1 00:00:14,760 --> 00:00:17,920 Welcome to the APM podcast. APM is the chartered body for 2 00:00:17,920 --> 00:00:20,800 the project profession. My name is Emma Devita. 3 00:00:20,800 --> 00:00:24,600 I'm the editor of Project, APM's quarterly journal and your host 4 00:00:25,400 --> 00:00:27,840 in this podcast. I'm speaking to Jonathan 5 00:00:27,840 --> 00:00:31,040 Simcock, a highly experienced and respected project leader in 6 00:00:31,040 --> 00:00:35,280 the UK who has held executive roles in oil and gas, energy, 7 00:00:35,280 --> 00:00:37,640 utilities and telecommunications sectors. 8 00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:41,080 He has been involved in the largest UK government project 9 00:00:41,080 --> 00:00:45,360 since 2007, when he took over what became the Infrastructure 10 00:00:45,360 --> 00:00:48,640 and Projects Authority and is now the National Infrastructure 11 00:00:48,640 --> 00:00:50,920 and Service Transformation Authority, or NISTA. 12 00:00:51,760 --> 00:00:54,600 Until last year he was chair with the Submarine Delivery 13 00:00:54,600 --> 00:00:58,240 Agency in the MOD. His book, The Delivery Gap, Why 14 00:00:58,240 --> 00:01:01,440 Government Projects Really Fail and What can be done about it, 15 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:05,560 comes out later this month and is available for pre-order now. 16 00:01:06,320 --> 00:01:10,080 When the UK is facing low growth, poor productivity, an 17 00:01:10,080 --> 00:01:14,000 increasingly insecure world and climate change, closing the 18 00:01:14,000 --> 00:01:17,480 delivery gap is an imperative, as important as any of the other 19 00:01:17,480 --> 00:01:19,840 challenges of statesmanship, he argues. 20 00:01:20,480 --> 00:01:23,160 So we at the APM Podcast couldn't wait to get him into 21 00:01:23,160 --> 00:01:26,040 the studio and ask him what he's learnt about delivering 22 00:01:26,040 --> 00:01:29,760 government projects, whether they're all doomed to fail, and 23 00:01:29,760 --> 00:01:33,440 what it takes to deliver some of the largest and most complex 24 00:01:33,440 --> 00:01:36,480 projects successfully. Welcome Jonathan. 25 00:01:36,560 --> 00:01:38,520 Thanks for joining us at the APM Podcast. 26 00:01:38,520 --> 00:01:40,880 How are you? I'm very well. 27 00:01:40,880 --> 00:01:42,640 Thank you ever so much for inviting me. 28 00:01:42,760 --> 00:01:46,480 No, it's a pleasure. I would like to begin by asking 29 00:01:46,480 --> 00:01:50,760 you briefly about your career and what you're doing now. 30 00:01:51,960 --> 00:01:57,320 So I spent the 1st 2/3 of my career probably in oil and gas. 31 00:01:57,960 --> 00:02:01,160 We didn't always call when I was doing projects in those days, 32 00:02:01,360 --> 00:02:05,120 but they were really big maintenance projects. 33 00:02:05,120 --> 00:02:07,160 We would call them now capital projects. 34 00:02:07,160 --> 00:02:11,320 I did quite a lot of mergers and acquisitions and then I did 35 00:02:11,320 --> 00:02:14,640 quite a lot of transformation, internal transformation in oil 36 00:02:14,640 --> 00:02:18,160 and gas businesses. But then relevant to this 37 00:02:18,160 --> 00:02:23,480 conversation, in 2007 by a series of accidents, I ended up 38 00:02:23,880 --> 00:02:26,240 as the major projects director in something was called the 39 00:02:26,240 --> 00:02:29,680 Office of Government Commerce, which as you say, turned into 40 00:02:29,880 --> 00:02:35,120 the Major Projects Authority, then the Infrastructure Projects 41 00:02:35,120 --> 00:02:37,520 Authority, and has now been merged into the new body. 42 00:02:38,160 --> 00:02:43,880 Mr I have to say in 2007 I was spectacularly under qualified 43 00:02:43,880 --> 00:02:46,680 for that job. I think I we got it because no 44 00:02:47,080 --> 00:02:49,680 civil servant of the right grade had had applied. 45 00:02:50,240 --> 00:02:57,600 But since then I've been leading, governing, advising, 46 00:02:57,920 --> 00:03:01,640 assuring on great big government projects one way or another. 47 00:03:01,920 --> 00:03:04,560 As you say, I was chair of the Submarine Delivery Authority 48 00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:08,600 until last year and earlier this year I stepped away from the 49 00:03:08,600 --> 00:03:12,440 board of Sellafield, the nuclear site in, in the Northwest. 50 00:03:12,760 --> 00:03:16,240 What I'm doing now, I'm spending quite a lot of time promoting 51 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:19,680 the delivery gap and and meanwhile waiting for, yeah, 52 00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:22,840 waiting for the next challenge, probably in an advisory or a a 53 00:03:22,840 --> 00:03:26,480 non executive role. Let's talk about your book. 54 00:03:26,480 --> 00:03:30,120 So it's it's called the delivery gap. 55 00:03:30,920 --> 00:03:34,280 What do you mean by that? What is? 56 00:03:34,320 --> 00:03:37,200 What is the delivery gap and and why? 57 00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:39,040 Why did you want to write the book now? 58 00:03:40,120 --> 00:03:45,240 So I think that the level of public debate about great big 59 00:03:45,240 --> 00:03:51,000 projects is terribly shallow, very superficial in the media. 60 00:03:51,240 --> 00:03:54,680 So if you listen to if you listen as I do, to sort of 61 00:03:54,680 --> 00:04:00,840 political podcasts or read, read political books, then the reason 62 00:04:00,840 --> 00:04:04,040 we have problems in big projects, it's all to do is oh, 63 00:04:04,200 --> 00:04:07,720 because we funny, we had some decent project managers or if 64 00:04:07,720 --> 00:04:10,800 only politicians were, you know, we had some decent politicians 65 00:04:11,080 --> 00:04:13,480 or if we sorted out the planning system. 66 00:04:13,960 --> 00:04:17,399 There is some truth, of course, in all of these things, but they 67 00:04:17,399 --> 00:04:21,440 betray A superficial understanding of what this is. 68 00:04:21,440 --> 00:04:24,080 This the the challenges that really go on in great big 69 00:04:24,080 --> 00:04:27,880 projects. So I, I had in mind to write a 70 00:04:27,880 --> 00:04:31,240 book of explaining, you know, why is this so hard that my 71 00:04:31,240 --> 00:04:36,320 first working title was not the delivery gap, it was how hard 72 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:41,760 can it be? But then in the wake of the HS2 73 00:04:43,080 --> 00:04:44,840 failure, I'm going to call it failure. 