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Welcome to epicenter the show 
which talks about the 

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Technologies projects and people
driving decentralization. 

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And the blockchain revolution, 
I'm free to recant and I'm 

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coming to you from Bogota where 
def con is happening this week 

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with a special bonus episode. 
I moderated a panel on credible 

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neutrality and you will be 
listening to the audio track for

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that. 
We didn't plan on this, but the 

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discussion was so good. 
And in this case, that means so 

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controversial that I decided to 
release this as a bonus episode 

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to you. 
On the panel, we had the Bastion

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burger from Harper who was on a 
regular epicenter, episode two 

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weeks ago, Phil Diane from 
fleshpots who has been on before

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as well, and Martin kupperman 
from noses who has been on 

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before as well. 
Patrick McCarthy joined for in 

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fury' and SRI Ram. 
Cannon, joined from I ganea, 

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Martin had given a lightning 
talk previously. 

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So I skipped him in the intro 
round on the panel, but you will

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hear him in due time. 
I give you some background to 

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the heart of the discussion. 
Even though a couple of weeks 

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ago, a number of smart contracts
related to the tornado cash. 

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We're put on the sanctions list 
by ofac, we did an episode on 

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that at the Time with Peter van 
valkenburg from coin Center. 

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The move itself is debatable 
because in principle technology 

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should not be able to be on a 
sanctions list. 

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But in response to this a large 
number of ecosystem players, 

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stop to interact with any 
address that had tornado touch 

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points in the past. 
You Nisswa poverty yd. 

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It's balancer. 
The list goes on in fear of 

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stopped serving requests for 
tornado. 

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Addresses, flash pots, Mev boost
that currently builds. 

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Half of all the theorem blocks. 
Stopped, including tornado 

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touching transactions into any 
block that building, effectively

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censoring, tornado transactions,
you know, from every other block

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and this numbers going up like 
crazy. 

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So all of this is highly 
problematic and this is why we 

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talked about Credible neutrality
on this panel, please enjoy it. 

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Thank you guys so much for 
joining us for this path. 

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It is a discussion on credibly 
neutral systems, and before we 

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actually dive into it, let's get
very brief, introductions, and I

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mean, like, like elevator brief,
maybe, we can give Martin, but 

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let's, let's let's start with 
sriram. 

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Oh, hi everybody. 
I'm sure your am. 

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I'm founder of this project I 
can layer which lets you Build 

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new Innovations on top of the 
etherium, trust Network by using

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this mechanism called Reese 
taking. 

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Yeah, my name is Pat McCrory. 
Historically speaking. 

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I'm a researcher but now I'm an 
intern at in fira. 

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Hi. 
I'm Phil. 

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I'm OCS. 
PhD student at Cornell and a 

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steward of flash pots and I am 
addicted to Mev. 

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Hi I'm Sebastian founder of 
Hopper incentivised mixed nets 

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for private data transport and 
recently we're working towards 

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private RPC providers called RPC
over Harper. 

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Fantastic. 
So before we dive in I expect 

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there will be some contentious 
topics here today. 

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So if you feel you want to say 
something to some of these to 

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someone of the other panelists, 
just jump in. 

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Okay, don't let me you know, 
don't make me call your name. 

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So fantastic. 
So, when we talk about credible 

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neutrality in a nutshell, what 
would you say that means to you?

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So what's credible neutrality to
you Sebastian? 

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So credibly neutrality to me is 
the inability of third parties 

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to influence the system in any 
way directly or indirectly. 

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And I think that's important. 
I actually don't know what it 

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is, to be totally honest. 
I don't necessarily fully 

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believe in them. 
Mean. 

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So, maybe I'm going to add some 
spice to this panel, I think 

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it's a nice idea and it like, 
implies a lot of nice things 

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that people want and that I 
agree are like good. 

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Like, you know, I think 
censorship resistance is great. 

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By the way disclaimer, these are
all my personal views, and not 

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the views of Cornell or Flash 
pots. 

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But I think all this, all these,
all these implications are 

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great. 
But the devil here is in the 

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details and like, can you really
build a system or like, third 

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parties can't, you know? 
Do things in kind of ways that 

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they might undo even want to 
because, like, sometimes you 

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want third parties to be able to
make choices or Express 

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preferences, those are open 
questions, I have. 

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So I'll be I'll be pressing on 
those more soon. 

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I guess there are many words 
that to me means the same thing 

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since the ship resistance 
permissionless, Innovation, 

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credibly neutrality. 
But yeah, I think it all boils 

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down to what you said that if 
You build an application on top 

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of such a credible neutral 
system. 

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You can be assured that. 
Yeah that that rules of that 

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system don't suddenly change 
against you. 

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Awesome. 
I'm just to clarify. 

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My opinions are my own and that 
of yours as well. 

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Pull that out there. 
So in terms would be incredible 

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new, credibly neutral, I mean, 
Google had this old slogan, you 

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know, we won't be evil, you 
know, we will do our best to 

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ensure that everyone has equal 
access to the system and we 

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would abuse the data, but when 
the nation's didn't knock on 

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your door and says are well know
if you don't start saying who is

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entering this transaction, then 
we're going to do bad things to 

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you. 
And so to be credibly neutral 

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you have to have this response 
to say that I Follow the 

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instruction that I was given by 
this nation state or this all 

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powerful adversary. 
So you won't be evil and you 

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can't be evil. 
It is impossible to be evil 

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because otherwise you'll get / 
you'll be removed from the 

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system. 
So incredibly credible 

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neutrality is really you just 
can't follow the instruction 

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about self-harm and it becomes 
like a mad-10s express, my views

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on censorship resistance. 
So if you look at our water 

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blockchain is doing, it's 
actually freezing something 

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temporal into something Eternal,
right? 

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You have transaction flow which 
is temporal and the core aspect 

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of the blockchain is to harden 
this transaction flow into 

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something that is frozen and 
Perpetual. 

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So that a future can then come 
and see what happened at that 

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time. 
So the way I look at a 

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blockchain is essentially as 
bearing testimony as bearing 

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eyewitness to be happy. 
Earnings at that moment and 

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censorship resistance is the 
ability to provide this service 

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without discrimination to what 
was actually happening. 

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You just stand there as a 
neutral Observer and see what 

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happened there. 
And recorded that is censorship 

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resistance and there are some 
very powerful properties 

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Downstream of the censorship 
resistance, which is, for 

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example, what I call, Matt, a 
censorship resistance. 

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What is this matter censorship 
resistance? 

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We talked about sensor, For 
transactions. 

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But there's also sends a ship 
resistance for the ability to 

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deploy new functionality on top,
which leads to permissionless 

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composability. 
So if we build a system which 

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has, which does not have the 
meta censorship Williston, which

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is the ability to deploy new 
features on top that is, again, 

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a degradation of censorship 
resistance. 

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Why do we want this in our view?
Why you want? 

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This is the entrance to parties 
in the system. 

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So we want to build a world 
where there is open, competition

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on almost everything, but the 
entrance to parties in the 

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system, need to be credibly 
neutral in order to make sure 

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that there is open competition 
on everything else. 

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So, on a base layer of 
censorship resistance, you can 

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build competitive systems on 
top, but if the entrenched layer

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itself is behaving in 
self-interest, they can rinse 

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it. 
The heck out of the whole 

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system, Everything we are 
building here, crumbles. 

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If you don't have such 
censorship lists, three of em. 

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You've used censorship 
resistance as synonymous with 

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credible neutrality. 
Would you guys agree? 

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Or do you see a difference? 
I have a question, which is, how

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are the rest of the panel is 
defining censorship resistance? 

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Because when I think about this 
I think of like Old School 

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academic definitions where it's 
like if a user has sufficient 

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incentive to include transaction
X in a blog, there's some 

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censorship resistance parameter 
Delta where like within Delta 

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Blocks the transaction will be 
included. 

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Is this like our operating 
definition? 

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Or are their disagreements that 
I can give like to like to 

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breakdowns to it? 
I think there's two different 

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forms of censorship. 
What is the clear kiss? 

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You know, the block proposer 
wants to stop the inclusion of 

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this transaction at all cost. 
No, no matter. 

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What if that transaction gets 
included, the block gets dropped

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and it will any of your super 
mean over. 

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Majority-black proposals, are 
you can single-handedly do this?

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The other one is this delaying 
the inclusion of it. 

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So maybe you don't have a 
majority of the harsh radar that

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of the, steno the validators. 
You only have one third or less 

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but you will do your best at the
to delay is inclusion. 

