1 00:00:00,200 --> 00:00:04,400 This is epicenter episode 470 with guest SRI Ram, cannon from 2 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:20,900 eigen Leia. Welcome to epicenter the show 3 00:00:20,900 --> 00:00:23,300 which talks about the Technologies projects and people 4 00:00:23,300 --> 00:00:25,700 driving decentralisation and the blockchain revolution. 5 00:00:25,900 --> 00:00:28,900 I'm literally qurans. And I'm joined by Felix doj's my 6 00:00:29,000 --> 00:00:31,100 co-host today. And we are speaking with SRI Ram 7 00:00:31,100 --> 00:00:34,500 Cannon, the founder of eigen layer, which is restacking 8 00:00:34,500 --> 00:00:37,000 protocol. And what that means we will get 9 00:00:37,000 --> 00:00:41,300 to in just a minute. But before we speak with SRI 10 00:00:41,300 --> 00:00:45,800 Ram, And let me tell you about our sponsor this week, Omni is 11 00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:48,000 your new favorite multi-chain Mobile Wallet. 12 00:00:48,000 --> 00:00:50,800 That puts the power of web 3 at your fingertips. 13 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:54,200 In just three tabs you can stay, can manage your assets on over 14 00:00:54,200 --> 00:00:57,300 20 to build in protocols, including all major EVMS. 15 00:00:57,700 --> 00:01:01,100 They are to is Nani vmstat Cosmos, Alana near and more. 16 00:01:01,400 --> 00:01:03,800 Omni abstracts away. All the complexity while being 17 00:01:03,800 --> 00:01:06,200 fully self custodian, meaning getting weird on. 18 00:01:06,200 --> 00:01:08,000 Your crypto has never been this easy. 19 00:01:08,800 --> 00:01:12,700 Omni also has a multi-chain NFC support so you can You are UNF 20 00:01:12,700 --> 00:01:16,200 T's in one place and you can flex your cleanest and ft by 21 00:01:16,200 --> 00:01:17,900 setting it as your app background. 22 00:01:18,100 --> 00:01:20,800 Don't forget to check out the exposed section in the app for 23 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:22,800 your daily fix of the hard steps year. 24 00:01:22,800 --> 00:01:26,100 The news across chains. And there's a lot of news, 25 00:01:26,100 --> 00:01:29,900 recently, Omni recently upgraded to emits app, to provide you 26 00:01:29,908 --> 00:01:33,200 with more functionality than tens of different defy, apps and 27 00:01:33,200 --> 00:01:35,900 wallets combined to highlight their transformation. 28 00:01:36,000 --> 00:01:39,300 They renamed from say, quality to Omni the next Generations of 29 00:01:39,300 --> 00:01:41,500 wallet. Join thousands of users on this 30 00:01:41,500 --> 00:01:43,400 next generation. Duration wallet by downloading 31 00:01:43,400 --> 00:01:47,300 it today on iOS or Android at Omni dot app. 32 00:01:48,300 --> 00:01:52,300 So, three around. It's a pleasure to have you on. 33 00:01:53,200 --> 00:01:58,300 I recently have moderated a panel at def con where you were 34 00:01:58,400 --> 00:02:01,700 a very contentious that I guess it was incredible neutrality 35 00:02:01,700 --> 00:02:03,400 was. So contentious that we released 36 00:02:03,400 --> 00:02:05,500 it as a special episode and epicenter. 37 00:02:06,000 --> 00:02:08,400 We're talk about credible neutrality and kind of 38 00:02:08,500 --> 00:02:11,900 centralization and looming be centrality centralization. 39 00:02:12,000 --> 00:02:16,400 And I mean a little bit later in the show, but before we kind of 40 00:02:16,400 --> 00:02:19,500 kick it off properly. Tell us how did you get into 41 00:02:19,500 --> 00:02:21,800 crypto? Thank you so much for a very 42 00:02:21,800 --> 00:02:24,100 good. I enjoyed that panel as well. 43 00:02:24,100 --> 00:02:30,900 And you know we could use more Frank candid conversations in 44 00:02:30,908 --> 00:02:34,900 this space and telling a little bit about myself. 45 00:02:35,200 --> 00:02:41,400 I got into Block chains per se in 2018, on January. 46 00:02:41,800 --> 00:02:46,700 But my interest in peer-to-peer system, States far back my PhD 47 00:02:46,700 --> 00:02:50,600 thesis was basically in peer-to-peer and wireless 48 00:02:50,600 --> 00:02:53,800 networks. This is my masters and PhD span 49 00:02:53,800 --> 00:02:58,600 from 2006 to 2011 12. So, I've been thinking about 50 00:02:58,600 --> 00:03:00,100 these systems at that time there. 51 00:03:00,100 --> 00:03:03,100 My interest in Wireless was primarily peer-to-peer Wireless 52 00:03:03,100 --> 00:03:06,800 and ad hoc mesh networks was mainly thinking through 53 00:03:07,300 --> 00:03:11,000 imagining a World where we don't need centralized intermediation 54 00:03:11,000 --> 00:03:13,400 to for me to talk to somebody else. 55 00:03:13,700 --> 00:03:17,200 And we were thinking one of the big use cases for something like 56 00:03:17,200 --> 00:03:19,200 this. Would be Last Mile coverage, 57 00:03:19,200 --> 00:03:20,800 right? Like in developing countries 58 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:24,500 where there may not be enough Wireless infrastructure but 59 00:03:24,500 --> 00:03:27,200 actually we were pleasantly surprised with the scale of 60 00:03:27,200 --> 00:03:29,900 infrastructure deployment in developing countries around the 61 00:03:29,908 --> 00:03:34,500 world where the the need for something like that, didn't 62 00:03:34,500 --> 00:03:40,200 emerge. So after my PhD I switched out 63 00:03:40,200 --> 00:03:45,000 and was working on computational genomics for several years and 64 00:03:45,600 --> 00:03:49,600 where we were mainly working on things like how do we analyze 65 00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:52,500 data coming from DNA RNA sequencing? 66 00:03:52,500 --> 00:03:54,200 How do genes regulate each other? 67 00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:59,200 All this kind of stuff, totally different from what I do right 68 00:03:59,200 --> 00:04:02,600 now. But in January, 2018 around the 69 00:04:02,600 --> 00:04:08,100 time, my PhD advisor promote, Was now at the Princeton 70 00:04:08,100 --> 00:04:11,400 blockchain Center. So he called me and he said she 71 00:04:11,400 --> 00:04:14,800 only to hear about this thing called Bitcoin and said, I heard 72 00:04:14,800 --> 00:04:20,300 about it, but I don't know much more and he's like, oh the 73 00:04:20,300 --> 00:04:22,200 things that we used to think about a lot. 74 00:04:22,200 --> 00:04:25,900 You know, how to maximize throughput minimize latency in 75 00:04:25,900 --> 00:04:29,100 peer-to-peer type systems. Is what do you know, Bitcoin is 76 00:04:29,100 --> 00:04:30,300 facing? There's a whole bunch of 77 00:04:30,300 --> 00:04:31,800 problems. Do you want to come and work on 78 00:04:31,800 --> 00:04:35,400 it? And as interesting as it was 79 00:04:35,400 --> 00:04:39,900 technically, Lee, I had already been burnt once trying to trying 80 00:04:39,900 --> 00:04:44,800 to do something in the peer-to-peer space and also I 81 00:04:44,800 --> 00:04:53,100 had a kind of intrinsic distrust of financial speculation and I 82 00:04:53,100 --> 00:04:58,000 looked at it at that time and I wanted to see if there is some 83 00:04:58,100 --> 00:05:02,100 more fundamental reason for me to commit to work on that for 84 00:05:02,100 --> 00:05:04,200 like, let's say, attend your time scale. 85 00:05:05,300 --> 00:05:09,500 And initially I was not convinced and it took me three, 86 00:05:09,500 --> 00:05:16,500 four months of like, wandering around and one of my like basic 87 00:05:16,500 --> 00:05:20,500 paradigms which is comes from like Evolution. 88 00:05:20,500 --> 00:05:23,300 And you can ask like what is the kind of evolutionary advantage 89 00:05:23,300 --> 00:05:29,800 of the species Homo sapiens and you know an an immediate guess 90 00:05:29,800 --> 00:05:32,800 would be something like oh we are intelligent and therefore we 91 00:05:32,800 --> 00:05:38,100 can I've taken over this planet, but I think a moment's 92 00:05:38,100 --> 00:05:41,000 examination would suggest that that's probably not true because 93 00:05:41,000 --> 00:05:44,300 if you take one intelligent person and take a gorilla and 94 00:05:44,300 --> 00:05:47,800 then give them an island, you know, who has better survival 95 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:51,200 there. So the thesis, this is actually, 96 00:05:51,200 --> 00:05:54,900 most clearly articulated by you all Nova Harari in his book 97 00:05:54,900 --> 00:05:59,900 sapiens. That the reason humans have 98 00:05:59,900 --> 00:06:03,500 taken over this planet is because we cooperate flexibly in 99 00:06:03,500 --> 00:06:06,700 large numbers. Because we cooperate flexibly in 100 00:06:06,700 --> 00:06:09,700 large numbers. I really like this thesis and 101 00:06:09,700 --> 00:06:13,700 it's kind of a foundational mental model for me. 102 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:18,600 And as I think through the thesis and looked at something 103 00:06:18,600 --> 00:06:26,200 like Bitcoin, it became clear that the ability to cooperate is 104 00:06:26,200 --> 00:06:29,300 limited by trust, right? Like I'm going to cooperate with 105 00:06:29,300 --> 00:06:34,400 you if I know I can trust you. And if I can remove the barriers 106 00:06:34,400 --> 00:06:40,700 to trust then I'll the then they'll be more cooperation 107 00:06:40,700 --> 00:06:43,300 flexibly large number. So I saw this as kind of like 108 00:06:43,300 --> 00:06:46,500 upgrading societal infrastructure and even 109 00:06:46,500 --> 00:06:50,700 providing basically an evolutionary Advantage for for 110 00:06:50,700 --> 00:06:53,200 our species, in our ability to cooperate flexibly loss of 111 00:06:53,200 --> 00:06:57,300 words. So that became like a once I saw 112 00:06:57,300 --> 00:07:01,900 that Paradigm, that essentially crypto can play a role in 113 00:07:01,900 --> 00:07:04,200 upgrading our cooperation infrastructure. 114 00:07:04,800 --> 00:07:09,200 I became fascinated with it and over the next, you know, few 115 00:07:09,200 --> 00:07:13,700 months I started diving in deeper and so I would say that 116 00:07:14,100 --> 00:07:16,800 I've gotten deeper and deeper down that rabbit hole in the 117 00:07:16,800 --> 00:07:19,900 last five years. So that's how I got a crypto. 118 00:07:21,000 --> 00:07:24,300 Nice. So yeah, before we talk about, I 119 00:07:24,300 --> 00:07:27,400 glared the project we're here to talk about, I guess one step 120 00:07:27,400 --> 00:07:29,300 before that. Or were you still part of his, 121 00:07:29,300 --> 00:07:34,800 the kind of University of Washington blockchain lab key. 122 00:07:34,800 --> 00:07:38,500 We talked a little bit about what you are, what the goal of 123 00:07:38,500 --> 00:07:41,900 this lab is and what you've been researching there or you're 124 00:07:41,900 --> 00:07:44,100 still researching their Capital if you are. 125 00:07:44,600 --> 00:07:48,000 Yeah. At the time, you know I was 126 00:07:49,300 --> 00:07:51,900 working on like I was saying Traditional genomics, but I was 127 00:07:51,900 --> 00:07:54,100 a professor assistant professor at the University of Washington, 128 00:07:54,100 --> 00:07:59,400 Seattle, and what ended up happening was, as I got more 129 00:07:59,400 --> 00:08:02,400 interested in this, I found that there is a bunch of, like basic 130 00:08:02,400 --> 00:08:04,600 questions which are unanswered, right? 131 00:08:05,100 --> 00:08:08,300 So just looping it back to my thesis, cooperate flexibly, in 132 00:08:08,300 --> 00:08:11,100 large numbers, you know, Bitcoin already showed us that, you 133 00:08:11,100 --> 00:08:14,000 know, you can do. Trustless cooperation, I would 134 00:08:14,000 --> 00:08:16,900 characterize the etherium as having showed us that we can 135 00:08:16,900 --> 00:08:20,500 cooperate flexibly. You know, her Re-Use. 136 00:08:20,700 --> 00:08:24,600 Let flexibly to differentiate from other species which only 137 00:08:24,600 --> 00:08:28,200 cooperate genetically, right? Like army ants cooperate in 138 00:08:28,200 --> 00:08:29,900 large numbers but only genetically. 139 00:08:30,500 --> 00:08:34,500 And you know the way I think about etherium is it enabled 140 00:08:34,500 --> 00:08:37,600 more flexible cooperation because you can program at eyes 141 00:08:37,600 --> 00:08:41,100 you know, applications that can then build on top of this common 142 00:08:41,100 --> 00:08:44,900 process structure. And so, the thing that I thought 143 00:08:44,900 --> 00:08:50,300 was missing at the time is the, in large numbers part, and in 144 00:08:50,300 --> 00:08:54,000 large Numbers basically, to me meant we need a much more 145 00:08:54,000 --> 00:08:58,000 scalable substrate. So most of our research ended up 146 00:08:58,000 --> 00:09:03,500 being thinking about how do we do scalable blockchains and what 147 00:09:03,500 --> 00:09:05,400 are the core features of consensus? 148 00:09:05,400 --> 00:09:07,600 Protocols, how do we get scalability? 149 00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:10,900 How do we get the game theory around this, right? 150 00:09:10,900 --> 00:09:13,100 And so on. So this is, this became the 151 00:09:13,100 --> 00:09:16,700 agenda and this became big enough, you know, to start the 152 00:09:16,708 --> 00:09:19,800 UW blockchain lab. So earlier it was part of my 153 00:09:20,100 --> 00:09:24,400 other Our research, just one one strand and the goal was 154 00:09:24,400 --> 00:09:27,500 basically to understand and create enough Primitives so that 155 00:09:27,500 --> 00:09:29,700 we can have scalable blockchains. 156 00:09:29,700 --> 00:09:34,800 So that was kind of the agenda for the lab and while doing this 157 00:09:34,900 --> 00:09:39,900 one of the things that I ran into was when you're thinking 158 00:09:39,900 --> 00:09:44,600 about how to build new say consensus, protocols or 159 00:09:44,600 --> 00:09:46,500 scalability or any of these things. 160 00:09:47,400 --> 00:09:51,300 There are very few avenues for you to deploy them into 161 00:09:51,300 --> 00:09:53,800 production. So what do I mean by that? 162 00:09:54,300 --> 00:09:57,600 You know, imagine you had a great idea for a distributed 163 00:09:57,600 --> 00:10:00,300 application like a smart contract, then you could then 164 00:10:00,300 --> 00:10:04,000 take it and run it on top of any major smart contract, 165 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:07,500 blockchains a 3 mm or any of these other changes that came 166 00:10:07,500 --> 00:10:10,600 after that. But if you had a great idea for 167 00:10:10,600 --> 00:10:14,200 how to improve the consensus protocol or scalability or 168 00:10:14,200 --> 00:10:17,400 adding new features, like how to build better oracle's or Or how 169 00:10:17,400 --> 00:10:20,500 to build better data availability or any of these 170 00:10:20,500 --> 00:10:22,500 things. There is no place for you to go 171 00:10:22,500 --> 00:10:24,400 and deploy any of these Innovations. 172 00:10:24,400 --> 00:10:29,400 In fact, every new innovation requires you having to create 173 00:10:29,400 --> 00:10:32,200 yourself a decentralized trust Network. 174 00:10:32,700 --> 00:10:35,000 The way I think about decentralized trust is this like 175 00:10:35,000 --> 00:10:38,200 a unicorn. It's so rare and it know it 176 00:10:38,200 --> 00:10:42,100 barely exists. And so it is completely 177 00:10:42,100 --> 00:10:46,400 untenable to ask like a good distributed systems engineer to 178 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,600 also create Decentralized trust along with each of their 179 00:10:49,600 --> 00:10:54,900 Innovations is appears rather insane to me that this is the 180 00:10:54,900 --> 00:10:57,700 expectation that we have that, like each person who has a good 181 00:10:57,700 --> 00:11:00,400 idea for a consensus protocol, a good idea for a virtual machine 182 00:11:00,400 --> 00:11:03,500 also, go and create a social Revolution, to create 183 00:11:03,500 --> 00:11:06,100 decentralized, trust is just simply untenable. 