 strong believer in this, experiencing the different 833 00:57:05,408 --> 00:57:08,796 cultures of academia and industry and different academia 834 00:57:08,796 --> 00:57:12,580 and different industry gives you a more rounded, you know, 835 00:57:12,588 --> 00:57:16,480 appreciation, which I, I assume has been very useful for you as 836 00:57:16,480 --> 00:57:18,708 you collaborate with different groups around the world. 837 00:57:18,716 --> 00:57:22,405 I didn't realize it at the time, but I was just collecting 838 00:57:22,413 --> 00:57:26,045 relationships and I when I look back through my career, that's 839 00:57:26,053 --> 00:57:29,352 what I remember. And, and I still have those 840 00:57:29,360 --> 00:57:31,805 relationships and I still interact with those people all 841 00:57:31,813 --> 00:57:36,335 the way back to my Hughes days. And even, you know, as an 842 00:57:36,343 --> 00:57:41,760 undergrad at Cal Poly by by by taking advantage of those 843 00:57:41,768 --> 00:57:44,614 situations. It it it was. 844 00:57:44,622 --> 00:57:46,432 It was. Just kind of magical. 845 00:57:46,440 --> 00:57:49,460 I I, I loved it. Yeah, yeah. 846 00:57:49,468 --> 00:57:51,649 That's incredible. And of course you're learning 847 00:57:51,657 --> 00:57:56,040 about CFD and, and we were doing drag extraction from CFD 848 00:57:56,048 --> 00:57:57,740 solutions. That's what Mike and I were 849 00:57:57,748 --> 00:58:01,256 working on. You know, could you predict drag 850 00:58:01,256 --> 00:58:04,384 using a RANS code? How well could you do it? 851 00:58:04,392 --> 00:58:07,286 And so we were. We were working on that while I 852 00:58:07,286 --> 00:58:10,140 was there. That was something Rolls Royce 853 00:58:10,148 --> 00:58:14,661 was interested in as well. And so, so that those are the 854 00:58:14,669 --> 00:58:18,028 kinds of things that that I was doing when I, when I was there 855 00:58:18,036 --> 00:58:21,640 in the 90s. Now I'm there working primarily 856 00:58:21,640 --> 00:58:25,520 in hypersonics, but that that. The another whole. 857 00:58:25,528 --> 00:58:31,780 Tale of how that happened but certainly certainly felt like I 858 00:58:31,780 --> 00:58:37,680 was just constantly learning and growing in in because I was 859 00:58:37,680 --> 00:58:42,620 taking advantages of these opportunities and and not not 860 00:58:42,628 --> 00:58:47,202 everybody does that later in life I I spent three years 861 00:58:47,210 --> 00:58:50,564 living in London so eventually I left Cal Poly and went to the 862 00:58:50,572 --> 00:58:53,933 Air Force Academy. One of the things that came out 863 00:58:53,933 --> 00:58:58,286 of that was I got to do an exchange to the AFOSR office in 864 00:58:58,286 --> 00:59:01,355 London. I spent three years as a tech 865 00:59:01,363 --> 00:59:05,270 director and then through that met academics all over Europe 866 00:59:05,278 --> 00:59:10,180 and the UK and Australia I was funding hypersonics research 867 00:59:10,188 --> 00:59:13,854 for. For Europe and Australia and so 868 00:59:13,854 --> 00:59:18,999 got in on the sort of the ground floor of what was going 869 00:59:18,999 --> 00:59:23,506 on at Oxford with Matt McGilvray and his team and and 870 00:59:23,506 --> 00:59:28,240 we were one of the first organizations to fund. 871 00:59:28,520 --> 00:59:31,640 Research with with Matt and his hypersonics group. 872 00:59:32,560 --> 00:59:37,320 There's a famous story at the AFOSR office in London. 873 00:59:37,328 --> 00:59:40,720 It's called EOARD, the European Office of Aerospace Research and 874 00:59:40,720 --> 00:59:45,038 Development. We've actually in that office 875 00:59:45,046 --> 00:59:49,460 over the years, funded a few Nobel Prize winners. 876 00:59:49,468 --> 00:59:57,415 And the great story is there was a program officer back around 877 00:59:57,423 --> 01:00:03,125 2010 or so 2009 maybe who funded A fledgling research project 878 01:00:03,125 --> 01:00:07,435 at the University of Manchester about this weird thing called 879 01:00:07,435 --> 01:00:10,982 graphene. And the guys who had that 880 01:00:10,990 --> 01:00:15,540 project, and this was one of their first funded projects for 881 01:00:15,540 --> 01:00:20,040 their graphene project for their for their lab ended up 882 01:00:20,040 --> 01:00:25,355 winning the Nobel Prize in I think it was in chemistry. 883 01:00:25,363 --> 01:00:31,200 And invited that program officer to the Nobel ceremony because he 884 01:00:31,200 --> 01:00:34,480 was the first one. Now they've got this massive 885 01:00:34,488 --> 01:00:38,292 building at the University of Manchester and 10s of millions 886 01:00:38,300 --> 01:00:43,592 of dollars of research going on. But they still remembered back. 887 01:00:43,592 --> 01:00:45,440 That's how we started. 888 01:00:45,840 --> 01:00:51,560 And I think Matt McGilvray and Peter Ireland and the people at 889 01:00:51,560 --> 01:00:53,760 the Oxford Thermofluids Institute. 890 01:00:54,160 --> 01:01:00,520 Felt that way about AFRL and AFOSR and, and, and not just me, 891 01:01:00,640 --> 01:01:05,260 but others as well, having faith in them and supporting them 892 01:01:05,260 --> 01:01:08,440 and helping them to get started as they were putting together 893 01:01:08,440 --> 01:01:12,600 tunnels and, and developing capabilities and CFD, etcetera. 894 01:01:12,920 --> 01:01:19,880 So that was that was a wonderful way to to make that connection 895 01:01:19,880 --> 01:01:23,160 while I was at officially working as an academic at the 896 01:01:23,160 --> 01:01:26,600 Air Force Academy. Yeah, Well, one of the things we 897 01:01:26,600 --> 01:01:29,360 want to pivot to a little bit was, you know, was around 898 01:01:29,360 --> 01:01:32,880 hypersonics. But as a link to that, what was 899 01:01:33,160 --> 01:01:35,280 how did you start to get into that? 900 01:01:35,280 --> 01:01:38,720 What made you then go to the Air Force and, and, and today, I 901 01:01:38,760 --> 01:01:40,160 guess mainly focus on hypersonics. 902 01:01:40,160 --> 01:01:41,720 How did how did that transition come about? 903 01:01:41,720 --> 01:01:46,800 So, so it was there back at Hughes, so way, way back in the 904 01:01:46,800 --> 01:01:52,520 80s with the R&D projects they worked on, but there were no 905 01:01:52,520 --> 01:01:56,400 tools like we have today back then. 906 01:01:58,520 --> 01:02:01,520 So I was actually using the Supersonic/Hypersonic Arbitrary- 907 01:02:01,520 --> 01:02:06,680 Body Program to analyze aerodynamic shapes, which is 908 01:02:06,680 --> 01:02:10,200 just surface impact methods. So Newtonian modified Newtonian 909 01:02:10,880 --> 01:02:15,640 tangent wedge tangent cone methods applied to geometries. 910 01:02:17,600 --> 01:02:21,880 But then when I went back to Cal Poly, there was very little 911 01:02:21,880 --> 01:02:26,160 hypersonics going on. And that that leads to an 912 01:02:26,160 --> 01:02:28,240 important if, if you don't understand this about 913 01:02:28,240 --> 01:02:30,680 hypersonics, especially in the US, you don't understand it. 914 01:02:31,560 --> 01:02:35,720 That hypersonics has been very cyclical since the 50s and the 915 01:02:35,720 --> 01:02:39,640 60's. The funding, if you graph it 916 01:02:39,640 --> 01:02:44,680 versus time is a sine wave and the period of that sine wave is 917 01:02:44,680 --> 01:02:49,120 about 10 to 12 years. And that's big projects like 918 01:02:49,600 --> 01:02:52,720 what the space shuttle coming and going or Apollo coming and 919 01:02:52,720 --> 01:02:56,240 going or the National Aerospace plane coming and going. 