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This is epicenter episode 253 
with guest Angela Walsh. 

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Hey work, or organizing a live 
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Ascender. 

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Hi, welcome to epicenter. 
So it's talks about the 

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technology. 
Projects and startups, driving 

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decentralization. 
And the global blockchain 

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Revolution. 
My name is Sebastian ink with 

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you and my name is Brian Pub, 
and crane we're here today with 

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Angela wall. 
She's a professor of law at st. 

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Mary's University School of Law 
in San Antonio. 

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She's also a research fellow at 
the blockchain center or Central

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Block Chain at University 
College London. 

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And she's a kind of prolific 
author of papers that are, you 

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know, all critical of 
blockchain, or looking at the 

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some of the downsides or some 
There, you know, maybe ways in 

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which the common narratives 
around blockchains should be 

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questions and so, yeah, I look 
forward to talking with, with 

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you about that today. 
Thank you. 

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I'm excited to be here and, yes,
I do write a lot of stuff that's

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kind of critical or ask hard 
questions. 

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I like to thank very good. 
So when did you first learn 

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about Bitcoin and blockchain and
start? 

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How did it start kind of rising 
you interest. 

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Okay so I was transitioning. 
I'm from practice, I was a 

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corporate lawyer for a while and
I was transitioning to practice 

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and had become very interested 
in money. 

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How money Works? 
How law helps to constitute? 

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What money is, how money can 
break? 

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All those types of questions? 
And I was very interested in 

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researching that area for my, 
you know, research as a 

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professor. 
So I was looking at, you know, 

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thinking about how the dollar 
worked and stuff and heard of 

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Bitcoin, I would Kind of like 
fall of 2011, early 2012 and 

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didn't dig in at that point. 
But once I was in Academia, for 

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real, I dug in, I would say 
early 2013 and the questions 

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around the governance who my 
attention very early. 

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I was it was so interesting to 
me going to I went to a remember

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my first Bitcoin conference in 
the summer of 2013. 13 in New 

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York and it was an early crowd. 
Remember meeting like Marco 

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Centauri there and some some 
other people who have continued 

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to kind of be prominent people 
in the space and the 

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conversation was about, oh, and 
we're talking about this new 

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Bitcoin Foundation that were 
forming, and I was like the 

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question in my head was wait a 
minute, how can you be a voice 

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of a technology that is, you 
know, decentralised and who gets

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the right to be the voice and 
to, to say things that are 

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Either on behalf purported to me
on behalf of this technology and

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decentralized community. 
So, those questions Drew my 

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interest early on. 
And then since then, I've just 

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kind of been along for the ride 
when I see things that don't 

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make sense to me, where maybe 
the the the discussion around 

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something doesn't match 
real-world events. 

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I write about it or talk about 
it in hopes of drawing attention

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to it and flushing out 
inconsistencies, which I see as 

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potential risks in many cases. 
So what has the reaction been 

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coming out of the blockchain 
community to your work? 

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It varies there early on I would
say it there was a lot of strong

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pushback that I shouldn't even 
be saying anything because I 

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just don't understand anything. 
I clearly since I'm not a 

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technologist, I can't possibly 
get it. 

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And I am not a technologist and 
that is that's absolutely fair. 

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That I don't understand certain 
things that Technologies do but 

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they also We don't understand 
certain things that I do. 

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So I think that's one of the 
challenges in this space is for 

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many, many disciplines to come 
together and try to communicate.

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So, I've been I've gotten a lot 
of bad feedback on Twitter, I 

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would say and I've spoken at 
conferences and when I speak to 

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tech people, they often hate 
what I'm saying. 

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And come up to me later and say,
I don't, I don't remember what 

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you said, but I know I hated it.
So I, I guess I'm just keeping 

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on I'm saying things despite 
that and there are plenty of 

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tech people in this space. 
Actually I I've met and had good

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discussions with and I think, 
you know, I count the number of 

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them as friends and critical 
thinkers as well. 

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So it's a mixed bag, I would say
Is this sort of reactions 

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something that you see in, maybe
other areas of Technologies over

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the broader fintech space or 
just like purely something you 

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see around with watching 
conferences. 

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So this types of events. 
Well, okay so my argument about 

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software developers is 
fiduciaries. 

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I think has you know it has 
resonance in the blockchain 

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space and this is where you know
I started thinking about that 

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idea originally, but I do think 
it has A lot larger much larger 

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implications. 
And I think it actually needs to

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be looked at in you know, maybe 
in open-source important open 

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source software projects 
generally and we can talk about 

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that a little bit more but so I 
feel like when I'm at Tec, when 

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I'm a tech conferences, 
blockchain has like probably the

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strongest reaction, but any 
software developer or anyone 

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involved Volved in software 
development, is probably going 

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to have a strong reaction to the
coders of fiduciaries idea. 

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When I talk to lawyers, i-i've 
been kind of calling out height 

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where I see it and the space and
inconsistencies, and people kind

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of mindlessly, I would say 
evangelizing for things that 

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they don't necessarily 
understand. 

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And I point that out in a 
variety of settings, I've 

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pointed it out at legal 
conferences. 

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Has and the, the this the 
feeling that I get from talking 

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to people, is that okay? 
It's very different from what 

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we're used to hearing about 
blockchain and maybe some wool 

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being pulled off of their eyes. 
I don't know. 

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That's my Hope anyway. 
So you mentioned these 

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inconsistencies already it. 
So what are in your opinion? 

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What in your eyes? 
The biggest inconsistencies that

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that people talk about when 
talking about blockchain in the 

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broader context of the law. 
So, I mean, one of the big 

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inconsistencies are things that 
I think of as problematic and we

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haven't gotten a good 
understanding of yet. 

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Is really this. 
What what is decentralized 

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governance? 
Mean, and as I said early on I 

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it was very interesting to me 
that the conversation around 

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Bitcoin and then other 
blockchains was, you know, that 

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it was just this software that 
miraculously was running on this

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network of computers and it just
it just worked and it was the 

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narrative was very much that 
there were not people involved 

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with it, that it was Tech doing 
this, right? 

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And again, not Technology is for
questions like well what happens

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is? 
There's a bug, surely someone's 

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fixing it, who is doing this 
where you know, they're making 

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changes to the software over 
time any updates and stuff. 

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So I feel like there was and 
there still is resistance to 

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this in some ways there was the 
it's been a long time coming. 

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The realization that governance 
is actually happening in 

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blockchains through the 
development of software and this

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this conversation hasn't is is 
Also still in progress, but I 

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think there there are similar 
arguments that significant 

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validators and miners. 
In the space Also function as 

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fiduciaries, the paper that I've
written here, the in-depth paper

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is looking at software 
developers in this light, but I 

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need to write and I have 
half-written, you know, want 

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about Miners and other 
validators as as fiduciaries. 

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So inconsistencies in thinking 
that Because we have this, you 

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know, a lot of computers somehow
the running of the system is 

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necessarily decentralized. 
I think they're starting to be 

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more clarity in descriptions of 
these systems that governance 

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happens in different levels, 
right? 

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And decentralization is relevant
in different places. 

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Decentralization can refer to 
the number of nodes in a network

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and can refer to concentration 
of the validators in a network. 

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It can refer to how the software
process software development 

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process happens. 
Right? 

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Is that centralized is a 
decentralized? 

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What is decentralized even mean?
So governance decentralization 

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is a term that I think is that's
what I'm working on right now. 

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So it's top of mind trying to 
figure out what that actually 

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means. 
And then I see just like a lot 

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of words used as basic. 
Descriptors of the technology 

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immutable secure reflects truth.
Trustless, I think all of those 

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are Widely repeated, including 
an academic Works in reports by 

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governments and nonprofits 
etcetera as being 

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characteristics of blockchain 
technology and their their 

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stated as characteristics of 
blockchain. 

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Whether we're talking about 
public blockchains or permission

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blockchains whatever as if they 
are Universal regardless of the 

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flavor of technology that you're
using and that's just not right.

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And yet the discussion continues
and I think it can have 

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significant consequences when we
expect the technology to do 

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things for us, that it just 
doesn't do great. 

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Now, I think that was a great 
kind of overview. 

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Now you've mentioned a few times
to term fiduciaries, and I think

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this idea of developers as 
producers is probably the most, 

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you know, controversial idea you
have and also an idea that, you 

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know, if kind of people went 
along with it and regulate the 

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spend along with it had would 
have a Women's consequences. 

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We can you talk a little bit 
about you know, what are 

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fiduciaries? 
And why is that relevant in the 

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blockchain context? 
Sure. 

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Okay so the the paper that I 
have out right now and I've been

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thinking about this for a long 
time, I guess I'm just slow on 

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this point to actually get that 
analysis out, but fiduciaries 

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are they're an important part of
our Lives generally. 

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And people that we think of as 
fulfilling the Re-roll commonly 

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are people like lawyers. 
Lawyers are fiduciaries of their

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clients, doctors are fiduciaries
of their patients, some people 

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view like pastors and stuff as 
fiduciaries of the, you know, 

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the the members of their, their,
their church or whatever. 

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Souls of that you sure. 
Yes, yeah. 

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Yeah. 
That there's, we could have a 

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very interesting discussion 
about that totally unrelated to 

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blockchain stuff but fiduciaries
basically are people that you 

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put trust in You essentially 
trust them to give you their 

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expertise in different ways, 
they may hold money on your your

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behalf. 
They, they do things that are of

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great importance for other 
people. 

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And in my paper, I use a 
framework that Tamar Frankel, 

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who is a very prominent very 
well respected, law, professor, 

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who has developed really a 
Theory of fiduciary law, I use 

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her description of what if a 
general description of what a 

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fiduciary is, and compare that 
to what I see software 

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developers doing in these walk 
chains. 

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And a crucial part of a 
fiduciary is because you're 

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trusting in them, you are 
enabling them to make decisions 

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for you that affect you and that
is putting power into their 

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hands. 
Okay? 

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So I think that people in the 
Software development part of 

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public blockchains people who 
are thinking and doing research 

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in what kind of policies, the 
software should reflect people 

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who are figuring out how the 
software would reflect those 

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policies and actually doing the 
coding, perhaps of reflecting 

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that and then reviewing, right? 
There's a lot of my 

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00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:14,800
understanding not being a 
software developer, there's a 

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lot of different steps that go 
into it. 

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It's not someone sits down and 
spits out code right there, 

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especially in systems that 
purport to transfer value and 

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you significant things for 
people. 

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The software development process
is extremely important and 

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fiduciary. 
I think these people are acting 

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as fiduciaries in that users of 
these systems, the ones who, you

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know, own the cryptocurrencies, 
or crypto assets that trade on 

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these things. 
People that potentially people 

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that are building businesses. 
On top of that using these 

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public blockchains, as 
infrastructure for various 

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things, they are relying very 
strongly on the software 

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developers to do two things. 
One to be good at what they're 

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doing to be competent, but 
that's not all. 

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Okay, they're also relying on 
these software developers to be 

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trustworthy and to not do things
for their own benefit, over the 

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benefit of the public, who's 
essentially We using these 

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systems meaning you wouldn't 
want a software developer for a 

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00:15:22,300 --> 00:15:25,700
theory and more for Bitcoin to 
be taking bribes from a 

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00:15:25,700 --> 00:15:30,700
particular minor or government 
to push a certain change to the 

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network right to talk it up. 
I think people would in the 

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blockchain space would be 
horrified to hear of that 

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00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:42,100
happening, but no one owes you 
that Duty, unless there's 

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00:15:42,100 --> 00:15:45,300
something like a fiduciary. 
In your paper. 

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00:15:45,300 --> 00:15:52,500
You you make reference to Tamar 
Frankel's scholarly fiduciary 

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00:15:52,500 --> 00:15:57,000
law, and and there's, there's 
there's four attributes. 

243
00:15:58,400 --> 00:16:02,100
And so you, you sort of mention 
them during your description of 

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00:16:02,100 --> 00:16:04,900
if you just sort of like go 
through them one by one. 

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00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:08,700
Because it is interesting to me 
this, this how these attributes,

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00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:12,800
it sort of reminds me of the 
Howey test in a sense where one 

247
00:16:12,800 --> 00:16:15,800
looks at an entity. 
In poses these questions. 

248
00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:20,300
And if they, if they answer yes 
to these questions, then one 

249
00:16:20,300 --> 00:16:23,000
could assume that they are 
fiduciary. 

250
00:16:23,200 --> 00:16:25,400
So if we could just go through 
this again, so we have them 

251
00:16:25,400 --> 00:16:27,800
popped out of mine and then sort
of, yeah, let's go through them 

252
00:16:27,800 --> 00:16:31,500
one by one. 
Okay, so Frankel says that all 

253
00:16:31,500 --> 00:16:34,200
fiduciary share a certain set of
attributes, okay? 

