Hello and welcome to the APM podcast brought to you by the
childhood body for the project profession in 2022, a PM is
celebrating its 50th Anniversary.
So throughout the year the OPM podcasters meeting some of the
movers and shakers who have shaped the project professional
across the past. Few decades will be asking them
how the profession has evolved where the untapped potential
might lie. And what the future might hold,
my name is Emma divita and I'm the editor of project apm's
quarterly Journal this episode Andrew Saunders business
journalist and regular. Contributor, to project sits
down with Mark wild ex-ceo of crossrail as one of the largest
Transportation programs, anywhere.
In the world crossrail has had a high-profile from the outset,
but the programs are construct. The Elizabeth line, a new high
frequency. Commuter Rail line through
London has often found itself in the headlines for the wrong
reasons. Mark took over as CEO in 2018,
as a time of Highly publicized budget and deadline overruns
fast forward to may this year and Mark stepped down the CEO
following the long-delayed but much celebrated opening of the
Elizabeth line having successfully turned around such
a complex and Fort program. In this podcast Mark shares his
insights into what went wrong in the early years of crossrail,
the changes who made upon becoming CEO and lessons for
future complex programs. A p.m. members will be able to
read an extended interview with Mark and the Autumn edition of
project Journal out in September.
And Thank you so much for talking to me today.
I'm sure you're very busy, man, and I appreciate it.
I'm looking forward to our conversation.
So let's I mean, I supposed to kind of start with crossrail or
bit of crossrail, what's the first thing that you do?
What was the first thing that you did?
When you rode across own, you've got this new got to turn around
this tanker. Yeah, well, first me first, I've
got to acknowledge that, you know, I was I was the boss of
the tube. So I was running, London
Underground and I was on the board of Crossroads so it would
not be true to say that. You know, I came in on some kind
of white charger and sort of the doubt, I and I think the reason
I might have an interesting perspective is, you know, I'm
part of the problem as well. You know, we always sitting on
the board when this occurred. So, first and foremost, your day
one wasn't completely unknown thing to me.
But first thing I did was, I think, you know, is a lot of
people know, one of the bad things that happened in
crossrail, was it that had been demobilized, you know, we lost
we always should be a thousand people in the client
organization and where I took over it was like 600.
So we lost critical mass. So the very first thing I did
was I rapid re inflation of people.
I think when you lose critical mass and you've got gaps, the
first thing that I did was we got it, we got a new Senior
Team, you know, we're going to have got Collin, Brown has our
technical director. We started with Peter Henderson,
our shoes are kind of program director and we went to Bechtel
Jacobs and everybody. And I Just got my bag and ball
out and said, look, I need help. So the very first thing I did
was focus on the rien Flesh and of the team because we were, we
were in a lot of trouble. You know, people were leaving
and the Really key people left, you know, the program, controls
character, safety director, all of these things that happen.
So yeah and it's still I mean it still didn't you take me losing
critical mass you lose momentum as well that the chronology was
in the July of that year. I think July or August.
It was clear that we couldn't Continue.
And I didn't take over till December, so there's an
interregnum, which Simon Wright. Who is the program director
acting CEO at the time. Did a really excellent job.
Simon actually, but credit time again, as soon as the black hole
was developed revealed, I should have left immediately so that
lack of momentum was really the critical point.
It was a, you know, that moment there were eight or nine
thousand people on my project productivity was we measured
Immediately, it was like fifteen to twenty percent were spending
a hundred and forty million every four weeks on the purpose
of the project was stalled. But consuming vast resources,
you know, not to be honest, very, very, very difficult
situation and he will think that you bitten off more than you
could chew when you learned it in there.
No, no, because custom in the guts of this project, a
fantastic. I knew all about it.
I had an inkling cells on the board, really about I think if I
could could say, one thing about me, I'm the reason that we
brought the collapse occurred was there was me with a couple
of colleagues on the board. Said look, we can't continue.
So now I knew, I knew the DNA was good and also I was backed
by the commissioner, the mayor, the permanent secretary so and I
also knew I was going to get on him eggs as my chair.
So if you have that sort of backing and you know, a bit
about it and you know the projects fundamentally sound.
Now I wasn't done that at all. Butter that all about.
Yeah, I'm I think, you know, they did one of the reasons that
I was members are good choice to do.
It was that I already knew about it.