74 00:04:45,480 --> 00:04:50,280 I, I realised that in my heart, I'm sometimes for these great 75 00:04:50,280 --> 00:04:53,000 big projects, expecting them to fail. 76 00:04:53,800 --> 00:04:55,880 And I'll come back to what I mean by failure in a in a 77 00:04:55,880 --> 00:04:58,360 minute. And that felt really 78 00:04:58,360 --> 00:05:02,280 uncomfortable, particularly in the context that you mentioned, 79 00:05:02,280 --> 00:05:06,120 which is, you know, we're in a we're in a country with no 80 00:05:06,120 --> 00:05:10,840 growth, with poor productivity, with a desperate need for for 81 00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:14,320 infrastructure investment, with growing defence threats. 82 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:19,360 We need projects. So to stop you to have to have 83 00:05:19,360 --> 00:05:21,520 this sort of mindset that of course with these things never 84 00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:24,400 work, that's really unhealthy. So I wanted to get under the 85 00:05:24,400 --> 00:05:29,080 skin of what really is going on here and I wanted it to be an 86 00:05:29,160 --> 00:05:32,640 insider's book. You know, there are good project 87 00:05:32,640 --> 00:05:39,080 management books from academia. There are some quite good public 88 00:05:39,080 --> 00:05:42,920 sector project books from sort of journalistic view. 89 00:05:44,120 --> 00:05:47,680 But I wanted to spend time and I have spent time talking with the 90 00:05:47,680 --> 00:05:52,560 ministers, the ex ministers, typically senior officials, the 91 00:05:52,560 --> 00:05:57,840 delivery leaders, civil servants, the supply chain to, 92 00:05:57,840 --> 00:06:01,320 to get a more of an insider's view about what really is going 93 00:06:01,320 --> 00:06:04,120 on here. And, and I think my conclusion 94 00:06:04,120 --> 00:06:12,560 out of all of that is good people are struggling in a, in a 95 00:06:12,560 --> 00:06:16,680 system that's failing. And it's to do with the 96 00:06:16,760 --> 00:06:22,640 incentive structures that Dr tendencies and behaviours that 97 00:06:22,640 --> 00:06:25,680 lead to failure. And then, and if we only think 98 00:06:25,680 --> 00:06:31,520 about improving the process and sorting out the planning system 99 00:06:31,600 --> 00:06:35,960 and so on, then when we're, we're not going to get to grips 100 00:06:35,960 --> 00:06:38,920 with the with the root causes here the book, the book is 101 00:06:38,920 --> 00:06:44,760 structured with 7 case studies at the beginning. 102 00:06:45,120 --> 00:06:47,040 Which case studies do you cover in the book? 103 00:06:47,480 --> 00:06:51,760 So I cover Crossrail, the Elizabeth line, I cover the 104 00:06:51,760 --> 00:06:55,120 Palace of Westminster Restoration and renewal project, 105 00:06:56,320 --> 00:06:59,200 I cover the Universal Credit project, completely different 106 00:06:59,200 --> 00:07:04,040 kind of of project. I cover the smart metre 107 00:07:05,040 --> 00:07:09,320 implementation programme, of which I'm definitely one of the 108 00:07:09,320 --> 00:07:14,440 guilty. I cover the the huge project for 109 00:07:15,240 --> 00:07:19,720 privatising the management of all of our nuclear legacy sites, 110 00:07:20,400 --> 00:07:23,160 including Sellafield where I was on the board. 111 00:07:24,360 --> 00:07:28,520 I cover the national programme for IT and the health service, 112 00:07:28,640 --> 00:07:33,480 massive top down rewiring and the health service and I cover 113 00:07:33,480 --> 00:07:38,160 the, the programme for the Astute tax submarines. 114 00:07:38,680 --> 00:07:42,800 So you'll, you'll, you'll notice from these that I'm talking 115 00:07:42,800 --> 00:07:46,240 about huge projects. You know, most of these projects 116 00:07:46,280 --> 00:07:51,680 are 10 billion plus. And that's, that's really the, 117 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:54,680 the, the light, the, the light I'm trying to shine is on that 118 00:07:54,680 --> 00:07:58,760 kind of huge endeavour. So that's, that's what motivated 119 00:07:58,760 --> 00:08:03,320 me to, to, to write the book. You asked me what I mean by the 120 00:08:03,320 --> 00:08:04,920 delivery gap. Yeah. 121 00:08:05,000 --> 00:08:08,080 Success and failure of projects is not a simple subject. 122 00:08:08,080 --> 00:08:10,640 Actually, it's worth the conversation in its own right. 123 00:08:11,000 --> 00:08:15,440 But in in context of this book, what I really mean is as simple 124 00:08:15,440 --> 00:08:21,480 as, did we do what we said we were going to do on the day we 125 00:08:21,480 --> 00:08:23,720 said we were going to do it for the amount of money that we 126 00:08:23,720 --> 00:08:25,920 promised? Did we do what it says on the 127 00:08:25,920 --> 00:08:29,160 tin? A successful project will kind 128 00:08:29,160 --> 00:08:33,000 of meet its promise. What if that promise gets 129 00:08:33,000 --> 00:08:39,880 redefined over many many years? So I think if the promise is 130 00:08:39,880 --> 00:08:44,400 redefined, so if if we're halfway through something and we 131 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:49,560 say, look, we don't really want a blue one, we've decided we now 132 00:08:49,560 --> 00:08:54,320 want a red one. And the project says, well, OK, 133 00:08:54,360 --> 00:08:58,000 if you want a red one, that's fine, but it's going to cost 2 134 00:08:58,000 --> 00:09:02,040 billion more and arrive 5, five years later and everyone says, 135 00:09:02,040 --> 00:09:05,480 yes, we still want to do it. That can still be a successful 136 00:09:05,480 --> 00:09:09,120 project. However, as you know as well as 137 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:13,440 I do, Emma, any, any experienced project professional will tell 138 00:09:13,440 --> 00:09:16,840 you that the best way to kill a project is to change your mind 139 00:09:16,840 --> 00:09:18,600 halfway through about what you're trying to achieve. 