184 00:11:06,600 --> 00:11:09,300 So, initially, I didn't understand all of this, my 185 00:11:09,300 --> 00:11:12,500 initial thinking was, hey, we have these cool ideas for how to 186 00:11:12,500 --> 00:11:16,000 improve considers protocols. Maybe somebody will take up and 187 00:11:16,000 --> 00:11:19,400 use it and And what I saw was there is a lot of governance 188 00:11:19,400 --> 00:11:23,800 bottleneck and pressure in big systems which rightfully should 189 00:11:23,800 --> 00:11:27,900 exist to you know the next upgrade needs to be made sure 190 00:11:27,900 --> 00:11:30,600 that you know it's it's really, really accurate. 191 00:11:30,600 --> 00:11:35,800 Correct and safe and it's a long process to get that and there is 192 00:11:35,800 --> 00:11:37,800 no place to do rapid experimentation. 193 00:11:38,500 --> 00:11:42,200 So saw that, and I was little bit frustrated with this, this 194 00:11:42,200 --> 00:11:46,100 state of the ecosystem that basically the idea that smart 195 00:11:46,100 --> 00:11:48,500 contract Developers Kind of variety of options for 196 00:11:48,500 --> 00:11:51,600 experimentation, whereas infrastructure Builders, which, 197 00:11:51,600 --> 00:11:56,800 which I thought was the core bottleneck, which was limiting. 198 00:11:56,800 --> 00:12:00,600 The scope of blockchains did not have the same playground for 199 00:12:00,700 --> 00:12:03,300 Innovation. And so this became a little bit 200 00:12:03,300 --> 00:12:07,200 of an obsession trying to figure out, how do we borrow existing 201 00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:12,300 large trust networks to then go and create and let anybody in a 202 00:12:12,308 --> 00:12:14,100 weight on top of a common substrate? 203 00:12:14,700 --> 00:12:20,800 And I would say that was of the seeds for what became eigen. 204 00:12:20,800 --> 00:12:24,000 Layer later, is this Obsession in trying to figure out how do 205 00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:26,900 we leverage existing, trust networks to do new things that 206 00:12:26,900 --> 00:12:31,800 it was not designed to do. So that's, that's a little bit 207 00:12:31,800 --> 00:12:36,000 of Prelude on on what we were doing before and how it led to 208 00:12:36,000 --> 00:12:40,800 this project and a sec. So I can a lets you piggyback of 209 00:12:41,300 --> 00:12:46,000 an existing decentralized trust Network, it does that through 210 00:12:46,000 --> 00:12:50,100 mechanism called He's taking can you explain to us what that is? 211 00:12:50,300 --> 00:12:55,400 Yeah absolutely Federica when you ask this question, How can 212 00:12:55,400 --> 00:12:59,500 we leverage an existing, trust Network, to do other things, it 213 00:12:59,900 --> 00:13:03,600 it begs the following, you know, secondary question, which is, 214 00:13:03,900 --> 00:13:07,700 what is the root of trust of these existing networks and we 215 00:13:07,700 --> 00:13:11,800 can take Athenian as as an example or Bitcoin as another 216 00:13:11,800 --> 00:13:14,400 example. So what is the root of trust 217 00:13:14,400 --> 00:13:16,600 with Bitcoin? The root of trust of Bitcoin is 218 00:13:16,700 --> 00:13:19,600 the proof of work, which Powers, you know, security for this 219 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:22,100 network and similarly, what is the root of trust for? 220 00:13:22,100 --> 00:13:25,000 Ethereum is the proof of stake That powers. 221 00:13:25,300 --> 00:13:28,000 The secondary for this network. What do we mean by proof of 222 00:13:28,000 --> 00:13:30,600 stake Powers? The security for this network, 223 00:13:31,000 --> 00:13:34,200 people are taking their steak, they eat, and then locking it in 224 00:13:34,200 --> 00:13:37,800 a contract. And then saying that I am 225 00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:41,300 abiding by the conditions of block production of this network 226 00:13:41,300 --> 00:13:44,900 of aetherium. And if I deviate from it, if I 227 00:13:44,900 --> 00:13:48,300 follow it, give me rewards. If I deviate from it, I have 228 00:13:48,300 --> 00:13:53,300 liability that I may lose my eat and this constraints the set of 229 00:13:53,300 --> 00:13:56,500 possible. Here's that participants in the 230 00:13:56,500 --> 00:13:59,900 block production system can exert. 231 00:14:00,400 --> 00:14:03,200 They have to make whether blocks of they make invalid blocks or 232 00:14:03,200 --> 00:14:05,600 double sign blocks. And so on, they are liable to 233 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:07,700 Costa Rica. So this is the root of trust. 234 00:14:08,000 --> 00:14:12,700 The root of trust with helium is people putting down eat and 235 00:14:12,700 --> 00:14:15,900 committing to both positive and negative incentives. 236 00:14:15,900 --> 00:14:20,600 For actually, making this Vlog in comparison to say Bitcoin 237 00:14:20,600 --> 00:14:24,800 provoked, work where people are buying and investing Eating like 238 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:31,500 mining equipment and using that to mine Bitcoin blocks and the 239 00:14:31,500 --> 00:14:34,100 space of there is a positive incentive for them. 240 00:14:34,100 --> 00:14:37,100 The positive incentive is that if you continue mining on the 241 00:14:37,108 --> 00:14:40,100 longest chain, you'll get rewards and there is a negative 242 00:14:40,100 --> 00:14:45,000 incentive, which is that if, you know, you don't, you try to 243 00:14:45,000 --> 00:14:48,700 attack the system or whatever, the there's no programmatic 244 00:14:48,700 --> 00:14:51,500 negative incentive, but there's a subjective - in Center, which 245 00:14:51,500 --> 00:14:54,100 is that the Bitcoin to use the price may go. 246 00:14:54,200 --> 00:14:58,200 Down and that adversely impacts the value of your investment, 247 00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:02,400 which is this mining equipment. So that's the economics. 248 00:15:02,900 --> 00:15:06,200 Underpinning, the root of trust in Bitcoin and say the root of 249 00:15:06,200 --> 00:15:10,300 trust in Athenian. What we found was the etherium 250 00:15:10,300 --> 00:15:12,200 root of trust or in general proof of stake. 251 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:17,600 Root of trust is much more programmable and what do I mean 252 00:15:17,600 --> 00:15:20,900 by that? Is you can take the same stake 253 00:15:20,900 --> 00:15:24,000 and opt-in to additional conditions. 254 00:15:24,100 --> 00:15:27,000 All positive incentives and negative incentives. 255 00:15:27,300 --> 00:15:31,000 Because it's state and steak is programmatically controlled by 256 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:34,500 the blockchain. But us, you cannot do the same 257 00:15:34,500 --> 00:15:37,100 thing on bitcoin. You cannot take Bitcoin root of 258 00:15:37,100 --> 00:15:41,200 trust and then say that I can also opt into additional 259 00:15:41,700 --> 00:15:45,600 negative incentives because any additional - in centers are have 260 00:15:45,600 --> 00:15:49,700 to translate to bitcoin to USD price movements and that's not 261 00:15:49,700 --> 00:15:54,700 possible for us to modulate. So we found that and and it is 262 00:15:54,900 --> 00:15:58,000 more fundamental than that. Because, you know, the core idea 263 00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:02,500 is you cannot the Bitcoin blockchain cannot go and burn 264 00:16:02,500 --> 00:16:04,700 your mining equipment if you do something wrong. 265 00:16:04,700 --> 00:16:07,300 And that's because that's just there is a digital-to-analog 266 00:16:07,300 --> 00:16:11,600 translation barrier that as you know, your eat is stored in a 267 00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:15,700 contract and you can basically, you know, burn loose transfer, 268 00:16:15,700 --> 00:16:20,300 whatever those that eat. So now having gotten to the root 269 00:16:20,300 --> 00:16:23,900 of trust of proof of stake. We can ask how can we leverage 270 00:16:23,900 --> 00:16:30,600 the same E2 then also secure other things imaginable, we're 271 00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:36,400 all stay kurz, opt-in re steak which is basically put their 272 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:40,500 steak at commit, their steak two additional Services. 273 00:16:40,500 --> 00:16:43,700 They say that. Hey I'm going to also run this 274 00:16:43,700 --> 00:16:49,300 other data storage Network, this Oracle, or this new chain, any 275 00:16:49,300 --> 00:16:52,400 of these other things and they Say that. 276 00:16:52,400 --> 00:16:56,700 If I do not behave correctly on any of these Services, I'm 277 00:16:56,700 --> 00:17:00,800 liable to lose my eat. And if it turns out that all of 278 00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:05,500 them, all the hundred percent of each takers opt-in, then you 279 00:17:05,500 --> 00:17:08,800 have kind of gotten the same root of trust that that is 280 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:12,099 underpinning. The etherium blockchain to also 281 00:17:12,099 --> 00:17:16,300 opt into your service so you can think of once you have like 282 00:17:16,300 --> 00:17:21,500 everybody opt-in and everybody restate, then it's almost as if 283 00:17:21,500 --> 00:17:26,200 the ATM protocol upgraded itself to make sure you are basically 284 00:17:26,200 --> 00:17:29,500 this other services being run by everybody who is also running. 285 00:17:29,500 --> 00:17:34,600 They think you're mistaking and you can think of like two 286 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:39,100 different ways in which trust transfers one is trust arising. 287 00:17:39,100 --> 00:17:42,900 Due to decentralization, each sake is widely distributed and 288 00:17:42,900 --> 00:17:47,000 stay, so that is one dimension. So to just access that 289 00:17:47,000 --> 00:17:50,400 Dimension, it is sufficient. If the same set of eats takers, 290 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:52,900 also go and run, On this other service. 291 00:17:53,700 --> 00:17:57,500 But to transfer the economic incentives, we need the steak to 292 00:17:57,500 --> 00:18:01,600 be committed programmatically to additional slashing conditions 293 00:18:02,100 --> 00:18:03,600 relevant to each of these services. 294 00:18:03,800 --> 00:18:09,200 So I can layer allows basically is a platform that lets takers 295 00:18:09,300 --> 00:18:12,900 opt in both their like peace and flies trust and economic 296 00:18:12,900 --> 00:18:18,000 security to opt into validating all of these other services to 297 00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:21,500 give a bit of context on the name, eigen layer icon in German 298 00:18:21,500 --> 00:18:26,600 for your own It's we envision a world where anybody can come and 299 00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:31,300 build any new service without having to go find or build their 300 00:18:31,300 --> 00:18:34,500 own decentralized trust Network. They can leverage this, existing 301 00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:38,300 massive trust network of aetherium and then, and then 302 00:18:38,300 --> 00:18:41,700 built this on top. We find the timing to be. 303 00:18:42,300 --> 00:18:44,400 This is the right time to build something like iron layer 304 00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:46,600 because we just went through the merge. 305 00:18:46,600 --> 00:18:50,600 And we are in a fully proof of stake world right now, the 306 00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:56,600 etherium landscape as Also the layer to landscape having 307 00:18:58,500 --> 00:19:02,700 significantly driven technology forward for example, by having 308 00:19:02,700 --> 00:19:06,300 sophisticated fraud proofs and validity proves. 309 00:19:06,400 --> 00:19:09,800 And these may be needed for services to exert slashing. 310 00:19:10,300 --> 00:19:13,700 So if a service, for example, if I'm running a chain and in that 311 00:19:13,700 --> 00:19:16,700 chain, if you double signed a block, or if you signed an 312 00:19:16,700 --> 00:19:19,700 invalid block, it should be transparent on the Athenian 313 00:19:19,700 --> 00:19:22,800 blockchain whether that was correct. 314 00:19:22,900 --> 00:19:25,500 Not and to do that. You need to have either fraud 315 00:19:25,500 --> 00:19:29,400 Pros or validity proofs and the emergence of the layer to 316 00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:34,300 actually helps us in in basically, writing these lashes 317 00:19:34,300 --> 00:19:37,100 and conditions sharply. So that's a kind of quick 318 00:19:37,100 --> 00:19:41,200 overview of iconic. There's tons to unpack here. 319 00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:44,600 Maybe kind of, let's roll up, historically a little bit 320 00:19:44,600 --> 00:19:49,300 before, we kind of dive into the weeds here, there used to be and 321 00:19:49,300 --> 00:19:52,200 the concept of merge mining or I mean the concept of sit around. 322 00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:54,200 It's just there. Doesn't really get talked about 323 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:55,900 anymore. And so, basically, the idea 324 00:19:55,900 --> 00:20:01,100 behind much mining was that if you improve of work obtained, 325 00:20:01,100 --> 00:20:08,300 the right to build a block, you would be conceded to build the 326 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:10,200 block on a different chain as well. 327 00:20:10,200 --> 00:20:14,500 So basically, so, so that basically several chains can use 328 00:20:14,500 --> 00:20:18,300 the same proof of work. Is this the proof of steak 329 00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:21,900 equivalent to merge mining? Yeah, absolutely. 330 00:20:21,900 --> 00:20:27,200 I think this is So the wreath taking another way of thinking 331 00:20:27,200 --> 00:20:31,300 about Reese taking is is just merge staking, right? 332 00:20:31,300 --> 00:20:36,400 And I think this is probably one of the reasons why nobody else 333 00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:38,900 came up with it. And we came up with it is 334 00:20:38,900 --> 00:20:42,300 because, you know, all the oh, jeez, who have been around in 335 00:20:42,300 --> 00:20:47,300 encrypt or like, you obviously have looked at this Paradigm of 336 00:20:47,300 --> 00:20:51,800 much Mining, and much mining is the idea like fredericka just 337 00:20:51,800 --> 00:20:55,600 explained that that basically if you mine a block in Bitcoin, you 338 00:20:55,600 --> 00:21:00,100 also kind of minor Block in this altcoin or this new ecosystem 339 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:05,500 and merge mining had very limited crypto economic 340 00:21:05,500 --> 00:21:08,900 transfer. So what do I mean by that is if 341 00:21:08,900 --> 00:21:12,700 you merge mine Bitcoin and some other chain in some other 342 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:18,500 altcoin in parallel, Firstly, you need a lot of Bitcoin - to 343 00:21:18,500 --> 00:21:22,100 opt into this other system in order to have any security 344 00:21:22,100 --> 00:21:24,600 transfer. Because even if you had a 345 00:21:24,608 --> 00:21:28,300 majority honest in Bitcoin, if only 5% is much mining your 346 00:21:28,300 --> 00:21:32,800 other coin, then basically, you, you don't have any measurable 347 00:21:32,800 --> 00:21:36,400 security because Mourinho 51% of Bitcoin miners are honest, but 348 00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:40,000 doesn't mean 51% of 5% of Bitcoin miners are honest. 349 00:21:40,000 --> 00:21:43,600 So you need every all the Bitcoin - too often. 350 00:21:43,600 --> 00:21:47,400 So that's number one but even if Bitcoin miner Ops into the other 351 00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:51,300 system, there is still a massive limitation and the limitation is 352 00:21:51,300 --> 00:21:55,300 that Even if hundred percent of Bitcoin miners are mining. 