I think if somebody landed cold into it while I don't really
know what they would have done. Yeah, that's interesting.
That isn't it because the that sort of the net that the natural
normal response, standard response in that sort of
processor at situation is to do precisely.
That is to get someone who, you know, has been around the block
a bit but isn't involved in that particular organization and
parachute them in and get them too.
To do their thing. Yeah, I mean, I thought when I
landed actually the first thought I had was, could I stop
the project could? I could we somehow demobilize
the project and restarted? And I thought, well, it's
impossible to stop a project until March 20 20 came along and
then actually, again, you could do it.
But of course, that was a pandemic crisis.
So, yeah, it was impossible to stop.
They had huge momentum. Nearly 10,000 people on the job.
So I think if somebody knew it landed, it would interfere with.
The first thing I did was Reinstate the senior team
really? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, it's
coming. It's not like, I guess it's not
easy to hire people back into project locally, there is it, I
don't know. Maybe people start to think you
might be career limiting to get involved, something like that.
Well, two things, it's an iconic project.
So I think, you know, even though it was getting B lived in
the press, all those who know in the world nor the, this is a
real proper job, you know, one of the top Jobs in the world.
The second thing was - are reflecting the team.
It was a bit simpler than that, really.
I simply went to see all of our supply chain Partners CEOs and
chairs and said, you're gonna, you're gonna help me.
And to a person, you know, whether it's Bechtel, WS P, PR
Consulting cost in the whole supply chain.
At the most senior level completely came on board.
And my, my, my offer to them, was complete transparency.
And Try my best. No games, not know, kind of
politics there started. The deal was to give me their
best people and they did so double the recipe.
Mark, when seen Mike Nesmith and asking for a guy called predict
massoud of who was inaudible system, integrator had been
degraded. The Victoria line was at that
moment. Working in Tel Aviv though and
within 24 hours, pretty basudev was the head of our system
integration. And I think that that's speed of
re inflation was Of the, the key thing really do, you knew where
to go and find you knew that you knew who to look for and where
to go and ask. Yeah.
We've made a few mistakes, you know.
We, if I hire 300 people, we might have got, you know, 20 or
30 people wrong obviously. But yeah.
And I guess the other thing about me was my background, my
background was predominantly and system integration.
So, I kind of knew I knew these people and put the big message,
I think. Is that, when, when, when the
proverbial did hit the On everybody really came to the
party and nobody nobody. Nobody whether you're a
politician or a board member or a stakeholder or its supply
chain leader. Nobody did not help me nobody.
No Berries. So I think good Esprit de corps
and I think everybody realized that it was a meant something
for the whole country as is evidence.
Now you know you look you look at how people think about the
project now which is like some kind of Stellar thing and I
think we all knew that when it did land.
And an open, it would have the absolute wild factor and
re-establish our reputation for major programs are.
Then there's a question isn't, I mean, this is the kind of debate
Kairos, rolls around. They're kind of project
management, Universe, more, or less constantly.
I could, I think, is it inevitable that big projects are
always be late and over budget? You hear people say that but it
strikes me as being a bit of that sort of counsel of Despair
that really surely. They shouldn't be, something's
wrong. That's the case, two things, two
perspectives, contemporary perspective.
If you look at the research, From Oxford, particularly you
will find that. Yes, the vast majority of major
programs around the world are late.
Another pigeon actually crossrail is 27 percent late and
over budget. It's actually not that bad.
You would say that that's a contemporary perspective.
So you're right. So yeah, in context, really
evidence shows, all these programs are letting over budget
or their underestimated. To start with one or two.
Here's my take them and the reason for Change and Why cross
from others? I think three big things are
happening in the world now that are really significant in major
programs first year. They getting bigger cross.
Real used to be the biggest in Europe and the fifth biggest in
the world. Now crossrail wouldn't get in
the top 10 globally and it wouldn't get in the top three in
Europe. So projects, getting bigger,
there is a massive rise of digitization massively.
And of course, there's a huge drive to NetZero.
Now, to me, those Now, mix on top of a situation that you've
pointed out that they're all laid anywhere, really calls to
change about how you manage these programs because I think
they are so big and complex. Now, a new approach that the
kind of the big learning, which we can get onto on the cross for
others, maybe he's in your approach, but to your point,
yeah, every major program in the world seems to have problems.