920 01:02:56,480 --> 01:03:02,226 And in between those major peaks were these massive valleys 921 01:03:02,226 --> 01:03:05,240 and, and that meant that. You were I. 922 01:03:05,480 --> 01:03:07,480 Mean I I always say you couldn't plan it. 923 01:03:07,480 --> 01:03:11,920 Better to ruin progress than to have 10 to 12 years between the 924 01:03:11,920 --> 01:03:17,040 peaks, because that meant halfway between everybody who 925 01:03:17,040 --> 01:03:22,680 had done that peak was gone, or almost everybody the people 926 01:03:22,680 --> 01:03:25,080 left. Maybe with a bad taste in their 927 01:03:25,080 --> 01:03:29,480 mouths about hypersonics. The facilities fell into 928 01:03:29,480 --> 01:03:34,480 disrepair perhaps and or were mothballed or even in many cases 929 01:03:34,520 --> 01:03:38,960 destroyed. That there's a report from 1963 930 01:03:38,960 --> 01:03:43,120 that there were 78 hypersonic wind tunnel facilities in the 931 01:03:43,120 --> 01:03:50,040 United States at that time. By about 2015, there were about 932 01:03:50,040 --> 01:03:58,280 35—78 to 35, and it's those cycles that led to that. 933 01:03:58,960 --> 01:04:03,400 There were many hypersonic tunnels in aerospace companies 934 01:04:03,880 --> 01:04:09,320 back in the 60s and there was only like one or two left by 935 01:04:09,320 --> 01:04:14,440 2015 or so. So so those peaks and valleys 936 01:04:14,960 --> 01:04:20,720 really hampered progress in in hypersonics in general. 937 01:04:21,080 --> 01:04:27,080 Certainly hypersonic CFD because it it wasn't a thing, right? 938 01:04:27,320 --> 01:04:30,720 The space shuttle was designed with no CFD. 939 01:04:32,200 --> 01:04:37,800 None. Now, people later on did lots of 940 01:04:37,800 --> 01:04:41,720 CFD for return to flight and, and different things like that, 941 01:04:42,800 --> 01:04:50,960 but there wasn't any the, the, the things that you expect to 942 01:04:50,960 --> 01:04:55,280 happen over time and were happening for CFD weren't 943 01:04:55,280 --> 01:04:59,680 happening for hypersonic CFD and hypersonics in general. 944 01:05:02,800 --> 01:05:05,280 I, I like to this, one of the things I, you know, I love to 945 01:05:05,280 --> 01:05:08,640 talk about this history to my students because I think, you 946 01:05:08,640 --> 01:05:12,880 know, when you go out there in your careers, you're, you're 947 01:05:12,880 --> 01:05:16,480 going to wonder why is hypersonic so far behind every 948 01:05:16,480 --> 01:05:19,680 other part of aerospace and aerodynamics and CFD? 949 01:05:20,800 --> 01:05:25,480 In 1992, Bill Clinton ran for president, and his campaign 950 01:05:25,480 --> 01:05:28,400 manager was this very colorful guy named James Carville. 951 01:05:28,400 --> 01:05:29,760 I don't know if you've heard of him. 952 01:05:30,000 --> 01:05:33,160 If you look him up on YouTube, he has this thick Southern 953 01:05:33,160 --> 01:05:38,000 accent and and you begin to wonder about his intelligence. 954 01:05:38,000 --> 01:05:41,440 Perhaps that's a common bias in the United States. 955 01:05:42,680 --> 01:05:46,480 But he's a smart guy, but he's also a little wild and wacky. 956 01:05:46,880 --> 01:05:50,760 During the campaign, he put up on the campaign headquarters 957 01:05:50,760 --> 01:05:54,440 wall a sign that said it's the economy, stupid. 958 01:05:55,680 --> 01:06:00,360 He did that to remind everybody who worked there and Clinton, 959 01:06:01,400 --> 01:06:05,280 stay to this point. If you don't understand this and 960 01:06:05,280 --> 01:06:06,880 stick to this, we're going to lose. 961 01:06:07,080 --> 01:06:09,160 If you stick to this, we have a chance to win. 962 01:06:10,040 --> 01:06:14,640 So what I tell my students is I'm going to use that phrase, 963 01:06:14,640 --> 01:06:17,560 but just change one word. Hypersonics. 964 01:06:17,720 --> 01:06:22,000 It's the heat, stupid. If you don't understand that, 965 01:06:22,600 --> 01:06:24,440 then you don't understand hypersonics. 966 01:06:24,840 --> 01:06:29,320 And everything about the challenges in hypersonics and 967 01:06:29,320 --> 01:06:32,480 that has to do with experimental testing, with flight testing, 968 01:06:32,760 --> 01:06:38,840 and with CFD revolves around that huge heat that has to be 969 01:06:38,840 --> 01:06:42,440 dealt with on the vehicles. I like to explain that to my 970 01:06:42,440 --> 01:06:45,200 students just by using, you know, going to the normal shock 971 01:06:45,200 --> 01:06:48,040 tables. And if you're a Mach 2, look up 972 01:06:48,040 --> 01:06:51,568 T₂/T₁, you know, the temperature change across a normal shock 973 01:06:51,568 --> 01:06:53,918 and it's, you know, OK, it's, it's going up, but it's not 974 01:06:53,918 --> 01:06:57,160 going up that much. But if you go up to Mach 5 and 975 01:06:57,160 --> 01:07:00,840 Mach 10 and Mach 15, it goes through the roof. 976 01:07:01,160 --> 01:07:07,352 It, it's exponential and that's all contained within the 977 01:07:07,352 --> 01:07:11,186 kinetic energy of the free stream. 978 01:07:11,194 --> 01:07:17,235 That's huge amount of energy in the free stream that then 979 01:07:17,243 --> 01:07:22,398 dissipates over a shock in a very small distance to what you 980 01:07:22,398 --> 01:07:27,955 go from Mach 20 to Mach 0.5 within the thickness of a shock. 981 01:07:27,955 --> 01:07:29,680 What happened to all that 982 01:07:29,680 --> 01:07:33,360 kinetic energy? It went into heat. 983 01:07:33,360 --> 01:07:36,240 It went into pressure work and and other things as well, but it 984 01:07:36,240 --> 01:07:39,680 went into heat. And where did that heat go? 985 01:07:40,640 --> 01:07:42,440 It's trying to go into your vehicle. 986 01:07:43,480 --> 01:07:48,200 It's also trying to change the the chemistry of the air going 987 01:07:48,200 --> 01:07:52,280 around the vehicle. It's affecting everything. 988 01:07:52,680 --> 01:07:55,680 It's absolutely affecting everything. 989 01:07:56,080 --> 01:07:59,960 And so you need to understand that. 990 01:08:02,000 --> 01:08:06,400 And that along with the cyclical nature of funding hypersonics, 991 01:08:06,840 --> 01:08:10,760 essentially meant hypersonic CFD just wasn't a thing. 992 01:08:11,200 --> 01:08:16,000 There were very few people doing that when the national 993 01:08:16,000 --> 01:08:20,040 aerospace plane came along. For example, the national 994 01:08:20,040 --> 01:08:22,520 aerospace plane started in the early 80s. 995 01:08:22,520 --> 01:08:28,319 It was cancelled in 92. I, I keep with me this report on 996 01:08:28,319 --> 01:08:32,352 the Defense Science Board report on the National Aerospace 997 01:08:32,352 --> 01:08:41,200 plane program because it has an interesting list of issues that 998 01:08:41,200 --> 01:08:45,359 needed to be invested in and improved before we would start a 999 01:08:45,359 --> 01:08:49,160 new national aerospace plane. So this is kind of like what 1000 01:08:49,160 --> 01:08:50,760 happened. What happened here? 1001 01:08:50,880 --> 01:08:56,520 Why did we go from a DARPA design in the early 80s that was 1002 01:08:56,520 --> 01:09:02,560 like 50,000 lbs and had 22.5% payload which is pretty good for 1003 01:09:02,560 --> 01:09:04,840 hypersonics. Not good for subsonics, but 1004 01:09:04,840 --> 01:09:10,316 pretty good for hypersonics to a nearly half-a-million-pound 1005 01:09:10,316 --> 01:09:19,120 vehicle in 92. The X-30, it's right there that 1006 01:09:19,120 --> 01:09:25,240 had no payload, 0 payload because of the heat they 1007 01:09:25,240 --> 01:09:27,720 couldn't close the design. It just kept getting bigger and 1008 01:09:27,720 --> 01:09:31,240 bigger and bigger. So the the Defense Science Board 1009 01:09:31,920 --> 01:09:35,279 kind of post mortem of the national Aerospace plane called 1010 01:09:35,279 --> 01:09:38,840 out a list of things that needed to be invested in in order to 1011 01:09:38,840 --> 01:09:43,200 improve the next hypersonic vehicle development. 