254
00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:37,400
And the first attribute, she 
says, they have is that they 

255
00:16:37,500 --> 00:16:41,900
generally offer services. 
Instead of products, the 

256
00:16:41,900 --> 00:16:45,100
services are usually socially 
desirable Durable and often 

257
00:16:45,100 --> 00:16:49,100
require expertise. 
Okay, so she gives examples of 

258
00:16:49,100 --> 00:16:52,500
things like Legal Services 
teaching Asset Management, 

259
00:16:52,500 --> 00:16:55,700
corporate management Etc. 
Okay, so people offering 

260
00:16:55,700 --> 00:16:59,400
Services based on their 
expertise and the way that I see

261
00:16:59,400 --> 00:17:02,900
that applying to software 
developers is that well, clearly

262
00:17:02,900 --> 00:17:05,300
they are providing Services, 
right? 

263
00:17:06,000 --> 00:17:09,700
The services of creating the 
code, if they are The 

264
00:17:09,700 --> 00:17:14,700
Originators of a blockchain 
system but also Meaning and 

265
00:17:14,700 --> 00:17:16,800
continuing to review the code, 
right? 

266
00:17:16,800 --> 00:17:20,700
And figuring out what changes 
are necessary and there is no 

267
00:17:20,700 --> 00:17:26,400
doubt that the services that the
Developers for systems, like 

268
00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:30,600
Bitcoin and etherium Z cash, 
and, and others, that all those 

269
00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:34,700
requiring, very significant 
expertise, right? 

270
00:17:34,700 --> 00:17:37,700
That it takes a long time for 
someone to develop the next 

271
00:17:37,700 --> 00:17:43,200
necessary, expertise, to to 
credibly do the development. 

272
00:17:43,300 --> 00:17:47,000
And actually, Ali, right? 
We've seen that, even those who 

273
00:17:47,000 --> 00:17:52,100
have created these systems still
don't have full understanding of

274
00:17:52,100 --> 00:17:55,500
them, right? 
With the parity, parity bug and 

275
00:17:55,500 --> 00:17:57,200
the different ones that have 
shown up in ethereum. 

276
00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:00,600
It's been the ones who created 
the systems that, you know, 

277
00:18:01,200 --> 00:18:02,900
they're not foolproof yet, 
right? 

278
00:18:02,900 --> 00:18:06,600
So it requires a lot of 
expertise, and actually there's 

279
00:18:06,600 --> 00:18:10,500
there was a computer science 
paper that I cite in my paper 

280
00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:14,100
that talks about software 
developer. 

281
00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:17,300
Blockchain software developers 
actually having a higher 

282
00:18:17,300 --> 00:18:21,400
standard of like, developing a 
blockchain software engineering 

283
00:18:21,400 --> 00:18:24,500
standard or something like that,
because it is such a demanding 

284
00:18:24,900 --> 00:18:29,200
role to play. 
So services that require 

285
00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:30,600
expertise. 
Okay? 

286
00:18:30,600 --> 00:18:34,200
The second factor is that in 
order to perform the services, 

287
00:18:34,200 --> 00:18:37,200
effectively, the fiduciaries 
have to be entrusted with 

288
00:18:37,200 --> 00:18:42,200
property or power, okay? 
So you could see that in the 

289
00:18:42,200 --> 00:18:45,000
context of, you know, 
run-of-the-mill, Series like 

290
00:18:45,000 --> 00:18:50,100
lawyers that, you know, the 
client is entrusting the lawyer 

291
00:18:50,100 --> 00:18:53,900
with power over their most 
private information. 

292
00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:56,100
Or one that you're turning over,
you're telling your lawyer, the 

293
00:18:56,100 --> 00:19:02,200
full truth, you may entrust an 
escrow agent with your property,

294
00:19:02,200 --> 00:19:04,700
right? 
And trust that they're that 

295
00:19:04,700 --> 00:19:07,300
they're not going to abscond 
with it. 

296
00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:12,000
So, that's how we see it in the 
general fiduciary world. 

297
00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:17,200
And in the blockchain, I see 
software developers and trusted 

298
00:19:17,200 --> 00:19:20,400
with with, with power certainly.
And I think there's actually an 

299
00:19:20,408 --> 00:19:23,200
argument that they're interested
with property potentially as 

300
00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:28,100
well. 
The power is that well not 

301
00:19:28,100 --> 00:19:32,600
everybody can read the software 
code, that people are that 

302
00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:33,900
people write for these 
blockchains. 

303
00:19:33,900 --> 00:19:37,500
I understand that they're all 
generally open source. 

304
00:19:37,500 --> 00:19:42,500
So the code is available, but 
people are not reviewing that on

305
00:19:42,500 --> 00:19:46,800
a day-to-day basis. 
I EU, like, 90% of the users of 

306
00:19:46,800 --> 00:19:50,200
Bitcoin, or ethereum or not 
referring reviewing, the, the 

307
00:19:50,200 --> 00:19:55,600
actual underlying software code.
So they are trusting that 

308
00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:59,900
software developers are doing 
it, doing it, right? 

309
00:19:59,900 --> 00:20:05,500
And doing it in, doing it in 
accordance with, you know, the 

310
00:20:05,500 --> 00:20:11,400
ethos of the community. 
There's an argument that these 

311
00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:14,000
people are actually even 
entrusted with property. 

312
00:20:14,200 --> 00:20:17,600
T in the sense that we're now 
viewing these cryptocurrencies 

313
00:20:18,500 --> 00:20:21,700
as assets right? 
There's been discussion the 

314
00:20:21,700 --> 00:20:23,400
legal World okay, are they 
Commodities? 

315
00:20:23,400 --> 00:20:25,200
What are they? 
They're these things that have 

316
00:20:25,200 --> 00:20:28,900
value. 
So I get a lot of pushback on 

317
00:20:28,900 --> 00:20:36,000
this argument but I think that 
These digital assets are 

318
00:20:36,000 --> 00:20:43,600
completely reliant on the 
ongoing skill and you know, good

319
00:20:43,600 --> 00:20:45,800
works of the software developers
write. 

320
00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:49,500
If they screw up, if they put a 
bug in, if they fail to come to 

321
00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:54,200
agreement as a group and don't 
repair a critical emergency, 

322
00:20:55,000 --> 00:20:57,800
then the property is kind of 
gone, right? 

323
00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:00,900
Or loses all its value. 
The digital assets value is very

324
00:21:00,900 --> 00:21:05,300
much tied to What the software 
developers do and we can go into

325
00:21:05,300 --> 00:21:08,400
more examples of that, I cite a 
few in my paper but I could have

326
00:21:08,400 --> 00:21:11,500
cited. 
I feel like many many more but 

327
00:21:11,500 --> 00:21:15,300
crisis moments to me in general 
are the ones that reveal the 

328
00:21:15,300 --> 00:21:18,000
power that people are 
exercising. 

329
00:21:18,500 --> 00:21:22,500
Okay. 
So the third factor that Frankel

330
00:21:22,500 --> 00:21:27,300
identifies as being one of 
fiduciaries is that trusting 

331
00:21:27,400 --> 00:21:32,200
these fiduciaries poses risks to
she calls them in Trust. 

332
00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:35,100
There's okay, so the people who 
are relying on the fiduciaries, 

333
00:21:35,500 --> 00:21:39,000
it poses a risk to them that the
fiduciaries are not going to be 

334
00:21:39,000 --> 00:21:41,500
trustworthy, okay? 
They may run off with the 

335
00:21:41,500 --> 00:21:44,800
property that you give them. 
They may not perform the 

336
00:21:44,800 --> 00:21:48,600
services they promised to 
adequately, they might misuse 

337
00:21:48,600 --> 00:21:50,400
the the property that you give 
them. 

338
00:21:51,100 --> 00:21:55,900
And I've talked about this a 
little bit already, I think, but

339
00:21:56,800 --> 00:22:01,100
if the software developers are 
not trustworthy, basically the 

340
00:22:01,100 --> 00:22:04,400
people who are using the the 
system are using it under false 

341
00:22:04,600 --> 00:22:12,600
pretenses, right? 
If metallic or Vlad are, you 

342
00:22:12,600 --> 00:22:15,500
know, taking bribes from the 
Russian government or something 

343
00:22:15,500 --> 00:22:17,400
like that, which I'm not 
accusing them of doing it 

344
00:22:17,400 --> 00:22:23,300
anyway, but it would be relevant
for the users of the etherium 

345
00:22:23,300 --> 00:22:27,400
community to know this, right? 
If there are secret backdoor 

346
00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:32,000
deals and one is getting paid by
my someone, People should know 

347
00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:37,400
that and right now, there is, 
there's nothing that obligates 

348
00:22:37,400 --> 00:22:40,300
them to do that. 
Unless we consider them to have 

349
00:22:40,300 --> 00:22:44,400
some sort of Duty to the people 
using these systems, okay? 

350
00:22:44,700 --> 00:22:48,400
Number four, there is a 
likelihood that the in truster 

351
00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:51,400
will fail to protect itself from
the risks involved in fiduciary 

352
00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:54,000
relationships. 
The markets may also fail to 

353
00:22:54,000 --> 00:22:56,200
protect them from these risks 
and the costs for the 

354
00:22:56,208 --> 00:22:59,000
fiduciaries of establishing. 
Their trustworthiness might be 

355
00:22:59,000 --> 00:23:01,300
higher than their benefits from 
the Oops. 

356
00:23:01,600 --> 00:23:04,700
This one has a lot of stuff 
embedded in it, so I'm going to 

357
00:23:04,700 --> 00:23:07,700
kind of simplify it for purposes
of this conversation. 

358
00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:17,200
Basically, I think that users of
these systems to me, the Ico 

359
00:23:17,300 --> 00:23:20,100
Market demonstrates, this 
beautifully that they will fail 

360
00:23:20,100 --> 00:23:22,600
to protect themselves from the 
risks involved in this to do 

361
00:23:22,600 --> 00:23:26,700
Sherry relationship, okay? 
People have been investing in, 

362
00:23:27,600 --> 00:23:30,600
you know so-called public 
blockchains like crazy over the 

363
00:23:31,000 --> 00:23:36,100
Steer in a lot of initial coin 
offerings and a recent study 

364
00:23:36,100 --> 00:23:39,200
that came out from the 
University of Pennsylvania 

365
00:23:39,200 --> 00:23:44,800
talked about how the code in 
these and many, many ico's 

366
00:23:45,100 --> 00:23:49,800
actually Bears, no relation to 
the promises made in white 

367
00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:52,900
papers, or in ads for the ico's,
right? 

368
00:23:53,200 --> 00:23:58,400
Things like, they will have a 
vesting provision for the 

369
00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:03,100
founders or they will take All 
founder control within the code.

370
00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:06,700
Well, when they reviewed the 
software code and the white 

371
00:24:06,700 --> 00:24:10,400
paper or whatever else making 
any promises generally, they 

372
00:24:10,400 --> 00:24:14,900
found that there were big gaps, 
many cases, the code again, as I

373
00:24:14,900 --> 00:24:19,100
said bore, no resemblance, the 
market certainly didn't protect 

374
00:24:19,100 --> 00:24:22,800
these people. 
They weren't they, they didn't 

375
00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:24,900
protect themselves. 
Right? 

376
00:24:24,900 --> 00:24:27,500
So nothing. 
No protection was happening for 

377
00:24:27,500 --> 00:24:30,600
people who were buying into 
these icos. 

378
00:24:31,000 --> 00:24:37,000
And I I feel it's easy to Tar. 
There's clearly a lot of fraud 

379
00:24:37,000 --> 00:24:38,800
in the Ico space over the past 
year. 

380
00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:43,600
And I don't want to get 
distracted by that because I 

381
00:24:43,600 --> 00:24:47,600
feel like these issues are not 
just relevant to what are 

382
00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:50,900
clearly fraudulent. 
Fly-by-night ico's. 

383
00:24:50,900 --> 00:24:54,800
I think they're actually 
relevant to even the more 

384
00:24:56,200 --> 00:24:59,700
legitimate projects. 
Like the client like ethereum 

385
00:24:59,700 --> 00:25:02,400
like Z cash. 
What which have very serious 

386
00:25:02,400 --> 00:25:07,800
technologists involved. 
So I think and as I explore in 

387
00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:11,100
my paper, I think there are very
strong arguments actually that 

388
00:25:11,100 --> 00:25:14,100
software developers in the broad
sense that I'm talking about, 

389
00:25:14,700 --> 00:25:19,500
actually fulfill all of these 
characteristics. 