353 00:21:55,300 --> 00:21:59,800 This altcoin if they all coordinated to attack this 354 00:21:59,800 --> 00:22:06,300 altcoin, what happens is the altcoin system doesn't work but 355 00:22:06,500 --> 00:22:10,600 that does not translate into any kind of like a meaningful loss 356 00:22:10,600 --> 00:22:14,500 for them in in the Bitcoin because, you know, they can 357 00:22:14,500 --> 00:22:17,100 continue to use their Bitcoin mining equipment to mine 358 00:22:17,100 --> 00:22:20,600 Bitcoins. So the the end of the day, the 359 00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:24,800 transfer of Economic Security from Bitcoin, to any of these 360 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:29,600 are all coins, which were merged, mine is very weak and 361 00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:35,900 because it's very weak, these systems did not did not evolve 362 00:22:35,900 --> 00:22:39,300 to the extent that people anticipated early on and these 363 00:22:39,300 --> 00:22:41,900 once these flaws were identified, people kind of gave 364 00:22:41,900 --> 00:22:45,800 up on this Paradigm and I think this is the reason why nobody 365 00:22:45,800 --> 00:22:48,300 really Revisited this Paradigm with you. 366 00:22:48,500 --> 00:22:53,600 Length of staking what we did in OS as kind of not having lived 367 00:22:53,600 --> 00:22:57,400 through all the experiences. We said, oh, yeah, case taking 368 00:22:57,400 --> 00:23:00,700 means that a slashing. And what this means is if you 369 00:23:00,700 --> 00:23:03,800 have like, you know, a twenty billion dollars, take Danny 370 00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:06,300 Theory. Mm, but even a 5% of it like 1 371 00:23:06,300 --> 00:23:10,100 billion dollar gets take then your alternative network if you 372 00:23:10,100 --> 00:23:14,100 misbehave, if you can lose all your eat, write the 1 billion 373 00:23:14,100 --> 00:23:16,700 dollar or wheat. That is a concrete - penalty. 374 00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:22,700 So the transfer of Economic Security is nearly perfect in 375 00:23:22,700 --> 00:23:26,800 merge staking, whereas the transfer of Economic Security in 376 00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:30,600 much mining is very limited or non-existent. 377 00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:36,200 So once we kind of broke the around this and this really 378 00:23:36,200 --> 00:23:38,300 needs two things, it needs proof of stake. 379 00:23:38,800 --> 00:23:42,300 It also needs a powerful general purpose programming, because 380 00:23:42,300 --> 00:23:45,700 otherwise, you cannot have strong programmatic conditions, 381 00:23:45,700 --> 00:23:49,600 which / the Money when you're misbehaving in all these 382 00:23:49,600 --> 00:23:52,800 protocols. So and both of them were kind of 383 00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:55,300 nicely getting well developed in Athenian. 384 00:23:55,400 --> 00:24:00,500 So that's the context for why I think many others who may have 385 00:24:00,500 --> 00:24:04,300 come up with it, missed it because of the trajectory of 386 00:24:04,300 --> 00:24:07,500 much mining which basically didn't work and I think much 387 00:24:07,500 --> 00:24:11,700 tracking works perfect. He I think I've seen you 388 00:24:11,700 --> 00:24:16,900 described also I glare as this programmable slashing protocol. 389 00:24:17,400 --> 00:24:19,200 Right. And I think one thing is 390 00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:21,100 interesting, I guess to some degree. 391 00:24:21,100 --> 00:24:24,900 If you if you think about sharding to right, I guess if 392 00:24:24,900 --> 00:24:28,100 you double side on one, another Shard, it kind of also slashed 393 00:24:28,100 --> 00:24:30,900 on the main charge, which essentially similar, just that. 394 00:24:30,900 --> 00:24:32,800 In this case, may be in our Lair. 395 00:24:33,300 --> 00:24:36,400 You somehow basically have like charts that do like different 396 00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:38,700 tasks. It's permissionless shown 397 00:24:38,700 --> 00:24:40,600 basically if you want to think about it. 398 00:24:40,600 --> 00:24:44,000 Yeah, so it's very interesting concept for sure. 399 00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:47,500 I have to say this one question that I definitely won't ask Why 400 00:24:47,500 --> 00:24:50,500 we're already on the kind of meat of it with the slashing, 401 00:24:50,500 --> 00:24:54,200 which is essentially only theory of right now. 402 00:24:54,500 --> 00:24:58,700 If you are a big enough, like steak, or you have this concept 403 00:24:58,700 --> 00:25:03,100 of correlated slashing, right that if like 33% of the network 404 00:25:03,100 --> 00:25:06,700 that was sign at certain point, you can have 100% slashing. 405 00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:11,700 Now, I guess I'm wondering since, of course, if you add 406 00:25:11,700 --> 00:25:15,900 more risks or more service on top, that can be / more 407 00:25:15,900 --> 00:25:19,600 conditions. And this case might be one of 408 00:25:19,600 --> 00:25:22,900 them you might potentially go like above 100%. 409 00:25:23,100 --> 00:25:28,000 Slashing, is that how do you like deal with that? 410 00:25:28,000 --> 00:25:31,900 Is there some kind of systemic risk there that the system? 411 00:25:32,100 --> 00:25:35,800 Generates and how if there is or like, if how do you think about 412 00:25:35,800 --> 00:25:38,800 it? And how do you limit that this? 413 00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:41,600 This happens? But obviously we don't like to 414 00:25:41,600 --> 00:25:43,700 see. No, no we'd like to see that at 415 00:25:43,700 --> 00:25:46,400 all and we try to minimize the chances for something like that. 416 00:25:46,800 --> 00:25:51,800 But Let's zoom out a little bit and see what we envision. 417 00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:55,600 The main use case of, I can layer to be that way and Wishin. 418 00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:58,200 I can lay it to play. The biggest role, is build 419 00:25:58,500 --> 00:26:01,300 services for the theorem ecosystem. 420 00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:06,700 So if you look at, if you look at what an application like 421 00:26:06,700 --> 00:26:12,500 adapted, a needs, It is paying etherium for, you know, 422 00:26:12,500 --> 00:26:15,700 decentralized trust on block building it, like on block 423 00:26:15,700 --> 00:26:20,500 making and block validation. But there is a whole domain of 424 00:26:20,500 --> 00:26:23,300 other things that are all needed in order to make this 425 00:26:23,300 --> 00:26:26,700 application usable. This could be things, like I 426 00:26:26,700 --> 00:26:31,700 need oracle's, I need Bridges, I need Mev management. 427 00:26:31,800 --> 00:26:35,100 I need data availability, I need, you know, faster or 428 00:26:35,100 --> 00:26:38,300 settlement, whatever the set of other services, you know, in a 429 00:26:38,300 --> 00:26:41,400 modular work. That you may want in order to 430 00:26:41,400 --> 00:26:45,300 actually have the application be trustless. 431 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:51,400 And if you look at this and when we talk about systemic risk, I 432 00:26:51,408 --> 00:26:55,000 think there is a kind of natural thing that people freak out when 433 00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:57,000 they see, like, oh, you're leveraging. 434 00:26:57,000 --> 00:27:01,100 Trust is going to be like, trigger system Icarus, but 435 00:27:01,100 --> 00:27:04,200 actually, I think I can layer significantly reduce the 436 00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:07,300 systemic risk and I'm going to kind of make a case for that. 437 00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:12,000 And why do I say that? So what is the systemic risk 438 00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:15,300 that we see today? If you're an application and you 439 00:27:15,300 --> 00:27:18,900 consume you know trust services from Atheneum. 440 00:27:18,900 --> 00:27:22,000 But you also consume Trust Services from oracle's from 441 00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:26,500 Bridges from, you know, other things that you all depend on 442 00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:34,300 and in some sense, trust is naturally based on the minimum 443 00:27:34,300 --> 00:27:36,800 bottleneck, right? Like whichever is the bottleneck 444 00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:39,600 trust that Determines like how much less you're getting. 445 00:27:40,300 --> 00:27:43,700 So you have, you know, ecosystem service from aetherium that 446 00:27:43,700 --> 00:27:47,000 basically makes blocks, but you also need all these other 447 00:27:47,000 --> 00:27:48,700 things. So imagine if you had like 448 00:27:48,700 --> 00:27:52,300 twenty billion dollars, take didn't eat on L1 but you have 449 00:27:52,300 --> 00:27:55,500 like 1 billion dollar staked in your Oracle 1 billion dollar in 450 00:27:55,500 --> 00:27:58,000 your bridge and 1 billion dollar in your data availability and 451 00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:01,100 other other things. Now the trust that you're 452 00:28:01,100 --> 00:28:03,800 getting as an application, what is the cost of attacking all 453 00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:07,600 these applications find the least trusted one and take over 454 00:28:07,600 --> 00:28:10,000 that. Thing that is all that is needed 455 00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:13,000 to actually attack the whole system of applications. 456 00:28:13,700 --> 00:28:17,700 And okay. Now, imagine in an eigen layer 457 00:28:17,700 --> 00:28:21,000 world, you are fully over-leveraged, which is what we 458 00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:22,300 are. Kind of worried about what is 459 00:28:22,300 --> 00:28:25,600 over-leveraged mean, like every steak is doing everything, okay? 460 00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:29,100 Every Staker is participating in the Oracle every sticker is 461 00:28:29,100 --> 00:28:31,600 participating in the bridge. Every sticker is participating 462 00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:34,100 in the data available. Only in fact, I'm going to argue 463 00:28:34,100 --> 00:28:36,200 that this is the best possible world can world. 464 00:28:36,900 --> 00:28:40,100 Why is this? Because now to attack any one of 465 00:28:40,100 --> 00:28:43,200 the applications, you have to attack a, either the coral one 466 00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:46,300 or one of these services. And if you're attacked anyone of 467 00:28:46,300 --> 00:28:49,700 these Services, you're going to slash 51% of that service. 468 00:28:50,000 --> 00:28:53,500 So that's the mental model for building on eigenvector is you 469 00:28:53,500 --> 00:28:58,200 should have if the safety of that service famed like then you 470 00:28:58,200 --> 00:29:00,900 should be able to / a majority of the stickers. 471 00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:05,400 So if you take this mental model, then essentially what you 472 00:29:05,400 --> 00:29:10,600 can do is to now attack any one of these Services, you need to 473 00:29:10,600 --> 00:29:14,100 attack like this 20 billion dollar State, you cannot attack 474 00:29:14,100 --> 00:29:16,400 1 billion dollars take and take over the system. 475 00:29:16,800 --> 00:29:20,300 So the cost of corrupting the ecosystem actually increases 476 00:29:20,700 --> 00:29:23,800 under perfectly staking, if you research a so does the reward 477 00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:27,300 know, sort of the reward. The reward doesn't increase, 478 00:29:27,300 --> 00:29:30,100 actually, why? Because you could have already 479 00:29:30,100 --> 00:29:32,500 taken that gained by Start a Kindle. 480 00:29:32,900 --> 00:29:36,000 So the reason the reward doesn't increase is the same set of 481 00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:39,100 daps. So the there is a set of dabs 482 00:29:39,100 --> 00:29:41,700 already living on aetherium. They trust the theory ml 1, 483 00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:44,200 right? And now they were dependent on 484 00:29:44,200 --> 00:29:47,100 all these external non ecosystem Services. 485 00:29:47,200 --> 00:29:51,200 It like oracle's Bridges which are not done by the L1, they 486 00:29:51,200 --> 00:29:53,800 were dependent on all of these and by attacking L1. 487 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:58,100 Any way you could have attacked these tabs but because, because 488 00:29:58,100 --> 00:30:00,500 it is trust is the Min of many things. 489 00:30:00,500 --> 00:30:03,600 If I trust you You and Felix and somebody else. 490 00:30:03,900 --> 00:30:07,300 And anyway, I'm trusting, let's say frederika with my life. 491 00:30:07,600 --> 00:30:10,700 I might as well trust her with my bag and like other things 492 00:30:11,300 --> 00:30:14,300 instead of like giving those other things to other people, 493 00:30:14,300 --> 00:30:17,000 then you know, my trust exposure actually increases. 494 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:19,600 But the cost of corruption, doesn't think the profit from 495 00:30:19,600 --> 00:30:22,000 corruption doesn't increase because Frederick, I could have 496 00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:25,800 already taken my life and she just, she's if she doesn't the 497 00:30:25,800 --> 00:30:28,700 same thing is happening with the L1 is basically already. 498 00:30:28,700 --> 00:30:31,800 The daps are trusting the l14 block reduction if you Fine. 499 00:30:31,800 --> 00:30:36,700 If you do any basic issue at the L1, you could have taken away 500 00:30:36,700 --> 00:30:40,800 kind of like value from the Taps, I'm, with you, part of the 501 00:30:40,800 --> 00:30:43,000 argument. So, I mean, obviously, if you 502 00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:47,700 have a system that is composed out of individual components, 503 00:30:47,700 --> 00:30:51,000 the weakest link is what you need to break in order to break 504 00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:53,000 the system, totally with you on this. 505 00:30:53,300 --> 00:30:59,100 But if you have different chains or different applications, you 506 00:30:59,100 --> 00:31:03,400 know, secured by the same. Steak to me, that's not the same 507 00:31:03,400 --> 00:31:05,400 thing. So basically if you have say the 508 00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:07,600 Oracle that would have been Incorporated anyway. 509 00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:10,200 Yeah that's kind of that's still the same system. 510 00:31:10,300 --> 00:31:15,100 So if I look at the theorem now say if you're in the he's you 511 00:31:15,108 --> 00:31:19,200 know, ethers were worth. I'm making this up now. 150 512 00:31:19,200 --> 00:31:24,200 billion give or take but the ecosystem is worth 500 per, you 513 00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:27,300 know, 800 billion whatever. I haven't done the math but 514 00:31:27,300 --> 00:31:31,200 probably by a park correct and that's probably fine. 515 00:31:31,600 --> 00:31:35,700 So basically, but if you have, if you wear to secure like the 516 00:31:35,700 --> 00:31:40,800 entire global economy with 150 billion, this will probably not 517 00:31:40,800 --> 00:31:43,000 be fine, right? So basically to me, the question 518 00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:47,900 is, is there a way to mathematically deduce? 