1012 01:09:44,560 --> 01:09:48,144 A lot of the things on that list are just like you, you would 1013 01:09:48,144 --> 01:09:52,091 be able to guess one of them was, well, you need to better 1014 01:09:52,091 --> 01:09:56,800 define what the application of this vehicle is, not just some 1015 01:09:56,800 --> 01:09:59,480 esoteric, let's do it, what is it for? 1016 01:09:59,480 --> 01:10:03,240 What's it going to do. But then they had a long list of 1017 01:10:03,280 --> 01:10:05,000 of things that needed to be improved. 1018 01:10:05,000 --> 01:10:08,960 So structures, materials, those make sense because dealing with 1019 01:10:08,960 --> 01:10:10,706 the heat propulsion system, so. 1020 01:10:10,714 --> 01:10:15,530 It was an air breather, you needed a scramjet and they never 1021 01:10:15,530 --> 01:10:19,820 got a working scramjet design for NASP really. 1022 01:10:19,828 --> 01:10:22,814 And they had. Concepts and but, but it just 1023 01:10:22,822 --> 01:10:26,094 never got there. Aerodynamics, OK, 1024 01:10:26,102 --> 01:10:31,040 aerothermodynamics. And then really, really strange 1025 01:10:31,040 --> 01:10:37,520 on this bulleted list of things that needed to be invested in 1026 01:10:37,528 --> 01:10:42,612 was CFD was like which one of these things is different than 1027 01:10:42,620 --> 01:10:45,300 the others? You know structures and 1028 01:10:45,308 --> 01:10:50,104 materials and aerodynamics and propulsion are all typical 1029 01:10:50,112 --> 01:10:55,280 aircraft disciplines, right? CFD is not that. 1030 01:10:55,288 --> 01:10:59,604 It is. It is something you use to do 1031 01:10:59,612 --> 01:11:01,705 predictions with and simulations. 1032 01:11:01,713 --> 01:11:09,320 And they went like nuts on CFD. Wasn't ready for prime time 1033 01:11:09,328 --> 01:11:10,820 hypersonic CFD. Why? 1034 01:11:10,828 --> 01:11:15,868 OK, they they just made the list Turbulence models. 1035 01:11:15,876 --> 01:11:20,685 Almost all turbulence models were developed using low speed 1036 01:11:20,693 --> 01:11:23,280 wind tunnel data. Yeah. 1037 01:11:23,288 --> 01:11:30,542 Not subsonic wind tunnel like water tunnel data or you know, 1038 01:11:30,550 --> 01:11:33,383 10 meters per second wind tunnel data. 1039 01:11:33,391 --> 01:11:39,034 And then and then what happens? You put that in a CFD code 1040 01:11:39,034 --> 01:11:41,754 that's being developed for subsonic or transonic aircraft 1041 01:11:41,754 --> 01:11:45,463 and it's like, well, can I use it at Mach 6? 1042 01:11:45,471 --> 01:11:51,962 Yeah, you can put in Mach 6 and some altitude and get an answer. 1043 01:11:51,962 --> 01:11:55,720 But, and I heard Graham Candler 1044 01:11:55,720 --> 01:11:59,480 say this once, I'm sure the people who developed those 1045 01:11:59,480 --> 01:12:03,440 turbulence models never in their wildest dreams thought someone 1046 01:12:03,440 --> 01:12:06,680 would use it at hypersonic speeds, but that's what 1047 01:12:06,680 --> 01:12:10,760 happened, perhaps with a compressibility correction, but 1048 01:12:10,760 --> 01:12:15,240 that's it. And then transition prediction, 1049 01:12:15,400 --> 01:12:18,280 you could say on the list of things that killed mass 1050 01:12:18,320 --> 01:12:21,040 transition was probably up there with them. 1051 01:12:22,480 --> 01:12:27,320 The inability to predict transition on a flight vehicle 1052 01:12:27,680 --> 01:12:32,040 was almost notorious. Dennis Bushnell at NASA Langley 1053 01:12:32,440 --> 01:12:37,560 used to say we've been, you know, singularly unsuccessful at 1054 01:12:37,560 --> 01:12:40,760 predicting transition on just about everything that's flown 1055 01:12:40,760 --> 01:12:42,280 hypersonically and then, he added. 1056 01:12:42,400 --> 01:12:44,280 Or even supersonically. Yeah. 1057 01:12:44,960 --> 01:12:48,985 The X-15 was an example where the wind tunnel test said the 1058 01:12:48,985 --> 01:12:52,234 flow is going to be mostly laminar while they're flying 1059 01:12:52,234 --> 01:12:55,720 and they come back and of course the flow was turbulent. 1060 01:12:56,160 --> 01:13:01,330 Well, that's OK that that if you just think about transition 1061 01:13:01,330 --> 01:13:06,320 and turbulence from a subsonic perspective, it's like, OK, you 1062 01:13:06,320 --> 01:13:10,520 have more drag. Yes, you also have 3 to 8 times 1063 01:13:10,520 --> 01:13:13,360 more heat transfer in a turbulent boundary layer at 1064 01:13:13,360 --> 01:13:17,800 hypersonic speeds than in a laminar boundary layer. 1065 01:13:19,080 --> 01:13:21,360 That can kill your design right there. 1066 01:13:22,120 --> 01:13:25,798 Because what are you going to do as an engineer if I don't 1067 01:13:25,798 --> 01:13:28,145 know, is it laminar or turbulent? 1068 01:13:28,153 --> 01:13:30,769 And if it's turbulent, it's 3 to 8 times more heat transfer, 1069 01:13:30,777 --> 01:13:34,360 which means I have to have the thermal protection system, maybe 1070 01:13:34,360 --> 01:13:41,120 active systems that are on board and doing work like on the 1071 01:13:41,120 --> 01:13:44,240 X-51, you know, cooling systems, etcetera. 1072 01:13:44,248 --> 01:13:47,634 That could mean I have no payload. 1073 01:13:47,642 --> 01:13:51,676 And that's what happened to NASP, no payload. 1074 01:13:51,684 --> 01:14:00,987 And so, so transition was a big deal and there there were 1075 01:14:00,995 --> 01:14:03,165 others. So then you talk to talk about 1076 01:14:03,173 --> 01:14:05,488 the thermal chemistry and its impact on on turbulence. 1077 01:14:05,496 --> 01:14:10,220 So as you go through that normal shock, the temperatures can go 1078 01:14:10,228 --> 01:14:14,940 up to easily 4000 Kelvin, 6000 Kelvin, 10,000 Kelvin depending 1079 01:14:14,940 --> 01:14:21,010 on the Mach number. And now you have chemical 1080 01:14:21,018 --> 01:14:24,320 reactions taking place due. To. 1081 01:14:24,328 --> 01:14:27,847 You know, dissociation and ionization and all kinds of 1082 01:14:27,855 --> 01:14:32,310 things. Where's that modeled in your CFD 1083 01:14:32,310 --> 01:14:37,000 code, your transonic CFD code? It's not, it's not there. 1084 01:14:37,008 --> 01:14:42,002 You all at best have what? OK, I choose perfect gas law. 1085 01:14:42,010 --> 01:14:46,447 OK, and, and, and I choose gamma, and that's it. 1086 01:14:46,455 --> 01:14:51,740 That is it. So there's all these traps for 1087 01:14:51,748 --> 01:14:56,784 using that CFD code that was developed for subsonic transonic 1088 01:14:56,784 --> 01:15:01,620 flow, but using it in hypersonic speeds, it doesn't 1089 01:15:01,620 --> 01:15:05,320 usually work. It just doesn't. 1090 01:15:05,960 --> 01:15:10,600 And as a designer, then you become conservative. 1091 01:15:11,360 --> 01:15:14,720 Engineers aren't typically conservative when it comes to 1092 01:15:14,720 --> 01:15:16,560 design choices and uncertainty. 