390
00:25:20,300 --> 00:25:24,400
And there's one thing that I do,
I want to be sure to mention 

391
00:25:24,700 --> 00:25:28,000
while I'm thinking about it. 
And one of the pushbacks that I 

392
00:25:28,000 --> 00:25:34,900
get about, About this idea is 
that people don't see them as 

393
00:25:34,900 --> 00:25:37,600
fiduciaries because they feel 
like the fiduciary has to have a

394
00:25:37,600 --> 00:25:43,000
personal relationship with with 
like there has to be a personal 

395
00:25:43,000 --> 00:25:46,200
relationship between the person 
serving is the fiduciary in the 

396
00:25:46,200 --> 00:25:51,800
person relying on them. 
And I'm I'm viewing this more as

397
00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:54,500
a kind of fiduciary almost of 
the public. 

398
00:25:54,500 --> 00:25:57,900
There's ideas about fiduciaries 
such as you know, some people 

399
00:25:57,900 --> 00:26:02,400
argue that politicians are 
fiduciaries or judges or 

400
00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:06,300
fiduciaries of the public and 
kind of have a the public 

401
00:26:06,300 --> 00:26:09,100
places, a trust in them. 
So I don't think it necessarily 

402
00:26:09,100 --> 00:26:13,300
has to be a one-on-one 
relationship between a user and 

403
00:26:13,300 --> 00:26:16,000
a developer for there to be a 
fiduciary relationship. 

404
00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:19,600
I think it can be a broader 
relationship one, too many 

405
00:26:19,700 --> 00:26:23,400
actually. 
Have you ever considered that 

406
00:26:23,400 --> 00:26:25,500
one of the biggest factors 
holding back growth in the 

407
00:26:25,508 --> 00:26:27,900
blockchain industry, is the lack
of talented available. 

408
00:26:27,900 --> 00:26:31,100
Developers by some estimates, 
there are up to 14 job, 

409
00:26:31,100 --> 00:26:33,500
openings, for every single Block
Chain developer in the world. 

410
00:26:33,900 --> 00:26:36,400
That's where Top Guns in top 
towels, a Global Network of 

411
00:26:36,400 --> 00:26:38,400
talent and business technology 
and design. 

412
00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:40,900
And they pick their members by 
selecting only the top, three 

413
00:26:40,900 --> 00:26:43,300
percent of applicants. 
When you work with top tell 

414
00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:46,200
you're getting the candid XM. 
We've got a blockchain 

415
00:26:46,200 --> 00:26:48,000
specialization that's an 
on-demand service. 

416
00:26:48,000 --> 00:26:50,700
That connects your business to 
an elite network of developers 

417
00:26:50,700 --> 00:26:52,200
and Engineers specializing in 
areas. 

418
00:26:52,300 --> 00:26:55,700
Like solidity smart contracts, 
hyper Ledger fabric are 3, 

419
00:26:55,700 --> 00:26:57,900
quart, a decentralized 
applications and more. 

420
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:01,000
What's best about top towel? 
What I like the most about this 

421
00:27:01,000 --> 00:27:04,400
service is they take the stress 
and pain out of hiring, who has 

422
00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:07,200
time to publish job, openings 
and sift through resumes and 

423
00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:08,700
schedule interviews and all that
stuff. 

424
00:27:08,900 --> 00:27:11,600
It's a white glove service so 
they take care of everything and

425
00:27:11,600 --> 00:27:13,000
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436
00:27:39,900 --> 00:27:43,300
Now if you Sheree, right this is
I think many people would agree 

437
00:27:43,300 --> 00:27:48,700
that of course as a user were 
blockchain II rely to varying 

438
00:27:48,700 --> 00:27:54,200
extents on different parties 
including developers but let's 

439
00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:57,700
say we actually went ahead with 
your suggestions as okay, we do 

440
00:27:57,700 --> 00:28:00,500
treat the mass-produced shoes. 
What would that practical mean? 

441
00:28:00,500 --> 00:28:02,200
Because that is illegal term 
right? 

442
00:28:02,200 --> 00:28:06,100
With all kinds of implications. 
Yes, you're right. 

443
00:28:06,500 --> 00:28:11,200
It is and there are there are 
many Patient, implications like 

444
00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:12,900
practical ones. 
There's a lot of practical 

445
00:28:12,900 --> 00:28:16,200
questions about it, and in the 
paper I explore some of the 

446
00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:19,100
costs and benefits of this 
because I don't think it's by 

447
00:28:19,100 --> 00:28:22,900
any means like an easy 
conclusion to decide that. 

448
00:28:23,300 --> 00:28:26,300
Okay, well, they are look doing 
things that make them look an 

449
00:28:26,300 --> 00:28:29,300
awful lot like fiduciaries. 
Do we actually go ahead and 

450
00:28:29,300 --> 00:28:32,100
treat them like that in in a 
legal sense. 

451
00:28:33,500 --> 00:28:35,600
So some of the big questions 
around this. 

452
00:28:35,600 --> 00:28:39,000
Are, you know, how do you 
identify which software 

453
00:28:39,000 --> 00:28:41,300
Developers? 
Which people in this process are

454
00:28:41,300 --> 00:28:45,100
actually functioning as 
fiduciaries, is it just the, you

455
00:28:45,100 --> 00:28:47,800
know, the the people who are 
supervising, the research is 

456
00:28:47,800 --> 00:28:52,400
that just the people who are 
doing the review of the code, do

457
00:28:53,100 --> 00:28:56,000
some of the pushback I get is 
that describing you know, 

458
00:28:56,000 --> 00:28:59,700
software developers are I've 
used the term coders as 

459
00:28:59,700 --> 00:29:02,500
fiduciaries, I get a lot of 
pushback because people think of

460
00:29:02,500 --> 00:29:06,300
the term coders just sounds like
the Scribe, write and not the 

461
00:29:06,300 --> 00:29:09,000
the brain power that's going 
into creating the code. 

462
00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:12,100
So you No, that's, that's those 
are big questions? 

463
00:29:13,100 --> 00:29:16,300
Which one's actually would be 
treated as fiduciaries figuring 

464
00:29:16,300 --> 00:29:19,100
out. 
Who is actually going to benefit

465
00:29:19,100 --> 00:29:22,800
from this legal category 
categorization, right? 

466
00:29:22,800 --> 00:29:27,500
Is it anyone who owns or has 
ever owned potentially the 

467
00:29:27,700 --> 00:29:33,500
cryptocurrency of the system is 
it can can we extend it to 

468
00:29:33,500 --> 00:29:38,200
people who have built businesses
on the system like exchanges or 

469
00:29:38,500 --> 00:29:42,400
wallet companies? 
Absolutely are similarly relying

470
00:29:42,400 --> 00:29:44,900
on the developers to do a good 
job and not cheat. 

471
00:29:45,500 --> 00:29:50,300
So identifying those parties is 
important and I mean of course 

472
00:29:50,300 --> 00:29:54,600
there would be challenges to 
figuring out what to blame 

473
00:29:54,600 --> 00:29:57,900
people for, right? 
Which bit of code is the one 

474
00:29:57,900 --> 00:30:03,700
that caused all the problems. 
That could be also an area of 

475
00:30:03,700 --> 00:30:06,300
controversy. 
But there are and I think you're

476
00:30:06,300 --> 00:30:09,400
getting out, there are a larger 
potential social. 

477
00:30:09,600 --> 00:30:12,500
Consequences to this 
categorization, right? 

478
00:30:13,000 --> 00:30:16,400
Software has a huge role and how
Society runs today. 

479
00:30:16,400 --> 00:30:19,900
It runs a lot of our most 
important infrastructures, right

480
00:30:20,700 --> 00:30:24,500
nuclear weapons systems the 
internet itself. 

481
00:30:24,500 --> 00:30:30,300
Like, all of these things, run 
on software and blockchains want

482
00:30:30,300 --> 00:30:34,100
to run important things. 
I mean, that's one of the things

483
00:30:34,100 --> 00:30:36,300
that people are excited about 
them for, right? 

484
00:30:36,300 --> 00:30:39,200
They want them to be used for 
important social systems. 

485
00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:44,700
If you are, if you decide to 
treat software developers of 

486
00:30:44,700 --> 00:30:47,800
these systems, which are kind of
bubbling up, there's this, you 

487
00:30:47,800 --> 00:30:51,700
know, great activity and 
Entrepreneurship in the area. 

488
00:30:51,900 --> 00:30:53,400
If you're treating those 
software developers as 

489
00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:55,700
fiduciaries that are you going 
to stifle everything and no 

490
00:30:55,700 --> 00:30:58,000
one's going to do any 
development at all, right? 

491
00:30:58,000 --> 00:31:01,700
Because they are worried about 
the liability that they may 

492
00:31:01,700 --> 00:31:03,900
face, right? 
If someone can sue you for 

493
00:31:03,900 --> 00:31:06,900
screwing up, you're probably not
going to want to do anything. 

494
00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:12,600
And I think this Is this really 
gets at some of these larger 

495
00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:15,400
questions that were wrestling 
with in Tech now? 

496
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:20,700
Right, what should 
accountability be for people who

497
00:31:20,700 --> 00:31:25,900
create really important systems 
and mess up Tech has had a lot 

498
00:31:25,900 --> 00:31:28,900
of protection. 
I would almost call it a subsidy

499
00:31:29,500 --> 00:31:33,300
in the sense that people who 
create have created software 

500
00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:40,100
have been very much insulated 
from liability and the If you 

501
00:31:40,100 --> 00:31:44,600
look at any agreement software 
licensing agreement, you will 

502
00:31:44,600 --> 00:31:47,700
see tons of disclaimers and if 
you look at any of the open 

503
00:31:47,700 --> 00:31:50,100
source software license 
agreements, that these 

504
00:31:50,100 --> 00:31:54,900
blockchains are that the 
software for the blockchains is 

505
00:31:55,300 --> 00:31:59,000
is tied to you will see full 
disclaimers of all sorts of 

506
00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:01,400
liability, right? 
And that the developers are 

507
00:32:01,400 --> 00:32:03,200
basically responsible for 
nothing. 

508
00:32:04,200 --> 00:32:09,200
So I don't think the the 
discussion stops just looking at

509
00:32:09,200 --> 00:32:15,100
what the license agreements say.
I think that this is actually a 

510
00:32:15,100 --> 00:32:17,000
policy question. 
Right? 

511
00:32:17,600 --> 00:32:19,700
Fine. 
So that the contracts have said 

512
00:32:19,700 --> 00:32:22,900
that. 
No one Bears any liability it 

513
00:32:22,900 --> 00:32:28,400
was that is that okay in a in a 
situation where so much trust is

514
00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:34,300
being placed on these people to 
know take care of Large amounts 

515
00:32:34,300 --> 00:32:37,700
of value. 
Should we impose more things? 

516
00:32:37,700 --> 00:32:40,600
That can't be disclaimed 
potentially? 

517
00:32:41,700 --> 00:32:44,600
So yeah, basically, I would be 
described as an innovation 

518
00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:47,100
Killer By Any Tech person. 
If you want to boil it down. 

519
00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:52,300
Yeah, I mean, one of the things 
that stand out to me is that 

520
00:32:52,300 --> 00:32:55,500
your proposals? 
Don't seem very practical, 

521
00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:57,700
right? 
So, we've, what we've seen in 

522
00:32:57,700 --> 00:33:00,300
the Block Chain spaces that it's
a global thing, right? 

523
00:33:00,300 --> 00:33:03,900
And of course, you can start and
run and and these It's from 

524
00:33:03,900 --> 00:33:08,000
anywhere and you know even if 
you look at something like a 

525
00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:12,700
token sales which I think the 
case there that there's some 

526
00:33:12,700 --> 00:33:15,800
regulation applied teams you 
know fairly straightforward in 

527
00:33:15,800 --> 00:33:19,700
comparison but you know the very
mobile can move around and so it

528
00:33:19,700 --> 00:33:25,100
seems like here if let's say the
US said okay developers are 

529
00:33:25,100 --> 00:33:27,300
fiduciaries. 
This would just push, you know, 

530
00:33:27,300 --> 00:33:30,300
Innovation abroad or people 
would find ways to Route Around.

531
00:33:30,300 --> 00:33:34,300
Let's say you said, okay, but 
only those who have MIT access 

532
00:33:34,300 --> 00:33:36,700
they are fiduciaries. 
Then people probably figure out 

533
00:33:36,700 --> 00:33:39,700
some way to like so nobody else 
commit access but still things 

534
00:33:39,700 --> 00:33:43,300
could committed or like I'm sure
people would immediately route 

535
00:33:43,300 --> 00:33:46,600
around it. 
So do you think there's actually

536
00:33:47,900 --> 00:33:50,600
like, what do you think is Paul 
realistically possible? 

537
00:33:51,600 --> 00:33:54,200
Yeah, those are all very good 
points. 

538
00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:58,300
I mean, people definitely 
respond to laws that are passed 

539
00:33:58,300 --> 00:34:01,000
by trying to get around them. 
Absolutely. 

540
00:34:01,700 --> 00:34:06,900
And we're seeing some of that 
play out in the laws that are 

541
00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:09,199
being developed in the 
blockchain space already, right?