There's something going wrong. Either in the delivery or in the
sea say, I mean I suspect that it's know.
A lot of it has to do with how much, you know how you asked.
Hey, you Estimate these things to start with and it's been
pretty, the more surely, the more complex of project is the
more difficult. It is to say before you started
with any kind of a hope of accuracy how much it's going to
cost to do. Ya mean, Kiki fundamental lesson
in Cross Rome was setting a singular end date and quite a
visible Public Funding envelope. They said December 18 and
fourteen point eight billion years in advance and made Very,
very public. So when Terri Morgan who I love
and there's the so go, wonderful man.
Terry when Terry said on time on budget, he was on a singular end
date and inform the envelope. And and I think the big big
learning, the big learning Ida crossrail is do not set singular
end dates, and mmm love, think about more windows of
uncertainty. And I've been very lucky.
Here's the good news, I would have been very lucky to look at
almost every major program in the world actually apart from
Whistling in China or Russia. I'm looked at that.
But now, nobody is doing across rural.
Everybody is in Windows of time and windows of money.
And if look at Mark thirst and on edge, just to done a very,
very good job. You know, he's no longer has a
singular end date of whatever it is 20:27 or whatever.
He talks about Windows, I think they have a window of funding as
well in which I don't fully understand.
So I'll to your point, I think the main catalytic problem is
underestimation, And not recognizing the downside risk,
but I think austrians changed all that.
I think. Now you look at every major
program, nobody is heroically driving for.
I'm going to, I'm going to Australia for them seeing all
the major cities in Australia, over the next 22 weeks, and none
of them. Then we're going to open it on
the night of December, 20, 2008, you know?
Yes, it seems like a good idea when you're a decade away.
That isn't it? But I can see it will soon
become a kind of millstone around your neck.
Yeah, but they don't know the art of major program management.
Is how you Maintain that tension.
If you've got a few more like a window of time or money and
early and late or low and high, and there's a window of
uncertainty, the art of project management is to drive the
team's to the front edge and progressively narrower the
windows and for me that's the thing.
The crossrail really unfortunately didn't didn't God
we got totally wrong. I mean I recognize a bit of a
kind of a Bailey very basic analogy from my own world.
Their own deadlines, you know, some writers, when you're
commissioning them, you know, they're late and they're always
late. So you give them a fake
deadline, but after you're done, argued work, and in for a bit,
they start to Twig that you're giving them fake deadlines and
so the fake deadlines lips lip as well.
So how do you avoid that happening in that world?
Where, you know, you're telling the team basically that this is
the tape and you're telling the world that this is the date.
So if you have this idea that you are progressively narrowing
and suddenly the lead, the dead is your commitment to your
stakeholders in the early. Dead is where you want the team
to drive two by two perspectives in the public realm.
Transparency is all 0 and if you don't know, you don't know.
And I think I think crossrail lost its reputation and your
reputation is what do you say times?
What you do? Yeah, then on crossrail, on
Time, on budget, they lost their reputation.
So, firstly on the later date, the that's got to be trusted,
you know, you can't have a false deadline to your to your point,
you know? So transparency Ultra
transparency works, even if it's uncomfortable for leaders, on
the early date on driving the, the team to the early date.
I'll give you an interesting concept of the really helped us.
Crossrail was thought to be a very collaborative place.
You know, everyone, 37 little Parts building, a halt, all very
collaborative actually values Awards.
We went a step further and cross.
For all, we went from collaboration to morning the
hall. Now, what's the difference?
Curren and owning the whole means that everybody's invested
in everybody's success or failure.
So for example, I used to think of these things as a battle on
risk, you know, from other delivery into operation.
I now realize that was completely flawed.
This is much more like an obstacle course.
Tough Mudder, where if somebody gets stuck like an operator or
Safety Authority, or a fire engineer, or the regulator, if
somebody gets stuck in the mud, There's no point everybody else
foraging on because we got to go back and get Bill on Mary and
we've all got to cross the line haul together.
So for me this was a profound shift in Cross Royal to talk
Ultra transparency publicly on the backend downside debt and
drive the internal team to own the whole by that the operator
and the delivery teams had to agree on.
What the requirements were. And they the problem of the
Baton person and Allergy is the operator just can't get all of
it and you know there's a mismatch in what they want.
They want bells and whistles, all this safety, press on the
fire brigade, want something else.