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I think even delaying it for ten
blocks, 20 blocks, 30 blocks 

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that is still a form of 
censorship, but it is not as 

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harmful as full censorship. 
So, very similar guy, I would 

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say that it is probably better 
to use the term incredible 

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neutral or at least that's what 
what what is in my view 

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important. 
That is not just the censorship 

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resistance but go to, but To go 
a step further and to say 

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transactions are treated equally
so it's not not enough to say, 

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well if you are willing to pay 
sufficiently that then you will 

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eventually get included. 
But I would say to be credible 

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neutral and then it's maybe 
better to specifically use that 

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term and not the terms intercept
resistant, I would say to makes 

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a claim system is credible 
neutral. 

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It would need to have the 
property that kind of, if there 

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are two transactions and they 
fade pays the same fee, they To 

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be treated equally and that's 
currently not the case on 

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etherium. 
Unfortunately, we're not cool, 

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but the frigid is that may be 
credible. 

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Neutral is the goal that you 
want to achieve, but the do 

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that, you need a censorship 
resist mechanism in order to 

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allow it to be incredibly 
neutral or maybe to say, kind of

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censorship resistance is the may
be credible, neutrality would 

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then be even a step. 
Above censorship resistance and 

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you can kind of s. 
Say but are you certainly need 

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to be? 
You certainly need to be 

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censorship resistant to be 
credible neutral but yeah, kind 

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of again, it's a step further, 
just to clarify. 

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Why I use the word censorship 
resistance, I think there is 

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many different layers in which 
you can be credibly neutral and 

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we are talking specifically 
about transaction inclusion. 

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And I would agree that the 
standard that we really want is 

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that irrespective of the content
of the transaction. 

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When I said that, your bearing 
testimony to What is actually 

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happening in aspect of the 
content of the transaction, you 

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are actually treating all 
transactions equally. 

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So that would, I would agree 
with that as the definition, but

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I view credible, neutrality as a
principle, which transcends 

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transaction inclusion. 
It is a more basic principle and

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as an example, we are talking 
about transaction inclusion, I 

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would agree. 
And I also think that if you 

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talk about credible neutrality, 
kind of reframes, the entire 

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issue, right? 
So basically, if you talk about 

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census, Censorship resistance. 
It's always kind of the, you 

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know, you have this image of, 
you know, you know, like spies 

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or whatever. 
And, you know, people who do 

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evil things, and basically 
credible neutrality is just 

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creating a base layer that 
belongs to no one and hence 

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belongs to everyone, right? 
So basically that's kind of as 

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an opinion I did for me, it 
gives me like Switzerland during

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WWII Vives and like, I don't 
know if that's good, like, I 

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don't know II just so I guess 
question like in y'all. 

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Use like when has he's been or 
not been credibly neutral and 

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like, where has it been in the 
past on that spectrum? 

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And where is it today? 
Basically would be curious. 

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I would say you used to, I would
say, probably two three years 

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ago that statement that I made 
was true that that if your 

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transaction, if they would be 
two transactions and they would 

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pay the same fee, they would be 
treated equally with a doubt. 

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Hacker agree. 
Yeah, I don't think that's true.

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I know. 
I mean, I mean. 

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No, of course, of course, it was
the daily event and in, That 

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case the theorem was clearly not
credible neutral. 

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I mean, there's there's no no no
question about it, but, but 

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since then, yeah, I mean, back 
then, I was certainly also in 

229
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favor of doing what was done and
probably yeah, if today there 

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would be an issue, let's say was
Something where 15% of all these

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00:13:06,900 --> 00:13:08,800
are would be affected. 
Let's say, I don't know the 

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00:13:08,800 --> 00:13:11,500
refugees, a contract would be 
had a hidden issue. 

233
00:13:11,600 --> 00:13:15,700
I would probably also be in 
favor of kind of hard fucking or

234
00:13:15,700 --> 00:13:19,600
kind of hard fucking, if it 
would be possible in such a 

235
00:13:19,608 --> 00:13:22,200
clean way as it was back in the 
day. 

236
00:13:22,200 --> 00:13:29,700
But, but yeah, but but now, I 
think we, well, we lost that. 

237
00:13:29,700 --> 00:13:34,000
And I, of course, they are 
reasons why that happened and 

238
00:13:34,500 --> 00:13:38,400
Maybe I guess you would claim 
they are. 

239
00:13:39,300 --> 00:13:41,700
It's inevitable, that that 
happened. 

240
00:13:42,000 --> 00:13:46,200
I would say there could have 
been and maybe should have been 

241
00:13:46,500 --> 00:13:51,200
several or there are in my view.
Many, many options that are not 

242
00:13:51,300 --> 00:13:56,400
explored or not. 
Not done that could try to come 

243
00:13:56,400 --> 00:14:01,600
closer to this goal of white 
least, maybe we should start to 

244
00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:04,200
say kind of to eat in the round.
Is it? 

245
00:14:04,400 --> 00:14:08,100
Is it the worst vehicle to kind 
of has this credible neutrality 

246
00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:10,200
and seems that you're saying? 
It's not. 

247
00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:12,400
That's not what I'm saying. 
I'm saying the name is not clear

248
00:14:12,400 --> 00:14:15,000
to me and I think if you use it 
to make choices, it will lead 

249
00:14:15,000 --> 00:14:17,700
you to suboptimal outcomes. 
Because like there are clearly 

250
00:14:17,700 --> 00:14:20,600
cases where like the community 
wants to make a choice, right? 

251
00:14:20,600 --> 00:14:22,900
And like people also have the 
right to make choices. 

252
00:14:23,100 --> 00:14:25,500
So to me, like there's also a 
subtlety here, maybe I want to 

253
00:14:25,508 --> 00:14:27,500
get into with the panel, which 
is the definitions. 

254
00:14:27,500 --> 00:14:30,000
You all gave we're kind of 
technical like you have TX 1 TX 

255
00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:31,700
2. 
If they pay the same fee, their 

256
00:14:31,700 --> 00:14:34,800
credibly neutral, what I was 
understanding from like You know

257
00:14:34,900 --> 00:14:37,000
what, Alex kind of writing on 
this in the general, like 

258
00:14:37,000 --> 00:14:40,800
diaspora, is it means more that,
like people believe that the 

259
00:14:40,808 --> 00:14:43,000
system will like, treat them 
fairly, like, that's the 

260
00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:45,900
credible part and that's not 
necessarily the same, as like 

261
00:14:45,900 --> 00:14:48,600
these two transactions that have
the same fee, get mine at the 

262
00:14:48,600 --> 00:14:50,000
same time. 
For example, the people who 

263
00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:52,500
invested in the Dow may not 
think that that's the fair 

264
00:14:52,500 --> 00:14:54,900
model. 
So I'm kind of trying to like 

265
00:14:54,900 --> 00:14:56,400
challenge law. 
I'm not trying to troll you too 

266
00:14:56,400 --> 00:14:58,800
hard. 
No I feel like I can just jump 

267
00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:01,000
in quickly. 
There is like two aspects to 

268
00:15:01,000 --> 00:15:03,400
this Source, the day-to-day 
operation of how the transaction

269
00:15:03,400 --> 00:15:05,600
system works. 
And there's the backstop in the 

270
00:15:05,608 --> 00:15:09,600
social consensus, to socially 
recover about situations. 

271
00:15:09,800 --> 00:15:12,000
So that's a, there was a marsh 
Fashion Event because there's a 

272
00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:16,700
zero-day exploit in a consensus 
client, will that be reverted or

273
00:15:16,700 --> 00:15:18,300
not? 
I believe it will be, but a lot 

274
00:15:18,300 --> 00:15:20,400
of people say it won't be, you 
know, that's sort of the 

275
00:15:20,400 --> 00:15:23,700
backdrop of the neutrality. 
No, I just wanted to get back to

276
00:15:23,700 --> 00:15:27,400
what Martin, Martin said that a 
few years back, you know, maybe 

277
00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:32,100
theorem was credibly neutral, I 
would say, I don't necessarily 

278
00:15:32,100 --> 00:15:35,800
agree because, you know, the 
system, I'm was in some regards 

279
00:15:35,800 --> 00:15:37,700
easier to capture than it is 
today. 

280
00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:43,100
So, for me, censorship resistant
is one necessity for getting to 

281
00:15:43,100 --> 00:15:47,300
some to credibly neutrality. 
And in order to get there, you 

282
00:15:47,300 --> 00:15:51,000
know, we need decentralization 
and privacy actually, and, you 

283
00:15:51,000 --> 00:15:54,900
know, both parts were actually 
less advanced than they are now.