542
00:34:09,199 --> 00:34:12,900
There's kind of there's some 
regulatory competition 

543
00:34:12,900 --> 00:34:16,000
happening. 
I would say, some jurisdictions 

544
00:34:16,000 --> 00:34:19,900
have decided they really want to
incentivize people to do this 

545
00:34:20,100 --> 00:34:23,300
type of software development. 
Creation of these businesses and

546
00:34:23,300 --> 00:34:28,800
their jurisdiction like in Malta
or and Bermuda or Gibraltar and 

547
00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:32,100
crypto crypto Valley right in 
Switzerland. 

548
00:34:33,000 --> 00:34:39,300
So the multi-jurisdictional, the
global aspect of it is certainly

549
00:34:39,699 --> 00:34:42,600
an important consideration? 
I don't know. 

550
00:34:42,600 --> 00:34:45,500
I don't think it's impossible 
that we could come to consensus 

551
00:34:45,500 --> 00:34:49,199
on the fact that software 
developers, fulfill an important

552
00:34:49,199 --> 00:34:51,199
role. 
And I don't, okay. 

553
00:34:51,400 --> 00:34:55,600
So I feel like we're early in 
the conversation on this as well

554
00:34:55,600 --> 00:35:03,400
and it's sort of I see it being 
part of my job as an academic to

555
00:35:03,400 --> 00:35:08,200
ask hard questions to describe 
things in ways that I'm seeing 

556
00:35:08,200 --> 00:35:12,300
them and for the world, then to 
figure out, well yeah, do we 

557
00:35:12,300 --> 00:35:15,100
need a change in this area? 
It would be a really important 

558
00:35:15,100 --> 00:35:18,900
change, but it's not necessarily
out of line with what we're 

559
00:35:18,900 --> 00:35:21,100
seeing in the larger Tech 
conversation. 

560
00:35:22,300 --> 00:35:26,800
For the longest time, the 
conversation around social media

561
00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:30,700
platforms and all these big Tech
platforms, like, Google and 

562
00:35:30,700 --> 00:35:35,000
Amazon, and Facebook, and stuff 
has been, you know, let him go, 

563
00:35:35,100 --> 00:35:37,100
let him go. 
They are doing so much good for 

564
00:35:37,100 --> 00:35:44,200
the world, all the real 
excitement at the, you know, as 

565
00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:47,100
the internet and social media 
were developing that these is 

566
00:35:47,100 --> 00:35:50,900
good, good, good, good, good. 
We're seeing a real change, I 

567
00:35:50,900 --> 00:35:54,200
think. 
In tone in the conversation and 

568
00:35:54,200 --> 00:35:59,400
things that would have been 
impossible to imagine that maybe

569
00:35:59,400 --> 00:36:03,100
Facebook could be broken up or 
maybe it will be regulated in 

570
00:36:03,100 --> 00:36:05,900
different ways. 
Those are impossible to imagine 

571
00:36:06,300 --> 00:36:10,500
just a few years ago but I don't
think they're impossible to 

572
00:36:10,500 --> 00:36:15,800
imagine now and I think that the
the tide can shift very rapidly 

573
00:36:16,500 --> 00:36:19,200
and I see the the blockchain 
conversation kind of 

574
00:36:19,200 --> 00:36:21,200
intersecting with that in that 
one of those. 

575
00:36:21,400 --> 00:36:25,000
The immense that blockchain 
supporters often make, is that 

576
00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:27,800
okay? 
Well we can use blockchains to 

577
00:36:27,800 --> 00:36:31,700
essentially fix all the bad 
things about tech that have 

578
00:36:31,700 --> 00:36:34,300
emerged, right? 
The extreme centralization that 

579
00:36:34,300 --> 00:36:37,800
we've seen in these platforms. 
The the concentrations of power 

580
00:36:38,000 --> 00:36:41,200
and doing things that a 
decentralized way is is going to

581
00:36:41,207 --> 00:36:46,300
be what solves the problem and 
that may well be true. 

582
00:36:46,700 --> 00:36:49,700
But I think we need to ask hard 
questions about what do we mean 

583
00:36:49,700 --> 00:36:53,100
by decentralized is just 
Slapping this label on something

584
00:36:53,100 --> 00:36:56,200
decentralized, is that absolve 
people and are we comfortable 

585
00:36:56,200 --> 00:37:00,200
that we understand how power 
works in those systems such that

586
00:37:00,600 --> 00:37:03,400
we're not just handing power to 
a different set of people, 

587
00:37:03,400 --> 00:37:07,100
rather than, you know, 
dispersing it or making a 

588
00:37:07,107 --> 00:37:12,700
meaningful change. 
So I'd like to bring up who 

589
00:37:13,500 --> 00:37:15,300
regulates fiduciaries in the 
u.s. 

590
00:37:15,500 --> 00:37:19,200
Is there a sort of a governing 
body like the SEC decides, what 

591
00:37:19,200 --> 00:37:21,500
is, or isn't a security? 
Is there a regulator that 

592
00:37:21,500 --> 00:37:24,700
decides what is and what is not 
as fiduciary know? 

593
00:37:25,000 --> 00:37:29,300
So a fiduciary characterization 
or categorization could come in 

594
00:37:29,300 --> 00:37:32,500
different ways. 
Okay, it could come from just 

595
00:37:32,500 --> 00:37:35,000
common law. 
So, in the u.s., a lot of our 

596
00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:39,600
law is, is made just by courts 
deciding actual disputes between

597
00:37:39,600 --> 00:37:42,400
people. 
They decide cases and over time 

598
00:37:42,800 --> 00:37:45,700
the law, very gradually might 
shift. 

599
00:37:45,900 --> 00:37:48,700
And that's generally what 
happens with the development of 

600
00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:52,300
fiduciary law. 
Now, it also can happen through 

601
00:37:52,300 --> 00:37:56,000
a legislature, making a decision
that a certain party is a 

602
00:37:56,008 --> 00:37:58,300
fiduciary, okay? 
So in some of our statutes 

603
00:37:58,900 --> 00:38:04,000
certain parties are treated as 
fiduciaries, like in there's a 

604
00:38:04,500 --> 00:38:09,500
Rissa is a statute in the u.s. 
that governs like Employee 

605
00:38:09,500 --> 00:38:12,200
Retirement. 
Plans and certain parties acting

606
00:38:12,200 --> 00:38:15,300
within that are de facto 
fiduciaries, right? 

607
00:38:15,700 --> 00:38:22,300
There's just been a big, big 
tussle in the u.s. about whether

608
00:38:22,400 --> 00:38:25,800
certain investment advisors are 
fiduciaries, okay? 

609
00:38:26,400 --> 00:38:28,900
And it was passed into law, that
they would be. 

610
00:38:28,900 --> 00:38:32,700
And now I think it's been taken 
back so it can also come from a 

611
00:38:32,707 --> 00:38:38,800
legislature but just because a 
court hasn't found it to be the 

612
00:38:38,800 --> 00:38:42,100
case doesn't mean They couldn't 
view. 

613
00:38:42,400 --> 00:38:46,000
You couldn't be persuaded by 
arguments like those that I'm 

614
00:38:46,000 --> 00:38:48,200
making that. 
Well, this sure looks like 

615
00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:50,700
fiduciaries that we see in other
contexts. 

616
00:38:51,900 --> 00:38:53,300
Maybe we're going to treat one 
like that. 

617
00:38:53,300 --> 00:38:57,200
In this case, it's certainly not
impossible for the law to move 

618
00:38:57,200 --> 00:39:01,800
gradually over time or to 
persuade, right? 

619
00:39:01,800 --> 00:39:06,500
Lawmakers that they are 
fiduciaries and to your question

620
00:39:06,500 --> 00:39:09,000
like how am I? 
I think it's getting at, you 

621
00:39:09,008 --> 00:39:11,000
know, like how might this 
Manifest. 

622
00:39:11,300 --> 00:39:16,500
We know to look to the SEC for 
what is a security, right? 

623
00:39:16,500 --> 00:39:19,000
And we've seen a ton of 
discussion about that over the 

624
00:39:19,000 --> 00:39:25,000
past year or two and this this 
very much relates. 

625
00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:31,700
I see the SEC having made in 
that the speech that got a lot 

626
00:39:31,700 --> 00:39:36,900
of attention by Hinman earlier 
this summer where he said that 

627
00:39:37,000 --> 00:39:39,900
you know, based on his read now,
aetherium met. 

628
00:39:40,400 --> 00:39:43,500
You know, leaving aside how it 
was initially issued and it's, 

629
00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:47,800
you know, it's its initial Ico, 
right? 

630
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:52,800
I guess that's initial initial 
but its initial fundraising, it 

631
00:39:52,800 --> 00:39:55,000
may have been a security then he
didn't say for sure. 

632
00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:57,500
But it doesn't look like one now
because it's sufficiently 

633
00:39:57,500 --> 00:40:00,500
decentralized. 
Okay, I see that being exactly 

634
00:40:00,500 --> 00:40:04,100
the same conversation that we're
having here because making a 

635
00:40:04,100 --> 00:40:06,000
conclusion about whether 
something is sufficiently, 

636
00:40:06,000 --> 00:40:09,700
decentralized is talking about 
how power Works in that system. 

637
00:40:10,100 --> 00:40:13,500
So the conclusion there seems to
be that people are no longer 

638
00:40:13,500 --> 00:40:16,900
needed to make important 
decisions to keep the system 

639
00:40:17,100 --> 00:40:20,000
running. 
And at least a central group of 

640
00:40:20,000 --> 00:40:23,000
people are not, and we're going 
to say, it's sufficiently 

641
00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:25,200
decentralized. 
Well, that means to me that. 

642
00:40:25,200 --> 00:40:28,800
Oh, well, maybe we don't see any
fiduciaries operating there. 

643
00:40:28,900 --> 00:40:31,900
Okay, people who have positions 
of trust and power. 

644
00:40:32,300 --> 00:40:34,800
So as you might guess, I 
completely disagree with that 

645
00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:39,300
analysis, but it's absolutely 
interconnected these 

646
00:40:39,300 --> 00:40:41,700
conversations. 
Is about power in these systems.

647
00:40:42,800 --> 00:40:44,900
Yeah. 
I mean to me it seems that, you 

648
00:40:44,908 --> 00:40:47,500
know, the one hand, you always 
lie, correct that, you know, 

649
00:40:47,500 --> 00:40:50,500
just calling something 
blockchain or even something. 

650
00:40:50,500 --> 00:40:53,000
Having this blockchain data 
structure that is sort of 

651
00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:55,500
absolves you from all 
responsibility like that, that 

652
00:40:55,500 --> 00:40:59,200
obviously doesn't make any sense
and I think there are plenty of 

653
00:40:59,200 --> 00:41:01,500
you have example. 
Remember a while ago, there was 

654
00:41:01,500 --> 00:41:03,900
this article about liske. 
I don't know if you read that 

655
00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:07,300
but in liske they have this sort
of this proof of stake 

656
00:41:07,300 --> 00:41:11,000
blockchain but there's two 
cartels that control the entire 

657
00:41:12,100 --> 00:41:15,000
network and they figured out 
basically some way to like 

658
00:41:15,000 --> 00:41:17,300
punish and push out. 
Anybody who doesn't agree with 

659
00:41:17,300 --> 00:41:19,600
them. 
So essentially I would like to 

660
00:41:19,600 --> 00:41:22,400
sort of organizations, you know,
governing that blockchain. 

661
00:41:23,700 --> 00:41:28,000
And so, you know, it seems 
obvious to me that like to some 

662
00:41:28,000 --> 00:41:31,400
things, you know, you should 
probably should really treat as 

663
00:41:31,700 --> 00:41:32,900
okay. 
You know, these people are 

664
00:41:32,900 --> 00:41:36,300
responsible for what happens 
there, but then at the same time

665
00:41:36,300 --> 00:41:40,300
when you look at something like 
Bitcoin and I guess that is also

666
00:41:40,300 --> 00:41:43,800
where red is SEC comments. 
Go at like then there's there's 

667
00:41:43,800 --> 00:41:47,400
other things where it's 
sufficiently decentralized, 

668
00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:50,600
whatever that means, so that you
don't really like that. 

669
00:41:51,100 --> 00:41:53,300
So but you disagree with this 
one too. 

670
00:41:53,300 --> 00:41:55,400
So you don't think there's this 
kind of line. 

671
00:41:55,900 --> 00:41:58,200
Yeah. 
Well so I do think it's 

672
00:41:58,200 --> 00:42:01,500
important to recognize that 
decentralization is something on

673
00:42:01,500 --> 00:42:05,000
a spectrum, right? 
Things are more, some things are

674
00:42:05,000 --> 00:42:08,000
more decentralized, some things 
are more centralized I guess, 

675
00:42:08,000 --> 00:42:12,000
less decentralized and we kind 
of have to figure out what we're

676
00:42:12,100 --> 00:42:16,000
we're measuring in that sense 
for me. 