So I think this, these are quite interesting concepts of how do
you maintain the tension in that windows?
That were talking? And I think they're both have to
happen transparency for the public, owning the whole for the
internal. And I think there's something
quite interesting in this and Our contractual forms.
No, the NEC. And I'll governance that they
don't really support this. I think that's another part of
the cultural Story. How did nobody detected like
kind of historical understanding those projects, got bigger and
more complicated. You ended up with these kind of
lots of multiple contracts because they were sort of
considered to be who, you know, sort of bite-sized manageable
chunks rather than kind of wrapping the whole thing in some
huge and incontrolable thing. So that, you know, the that sort
of fragmentation was done on purpose.
Purpose with the intent of making the whole thing more
manageable. But actually, but maybe in some
respects, you know, achieve the opposite, who are only a few
that decision was very cogent, because after the global
financial crisis 2010 2011, the market was fragmented.
Everybody needs everybody needed a every mouth needed to be fed
if you think about 2012, We were part of the Olympics after the
Olympics. There is nothing.
So, every month had to be fed. So breaking into 37 jigsaw
pieces, not a bad idea, right? It might take about what went
wrong. If you drew like a 2x2 Grid in
your head and on the bottom axis was complexity low to high and
on this axis was the need for the client to coordinate from
low to high. I think the problem uncrossed
real was 37 contracts. Inevitably created huge
complexity. So on my, in my 2x2 grid, it was
on the right hand side yet. Highly complex for me.
Crossville should have been in the top right-hand corner.
Hi the coordinating. So, if you've got a lot of
complexity crossrail should have been the conductor of the
orchestra in quite deep, in intrusion, into the sequence of
how things were done. Corporal didn't do that across.
Rural was Low coordination. So it was kind of in the my 2x2
grid crossrail was in the bottom right-hand corner, highly
complex, but generally law coordination because they
thought the supply chain would work it out for themselves.
It didn't it didn't. So the message for me is to
point first of all, don't don't try to complexify it.
You know, try to stay low complexity.
But if you do have to go to High complexity from various Ins
become, highly coordinating. And that's kind of one of the
big lessons, the more complex, it becomes the more than need
for alignment and coordination from the center and its back to
kind of, you know, theories of entropy.
And I've said that you've got like the project getting bigger
drive to 90 and huge digitization, those Mega Trends
are producing entropic on end, Tropic things in programs.
I they will tend to chaos without some control and I think
CrossFit I think this is well documented really did not call
it a lie. I give you the most fantastic,
practical example of this 37 contracts and at least half of
them had fire engineering serious, fire, engineering
requirements. And, you know, you know, serious
headers and now again, we had one company a tier 2, called
Protec excellent company. Brilliant.
The only had 250 engineers and they pretty much had the market
in people certified approve, London Fire.
Brigade, fire. All those 50 Engineers were of
Protech were working for 20 of the tier ones, but the client
couldn't see it. So they were being pulled from
Pillar To Post. Yeah.
So one of the things that we did was we started to coordinate
project and people either scarce resources, for a centrally
coordinated, IE Paddington first, then Whitechapel instead
of them all not fighting for trying to collaborate together.
So that's a now to do that, of course.
You interfere in the commercial relationship with the tier 1s
and the risk transfer. And I think this is a, this is
like a really fundamental Point. As complexity went up showed, so
did the need for the client to coordinate and one of the big
reasons for the collapse of cross Rome and the emergence of
a huge black hole was the Unseen effort that the supply chain was
having to make that the client couldn't see.
I mean yeah I'll give you a mind-blowing.
I'm stat, he's a mind-blowing start run, all of these
contracts had we called it outstanding Works list element,
outstanding works, though. It was a punch list every
contract, I'd like a punch list, you know, there were things for
defects. You get back to you later.
I'm your material non-compliances things that
weren't quite right dense indoors.
Cracked window opens. You know thought also that man's
natural snagging list. In my first six months of
crossrail, the new technical, director added up how many they
were in the hole. There were 75,000 things missing
in Cross from and when you looked at them, a lot of defects
are normal things, but a lot of them thousands, tens of
thousands were sitting on element outstanding Works lists
because they were depending on somebody else or maybe three
other people. So the real question is hold on,
Mark you On the board. Why didn't you just have a
simple measure of outstanding Works list where we didn't?