1093 01:15:16,568 --> 01:15:21,140 And if you don't know you're going to assume worst case, 1094 01:15:21,148 --> 01:15:23,827 well, worst case assumption can kill your design. 1095 01:15:23,835 --> 01:15:27,290 That is assuming that the flow is fully turbulent along the 1096 01:15:27,298 --> 01:15:32,327 entire length of the vehicle and now you're in deep trouble. 1097 01:15:32,335 --> 01:15:35,835 So. So those things make hypersonic 1098 01:15:35,835 --> 01:15:39,720 CFD difficult. They also make hypersonic ground 1099 01:15:39,720 --> 01:15:43,160 testing difficult. They also make hypersonic flight 1100 01:15:43,160 --> 01:15:47,335 testing difficult. I mean, I loved, I was at Oxford 1101 01:15:47,335 --> 01:15:49,950 last summer and they were showing one of the SpaceX 1102 01:15:49,958 --> 01:15:52,828 launches and one of the grad students said, what's what's 1103 01:15:52,836 --> 01:15:56,824 happening right there and go? That's the fin burning off and 1104 01:15:56,832 --> 01:15:59,934 they're all cheering because they don't even know what's 1105 01:15:59,942 --> 01:16:02,808 happening. And and. 1106 01:16:02,816 --> 01:16:08,635 It turned out to be true, so so it impacts everything you do in 1107 01:16:08,635 --> 01:16:10,944 hypersonic. So ground test facilities 1108 01:16:10,952 --> 01:16:15,020 typically to get that high of Mach number and that kinetic 1109 01:16:15,028 --> 01:16:18,296 energy can only run for milliseconds or hundreds of 1110 01:16:18,304 --> 01:16:23,546 milliseconds. The flight tests have all kinds 1111 01:16:23,546 --> 01:16:29,684 of issues often to do with the heat that also is like it rolls 1112 01:16:29,684 --> 01:16:34,670 back on itself because now I don't have validation data that 1113 01:16:34,670 --> 01:16:39,174 I I know is good for flight test vehicles. 1114 01:16:39,182 --> 01:16:45,003 So, so you know what's? Going on when I want to validate 1115 01:16:45,003 --> 01:16:49,517 my code and I don't even know what the truth is. 1116 01:16:49,525 --> 01:16:54,984 I don't even know, you know, did that tweak I just made to the 1117 01:16:54,992 --> 01:16:57,805 turbulence model specifically for hypersonics, for example, 1118 01:16:57,813 --> 01:17:02,194 make it better or worse? I don't even know. 1119 01:17:02,202 --> 01:17:07,168 And so, so all of that hampered, the development of hypersonic 1120 01:17:07,176 --> 01:17:11,635 CFD, while there was lots of effort being placed in transonic 1121 01:17:11,635 --> 01:17:15,235 CFD, in fact, I like to say that. 1122 01:17:15,243 --> 01:17:19,139 If you look at the typical numerical methods developed. 1123 01:17:19,147 --> 01:17:23,379 In the 70s and the 80s, so now we're talking about Jameson and, 1124 01:17:23,379 --> 01:17:26,832 and all these guys that I worked with at Ames, whether 1125 01:17:26,832 --> 01:17:29,878 they thought about it explicitly or not, were 1126 01:17:29,878 --> 01:17:34,480 developed for a normal shock in a, in a cell, right. 1127 01:17:35,200 --> 01:17:38,182 And so the upwinding approaches and, you know, Murman and 1128 01:17:38,182 --> 01:17:41,273 Cole's just, you know, having the, the switch between 1129 01:17:41,273 --> 01:17:46,456 elliptic and, and hyperbolic and, and all of that was based 1130 01:17:46,456 --> 01:17:49,810 on this picture in your mind that that's what you're 1131 01:17:49,810 --> 01:17:51,880 dealing with. Now I'm going hypersonic. 1132 01:17:51,888 --> 01:17:55,328 The shock's not normal. Maybe a little portion of it is, 1133 01:17:55,328 --> 01:17:59,880 it's highly swept. Is that transonic numerical 1134 01:17:59,888 --> 01:18:04,840 method working for my hypersonic flight conditions? 1135 01:18:04,848 --> 01:18:10,328 Does it know what to do when the, the shock is like swept 1136 01:18:10,336 --> 01:18:15,544 back at A, at a, you know, a Mach angle of 25°? 1137 01:18:15,552 --> 01:18:21,100 So, so it's not just the physical models, it's not just 1138 01:18:21,108 --> 01:18:24,920 the chemistry, it's not just turbulence and transition, it's 1139 01:18:24,920 --> 01:18:29,135 even the numerical methods. There has been no investment 1140 01:18:29,143 --> 01:18:33,309 whatsoever in developing hypersonic numerical methods for 1141 01:18:33,309 --> 01:18:39,650 CFD codes 0. And part of the problem there 1142 01:18:39,658 --> 01:18:43,120 has just been, you know, everybody kind of pointing at 1143 01:18:43,128 --> 01:18:43,815 everybody. Else. 1144 01:18:43,823 --> 01:18:48,605 So well you know, the DoD says well that's the company's job. 1145 01:18:48,613 --> 01:18:53,180 There is no appetite in an aerospace company these days to 1146 01:18:53,180 --> 01:18:55,735 spend money developing a CFD code. 1147 01:18:55,743 --> 01:19:02,640 This is 0 because why they did that back in the 70s and the 80s 1148 01:19:02,640 --> 01:19:05,780 and developed in-house codes like Boeing and Lockheed Martin 1149 01:19:05,780 --> 01:19:11,152 that they've been improving and using ever since for a fighter 1150 01:19:11,160 --> 01:19:17,735 or a cargo airplane. Now you use it on a re-entry 1151 01:19:17,743 --> 01:19:22,662 vehicle and it doesn't work. How do you deal with that? 1152 01:19:22,670 --> 01:19:26,589 They're not going to spend money developing hypersonic CFD. 1153 01:19:26,597 --> 01:19:31,207 The government doesn't spend money doing that. 1154 01:19:31,215 --> 01:19:36,650 Very little physical modeling research is done. 1155 01:19:36,658 --> 01:19:42,440 Lots of basic science research in turbulence and transition for 1156 01:19:42,440 --> 01:19:46,464 hypersonics, almost none of that going applied right where 1157 01:19:46,464 --> 01:19:48,720 you. Take what you've learned and 1158 01:19:48,720 --> 01:19:53,520 then make a model out of it. Not not only wasn't that done, 1159 01:19:53,640 --> 01:19:56,680 nobody even funded to ask those questions. 1160 01:19:56,920 --> 01:19:59,680 What would I have to do to make that happen? 1161 01:19:59,840 --> 01:20:04,320 Just wasn't happening. So I guess maybe this tees up 1162 01:20:04,320 --> 01:20:05,960 then the question. Sort of does. 1163 01:20:08,360 --> 01:20:12,480 I like what you did there, the HVSI program, maybe you know 1164 01:20:12,520 --> 01:20:16,040 Hypersonic Vehicle Simulation Institute, maybe you could 1165 01:20:16,040 --> 01:20:18,120 explain a little bit about that program, What that? 1166 01:20:18,520 --> 01:20:20,320 Right. So after Cal Poly, I came to the 1167 01:20:20,320 --> 01:20:22,640 Air Force Academy. They had a great group of people 1168 01:20:22,640 --> 01:20:25,680 doing CFD. Scott Morton, Doug Blake, Jim 1169 01:20:25,680 --> 01:20:29,720 Forsythe. I joined with them doing 1170 01:20:29,720 --> 01:20:32,600 massively separated flows, so high angle of attack flows, 1171 01:20:32,600 --> 01:20:34,520 which I had done when I was at Ames. 1172 01:20:35,200 --> 01:20:38,880 So that was a nice connection. What then pushed me into 1173 01:20:38,880 --> 01:20:43,040 hypersonics was the discipline director for aerodynamics at the 1174 01:20:43,040 --> 01:20:47,400 Air Force Academy at the time was John Bertin, and John Bertin 1175 01:20:47,400 --> 01:20:49,680 had spent his career working in hypersonics. 