140 00:09:19,600 --> 00:09:25,160 So the, so the worst thing a project leader can do is to not 141 00:09:25,160 --> 00:09:30,520 face up to the realities of what change means, not force, if I 142 00:09:30,520 --> 00:09:33,880 can use that word. The stakeholders, the sponsors, 143 00:09:33,880 --> 00:09:38,400 the the funders of the project to the consequences of the 144 00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:42,760 change they want to make and fudge it to pretend that while 145 00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:45,360 we can sort of still do a blue 1 and it might be a little bit 146 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:48,840 more expensive, but it probably won't because that's what 147 00:09:48,840 --> 00:09:51,880 everybody wants to hear. So there's so there's something, 148 00:09:52,440 --> 00:09:56,480 there's something really important about professional 149 00:09:56,480 --> 00:10:00,880 confidence and candour. Candour. 150 00:10:00,880 --> 00:10:04,240 So actually you're describing some behaviours there that I 151 00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:07,400 wanted to circle background to because you referred to 152 00:10:07,400 --> 00:10:10,760 incentives and behaviours and perhaps the wrong behaviours are 153 00:10:10,760 --> 00:10:17,520 being encouraged and perhaps not having candour is one of those 154 00:10:17,520 --> 00:10:19,600 behaviours. So could you tell us a bit more 155 00:10:19,600 --> 00:10:23,800 about that? I spoke to a leader of a project 156 00:10:23,800 --> 00:10:27,120 that everybody or almost everybody listening to this 157 00:10:27,120 --> 00:10:34,560 project will have will have heard of who described the, the, 158 00:10:34,640 --> 00:10:40,520 the systemic pressure on them to undercook their estimates. 159 00:10:41,520 --> 00:10:45,160 You know, now, now he was absolutely clear that he wasn't 160 00:10:45,160 --> 00:10:49,600 going to do that, but he was also, he was also honest enough 161 00:10:50,520 --> 00:10:53,600 to say you shouldn't underestimate the, the ability 162 00:10:53,600 --> 00:10:56,240 to sort of get yourself to believe what you need to believe 163 00:10:56,240 --> 00:10:57,920 in order to get to where you want to get to. 164 00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:01,360 And, and, and so the, the example that he's using, I'm, 165 00:11:01,520 --> 00:11:03,280 I'm keeping it very anonymous here. 166 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:07,560 He said, well, if you know, I'm, I'm going to say that it's, you 167 00:11:07,560 --> 00:11:10,160 know, X billion and, and X years. 168 00:11:11,720 --> 00:11:15,720 And I know in I know that if I said it was X + 4 billion and 169 00:11:15,760 --> 00:11:19,760 years plus three, that, that I, that I wouldn't get next year's 170 00:11:19,760 --> 00:11:22,640 funding and without necessarily funding out no project. 171 00:11:22,960 --> 00:11:25,880 So he's, he's it's, so he's not lying. 172 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:29,120 But those pressures exist in the system. 173 00:11:29,120 --> 00:11:32,920 And it's somebody else described to me this tendency as limbo 174 00:11:32,920 --> 00:11:39,240 dancing that that's kind of what we do in in developing a big 175 00:11:39,240 --> 00:11:43,200 government projects. Why do these pressures exist in 176 00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:48,320 the 1st place and is it because of poor estimation, lack of 177 00:11:48,320 --> 00:11:53,400 clarity over the purpose of the project, political desires and 178 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:58,360 ambition, and but compounded with this kind of 179 00:11:58,360 --> 00:12:01,320 miscommunication and lack of trust because people don't stick 180 00:12:01,320 --> 00:12:04,200 around long enough? What would stop this happening 181 00:12:04,200 --> 00:12:08,520 in the first place? All of the above, all of the 182 00:12:08,520 --> 00:12:12,040 above. So if if a strong minister. 183 00:12:12,040 --> 00:12:14,960 So I'm now thinking about the case of Universal Credit, a 184 00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:24,280 strong minister with very strong vision, determined to overcome 185 00:12:24,280 --> 00:12:27,680 any barrier to get going and to make this project survive and 186 00:12:27,680 --> 00:12:32,840 to, to get it, to get it going. Nobody in the system was strong 187 00:12:32,840 --> 00:12:37,920 enough to to stand up to that. Not, not by saying, well, you 188 00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:39,680 know, your project plan says this. 189 00:12:39,720 --> 00:12:42,720 Well, my project plan says that because it was too early for a 190 00:12:42,720 --> 00:12:44,040 project plan. There was, you know, we haven't 191 00:12:44,040 --> 00:12:45,920 got a project yet. We don't know how we're going to 192 00:12:45,920 --> 00:12:49,840 do it and the incentives in the system don't encourage anybody 193 00:12:49,840 --> 00:12:52,640 to to stand up. What, what can we, what can we 194 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:57,720 do about these things? When I started writing, after a 195 00:12:57,720 --> 00:13:03,160 little while, I felt I'd not really, I'd not really satisfied 196 00:13:03,240 --> 00:13:06,120 with this. And I realised that what, what 197 00:13:06,120 --> 00:13:09,840 was happening was I've spent so many years writing gateway 198 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:15,320 reviews or structured advice for senior officials or for 199 00:13:15,320 --> 00:13:20,240 ministers that, that I was cramping myself into a sort of a 200 00:13:20,240 --> 00:13:23,680 style of writing which where I was continually hedging and 201 00:13:23,680 --> 00:13:26,520 thinking, well, how will that read to a minister? 202 00:13:26,520 --> 00:13:29,600 And what will, how realistic will that be in the political 203 00:13:29,600 --> 00:13:31,440 context into which I'm delivering it? 204 00:13:31,440 --> 00:13:34,440 And could I rephrase this in a way which makes it gentler? 