I mean that's a fundamental mistake.
We weren't measuring. We thought we were in 97 percent
complete. We were 60% Complete because
there were 75,000 things off the books that you didn't deserve
it. Individual contracts new, you
know? Yes, you're Whitechapel.
You knew you had 7,000 and But nobody out of the hole back to
this concept of owning the whole.
And, you know, the minute we realized there were 75,000
things to do then that became very serious.
Yes, absolutely. But systemic risk, I mean that's
like the financial crash. It seems like all those
individual Banks, not realizing how much on the hook or the
other bank don't want. I'll give you another one about
crossrail in terms of risk. You might say this but Mark you
are the best in the world and you're on the board.
Mark, what were you doing? What are you idiots doing?
Well, where was your risk for us as well?
Actually, interestingly, these risks were all in our risk
registers and we had the most pristine risk process.
We had four late for layers of assurance, the best in the
world. We spend millions and tens of
Millions on Assurance, we had Checkers and, you know,
verifiers. So what went wrong?
Well to me, cross for a lived in the house of It was like
traveling on the desert and you can see the mountain right, the
blue mountain range your head. Then you knew that mountain
range was going to be difficult to climb but on your walk.
In the desert you would write yourselves ever, Fantastical
risk, mitigation. So in the house of risk cross,
real would recognize outstanding Works list, but we write a
mitigation that was never actually happened.
It was something like we were all we have a supply chain
meeting where we'll ask them about.
Out how they're doing, will standardize something over here.
They were living in the house of risk putting their effort into
thinking. If that occurred, what would we
do? They should have really lived in
the house of Intervention, which was intervening in what they
would intuitively. Know was a problem.
So obviously early in 2015 16 somebody should have started to
measure the agglomerating accumulating group of
outstanding works but they didn't, they kept it in there.
Registers, so this idea of how do you intervene rather than
just write? A risk is one of them, big, big
lessons and I'm going to Australia.
And this is one of the key themes because they're the same
as crossrail. I've got every Bell and whistle
on early warning of assurance. But cross for the ended up
within a four billion, pound black hole all because it was
masked by fantastic or mitigation.
Ins. They have the right.
They have the right color project tools in place to they
have the right, you know, where they went.
When they were obviously weren't measuring the right things or
not in not in aggregate anyway. Well, I think they did.
They had they had the state-of-the-art know, they had
bad, the other state-of-the-art, let me the world's moved on a
bit. Now, if you go to like Oxford
and there's a lot of AI technology and now but you know
they have the whole thing that they were the first people to
put them in, they had business in your power, user type of
stuff on their data. No, I think what happened is the
leadership team created an environment on the board that I
was part of where failure was not an option.
Another fundamental lesson that I learned through this to
succeed means, you have to fill. Failure is an intrinsic part of
success. So in an environment where you
couldn't fail People started to not measure the important stuff,
is it? Hargreaves law or after?
Dig it out for the law. When a measure becomes a Target,
it no longer becomes useful. So across rural, the measure
Terry Morgan would use is a percentage completion.
There was a value is valid, it was in place since 2012 and it
was basically measuring cubes of concrete and wire terminations.
It was the physical state of completion and it became the
measure and The in the last board meeting before it all
collapsed crossrail was 97.1%. Complete it wasn't.
It was 60%. So that is the classic thing
where everybody's got the wrong measure.
The became a Target. Yeah, and that was partly
because they were measuring the wrong things and perhaps because
they underestimated the scale of the kind of integration side of
it to that that I mean, the guys with the guys are in there goes,
our civil engineers and they are guess.
So they've thought that digging the tunnels is going to be the
hard bit, the real, another Insight I'd give you would be
the the guts of the machine where okay it was more.
It wouldn't be fair to say this is all a bunch of civil
engineers, trying to wise to vote more likely that at the
very, very top including the board that I was part of we were
not curious enough, we just weren't curious enough and we
might have maybe had a bit of a heroic style.
I think the modern the modern project leader We'll manage
Windows about like we said for the mud, the modern project
leader will be comfortable with uncertainty and gaps and will be
curious and somebody could have asked the question, couldn't
they look? Well um how are we going to
integrate as many? I'll give you a great, a great
example of this in our safety case.
There are two hundred thousand documents in our city.