677
00:42:16,000 --> 00:42:18,800
A lot of it comes down to 
looking at how the software is 

678
00:42:18,800 --> 00:42:21,900
developed and who actually plays
a role in that and who makes a 

679
00:42:21,908 --> 00:42:24,500
decision. 
You mentioned commit access 

680
00:42:24,500 --> 00:42:26,300
earlier. 
I think that's actually a hugely

681
00:42:26,300 --> 00:42:29,900
important thing, right? 
Someone is making a decision. 

682
00:42:29,900 --> 00:42:31,600
They're about. 
What actually ends up in the 

683
00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:33,300
code that is going to be 
released. 

684
00:42:33,600 --> 00:42:37,200
Someone is without their 
password. 

685
00:42:37,200 --> 00:42:40,000
It's not going to get in. 
I mean, of course, what about 

686
00:42:40,000 --> 00:42:41,800
you think? 
They're, I people mad at me for 

687
00:42:41,800 --> 00:42:43,100
that. 
So what am I right? 

688
00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:45,500
I think what you're missing 
that. 

689
00:42:45,500 --> 00:42:47,600
You know most blockchain people 
will point out. 

690
00:42:47,600 --> 00:42:49,500
Is that okay? 
Like I said, say, somebody 

691
00:42:49,500 --> 00:42:55,700
changes that that Bitcoin repo 
or the code there but it's still

692
00:42:55,700 --> 00:42:58,800
afterwards, you know, active 
decision of like, you know, a 

693
00:42:58,800 --> 00:43:03,000
minor whether they actually use 
that code to operate at code but

694
00:43:03,000 --> 00:43:06,900
you know, of course, Influence 
is a blurry line and it 

695
00:43:06,900 --> 00:43:08,200
certainly happens. 
That's true. 

696
00:43:08,200 --> 00:43:12,100
Yeah, yeah. 
So I'm still messing with this 

697
00:43:12,100 --> 00:43:17,400
idea, but I feel like the 
conversation has been sort of 

698
00:43:17,408 --> 00:43:20,500
like if son, less than one has 
absolute control and 

699
00:43:20,500 --> 00:43:22,000
dictatorship. 
We're going to say that they 

700
00:43:22,000 --> 00:43:26,200
have no power, right? 
So because there are checks and 

701
00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:28,300
balances in these systems, 
right? 

702
00:43:28,300 --> 00:43:32,700
You could argue that the, the 
miners are validators, are kind 

703
00:43:32,700 --> 00:43:35,000
of a check in some ways on the 
Le purrs. 

704
00:43:35,000 --> 00:43:40,000
And then vice versa, right? 
So in our system of government, 

705
00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:44,200
right? 
Just because Congress has to 

706
00:43:44,207 --> 00:43:48,200
have a signature by the 
president to put in the US to 

707
00:43:48,200 --> 00:43:50,100
put something into law, doesn't 
mean that Congress doesn't have 

708
00:43:50,100 --> 00:43:53,600
any power right there are checks
and balances but people are 

709
00:43:53,600 --> 00:43:56,600
still exercising power and we 
still want people and we still 

710
00:43:56,600 --> 00:43:59,200
expect those people to be 
accountable and oh duties 

711
00:43:59,200 --> 00:44:02,200
despite the fact that they don't
have absolute control. 

712
00:44:02,500 --> 00:44:04,300
Of course, this is all, you 
know, potentially out the window

713
00:44:04,500 --> 00:44:06,800
How I love everything is in 
chaos with the government's 

714
00:44:06,800 --> 00:44:11,300
anyway, but but I think that is 
something that's important 

715
00:44:11,300 --> 00:44:13,000
that's often left out of the 
discussion. 

716
00:44:14,200 --> 00:44:18,300
So there's one thing that we 
sort of alluded to in the 

717
00:44:18,300 --> 00:44:20,800
conversation but not directly 
and that, is that. 

718
00:44:22,000 --> 00:44:24,800
This this idea that software 
developers should be 

719
00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,900
fiduciaries, doesn't only apply 
to blockchains but it that it 

720
00:44:28,900 --> 00:44:31,100
might also apply to all open 
source software. 

721
00:44:31,100 --> 00:44:35,400
So if we go back to the four, 
the four characteristics of a 

722
00:44:35,400 --> 00:44:38,500
fiduciary, you know, you could 
potentially apply those 

723
00:44:38,500 --> 00:44:42,900
questions to something like, 
Linux and argue that the 

724
00:44:43,500 --> 00:44:47,100
benevolent dictator is or Linus.
Torvalds or whoever are also 

725
00:44:47,100 --> 00:44:51,200
fiduciaries in that sense. 
Now, if if that were to be the 

726
00:44:51,200 --> 00:44:54,800
case, Asif jurisprudence in the 
US or anywhere else where to 

727
00:44:54,800 --> 00:44:57,800
establish its software 
developers, in any case in any 

728
00:44:57,800 --> 00:45:00,000
type of Open Source software 
regardless of the licensing, 

729
00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:03,700
where have you are? 
In fact, fiduciaries, what do 

730
00:45:03,707 --> 00:45:06,200
you think this would do to the 
software industry? 

731
00:45:07,100 --> 00:45:10,200
Is this something that's 
desirable in today's world offer

732
00:45:10,500 --> 00:45:14,900
because or something everything 
that we do and everything? 

733
00:45:16,900 --> 00:45:20,200
It's everywhere. 
And I think it's something that 

734
00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:23,000
we would need to think very 
carefully about Don't think for 

735
00:45:23,000 --> 00:45:25,700
one, I don't think it's every 
open source, software project, I

736
00:45:25,700 --> 00:45:29,700
think there, maybe we, you know,
there needs to be some Nuance to

737
00:45:29,700 --> 00:45:33,900
it in the sense of how critical 
it is, like, how many people are

738
00:45:33,900 --> 00:45:36,000
relying on it potentially, 
right? 

739
00:45:37,000 --> 00:45:38,700
We saw that it was a problem, 
right? 

740
00:45:38,700 --> 00:45:43,300
In the case of just Heartbleed 
41, right? 

741
00:45:44,700 --> 00:45:47,100
It really important piece of 
Open Source. 

742
00:45:47,300 --> 00:45:51,500
Software infrastructure, fund 
function is infrastructure. 

743
00:45:51,600 --> 00:45:53,100
Right? 
There's a critical bug in it and

744
00:45:53,100 --> 00:45:55,300
it turned out well. 
It happened because no one was 

745
00:45:55,300 --> 00:45:57,800
really looking at it and only 
had like one or two people 

746
00:45:57,800 --> 00:46:00,500
wrote, you know, responsible for
it. 

747
00:46:00,500 --> 00:46:03,200
And whoa, this is critical 
infrastructure and nobody's 

748
00:46:03,200 --> 00:46:08,900
doing anything for it. 
So I feel like we need to take 

749
00:46:08,900 --> 00:46:13,400
this stuff seriously, and in the
past accountability, for 

750
00:46:13,400 --> 00:46:16,500
important stuff. 
That makes you take it more. 

751
00:46:16,500 --> 00:46:20,900
Seriously, if I may interject 
there, I think so that that 

752
00:46:20,900 --> 00:46:25,400
examples, interesting, right? 
So hardly SSL bug like many 

753
00:46:25,400 --> 00:46:27,500
people actually in the Block 
Chain space of use that, as an 

754
00:46:27,500 --> 00:46:32,000
example of like, exactly why 
blockchain and token sales and 

755
00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:35,200
it's so important because 
they're the problem wasn't that?

756
00:46:35,200 --> 00:46:38,500
Nobody was responsible problem 
was there was no not funny, no 

757
00:46:38,500 --> 00:46:41,200
money, no money, tacitly. 
So if you know, now, treated the

758
00:46:41,200 --> 00:46:43,400
developers as fiduciary. 
The I actually do think there 

759
00:46:44,200 --> 00:46:48,500
must be love. 
Less likely to go in there and 

760
00:46:48,600 --> 00:46:52,300
and may something with it. 
So it seems like your proposal 

761
00:46:52,300 --> 00:46:56,200
would almost certainly be 
counterproductive in terms of 

762
00:46:56,300 --> 00:46:59,200
reducing funding interest and 
work on all of this 

763
00:46:59,200 --> 00:47:02,700
infrastructure and I don't think
in general, right? 

764
00:47:02,700 --> 00:47:06,900
It's not like there was some 
malicious person in Hartley that

765
00:47:07,000 --> 00:47:10,700
you know, they didn't, you know,
if you had given them some legal

766
00:47:10,700 --> 00:47:13,300
obligation, they would have done
a better job but it's just that 

767
00:47:13,300 --> 00:47:17,500
there wasn't enough Ian. 
And I think that we need to 

768
00:47:17,500 --> 00:47:20,500
rethink that whole governance 
structure potentially generally 

769
00:47:21,300 --> 00:47:26,000
that, whether it's okay weather 
for society, right? 

770
00:47:26,000 --> 00:47:28,600
Whether it's a good idea for 
society, kind of from a risk 

771
00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:32,000
management perspective to use 
this governance model where 

772
00:47:32,000 --> 00:47:35,600
people do it kind of, you know, 
just on their own and their free

773
00:47:35,600 --> 00:47:37,700
time for things that are 
critical to the ongoing 

774
00:47:37,700 --> 00:47:41,100
operation of the world and our 
economies, right? 

775
00:47:41,500 --> 00:47:45,100
It's so and this has that the 
Heartbleed issue. 

776
00:47:45,500 --> 00:47:48,000
As you probably know led to this
creation of this, like the thing

777
00:47:48,000 --> 00:47:49,900
is called the core 
infrastructure initiative or 

778
00:47:49,900 --> 00:47:52,100
something like that, where a 
bunch of tech companies have now

779
00:47:52,100 --> 00:47:56,600
contributed funding and are 
trying to provide funding for 

780
00:47:57,100 --> 00:48:00,700
will to identify open source 
software projects that function 

781
00:48:00,700 --> 00:48:03,400
as infrastructure and to provide
some more funding. 

782
00:48:03,400 --> 00:48:09,700
But it's a work in progress and 
I agree with you that the token 

783
00:48:09,700 --> 00:48:13,000
sales and stuff are groping or 
trying to get to a solution to 

784
00:48:13,000 --> 00:48:18,300
this problem the funding issue. 
that, that is relevant here, but

785
00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:24,900
the funding of The core 
Protocols of Bitcoin in 

786
00:48:24,900 --> 00:48:28,600
aetherium remains an issue. 
Despite all this idea about you 

787
00:48:28,600 --> 00:48:31,300
know, ico's fixing this problem,
right? 

788
00:48:31,300 --> 00:48:36,200
I see it talked about as a 
continuing issue, who should pay

789
00:48:36,200 --> 00:48:39,100
the Bitcoin core developers. 
Should it be companies within 

790
00:48:39,100 --> 00:48:40,800
the ecosystem? 
Should they be sponsored? 

791
00:48:41,000 --> 00:48:42,900
I don't know. 
But they're, they're very 

792
00:48:42,900 --> 00:48:44,700
important. 
People from the perspective of 

793
00:48:44,700 --> 00:48:47,600
every single person who relies 
on this system who should pay 

794
00:48:47,600 --> 00:48:48,800
him. 
Nobody knows right now. 

795
00:48:51,200 --> 00:48:53,500
If you've listened to previous 
episodes with Marlon gray and 

796
00:48:53,500 --> 00:48:56,000
Matt koerner, you know, that 
Microsoft is committed to 

797
00:48:56,000 --> 00:48:58,500
providing enterprise-grade tools
and infrastructure for 

798
00:48:58,500 --> 00:49:01,300
blockchain developers. 
Well, the Azure blockchain 

799
00:49:01,300 --> 00:49:03,600
workbench is perfect for 
organizations building. 

800
00:49:03,600 --> 00:49:05,900
Consortium networks. 
Take the etherium proof of 

801
00:49:05,900 --> 00:49:08,600
authority template, for example,
it's ideal for permission. 

802
00:49:08,600 --> 00:49:10,600
Networks were consensus, 
participants are known in 

803
00:49:10,600 --> 00:49:13,300
reputable. 
A theorem on Azure has on chain 

804
00:49:13,300 --> 00:49:15,700
Network governance, that 
leverages parodies extensible, 

805
00:49:15,700 --> 00:49:18,600
proof of authority, client, each
Consortium member has the power 

806
00:49:18,600 --> 00:49:20,800
to govern the network or 
delegate their consensus. 

807
00:49:21,000 --> 00:49:23,700
Participants to a trusted 
operator and parodies. 