205 00:13:35,240 --> 00:13:40,960 And, and I had a, a conversation with a, a literary agent in the 206 00:13:40,960 --> 00:13:42,560 process of trying to get a publisher. 207 00:13:42,840 --> 00:13:45,040 And he said that's, that's really not what you're trying to 208 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,120 do here. You're not trying to say to, 209 00:13:47,120 --> 00:13:50,480 you're not trying to produce a sort of a set of simple 210 00:13:50,480 --> 00:13:54,880 recommendations which are bound to be easily applicable in the 211 00:13:54,880 --> 00:13:57,400 environment you're talking to. You're trying to advance the 212 00:13:57,400 --> 00:13:58,560 debate. You're trying to get people 213 00:13:58,560 --> 00:14:00,440 thinking about things in a different way. 214 00:14:00,840 --> 00:14:06,840 And suddenly I found myself much freer to to to, to think about 215 00:14:06,840 --> 00:14:10,160 things which, yeah, I wouldn't look particularly easy if they 216 00:14:10,160 --> 00:14:15,840 landed on on the desk in Mr the Day after Tomorrow. 217 00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:17,440 But. But I came into that 218 00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:20,320 conversation because you asked me, what can we do about this? 219 00:14:20,640 --> 00:14:27,520 One of the things I feel more and more strongly about is that 220 00:14:28,480 --> 00:14:33,920 the players in this game, with the probable exception of the 221 00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:38,440 politicians there should be, we should be subject to a kind of a 222 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:43,640 duty of candour. Now it it, it, it, it shouldn't 223 00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:49,080 be OK to allow a business case to go forward with estimates 224 00:14:49,080 --> 00:14:52,560 that are under cooked where everyone sort of knows they're 225 00:14:52,560 --> 00:14:54,880 under cooked. But you know, this is what we 226 00:14:54,880 --> 00:14:57,200 need in order to get the project going. 227 00:14:57,600 --> 00:15:00,840 And I, and I'm that this isn't a criticism of individual project 228 00:15:00,840 --> 00:15:03,320 people, let's say it is to do with the system. 229 00:15:03,960 --> 00:15:10,560 And so one of the things I, I think we need is rather than the 230 00:15:10,560 --> 00:15:14,240 mountain of project assurance, which which any big project in 231 00:15:14,240 --> 00:15:18,680 government gets drowned by, I think there should be something 232 00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:23,720 that is genuinely independent that the, that the, that the 233 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:30,800 professional knows is going to be exposed, you know, but to 234 00:15:30,800 --> 00:15:34,040 people to, to a, to a small group of experienced people who 235 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:36,760 can, who can hold them to account. 236 00:15:37,440 --> 00:15:39,000 No, that doesn't exist at the moment. 237 00:15:39,320 --> 00:15:41,560 You know, the National Audit Office is a wonderful 238 00:15:41,560 --> 00:15:44,600 institution and full of wisdom that nobody particularly takes 239 00:15:44,640 --> 00:15:47,160 much notice of. But it's auditing, it's backward 240 00:15:47,160 --> 00:15:49,440 looking. I'm talking about something that 241 00:15:49,440 --> 00:15:53,880 would feel a bit more like a kind of project equivalent of 242 00:15:53,880 --> 00:15:56,120 the Office of Budget Responsibility. 243 00:15:58,600 --> 00:16:00,480 Consequently, everybody will hate this idea. 244 00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:04,560 But do you see what I mean? Is that not part of Nistor's 245 00:16:04,560 --> 00:16:06,960 role? I'm sure it is. 246 00:16:06,960 --> 00:16:10,640 And you know, you can follow that thread right back to, to my 247 00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:15,760 time in in #1 Horse Gas Rd in the Treasury. 248 00:16:16,280 --> 00:16:20,960 But Nistor's not independent. You know, every everybody 249 00:16:20,960 --> 00:16:23,360 involved in that is that decision making works for the 250 00:16:23,360 --> 00:16:27,680 Prime Minister. It's, it's so it's, it's, yeah. 251 00:16:27,680 --> 00:16:31,200 It's just not independent. Yeah, completely outside of 252 00:16:31,200 --> 00:16:36,200 that, what were you going to say about Crossroad? 253 00:16:36,760 --> 00:16:38,760 I think, I don't know if I mentioned this earlier on, but 254 00:16:38,760 --> 00:16:44,520 everyone I guess remembers this, that first of all, though, just 255 00:16:44,520 --> 00:16:48,760 to be completely clear, Crossrail is a fantastic piece 256 00:16:48,760 --> 00:16:51,520 of infrastructure, You know, one that the nation should be proud 257 00:16:51,520 --> 00:16:55,760 of and the people that built it should be proud of and is, you 258 00:16:55,760 --> 00:17:00,400 know, delivering above its above its volumes and its and its 259 00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:06,079 passenger numbers and so on. And the, and the early phases of 260 00:17:06,079 --> 00:17:08,079 the Cross Road project went brilliantly well. 261 00:17:08,079 --> 00:17:10,040 The civil phases were a were a miracle. 