519 00:31:48,200 --> 00:31:55,600 How much you can actually secure economically with the steak that 520 00:31:55,700 --> 00:31:59,900 you're we're talking about here, namely the 150 billion of eats 521 00:32:01,700 --> 00:32:04,600 Yes. So, so first point, I think, you 522 00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:06,300 know what, what you're saying is? 523 00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:10,300 Well, if there were applications that already existed on etherium 524 00:32:10,300 --> 00:32:13,700 today and only they are being served by these additional 525 00:32:13,700 --> 00:32:17,400 Services than yes, the profit from corrupting doesn't increase 526 00:32:17,400 --> 00:32:20,600 because they're already there. But if it does increase the 527 00:32:20,600 --> 00:32:24,600 economy significantly because of like oh actually the same money 528 00:32:24,600 --> 00:32:28,100 is now securing a much bigger economy, then you know, you'd be 529 00:32:28,100 --> 00:32:31,400 under serious trouble. But let me make a Contrapositive 530 00:32:31,400 --> 00:32:36,400 to this. The imagine we had four years 531 00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:40,300 back, okay? And you know, somebody comes and 532 00:32:40,300 --> 00:32:44,800 tells me eat is worth whatever 100 million 200 million today. 533 00:32:44,900 --> 00:32:48,800 And, you know, there is no way that he can secure like a 500 534 00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:53,100 billion dollar worth of an ecosystem and that didn't turn 535 00:32:53,100 --> 00:32:55,500 out to be the case. It is now securing a 500 billion 536 00:32:55,500 --> 00:32:58,300 dollar worth of ecosystem. And you can ask, why is that 537 00:32:58,900 --> 00:33:02,300 Because eat grew in value relative to the ecosystem 538 00:33:02,300 --> 00:33:05,400 securing it. It is securing and this is for 539 00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:07,700 the good, right? Because actually, you know, the 540 00:33:07,700 --> 00:33:12,400 value of flow from the fees, actually, sustains enough value 541 00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:17,600 to actually make sure that it is valuable enough and one could 542 00:33:17,600 --> 00:33:22,100 make the same argument that by making what the theorem secures 543 00:33:22,100 --> 00:33:26,400 a little bit more meta. By making is not only what is 544 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:28,300 run on the etherium virtual machine. 545 00:33:28,800 --> 00:33:32,000 Basically anything that they didn't trust Network and secure, 546 00:33:32,100 --> 00:33:34,800 you're actually just, you know, increasing the scope of 547 00:33:34,800 --> 00:33:37,700 applications what were what could be built as applications 548 00:33:37,700 --> 00:33:39,800 on evm. This is what could be built 549 00:33:39,800 --> 00:33:43,100 those applications which are natively, you know, new 550 00:33:43,100 --> 00:33:47,100 distributed systems that can then be programmed on top and 551 00:33:47,200 --> 00:33:50,000 you could make the argument that basically eat will grow because 552 00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:53,100 you're receiving fees from not only, you know, block making, 553 00:33:53,100 --> 00:33:56,000 but also from all these other services accrue back to 554 00:33:56,000 --> 00:34:00,100 etherium. But I think there is a The the 555 00:34:00,100 --> 00:34:03,100 separate part of your question which is a more mathematical 556 00:34:03,100 --> 00:34:06,600 kind of a question. And the question is, what are 557 00:34:06,600 --> 00:34:11,500 like exact equations that like calculate and understand this 558 00:34:11,500 --> 00:34:13,900 over leveraging? So to do that, we have to 559 00:34:13,900 --> 00:34:17,100 actually look at what's happening in the ecosystem today 560 00:34:17,100 --> 00:34:20,300 already. And you look at it, you have 561 00:34:20,300 --> 00:34:24,100 twenty billion dollars aside. We 3m's worth 150 billion years. 562 00:34:24,100 --> 00:34:27,199 That's true. But each stake, this worth maybe 563 00:34:27,199 --> 00:34:30,100 less than 20 billion today. But it is securing this. 564 00:34:30,100 --> 00:34:31,800 Find it billion-dollar ecosystem. 565 00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:34,600 Why are we not worried about this over-leveraged? 566 00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:38,100 What is going on, right? Like, what's the underpinnings 567 00:34:38,100 --> 00:34:40,900 of not worrying about this over-leveraged? 568 00:34:41,400 --> 00:34:45,300 And I think there are two things, two ways to look at it. 569 00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:49,600 One is a practical way and then I'll go to the mathematical way. 570 00:34:49,699 --> 00:34:52,199 The practical way is you look at it and you say oh you know you 571 00:34:52,199 --> 00:34:54,699 have twenty billion dollars ticked and if you're an 572 00:34:54,699 --> 00:34:58,700 attacker, firstly, you have to acquire 20 billion dollars. 573 00:34:58,800 --> 00:35:01,000 Or whatever two-thirds of 20 billion dollars. 574 00:35:01,700 --> 00:35:05,500 And because there is a slashing protocol at work, you're going 575 00:35:05,500 --> 00:35:08,500 to guaranteed to lose that six billion, seven billion 13 576 00:35:08,500 --> 00:35:11,300 billion, whatever depending on what type of attack are falling 577 00:35:11,300 --> 00:35:14,500 off. So you're guaranteed to lose a 578 00:35:14,500 --> 00:35:18,400 whole bunch of money, whether you are able to make our way 579 00:35:18,400 --> 00:35:20,900 with a whole bunch of money is anybody's question, right? 580 00:35:20,900 --> 00:35:24,600 Like whether you are, you will be able to run away with more 581 00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:29,600 than 10 billion dollars. From this ecosystem is and is 582 00:35:29,600 --> 00:35:31,900 questionable because because of what? 583 00:35:31,900 --> 00:35:35,000 Because you don't have exchanged liquidity yet that scale, you 584 00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:39,200 don't have, you know, exit points and there is frictions 585 00:35:39,200 --> 00:35:42,300 and Society will Fork you out and all these other things. 586 00:35:42,700 --> 00:35:45,400 That essentially constrain the profit from corruption. 587 00:35:46,200 --> 00:35:49,200 So the cost of corruption, the cost to the attacker is 588 00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:52,200 guaranteed that they have to, they have to take, you know, the 589 00:35:52,200 --> 00:35:55,600 six billion dollars or 13 billion dollar risk. 590 00:35:55,900 --> 00:36:00,300 And the profit that they can make is potentially limited, and 591 00:36:00,300 --> 00:36:02,700 these two together, constrain, the system enough that 592 00:36:02,700 --> 00:36:06,200 practically, we don't see these attacks but you evading my 593 00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:08,400 question, right? So, basically, because I'm 594 00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:11,000 asking was the upper bound and you say it, no, no, no, but it's 595 00:36:11,000 --> 00:36:14,200 lower than the upper bound. Which I am sure it is. 596 00:36:14,300 --> 00:36:17,200 I mean to basically, I totally couldn't see that say, you break 597 00:36:17,200 --> 00:36:21,100 a helium, the maker token is probably where crash. 598 00:36:21,200 --> 00:36:25,600 I mean, totally with you on that but I mean, yeah, I mean it's a 599 00:36:25,600 --> 00:36:27,900 way to have Kate number. Yeah, that's the next part of 600 00:36:27,900 --> 00:36:29,700 the question. That I said, I just answered the 601 00:36:29,700 --> 00:36:32,900 practical way. We can also actually understand 602 00:36:32,900 --> 00:36:37,500 these more mathematically, and to do this, actually, you need 603 00:36:37,500 --> 00:36:40,100 to redesign aetherium a little bit. 604 00:36:40,300 --> 00:36:44,700 And so, for All what you need is. 605 00:36:45,400 --> 00:36:47,900 Okay, well, how do we mathematically understand, like 606 00:36:47,900 --> 00:36:50,900 what is the limits of Leverage and why are we not 607 00:36:50,900 --> 00:36:53,500 over-leveraged today on aetherium, right before we 608 00:36:53,500 --> 00:36:57,300 extend leverage even more to other things that I'm talking 609 00:36:57,300 --> 00:36:58,700 about? We have to understand why we are 610 00:36:58,700 --> 00:37:02,500 not all over yesterday. So the first part was a 611 00:37:02,500 --> 00:37:05,800 practical argument arguing that there is a kind of hardening of 612 00:37:05,800 --> 00:37:09,900 security at a certain scale and that's the argument but the 613 00:37:09,900 --> 00:37:12,300 second part is the more mathematical argument and what? 614 00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:17,600 You can do is you can say that the total amount of transact. 615 00:37:17,600 --> 00:37:21,000 So whenever there is some kind of an event that is either a 616 00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:23,600 social response or other response which happens within a 617 00:37:23,607 --> 00:37:27,700 certain time. And if you can bound the total 618 00:37:27,900 --> 00:37:30,400 value flow within that amount of time. 619 00:37:30,700 --> 00:37:33,200 So if you can bond that you know, you will not be able to 620 00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:37,600 move more than whatever, you know, 6 billion or 7 billion or 621 00:37:37,600 --> 00:37:40,600 something within that time, which is the incidence response 622 00:37:40,600 --> 00:37:43,800 time incidence response time. Be like time to detect a 623 00:37:43,808 --> 00:37:47,200 double-double signed block and then shut down, like further 624 00:37:47,200 --> 00:37:50,600 transfers, it may be the time for like, a community to Fork 625 00:37:50,600 --> 00:37:54,300 out an obvious, like, you know, a fraudulent Fork. 626 00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:57,500 So essentially, what you want to do is you want to bound the 627 00:37:57,500 --> 00:38:01,900 total volume that of transactions within the Event 628 00:38:01,900 --> 00:38:03,500 Horizon. We're like so there's an event 629 00:38:03,500 --> 00:38:07,300 horizon and then there is a total volume that total 630 00:38:07,300 --> 00:38:11,400 transaction volume. And right now, there is no nice 631 00:38:11,400 --> 00:38:13,800 way to do it. Because we don't know how much 632 00:38:13,800 --> 00:38:16,100 Finance transfer, we don't know how much crack and transferred. 633 00:38:16,100 --> 00:38:19,200 We don't know how much some other like mom-and-pop exchange 634 00:38:19,200 --> 00:38:20,700 transferred. We don't know how much somebody 635 00:38:20,700 --> 00:38:23,100 sold the Mercedes-Benz 4 and so on, right. 636 00:38:23,100 --> 00:38:26,200 Like with there's all this activity happening outside and 637 00:38:26,200 --> 00:38:28,000 there is no protocol level monitoring. 638 00:38:28,300 --> 00:38:30,800 And why am I focusing on only exit exit? 639 00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:35,100 Paths is because you can kind of categorize transactions into two 640 00:38:35,100 --> 00:38:37,700 types. One is transactions that are 641 00:38:37,700 --> 00:38:41,000 internally Atomic. I am selling my eat and getting 642 00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:44,000 a an It right? Like, I'm selling my eat and 643 00:38:44,000 --> 00:38:46,200 getting aboard. A this is an atomic transfer 644 00:38:46,200 --> 00:38:49,500 inside the Block Chain, if it reverts both rebirth, right? 645 00:38:49,800 --> 00:38:53,200 I either have the eat or I have the, have the bullet and I'm 646 00:38:53,200 --> 00:38:57,100 kind of fine, both ways but there are transactions which are 647 00:38:57,100 --> 00:38:59,400 not Atomic inside the blockchain, right? 648 00:38:59,400 --> 00:39:02,400 One leg of the transaction is happening on the blockchain and 649 00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:04,500 another leg is happening in the real world, right? 650 00:39:04,500 --> 00:39:08,600 These are the ones that get screwed if you actually have 651 00:39:08,600 --> 00:39:11,400 like, you know, blockchain reversals and we are exam. 652 00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:15,100 Things like that. And what you can start doing is 653 00:39:15,100 --> 00:39:20,100 if you can bound the total value of non-atomic, transactions, per 654 00:39:20,100 --> 00:39:25,300 unit time, then you can actually start saying that actually 20 655 00:39:25,300 --> 00:39:28,400 billion dollars is not a bound on, whatever is the amount steak 656 00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:32,000 does not a bound on the total value at risk. 657 00:39:32,100 --> 00:39:35,800 It is only a bound on the total volume transacted within the 658 00:39:35,800 --> 00:39:38,800 Event Horizon. So that is you can actually 659 00:39:39,300 --> 00:39:41,100 okay, so this is a whole other discussion. 660 00:39:41,100 --> 00:39:45,800 I have a full design for How to actually modulate the etherium 661 00:39:45,800 --> 00:39:51,500 protocol where the slashed funds are used as insurance against 662 00:39:51,500 --> 00:39:55,100 tree Orcs, so you can actually start selling insurance bonds 663 00:39:55,500 --> 00:39:58,900 against the / funds, or at least a portion of the / once even if 664 00:39:58,900 --> 00:40:01,600 half of the funds are burnt, the other half is used for insurance 665 00:40:02,000 --> 00:40:05,400 and anybody who's transacting you know and wants protection 666 00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:08,200 against, you know, these bad events actually takes out an 667 00:40:08,200 --> 00:40:11,900 insurance from the theorem protocol and by doing this what 668 00:40:11,900 --> 00:40:13,500 happens. Is the theorem protocol as 669 00:40:13,500 --> 00:40:16,500 creates common information on the total volume transacted 670 00:40:16,500 --> 00:40:19,700 within, within a unit time because you, you wouldn't 671 00:40:19,700 --> 00:40:22,600 ransacked huge volume without having commensurate insurance. 672 00:40:23,100 --> 00:40:26,800 So, anyway, this is a whole other, like, rabbit hole. 673 00:40:26,800 --> 00:40:30,300 I'm happy to talk more about, but I think you need more 674 00:40:30,300 --> 00:40:33,400 sophisticated systems to actually have mathematically 675 00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:37,500 bound the over-leveraged on on ethereum today and we are 676 00:40:37,500 --> 00:40:41,400 building some of these into part of our protocol. 677 00:40:42,400 --> 00:40:46,400 At least the roadmap of our protocol but we do need more 678 00:40:46,400 --> 00:40:50,200 native support from theorem. What kind of heuristics are you 679 00:40:50,200 --> 00:40:54,300 using for the event horizon and the volume mean, how would you 680 00:40:54,300 --> 00:40:56,900 define the Event Horizon? How long do you think that is on 681 00:40:56,900 --> 00:41:01,800 East to? Okay, so the The Event Horizon 682 00:41:01,800 --> 00:41:04,800 depends on the type of bad event you're worried about. 683 00:41:05,000 --> 00:41:08,600 And I think one important kind of bad event, we should be 684 00:41:08,600 --> 00:41:12,400 worried about is Shocked. I'm real excited. 685 00:41:12,400 --> 00:41:14,600 Claim a block is finalized, right? 686 00:41:14,600 --> 00:41:18,600 And I make a lot of transactions and then like I go and create 687 00:41:18,600 --> 00:41:22,300 another as ass takers. They create another like fork 688 00:41:22,400 --> 00:41:25,800 with another finalized block, which would not happen and is 689 00:41:26,000 --> 00:41:29,300 slashed by the slashing protocol, but, you know, if 690 00:41:29,300 --> 00:41:31,400 there is more money to be made, it could happen. 