808
00:49:23,900 --> 00:49:26,100
Webassembly support allows 
developers to write smart 

809
00:49:26,100 --> 00:49:30,700
contracts and familiar languages
like C C++ and rust as your 

810
00:49:30,700 --> 00:49:33,200
blockchain workbench was created
on the same principles that 

811
00:49:33,200 --> 00:49:35,900
drive all Production Services in
Azure, so, you know, you're 

812
00:49:35,900 --> 00:49:38,700
relying on secure redundant 
infrastructure, that can scale 

813
00:49:39,200 --> 00:49:42,000
and we built in services. 
Like authenticating apis off 

814
00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:44,400
chain databases and secure Key 
Management Services. 

815
00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:46,600
You can scaffold your 
infrastructure in just a few 

816
00:49:46,600 --> 00:49:49,900
hours to learn more about Azure 
blockchain workbench and how 

817
00:49:49,900 --> 00:49:53,100
Microsoft is Blockchain 
usability and Enterprise, check 

818
00:49:53,100 --> 00:49:56,900
out aka.ms/offweb the center and
start building today. 

819
00:49:57,600 --> 00:49:59,700
We'd like to thank Microsoft 
Azure for their support of 

820
00:49:59,700 --> 00:50:02,500
epicenter. 
So you wrote another paper 

821
00:50:03,200 --> 00:50:09,200
title, the path of the 
blockchain, Lexicon and the law.

822
00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:14,300
And this paper explores the 
ever-changing and evolving and 

823
00:50:14,300 --> 00:50:20,300
sometimes confusing lexicon used
in the Block Chain space and 

824
00:50:21,500 --> 00:50:24,600
Block Chain space botanique 
industry watching ecosystem. 

825
00:50:25,000 --> 00:50:29,800
There, there's wise at least 11 
sort of terminology that we 

826
00:50:29,800 --> 00:50:33,800
can't even agree on and 
specifically how all this 

827
00:50:33,800 --> 00:50:39,600
changing lexicon poses. 
The confusion and potentially is

828
00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:42,200
threatening for Regulators. 
Could you give us a high level 

829
00:50:42,200 --> 00:50:45,700
overview and of this paper, we 
can sort of dive into the sure. 

830
00:50:46,000 --> 00:50:50,300
So you've done a pretty good 
description but basically the 

831
00:50:50,300 --> 00:50:54,600
paper Is trying to draw 
attention to the fact that the 

832
00:50:54,900 --> 00:50:59,500
lingo in blockchain world is all
over the place. 

833
00:50:59,800 --> 00:51:02,700
Nobody knows what a blockchain 
is versus a distributed Ledger. 

834
00:51:02,700 --> 00:51:04,500
Nobody knows what a smart 
contract. 

835
00:51:04,500 --> 00:51:08,500
Is nobody knows what any of 
these terms like that have 

836
00:51:08,500 --> 00:51:10,200
already come up in our 
conversation today. 

837
00:51:10,300 --> 00:51:12,700
What is decentralized mean? 
What is immutable mean what is 

838
00:51:12,700 --> 00:51:15,400
secure mean? 
What is trustless mean? 

839
00:51:15,400 --> 00:51:17,700
What do any of these mean? 
And people are using them as if 

840
00:51:17,700 --> 00:51:22,800
they do and I think that leads 
to Mass confusion about the 

841
00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:29,400
capabilities of the technology 
and it makes it really hard for 

842
00:51:29,400 --> 00:51:36,600
people to get down to the facts.
Okay, what can this type of 

843
00:51:36,600 --> 00:51:39,100
Technology? 
This flavor of Technology 

844
00:51:39,100 --> 00:51:44,700
actually do, can I rely on it to
actually create a record that is

845
00:51:44,700 --> 00:51:47,700
going to be permanent and 
impossible to change? 

846
00:51:48,300 --> 00:51:52,400
Well, I would argue no. 
Li but certainly some 

847
00:51:52,400 --> 00:51:57,600
blockchains or things that go by
the name blockchain, they vary 

848
00:51:57,700 --> 00:52:00,000
in their ability to make this 
claim, right? 

849
00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:03,200
It's all spectrums. 
But the the terminology in the 

850
00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:07,600
space, often speaks in terms of 
absolutes, okay? 

851
00:52:07,600 --> 00:52:10,500
Right. 
Unchangeable unhackable 

852
00:52:10,800 --> 00:52:14,500
permanent secure, right? 
Those are all like absolutes. 

853
00:52:14,500 --> 00:52:18,200
It's decentralized instead of 
the spectrum idea and I think 

854
00:52:18,200 --> 00:52:22,200
that that that all of this has 
significant consequences. 

855
00:52:22,200 --> 00:52:25,700
I framed the paper in terms of 
the trouble that it can cause 

856
00:52:25,700 --> 00:52:28,600
for Regulators in that you have 
to be able to understand the 

857
00:52:28,600 --> 00:52:30,800
facts about what you're 
regulating order to make good 

858
00:52:30,800 --> 00:52:34,200
decisions about it, but it's 
certainly much broader than just

859
00:52:34,200 --> 00:52:36,300
Regulators, right? 
It's every policy maker. 

860
00:52:36,300 --> 00:52:40,000
Evaluating how to treat the 
technology and also whether to 

861
00:52:40,000 --> 00:52:44,200
adopt it at, all right? 
So anyone making decisions about

862
00:52:44,200 --> 00:52:48,300
the technology is affected by 
the problematic language in the 

863
00:52:48,300 --> 00:52:56,400
space and Unfortunately language
is this kind of weird thing 

864
00:52:56,400 --> 00:52:59,200
right? 
You can't get rid of terms just 

865
00:52:59,200 --> 00:53:03,100
because they seem to be used 
badly. 

866
00:53:03,300 --> 00:53:06,500
We kind of get stuck with them 
and maybe we figure it out in 

867
00:53:06,500 --> 00:53:09,600
the end and come up with a 
better lingo. 

868
00:53:09,600 --> 00:53:13,400
But right now it's a mess and 
we're seeing a lot of different 

869
00:53:13,400 --> 00:53:17,000
initiatives to try to pin down 
the terminology more. 

870
00:53:17,200 --> 00:53:20,800
But that's of course a challenge
because the technology is moving

871
00:53:20,900 --> 00:53:24,300
Moving at such a pace, right? 
The experimentation is happening

872
00:53:24,300 --> 00:53:27,000
so rapidly. 
So it's really hard to know when

873
00:53:27,000 --> 00:53:30,700
you can actually pin down pin 
something down like into a 

874
00:53:30,700 --> 00:53:36,800
standard into a technical 
defined terminology and just the

875
00:53:36,800 --> 00:53:39,900
pace of it. 
Like I feel like I'm running as 

876
00:53:39,900 --> 00:53:44,300
fast as I can and just you know,
grasping it to try to understand

877
00:53:44,300 --> 00:53:46,600
anything it's impossible to stay
on top of things in the space 

878
00:53:46,600 --> 00:53:49,900
because of the pace. 
And I think that all creates 

879
00:53:49,900 --> 00:53:55,600
potential for A lot of bad 
decisions and the reason I kind 

880
00:53:55,600 --> 00:53:59,900
of try to draw attention to this
is because these systems are 

881
00:53:59,900 --> 00:54:04,800
talked about as being useful for
lots of critical critical 

882
00:54:04,800 --> 00:54:10,100
functions, critical to social 
like our societies like voting, 

883
00:54:10,300 --> 00:54:14,600
right? 
Or finance and when you, you 

884
00:54:14,600 --> 00:54:17,900
better know what you're putting 
in, and not have a mistaken 

885
00:54:17,900 --> 00:54:20,000
impression of it. 
When you're dealing with big 

886
00:54:20,000 --> 00:54:24,300
social systems, Yeah. 
So of course you totally right, 

887
00:54:24,300 --> 00:54:26,000
right. 
The, the terminology is very 

888
00:54:26,000 --> 00:54:28,400
hard and decentralized is a 
great example of that. 

889
00:54:29,100 --> 00:54:32,900
Like, what's the Practical 
takeaway from this observation? 

890
00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:36,400
Like, what can we do about this?
I guess the Practical takeaway 

891
00:54:36,800 --> 00:54:41,100
is the extremely skeptical in 
that. 

892
00:54:41,100 --> 00:54:44,100
Anyone who is considering 
adopting this any regulator who 

893
00:54:44,100 --> 00:54:48,000
is considering how to treat this
anyone and everyone should be 

894
00:54:48,000 --> 00:54:52,300
extremely skeptical and critical
of everything they hear. 

895
00:54:52,500 --> 00:54:56,400
Or read about the technology. 
So basically join my team. 

896
00:54:58,300 --> 00:55:04,800
So Recognize that words don't 
mean what you think, they mean, 

897
00:55:05,000 --> 00:55:07,100
right? 
And you need to dig further, you

898
00:55:07,100 --> 00:55:11,100
can't take anything at face 
value, unfortunately, and that 

899
00:55:11,100 --> 00:55:15,600
includes academic work from the 
most prominent of forms, right? 

900
00:55:16,300 --> 00:55:20,100
Stuff, that it just, you would 
think that you could rely on. 

901
00:55:20,100 --> 00:55:23,700
But from my perspective, you can
it uses all the language that is

902
00:55:23,700 --> 00:55:26,000
misleading. 
So be skeptical. 

903
00:55:26,600 --> 00:55:30,800
So can you speak about the 
example of the ERM immutability.

904
00:55:30,800 --> 00:55:32,400
Like how do you think of that 
term? 

905
00:55:32,500 --> 00:55:33,400
Sure. 
Okay. 

906
00:55:33,400 --> 00:55:37,400
I think it's completely wrong 
because I think it's again, one 

907
00:55:37,400 --> 00:55:41,100
of those absolute terms. 
So delay meeting of immutable 

908
00:55:41,100 --> 00:55:46,500
would be unchangeable, right? 
It can never be changed and the 

909
00:55:46,500 --> 00:55:49,700
term is omnipresent in the 
discussion around blockchain 

910
00:55:49,900 --> 00:55:52,400
technology. 
I feel like it's starting to 

911
00:55:52,400 --> 00:55:56,700
shift a little bit and I don't 
know if I've had anything to do 

912
00:55:56,700 --> 00:56:00,400
with that, but I'm happy that I 
feel like it's Going to shift 

913
00:56:00,500 --> 00:56:05,900
but I think it's I think it's 
inaccurate for a few reasons and

914
00:56:06,500 --> 00:56:11,300
one of those is that we have 
definitely seen even in public 

915
00:56:11,300 --> 00:56:15,100
blockchains which to me have the
certainly much more than any 

916
00:56:15,100 --> 00:56:17,700
permission. 
Blockchain would have a stronger

917
00:56:17,700 --> 00:56:21,300
claim of being harder to change.
I feel like permission 

918
00:56:21,300 --> 00:56:24,800
blockchains, I see them as just 
joint-venture databases and it's

919
00:56:24,800 --> 00:56:29,300
hard for them to claim that they
have actually any of the actu. 

920
00:56:29,400 --> 00:56:33,300
Attributes that public 
blockchains have. 

921
00:56:33,300 --> 00:56:35,300
I see them as just totally 
different beast and it's bizarre

922
00:56:35,300 --> 00:56:37,500
to me that they go by the same 
name at all. 

923
00:56:37,800 --> 00:56:40,300
But okay. 
So but just focusing on public 

924
00:56:40,300 --> 00:56:43,400
blockchains, we've seen 
instances. 

925
00:56:43,400 --> 00:56:46,800
Where the record that was 
created was not immutable, it 

926
00:56:46,800 --> 00:56:50,300
was not unchangeable, in fact, 
it was, it was altered. 

927
00:56:50,300 --> 00:56:56,400
I mean, people, I always go back
to one instance, being the 2013 

928
00:56:57,600 --> 00:57:02,400
4 in Bitcoin, which Which was 
caused by different software 

929
00:57:02,400 --> 00:57:07,100
being run by different portions 
of the validating Network 

930
00:57:07,100 --> 00:57:10,100
different nodes, wearing 
different versions and some 

931
00:57:10,100 --> 00:57:13,700
miners you know had to 
essentially abandon a chain that

932
00:57:13,700 --> 00:57:16,100
they'd already earned money on 
when the core developers 

933
00:57:16,100 --> 00:57:17,600
decided. 
Nope, that's wrong. 

934
00:57:17,600 --> 00:57:19,300
We're going to go to this 
change. 

935
00:57:19,300 --> 00:57:23,100
This we're going to choose which
of the the split Ledger's is 

936
00:57:23,100 --> 00:57:25,700
authoritative which one is 
actually Bitcoin. 

937
00:57:26,800 --> 00:57:30,600
And a small group of people 
decided which one it was and 

938
00:57:30,600 --> 00:57:34,600
went there. 
So a let Ledger that appeared 

939
00:57:34,600 --> 00:57:37,600
legitimate, that should have 
been immutable and used forever,

940
00:57:37,900 --> 00:57:42,300
right, was rejected as no good. 
I see. 