1176 01:20:50,440 --> 01:20:55,080 He asked me to become the co-author of his textbook called 1177 01:20:55,080 --> 01:20:59,120 Aerodynamics for Engineers. By the way, just just by 1178 01:20:59,120 --> 01:21:03,360 accident, the 7th edition published by Cambridge Press 1179 01:21:03,360 --> 01:21:07,800 just came out this week. I just got my copies last Friday 1180 01:21:08,880 --> 01:21:11,160 and. And and so that was not a 1181 01:21:11,160 --> 01:21:11,920 shameless. Plug. 1182 01:21:11,920 --> 01:21:15,680 It was just, I'm kind of proud about that because it takes 1183 01:21:15,680 --> 01:21:18,520 years. It takes years and it's just 1184 01:21:18,520 --> 01:21:22,400 kind of magical. John Bertin not only asked me to 1185 01:21:22,400 --> 01:21:26,720 help him with that, but also was heavily involved in doing 1186 01:21:26,720 --> 01:21:30,040 hypersonic research at the Academy, both experimental and 1187 01:21:30,040 --> 01:21:35,200 then he was not. a CFD guy but asked me to be his 1188 01:21:35,200 --> 01:21:37,445 connection to, well, what could? 1189 01:21:37,453 --> 01:21:41,224 What could different simulation approaches do for these 1190 01:21:41,232 --> 01:21:43,483 projects? I'm working on and he went all 1191 01:21:43,491 --> 01:21:47,776 the way back to the Apollo days at at NASA Johnson. 1192 01:21:47,784 --> 01:21:52,420 And he also worked for Sandia and then was a professor for 1193 01:21:52,428 --> 01:21:55,165 many years at the University of Texas at Austin before he came 1194 01:21:55,173 --> 01:21:59,295 to the Air Force Academy. He wrote one of the two. 1195 01:21:59,303 --> 01:22:02,480 Probably best used textbooks on hypersonic aerothermodynamics 1196 01:22:02,488 --> 01:22:08,202 along with John Anderson has a book and John Bertin had a 1197 01:22:08,210 --> 01:22:13,098 book and so that's what started to get me ramped up doing 1198 01:22:13,106 --> 01:22:16,404 hypersonics. Like I said, I went to London 1199 01:22:16,412 --> 01:22:20,380 for three years working as a tech director there, and that 1200 01:22:20,388 --> 01:22:24,480 experience, so being a program officer as well, funding 1201 01:22:24,488 --> 01:22:28,995 research at universities in hypersonics, led me when I 1202 01:22:29,003 --> 01:22:34,215 returned, to be asked to start the Hypersonic Vehicle 1203 01:22:34,223 --> 01:22:37,832 Simulation Institute for the DoD High Performance Computing 1204 01:22:37,840 --> 01:22:42,575 Modernization Program. They fund the development of 1205 01:22:42,583 --> 01:22:46,382 institutes realize that hypersonic CFD was going to be 1206 01:22:46,390 --> 01:22:50,820 an important thing and that it was not being invested in. 1207 01:22:50,828 --> 01:22:56,460 And so they wanted me to determine what needed to be 1208 01:22:56,468 --> 01:23:01,624 invested in, you know, which, which led me to spend many hours 1209 01:23:01,624 --> 01:23:05,788 on telephone interviews with people, the aerospace companies 1210 01:23:05,788 --> 01:23:11,810 and government labs and, and find out where were these 1211 01:23:11,818 --> 01:23:16,200 shortfalls, what were these issues and what do you need to, 1212 01:23:16,200 --> 01:23:20,582 to do a better job. I was kind of surprised that 1213 01:23:20,590 --> 01:23:25,340 none of that had taken place. Nobody had ever asked those 1214 01:23:25,348 --> 01:23:29,304 questions before, at least not that I knew of. 1215 01:23:29,312 --> 01:23:34,024 Just I kept pinching myself saying how can I be the only 1216 01:23:34,032 --> 01:23:36,509 person asking these questions about hypersonic CFD? 1217 01:23:36,517 --> 01:23:41,099 Certainly people like Graham Candler and and and and his gang 1218 01:23:41,099 --> 01:23:45,800 at Minnesota and other places knew that this was a problem. 1219 01:23:45,808 --> 01:23:50,160 But who was going to fund research in that area? 1220 01:23:50,168 --> 01:23:55,415 Applied research, not basic science research and so started 1221 01:23:55,415 --> 01:24:00,694 funding research and physical model development and also 1222 01:24:00,702 --> 01:24:03,322 validation data. So the collection of data that 1223 01:24:03,330 --> 01:24:05,620 could be used. So for example at Oxford, 1224 01:24:05,628 --> 01:24:07,155 they're doing a double cone experiment. 1225 01:24:07,163 --> 01:24:09,212 They've been doing it for quite a few years. 1226 01:24:09,220 --> 01:24:14,856 There's, they've got another test coming up in, in T5 in, in 1227 01:24:14,856 --> 01:24:19,240 QLD, they're all over in Australia right now for a 1228 01:24:19,248 --> 01:24:23,743 conference. And, and so just so many 1229 01:24:23,751 --> 01:24:28,280 questions. I mean, that came out of the 1230 01:24:28,288 --> 01:24:35,600 like 2013, 2014 AIAA hypersonic CFD blind code study at CUBRC. 1231 01:24:35,600 --> 01:24:40,080 They did some tests on a variety of basic geometries like the 1232 01:24:40,080 --> 01:24:44,988 hollow cylinder and a double cone and a cone flare and 1233 01:24:44,988 --> 01:24:49,264 asked for people to submit their simulations and then at an 1234 01:24:49,264 --> 01:24:53,600 AIAA meeting in 2014 showed the results and they were terrible. 1235 01:24:54,160 --> 01:24:59,880 They were terrible. Not for all cases, not for all 1236 01:24:59,880 --> 01:25:03,400 geometries, but in general it only led to more questions than 1237 01:25:03,400 --> 01:25:10,840 answers that did not transcend into funding for trying to 1238 01:25:10,840 --> 01:25:12,475 accomplish any of those things. 1239 01:25:12,483 --> 01:25:17,024 So I felt like that's what HVSI was starting to do. 1240 01:25:17,032 --> 01:25:22,082 Since then, ONR's Eric Marineau has picked up on that and he's 1241 01:25:22,090 --> 01:25:26,088 he's really become kind of a a great supporter of that. 1242 01:25:26,096 --> 01:25:30,820 AFOSR not so much because they only fund basic science. 1243 01:25:30,828 --> 01:25:35,150 So developing, you know, turbulence models is not in 1244 01:25:35,158 --> 01:25:38,460 their ballpark, but but it's in somebody's ballpark. 1245 01:25:38,468 --> 01:25:45,000 I just couldn't find out who, and so that led to quite a few 1246 01:25:45,008 --> 01:25:49,170 years of trying to not only determine what the issues were, 1247 01:25:49,170 --> 01:25:51,287 but then trying to fund applied research. 1248 01:25:51,295 --> 01:25:57,658 That could help solve them. And that is across, I guess 1249 01:25:57,666 --> 01:25:59,407 academia. How about industry? 1250 01:25:59,415 --> 01:26:01,094 What's the involvement with industry? 1251 01:26:01,102 --> 01:26:05,240 Are they Co funding or sponsoring or is this? 1252 01:26:05,248 --> 01:26:07,048 Yeah. How, how do you? 1253 01:26:07,056 --> 01:26:09,704 Yeah. So, so first they were the 1254 01:26:09,712 --> 01:26:13,769 people I was asking the questions to, but then kind of a 1255 01:26:13,769 --> 01:26:19,496 fun thing happened almost by accident as I would fund these 1256 01:26:19,504 --> 01:26:24,540 projects, people from industry asked if they could participate, 1257 01:26:24,540 --> 01:26:29,948 not paid, but just as consultants on on these 1258 01:26:29,956 --> 01:26:34,547 university projects. So for example, I had two 1259 01:26:34,555 --> 01:26:38,102 transition modeling projects, one at the University of Arizona 1260 01:26:38,102 --> 01:26:42,580 and New Mexico State and one at the University of Tennessee 1261 01:26:42,580 --> 01:26:46,040 late later Penn State and Texas A&M. 1262 01:26:46,800 --> 01:26:52,440 And each of those projects had industry partners who were 1263 01:26:53,000 --> 01:26:57,200 giving advice, looking at what what are they doing and how's it 1264 01:26:57,200 --> 01:26:59,480 working and, and maybe we can use this. 1265 01:26:59,480 --> 01:27:04,753 So Raytheon at the University of Arizona and Lockheed Martin 1266 01:27:04,753 --> 01:27:10,570 with the one at Tennessee and, and just being there side by 1267 01:27:10,570 --> 01:27:13,920 side to be involved. But again, they're not going to 1268 01:27:13,920 --> 01:27:18,600 get any money to do that on their own when when they get a 1269 01:27:18,600 --> 01:27:24,560 program like a new hypersonic vehicle, there is 0 money for 1270 01:27:24,600 --> 01:27:28,120 developing tool tool capabilities. 