Guest 200,000 here, you can imagine what they are and if
they build up like a pyramid and the end in one final City case
like a pyramid Paul. Classic system engineering
career really, very, very good. Unfortunately, if the does you
got to the top of the mountain, nobody's ever, thought about how
you would actually integrate the real way in testing it all of
the effort has gone into the the structure of the poem in this
virtual pyramid rather than thinking.
Well how are we gonna prove that these things aren't right?
You know and there's many many examples I just like we thought
that the software The trend management software might need
45. Jobs, you know, upgrades between
Siemens and Bombardier, there might be four or five hops, it's
been 70 or 80. We've climbed, we've climbed the
software Mountain, 10 meters at a time.
Tiny incremental steps, keeping everybody in harmony.
It was back back to this idea of in high complexity, the client
needs to be highly coordinating. I mean, that there's something
fundamental about, you know, the more complex, these systems are
more complex only and they, you know, complex systems go wrong
and complex ways I guess. And so they need a lot more
testing. We need to verify check.
If you buy the concept of the fact that we should try and
minimize complexity, let's just hold that, right?
It's a good idea to minimize complexity, simplify on
crossrail, since Adam was allowed having three different
signaling systems, was always going to be complex.
It's the most complex in the world.
There's no way around it. It's it was always going to be
off the scale. So for me, that meant Aunt.
Everything else had to become simpler to leave you with the
core of what was always going to be an epic integration Challenge
on cost roll. Unfortunately, he's another key
lesson. The client design in 2014, 15
was running late. The client was doing the basic
design and then the individual contractors were going to do the
detailed design. This is like mechanical
electrical equipment. The fire alarm, do you know all
the details that and the client does I was running late, but
unfortunately, instead of pausing the program around 2014,
15 to take a breath finish, the client design to allow the
supply chain to modularize their design, make it simple, you
know, build it in a factory. Bring it to side and plug it in.
They didn't they? They commence the stage of
detailed design before the client ID really finish theirs.
And that was because they knew they were trying to get to this
endless really tough ended. So as early as 2014, Teen.
There was massive stress and program and back to complexity
that that was, that was a big mistake because the minute
everything started to get complex, it even started to come
back into the signaling system because it's on India, it's a
single integrated system. So what should happen is in
2014, every should have recognized that the signaling
was going to be really hard. We must modularize everything
else which would have meant, probably a nine months, a bridge
in 2014 15. It would have taken a brave
person though in 2014 15 to say that they couldn't recover it.
Yes, yes, interesting. Guys in it.
So it's a bit of a lesson for projects is to identify the
places that you cannot be. There are irredeemably, complex
and identify those. And then try and simplify
everything else around them as much as you can.
That's performed. I mean, you said that, I think
might be one of the most important lessons in the whole
of nature programs in the world. Which of course, the audience.
Street learned for years, you know this is like a thing that
the oil industry and the IT industry have been doing for
years where they modularize what they can and they they they know
some things are going to be like a moon landing, you know?
But we know crossrail. We've ended up with Incredible
complexity in things like the, The Lighting systems of the, the
station's, you know, really complex stuff when it's just
written a bit lower. Yes, interesting things but
interesting those told him about no come come to the time it took
a bit about you and your kind of background and your your career.
You sound like you sound like you're from County Durham.
Oh, very good. Very, very on Adam Cole - Sun
literally and my dad worked down the mines pit Village called Ash
winning in Durham. So I grew up in a you know,
classic Working class family. My dad was a miner, their minds
were in the great, you know, but this is the kind of guy was born
in 65. So my dad went all through the
tumultuous times in the mines, right up to the, the end of it
all and during, which is kind of like 70s and, you know, as you
know, in the mines and engineers and important things for my dad,
always wanted me to be an engineer.
So, I became an engineer went to Newcastle Polly, didn't really
do very well. In my, a levels, went to the
polyfill electrical engineer. Was probably a bit of a late
starter academically did quite well.
The poly became joined the electricity industry.
So I spent the first kind of ten years of my career kind of 85 to
87 to 97 in the utility industry.
Engineering projects. I mean Margaret Thatcher is not
quite my politics but you did do one thing for me but she
privatize the electricity industry and Berkshire Hathaway.
Warren Buffett's company bought But leap not electric which
opened up the possibility of international travel and getting
away from the regulated wires business.
So I went in the non reg business ended up in Railways.