691 00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:34,800 But with this was East to, that's much more difficult. 692 00:41:34,800 --> 00:41:36,300 No. I mean, so basically, Rio 693 00:41:36,300 --> 00:41:38,500 ganging. I means you can miss a block, 694 00:41:38,500 --> 00:41:44,200 and you can kind of you can You can produce a network split by 695 00:41:44,900 --> 00:41:49,900 submitting a block deliberately late, but you kind of eliminate 696 00:41:49,900 --> 00:41:55,800 most of the of the reorg mess that we had with if you re on 697 00:41:55,800 --> 00:41:58,500 one. No, I mean eliminate to the 698 00:41:58,500 --> 00:42:02,400 extent that it creates an economic damage to the attacker, 699 00:42:02,400 --> 00:42:06,200 but if the economic profit to the attacker is 500 billion and 700 00:42:06,200 --> 00:42:08,600 that's it. So that's that's the thing that 701 00:42:09,000 --> 00:42:12,300 absolutely rely proof of stake. It's flashing and slashing 702 00:42:12,300 --> 00:42:15,600 creates an economic damage. But I may take the economic 703 00:42:15,600 --> 00:42:18,500 damage because my economic profit is higher than the 704 00:42:18,508 --> 00:42:22,200 economic damage. And so, I think that's the thing 705 00:42:22,200 --> 00:42:25,300 that because, you know, put producing invalid blocks is not 706 00:42:25,300 --> 00:42:28,700 a valid attack on full nodes, which can validate the blocks. 707 00:42:29,300 --> 00:42:33,700 So really the only major safety attack is reorganize finalized 708 00:42:33,700 --> 00:42:36,000 blocks, right? And you can reorder paralyzed 709 00:42:36,000 --> 00:42:38,600 blocks. If you have majority stake and 710 00:42:38,600 --> 00:42:42,100 you're willing to lose it. And So the question is, like, 711 00:42:42,700 --> 00:42:49,100 suppose somebody re orgs eat to block right, and at what time 712 00:42:49,100 --> 00:42:52,800 scale, so if they re or God block, which is 10 days old 713 00:42:53,100 --> 00:42:57,000 likely, we will all even if we /, it will continue with the 714 00:42:57,000 --> 00:42:59,600 other Fork, right? Like the fork in which, you 715 00:42:59,607 --> 00:43:04,100 know, which was not 10 days old. But if it was 12 minutes old, 716 00:43:04,500 --> 00:43:07,200 which one will we continue with? I don't know, right. 717 00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:12,400 And so the Event Horizon is, Actually, you know, the time to 718 00:43:12,400 --> 00:43:15,500 detect a reorg attack or the time within which you can 719 00:43:15,500 --> 00:43:18,600 effectively make a reorg attack, which will not be rejected. 720 00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:21,300 And so, that's roughly what I would say. 721 00:43:21,700 --> 00:43:25,200 I mean, it's in the order of basically minutes or hours 722 00:43:25,200 --> 00:43:29,600 rather than, in the order of like months, or weeks, right? 723 00:43:29,600 --> 00:43:32,200 So that's the and so, essentially, you have to just 724 00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:35,700 bound the economic volume traded within that period. 725 00:43:35,800 --> 00:43:39,700 And I think that's why it helium is safe today because of these 726 00:43:39,700 --> 00:43:43,700 reasons and And we can imbue something like I can layer with 727 00:43:43,700 --> 00:43:47,500 the exact same set of conditions but we can even make it more 728 00:43:47,500 --> 00:43:49,600 programmatic because we are building it. 729 00:43:49,600 --> 00:43:53,000 We can say that you can not transact more than a certain 730 00:43:53,100 --> 00:43:56,800 value per unit time and so on. And that's enough to basically 731 00:43:57,200 --> 00:43:59,600 make it very difficult to execute these attacks. 732 00:44:00,900 --> 00:44:03,200 Right. Yeah, thanks for this excursion 733 00:44:03,200 --> 00:44:07,100 and we would love to see the design of the insurance thing. 734 00:44:07,100 --> 00:44:08,200 That actually sounded. Super cool. 735 00:44:08,200 --> 00:44:11,800 I hope we'll learn more about that soon. 736 00:44:11,800 --> 00:44:14,000 I wanted to take it back. Obviously, about the topic. 737 00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:16,900 We also want to talk about like I can layer itself, right? 738 00:44:16,900 --> 00:44:19,500 A little bit, kind of the economics, the participants. 739 00:44:19,500 --> 00:44:22,700 We were talking a little bit about the validators, basically 740 00:44:22,700 --> 00:44:25,300 opting into these other services. 741 00:44:25,300 --> 00:44:28,500 Probably, you could also see, maybe like liquid, staking, 742 00:44:28,500 --> 00:44:33,400 protocols forcing, Essentially to opt in to certain services 743 00:44:33,900 --> 00:44:39,100 and then on the other hand, you have people paying for the, 744 00:44:39,200 --> 00:44:41,600 these eigen layers services that are being provided. 745 00:44:41,600 --> 00:44:47,200 That's, is that correct? And then I guess how, who pays 746 00:44:47,200 --> 00:44:49,300 first of all is the applications. 747 00:44:50,100 --> 00:44:53,900 How do they pay for it? What are kind of like models and 748 00:44:53,900 --> 00:44:57,300 and who, then receives the, I guess that's the validators 749 00:44:57,300 --> 00:44:59,300 again, but maybe you can talk a little bit just about like, how 750 00:44:59,300 --> 00:45:01,900 useful the economy. That is underpinning. 751 00:45:01,900 --> 00:45:04,700 This? So one way we think about the 752 00:45:04,700 --> 00:45:07,700 economy underlying I can layer is to start with first 753 00:45:07,700 --> 00:45:10,200 principles. And the first principle is the 754 00:45:10,200 --> 00:45:12,300 core value proposition of blockchain is decentralized 755 00:45:12,300 --> 00:45:17,300 trust and what how we think of eigen layer is a Marketplace for 756 00:45:17,300 --> 00:45:20,900 decentralized trust. If decentralized trust is such 757 00:45:20,900 --> 00:45:24,900 an important thing in this, this blockchain economy, we need a 758 00:45:24,908 --> 00:45:28,100 marketplace where decent lies trust is bought and sold and 759 00:45:28,100 --> 00:45:31,200 people have recognized this in other ways and One way of 760 00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:34,700 thinking about it was block space as a kind of, like a unit 761 00:45:34,700 --> 00:45:38,400 of decentralized trust, but we think that's not the right level 762 00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:41,700 of abstraction. Recently block space, is not the 763 00:45:41,700 --> 00:45:44,900 right level of abstraction. For the generic nature of decent 764 00:45:44,900 --> 00:45:47,800 lights trust, you may want to run a new distributed system, 765 00:45:47,800 --> 00:45:51,400 you may want to run like a secure multi-party computation 766 00:45:51,400 --> 00:45:54,600 and whatever that was not natively in the protocol, right? 767 00:45:54,600 --> 00:45:59,900 So the right unit is you have this decentralized trust Network 768 00:45:59,900 --> 00:46:03,700 and And you are basically committing to do additional 769 00:46:03,700 --> 00:46:06,200 validation. And the question is, how much 770 00:46:07,100 --> 00:46:10,900 value or you willing to take for it, right? 771 00:46:11,000 --> 00:46:13,500 And so to elucidate this economy a bit. 772 00:46:13,500 --> 00:46:15,300 So there are two sides to this Market. 773 00:46:15,300 --> 00:46:18,300 One side is stickers who are then offering their 774 00:46:18,300 --> 00:46:21,300 decentralized, Trust Services to others, right? 775 00:46:21,700 --> 00:46:25,100 And the other side of the market is we think of them as 776 00:46:25,100 --> 00:46:29,000 middlewares but they could be generic distributed systems 777 00:46:29,000 --> 00:46:33,000 right services that are built. All of this these Services, you 778 00:46:33,000 --> 00:46:36,400 know, just to make, make it concrete, let's think of it. 779 00:46:36,500 --> 00:46:39,500 Think of the data availability service that we're building, you 780 00:46:39,500 --> 00:46:43,300 can think of it just simply as a data storage service is not a 781 00:46:43,308 --> 00:46:46,600 data storage data availability. But just for Simplicity let's 782 00:46:46,600 --> 00:46:50,400 think of it as a. I'm going to take some blob and 783 00:46:50,400 --> 00:46:53,300 throw it into this network and they have to store this blob for 784 00:46:53,300 --> 00:46:58,100 this amount of time. And now you want to do this, 785 00:46:58,400 --> 00:47:01,700 who's paying for this, so Eddie creates this service. 786 00:47:01,700 --> 00:47:04,700 Let's say you know fredericka and Felix wrote the service, 787 00:47:04,700 --> 00:47:07,200 they want to create a data storage service, they wrote it 788 00:47:07,200 --> 00:47:10,200 and then they are tired of like pumping and chilling. 789 00:47:10,200 --> 00:47:12,800 A new token so they say no I'm not going to do it. 790 00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:15,000 I'm just going to run it on. I can layer just throw it on 791 00:47:15,000 --> 00:47:19,200 this distributed Network and they do it and they say, oh, you 792 00:47:19,200 --> 00:47:22,900 know, there's a Frederick on Felix wallet it like so you have 793 00:47:22,900 --> 00:47:26,100 a wallet and you say that anybody who's paying. 794 00:47:26,100 --> 00:47:28,600 So and you also create an economy around it, you say, 795 00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:31,800 anybody who wants to store data on this, Distributed Network 796 00:47:31,800 --> 00:47:35,800 needs to pay $1 per byte or one unit per byte or whatever, 797 00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:37,700 right? One unit per gigabyte, okay? 798 00:47:38,100 --> 00:47:42,400 So yeah, the one eat per gigabyte and now somebody else 799 00:47:42,400 --> 00:47:45,100 who wants to use the service, they come and they have some 800 00:47:45,100 --> 00:47:48,600 interfaces, they store the data on this like decentralized 801 00:47:48,600 --> 00:47:52,900 Network and they pay that one eat per gigabyte to store that 802 00:47:53,000 --> 00:47:55,900 data. And, you know, when fragance 803 00:47:55,900 --> 00:47:59,200 Alex created it, they also created a distribution economy 804 00:47:59,200 --> 00:48:06,900 which said that Yeah, we will take 30% of this, like one eat 4 805 00:48:06,900 --> 00:48:10,700 GB and the remaining 70% goes to the validators and the 806 00:48:10,707 --> 00:48:12,800 validators, look at it and they say it. 807 00:48:12,800 --> 00:48:14,700 Does this make sense for me or not? 808 00:48:15,000 --> 00:48:17,600 And they obtained if it makes sense, if that economy makes 809 00:48:17,600 --> 00:48:21,200 sense for them. And so, every time when somebody 810 00:48:21,200 --> 00:48:23,700 comes and stores data, they collect that one eat. 811 00:48:23,700 --> 00:48:26,500 And that 18.3 it goes into your wallet. 812 00:48:26,500 --> 00:48:29,700 And then the remaining .7 e gets redistributed among all the 813 00:48:29,700 --> 00:48:32,900 stickers. So there is really a third party 814 00:48:32,900 --> 00:48:35,700 like there was originally a service and then there was the 815 00:48:35,700 --> 00:48:39,500 stickers, then there is service users of that service which 816 00:48:39,500 --> 00:48:43,900 could be Roll-Ups which could be applications like distributed 817 00:48:43,900 --> 00:48:45,900 applications. Should be end users who just 818 00:48:45,900 --> 00:48:50,300 want like a drop box type thing to be built on a blockchain. 819 00:48:50,800 --> 00:48:54,300 So that's the economy. The economy is basically the 820 00:48:54,300 --> 00:48:59,100 creator of the service decides how value is apportioned between 821 00:48:59,100 --> 00:49:00,500 the Creator. The innovator. 822 00:49:00,600 --> 00:49:03,800 ER and the service providers, the stickers, right? 823 00:49:03,800 --> 00:49:08,300 So how this economy is distributed, and once they set 824 00:49:08,300 --> 00:49:10,800 forth the set of these conditions, what they actually 825 00:49:10,800 --> 00:49:12,900 do is, you know, a service Creator. 826 00:49:13,300 --> 00:49:15,800 So to delve into this a little bit more, the service creator 827 00:49:15,800 --> 00:49:20,500 also creates a like a container which you can just take her, 828 00:49:20,500 --> 00:49:23,100 should be able to download and run which does this particular 829 00:49:23,100 --> 00:49:27,700 service downloading and and storing the data for this amount 830 00:49:27,700 --> 00:49:32,500 of period, if he has been paid and They also create a smart 831 00:49:32,500 --> 00:49:35,200 contract, the service or middleware creates a smart 832 00:49:35,200 --> 00:49:37,800 contract, which talks to the eigen layers, smart contracts 833 00:49:39,000 --> 00:49:43,200 and establishes, who can participate in the system. 834 00:49:43,400 --> 00:49:47,000 It's takers with whatever. You know at least so much state 835 00:49:47,300 --> 00:49:49,500 or do you allow steak need holders? 836 00:49:49,700 --> 00:49:53,000 What is the entry condition to participate in your particular 837 00:49:53,000 --> 00:49:54,600 service? That's the first part. 838 00:49:55,100 --> 00:49:59,600 The second part is what is the payment condition or it is 839 00:49:59,600 --> 00:50:02,900 actually one? One beat per gigabyte and point 840 00:50:02,900 --> 00:50:06,300 3 goes to the creators and .7 goes to the stickers. 841 00:50:06,400 --> 00:50:08,800 That's the payment conditions are encoded in the smart 842 00:50:08,800 --> 00:50:12,400 contract and finally negative incentives like slashing or also 843 00:50:12,400 --> 00:50:15,600 encoded in the smart contract. It says, oh, if there is a 844 00:50:15,600 --> 00:50:18,500 recall game and then I say that randomly I'm going to recall 845 00:50:18,500 --> 00:50:20,600 some bites and you have to produce it, and if you don't 846 00:50:20,600 --> 00:50:23,800 produce it, you'll get slashed. So some kind of like a negative 847 00:50:23,800 --> 00:50:26,300 incentives. Those are encoded into the smart 848 00:50:26,300 --> 00:50:29,700 contract. Now if your ass taker you and 849 00:50:29,700 --> 00:50:32,600 you're participating in, Can layer, you can go and express 850 00:50:32,600 --> 00:50:36,000 your preference whether you want to opt into this particular 851 00:50:36,000 --> 00:50:40,100 service or not and you go in and like, you know, sign a thing and 852 00:50:40,100 --> 00:50:43,200 say that, yes, I want to opt into this particular service. 853 00:50:43,500 --> 00:50:46,000 Then you're registered for that service which means you're 854 00:50:46,000 --> 00:50:50,400 supposed to be providing it. And if you violate some 855 00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:52,800 conditions stated in the smart contract, then you will get 856 00:50:52,800 --> 00:50:55,400 slashed, but if you don't violate any of those things, you 857 00:50:55,400 --> 00:50:58,700 will continue to receive payments at the encoder tricked. 858 00:50:59,100 --> 00:51:01,600 So that's the core economic Ami of Argan layered. 859 00:51:01,600 --> 00:51:03,900 So to build an angular service, you have to write an off chain 860 00:51:03,900 --> 00:51:06,600 container. That's take us, can download and 861 00:51:06,600 --> 00:51:09,200 run. It can be arbitrary language as 862 00:51:09,200 --> 00:51:12,700 of now. And the, there is a non chain, 863 00:51:13,400 --> 00:51:16,600 slashing contract or on chain contract Service, contractor to 864 00:51:16,600 --> 00:51:20,300 write, which controls gating who, participates positive in 865 00:51:20,300 --> 00:51:23,100 centers and negative incentives. These are all encoded into the 866 00:51:23,100 --> 00:51:26,000 smart contract. And so, when somebody is opting 867 00:51:26,000 --> 00:51:29,000 into a particular eigen their service, they know exactly what 868 00:51:29,000 --> 00:51:30,400 set of things. They're opening it. 869 00:51:31,100 --> 00:51:36,500 How much due diligence does this require from the validators, 870 00:51:36,500 --> 00:51:38,300 right? So basically if I'm a mom and 871 00:51:38,300 --> 00:51:43,400 pop, validator, do I know which things I should be validating 872 00:51:43,400 --> 00:51:46,100 on? If it's too difficult to 873 00:51:46,100 --> 00:51:51,500 discern, which ones are good things to covid, 84? 