941
00:57:42,500 --> 00:57:48,100
I see the the post Dow Fork 
telling us a similar story, 

942
00:57:48,200 --> 00:57:52,800
right? 
The fact that the decision was 

943
00:57:52,800 --> 00:57:58,300
made to treat, the hack is a 
theft Theft was an active 

944
00:57:58,300 --> 00:58:02,400
decision made and it affected 
the record that appears in what 

945
00:58:02,400 --> 00:58:03,800
is now called Theory. 
Mm. 

946
00:58:04,000 --> 00:58:05,700
I mean just technically 
speaking, right? 

947
00:58:05,700 --> 00:58:08,100
So I mean I guess in the Bitcoin
case, it is true, right? 

948
00:58:08,100 --> 00:58:10,600
That you have two different 
chains and then one of them sort

949
00:58:10,600 --> 00:58:14,700
of you know never made it into 
history but in the theorem case 

950
00:58:14,900 --> 00:58:18,100
I mean the record wasn't you 
know retroactively change. 

951
00:58:18,100 --> 00:58:22,400
It's just that I guess the 
reversibility in a way of 

952
00:58:22,400 --> 00:58:26,100
transaction was sort of it was 
changed in a way that was not in

953
00:58:26,100 --> 00:58:27,600
accordance. 
With the rules that people 

954
00:58:27,600 --> 00:58:30,700
thought there was for the 
changeability for the record 

955
00:58:30,800 --> 00:58:33,500
right there were certainly not 
in accordance with the you know 

956
00:58:33,500 --> 00:58:39,800
the sort of ethereum vision or 
description of code is Law and 

957
00:58:39,800 --> 00:58:44,400
being above the, you know, 
reproach or sort of the control 

958
00:58:44,400 --> 00:58:46,700
of ordinary people and 
developers. 

959
00:58:46,700 --> 00:58:48,100
That's exactly. 
Yeah. 

960
00:58:48,300 --> 00:58:51,200
So I see those as kind of 
disproving the idea of 

961
00:58:51,200 --> 00:58:53,400
immutable. 
So it's always very interesting 

962
00:58:53,400 --> 00:58:56,400
to me that people continue to 
use the term and then my other 

963
00:58:56,500 --> 00:59:01,900
other critique of it is that a 
lot of these features that we 

964
00:59:01,900 --> 00:59:07,400
use to describe the technology 
the record of that created by 

965
00:59:07,400 --> 00:59:10,400
the technology, right? 
This immutable or skewer or 

966
00:59:10,600 --> 00:59:15,500
whatever are ones that they're 
like, emergent properties, okay?

967
00:59:15,800 --> 00:59:20,800
Of these complex systems. 
So somehow when we put together 

968
00:59:21,200 --> 00:59:24,400
this particular consensus 
mechanism and certain 

969
00:59:24,400 --> 00:59:28,400
cryptography, and whatever All 
else these ingredients are we 

970
00:59:28,400 --> 00:59:34,800
get that all this magical record
that's immutable and secure and 

971
00:59:35,000 --> 00:59:39,600
reflects the truth and all that.
Okay so I now adjust it in my 

972
00:59:39,600 --> 00:59:41,600
paper to baking a cake. 
Okay. 

973
00:59:42,900 --> 00:59:45,300
You put this group of 
ingredients together. 

974
00:59:45,500 --> 00:59:48,300
You treated a particular way, 
you run it a particular way and 

975
00:59:48,300 --> 00:59:53,500
you get these great properties. 
Okay, what we're seeing with the

976
00:59:53,500 --> 00:59:55,300
development in the blockchain 
space is tons of 

977
00:59:55,300 --> 00:59:56,900
experimentation. 
Right. 

978
00:59:56,900 --> 00:59:59,700
Everything every possible thing 
is being varied from the 

979
00:59:59,707 --> 01:00:04,400
consensus mechanism to yeah. 
Who are validators, who are, who

980
01:00:04,400 --> 01:00:06,500
are developers. 
What cryptography is being used,

981
01:00:06,500 --> 01:00:08,900
everything is is up for grabs, 
right? 

982
01:00:09,100 --> 01:00:14,200
But people still persist in 
talking about every system that 

983
01:00:14,200 --> 01:00:17,400
might be considered a blockchain
as giving rise to the same 

984
01:00:17,600 --> 01:00:23,100
miraculous set of immutable 
records, these magical emergent 

985
01:00:23,100 --> 01:00:26,100
properties so it's as if you 
change the ingredients of the 

986
01:00:26,100 --> 01:00:28,500
cake, Make you change the 
temperature, you bake it at you 

987
01:00:28,500 --> 01:00:30,300
change. 
How long you bake it at and 

988
01:00:30,300 --> 01:00:32,900
you're still expecting to get 
the same cake in the end. 

989
01:00:33,000 --> 01:00:35,800
I think that is doesn't make 
sense. 

990
01:00:36,800 --> 01:00:39,800
I think you're expecting to get 
a cake just the whether or not 

991
01:00:39,800 --> 01:00:42,900
it'll be a cake that you 
particularly want to eat or not,

992
01:00:43,000 --> 01:00:46,900
is what's put in my question. 
I want to come back on this idea

993
01:00:46,900 --> 01:00:50,300
of immutability because I sort 
of see immutability is something

994
01:00:50,300 --> 01:00:53,000
that you can apply that property
and think of it in different 

995
01:00:53,000 --> 01:00:56,500
ways given the context. 
So what I would tend to agree 

996
01:00:56,500 --> 01:00:59,900
with Brian was saying earlier 
that, you know, the data itself 

997
01:00:59,900 --> 01:01:02,600
continues to exist. 
However, as from the point of 

998
01:01:02,600 --> 01:01:06,000
view of the user, you know was 
the transaction where those 

999
01:01:06,200 --> 01:01:11,400
Transactions immutable whereas 
like the money in your wallet is

1000
01:01:11,400 --> 01:01:15,700
still there and I sort of see 
blockchains analysis and 

1001
01:01:15,800 --> 01:01:19,800
analogize them in the following 
ways that we used to think that 

1002
01:01:19,800 --> 01:01:23,100
the Earth was flat. 
There was a consensus around 

1003
01:01:23,100 --> 01:01:25,700
that and the majority of people 
were to think that the Earth was

1004
01:01:25,700 --> 01:01:28,300
flat. 
And at some point there was a 

1005
01:01:28,300 --> 01:01:31,300
change in consensus. 
And so, you know, one can 

1006
01:01:31,400 --> 01:01:34,500
consider that to be sort of a 
fork and the majority of people 

1007
01:01:34,500 --> 01:01:36,800
now think, although there's 
still a small, Majority of 

1008
01:01:36,800 --> 01:01:40,100
people that think the Earth is 
flat, but the majority of people

1009
01:01:40,100 --> 01:01:42,900
now think the Earth is round, so
you could consider that as the 

1010
01:01:42,900 --> 01:01:47,800
chain with the most validators. 
Now, when we still, we still all

1011
01:01:47,800 --> 01:01:50,300
agree that at some point, we 
thought the Earth was flat, we 

1012
01:01:50,300 --> 01:01:52,500
just don't think that's, that's 
true anymore, but the 

1013
01:01:52,508 --> 01:01:54,700
information and the data is 
still there. 

1014
01:01:55,500 --> 01:01:59,500
So to me that sort of resembles 
what happened with the etherium 

1015
01:01:59,500 --> 01:02:02,500
heart Fork, the data still 
exists, it continues to exist, 

1016
01:02:02,500 --> 01:02:06,900
just the consensus and the 
majority of people Yeah. 

1017
01:02:07,100 --> 01:02:11,300
Yeah, no. 
I absolutely see that argument. 

1018
01:02:11,900 --> 01:02:15,600
I think it intertwines in an 
interesting way with the 

1019
01:02:15,607 --> 01:02:21,300
governance conversation because 
kind of like what we were 

1020
01:02:21,300 --> 01:02:26,000
talking about earlier, right? 
It changed in ways that we're 

1021
01:02:26,000 --> 01:02:29,300
not in line with how people 
expected it to be able to 

1022
01:02:29,300 --> 01:02:33,600
change, right? 
So the change happened that the 

1023
01:02:33,600 --> 01:02:38,500
change taking away the money 
from the right, the the hacker 

1024
01:02:38,500 --> 01:02:44,300
or whatever, the thief that 
change was not in line with the 

1025
01:02:44,300 --> 01:02:49,200
rules. 
So I there's some interesting 

1026
01:02:49,200 --> 01:02:52,600
conflation here that maybe I'm 
making with immutability and 

1027
01:02:52,600 --> 01:02:54,500
governance. 
I think they're intimately 

1028
01:02:54,700 --> 01:02:58,000
related though. 
I'm not sure quite how to 

1029
01:02:58,000 --> 01:03:03,000
articulate that but I think 
immutable is the wrong term, 

1030
01:03:03,100 --> 01:03:10,000
because humans, Remain in charge
of the the system. 

1031
01:03:10,200 --> 01:03:18,800
And I think I think that term 
is, is part of the way that 

1032
01:03:18,800 --> 01:03:22,900
people talk about these systems 
as not involving humans, right? 

1033
01:03:22,900 --> 01:03:25,000
Tech is going to fix these 
problems. 

1034
01:03:25,000 --> 01:03:26,700
We don't have to trust in 
humans. 

1035
01:03:27,600 --> 01:03:31,900
It's it's Tech, it's running 
away from Human flaws, it we've 

1036
01:03:31,900 --> 01:03:34,700
escaped the human flaws. 
So the tech is going to just do 

1037
01:03:34,700 --> 01:03:38,000
these things for us and 
Immutable acts as if the humans 

1038
01:03:38,000 --> 01:03:41,100
who are running the system. 
Can't continue to make decisions

1039
01:03:41,100 --> 01:03:46,000
about it and they do and we'll 
and I I think I may be slightly 

1040
01:03:46,000 --> 01:03:52,500
more appropriate term might be 
auditable because regardless of 

1041
01:03:52,900 --> 01:03:56,500
regardless of the changes that 
that occur of the shifts and 

1042
01:03:56,500 --> 01:04:00,200
consensus, the data were you 
went, you can see where you went

1043
01:04:00,200 --> 01:04:02,300
and where you've been, and you 
can always audit that 

1044
01:04:02,300 --> 01:04:06,200
information. 
I think that, you know, that may

1045
01:04:06,200 --> 01:04:09,200
be more helpful. 
Yeah. 

1046
01:04:09,200 --> 01:04:12,200
I have a suggestion for a guest,
for you actually. 

1047
01:04:13,600 --> 01:04:15,400
An archivist. 
Yeah. 

1048
01:04:16,200 --> 01:04:19,400
Victoria Lemieux is an archivist
at a digital archivist at the 

1049
01:04:19,400 --> 01:04:22,600
University of British Columbia 
and these are record-keeping 

1050
01:04:22,600 --> 01:04:24,300
systems, right? 
But there's not enough archivist

1051
01:04:24,300 --> 01:04:26,800
in the conversation who actually
know what record keeping is all 

1052
01:04:26,800 --> 01:04:29,600
about. 
So she is an expert on 

1053
01:04:29,600 --> 01:04:34,700
blockchains and records and I 
think Enjoy. 

1054
01:04:34,700 --> 01:04:37,900
Yeah, she's awesome great. 
Now I would love to dive in a 

1055
01:04:37,908 --> 01:04:41,800
little bit on your so, you know,
you written a lot of these 

1056
01:04:41,800 --> 01:04:46,500
academic papers looking at some 
of the you know, maybe flaws or 

1057
01:04:46,500 --> 01:04:48,700
questionable aspects of the 
blockchain discussion. 

1058
01:04:49,000 --> 01:04:50,500
Like, what's your personal 
stance on this? 

1059
01:04:50,500 --> 01:04:56,000
You feel like this is, you know,
some sort of insane hype and it 

1060
01:04:56,300 --> 01:04:59,000
needs to be deflated or you 
think they really is great 

1061
01:04:59,000 --> 01:05:01,600
promise in blockchain and we'll 
have a lot of great effects. 

1062
01:05:01,600 --> 01:05:03,100
Like how do you think about 
this? 

1063
01:05:04,200 --> 01:05:08,900
I'm unconvinced I think at the 
moment of the the great 

1064
01:05:08,900 --> 01:05:13,600
potential for the tech, I'm 
still I'm still needing 

1065
01:05:13,600 --> 01:05:17,600
convincing the reason. 
I think that I'm I'm so 

1066
01:05:17,600 --> 01:05:22,100
interested and have wanted to 
contribute to the conversation 

1067
01:05:22,100 --> 01:05:25,500
here is as I've said, because 
people want to use it for 

1068
01:05:25,500 --> 01:05:28,300
socially significant things. 
And I feel that if you're going 

1069
01:05:28,300 --> 01:05:32,000
to use something for big things,
you need to make sure that 

1070
01:05:32,000 --> 01:05:36,800
you're having a That you're 
putting in the right amount of 

1071
01:05:36,808 --> 01:05:39,900
thinking to it that your 
scrutinizing every conclusion, 

1072
01:05:39,900 --> 01:05:44,500
every assumption, everything, 
and I don't otherwise see that 

1073
01:05:44,600 --> 01:05:48,300
happening to to the extent. 
I think it should. 