284
00:15:54,900 --> 00:15:57,700
So, you know, I think since the 
launch of the beacon chain, you 

285
00:15:57,700 --> 00:16:00,100
know, having more client, 
diversity is a great 

286
00:16:00,100 --> 00:16:01,900
achievement. 
Of course, we're not fully there

287
00:16:01,900 --> 00:16:05,900
yet, but there are some points, 
which I wouldn't say it was 

288
00:16:05,900 --> 00:16:09,800
necessarily better than maybe. 
Let's bring this into the very 

289
00:16:09,800 --> 00:16:12,200
concrete. 
So, recently we've seen 

290
00:16:12,200 --> 00:16:15,600
instances where credible 
neutrality has clearly been 

291
00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:17,900
breached. 
So I'm thinking for instance of 

292
00:16:17,900 --> 00:16:22,000
that tornado, cash sanctions 
that kind of led to several key,

293
00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:25,000
five projects. 
No longer touching addresses 

294
00:16:25,000 --> 00:16:28,100
that had previously interacted 
with tornado cash in. 

295
00:16:28,100 --> 00:16:30,500
Fewer are no longer serves 
tornado. 

296
00:16:30,500 --> 00:16:34,100
The elephants in the room here. 
Yeah, flash flash pots. 

297
00:16:34,900 --> 00:16:37,800
Census for NATO cash 
transactions. 

298
00:16:38,100 --> 00:16:43,500
So it's the community dealing 
with these issues in in the 

299
00:16:43,500 --> 00:16:45,000
correct way. 
What do you say? 

300
00:16:45,500 --> 00:16:50,000
So maybe let me take this first 
in my view it's not that flash 

301
00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:52,500
pots. 
The project like is intended or 

302
00:16:52,500 --> 00:16:55,500
you know the goal of the project
is to censor aetherium or 

303
00:16:55,500 --> 00:16:58,200
anything like that. 
I think we look at the game 

304
00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:00,800
theory of how can we most 
effectively achieve? 

305
00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:03,600
Our strategic games which are 
basically ensuring any of the 

306
00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:06,599
Dozen Central? 
Is Eve in like today's model. 

307
00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:09,800
So from that perspective like 
yes, we do sensor certain 

308
00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:12,800
transactions. 
No, we do not want long-term to 

309
00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:15,400
like, have the ability to impose
censorship on eith. 

310
00:17:15,599 --> 00:17:17,000
That's like a very hard line for
us. 

311
00:17:17,000 --> 00:17:19,300
Like, we won't step into that 
position. 

312
00:17:19,400 --> 00:17:21,599
And again, it's arguable about 
whether it's already happening 

313
00:17:21,599 --> 00:17:24,200
or not. 
My personal belief is it's not. 

314
00:17:24,800 --> 00:17:26,700
The other thing is, like, you 
have to look at this game 

315
00:17:26,700 --> 00:17:28,400
theory, right? 
Of like you have companies that 

316
00:17:28,400 --> 00:17:31,600
are providing services and they 
also have like choices to make 

317
00:17:31,600 --> 00:17:34,100
and like certain rights. 
So like if you're a validator in

318
00:17:34,200 --> 00:17:35,800
The US. 
And the government comes 

319
00:17:35,800 --> 00:17:38,600
knocking and says, like, look, 
you have to remove these 

320
00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:41,000
transactions, or you have to 
shut down, or you have to go to 

321
00:17:41,000 --> 00:17:43,000
jail, right? 
What ultimately ends up 

322
00:17:43,000 --> 00:17:45,000
happening. 
If we like throw up the middle 

323
00:17:45,000 --> 00:17:48,000
finger immediately, is that all 
of those validators will be shut

324
00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:50,700
down and it will move elsewhere.
The same thing that happened in 

325
00:17:50,700 --> 00:17:53,900
China basically. 
And to me, this reduces the 

326
00:17:53,900 --> 00:17:55,500
robustness of the etherium 
network. 

327
00:17:55,500 --> 00:17:58,300
It reduces the censorship 
resistance, ultimately, what we 

328
00:17:58,300 --> 00:18:01,500
need is geographic diversity, 
and ultimately, if everyone in 

329
00:18:01,508 --> 00:18:04,100
this geographically diverse 
system, you know, agree. 

330
00:18:04,300 --> 00:18:08,000
Is to like build blocks a 
certain way, like it's above my 

331
00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:10,000
pay grade to try to stop them to
an extent. 

332
00:18:10,100 --> 00:18:13,800
So our philosophy is to provide 
paths, and try to decentralize 

333
00:18:13,800 --> 00:18:16,400
and build as much competitive 
globally, competitive 

334
00:18:16,400 --> 00:18:18,500
infrastructure as we can. 
That's why we're open sourcing a

335
00:18:18,508 --> 00:18:20,900
lot of our stuff. 
That's why we kind of D 

336
00:18:20,900 --> 00:18:23,200
vertically integrated, our 
client after the merge within 

337
00:18:23,200 --> 00:18:25,600
that boost, and we're going to 
keep kind of aggressively 

338
00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:29,600
pushing towards that direction, 
but at the end of the day, like,

339
00:18:29,600 --> 00:18:33,500
you have to be realistic. 
I'm just the, the win here for 

340
00:18:33,500 --> 00:18:35,500
the Flash. 
Spine angle, offer the first 

341
00:18:35,500 --> 00:18:38,600
Parts angle, you know, Sanders, 
Sanders up resistance, you need 

342
00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:40,800
to have like a good granular. 
Definition of it is filled with 

343
00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:44,400
saying before, so if your blog 
proposer, there's two ways you 

344
00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:47,300
could prevent the inclusion of a
transaction either. 

345
00:18:47,300 --> 00:18:49,500
I just don't include it in my 
block and that's what's happened

346
00:18:49,500 --> 00:18:51,600
in the flat spots today. 
You know, I propose a block, 

347
00:18:51,600 --> 00:18:54,100
it's missing the transaction 
because the relay just didn't 

348
00:18:54,100 --> 00:18:57,300
give it to me, but if there's 
another block, know what. 

349
00:18:57,500 --> 00:19:01,100
So, if one, I don't include it 
in my block to, I have to pick a

350
00:19:01,100 --> 00:19:03,300
block to extend. 
There has to be a parent block 

351
00:19:03,300 --> 00:19:05,500
that I extend. 
That includes the center 

352
00:19:05,500 --> 00:19:08,700
transaction but I extended. 
Anyway, then you're not Century 

353
00:19:08,700 --> 00:19:10,900
in the network, you're just 
centering it from your own 

354
00:19:10,900 --> 00:19:12,900
block. 
Sounds more like a delay. 

355
00:19:12,900 --> 00:19:15,500
You're delaying its inclusion, 
but you're not censoring it 

356
00:19:15,700 --> 00:19:17,600
because as long as there's one 
on as party, it will get 

357
00:19:17,600 --> 00:19:19,900
included eventually, but where 
do you stop? 

358
00:19:19,900 --> 00:19:24,700
So can you attest to block that 
that that has a tornado 

359
00:19:24,700 --> 00:19:26,500
protector. 
Cash transaction in it. 

360
00:19:27,300 --> 00:19:31,000
Plus what happens, you know, 
with t webs that might have, you

361
00:19:31,000 --> 00:19:34,500
know, catastrophic failure modes
if certain transactions Do not 

362
00:19:34,500 --> 00:19:37,700
get included. 
So I think it is not fair to say

363
00:19:37,800 --> 00:19:40,200
that you know delaying things is
just delaying things, it's not 

364
00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:42,800
censorship, might have 
catastrophic failure modes in 

365
00:19:42,800 --> 00:19:45,700
some, you know, apps actually 
disagree with that. 

366
00:19:45,700 --> 00:19:47,600
I think, if you're not building 
around like, short-term 

367
00:19:47,600 --> 00:19:50,100
censorship, you're completely 
insecure even in like, 

368
00:19:50,400 --> 00:19:53,100
completely honest Network. 
Because if someone a single 

369
00:19:53,100 --> 00:19:55,800
Brock producer has a few blocks 
or like one person with 

370
00:19:55,800 --> 00:19:58,800
substantial hatch power, decides
to attack you like you need to 

371
00:19:58,800 --> 00:20:01,200
build your parameters such that 
you're including enough, a set 

372
00:20:01,200 --> 00:20:03,500
of miners that it gives you the 
guarantees you want. 

373
00:20:03,500 --> 00:20:05,200
And like once you've Now, you 
won't have that. 

374
00:20:05,200 --> 00:20:09,300
So what is enough, what what is 
enough, what is enough? 