874 00:51:51,500 --> 00:51:57,300 I might be for going yeard and which might make it economically 875 00:51:57,300 --> 00:52:03,800 unviable to to validate myself. And I mean, this is something 876 00:52:03,800 --> 00:52:08,500 that the network needs, right? So basically, we've seen re 877 00:52:08,500 --> 00:52:11,300 centralization, you know, for other reasons. 878 00:52:11,300 --> 00:52:15,300 So I mean basically people are people just steak with eggs 879 00:52:15,300 --> 00:52:20,200 changes or, you know, there's, you know, like I do and you 880 00:52:20,200 --> 00:52:22,800 know, don't get me started on proposed a builder, separation 881 00:52:22,800 --> 00:52:26,000 and mahfouz, whatever. So basically, I mean we've seen 882 00:52:26,000 --> 00:52:29,800 these that does this with this, add to this. 883 00:52:30,600 --> 00:52:35,400 Entire situation, it adds a little surprise eggs and I'm 884 00:52:35,400 --> 00:52:38,800 going to explain both sides. How much doodle is diligence 885 00:52:38,800 --> 00:52:41,900 does a home Stager need. And what we're trying to do is 886 00:52:41,900 --> 00:52:46,300 to create audit economy around these eigen layer Services, 887 00:52:46,300 --> 00:52:48,200 right? So there is going to be just 888 00:52:48,200 --> 00:52:51,800 like smart contract audits is how like users, trust smart 889 00:52:51,800 --> 00:52:55,500 contracts to do the things that they say in the white paper or 890 00:52:55,500 --> 00:53:00,100 whatever other things. So there is a barrier for a user 891 00:53:00,100 --> 00:53:02,000 to use a Smart contract in the same way. 892 00:53:02,000 --> 00:53:06,800 Now, there is a barrier for Staker to opt into new services. 893 00:53:07,200 --> 00:53:12,400 So there is a attendant or it economy that is needed and we 894 00:53:12,400 --> 00:53:15,800 want to absolutely minimize the amount of diligence that 895 00:53:15,800 --> 00:53:18,500 somebody has to do. And there may be multiple 896 00:53:18,500 --> 00:53:22,200 categories of services, those that are kind of battered by us 897 00:53:22,200 --> 00:53:26,900 and you know, or some other reputed agencies and so on and 898 00:53:27,000 --> 00:53:30,900 And you know and stickers may feel more inclined to opt into 899 00:53:30,900 --> 00:53:32,800 them. And there may be others that 900 00:53:33,100 --> 00:53:35,700 basically for. So you can imagine a world where 901 00:53:35,700 --> 00:53:39,600 a Staker home Stager says, yeah, I know give me Frederick has 902 00:53:39,600 --> 00:53:43,700 curation of services. I only like opt into everything 903 00:53:43,700 --> 00:53:47,200 that frederika says, right? And that should be possible. 904 00:53:47,200 --> 00:53:50,300 And if somebody says no no, actually, I want to be the one 905 00:53:50,300 --> 00:53:53,500 who wants to make the decision that also, you know, something 906 00:53:53,500 --> 00:53:56,600 that is available in this free economy, Okay? 907 00:53:56,700 --> 00:54:01,300 So, There is a bit of barrier on auditing wetting. 908 00:54:01,300 --> 00:54:06,100 Like what the services are. So that is something that, but 909 00:54:06,100 --> 00:54:08,200 it can be kind of delegated, right? 910 00:54:08,200 --> 00:54:11,900 Like just that ability to say that am trusting acts for doing 911 00:54:11,900 --> 00:54:15,800 the delegation, and I'm just following along, and in terms of 912 00:54:15,800 --> 00:54:18,900 missing out on eel, do you know, I think, like everywhere else 913 00:54:18,900 --> 00:54:22,100 there will be a power law. There will be maybe three 914 00:54:22,100 --> 00:54:25,700 services that account for pretty much all of the yield, like, 90% 915 00:54:25,700 --> 00:54:29,900 of the yield in this kind of A platform and the same way like 916 00:54:29,900 --> 00:54:32,900 we have daps and, you know, there are thousands of daps and 917 00:54:32,900 --> 00:54:35,900 maybe three account for pretty much all of the feast today on 918 00:54:35,900 --> 00:54:39,700 aetherium and they'll be a similar thing and we're a 919 00:54:39,700 --> 00:54:42,300 Homestay culture stopped into these three services and 920 00:54:42,300 --> 00:54:46,400 essentially get all of the eat. And so one of our interest is in 921 00:54:46,400 --> 00:54:51,200 making sure that these services are as lightweight as possible 922 00:54:51,200 --> 00:54:53,300 that a home Stager should be able to obtain. 923 00:54:53,900 --> 00:54:56,900 And this is a kind of like a guiding principle for us. 924 00:54:57,100 --> 00:55:01,900 Is actually, we think something is scaling only. 925 00:55:01,900 --> 00:55:05,500 If each node needs to do very little, but the system can do a 926 00:55:05,508 --> 00:55:07,600 lot, right? Like a scalable system, 927 00:55:07,600 --> 00:55:11,200 basically means that each node does little but the system 928 00:55:11,200 --> 00:55:14,500 together does a lot. And that's when decentralization 929 00:55:14,500 --> 00:55:17,600 and scalability or not, in fundamental tension. 930 00:55:18,400 --> 00:55:22,000 And we think that there is, we have, you know, in general, the 931 00:55:22,000 --> 00:55:24,700 ecosystem as an ecosystem, we have understood enough 932 00:55:24,700 --> 00:55:29,100 principles that actually we Know how to build systems with scale. 933 00:55:29,100 --> 00:55:32,900 Horizontally, for example, our data availability service is 934 00:55:32,900 --> 00:55:37,500 built in such a way that each steak or needs like Point 3 935 00:55:37,500 --> 00:55:40,900 megabytes per second in network bandwidth. 936 00:55:41,200 --> 00:55:43,900 But together, the system bandwidth is 15 megabytes per 937 00:55:43,900 --> 00:55:47,900 second. So it is not based on everybody 938 00:55:47,900 --> 00:55:50,600 needing to have a lot of computational infrastructure. 939 00:55:50,600 --> 00:55:54,200 It is based on everybody doing a little but data being 940 00:55:54,200 --> 00:55:56,900 distributed through this network and and tasks. 941 00:55:57,000 --> 00:56:00,600 Achieving scaling. So one part of the answer is 942 00:56:00,600 --> 00:56:04,800 making it easy to do Audits and follow along other people's like 943 00:56:04,800 --> 00:56:07,000 recommendations. Another part of the answer is 944 00:56:07,000 --> 00:56:09,900 there's only a few Services which will matter and we try to 945 00:56:09,900 --> 00:56:12,600 make those Services. Be home. 946 00:56:13,300 --> 00:56:18,600 You know, be easy for home stagers to participate in and I 947 00:56:18,600 --> 00:56:22,500 think there is a third dimension to this answer, which actually 948 00:56:22,500 --> 00:56:26,700 I'm most excited about. So if you look at the whole Mev 949 00:56:26,700 --> 00:56:28,400 and Other things going on and a theory. 950 00:56:28,400 --> 00:56:32,800 Mmm, one thing we'll see is there is a lot of discussion 951 00:56:32,800 --> 00:56:38,600 about how to keep a home stagers decentralized. 952 00:56:39,200 --> 00:56:43,100 And if you just examine the system objectively, there is a 953 00:56:43,100 --> 00:56:47,000 gradient or pressure to centralization, but there is no 954 00:56:47,000 --> 00:56:50,400 gradient or pressure to decentralization system. 955 00:56:50,400 --> 00:56:53,000 Doesn't have it. We only enforce it socially or 956 00:56:53,000 --> 00:56:56,200 religiously, right? Like there is the system by 957 00:56:56,200 --> 00:56:57,900 itself. No pressure. 958 00:56:58,400 --> 00:57:00,800 There is no advantage in being decent less. 959 00:57:00,800 --> 00:57:02,400 There is some advantage in being centralized. 960 00:57:02,400 --> 00:57:04,900 So there is a gradient or pressure to become more 961 00:57:04,900 --> 00:57:08,500 centralized and all we can do. All we are trying to do when we 962 00:57:08,500 --> 00:57:12,200 are doing you know Mev boost or PBS or any other. 963 00:57:12,200 --> 00:57:15,700 Like design consideration is how to minimize the gradient to 964 00:57:15,700 --> 00:57:18,000 centralization. That's all that's being done. 965 00:57:18,300 --> 00:57:20,900 There is no gradient to decentralisation. 966 00:57:21,300 --> 00:57:24,100 It's not that and because these analyzation is not objectively 967 00:57:24,100 --> 00:57:26,800 measurable. It's not possible to make the 968 00:57:26,900 --> 00:57:30,500 Call recognize and incentivize it even though one of the most 969 00:57:30,500 --> 00:57:33,900 critical aspects of building the theorem protocols. 970 00:57:34,600 --> 00:57:37,300 So, we are very excited about the role. 971 00:57:37,400 --> 00:57:39,600 I can layer can play in this. What is this? 972 00:57:40,300 --> 00:57:44,500 So in, I can layer we don't want the platform to exert 973 00:57:44,500 --> 00:57:47,500 subjectivity but we want middlewares or Services 974 00:57:47,500 --> 00:57:51,500 consuming, you know, decent lives trust to exert 975 00:57:51,500 --> 00:57:53,600 subjectivity. What do I mean by that? 976 00:57:53,800 --> 00:57:56,700 For example, imagine Felix is building a service. 977 00:57:57,000 --> 00:58:01,900 Service is based on you know, threshold encryption, okay? 978 00:58:01,900 --> 00:58:06,800 So artificial encryption is is dividing some secret into many, 979 00:58:06,900 --> 00:58:10,500 many chunks and each person, holds a Chung and if they all 980 00:58:10,500 --> 00:58:13,100 don't collude with each other or at least majority of people 981 00:58:13,100 --> 00:58:16,000 don't collude with each other. The secret remains a secret. 982 00:58:16,400 --> 00:58:21,400 Okay, this is an example of something which is not based on 983 00:58:21,400 --> 00:58:24,100 economic security. This is based purely on 984 00:58:24,100 --> 00:58:27,600 decentralisation because people should not be able to To collude 985 00:58:27,600 --> 00:58:30,600 with each other easily if it's just like so there are certain 986 00:58:30,600 --> 00:58:34,800 things certain Services which can absorb trust from economics. 987 00:58:34,900 --> 00:58:37,900 And there are certain Services which only absorb crossed from 988 00:58:37,900 --> 00:58:41,000 decentralization and threshold. Encryption is a great example of 989 00:58:41,000 --> 00:58:44,300 something that only absorbs trust from recent location. 990 00:58:44,700 --> 00:58:47,500 So Felix may come in and say, when building on, I can layer 991 00:58:47,500 --> 00:58:51,300 that he doesn't care about who has how much eat, but he has 992 00:58:51,300 --> 00:58:53,900 some subjective measurement of decentralization. 993 00:58:54,100 --> 00:58:58,000 Maybe he comes in and says, I only want to Can pull stake us 994 00:58:58,000 --> 00:59:01,300 to participate in a system or you only want certain home 995 00:59:01,300 --> 00:59:03,100 stagers to participate in a system? 996 00:59:03,300 --> 00:59:07,100 Or he has an oracle feed that he himself creates and it says, 997 00:59:07,100 --> 00:59:10,500 only people in this like, you know, my whitelist can 998 00:59:10,500 --> 00:59:12,700 participate in this ecosystem because he has somehow 999 00:59:12,700 --> 00:59:15,100 subjectively wet at that. They are actually more 1000 00:59:15,100 --> 00:59:18,500 decentralized. So if this happens then what 1001 00:59:18,500 --> 00:59:23,000 happens is that you are actually then fell X is paying for 1002 00:59:23,000 --> 00:59:26,100 decentralisation. So the decentralized Quorum can 1003 00:59:26,100 --> 00:59:29,200 potentially earn earn even more than a centralized Quorum 1004 00:59:29,300 --> 00:59:33,400 creating a gradient of pressure to decentralization, because 1005 00:59:33,400 --> 00:59:36,400 these centralized trust is. So another way of thinking about 1006 00:59:36,400 --> 00:59:39,100 it is, if we all value decentralized trust, why are we 1007 00:59:39,100 --> 00:59:43,200 not paying for it because the rich expressive markets to 1008 00:59:43,200 --> 00:59:45,400 Value, decentralized, trust don't exist today. 1009 00:59:46,000 --> 00:59:49,800 And if you if you allow for Rich expressive markets to Value 1010 00:59:49,800 --> 00:59:53,400 decentralized, trust people will pay more for things to be 1011 00:59:53,400 --> 00:59:55,700 decentralized in things that you care about. 1012 00:59:56,300 --> 00:59:58,500 And we don't know, How the economics is going to play out. 1013 00:59:58,500 --> 01:00:02,800 But at least there is a possibility to create a gradient 1014 01:00:02,800 --> 01:00:05,500 for decentralization. This is something that I'm super 1015 01:00:05,500 --> 01:00:08,000 excited about as a possibility for what I can live. 1016 01:00:08,800 --> 01:00:10,600 What kind of services? Do you see? 1017 01:00:10,600 --> 01:00:12,400 Building on top of, I can layer a layer. 1018 01:00:12,400 --> 01:00:16,300 So basically, what are the biggest use cases? 1019 01:00:16,600 --> 01:00:19,900 You see coming on top of like there. 1020 01:00:20,200 --> 01:00:23,700 So I mean of course we are building the first service 1021 01:00:23,700 --> 01:00:26,500 ourselves which is a data availability service. 1022 01:00:26,500 --> 01:00:30,900 And the reason we chose to double down on building a data. 1023 01:00:30,900 --> 01:00:35,300 Availability service is of course the ethereum roadmap is 1024 01:00:36,300 --> 01:00:40,700 strongly oriented. Birds modular ecosystem, where 1025 01:00:40,700 --> 01:00:43,100 Roll-Ups basically write data into Theory. 1026 01:00:43,100 --> 01:00:44,700 Mm. And right commitments. 1027 01:00:45,200 --> 01:00:51,000 And one of the things that we want to see is a world where 1028 01:00:51,000 --> 01:00:53,800 thousands of Roll-Ups can flourish and to do this, you 1029 01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:57,600 need much more data bandwidth than available on ethereum today 1030 01:00:57,600 --> 01:01:01,000 and even in the foreseeable future including things like 1031 01:01:01,000 --> 01:01:04,500 dong shouting. We want to provide 100 x, 1032 01:01:04,500 --> 01:01:07,500 thousand X more data bandwidth and what is available. 1033 01:01:08,100 --> 01:01:10,900 In the set of techniques, already actually have been 1034 01:01:10,900 --> 01:01:15,500 pioneered in the 3mm research community and we can build, you 1035 01:01:15,500 --> 01:01:18,700 know, much more flexible engineering modules around these 1036 01:01:18,700 --> 01:01:21,600 basic cryptography. Like using the, in all things 1037 01:01:21,600 --> 01:01:23,400 like kcg polynomial, commitments. 1038 01:01:23,800 --> 01:01:26,300 And how they were used in. Doc sharing, we can take them 1039 01:01:26,300 --> 01:01:30,300 and engineer, like many different kinds of systems 1040 01:01:30,300 --> 01:01:33,000 around it. So data availability is one 1041 01:01:33,100 --> 01:01:37,100 example of what we are building and which could be a very useful 1042 01:01:37,100 --> 01:01:38,300 ecosystem. Us. 1043 01:01:38,700 --> 01:01:43,700 And we are trying to build it in a way that stagers of all shapes 1044 01:01:43,700 --> 01:01:47,400 and forms can participate in it. That's one example, another 1045 01:01:47,400 --> 01:01:50,500 example of what could be built on the above, I can layer is a 1046 01:01:50,500 --> 01:01:54,000 whole host of Mev Management Services. 1047 01:01:55,000 --> 01:01:55,400 Why? What? 1048 01:01:55,400 --> 01:01:58,600 A requirement talking about. Mev Management Services is if 1049 01:01:58,600 --> 01:02:01,300 you are sticked. If you're staking any Theory. 1050 01:02:01,300 --> 01:02:03,800 Mm, but it also reads take Don I can layer. 