1074
01:05:48,600 --> 01:05:53,700
So that's kind of what the role 
that I've been trying to fill in

1075
01:05:53,700 --> 01:05:57,900
the space. 
I think bottom line, I'm feeling

1076
01:05:57,900 --> 01:06:01,700
like private blockchains, these 
are these permission blockchains

1077
01:06:01,700 --> 01:06:06,900
whatever you want to call them. 
From technologists who I trust 

1078
01:06:06,900 --> 01:06:09,500
and believe are credible in the 
space. 

1079
01:06:10,000 --> 01:06:14,000
These are nothing revolutionary.
Their stuff that we've been able

1080
01:06:14,000 --> 01:06:17,200
to do for a long time but the 
marketing around blockchain and 

1081
01:06:17,200 --> 01:06:19,400
stuff has made people more 
interested in doing it 

1082
01:06:19,400 --> 01:06:22,200
potentially. 
But I'm skeptical that they have

1083
01:06:22,200 --> 01:06:24,700
the capabilities that people 
ascribe to them. 

1084
01:06:25,000 --> 01:06:29,500
And that they, I'm hoping that 
we don't end up in a situation 

1085
01:06:29,600 --> 01:06:32,600
because we're because 
policymakers believe that they 

1086
01:06:32,600 --> 01:06:35,000
have certain capabilities. 
Abilities and adopt them for 

1087
01:06:35,100 --> 01:06:36,700
important, very important 
systems. 

1088
01:06:36,700 --> 01:06:42,300
I mean, there are, there are, is
a, you know, strong push to do 

1089
01:06:42,300 --> 01:06:47,300
blockchain based voting, which I
again, another topic for a show 

1090
01:06:47,400 --> 01:06:50,100
for you. 
But the again, the 

1091
01:06:50,100 --> 01:06:52,600
cryptographers and the people 
who are respecting the space or 

1092
01:06:52,600 --> 01:06:55,400
like, no, that's crazy for many,
many reasons. 

1093
01:06:56,400 --> 01:06:59,100
So I'm skeptical of private 
blockchains on the public 

1094
01:06:59,100 --> 01:07:02,100
blockchain side. 
I think it's very interesting. 

1095
01:07:02,100 --> 01:07:06,900
I think the The gun, the 
governance and the idea of 

1096
01:07:06,900 --> 01:07:10,100
humans doing something in this 
way, is very interesting, but 

1097
01:07:10,500 --> 01:07:14,200
right now, I feel like they 
can't actually be useful for 

1098
01:07:14,200 --> 01:07:17,700
things of social importance, 
unless they get governance. 

1099
01:07:17,700 --> 01:07:21,300
Worked out because governance I 
think is a core flaw and no 

1100
01:07:21,300 --> 01:07:25,600
matter whether you talking about
the on chain stuff, or, or off 

1101
01:07:25,600 --> 01:07:28,700
chain governance, it's all 
experimental at this point. 

1102
01:07:28,700 --> 01:07:32,100
So unless you figure out the 
governance there too unstable I 

1103
01:07:32,107 --> 01:07:36,600
think for anything. 
That more than a small group of 

1104
01:07:36,600 --> 01:07:40,400
people can rely on. 
That's where I am right now. 

1105
01:07:41,500 --> 01:07:44,900
Okay. 
But then I guess you are looking

1106
01:07:44,900 --> 01:07:48,300
positively on you know many 
blockchain projects today. 

1107
01:07:48,300 --> 01:07:50,800
You know explicitly think about 
governance and talk about 

1108
01:07:50,800 --> 01:07:53,100
governance mechanisms. 
So you do think that well I 

1109
01:07:53,107 --> 01:07:56,400
think that's I think that's a 
step forward to acknowledge that

1110
01:07:56,400 --> 01:08:01,700
governance is inevitable and has
to happen but we'll see what 

1111
01:08:01,700 --> 01:08:04,200
happens. 
The deal is So you can look at 

1112
01:08:04,200 --> 01:08:07,200
governance over time in a number
of ways, right? 

1113
01:08:08,100 --> 01:08:10,900
I guess dip. 
Every every governance method we

1114
01:08:10,900 --> 01:08:12,700
have is a work in progress, 
right? 

1115
01:08:12,800 --> 01:08:15,100
We like to think that democracy 
is perfect but now, we're 

1116
01:08:15,100 --> 01:08:19,200
finding out about, you know, how
much of in the u.s. right, how 

1117
01:08:19,200 --> 01:08:22,399
much of democracy is you know 
stuff that's actually written 

1118
01:08:22,399 --> 01:08:26,200
into a constitution versus just 
Norms that have put limits on 

1119
01:08:26,200 --> 01:08:28,100
the behaviors that we think are 
acceptable. 

1120
01:08:28,100 --> 01:08:34,700
So maybe I'm romanticizing, you 
know, our Or overstating what we

1121
01:08:34,707 --> 01:08:39,700
know about governance, generally
in other contexts, but I think 

1122
01:08:39,700 --> 01:08:43,500
that it's really important for 
people designing governance 

1123
01:08:43,500 --> 01:08:46,700
systems in blockchain systems, 
to learn from what humans have 

1124
01:08:46,700 --> 01:08:52,300
done before, and to bring 
multiple, disciplines to it, to 

1125
01:08:52,300 --> 01:08:56,600
bring history to it. 
Because I think that just 

1126
01:08:56,600 --> 01:09:02,399
throwing it out as and We Know 
Better, We Know Better is It's 

1127
01:09:02,399 --> 01:09:04,600
it waste time and it's 
potentially harmful. 

1128
01:09:06,100 --> 01:09:08,899
Yeah, so you've written a bunch 
of paper is what's coming up for

1129
01:09:08,899 --> 01:09:10,700
you. 
Are there still some, you know, 

1130
01:09:10,700 --> 01:09:13,600
some big really important areas 
that you feel you want to look 

1131
01:09:13,600 --> 01:09:19,600
at in the next year's. 
So I'm thinking a lot about 

1132
01:09:19,600 --> 01:09:22,899
decentralization right now. 
I'm working on a paper kind of 

1133
01:09:23,200 --> 01:09:28,399
trying to deconstruct the term 
and think about its potential 

1134
01:09:28,399 --> 01:09:32,399
legal implications, whether 
we're thinking about decentral, 

1135
01:09:32,500 --> 01:09:35,600
something that's decentralized 
as a way of You know, a code 

1136
01:09:35,600 --> 01:09:39,300
word for, we don't have to worry
about power, that's being 

1137
01:09:39,300 --> 01:09:41,800
exercised and something that can
claim to be decentralized. 

1138
01:09:41,800 --> 01:09:43,200
So I'm working on a paper on 
that. 

1139
01:09:44,000 --> 01:09:49,000
I've been, I'm teaching a 
course, totally devoted to 

1140
01:09:49,500 --> 01:09:52,899
cryptocurrencies blockchain and 
the law this semester. 

1141
01:09:52,899 --> 01:09:57,700
So trying to stay on top of that
is fun and there's just so much 

1142
01:09:57,700 --> 01:10:00,900
going on in the space that it's 
hard to figure out what to 

1143
01:10:00,900 --> 01:10:02,600
prioritize and spend your time 
on. 

1144
01:10:02,700 --> 01:10:07,400
There's just, there's And I have
probably 50 papers that I have 

1145
01:10:07,400 --> 01:10:13,000
ideas for and want to write, 
but, you know, time time time. 

1146
01:10:13,900 --> 01:10:17,500
So before we wrap up, I just 
want to ask you about this 

1147
01:10:17,500 --> 01:10:20,300
initiative that you're a part of
which is the Journal of 

1148
01:10:20,300 --> 01:10:25,000
financial technology which else 
that also includes the some some

1149
01:10:25,000 --> 01:10:26,600
other guests that we've had on 
the show before. 

1150
01:10:26,600 --> 01:10:28,700
Could just briefly tell us, tell
us about that. 

1151
01:10:28,700 --> 01:10:31,000
And what's going on with that? 
Sure. 

1152
01:10:31,000 --> 01:10:36,900
So in past year, a group of Of 
academics, kind of, from a bunch

1153
01:10:36,900 --> 01:10:39,300
of different places, around the 
world have gotten together to, 

1154
01:10:40,000 --> 01:10:47,000
to try to. 
To create the field of fintech 

1155
01:10:47,000 --> 01:10:49,300
financial technology as a real 
academic discipline. 

1156
01:10:49,700 --> 01:10:54,600
And I'm on it for the long kind 
of in regulation side, there are

1157
01:10:54,600 --> 01:10:58,200
mathematicians computer, 
scientists, economists, people 

1158
01:10:58,200 --> 01:11:02,300
in finance. 
And it's it, recognizes that 

1159
01:11:02,300 --> 01:11:08,500
this field is interdisciplinary 
by nature and that the different

1160
01:11:08,500 --> 01:11:11,300
disciplines need to be talking 
to one another so that we can 

1161
01:11:11,300 --> 01:11:12,700
understand what's going on, 
right? 

1162
01:11:12,700 --> 01:11:15,300
We can each inform the 
conversation in different ways 

1163
01:11:15,300 --> 01:11:22,500
so it I mean it is intended to 
bring pieces from, you know, the

1164
01:11:22,500 --> 01:11:24,700
perspective of their discipline.
So you would expect to see 

1165
01:11:24,700 --> 01:11:28,000
articles written like law review
articles, you expect to see 

1166
01:11:28,000 --> 01:11:30,100
ones. 
Economics ones written like 

1167
01:11:30,100 --> 01:11:33,100
economics papers, Etc. 
So I don't know that we all 

1168
01:11:33,100 --> 01:11:36,300
speak the same We can fully 
understand what each other is 

1169
01:11:36,300 --> 01:11:37,900
saying, but I think it's 
important to at least get us all

1170
01:11:37,900 --> 01:11:41,300
in the same room so that's what 
that's what the goal is. 

1171
01:11:41,300 --> 01:11:44,700
So if people have papers look up
journal for financial 

1172
01:11:44,700 --> 01:11:49,400
technology, I think it's the JF 
t.com and send us something. 

1173
01:11:50,600 --> 01:11:52,700
We'll have links for that in the
show notes, of course. 

1174
01:11:53,900 --> 01:11:59,100
And also the you were mentioning
a paper earlier by the my 

1175
01:11:59,100 --> 01:12:04,300
researchers at the University of
Penn State University of I think

1176
01:12:04,300 --> 01:12:07,500
it's good that it's the coin 
operated capitalism one, right? 

1177
01:12:07,500 --> 01:12:08,900
Yeah. 
So we'll also link to that in 

1178
01:12:08,900 --> 01:12:10,500
the show notes. 
Great cool. 

1179
01:12:10,500 --> 01:12:12,700
Well, thanks so much for joining
us today on July was, it was 

1180
01:12:12,700 --> 01:12:14,700
great speaking with you. 
I think, you know, certainly 

1181
01:12:14,700 --> 01:12:17,200
doing important work, that's, 
you know, needed. 

1182
01:12:17,200 --> 01:12:21,000
Then there's sort of a balance 
in the blockchain space and that

1183
01:12:21,000 --> 01:12:23,300
I look forward to more paper by 
you. 

1184
01:12:23,600 --> 01:12:25,900
Thank you was a real pleasure to
talk with you guys. 

1185
01:12:27,000 --> 01:12:29,500
Thank you cool. 
And of course we're going to 

1186
01:12:29,500 --> 01:12:32,200
have your links to to a whole 
bunch of her papers in the show 

1187
01:12:32,200 --> 01:12:33,800
notes if you want to check that 
out. 

1188
01:12:33,800 --> 01:12:35,800
And also, Rep side. 
You just check out the show 

1189
01:12:35,800 --> 01:12:38,900
notes and thanks so much for 
listener for once again, tuning 

1190
01:12:38,900 --> 01:12:42,100
in, if you want to support the 
show, you can leave us an iTunes

1191
01:12:42,100 --> 01:12:43,900
review. 
That helps new people find show.

1192
01:12:44,100 --> 01:12:47,800
You can, of course, watch 
YouTube videos on youtube.com 

1193
01:12:47,800 --> 01:12:50,300
slash Epson Bitcoin. 
And yeah, we look forward to 

1194
01:12:50,300 --> 01:12:51,300
being back next week.