375
00:20:09,400 --> 00:20:12,000
I mean that's like up to the 
privatization of Makoto 

376
00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:13,600
auctions. 
A good example of that because 

377
00:20:13,600 --> 00:20:16,200
they were timid at all consider 
blew up and now it's like six 

378
00:20:16,200 --> 00:20:18,400
hours exact. 
But of course like what is 

379
00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:19,900
enough? 
Very much depends on the 

380
00:20:19,908 --> 00:20:24,500
question of in. 
Well, kind of if you say 

381
00:20:24,500 --> 00:20:27,500
previously, like let's say ten 
blocks were enough but then 

382
00:20:27,500 --> 00:20:31,900
let's say you move to a 
situation where suddently 80% of

383
00:20:31,900 --> 00:20:36,700
the or let's say just 50 Scent 
of the validators, kind of don't

384
00:20:36,700 --> 00:20:39,100
don't include your transaction 
then suddenly, it means. 

385
00:20:39,100 --> 00:20:42,600
Well, now 20 blocks are enough, 
but the issue is, you don't 

386
00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:48,900
know, kind of whether it's 50%. 
Or, I mean, I feel like having 

387
00:20:48,900 --> 00:20:52,700
that kind of having this 
additional uncertainty about, 

388
00:20:52,700 --> 00:20:56,200
yeah. 
Again, whether the, whether the 

389
00:20:56,208 --> 00:21:01,500
network will, how do you treat 
your transaction will make it 

390
00:21:01,500 --> 00:21:03,400
kind of impossible to determine 
this? 

391
00:21:05,000 --> 00:21:06,800
What is enough? 
It's a hard problem and it's 

392
00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:08,400
something you have to 
continuously, adjust, but that's

393
00:21:08,400 --> 00:21:10,000
the case. 
Anyway, even when we'd seen 

394
00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:12,200
congestion fee markets, where 
your application might just be 

395
00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:15,000
censured, by not being able to 
pay the fees for a woman like 

396
00:21:15,000 --> 00:21:18,000
this, it's always something you 
need to kind of react. 

397
00:21:18,200 --> 00:21:22,300
We have like important Concepts 
like kind of the, the base fee 

398
00:21:22,300 --> 00:21:27,000
and kind of what they did. 
What is important piece whites. 

399
00:21:27,600 --> 00:21:31,700
Yeah, you can at least measure 
that so you can measure. 

400
00:21:34,200 --> 00:21:39,400
Asians somewhat objectively. 
Those extra all those other 

401
00:21:39,400 --> 00:21:42,600
forms of not including 
predictions that much harder to,

402
00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:46,500
to reasonable measure. 
I would say, I don't think so. 

403
00:21:46,500 --> 00:21:48,800
I think it's very easy to reason
about what percentage of blocks 

404
00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:50,000
today. 
Don't have tornado Cash. 

405
00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:53,100
There's a dashboard on it 
online, but they, but I mean, 

406
00:21:53,100 --> 00:21:55,700
also if you think about the 
Alternatives that security 

407
00:21:55,700 --> 00:21:58,700
trusses sumption, if you're just
delaying inclusion, you're 

408
00:21:58,700 --> 00:22:00,900
relying on one on us, quality 
attorney lots of great trust, 

409
00:22:00,900 --> 00:22:03,100
assumption. 
The how if there's a full 

410
00:22:03,100 --> 00:22:06,000
outright And they're not 
extending blocks with Center 

411
00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:08,600
transactions, then you ran on 
the honest majority. 

412
00:22:08,700 --> 00:22:10,600
So, they're two different cases 
that should be considered 

413
00:22:10,600 --> 00:22:12,500
separately. 
I also think, an interesting 

414
00:22:12,500 --> 00:22:15,000
point is, like, if you do have 
validators that are choosing 

415
00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:17,100
because ultimately, this is a 
validator choice, how they build

416
00:22:17,100 --> 00:22:20,000
their blocks to not include 
certain transactions, that 

417
00:22:20,000 --> 00:22:22,800
increases the revenue for anyone
who's like, willing to adopt the

418
00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:25,100
opposite policy. 
So, essentially, it's a subsidy 

419
00:22:25,100 --> 00:22:28,600
for the network of self-healing 
subsidy away from censorship, 

420
00:22:28,600 --> 00:22:31,400
especially if the systems are 
designed appropriately, I would 

421
00:22:31,400 --> 00:22:34,000
say that the argument, like the 
example that we started with, 

422
00:22:34,100 --> 00:22:36,700
You know, kind of doesn't 
support your point because like,

423
00:22:36,700 --> 00:22:40,000
tornado is an application that 
didn't have a shitload of 

424
00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,800
transactions, right? 
So the subsidy that you get from

425
00:22:42,800 --> 00:22:45,300
it like the Mev potential and so
on is minimal. 

426
00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:48,900
So you basically censoring like 
a large, you know, very 

427
00:22:48,900 --> 00:22:52,000
interesting set of use cases 
and, you know, you do not 

428
00:22:52,000 --> 00:22:54,800
actually provide significant 
upsides for anybody to take up 

429
00:22:54,800 --> 00:22:57,000
these very few, very little 
value transactions. 

430
00:22:57,200 --> 00:22:59,400
I feel like I'm falling everyone
here, but this is a 

431
00:22:59,408 --> 00:23:02,000
misconception, like Mev is not 
proportional to the number of 

432
00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:04,300
transactions. 
It's proportional to how much As

433
00:23:04,300 --> 00:23:07,000
people are willing to pay to not
be censored and if there's like 

434
00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:09,200
an act of censorship going on, 
that number will increase. 

435
00:23:09,200 --> 00:23:12,400
So you have to so you think it's
an okay idea that, you know, 90%

436
00:23:12,400 --> 00:23:16,700
of people and kind of sensor it 
and therefore like my costs of a

437
00:23:16,700 --> 00:23:19,900
tornado inclusion goes up by 
10x, I think if that's the 

438
00:23:19,900 --> 00:23:22,100
validator choice. 
It's like not unethical for them

439
00:23:22,100 --> 00:23:24,600
to do that. 
Personally and I think like, you

440
00:23:24,608 --> 00:23:26,000
know, there are their degrees, 
right? 

441
00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:28,100
Like it's a question of like, 
what is the x is like, a 

442
00:23:28,100 --> 00:23:31,600
utilitarian calculation? 
To me, it's like a fallacy to 

443
00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:34,000
think that like, every validator
will. 

444
00:23:34,100 --> 00:23:36,200
Really choose to include 
everything especially when today

445
00:23:36,200 --> 00:23:38,700
are one of our largest 
validation pools is a regulated 

446
00:23:38,700 --> 00:23:41,600
u.s. exchange and I expect that 
will like continue in proof of 

447
00:23:41,600 --> 00:23:44,100
stake. 
So I don't see an alternative 

448
00:23:44,100 --> 00:23:46,400
really. 
Oh yeah, I mean they're plenty 

449
00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:49,200
of attentive. 
So I mean, just to mention one 

450
00:23:49,500 --> 00:23:54,200
is, of course, is idea that you 
can have that you can commit to 

451
00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:57,400
transaction inclusion. 
While transactions are are still

452
00:23:57,400 --> 00:23:59,900
encrypted. 
This is about you sure. 

453
00:23:59,900 --> 00:24:01,200
Do know. 
I mean then you can just ask 

454
00:24:01,200 --> 00:24:04,000
people to like kyc your endpoint
and still sensor it right? 

455
00:24:04,200 --> 00:24:06,800
There is no privacy doesn't 
solve this issue. 

456
00:24:06,900 --> 00:24:09,000
Ultimately like the government's
not going to say like oh this is

457
00:24:09,000 --> 00:24:11,100
private, we're not touching it. 
That's also a fantasy. 

458
00:24:11,100 --> 00:24:12,900
I feel like well I feel like 
we're far apart should have 

459
00:24:12,900 --> 00:24:15,700
included was the see our list in
their implementation. 

460
00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:18,700
Yeah. 
So, you know, I can't, I again, 

461
00:24:18,700 --> 00:24:22,900
these are all my personal views 
on this flat spots but we did, 

462
00:24:23,300 --> 00:24:27,000
you know, we do like extensive 
work on this with key 

463
00:24:27,000 --> 00:24:30,500
stakeholders in the Austrian 
like Again, like I think this 

464
00:24:30,500 --> 00:24:32,200
will cook more will come out 
about this soon. 

465
00:24:32,200 --> 00:24:34,700
Basically, I would, I would 
definitely push back yourself 

466
00:24:34,700 --> 00:24:39,600
because because in my 
understanding, it's absolutely 

467
00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:44,800
not clear that that as well 
director, you even have that 

468
00:24:44,800 --> 00:24:47,600
obligation to, to censor, those 
transactions. 