1051 01:02:04,300 --> 01:02:08,900 Then you can start. Making credible commitments 1052 01:02:08,900 --> 01:02:12,600 about your behavior you can say. For example, I'm selling you a 1053 01:02:12,600 --> 01:02:16,000 portion of my blog space. You're doing an auction but 1054 01:02:16,000 --> 01:02:17,900 you're not doing an auction where you're selling the 1055 01:02:17,900 --> 01:02:20,800 entirety of locks, which is what is happening in the Mev boost 1056 01:02:20,800 --> 01:02:23,300 market today. That is what you could do is, 1057 01:02:23,300 --> 01:02:26,400 you could say, yeah, I'm selling most of my blog space, but I 1058 01:02:26,400 --> 01:02:29,400 still retain the ability to add stuff at the end of my block 1059 01:02:29,400 --> 01:02:31,800 space. This is something that you could 1060 01:02:31,800 --> 01:02:33,800 do. In fact, we are designed for 1061 01:02:33,808 --> 01:02:37,800 this, we call Mev boost plus plus, which is Tickly saying 1062 01:02:38,200 --> 01:02:42,200 you, you are auctioning off the rights to fill, you know, some 1063 01:02:42,200 --> 01:02:44,500 portion of the block, but there's still space at the end 1064 01:02:44,500 --> 01:02:47,800 of the block where I can add in, as a lot proposal, whatever, 1065 01:02:47,800 --> 01:02:50,200 transactions that I want at the end of the block. 1066 01:02:50,600 --> 01:02:53,800 So you don't have to make a trade-off between expressing my 1067 01:02:53,800 --> 01:02:58,200 preferences as a block proposal, and the economic upside of 1068 01:02:58,200 --> 01:03:01,300 having to participate in an MTV Market, I can do both. 1069 01:03:01,900 --> 01:03:06,800 So, the one example of what you can build on on our layer as an 1070 01:03:06,900 --> 01:03:08,400 TV service. But there's a whole host of 1071 01:03:08,400 --> 01:03:11,100 other things. You can start doing things like 1072 01:03:11,500 --> 01:03:13,900 multiple block. Builders decentralized block 1073 01:03:13,900 --> 01:03:16,000 building. What I do is instead of selling 1074 01:03:16,000 --> 01:03:19,700 all my blog space to one person I say oh I'm selling the first 1075 01:03:19,700 --> 01:03:22,800 30% of my blog space to Frederick the next thirty 1076 01:03:22,800 --> 01:03:27,100 percent fell X and so on. Right, I can start doing more of 1077 01:03:27,100 --> 01:03:30,100 these things and what does I go layers particularly enable in 1078 01:03:30,100 --> 01:03:33,800 it? The idea that if I don't stand 1079 01:03:33,800 --> 01:03:37,100 by my word, if I told fredericka that I am going to include And 1080 01:03:37,100 --> 01:03:39,700 of her, you know, transactions in the first portion of the 1081 01:03:39,700 --> 01:03:43,400 block, but I don't then I'm /. I could be slashed on Atheneum, 1082 01:03:43,600 --> 01:03:46,100 right? So that my could lose my eat and 1083 01:03:46,100 --> 01:03:50,300 that gives Federica some trust in me in actually making this 1084 01:03:50,300 --> 01:03:53,400 transaction possible. So the ability to make credible 1085 01:03:53,400 --> 01:03:57,200 commitments, actually opens up the space for How We Do 1086 01:03:57,600 --> 01:03:59,500 transaction ordering priority even things. 1087 01:03:59,500 --> 01:04:03,000 Like, I want to build a threshold and Cryptid mental. 1088 01:04:03,300 --> 01:04:07,700 So I commit to maybe selling the first 30 Percent of my blog 1089 01:04:07,700 --> 01:04:10,900 space and then I say that the remaining 30% or the next study 1090 01:04:10,900 --> 01:04:14,300 was and I'm going to use threshold encryption and I 1091 01:04:14,300 --> 01:04:16,400 agree. I send a signature saying I'm 1092 01:04:16,400 --> 01:04:18,800 going to use the decrypted version of these encrypted 1093 01:04:18,800 --> 01:04:22,400 transactions and if I don't include them in the block, then 1094 01:04:22,400 --> 01:04:25,900 I'll get slashed. So it opens up the space for 1095 01:04:26,000 --> 01:04:29,700 anybody to come in and innovate on Mev Management Services. 1096 01:04:30,100 --> 01:04:32,400 So that's, that's one. Huge category. 1097 01:04:32,500 --> 01:04:36,000 There are also other things that are things like I want to do 1098 01:04:36,400 --> 01:04:39,000 event. An activation, for example, if 1099 01:04:39,008 --> 01:04:43,100 Alex is like, hey, you know, whenever my I'm I'm under 1100 01:04:43,100 --> 01:04:47,300 collateralized on compound then refill my collateral from my 1101 01:04:47,300 --> 01:04:50,600 wallet at this address. And that's just a kind of 1102 01:04:50,600 --> 01:04:54,300 standing instruction, even driven instruction that he wants 1103 01:04:54,300 --> 01:04:58,000 to give you can do this today. Using this category of, like, 1104 01:04:58,000 --> 01:05:01,000 middlewares called Keepers, which, you know, like, gelato 1105 01:05:01,000 --> 01:05:03,600 and chain-link has something and there are others building in. 1106 01:05:04,100 --> 01:05:08,800 And, but the problem with those services, Has is there is a kind 1107 01:05:08,800 --> 01:05:12,700 of non attribute ability problem, whether that node 1108 01:05:12,700 --> 01:05:15,500 triggered the transaction and but the transaction was not 1109 01:05:15,500 --> 01:05:18,900 included in the block or that note did not record the 1110 01:05:18,900 --> 01:05:21,000 transaction and therefore it was not included in the block, this 1111 01:05:21,000 --> 01:05:24,400 is not attributable. Whereas on, I can layer if a 1112 01:05:24,400 --> 01:05:28,000 block proposal hops into these event-driven conditions. 1113 01:05:28,300 --> 01:05:30,800 If a block proposed, Iraq Ops into these event ruined 1114 01:05:30,800 --> 01:05:33,800 conditions, then it's uniquely attributable because the block 1115 01:05:33,800 --> 01:05:35,800 proposal of course controls block space. 1116 01:05:36,300 --> 01:05:38,900 So There's another example, there's all kinds of other 1117 01:05:38,900 --> 01:05:42,100 examples, like, whole block, flash loans and, you know, other 1118 01:05:42,100 --> 01:05:44,900 like crazy economic objects. You can start building because 1119 01:05:44,900 --> 01:05:48,900 block proposes our state, they can kind of opt into covenants 1120 01:05:49,200 --> 01:05:52,700 on what they cannot break. So this is one class of 1121 01:05:52,700 --> 01:05:56,800 solutions, Mev management questions comments. 1122 01:05:56,900 --> 01:06:00,500 Yes, let me move away from the financialized use cases of it. 1123 01:06:00,600 --> 01:06:04,100 So in principle, there's lots of things that you would love to 1124 01:06:04,100 --> 01:06:08,600 have a trust Network for Or that are non financially, 1125 01:06:08,800 --> 01:06:12,300 non-financial eyes and consequently currently crowded 1126 01:06:12,300 --> 01:06:16,500 out of the truly credibly neutral blockchain, which is 1127 01:06:16,500 --> 01:06:19,400 easier IAM. So, can you kind of make it 1128 01:06:19,400 --> 01:06:23,200 viable for them to run on eigen are absolutely. 1129 01:06:23,200 --> 01:06:28,900 I think one consequence of like high performance data 1130 01:06:28,900 --> 01:06:32,600 availability is, if you have like a huge amount of data 1131 01:06:32,600 --> 01:06:35,300 availability bandwidth. Now, you know, you can start 1132 01:06:35,300 --> 01:06:38,200 running applications which are simply And actually priced out, 1133 01:06:38,300 --> 01:06:40,700 right? And one of the ways we think 1134 01:06:40,700 --> 01:06:45,900 about this is, if you look at the current networks, the 1135 01:06:45,900 --> 01:06:50,300 operational cost of running the network is far lower than the 1136 01:06:50,300 --> 01:06:53,700 capital cost of staking, right? Like I'm putting twenty billion 1137 01:06:53,700 --> 01:06:56,500 dollar of staking so I need at least a ten percent seven 1138 01:06:56,500 --> 01:06:58,500 percent some epr. So I need at least two billion 1139 01:06:58,500 --> 01:07:00,500 dollars annually in return, right? 1140 01:07:00,500 --> 01:07:03,100 So that's the capital cost of taking and then there is an 1141 01:07:03,100 --> 01:07:06,700 operational cost of like scaling and providing whatever. 1142 01:07:06,800 --> 01:07:10,800 Is that you want and actually the operational cost is not at 1143 01:07:10,800 --> 01:07:14,000 all dominant, right today, staking cost is dominant so you 1144 01:07:14,000 --> 01:07:19,000 can overlay more operations and, and still, you know, not suffer 1145 01:07:19,000 --> 01:07:21,300 significant cost. That's one part of it. 1146 01:07:21,300 --> 01:07:24,300 The other part of it is actually just by battery engineering, you 1147 01:07:24,300 --> 01:07:27,300 can use the same amount of bandwidth much more efficiently. 1148 01:07:27,500 --> 01:07:29,300 And that's the part I was talking about in our data 1149 01:07:29,300 --> 01:07:32,800 availability is by, actually every note, doing a little, but 1150 01:07:32,800 --> 01:07:36,100 together, they do a lot. And by scaling across nodes, you 1151 01:07:36,100 --> 01:07:38,700 can actually Provide a huge amount of bandwidth for 1152 01:07:39,100 --> 01:07:43,000 applications to consume and this is one of the reasons we 1153 01:07:43,000 --> 01:07:44,600 actually built the data availability. 1154 01:07:44,600 --> 01:07:49,800 First is is just like opens up the volume of use cases from use 1155 01:07:49,800 --> 01:07:53,800 cases, where there was high amount of value, flowing, per 1156 01:07:53,800 --> 01:07:58,100 bit of data, to use cases, where you don't need a lot of value 1157 01:07:58,100 --> 01:08:02,400 flowing per bit and then open up to the long, you know, use cases 1158 01:08:02,400 --> 01:08:04,400 bad. Like there is going to be a lot 1159 01:08:04,400 --> 01:08:06,700 of data needed to be transmitted. 1160 01:08:06,800 --> 01:08:10,100 To to arrive at still like Leverage. 1161 01:08:10,100 --> 01:08:12,700 The Credible, neutral platform, like theorem for line. 1162 01:08:13,200 --> 01:08:17,500 Let me Zoom right out. So I mean, if you look at eigen 1163 01:08:17,500 --> 01:08:25,200 layer as a concept, its kind of a different Paradigm in scaling. 1164 01:08:25,200 --> 01:08:28,000 So I mean, So currently in scaling, we kind of, we have 1165 01:08:28,399 --> 01:08:33,399 layer choose. We have like the IBC, you know, 1166 01:08:33,399 --> 01:08:38,600 style connected there once and Now, we kind of have this 1167 01:08:39,100 --> 01:08:44,899 piggybacking mechanism that is eigen are, can you talk about 1168 01:08:45,200 --> 01:08:50,700 how these compare and whether piggybacking often off an 1169 01:08:50,700 --> 01:08:56,399 existing economic system has negative externalities for just 1170 01:08:56,399 --> 01:08:58,200 that system. So basically does it. 1171 01:08:58,200 --> 01:09:02,000 Do anything, does it take away anything from a theorem that 1172 01:09:02,000 --> 01:09:06,300 you're using this as well as an economic trust layer? 1173 01:09:07,300 --> 01:09:10,899 I think it goes back to mostly The Leverage type questions that 1174 01:09:10,899 --> 01:09:13,200 we talked about earlier, right? That's one part. 1175 01:09:13,700 --> 01:09:17,300 So I won't go into the same thing again but what other 1176 01:09:17,300 --> 01:09:20,600 issues are there? One other issue is the same 1177 01:09:20,600 --> 01:09:23,100 stake is committed, now for etherium. 1178 01:09:23,100 --> 01:09:28,899 But for also to do these other validation tasks and the one 1179 01:09:28,899 --> 01:09:33,200 thing to understand is aetherium is the primary and everything 1180 01:09:33,200 --> 01:09:35,100 else is the secondary in this market. 1181 01:09:35,100 --> 01:09:38,200 Because your steak do you need and The actual mechanics, which 1182 01:09:38,200 --> 01:09:41,000 I didn't go into earlier, is your stake in etherium, and then 1183 01:09:41,000 --> 01:09:44,100 you set the withdrawal powers to the eigen layer, smart 1184 01:09:44,100 --> 01:09:46,600 contracts. So what happens is it? 1185 01:09:46,600 --> 01:09:50,399 Helium have like first dibs at slashing etherium has basically. 1186 01:09:50,500 --> 01:09:52,300 So theorem is the primary loan holder. 1187 01:09:52,300 --> 01:09:56,200 So to say, everybody else is a secondary on this platform. 1188 01:09:56,800 --> 01:10:00,000 So that means actually that Athenian protocol has the 1189 01:10:00,000 --> 01:10:03,500 priority on slashing. So I don't think it affects the 1190 01:10:03,500 --> 01:10:06,500 core core properties. There's one thing though, which 1191 01:10:06,600 --> 01:10:09,300 is no is just temporary and we hope that it will get sorted 1192 01:10:09,300 --> 01:10:12,500 out. Eventually is the idea that when 1193 01:10:12,600 --> 01:10:15,100 somebody slashed on, I can layer, when does it helium? 1194 01:10:15,100 --> 01:10:18,500 Get to know about it, right? Like if there is a huge delay 1195 01:10:18,900 --> 01:10:21,400 and like the person is actually completely slashed already, they 1196 01:10:21,400 --> 01:10:24,700 don't have anything remaining and, you know, Liam thinks that 1197 01:10:24,700 --> 01:10:28,700 they have a lot, but actually, they don't, and this problem can 1198 01:10:28,700 --> 01:10:32,900 be minimized by, you know, a feature in etherium called smart 1199 01:10:32,900 --> 01:10:35,800 contract, triggered withdrawals. If they didn't, I can laughs my 1200 01:10:35,800 --> 01:10:38,500 contract, can immediately Li the way slashing happens. 1201 01:10:38,500 --> 01:10:42,000 Is they immediately triggers withdrawal from etherium. 1202 01:10:42,500 --> 01:10:45,300 Then basically, you don't have this principle agent type 1203 01:10:45,300 --> 01:10:48,000 problem. So that's another, another 1204 01:10:48,000 --> 01:10:51,000 dimension that we've discussed with the EF people. 1205 01:10:51,100 --> 01:10:54,100 And I think, in general, something like smart contract, 1206 01:10:54,100 --> 01:10:57,800 triggered withdrawals helps all kinds of staking protocols. 1207 01:10:58,400 --> 01:11:01,600 But, other than that, I don't see any significant other 1208 01:11:01,600 --> 01:11:05,900 aspects to do these. What you would always withdraw 1209 01:11:05,900 --> 01:11:09,800 the entire Our validator, like, all 32 years for every slashing 1210 01:11:09,800 --> 01:11:14,000 I could imagine, like, some slashings being kind of minor to 1211 01:11:14,000 --> 01:11:17,000 just kind of discourage you. So one of them. 1212 01:11:17,400 --> 01:11:20,500 Yeah, I think one of the principles we using for eigen 1213 01:11:20,500 --> 01:11:27,200 layer, slashing is to be as rare as possible, and when it happens 1214 01:11:27,200 --> 01:11:30,100 to be, as severe as possible. So as severe as possible, 1215 01:11:30,300 --> 01:11:34,200 because we don't flash for things, like up time, only / 1216 01:11:34,200 --> 01:11:36,400 when there is like a significant safety failure. 1217 01:11:36,900 --> 01:11:39,700 Probably militias action. So I when there's a probably 1218 01:11:39,700 --> 01:11:43,800 malicious action we don't need to slash a little. 1219 01:11:44,200 --> 01:11:49,000 So a slashing is designed to be very rare and severe when it 1220 01:11:49,000 --> 01:11:52,400 actually happens. But this this you mean is this 1221 01:11:52,400 --> 01:11:55,200 for your specific service your building or because I guess 1222 01:11:55,200 --> 01:11:58,400 that's kind of customizable for something that's right but 1223 01:11:58,400 --> 01:12:01,500 that's the recommendation for all these services and we want 1224 01:12:01,500 --> 01:12:06,600 to because you know we don't take slashing eat lightly and I 1225 01:12:06,700 --> 01:12:09,400 I think it should not be taken lightly by any service either 1226 01:12:10,100 --> 01:12:12,800 especially because of this primary secondary type problem 1227 01:12:12,800 --> 01:12:15,900 that we talked about and it should only happen when there is 1228 01:12:15,900 --> 01:12:19,800 a clearly probable militias action, if I'm /. 1229 01:12:19,800 --> 01:12:23,200 Do I have a recourse? So basically if say if say for 1230 01:12:23,200 --> 01:12:28,200 instance I'm Eva the ha ha and I built a service on top of eigen 1231 01:12:28,200 --> 01:12:32,100 layer. That uses a malicious contract 1232 01:12:32,100 --> 01:12:37,400 to slash unsuspecting stake us. Do they have a Course climate. 