1271 01:27:28,840 --> 01:27:34,800 It's all about getting answers and, and using whatever you have 1272 01:27:34,920 --> 01:27:37,640 and, and trying to get to where you need it to get. 1273 01:27:38,320 --> 01:27:41,440 And so they really realized the importance of that. 1274 01:27:41,440 --> 01:27:47,800 I had somebody at Raytheon tell me this is the first time when 1275 01:27:47,800 --> 01:27:49,960 the government came to me and asked me questions. 1276 01:27:50,400 --> 01:27:54,280 And then I realized they actually listened and did what I 1277 01:27:54,280 --> 01:27:58,880 recommended for them to do. And so that was kind of a, a 1278 01:27:58,880 --> 01:28:03,040 proud moment that that they realized we, we were trying to 1279 01:28:03,040 --> 01:28:07,160 do what needed to be done. Now this, you mentioned the 1280 01:28:07,160 --> 01:28:10,695 context of the high performance computing modernization 1281 01:28:10,695 --> 01:28:16,067 program, one of the questions I guess is on most people's lips 1282 01:28:16,067 --> 01:28:18,280 broader than just hypersonics. But I want to ask you about the 1283 01:28:18,280 --> 01:28:23,040 hypersonics is the role of AI. As you say decades turbulence 1284 01:28:23,040 --> 01:28:26,440 models and transition models were done using empirical or 1285 01:28:26,680 --> 01:28:32,840 semi empirical methods. Are you optimistic, Skeptical. 1286 01:28:33,520 --> 01:28:34,360 Yeah. What's your? 1287 01:28:34,720 --> 01:28:37,720 It's a hot topic and very opinionated I find, so I'm 1288 01:28:37,720 --> 01:28:39,160 interested to see your view on this. 1289 01:28:39,920 --> 01:28:49,000 So AI and/or machine learning for some aerodynamic, you know, 1290 01:28:49,080 --> 01:28:52,026 increase in our capabilities and our knowledge I think will 1291 01:28:52,026 --> 01:28:55,384 work. I'm not so positive about it 1292 01:28:55,392 --> 01:28:58,800 working well for hypersonics. And that backs up to what I said 1293 01:28:58,800 --> 01:29:00,486 about the lack of validation data. 1294 01:29:00,494 --> 01:29:05,605 AI and machine learning have to have information, right? 1295 01:29:05,613 --> 01:29:11,392 They have to know, hopefully mostly within some error bar 1296 01:29:11,400 --> 01:29:16,419 what the truth is. And we don't necessarily know 1297 01:29:16,427 --> 01:29:21,494 that and, or the things that we have learned historically might 1298 01:29:21,494 --> 01:29:25,480 be classified. And so they can't have it. 1299 01:29:25,488 --> 01:29:29,560 And so the first question I asked when somebody recommends 1300 01:29:29,568 --> 01:29:34,390 doing some kind of AI machine learning, hypersonic physical 1301 01:29:34,398 --> 01:29:41,048 model development is where are you going to get your data? 1302 01:29:41,056 --> 01:29:47,015 How, how is, how is that process going to work when your data is 1303 01:29:47,015 --> 01:29:51,495 very slim or next to none? And I mean, Steve Schneider at 1304 01:29:51,503 --> 01:29:54,000 Purdue can probably go through every hypersonic wind tunnel 1305 01:29:54,008 --> 01:29:56,962 test that's ever been done and tell you all the problems that 1306 01:29:56,970 --> 01:30:01,180 happened in that test or with that data, especially if it 1307 01:30:01,188 --> 01:30:06,840 relates to transition. There are there are always 1308 01:30:06,848 --> 01:30:10,953 questions about the tests and flight tests too. 1309 01:30:10,961 --> 01:30:18,340 And so how is it going to work? Because it doesn't know what the 1310 01:30:18,340 --> 01:30:22,175 truth is or even what approximate truth is. 1311 01:30:22,183 --> 01:30:28,064 So I'm kind of skeptical. I think you could use DNS 1312 01:30:28,072 --> 01:30:31,885 simulations of hypersonic flows to maybe help that. 1313 01:30:31,893 --> 01:30:36,885 There's some, some great people working on that, certainly 1314 01:30:36,893 --> 01:30:41,881 Graham Candler and others around around the world. 1315 01:30:41,889 --> 01:30:47,348 So you could say, well, let's let's start simple, some simple 1316 01:30:47,348 --> 01:30:50,860 flows, some very expensive. And Graham Candler likes to say, 1317 01:30:50,860 --> 01:30:53,965 you give me a billion grid points and the computers to 1318 01:30:53,973 --> 01:30:57,560 solve my code on and I can tell you what's happening. 1319 01:30:57,568 --> 01:31:02,552 And I believe him. That's just not helpful for a 1320 01:31:02,560 --> 01:31:05,949 design approach other than answering a specific question 1321 01:31:05,957 --> 01:31:08,195 here or there. And that can absolutely happen 1322 01:31:08,203 --> 01:31:13,083 in the development of a of a of a program or a vehicle, but it's 1323 01:31:13,083 --> 01:31:16,055 not how you're going to do the design. 1324 01:31:16,063 --> 01:31:21,295 You can't afford that as the way to predict your aerodynamic 1325 01:31:21,303 --> 01:31:23,830 database, for example, for a vehicle. 1326 01:31:23,838 --> 01:31:26,610 So I'm sceptical. Yeah. 1327 01:31:26,618 --> 01:31:28,752 No, that's interesting. And I, I think I understand 1328 01:31:28,760 --> 01:31:31,842 where you're coming from. I guess the analogy with the 1329 01:31:31,850 --> 01:31:35,280 lower speed is that over the past decades there has been 1330 01:31:35,288 --> 01:31:37,920 quite a lot of data. There's no issue of 1331 01:31:37,928 --> 01:31:41,332 classification. There is still an issue of data 1332 01:31:41,332 --> 01:31:45,034 being truly public, but there is an ability to generate that 1333 01:31:45,042 --> 01:31:46,904 data. And crucially, the experimental 1334 01:31:46,904 --> 01:31:50,584 data and the flight data is relatively mature. 1335 01:31:50,592 --> 01:31:55,842 I guess with hypersonics with maybe too early on, like you 1336 01:31:55,850 --> 01:31:58,998 know, if CFD and experiments get better and better, but then I 1337 01:31:59,006 --> 01:32:00,936 guess you still have the classification issue and it's 1338 01:32:00,944 --> 01:32:03,312 still a niche, a more niche problem than. 1339 01:32:03,320 --> 01:32:05,578 Low speed flow. Right. 1340 01:32:05,586 --> 01:32:11,000 So it it, it, it has lots of limitations that may make that 1341 01:32:11,008 --> 01:32:15,605 something that's not ready for prime time for for quite a few 1342 01:32:15,613 --> 01:32:17,270 years. Yeah, Yeah. 1343 01:32:17,278 --> 01:32:20,910 Well, you know, it's good for people in CFD jobs, right? 1344 01:32:20,918 --> 01:32:22,098 That keeps them. That's right. 1345 01:32:22,106 --> 01:32:25,466 If there was a solution with AI right now, then we'd all retire. 