469
00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:54,600
I mean in my understanding it is
even allowed for us persons or 

470
00:24:54,600 --> 00:24:59,300
clicking if there is is there's 
a way for you as person to to To

471
00:24:59,300 --> 00:25:03,500
get permission essentially to 
withdraw, from from from 

472
00:25:03,500 --> 00:25:08,300
tornado, in specific situations.
So if that is even allowed, then

473
00:25:08,300 --> 00:25:13,800
then then it needs to be allowed
also for for validators to 

474
00:25:13,800 --> 00:25:17,600
include this transactions. 
I don't agree with your analysis

475
00:25:17,600 --> 00:25:22,700
and I think this is one of the 
things I like most, I mean, I 

476
00:25:22,700 --> 00:25:26,000
don't agree that like, it's 
currently clear in like, the 

477
00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,600
legal game theory, that 
validators have no obligation to

478
00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:31,100
sense. 
It survived the first part so 

479
00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:34,300
you agree. 
It is or the law says you. 

480
00:25:34,300 --> 00:25:36,500
I don't want to get into legal 
analyses that's like not the 

481
00:25:36,500 --> 00:25:38,800
direction I want to go in but 
like I want to make a meta 

482
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:41,000
point, which is like a lot of 
people here are looking at other

483
00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:44,000
people's actions and saying like
here's my legal analysis of it 

484
00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:47,000
and like you're not really in 
the position to like make that 

485
00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:48,300
call like their lawyers are, 
right? 

486
00:25:48,300 --> 00:25:51,100
So like it's easy to look at a 
coin base and say like wow you 

487
00:25:51,100 --> 00:25:53,500
don't have to be doing this. 
You're going overboard but they 

488
00:25:53,500 --> 00:25:56,300
don't want to over comply right 
there talking to their lawyers 

489
00:25:56,300 --> 00:25:59,400
and they're like, getting advice
and like, you know, No, our 

490
00:25:59,400 --> 00:26:01,800
legal understanding, as a 
community, doesn't supersede 

491
00:26:01,800 --> 00:26:04,200
like their risk calculation 
against going to jail or like 

492
00:26:04,200 --> 00:26:07,100
having their company liquidated.
So like we do have to respect 

493
00:26:07,100 --> 00:26:09,900
people's preferences as well. 
In that in that regard, I think.

494
00:26:10,600 --> 00:26:16,600
Do you think metadata's have a 
moral obligation to serve 

495
00:26:16,600 --> 00:26:18,800
everyone? 
I mean, obviously, you don't but

496
00:26:18,800 --> 00:26:22,400
I mean I mean I don't like what 
if you have a validator that 

497
00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:25,300
says, this is a transaction that
has Pike's, some really morally 

498
00:26:25,300 --> 00:26:28,300
offensive content to me. 
And if I do - the community is 

499
00:26:28,300 --> 00:26:29,200
going to slash Right? 
Leg. 

500
00:26:29,200 --> 00:26:30,300
Is that a good position to be 
in? 

501
00:26:30,300 --> 00:26:33,300
Is that what we want? 
For our validators know II II II

502
00:26:33,300 --> 00:26:36,000
see your point. 
But say for instance what do you

503
00:26:36,008 --> 00:26:39,800
have said the same thing about 
kind of delivering mail or kind 

504
00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:44,300
of connecting phone calls based 
on whether you like the person 

505
00:26:44,300 --> 00:26:46,400
or not, delivering mail is not 
censorship resistant. 

506
00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:48,900
Either our phone calls like new.
You can't ship cracking the mail

507
00:26:48,900 --> 00:26:55,200
right. 
Look, I will generally deliver 

508
00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:58,700
mail but not to 
African-Americans or not too. 

509
00:26:58,900 --> 00:27:01,600
When the no not in your, yeah, I
think getting into the details 

510
00:27:01,600 --> 00:27:03,700
of like, why things are not 
being delivered as a whole 

511
00:27:03,700 --> 00:27:06,000
separate argument, but the nail 
is not censorship resistant and 

512
00:27:06,000 --> 00:27:07,700
neither are phone calls. 
Like, you can be censored. 

513
00:27:07,700 --> 00:27:09,900
I should they be? 
Can I jump high jump? 

514
00:27:09,900 --> 00:27:13,900
And so this is the most famous. 
Connor isn't very fire pit. 

515
00:27:14,100 --> 00:27:16,700
So I think like, theoretically 
speaking, it should be based on 

516
00:27:16,700 --> 00:27:18,900
the fee. 
But empirically speaking, they 

517
00:27:18,900 --> 00:27:21,100
censorship has always been an 
issue in cryptocurrencies. 

518
00:27:21,100 --> 00:27:23,400
So if you consider Bitcoin look 
jr. 

519
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:26,900
Tried the bonds Itachi dice 
because it was spamming the 

520
00:27:26,900 --> 00:27:30,800
network back in 2013. 
Many miners were notorious for 

521
00:27:30,800 --> 00:27:33,100
making deals with very large 
exchanges to make sure their 

522
00:27:33,100 --> 00:27:36,000
withdrawal transactions would 
always get processed even if 

523
00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:37,600
they can pay the fee at the 
time. 

524
00:27:38,100 --> 00:27:41,300
Now, the difference is that 
because mean one there's way 

525
00:27:41,300 --> 00:27:44,800
more volunteers now, so it's 
very difficult to trust the five

526
00:27:44,800 --> 00:27:47,100
people who are basically 
ordering transactions and proof 

527
00:27:47,100 --> 00:27:49,200
of work. 
And now this is why the flash 

528
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:52,100
boss issues come up because 
there's a it's a last trusted 

529
00:27:52,100 --> 00:27:54,900
systems you have to have to 
build a real, you know, trust 

530
00:27:54,900 --> 00:27:56,900
for your Mexican. 
Oh Max maximizing. 

531
00:27:56,900 --> 00:28:00,900
The trustview protocol between 
the Relay on the Block Builder. 

532
00:28:01,100 --> 00:28:04,300
So it's a yeah, there's a 
basically empirically is always 

533
00:28:04,300 --> 00:28:07,100
had this issue as much more 
evident now, I agree and there's

534
00:28:07,100 --> 00:28:09,200
like, many edge cases here, like
he's selling blocked, space, 

535
00:28:09,200 --> 00:28:11,300
Futures, and then mining 
something lower fee later 

536
00:28:11,300 --> 00:28:13,800
because you've committed to it 
is that censorship or is it, is 

537
00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:15,700
it not? 
Credibly neutral is, if you're a

538
00:28:15,700 --> 00:28:17,800
mining pool, putting your 
withdrawal transactions first 

539
00:28:17,800 --> 00:28:20,000
and having zero fees on them 
because that's what they all do,

540
00:28:20,200 --> 00:28:22,100
is that not? 
Is that not credibly neutral? 

541
00:28:22,100 --> 00:28:24,900
I mean, it's not right. 
So, like ultimately to me, we 

542
00:28:24,900 --> 00:28:27,400
need to realize that people have
preferences and they need to be 

543
00:28:27,400 --> 00:28:30,800
respected. 
So you would say, It's kind of 

544
00:28:30,800 --> 00:28:35,000
expected that let's say you are 
large decks or there are two 

545
00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:38,500
competing dex's and one will 
eventually say okay let's let's 

546
00:28:38,500 --> 00:28:41,800
do a deal with validators. 
Say kind of, we get generally 

547
00:28:41,800 --> 00:28:46,200
preferential treatment that's 
just how it is and that's yeah. 

548
00:28:46,200 --> 00:28:49,800
How many is even worse now 
because that's what these are. 

549
00:28:49,800 --> 00:28:50,700
Yeah. 
Well the whole egg, the 

550
00:28:50,700 --> 00:28:53,400
theoretical model around the 
transaction fee was that the 

551
00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:56,300
minor we pick up all the fees 
and that was their main source 

552
00:28:56,300 --> 00:28:59,300
of Revenue or actually in a 
theorem we burn all the These 

553
00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:02,000
you get this constant issuance, 
you don't really care about the 

554
00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:04,600
fee Market as much anymore, so 
as a less of an impact for 

555
00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:07,900
deciding which transactions, I 
include some just getting tips. 

556
00:29:08,600 --> 00:29:10,400
It's been a major source of my 
Revenue anymore. 

557
00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:14,400
I have a question for the people
pushing credible neutrality 

558
00:29:14,400 --> 00:29:17,400
name, these evasion Martinez 
sriram here. 

559
00:29:18,500 --> 00:29:22,800
Do you guys think that credible 
neutrality needs to be enshrined

560
00:29:22,800 --> 00:29:28,000
in the technology itself or can 
it also be a societal consensus?