1233 01:12:37,400 --> 01:12:38,800 Can they do something against this? 1234 01:12:38,800 --> 01:12:41,700 Absolutely. So this is something we take 1235 01:12:41,700 --> 01:12:46,600 very, very seriously and no amount of audited audit and 1236 01:12:46,600 --> 01:12:51,200 other things is sufficient to guarantee that there's no like, 1237 01:12:51,200 --> 01:12:54,700 Edge case and malicious code base in slashing. 1238 01:12:54,700 --> 01:12:59,800 So I think that is a significant problem and in, especially in, I 1239 01:12:59,800 --> 01:13:02,400 can layer which couples trust across multiple systems. 1240 01:13:02,400 --> 01:13:06,100 You know, it could very well happen that all eats takers opt 1241 01:13:06,100 --> 01:13:10,700 into Eureka's like evil contract and like you know they all get 1242 01:13:10,700 --> 01:13:13,100 slashed and be like an absolute nightmare. 1243 01:13:13,600 --> 01:13:19,900 So the way we deal with this is by requiring or like enabling 1244 01:13:19,900 --> 01:13:23,900 what we call a slashing veto, there is a veto for slashing run 1245 01:13:23,900 --> 01:13:27,700 by like a reputed committee. The only thing, this committee 1246 01:13:27,700 --> 01:13:33,000 can do is basically we to slashings and you can think of 1247 01:13:33,000 --> 01:13:35,900 basically slashing needs approval both by the contract 1248 01:13:35,900 --> 01:13:38,500 and buy this car. Dean order to actually pass. 1249 01:13:38,900 --> 01:13:44,300 So that's the trust model is basically, you're trusting one 1250 01:13:44,300 --> 01:13:47,600 of these two to work correctly, to protect against slashing 1251 01:13:47,600 --> 01:13:50,100 errors. And if both are malicious, then 1252 01:13:50,100 --> 01:13:53,800 that is a problem, okay, but that's currently social 1253 01:13:53,800 --> 01:13:57,100 consensus. Right, so basically it, if it's 1254 01:13:57,100 --> 01:14:00,700 a pool of known individuals who say, like, clearly, if it occurs 1255 01:14:00,700 --> 01:14:03,200 out of her mind, this was not a special Bill fence. 1256 01:14:03,600 --> 01:14:05,400 Give back the steak, that's correct. 1257 01:14:05,400 --> 01:14:09,000 So this is a sin. This system relies on both 1258 01:14:09,500 --> 01:14:13,900 neutral objective algorithm just, you know, smart contract 1259 01:14:13,900 --> 01:14:18,000 plus a social layer. So, the things that blockchains 1260 01:14:18,000 --> 01:14:21,200 have natively is a social layer to Fork the chain, if something 1261 01:14:21,200 --> 01:14:22,800 crazy happened. Sure. 1262 01:14:22,900 --> 01:14:26,600 And we are an overlay layer and we don't have the ability to 43. 1263 01:14:26,600 --> 01:14:29,900 Mm and some or we don't want to assume the ability to have four 1264 01:14:29,900 --> 01:14:31,400 kids helium and something bad happens. 1265 01:14:31,400 --> 01:14:35,100 So we are incorporating the social layer into the protocol 1266 01:14:35,200 --> 01:14:39,000 and that's a necessary. And so this layer is not run by 1267 01:14:39,000 --> 01:14:43,000 like economic committee. We do not think that it's 1268 01:14:43,300 --> 01:14:46,200 correct to have a token committee or whatever, you know 1269 01:14:46,200 --> 01:14:51,400 Rum Run this thing should be run by like trusted individuals. 1270 01:14:51,400 --> 01:14:54,600 Reputed entities in the in the ecosystem. 1271 01:14:55,600 --> 01:14:58,300 Yeah that makes sense. Coming back to the second half 1272 01:14:58,300 --> 01:15:00,500 of my question. How does this compare and 1273 01:15:00,500 --> 01:15:04,400 contrast with other skating solution basically Loosely 1274 01:15:04,400 --> 01:15:09,000 meshing, I can layer with They are tools and you know IVC 1275 01:15:09,000 --> 01:15:14,900 connected blockchains how does it compare and contrast so I can 1276 01:15:14,900 --> 01:15:19,700 layer the is designed for a modular world so it is designed 1277 01:15:19,700 --> 01:15:25,100 for the roll-up world so it it doesn't add particularly 1278 01:15:25,100 --> 01:15:29,100 anything to the to one part of the role of world which is you 1279 01:15:29,100 --> 01:15:31,500 know you want to do zero-knowledge proves or other 1280 01:15:31,500 --> 01:15:35,100 like economic games in which you can actually prove that your 1281 01:15:35,100 --> 01:15:36,900 execution status correct. Act. 1282 01:15:36,900 --> 01:15:41,000 I think that is something that we like a lot and, you know, 1283 01:15:41,000 --> 01:15:44,200 it's completely complimentary to what is what I can layer is 1284 01:15:44,200 --> 01:15:48,500 offering. So it does offer something to in 1285 01:15:48,500 --> 01:15:51,500 terms of our particular Solution on data availability, but also 1286 01:15:51,500 --> 01:15:55,000 for the ability for others to build, even better data 1287 01:15:55,000 --> 01:15:57,200 availability Solutions on top of eigen layer. 1288 01:15:57,200 --> 01:16:00,700 I think that is something that we are quite excited about the 1289 01:16:00,700 --> 01:16:05,500 fact that, you know, the area of open Innovation can can be quite 1290 01:16:05,500 --> 01:16:08,500 large there. In terms of other services, 1291 01:16:08,500 --> 01:16:10,800 other other kind of like Paradigm. 1292 01:16:11,000 --> 01:16:13,800 So just to add a little bit more there, on for things, like, 1293 01:16:13,800 --> 01:16:17,300 optimistic Roll-Ups, you have a layer of Economic Security, 1294 01:16:17,300 --> 01:16:20,200 which is the sequencer is basically making a claim that 1295 01:16:20,300 --> 01:16:23,100 what they said is correct. And then you also have a layer 1296 01:16:23,100 --> 01:16:26,000 of verification which is that they'll get slashed if if that 1297 01:16:26,000 --> 01:16:29,100 doesn't happen correctly you know on things like I can layer 1298 01:16:29,100 --> 01:16:33,400 you can reuse a lot of steak and provide more Economic Security 1299 01:16:33,400 --> 01:16:36,400 at you know, for for things like optimistic goal. 1300 01:16:36,500 --> 01:16:39,400 Oops so that's something interesting. 1301 01:16:39,400 --> 01:16:43,500 It adds to the optimistic goal of ecosystem on these EK, 1302 01:16:43,500 --> 01:16:46,400 roll-up ecosystem. I think one thing something like 1303 01:16:46,400 --> 01:16:51,200 iron their ads is, you know, proof verification on, Atheneum 1304 01:16:51,200 --> 01:16:54,300 is still expensive, right? And and it is expensive, because 1305 01:16:54,300 --> 01:16:57,300 of some basic fundamental limits, you know, if you use the 1306 01:16:57,300 --> 01:17:01,000 theorem blocks only to do like ZK, proof verification, maybe 1307 01:17:01,000 --> 01:17:04,700 you can do like 15 to 30 easy Capo verifications for Block. 1308 01:17:04,700 --> 01:17:06,400 So that's the current like block. 1309 01:17:06,600 --> 01:17:09,500 Plays and gas consumption of these things. 1310 01:17:10,200 --> 01:17:13,500 So if you had a world where there are like thousands of 1311 01:17:13,500 --> 01:17:17,000 different Roll-Ups then they cannot all right, ZK proves into 1312 01:17:17,000 --> 01:17:19,100 theorem every block so that's not possible. 1313 01:17:19,600 --> 01:17:24,100 But what they can do is if there was a kind of like restate 1314 01:17:24,100 --> 01:17:27,600 Quorum of all the Athenians takers and they all verify, but 1315 01:17:27,600 --> 01:17:31,800 the fact is verifying, ZK proofs is very trivial of chain, right? 1316 01:17:31,800 --> 01:17:34,700 Like you can you can run it in parallel, you can check on 1317 01:17:34,800 --> 01:17:37,100 hundreds of ZK probes in parallel each Of them may take 1318 01:17:37,100 --> 01:17:40,300 only like tens of milliseconds and so you can actually verify 1319 01:17:40,300 --> 01:17:44,400 thousands of ZK proves so in in a, in a reasonable note. 1320 01:17:44,700 --> 01:17:47,800 So the question is like, on on and off chain. 1321 01:17:48,200 --> 01:17:51,600 So the, The Proposal could be something, like, you can create 1322 01:17:51,600 --> 01:17:54,400 a service on top of, I can layer where all the eat steak as 1323 01:17:54,400 --> 01:17:57,500 participate and they verify, like thousands of the gay proves 1324 01:17:57,500 --> 01:18:00,300 in parallel, and then they just certify that they have verified 1325 01:18:00,300 --> 01:18:04,200 all of this on etherium. So, this could be an example of 1326 01:18:04,300 --> 01:18:08,800 a kind of synergy with things like Let's do labs and the one 1327 01:18:08,800 --> 01:18:11,500 thing we see in the catalogs today is they wait for a long 1328 01:18:11,500 --> 01:18:16,300 time to batch because of the verification cost and you don't 1329 01:18:16,300 --> 01:18:19,500 need to do it and you can have a bridge which, which moves data 1330 01:18:19,500 --> 01:18:22,100 between the roll-up and etherium every block. 1331 01:18:22,100 --> 01:18:25,600 If you had a layer like this, going to your broader question 1332 01:18:25,600 --> 01:18:28,600 on things like IBC and the external ecosystem. 1333 01:18:29,500 --> 01:18:33,200 I can layer bars, close similarity with what is called 1334 01:18:33,200 --> 01:18:36,700 interchange security, right? Which is basically one Jane 1335 01:18:36,700 --> 01:18:38,800 providing security to other chains. 1336 01:18:39,100 --> 01:18:41,700 I think there are a couple of important differences 1337 01:18:41,700 --> 01:18:46,700 interchange security as it is being talked about today is the 1338 01:18:46,800 --> 01:18:50,900 the provider chain has to have a governance upgrade to to obtain 1339 01:18:50,900 --> 01:18:55,000 to serve this other chain. And, you know, just working in 1340 01:18:55,008 --> 01:18:58,200 this space for enough time. Anything that has a governance 1341 01:18:58,200 --> 01:19:01,000 upgrade, I'm like, okay, that's that's too slow. 1342 01:19:01,500 --> 01:19:05,500 So I like the nature of like, what we are doing with eigen 1343 01:19:05,500 --> 01:19:08,700 layer, which is Basically validator level opt-in 1344 01:19:09,100 --> 01:19:11,300 permissionless, each validator, make a decision. 1345 01:19:11,300 --> 01:19:13,700 An opt-in. I think it reduces frictions 1346 01:19:13,700 --> 01:19:16,700 massively. And the second thing is the way 1347 01:19:16,700 --> 01:19:18,600 we think about what should be built on. 1348 01:19:18,600 --> 01:19:21,600 I can layer which is more of a subjective opinion, but I think 1349 01:19:21,600 --> 01:19:23,500 it aligns deeply with the 3M land. 1350 01:19:23,800 --> 01:19:28,300 Landscape is to build modules. Each module being secured by the 1351 01:19:28,300 --> 01:19:33,900 same stake, rather than to build chains which is what interchange 1352 01:19:33,900 --> 01:19:38,200 security is optimizing for. Okay, to add to your last 1353 01:19:38,200 --> 01:19:40,400 question about IBC in particular, right? 1354 01:19:40,500 --> 01:19:44,500 IBC is enter blockchain. Communication is the standard 1355 01:19:44,500 --> 01:19:46,300 for talking between different blockchains. 1356 01:19:46,600 --> 01:19:51,700 I think we need a powerful. IBC port for ethereal and be 1357 01:19:51,700 --> 01:19:53,700 very excited to see people bills. 1358 01:19:53,800 --> 01:19:56,100 Something like that. For example, on, I can layer 1359 01:19:56,100 --> 01:19:59,600 because what you can do is once you have stickers opt-in, you 1360 01:19:59,600 --> 01:20:03,200 can verify signatures from all these IBC connected chains and 1361 01:20:03,200 --> 01:20:06,000 just make an economic certificate saying that, yeah, 1362 01:20:06,000 --> 01:20:08,700 we We all know that this is the set of signatures in these other 1363 01:20:08,700 --> 01:20:12,400 chains. So, that's an example, for, how, 1364 01:20:12,800 --> 01:20:17,400 what can be built on? I can learn Thanks for expanding 1365 01:20:17,400 --> 01:20:21,100 so far into it. I think we're also like been at 1366 01:20:21,100 --> 01:20:23,100 it for a while. I think we can slowly get to 1367 01:20:23,800 --> 01:20:27,200 kind of wrapping up. Maybe for a final question. 1368 01:20:27,200 --> 01:20:30,600 We can talk a little bit about where the project is at right 1369 01:20:30,600 --> 01:20:32,500 now. I mean we talked a lot about 1370 01:20:32,500 --> 01:20:36,000 what is theoretically possible. Maybe we can hear a bit, you 1371 01:20:36,000 --> 01:20:37,200 know, where are you at right now? 1372 01:20:37,200 --> 01:20:42,600 What's on the roadmap? It like the video yet future the 1373 01:20:42,600 --> 01:20:45,200 way we building eigenvector is initially. 1374 01:20:45,400 --> 01:20:48,500 Building the first service ourselves and on launch that 1375 01:20:48,500 --> 01:20:51,700 will only be the one service, the data availability service, 1376 01:20:51,700 --> 01:20:55,800 we are building on top of it and we want to slowly open it up 1377 01:20:55,800 --> 01:21:01,500 from being one service platform to a few like partner services 1378 01:21:01,500 --> 01:21:05,000 to then to be a self-serve platform on which anybody can 1379 01:21:05,000 --> 01:21:06,800 come and build anything that they want. 1380 01:21:07,400 --> 01:21:11,900 So we'll see the first service launched hopefully mid-next year 1381 01:21:12,600 --> 01:21:17,000 and then we'll have a whole bunch of other services on board 1382 01:21:17,000 --> 01:21:20,700 in the months following. So that's the road map, right 1383 01:21:20,700 --> 01:21:24,800 now we are internal test net. We have a you know few 1384 01:21:24,800 --> 01:21:26,800 Integrations. We are testing inside the 1385 01:21:27,300 --> 01:21:30,300 internal test and so that's that's where we are and we will 1386 01:21:30,300 --> 01:21:34,000 hope to have a more public facing test net, in the months 1387 01:21:34,000 --> 01:21:39,800 between now and and launch. In Castaic we look forward to 1388 01:21:39,800 --> 01:21:42,000 that. It's been an absolute pleasure 1389 01:21:42,000 --> 01:21:46,000 to have you on SRI Ram. It's I have learned a lot. 1390 01:21:46,000 --> 01:21:51,100 This is such an interesting project excited to see where 1391 01:21:51,100 --> 01:21:53,000 this takes you. Thank you so much. 1392 01:21:53,000 --> 01:21:56,100 For every guy I've had, you know, was really, really enjoyed 1393 01:21:56,100 --> 01:22:00,000 talking to you and selects a podcast look forward to be in 1394 01:22:00,008 --> 01:22:04,300 touch and future. Quit thank you guys thank you 1395 01:22:04,300 --> 01:22:05,800 for Luke's. Thank you for everything. 1396 01:22:06,000 --> 01:22:06,900 Thank you. See Rama. 1397 01:22:09,500 --> 01:22:11,400 Thank you for joining us on this week's episode. 1398 01:22:11,700 --> 01:22:13,300 We release new episodes every week. 1399 01:22:13,800 --> 01:22:16,600 You can find And subscribe to the show on iTunes Spotify, 1400 01:22:16,700 --> 01:22:19,800 YouTube SoundCloud or wherever you listen to podcast. 1401 01:22:20,100 --> 01:22:22,900 And if you have a Google home or Alexa device, you can tell it to 1402 01:22:22,900 --> 01:22:25,800 listen to the latest episode of the epicenter podcast, go to 1403 01:22:25,800 --> 01:22:28,900 epicenter dot TV /, subscribe for a full list of places where 1404 01:22:28,900 --> 01:22:31,600 you can watch and listen, while you're there, be sure to sign up 1405 01:22:31,600 --> 01:22:34,400 for the newsletter so you get new episodes in your inbox as 1406 01:22:34,400 --> 01:22:36,900 they're released if you want to interact with us. 1407 01:22:37,300 --> 01:22:39,500 Guests or other podcast listeners you can follow us on 1408 01:22:39,500 --> 01:22:41,800 Twitter and please leave us a review on iTunes. 1409 01:22:41,900 --> 01:22:44,300 It helps people find the show and we're always happy to read 1410 01:22:44,300 --> 01:22:47,600 them but thanks so much and we look forward to being back next 1411 01:22:47,600 --> 01:22:38,300 week. Guests or other podcast 1412 01:22:38,300 --> 01:22:41,000 listeners you can follow us on Twitter and please leave us a 1413 01:22:41,008 --> 01:22:43,100 review on iTunes. It helps people find the show 1414 01:22:43,300 --> 01:22:46,500 and we're always happy to read them but thanks so much and we 1415 01:22:46,500 --> 01:22:47,800 look forward to being back next week.