262 00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:22,359 However, in August 2018, the project was still saying that it 263 00:17:22,359 --> 00:17:27,200 was going to open the central section of the of the railway in 264 00:17:27,359 --> 00:17:30,480 December 2018, four, four in four months time. 265 00:17:31,160 --> 00:17:35,280 And at that point the underlying problems became undeniable and 266 00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:40,200 serviced publicly and the the overall railway was not fully 267 00:17:40,200 --> 00:17:44,480 opened until 2023. Billions of pounds more spent 268 00:17:44,680 --> 00:17:49,520 and yet years more consumed. And yes, it's a wonderful 269 00:17:49,520 --> 00:17:55,520 railway, but that is not OK. So the people leading that 270 00:17:55,520 --> 00:17:59,880 programme, some of them knew but weren't prepared to say. 271 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:03,720 And some of them, you know, had managed to convince themselves 272 00:18:03,720 --> 00:18:06,440 that they that they didn't know. That isn't that is not all 273 00:18:06,440 --> 00:18:10,440 right. That's the kind of, that's the 274 00:18:10,440 --> 00:18:15,120 kind of behaviours, if you like the tendencies, which we've got 275 00:18:15,120 --> 00:18:19,880 to, we've got to overcome. I use it as an extreme example 276 00:18:19,880 --> 00:18:24,000 and, but, but just to be clear, this is absolutely not a unique 277 00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:26,320 situation. I have sits at around so many 278 00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:31,200 tables where everybody kind of knows that the schedule that 279 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:33,320 they're looking at is not a realistic 1. 280 00:18:34,360 --> 00:18:37,040 And then, and then the project leaders will look at each other 281 00:18:37,040 --> 00:18:41,360 and say, well, you know, if we rebaseline now and and say it's 282 00:18:41,360 --> 00:18:45,680 going to take another year, then in a year we'll have lost all of 283 00:18:45,680 --> 00:18:48,480 that float and we'll be back to say to rebaseline it again. 284 00:18:48,480 --> 00:18:51,320 There's this fear of facing reality. 285 00:18:52,560 --> 00:18:56,560 To ask an obvious question and the fear of facing that reality 286 00:18:56,560 --> 00:18:59,280 is the fear of what? What are the consequences 287 00:18:59,280 --> 00:19:04,280 they're seeking to avoid? There is a genuine concern 288 00:19:04,400 --> 00:19:10,040 around project leadership tables in a situation where the 289 00:19:10,040 --> 00:19:14,640 schedule is under real pressure and where it's likelihood of 290 00:19:14,640 --> 00:19:19,600 delivery has become very low or even non existence. 291 00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:24,360 There is a genuine concern around that table that if you 292 00:19:24,360 --> 00:19:28,640 acknowledge that reality and say to use the Crossrail example, 293 00:19:29,040 --> 00:19:32,960 it's not going to be 2018, it's going to be 2020. 294 00:19:33,640 --> 00:19:38,360 There is, there is a concern around that table that a year 295 00:19:38,360 --> 00:19:43,120 later all of that new float, all of that new schedule contingency 296 00:19:43,120 --> 00:19:46,600 would have got swallowed up and that we'll be facing exactly the 297 00:19:46,600 --> 00:19:49,120 same situation again. And then it won't be 2020, it'll 298 00:19:49,120 --> 00:19:52,280 be 20. And that is, there is, there is 299 00:19:52,280 --> 00:19:56,520 some truth in that line and it is a, it is a, it's a genuine 300 00:19:56,520 --> 00:19:59,880 tension in a big project to say at what point is the right point 301 00:19:59,880 --> 00:20:03,000 to rebaseline the schedule. It's a, It's a It's a valuable 302 00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:05,920 and important conversation, however. 303 00:20:06,240 --> 00:20:09,960 There is something else going on with that around that table and 304 00:20:09,960 --> 00:20:13,560 that is if I acknowledge this isn't going to get delivered, 305 00:20:14,240 --> 00:20:18,640 then I have to go and tell the sponsor this isn't going to get 306 00:20:18,640 --> 00:20:20,640 delivered. He has to then go and tell the 307 00:20:20,640 --> 00:20:23,520 minister, or in this case the the mayor, that he isn't going 308 00:20:23,520 --> 00:20:27,240 to get delivered. We'll end up with a, a team of 309 00:20:27,240 --> 00:20:30,360 outsiders will be sent in to work out why we've done such a 310 00:20:30,360 --> 00:20:32,280 bad job and what we should do differently. 311 00:20:32,400 --> 00:20:36,600 That's going to distract us for, for six months and I might lose 312 00:20:36,600 --> 00:20:41,480 my job. And, and, and so, so these 313 00:20:41,480 --> 00:20:49,440 subtler tendencies, the subtler incentives, encourage the 314 00:20:49,440 --> 00:20:52,480 delusion, encourage the obfuscation, encourage the 315 00:20:52,520 --> 00:20:57,680 unreasonable optimism that is endemic in in a lot of 316 00:20:57,680 --> 00:21:02,240 government projects. You know this is known about, 317 00:21:02,280 --> 00:21:05,400 isn't it, that people have this optimism bias? 318 00:21:06,320 --> 00:21:11,000 Why does this still happen? What fundamentally needs to 319 00:21:11,040 --> 00:21:13,520 change then? Yeah. 320 00:21:14,840 --> 00:21:17,640 So I, I love the phrase optimism dies bias. 321 00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:21,200 It sounds, doesn't it? It sounds like a kind of a, a 322 00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:25,120 very human sort of tendency to look on the bright side. 323 00:21:25,120 --> 00:21:28,320 You know, it's quite a warm thing, you know, optimistic. 324 00:21:29,120 --> 00:21:32,600 It sounds nice, doesn't it, what we're talking about in these 325 00:21:32,600 --> 00:21:36,760 kind of situations, and I'm going to, I'm going to use a 326 00:21:36,760 --> 00:21:38,720 deliberately nasty way of describing it. 327 00:21:38,720 --> 00:21:42,480 It's a kind of a collective conspiracy to delude ourselves 328 00:21:42,680 --> 00:21:46,120 and not only ourselves, but our sort of stakeholders and, and 329 00:21:46,120 --> 00:21:48,320 funders. And that's why I think this 330 00:21:48,320 --> 00:21:52,760 happens a lot less in the private sector than it does in 331 00:21:52,760 --> 00:21:56,080 the still happens in the private sector, just to be clear, but it 332 00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:58,280 happens less often in the private sector than the public 333 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:02,800 sector. So coming back to my requirement 334 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:05,920 for candour, let's imagine a slightly different world than 335 00:22:05,920 --> 00:22:09,720 the one we're in. Let's imagine that the the 336 00:22:09,720 --> 00:22:14,240 business case for this project, rather than being buried in 337 00:22:14,240 --> 00:22:18,880 bureaucracy in Whitehall is in so far as it could be done from 338 00:22:18,880 --> 00:22:21,120 a confidentiality point of view in the public domain. 