561
00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:31,800
That Behave in a certain way, 
all validators behave in a 

562
00:29:31,808 --> 00:29:36,700
certain way. 
But my view here is I think 

563
00:29:36,700 --> 00:29:40,700
Patrick was unloading earlier to
the idea of don't be evil to 

564
00:29:40,700 --> 00:29:46,400
can't be evil and I think we 
need to make sure that 

565
00:29:46,400 --> 00:29:51,300
technologically it is impossible
or difficult to break credible 

566
00:29:51,300 --> 00:29:53,700
neutrality. 
I think societal ways of 

567
00:29:54,000 --> 00:29:59,300
enforcing it lead to only 
further conflict I It's not 

568
00:29:59,300 --> 00:30:02,700
going to be easy to enforce 
censorship resistance in our 

569
00:30:02,700 --> 00:30:06,900
societal way ideas. 
Like, for example, you know, we 

570
00:30:07,200 --> 00:30:10,100
I like the word the way that you
are described credible 

571
00:30:10,100 --> 00:30:12,100
neutrality, as a better way of 
phrasing. 

572
00:30:12,100 --> 00:30:14,400
It just like net neutrality, 
right? 

573
00:30:14,400 --> 00:30:18,100
Like you just want to send your 
a common carrier just sending 

574
00:30:18,100 --> 00:30:22,100
packets through and we need to 
get to that model to actually 

575
00:30:22,100 --> 00:30:25,000
make sure that the core function
of validators. 

576
00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:27,600
I think I don't I don't even 
like the word validator so I 

577
00:30:27,608 --> 00:30:30,800
think it's a very bad. 
Are you should call it consensus

578
00:30:30,800 --> 00:30:34,500
nodes because are even better 
witness nodes. 

579
00:30:34,500 --> 00:30:38,400
There only bearing witness to a 
certain flow of information. 

580
00:30:38,700 --> 00:30:41,000
This should be their official 
Duty. 

581
00:30:41,500 --> 00:30:43,900
They're not validating any 
transaction, they're just 

582
00:30:43,900 --> 00:30:47,100
sitting there and observing a 
certain transaction flow and 

583
00:30:47,100 --> 00:30:52,200
recording it for perpetuating 
and their liability and duties 

584
00:30:52,300 --> 00:30:55,700
and there, they are purely 
trading information. 

585
00:30:56,100 --> 00:30:58,600
They are not trading in value 
the ACT. 

586
00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:03,800
Abusin of value to that 
information is X, is should be 

587
00:31:03,800 --> 00:31:08,100
separated from the construction 
of an information flow, and the 

588
00:31:08,108 --> 00:31:10,600
blockchain is purely. 
A construction of information 

589
00:31:10,600 --> 00:31:15,400
flow that has been recorded for 
perpetuity, and and things like 

590
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,800
transaction. 
Encryption, actually make it 

591
00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:21,400
technologically more feasible to
actually get to a system like 

592
00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:24,200
this. 
So I think credible neutrality 

593
00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:27,800
should be more enshrined by 
technology. 

594
00:31:28,100 --> 00:31:32,600
And Core function of the 
blockchain should shift, or are 

595
00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:37,000
the consensus notes should shift
from validation or execution, or

596
00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:40,500
other things to just bearing 
testimony to information flow 

597
00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:44,400
and in which case you're 
protected very strongly, it's 

598
00:31:44,400 --> 00:31:46,300
just your trading and 
information. 

599
00:31:46,800 --> 00:31:50,400
And that's really the main 
thing, which which cannot be 

600
00:31:51,100 --> 00:31:53,700
objective. 
The only subjective aspect and 

601
00:31:53,700 --> 00:31:57,100
the only reason we need a 
blockchain to begin with is to 

602
00:31:57,100 --> 00:32:00,400
freeze this subjectivity If 
there is no subjectivity, 

603
00:32:00,400 --> 00:32:02,300
everything is just execution. 
I'll just do zero. 

604
00:32:02,300 --> 00:32:05,300
Knowledge proof is on my server 
and then send you proofs. 

605
00:32:05,500 --> 00:32:09,100
The only reason we need a 
blockchain is to resolve. 

606
00:32:09,100 --> 00:32:14,900
This liquid temporal fluctuating
thing into something solid for 

607
00:32:14,900 --> 00:32:18,500
the future and we should build 
blockchains whose consensus 

608
00:32:18,500 --> 00:32:22,300
nodes main feature is to Bear 
witness to this flow. 

609
00:32:23,000 --> 00:32:26,600
Yeah, I was in, he say I'm not 
willing to give up on the idea 

610
00:32:26,600 --> 00:32:31,800
of having a cradle. 
For the platform, I think it can

611
00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:37,200
be done for etherium, but we 
will certainly try to push as 

612
00:32:37,200 --> 00:32:41,200
hard as possible on another 
saying that direction. 

613
00:32:41,200 --> 00:32:46,100
And I would say, the the list of
potential ideas of how to do 

614
00:32:46,100 --> 00:32:51,000
that is long. 
So, we are starting with from 

615
00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:56,400
the very beginning of putting a 
lot of effort in making this 

616
00:32:56,400 --> 00:33:01,000
diverse. 
Ali diverse validator said, was 

617
00:33:01,000 --> 00:33:06,400
many kind of validate from home 
people. 

618
00:33:06,500 --> 00:33:09,500
There is this option of this 
shutter I speak in chain kind of

619
00:33:09,500 --> 00:33:14,100
the idea of yeah, privacy or 
yeah. 

620
00:33:14,100 --> 00:33:19,200
Encrypted connections. 
There are ways to unchain 

621
00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:25,800
objectively measure censorship 
and you could have rules too. 

622
00:33:26,700 --> 00:33:30,600
Yeah, kind of to then do. 
Slashing based on that objective

623
00:33:30,800 --> 00:33:36,500
measurement and furthermore 
there are several potential ways

624
00:33:36,500 --> 00:33:45,500
to reduce the freedom of of 
well, data off of a builder to 

625
00:33:45,500 --> 00:33:48,200
build a block. 
I mean, super simple one would 

626
00:33:48,200 --> 00:33:56,100
be would be to say you need to, 
you need to sort transactions by

627
00:33:57,100 --> 00:34:01,400
by feel but you There are also 
ways to kind of sort them 

628
00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:06,700
pseudorandomly, but any any 
anything that reduces the 

629
00:34:07,300 --> 00:34:10,500
anything that reduces the 
freedom of the Builder, or of 

630
00:34:10,500 --> 00:34:16,600
the valid data to, to produce 
blocks will reduce Mev to some 

631
00:34:16,600 --> 00:34:21,800
extent. 
And yeah, with those a bunch of 

632
00:34:21,800 --> 00:34:25,600
different categories. 
We he will push as hard as 

633
00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:29,600
possible to achieve Arctic 
Discuss the possibilities. 

634
00:34:29,600 --> 00:34:33,100
This incredible neutral base 
layer. 

635
00:34:33,900 --> 00:34:37,600
I don't think it can be directly
kind of enshrined in Technical 

636
00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:40,699
Solutions this credible 
neutrality because to me, 

637
00:34:41,199 --> 00:34:44,400
credible neutrality is a goal 
and this goal has some, you 

638
00:34:44,408 --> 00:34:49,300
know, has some paths to get 
there and, you know, those are, 

639
00:34:49,500 --> 00:34:51,699
some of them are technical, 
like, shutter. 

640
00:34:51,699 --> 00:34:55,900
I speak in chain is one of them.
But the other one to me, is kind

641
00:34:55,900 --> 00:34:58,200
of on the social side on the 
social side. 

642
00:34:58,200 --> 00:35:02,200
Now, got Get to troll fill a bit
back is like let's stop being 

643
00:35:02,200 --> 00:35:04,600
naive, right? 
It stopped like thinking our 

644
00:35:04,600 --> 00:35:07,300
tiny little comfortable box or 
we get to think about you know, 

645
00:35:07,300 --> 00:35:11,700
Game Theory and it's, you know, 
maybe not yet like YOLO 

646
00:35:11,900 --> 00:35:15,100
incorporate a Delaware LLC just 
because the most convenient 

647
00:35:15,100 --> 00:35:17,900
thing to do. 
It's not holes domains that end 

648
00:35:17,900 --> 00:35:21,200
on something.com just because 
the most convenient thing to do 

649
00:35:21,200 --> 00:35:25,400
and make ourselves capturable 
and making ourselves capturable 

650
00:35:25,400 --> 00:35:28,500
is something that is just we see
now, you know, while you 

651
00:35:28,700 --> 00:35:31,700
Yourself capturable Kelsey State
me a little convenient box. 

652
00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:36,500
And you know, now we you know 
find out right as people say. 