Recently read put the power supply in for the southern
region. Working for Andy Mitchell.
Went to Westinghouse signals ended up running Westinghouse
signals, which was part of inventors, which is a bigger
signaling company. The world seems bored and vents.
So I left re signal the Jubilee line, then I went to Australia
and I run all of the public transportation in Melbourne.
Big state of Victoria Australia. Well, kind of it was kind of a
bit my Wilderness years really. I'd left invents this because
Siemens came in, I done said, work for Talus on the Jubilee
line and I guess I was at the time in my career that I
realized that, I wanted to be a more general leader and I didn't
have much operational experience.
Audience, you know, I so I went The Treasure of Oz was just, you
know, new jurisdiction and it was a great place to live and
you got got my hands on the whole of the state transport
Network. You know, the trams, the trains,
the buses, the furries that was just fantastic.
So for five years then I was running all of their public
transportation working for the government time in the Private
Industry and timing public sectors important.
You know, because you just don't have preconceptions about what
the private sectors like other public sectors.
Like, but you really want to do both nothing.
So I went to the government of Australia, then opportunity came
up to run the tube, you know if you're a railway person running
London Underground so Mike Brown, invited me back to run
London Underground, which I thought was like the best job in
the world, you know, running the tube and then I was quite happy
until in 2017. I was on the board of cross
Royal and pretty much from Led 17.
It was obvious to me that there was real problems in this.
Program. And again, Lessons Learned we
probably should have acted six months earlier than we did.
But ultimately, you know, I was quite sad to leave the tube
really but but, you know, the the prospect of delivering
Elizabeth on and now obviously, that's a backfield, my job, the
other great guy called Andy Lord, I was always going to
leave when we open the Elizabeth mine.
I think we've had a good three and a half years doing that.
And now for me, I'm interesting heading back to the utility
sector where next well I'm gonna become the sea.
You of sgn who are one of Britain's for Gas Distribution
Company that's selling guest Network Star Wars, isn't it?
Yeah, well I'm Scotland. The SEC is is actually Scotia.
So it says she's got all the Scotland and Southern England
and the reason for that is one way of Learners, you going back
to utilities Mark? Well, it's a good business, big
scale, business operationally. But the attraction for me is
energy conversion Drive. Nancy were the hydrogen question
is so for me, What I've liked most of my career was solving
really complicated puzzles. You know, so I think getting
back into energy is just quite cool.
So I'm really looking forward to if I'm still going to keep my
hands fingers in major programs. And I've learned so much out of
crossrail, I really think the case is there for change in how
we manage major programs. Really think it's there.
So will you I mean, it's like, well, that be, you know, part of
what you do, do you feel that the sort of driver
responsibility to try and kind of pass on the message?
It's because I think Another thing I do talk quite a lot of
people about lessons. They learned from projects and
they always seem to be quite a lot of them are quite profound.
Well, I think about me as a person engineer project manager
and what I'm really here for me. I've enjoyed doing these jobs
and they've been growing all enjoyed being the CEO of sgn.
But really what I think I'm here for is exactly that.
I don't think I'm here for. How did a working-class kid from
a privilege in Durham get to where I am?
There's a bit of talent there but there's a hell of a lot of
look. I think my purpose is to make
sure we are representation in engineering of everybody and
fundamentally where we started this conversation.
I think the world of major programs is getting
exponentially more complex, which brings a new leadership
style. So yeah, the thing I'd really
like to focus on outside of kind of my work is, how do we create
a new way of leading major programs and engineering.
What kind of leader? What sort of person do you?
What kind of qualities do you need to be a leader in that kind
of increasingly complex, environment person could work
from Andrew McNaughton that I've been contributing to your, for
the i.c.e. on systems thinking and because they know, first of
all, what it isn't? It isn't the heroic leadership
style of one person at the top knowing everything.
That's not, not the right and wrong.
So the modern leader will be curious.
Will understand uncertainty will understand that there are some
Things that are unknowable but we'll work hard to minimize
that. The leader will be.
Somebody who is an environment is created, where there is no
fear the environment where truth to power where my big learning
across rural. One of them is even the most
epic problems we got. As soon as it became
transparent, the team, we had the convening power and the Epic
horse power of the team could solve it.
The problem was surfacing the You.
So leave us to the future will be incomplete and somewhere.