339 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:26,400 And that the schedule has the name of the, the project 340 00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:29,080 director, you know, in the public domain. 341 00:22:29,080 --> 00:22:32,880 This is the schedule which I say I can deliver you hold me to 342 00:22:32,880 --> 00:22:35,080 this. And the, you know, the, the, 343 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:38,720 the, the cost estimations in the, in a, in a similar way. 344 00:22:39,440 --> 00:22:44,400 And that that person knows that it is, it is, it's going to be 345 00:22:44,400 --> 00:22:48,680 viewed by these Office of budget responsibility in genuinely 346 00:22:48,680 --> 00:22:51,560 independent people who are reporting to Parliament rather 347 00:22:51,560 --> 00:22:55,080 than reporting to, to, to, to governments, say. 348 00:22:56,960 --> 00:23:00,720 And then couple that with that, everybody I've just talked about 349 00:23:01,240 --> 00:23:04,360 is likely to be in their jobs for four or five years rather 350 00:23:04,360 --> 00:23:06,480 than 18 months. So you can't. 351 00:23:06,480 --> 00:23:08,640 So there's, there's much less incentive to sort of just keep 352 00:23:08,640 --> 00:23:11,160 your head down and hope and, and hope that it'll all be all right 353 00:23:11,160 --> 00:23:14,280 when I leave it. The, the, what we've changed 354 00:23:14,280 --> 00:23:17,600 there is the incentives in the system and it's those 355 00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:20,800 incentives, just changes in those incentives which would 356 00:23:20,800 --> 00:23:24,560 change the behaviours I, I naively assert. 357 00:23:25,480 --> 00:23:30,560 Do you think all the attention on data analytics and AI is one 358 00:23:30,560 --> 00:23:34,400 of those things that people hopes of project delivery with? 359 00:23:35,320 --> 00:23:40,360 So I'm going to take you back bloody decades because I talked 360 00:23:40,360 --> 00:23:43,000 about the Astute programme, the Astute, you know, the is the 361 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:47,360 attack submarines that form up form the, the attack submarine 362 00:23:47,360 --> 00:23:51,480 part of the of the Royal Navy's nuclear defence fleet. 363 00:23:52,000 --> 00:23:57,560 And, and by the time we finish the Astute programme, there are 364 00:23:57,560 --> 00:23:59,960 still a couple of submarines still in the yard. 365 00:24:01,080 --> 00:24:07,080 Those 7 submarines will have taken pretty much exactly twice 366 00:24:07,120 --> 00:24:11,840 as long as the previous class of 7 submarines, the Trafalgar 367 00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:14,680 class, took back in the sort of 80s and 90s. 368 00:24:15,640 --> 00:24:20,320 One of the things people thought right at the beginning of the 369 00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:23,240 Stew programme, and I, I recognise I'm talking 25 years 370 00:24:23,240 --> 00:24:28,720 ago now, was rather than using warehouses full of draughtsmen 371 00:24:28,720 --> 00:24:32,360 with beautiful drafting boards and pens and inks, we're going 372 00:24:32,360 --> 00:24:35,520 to use this, this 3D CAD process. 373 00:24:35,520 --> 00:24:37,400 It's going to be, you know, much better. 374 00:24:37,920 --> 00:24:41,560 And of course, 3D CAD is much better and it's completely 375 00:24:41,760 --> 00:24:46,440 replaced hundreds of draw of draughtsman with, with drawing 376 00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:50,080 boards. But at the time it introduced a, 377 00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:54,000 a huge delay in the, Oh no, a delay in the programme because 378 00:24:54,400 --> 00:24:56,880 the technology wasn't really up to something as complex as a 379 00:24:56,880 --> 00:24:58,720 nuclear submarine. You could use it for a simple 380 00:24:58,720 --> 00:25:01,320 ship, but it wouldn't do a nuclear submarine and there 381 00:25:01,320 --> 00:25:04,120 weren't enough people skilled enough to to use it. 382 00:25:04,400 --> 00:25:07,200 And so design went very much more slowly than it, than it 383 00:25:07,200 --> 00:25:10,160 did. My, my suspicion is that that 384 00:25:10,160 --> 00:25:12,800 same pattern, they hopefully it'll happen faster. 385 00:25:13,080 --> 00:25:19,280 We see some of that pattern with AI and, and, and learning 386 00:25:19,280 --> 00:25:22,400 technologies. If you come back in 10 years 387 00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:24,800 time, it, they'll have made a huge impact. 388 00:25:25,760 --> 00:25:30,680 But we'll, I, I, I fear we'll go down a lot of rabbit holes first 389 00:25:30,680 --> 00:25:34,400 if we're not careful. And and so I'd encourage people 390 00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:39,440 to experiment, to try, but not to lose sight of the 391 00:25:39,440 --> 00:25:43,200 fundamentals of designing and building complex projects. 392 00:25:44,960 --> 00:25:50,680 The kind of prevalent cultural attitude that these projects are 393 00:25:50,680 --> 00:25:54,880 deemed to fail. How do you shift that? 394 00:25:55,040 --> 00:26:00,360 Is it about finding pockets of success and reminding people 395 00:26:00,360 --> 00:26:05,160 about those? The APM salary survey this year 396 00:26:05,160 --> 00:26:08,040 showed that there was a great. Distrust. 397 00:26:08,040 --> 00:26:13,560 In the successive major project government projects. 