653
00:35:36,600 --> 00:35:41,200
So I would say this is something
we really have to tackle, we 

654
00:35:41,200 --> 00:35:44,900
have to be serious about it. 
Maybe a positive shout out in 

655
00:35:44,908 --> 00:35:48,600
the end is you know there's 
people are working on that and 

656
00:35:48,600 --> 00:35:52,500
that is yeah, actually removing 
these single points of failure 

657
00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:55,900
liquidy is in my eyes. 
One, great example to remove 

658
00:35:55,900 --> 00:35:58,500
these Central choke points as 
for example. 

659
00:35:58,700 --> 00:36:01,400
Oil. 
The front end and decentralized 

660
00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:04,100
properly. 
So if we take this seriously and

661
00:36:04,100 --> 00:36:07,400
if we actually strive for that, 
I think we will end up with 

662
00:36:07,400 --> 00:36:10,200
systems that overall are much 
more credible neutral. 

663
00:36:10,400 --> 00:36:13,200
And what we have today where 
there are some like violent 

664
00:36:13,200 --> 00:36:16,500
regulator, which happens to be 
called Uncle Sam that, you know,

665
00:36:16,500 --> 00:36:20,200
comes after us and we say, oh we
are very surprised about that. 

666
00:36:20,800 --> 00:36:23,400
Do I get to respond or is it is 
censorship situation? 

667
00:36:28,800 --> 00:36:31,500
I myself am not in the habit of 
changing people's. 

668
00:36:31,500 --> 00:36:34,200
Okay, great. 
So, sriram to things on your 

669
00:36:34,200 --> 00:36:36,300
points. 
Number one, I disagree that we 

670
00:36:36,300 --> 00:36:38,400
have net neutrality, especially 
when it comes to ofac. 

671
00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:41,700
So I think that mean is great. 
And I love the comparison and I 

672
00:36:41,700 --> 00:36:43,800
like totally agree with it. 
But Gmail sensors. 

673
00:36:43,800 --> 00:36:46,700
Ofac, you know, Google sensors. 
Oh so do many, many any web to 

674
00:36:46,700 --> 00:36:48,700
company is under this 
regulation, right? 

675
00:36:48,700 --> 00:36:51,700
So like, we, as a society. 
Yes, we want this. 

676
00:36:51,700 --> 00:36:53,100
But we've also accepted the 
trade-off. 

677
00:36:53,100 --> 00:36:55,800
So, like, let's be realistic 
about where we are and like 

678
00:36:55,800 --> 00:36:57,400
that. 
This will be another instance of

679
00:36:57,400 --> 00:37:00,300
like the same pad. 
Blockchains because like we are 

680
00:37:00,300 --> 00:37:02,400
not above the law, right? 
That would be Fantasy Land. 

681
00:37:02,500 --> 00:37:04,600
The other thing I wanted to just
roll you a little bit on and 

682
00:37:04,600 --> 00:37:07,200
probably only you will get this 
is like I don't agree that you 

683
00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:10,000
can separate the like 
information transfer from the 

684
00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:11,600
value flow. 
I think, in these systems, the 

685
00:37:12,500 --> 00:37:15,300
one in the same it's like 
relates to this crystallization 

686
00:37:15,300 --> 00:37:18,200
of like State process. 
We talked about, but we can go 

687
00:37:18,200 --> 00:37:20,000
deeper on that later because I 
don't want to take up all the 

688
00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:22,400
time. 
The other thing is like so I 

689
00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:24,700
think making trade-offs for 
example, in gnosis chain that 

690
00:37:24,700 --> 00:37:26,800
like increased credible 
neutrality that sounds great. 

691
00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:28,900
And like I'm not opposed to any 
of Things. 

692
00:37:28,900 --> 00:37:32,600
I would love to experiment with 
all those things like amazing on

693
00:37:32,600 --> 00:37:35,000
the other hand, they imply 
trade-off preferences and this 

694
00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:37,800
is why I was kind of drilling 
into this definition because it 

695
00:37:37,800 --> 00:37:39,900
might be the case that like if 
you achieve this little 

696
00:37:39,900 --> 00:37:43,100
definition of credible 
neutrality, so many other people

697
00:37:43,100 --> 00:37:45,600
that makes the mechanism, not 
credibly neutral, right? 

698
00:37:46,000 --> 00:37:48,700
Like it's not just because you 
have this technical notion that 

699
00:37:48,700 --> 00:37:51,700
true transactions, pay the fee 
that get in that like some 

700
00:37:51,700 --> 00:37:54,600
random person sample from the 
population will say, like yes 

701
00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:56,400
this is credible to me that this
is neutral. 

702
00:37:56,400 --> 00:37:58,500
That's like a separate social 
property that we need. 

703
00:37:58,600 --> 00:38:01,500
Need to be careful about 
conflating anyway, trying to 

704
00:38:01,500 --> 00:38:04,300
rapid-fire and and yes, I agree 
with you completely in your 

705
00:38:04,300 --> 00:38:07,700
trolling. 
I think flash pots is not trying

706
00:38:07,700 --> 00:38:09,500
long-term to build centralized 
infrastructure. 

707
00:38:09,500 --> 00:38:11,600
We are trying to build 
decentralized infrastructure. 

708
00:38:11,700 --> 00:38:13,200
I want to be super clear about 
it. 

709
00:38:13,300 --> 00:38:15,600
I think the criticism of the 
path, it's valid and like the 

710
00:38:15,600 --> 00:38:19,100
success the path has had. 
I think the counter argument 

711
00:38:19,100 --> 00:38:21,600
would be like, this is a rock 
and a hard place situation of 

712
00:38:21,600 --> 00:38:23,100
like, there are doors to knock 
on. 

713
00:38:23,300 --> 00:38:24,400
And is it going to be flash 
pots? 

714
00:38:24,400 --> 00:38:25,700
Or is it going to be the 
validator? 

715
00:38:25,800 --> 00:38:28,200
It's basically the choice. 
When we incorporated Delaware, 

716
00:38:28,200 --> 00:38:32,400
LLC That we were facing and I do
stand by the choice we've made. 

717
00:38:32,700 --> 00:38:34,600
I don't expect the community to 
love it. 

718
00:38:34,600 --> 00:38:37,500
I expect that the community will
keep trolling us and pushing 

719
00:38:37,500 --> 00:38:40,400
back on our actions and like, 
our actions will need to like be

720
00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:44,100
above this kind of, you know, be
kind of respond to this as well,

721
00:38:44,200 --> 00:38:45,600
and like, we are going to do 
that. 

722
00:38:45,600 --> 00:38:48,600
So, no trolling. 
Love it, amazing. 

723
00:38:49,800 --> 00:38:53,800
So fairly tell us about the 
roadmap for you know, mentoring 

724
00:38:53,800 --> 00:38:56,600
towards no more credit, be 
neutral Place. 

725
00:38:56,900 --> 00:39:00,400
Sure decentralization. 
Ation Global competition. 

726
00:39:00,500 --> 00:39:03,900
And by decentralization, I mean,
of economic power in the market 

727
00:39:04,600 --> 00:39:07,600
and of Technology as well, 
Global competition. 

728
00:39:07,800 --> 00:39:10,300
And also, like engaging with 
everybody in the community, 

729
00:39:10,300 --> 00:39:13,400
everyone in this room, everyone 
on this panel, yes. 

730
00:39:13,400 --> 00:39:15,500
Also The Regulators. 
Yes, also the validation 

731
00:39:15,500 --> 00:39:18,100
Community, everyone who is a 
stakeholder in this industry 

732
00:39:18,700 --> 00:39:21,400
because I do believe like the 
pie is bigger when like people 

733
00:39:21,400 --> 00:39:23,000
can cooperate. 
That's ultimately what we're 

734
00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:24,900
trying to build here. 
That's what the internet is 

735
00:39:24,900 --> 00:39:27,700
trying to build as well. 
And I think like really the 

736
00:39:27,700 --> 00:39:31,100
entire Community is Line behind.
So that's the roadmap. 

737
00:39:31,200 --> 00:39:33,900
If, you know, if you want more 
specific information, all I'm 

738
00:39:33,900 --> 00:39:35,900
going to do now, is pop my talk 
on Friday. 

739
00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:38,900
So we will drop some alfond you 
there. 

740
00:39:39,500 --> 00:39:43,600
Yeah, we have come to your talk 
with more questions Sebastian. 

741
00:39:43,600 --> 00:39:47,500
Tell us about Hopper and how 
you're trying to get to Credible

742
00:39:47,500 --> 00:39:50,600
neutrality. 
Yeah, so as I said to me 

743
00:39:51,200 --> 00:39:56,100
censorship resistant is One 
requirement for neutrality and 

744
00:39:56,100 --> 00:39:59,900
censorship resistant needs. 
Ation which everybody talks 

745
00:39:59,900 --> 00:40:03,700
about which we all love but you 
know, a decentralized world 

746
00:40:03,700 --> 00:40:06,700
needs privacy much more than a 
centralized world. 