1346 01:32:25,466 --> 01:32:27,360 When I first went to work at 1347 01:32:27,360 --> 01:32:31,040 Hughes, I, I at one point, maybe during my first year and the 1348 01:32:31,040 --> 01:32:34,524 entire first year, I felt like I was an idiot because 1349 01:32:34,524 --> 01:32:38,760 everything I did was wrong. Somebody said don't ever 1350 01:32:38,760 --> 01:32:42,480 complain about how hard this is because turbulence is going to 1351 01:32:42,480 --> 01:32:46,080 pay your your paycheck for the rest of your life. 1352 01:32:47,280 --> 01:32:49,224 And that's certainly been true. 1353 01:32:49,232 --> 01:32:51,608 Yeah, yeah. Well, Pete, you know this, that 1354 01:32:51,608 --> 01:32:54,162 people often in experimental testing, and we'll say for the 1355 01:32:54,170 --> 01:32:57,175 past 40 years, CFD has claimed to replace wind tunnels and 1356 01:32:57,183 --> 01:32:58,776 they're still, they're still going. 1357 01:32:58,784 --> 01:33:02,766 So I am a. Strong believer in the the 1358 01:33:02,774 --> 01:33:07,563 opposite opinion. I think CFD and wind tunnels and 1359 01:33:07,563 --> 01:33:11,988 flight tests are should be in a symbiotic relationship that 1360 01:33:11,988 --> 01:33:14,520 they they can inform each other. 1361 01:33:14,840 --> 01:33:19,059 You can learn about things from the test using CFD. 1362 01:33:19,059 --> 01:33:20,840 I Think they should be done in parallel? 1363 01:33:20,840 --> 01:33:23,520 I don't think it should be. We ran an experiment and now we 1364 01:33:23,520 --> 01:33:25,000 have to figure out why it didn't work. 1365 01:33:25,760 --> 01:33:28,840 So let's use some CFD. No, you should be designing the 1366 01:33:28,840 --> 01:33:31,600 test with CFD. You should be doing the 1367 01:33:31,600 --> 01:33:36,320 simulations at the same time you're running the the code. 1368 01:33:36,360 --> 01:33:40,480 I mean, I had a great experience when I was at Ames working on 1369 01:33:40,480 --> 01:33:43,042 the high-angle-of-attack research vehicle, the F-18 1370 01:33:43,042 --> 01:33:45,312 flying at very high angles of attack. 1371 01:33:45,320 --> 01:33:48,416 They were doing flight tests and wind tunnel tests for that. 1372 01:33:48,424 --> 01:33:55,840 So we had all three legs of the, of the, of the three leg stool 1373 01:33:55,848 --> 01:34:00,591 and I did CFD simulations of what the pressure distribution 1374 01:34:00,599 --> 01:34:05,184 would be on the F-18 for a certain flight condition and 1375 01:34:05,192 --> 01:34:11,398 sent it down to NASA Dryden. And then they did the flight 1376 01:34:11,406 --> 01:34:13,964 tests and sent back the comparisons. 1377 01:34:13,972 --> 01:34:18,120 And I, I was, I was in, I was like. 1378 01:34:18,128 --> 01:34:23,154 Wow. I mean very few grid points at 1379 01:34:23,162 --> 01:34:28,432 the time, cells whatever relatively speaking compared to 1380 01:34:28,432 --> 01:34:32,052 today. Yet we were pretty much nailing 1381 01:34:32,052 --> 01:34:36,096 those, especially a high angle of attack where you get flow 1382 01:34:36,104 --> 01:34:40,370 separation and vortices and everything else with RANS codes 1383 01:34:40,370 --> 01:34:43,626 using algebraic turbulence models with corrections for a 1384 01:34:43,634 --> 01:34:46,864 high angle of attack that the Chaderjian and Schiff did. 1385 01:34:46,872 --> 01:34:51,662 We were were doing a really good job and I had predicted that 1386 01:34:51,670 --> 01:34:56,819 before the the flight test that was that was a great feeling, a 1387 01:34:56,819 --> 01:35:00,892 true prediction and and then comparison with flight test data 1388 01:35:00,892 --> 01:35:04,500 that that doesn't happen, but I think it should be happening 1389 01:35:04,500 --> 01:35:06,899 all the time. Well, someone told me this and I 1390 01:35:06,899 --> 01:35:09,300 can't remember who it was now, but they were commenting that 1391 01:35:09,308 --> 01:35:14,940 part of the issue is maybe previously when CFD was less 1392 01:35:14,948 --> 01:35:19,820 mature for for whatever reasons, people would often do an 1393 01:35:19,828 --> 01:35:23,116 experiment and CFD, they they would be doing both. 1394 01:35:23,124 --> 01:35:26,980 So they would naturally where now because the fields have 1395 01:35:26,988 --> 01:35:30,896 grown and expanded, very few people do the CFD and the 1396 01:35:30,904 --> 01:35:34,400 experiment themselves, do they? They tend to be siloed into an 1397 01:35:34,408 --> 01:35:37,600 experimental person or CFD, so maybe that makes them separate 1398 01:35:37,608 --> 01:35:41,706 if you know what I mean. So I think that's a mistake. 1399 01:35:41,714 --> 01:35:44,495 I think when you're doing experiments, you should have, 1400 01:35:44,503 --> 01:35:47,980 maybe they're not in your research group, but they're in 1401 01:35:47,988 --> 01:35:51,245 your organization or your lab. People doing CFD. 1402 01:35:51,253 --> 01:35:56,655 They're doing that at Oxford. So you've got Matt and Luca di 1403 01:35:56,655 --> 01:36:00,087 Mare running the CFD group now. 1404 01:36:00,095 --> 01:36:03,550 He came from Imperial College and is at Oxford doing a great 1405 01:36:03,558 --> 01:36:07,372 job. Matt's done marvels with the 1406 01:36:07,380 --> 01:36:12,148 experimental facilities. He's got a whole army, not only 1407 01:36:12,148 --> 01:36:15,770 of, of regular graduate students, but we send, we send 1408 01:36:15,778 --> 01:36:18,895 graduates from the Air Force Academy there on a regular basis 1409 01:36:18,895 --> 01:36:21,890 to get their degrees, their graduate degrees. 1410 01:36:21,898 --> 01:36:28,080 And so I think that's essential. I mean, that's one of the things 1411 01:36:28,080 --> 01:36:34,092 I'll be working on this summer is comparing for a reflected 1412 01:36:34,100 --> 01:36:40,965 shock to the conditions with CFD and with from from the tunnel 1413 01:36:40,973 --> 01:36:44,468 itself, the operation of the tunnel itself to to then 1414 01:36:44,476 --> 01:36:47,505 understand what are the. Conditions in the test section. 1415 01:36:47,505 --> 01:36:49,440 You think that would be a simple 1416 01:36:49,440 --> 01:36:52,240 question, right? If I, if I'm down in the low 1417 01:36:52,240 --> 01:36:55,247 speed tunnel in the aeronautics lab here at the Academy, I 1418 01:36:55,247 --> 01:36:59,650 don't ask what is the Mach number in the test section, I 1419 01:36:59,650 --> 01:37:02,720 or the Reynolds number. I don't ask that question. 1420 01:37:03,120 --> 01:37:06,760 But you have to ask that question when you're doing 1421 01:37:06,760 --> 01:37:10,720 hypersonic ground testing. And how you answer that question 1422 01:37:10,720 --> 01:37:14,440 could mean your results are are it's not your results are bad, 1423 01:37:14,560 --> 01:37:17,960 you've collected good data, but you don't know the conditions 1424 01:37:18,120 --> 01:37:21,720 that data is for. So when you report it, you say 1425 01:37:21,720 --> 01:37:24,416 this for a Mach number and a Reynolds number of such and 1426 01:37:24,416 --> 01:37:28,685 such. How did you get that? 1427 01:37:28,693 --> 01:37:32,612 And nobody or very few people ever say that in their papers. 1428 01:37:32,620 --> 01:37:37,196 OK, I've got a Mach 6 Ludwieg tube and I can, I can do some 1429 01:37:37,204 --> 01:37:40,885 measurements and I can tell you that it's OK, it's 5.93. 1430 01:37:40,893 --> 01:37:45,587 And that's pretty typical. And, but what's the Reynolds 1431 01:37:45,595 --> 01:37:47,715 number? How do I know the Reynolds 1432 01:37:47,723 --> 01:37:51,612 number? What do I have to measure to 1433 01:37:51,620 --> 01:37:55,704 figure that out? And and in a test that lasts for 1434 01:37:55,704 --> 01:37:59,700 a millisecond. So those those are really 1435 01:37:59,708 --> 01:38:03,012 interesting things that are that that that I'm still learning 1436 01:38:03,020 --> 01:38:06,427 from and and having enjoyment in in doing. 