398 00:26:13,960 --> 00:26:17,880 So it's kind of entrenched and expected so. 399 00:26:19,320 --> 00:26:21,960 Put issues in. Someone who's trying to lead a 400 00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:26,120 project, maybe, maybe not a massive scale, but faces this 401 00:26:27,240 --> 00:26:33,680 expectation of failure. What on earth do you do to try 402 00:26:33,680 --> 00:26:38,080 and make that people you're working with think that no, we 403 00:26:38,080 --> 00:26:41,560 can do this? Well, the the. 404 00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:44,080 The things. I'm about to mention, you know, 405 00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:46,560 anybody that's been living in this world for, for, for 10 406 00:26:46,560 --> 00:26:49,960 years will, will recognise them. So things like, you know, the 407 00:26:49,960 --> 00:26:53,960 delivery professions, including prodigy management in government 408 00:26:53,960 --> 00:26:57,920 should have the same kind of esteem in government as policy 409 00:26:58,080 --> 00:27:01,080 development. Ministers and civil servants 410 00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:03,000 should spend longer in their jobs. 411 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:06,960 The challenge of a project should be matched by the 412 00:27:06,960 --> 00:27:12,280 capability and and resources that are required to deliver it. 413 00:27:12,480 --> 00:27:14,320 You know, this is this is not rocket science. 414 00:27:15,560 --> 00:27:19,360 Projects shouldn't be initiated without clarity about what 415 00:27:19,360 --> 00:27:23,040 they're trying to achieve. The estimation, the cost and 416 00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:27,480 schedule estimation of projects should genuinely take 417 00:27:27,480 --> 00:27:31,040 accountability of uncertainty. Which means that early on you're 418 00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:35,600 going to have very wide bounds of of cost estimate and and the 419 00:27:35,600 --> 00:27:38,120 tendency will for everybody who wants you to be much much more 420 00:27:38,120 --> 00:27:41,480 specific and exact before you know really what you're doing. 421 00:27:41,640 --> 00:27:46,000 So these these are all really well known unanticipated 422 00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:48,920 pressures on cost and schedule should be brought out into the 423 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:50,960 open and acknowledged and dealt with as you go along. 424 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:54,960 We've been talking. Mostly in this in this 425 00:27:54,960 --> 00:27:59,040 conversation about why these underlying things prevent these 426 00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:01,560 well known things being being addressed. 427 00:28:01,880 --> 00:28:04,560 We talked about duty of candour. We don't need to talk about that 428 00:28:04,560 --> 00:28:08,240 anymore. Let me talk about two others. 429 00:28:08,920 --> 00:28:15,200 The first is, if you're that project leader, place a really 430 00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:20,520 high value on simplicity. You know, try to. 431 00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:27,480 Avoid the tenders, the pressures in the system which will lead 432 00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:32,640 you to more and more complexity. I'm going to give. 433 00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:36,640 You give you, again I'll be brief, an example that I 434 00:28:36,880 --> 00:28:39,040 unfortunately know a lot about, which is the smart metering 435 00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:46,200 programme where in pursuit of theoretical perfection. 436 00:28:47,400 --> 00:28:51,080 We developed a. Complex solution which became 437 00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:56,400 functionally undeliverable, at least in the context of the time 438 00:28:56,400 --> 00:28:58,200 scales that the government wanted to deliver. 439 00:28:58,680 --> 00:29:02,040 So rather than finishing the project in 2020, you know, it'll 440 00:29:02,040 --> 00:29:07,440 be that the current timeline says 80% of homes in 2026. 441 00:29:07,760 --> 00:29:09,400 But I'm not, I'm not holding my breath. 442 00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:14,520 So, so we could have done something much, much simpler. 443 00:29:14,520 --> 00:29:16,960 It wouldn't have had all the bells and whistles of benefits, 444 00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:19,360 but then it would have been delivered, you know, a decade 445 00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:21,000 earlier. And therefore, you know, who 446 00:29:21,000 --> 00:29:23,160 knows what we're doing with technology by now. 447 00:29:23,520 --> 00:29:30,200 So, so one really important thing is prioritising simplicity 448 00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:36,120 over complexity and the other, which is less in the hands of 449 00:29:36,640 --> 00:29:42,160 the project leader perhaps is So I, I, I don't know if you've 450 00:29:42,280 --> 00:29:47,760 noticed how many times big projects get announced, you 451 00:29:47,760 --> 00:29:48,440 know. The the the. 452 00:29:48,840 --> 00:29:51,320 How how many times? The HS2 announced between its 453 00:29:51,320 --> 00:29:57,280 first conception in sort of 2009 and an actual formal business 454 00:29:57,280 --> 00:30:01,640 decision being made in 2020. Boris Johnson approved phase one 455 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:04,960 in 2020. It must have been announced, you 456 00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:10,320 know, 20 times. So the world takes a huge 457 00:30:10,320 --> 00:30:12,840 account of announcements, even though they don't really mean 458 00:30:12,840 --> 00:30:17,920 very much and takes almost no account of actual formal 459 00:30:18,920 --> 00:30:20,960 commitments, business commitments. 460 00:30:22,240 --> 00:30:26,600 And if I working for a day, I would correct that balance so 461 00:30:26,600 --> 00:30:30,520 that I I mentioned before publishing of of business cases 462 00:30:30,640 --> 00:30:34,080 formal proper formal announcements of when, when 463 00:30:34,080 --> 00:30:40,200 ministers have genuinely made a clear, not not political intent, 464 00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:45,400 but an actual investment decision that should be very 465 00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:48,160 clear, very explicit and very, very public. 466 00:30:48,760 --> 00:30:51,000 But but because you're. Hugely experienced. 