As they will understand that there are gaps and they will
create environments where those gaps are spotted and people were
collegiately owning the whole. So this kind of leadership style
is it's kind of a bit different, really?
It's more people who can convene and align people to
breakthroughs, rather than a singular person.
Heroically leading the charge, I'm being a bit kind of
stereotypical. So listening is important on.
I think, you know, you talk about the archetypal, modern Lee
modern project leader, they'll be good, active listeners, and
they will be able to web sent their ego from The Challenge.
There's, this is quite profound to me the days of egocentric
leadership Grover. And I don't mean, I don't mean
people were bullies and aggressive.
I just mean the process of absenting yourself from a
problem and become inconsiderate.
And thinking of everybody sings and ultimately The boss is there
to make a decision? Ultimately, I was the CEO how to
make the decision but I'd rather an informed decision that came
from a sense of consensus and everybody looked at a 360.
The trick is, how do you have how in that in type of
environment? How do you stop procrastination?
Which goes back to living in the house of intervention rather
than House of risk. Absolutely.
Yes, yes, absolutely. In there are more dismal
auditions have more decisions to be taken more quickly.
The more complex Things become But this is talk about how, you
know, the pandemic might have changed well kind of combination
of pandemic in climate change. I suppose it's changing people's
Mobility patterns. Maybe people will be moving
around less and they'll be more digitally connected rather than
kind of physically connected to think that.
What does that does that make a difference too?
Well to project La Crosse world that have already been done?
And to think like a chess to the hostel in the part 1?
Well, no doubt, no doubt there's been a disruption as no, no
doubt, I think a positive disruption or people.
Going to be help healthier and happier by having a better
work-life balance. But but for me, I still believe
in must transportation. And the agglomerating affecting
crossrail will produce 42 billion pounds of economic
benefit. You look at wallet, she took a
bullet or in your work, what's happening?
Well it's not for me, they'll undoubtedly be a delay.
You know it'll there's a slug Something's Happened, you know,
in the next two to three years, but we've gotta cross role for a
design life of 120 years but it'll be here in 250.
Yes. I mean, you know, been in 200
years time, I mean, who knows what I did, but I do know that
the cross rail tunnels will exist.
What about the kind of leveling up?
Question wouldn't believe been better spent kind of in small
doses, all around the country instead of one big dollop in
that I'm young. So a majority you know I know I
know buddy. Nobody cares more about where I
come from the me, you know, and I'm very proud but I'm also
understand this. And the only reason crossed real
can get built is the densification of activity.
And that's why Crossroad produces 42 billion pounds of
real economic benefit. Also London, London creates 25%
of the UK's GDP but more fundamentally in Cross Rome,
75,000 people worked on it and we think at least 40 or 50,000
and never came to London. And, you know, the signs are
manufactured in the Isle of Wight, the doors came from
Cheshire. Sure, the drones were men and
Darby 60 or 70% of it came from small to medium Enterprises
outside of London in the UK. But for me, the narratively
people have got to understand that the economic generator of
the Elizabeth line is for the whole country, particularly for
London, Southeast peaceful country and secondly, building
spending 20 billion quid billions went into local
economies. So I'd know I Spy That's not to
say, we shouldn't have great transportation in the north and
you know, they're like the transparent upgrades really
fantastic program and the latest work on buses in Manchester
looks fantastic. But in major programs coming
out, I really hope that we get on the size while.
See, you know, I really hope that and when size won't gets
built it'll benefit the Suffolk Coast but I'm sure whoever
builds it will will be a huge, huge pipeline in.
And I think that's why, by the way, Andy Byford is such a
Fantastic, commissioner for London and I really hope she
gets a sustainable Capital deal because a vibrant London is
essential and that's coming from a working class.
Boy from Adam pit villager. I understand that a vibrant
London is absolutely essential. Yes, there's a sort of, there's
a polarity developing in the kind of debate about everything
everywhere isn't there, which is kind of damaging, really?
It's not either, or it's both isn't it, the kind of who knows
together. And what kind of mold and we all
report saying? Well, that was fascinating, I
really enjoyed to. Thank you.
Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your
time today. Thanks to mark for taking time
out to join, Andy and conversation and to you for
listening to this podcast for extra content from Mark.
Look out for the Autumn edition of apm's project Journal, which
is arson September. If you have any comments,
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