1437 01:38:06,435 --> 01:38:09,782 Yeah. Well, our time is nearly up. 1438 01:38:09,790 --> 01:38:12,994 I appreciate we, you know, we could probably talk for hours on 1439 01:38:12,994 --> 01:38:15,276 this and it would be great to have that opportunity. 1440 01:38:15,284 --> 01:38:19,080 But one last question I had for you was, you know, you've worked 1441 01:38:19,080 --> 01:38:22,407 in the aeronautics industry, both in academia, now industry, 1442 01:38:22,407 --> 01:38:25,810 government. What advice would you give to 1443 01:38:25,818 --> 01:38:28,918 people who are maybe your younger self, who are looking 1444 01:38:28,926 --> 01:38:33,380 for a career to follow you? You know, what advice would you 1445 01:38:33,380 --> 01:38:37,100 give them? So because I was involved in 1446 01:38:37,108 --> 01:38:40,605 student activities at AIAA for many years, I've had, I've had 1447 01:38:40,613 --> 01:38:43,460 people ask that question before, what's, what's the thing that 1448 01:38:43,468 --> 01:38:46,674 that led to all this? Well, first of all, I didn't 1449 01:38:46,682 --> 01:38:51,910 plan any of this, but I would say in one word, perseverance. 1450 01:38:51,918 --> 01:38:55,438 Don't give up. So I think back to that kid 1451 01:38:55,446 --> 01:38:58,195 coming out of high school who was being told you're making the 1452 01:38:58,195 --> 01:39:01,778 worst decision of your life. And all I could say was I love 1453 01:39:01,786 --> 01:39:03,916 airplanes. I'm going to do this because I 1454 01:39:03,924 --> 01:39:06,974 love airplanes. And if it means I have a career 1455 01:39:06,974 --> 01:39:10,880 where it's up and down and bumpy, and it was for many 1456 01:39:10,888 --> 01:39:14,560 people, that's fine, but it hasn't been for me. 1457 01:39:14,568 --> 01:39:18,052 Just don't give up. If this is something you really 1458 01:39:18,052 --> 01:39:20,350 enjoy. Like they say, you'll never work 1459 01:39:20,350 --> 01:39:23,835 a day in your life. You'll you'll be enjoying what 1460 01:39:23,843 --> 01:39:27,396 you do. You'll be learning, you'll be 1461 01:39:27,404 --> 01:39:30,680 teaching, you'll be helping others to understand. 1462 01:39:30,688 --> 01:39:33,370 You'll be writing textbooks. Whoever thought when I was 1463 01:39:33,378 --> 01:39:35,247 taking that aerodynamics? Class as an. 1464 01:39:35,255 --> 01:39:37,820 Undergraduate that not only would I teach aerodynamics, but 1465 01:39:37,820 --> 01:39:42,184 I would write the textbook. It's like, that's crazy talk. 1466 01:39:42,192 --> 01:39:46,880 Just just keep going. Do what what's interesting, do 1467 01:39:46,888 --> 01:39:51,389 what you're interested in and you enjoy and and and and don't 1468 01:39:51,389 --> 01:39:54,904 don't necessarily listen to what everybody else is saying. 1469 01:39:54,912 --> 01:39:57,189 I I remember what Dustin Hoffman. 1470 01:39:57,197 --> 01:40:01,176 In what's that movie where the guy comes up to him and says the 1471 01:40:01,176 --> 01:40:06,274 future is plastics, right? That that was a famous line back 1472 01:40:06,274 --> 01:40:08,134 then, in, like, the early 70's. 1473 01:40:08,142 --> 01:40:11,350 The future is plastic. It's like, all right, Do I 1474 01:40:11,358 --> 01:40:15,760 really want to listen to a guy who told me that at a party when 1475 01:40:15,760 --> 01:40:18,762 I graduated? No, Do what you really are 1476 01:40:18,770 --> 01:40:21,823 interested in and and don't let other people. 1477 01:40:21,831 --> 01:40:26,730 You know, you, you want to grow, you want to expand, you want to 1478 01:40:26,730 --> 01:40:31,758 evolve, but just keep going. I, I saw many people along the 1479 01:40:31,766 --> 01:40:36,430 path who were I, I absolutely believe this much smarter than I 1480 01:40:36,430 --> 01:40:41,705 am who crashed and burned on the side of the road for 1481 01:40:41,705 --> 01:40:47,632 whatever reason, I I was not the instant you know, I figured 1482 01:40:47,632 --> 01:40:49,720 it out. I understand it. 1483 01:40:49,720 --> 01:40:55,040 I know what I'm doing person as I went through my studies and, 1484 01:40:57,880 --> 01:41:02,000 and maybe that helped because I was just going, I have to work, 1485 01:41:02,240 --> 01:41:05,563 I have to, I have to spend time, I have to try to understand 1486 01:41:05,563 --> 01:41:09,139 this and I'm going to put that time in and, and get that 1487 01:41:09,139 --> 01:41:12,122 done. And then, like I said, couple 1488 01:41:12,130 --> 01:41:18,140 that with meeting people as you go, and not just at that moment, 1489 01:41:18,140 --> 01:41:20,928 but making those relationships, the relationships 1490 01:41:20,928 --> 01:41:24,600 of a lifetime, because those people aren't just colleagues, 1491 01:41:24,600 --> 01:41:28,800 they're friends. And there's hundreds of them. 1492 01:41:30,240 --> 01:41:32,677 My, my kids are that, you know, dad, you don't have any 1493 01:41:32,677 --> 01:41:34,056 friends. You go, no, I have friends all 1494 01:41:34,064 --> 01:41:36,440 over the world. It's just. 1495 01:41:36,448 --> 01:41:39,232 It's just. You know, I go to Oxford and 1496 01:41:39,240 --> 01:41:41,352 they're there. I go to Germany to DLR and 1497 01:41:41,360 --> 01:41:43,280 they're there. I already go to Australia and 1498 01:41:43,288 --> 01:41:47,736 they're there. It it really is. 1499 01:41:47,744 --> 01:41:53,362 More than just the thing you're doing, it's and we said that 1500 01:41:53,370 --> 01:41:58,902 what for Hughes and for Oxford and you know, all the way 1501 01:41:58,910 --> 01:42:03,445 through, just enjoy it and, and you'll make it work. 1502 01:42:03,453 --> 01:42:07,120 Yeah, great piece of advice. I completely agree with you. 1503 01:42:07,128 --> 01:42:10,080 Perseverance and doing a job that you'll love and you're 1504 01:42:10,088 --> 01:42:12,445 passionate about makes it feel less like a job. 1505 01:42:12,453 --> 01:42:15,320 Of course there's always times when it will feel like a job and 1506 01:42:15,320 --> 01:42:16,440 they'll be stressed and everything. 1507 01:42:16,448 --> 01:42:22,294 But if, if you love what you do, then yeah, it makes it all a lot 1508 01:42:22,294 --> 01:42:24,055 easier. So, yeah, thank you again. 1509 01:42:24,063 --> 01:42:28,408 This was, you know, really I learnt a lot and I love your, 1510 01:42:28,416 --> 01:42:32,066 your life story and your we obviously there's so many things 1511 01:42:32,066 --> 01:42:35,189 that you've done more in the specifics at which we didn't get 1512 01:42:35,189 --> 01:42:36,570 time. We kept this a little bit more 1513 01:42:36,578 --> 01:42:38,959 high level. But I will put some links to, 1514 01:42:38,967 --> 01:42:41,478 you know, the textbooks and papers and and things that 1515 01:42:41,486 --> 01:42:44,660 you've done so people can, you know, investigate in their own 1516 01:42:44,668 --> 01:42:46,266 time. But yeah, thank you again, Russ, 1517 01:42:46,266 --> 01:42:49,558 This was this was great. My absolute pleasure and thank 1518 01:42:49,566 --> 01:42:52,660 you, Neil, for, for doing this, for not, not just for this 1519 01:42:52,668 --> 01:42:54,920 podcast, but for all the ones you've done. 1520 01:42:54,928 --> 01:42:57,498 They're they're really interesting and, and I've 1521 01:42:57,506 --> 01:42:59,454 enjoyed watching them. Great. 1522 01:42:59,462 --> 01:42:59,960 Thank you.