467 00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:55,120 I, I wanted to find out from you what, what perhaps have been the 468 00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:59,040 most important career lessons, maybe one or two that you've 469 00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:03,320 learnt. So either personally as a as a 470 00:31:03,480 --> 00:31:07,560 kind of project person. And or related. 471 00:31:07,560 --> 00:31:10,560 To projects as well. So if you could pass on any 472 00:31:10,680 --> 00:31:14,320 advice, wisdom to project professionals out there who 473 00:31:14,320 --> 00:31:17,760 perhaps aren't as senior as you, maybe something you would have 474 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:21,080 told a younger version of yourself, well. 475 00:31:22,560 --> 00:31:25,480 I guess the first. Thing I'd say is, you know, 476 00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:27,760 stick with it. You know, they, these are, these 477 00:31:27,760 --> 00:31:32,200 are fantastic careers being involved in, in these huge 478 00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:36,920 endeavours, world scale projects, you know, don't let 479 00:31:37,480 --> 00:31:41,960 old grumpy grey haired men like me put you, put you off, you 480 00:31:41,960 --> 00:31:44,200 know, still stick with it. That's the that's the first 481 00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:50,520 message. The second is I think so 482 00:31:50,880 --> 00:31:54,680 professionalism, we've come such a long way with professionalism 483 00:31:54,680 --> 00:31:56,480 in the last in the last 20 years. 484 00:31:56,960 --> 00:32:02,920 But professionalism is more than a collection of sort of niche 485 00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:06,760 technical capabilities, scheduling or cost estimating or 486 00:32:06,760 --> 00:32:10,000 risk management or whatever. I. 487 00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:13,280 Talked before about. Parity of esteem in, in, in a 488 00:32:13,280 --> 00:32:15,800 public sector context, parity of esteem with the sort of the 489 00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:19,920 policy and what, what one of my project friends used to call 490 00:32:19,920 --> 00:32:24,600 policy La La land. So that that parity of esteem 491 00:32:24,920 --> 00:32:28,520 starts with you if you're a project professional, you know. 492 00:32:28,520 --> 00:32:35,800 So, so if, if the if the policy wonk can't explain how what they 493 00:32:36,120 --> 00:32:38,800 have written down as the scope of their project is really going 494 00:32:38,800 --> 00:32:43,200 to deliver what they think it will, you have to call them out 495 00:32:43,200 --> 00:32:45,920 on it. If the minister is unrealistic, 496 00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:49,640 and I know it's easy to say and it's hard to do, you have to 497 00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:52,800 step up and say so. So there's an element of. 498 00:32:53,920 --> 00:32:57,040 Courage. That I would encourage people to 499 00:32:57,120 --> 00:33:00,240 adopt. And the final thing I would say 500 00:33:00,240 --> 00:33:08,960 is so, you know, be sceptical from time to time when you need 501 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:14,720 to be, but don't ever let yourself drift into cynicism. 502 00:33:15,120 --> 00:33:22,320 Cynicism kills big projects. And in a way, it's kind of why I 503 00:33:22,320 --> 00:33:24,600 wanted to write the book, because I could feel that 504 00:33:24,600 --> 00:33:29,800 tendency in myself, the sort of this will never work tendency. 505 00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:32,720 And that we, we can't afford that as a, as a country, we 506 00:33:32,720 --> 00:33:36,040 can't afford it. And it is there are things that 507 00:33:36,040 --> 00:33:38,680 we can do and we have to do to do better. 508 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:42,560 Jonathan, that's. A great way to end the podcast. 509 00:33:42,560 --> 00:33:47,280 I mean, it just leaves me to say thank you for your time and for 510 00:33:47,280 --> 00:33:50,920 such a thoughtful conversation and obviously wish you the best 511 00:33:50,920 --> 00:33:53,640 of luck with your book. So thank you very much. 512 00:33:54,880 --> 00:33:55,680 It's a. It's a. 513 00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:56,960 Great pleasure. Thanks ever so much. 514 00:33:56,960 --> 00:33:59,000 And I'm sorry we meandered around a little bit. 515 00:33:59,400 --> 00:34:00,960 No, that's the. That's the fun of it. 516 00:34:00,960 --> 00:34:05,800 I think that's I expect that. So I plan for that some 517 00:34:05,800 --> 00:34:08,639 contingency, contingency planning involved. 518 00:34:09,159 --> 00:34:10,080 Well, that's what we. Need. 519 00:34:10,080 --> 00:34:13,320 That's what we need. So thanks again for Jonathan for 520 00:34:13,320 --> 00:34:16,040 joining us and to you for listening to the APM podcast. 521 00:34:16,520 --> 00:34:19,400 Just to mention again that his book, The Delivery Gap, Why 522 00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:22,080 Government Projects Really Fail, and What Can be Done about it, 523 00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:26,480 publishes in September 2025. Don't forget to look out for 524 00:34:26,480 --> 00:34:28,600 more episodes or to rate and reviews. 525 00:34:28,600 --> 00:34:31,840 Wherever you get your podcasts, we'd welcome you to get in touch 526 00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:35,719 with your comments, feedback and suggestions by emailing us at 527 00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:41,320 apmpodcast@thinkpublishing.co.uk. Spotify users can also send us 528 00:34:41,320 --> 00:34:43,400 feedback directly within the Spotify app. 529 00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:47,880 This podcast has been brought to you by APM, the childhood body 530 00:34:47,880 --> 00:34:51,280 for the project profession. For more information on APM, 531 00:34:51,280 --> 00:34:53,800 visit apm.org.uk.