747
00:40:06,700 --> 00:40:09,300
That's something that many 
people don't realize, you know? 

748
00:40:09,300 --> 00:40:11,300
And we only start to realize 
that now. 

749
00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:15,200
So you know the trust Assumption
of the web to they are kind of 

750
00:40:15,200 --> 00:40:17,300
okay, right. 
I like to bring this example of 

751
00:40:17,300 --> 00:40:21,300
Facebook and US uploading random
stuff to Facebook, it's okay. 

752
00:40:21,400 --> 00:40:23,000
Right. 
Like you don't find like really 

753
00:40:23,000 --> 00:40:25,500
embarrassing pictures of 
yourself and the billboard cross

754
00:40:25,900 --> 00:40:28,200
from your home, right? 
But that trust is sumption. 

755
00:40:28,200 --> 00:40:30,700
Doesn't Going to have three 
which is not protected by any 

756
00:40:30,700 --> 00:40:34,000
laws and regulations. 
So the only thing that actually 

757
00:40:34,000 --> 00:40:36,900
protects us in their web three 
world, that is fully 

758
00:40:36,900 --> 00:40:41,700
decentralized is strong privacy 
Tech and that's what we built on

759
00:40:41,700 --> 00:40:45,100
Harper at Harbor and the most 
like fundamental layer. 

760
00:40:45,200 --> 00:40:46,800
Not all these Fancy on change 
stuff. 

761
00:40:46,800 --> 00:40:50,000
That's all great. 
But even the most private chain 

762
00:40:50,000 --> 00:40:53,200
does need transport privacy. 
And yeah that's what we build a 

763
00:40:53,207 --> 00:40:57,200
Topper with this with this mixed
net and you know, one point a 

764
00:40:57,200 --> 00:41:00,400
tie Like to also point out 
because we talk a lot about 

765
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:02,700
validators. 
It's like, you know, if we don't

766
00:41:02,700 --> 00:41:05,800
have validator privacy, it's 
going to be a whole lot of weird

767
00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:08,800
stuff that will happen. 
So even if we have a single 

768
00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:12,000
secret leader election, you 
know, maybe I can, you know, 

769
00:41:12,000 --> 00:41:16,300
knockout in a targeted fashion 
fails, validator, but in a 

770
00:41:16,308 --> 00:41:18,700
targeted fashion that I can 
still just troll him, you know, 

771
00:41:18,700 --> 00:41:21,900
because you know and Phil likes 
to get trolled and you know, I 

772
00:41:21,900 --> 00:41:24,300
find it funny to just ddosed him
all the time. 

773
00:41:24,700 --> 00:41:29,600
So even with SLE we do need some
Some fundamental error of 

774
00:41:29,600 --> 00:41:33,000
privacy. 
It's a hard problem, especially 

775
00:41:33,100 --> 00:41:35,200
when we talk about the 
trade-offs, for example, of 

776
00:41:35,207 --> 00:41:38,900
latency versus privacy. 
So lots of work ahead there but 

777
00:41:39,100 --> 00:41:41,600
I think it's an absolute 
necessity to get us in a 

778
00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:43,200
Direction Where We I think I'll 
want to go. 

779
00:41:46,600 --> 00:41:49,600
Patrick, tell us about a new 
fewer and fewer. 

780
00:41:49,600 --> 00:41:52,500
Oh, yes, I do. 
I heard you in training. 

781
00:41:52,500 --> 00:41:54,700
There is no longer the master 
node. 

782
00:41:54,800 --> 00:41:56,600
So I'll start with that, I'm not
joking. 

783
00:41:58,100 --> 00:42:01,100
So obviously, in fear is a web 
to company and it is following 

784
00:42:01,100 --> 00:42:04,700
the ofac sanctions and obviously
not allowing people to send 

785
00:42:04,700 --> 00:42:10,300
transactions to to tornado cash.
So, inferior is working on a new

786
00:42:10,300 --> 00:42:13,200
goal for decentralized inferior,
but the goal of that isn't 

787
00:42:13,200 --> 00:42:15,500
necessary. 
The censorship resistance, but I

788
00:42:15,508 --> 00:42:18,300
think that was just be a side 
and a side, a side effect 

789
00:42:18,300 --> 00:42:21,400
offered because you have any, 
no, a fatter in a network of, I 

790
00:42:21,408 --> 00:42:24,000
don't know, 10 20, 30 different 
known providers. 

791
00:42:24,300 --> 00:42:27,200
They'll be reasonably digital 
reasonably geographically, be 

792
00:42:27,200 --> 00:42:30,400
distributed, you'll hopefully 
get that for free but in fear is

793
00:42:30,400 --> 00:42:33,700
music, has run out and focusing 
on redundancy and reliability. 

794
00:42:34,200 --> 00:42:36,500
You know, I'm sure you've all 
seen The Meta, Moscow, teach 

795
00:42:36,500 --> 00:42:38,000
that we don't like to talk 
about. 

796
00:42:38,200 --> 00:42:41,400
But that sort of inspired, 
decentralizing fury because we 

797
00:42:41,400 --> 00:42:43,800
want to make sure. 
Even if we go down, man. 

798
00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:46,600
Still works. 
So sort of a focusing on right 

799
00:42:46,600 --> 00:42:48,700
now. 
Thank you, Shriram. 

800
00:42:48,700 --> 00:42:51,600
What about you? 
And I can layer, I can layer is 

801
00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:54,300
an add-on layer to aetherium, so
it does. 

802
00:42:54,300 --> 00:42:58,000
It cannot increase etherium 
censorship resistance in a basic

803
00:42:58,000 --> 00:43:02,400
way, but we do think a lot about
how we can contribute to 

804
00:43:02,400 --> 00:43:06,000
potentially increasing the 
censorship resistance before it,

805
00:43:06,000 --> 00:43:08,200
our War II later. 
I just want to address this 

806
00:43:08,200 --> 00:43:20,300
point on Because I think at the 
end of the day, Gmail may have 

807
00:43:20,300 --> 00:43:24,100
to censor but optic, fiber 
companies may not have to censor

808
00:43:24,100 --> 00:43:27,800
what is going through and this 
is the right layering that 

809
00:43:27,800 --> 00:43:32,200
blockchains be treated like 
optic, fiber companies, 

810
00:43:32,500 --> 00:43:35,400
especially if it is not even 
feasible for them to look into 

811
00:43:35,400 --> 00:43:40,400
what is going on inside. 
And I'm not saying there for 

812
00:43:40,400 --> 00:43:43,200
that, we will get value 
censorship resistance. 

813
00:43:43,200 --> 00:43:45,700
They'll be in Emission 
censorship resistance is 

814
00:43:45,700 --> 00:43:49,100
different from values and social
assistance because value needs. 

815
00:43:49,300 --> 00:43:55,600
What we need to do is to push 
more agency to agents and the 

816
00:43:55,600 --> 00:43:59,700
system should not have any 
agency and what is an agent in 

817
00:43:59,700 --> 00:44:02,600
our company, which is trading on
top of this Block Chain as an 

818
00:44:02,600 --> 00:44:05,700
agent, the user who's receiving 
money from somebody else's an 

819
00:44:05,700 --> 00:44:08,000
agent, they are counterparties 
to somebody else. 

820
00:44:08,300 --> 00:44:12,100
They should be able to express 
their Rich intersubjective 

821
00:44:12,100 --> 00:44:15,600
preferences on who they to deal 
with and they will take the 

822
00:44:15,600 --> 00:44:18,600
liability. 
So it's exactly like when it's a

823
00:44:18,607 --> 00:44:22,600
matter of layering and 
restricting, the scope of what 

824
00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:23,800
is happening at different 
layers. 

825
00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:28,000
Answering the question on what 
we can do to increase censorship

826
00:44:28,100 --> 00:44:32,000
censorship resistance. 
We had this proposal on how we 

827
00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:37,000
can potentially let block 
proposes, subscribe to 

828
00:44:38,000 --> 00:44:41,800
additional ordering constraints 
by Reese taking on I can layer. 

829
00:44:41,800 --> 00:44:45,600
So when this, when Now, proposes
are restricting, I can layer. 

830
00:44:45,600 --> 00:44:48,700
They could potentially 
participate in different kinds 

831
00:44:48,700 --> 00:44:51,900
of markets, which potentially, 
for example, including things 

832
00:44:51,900 --> 00:44:54,300
like distributed, relay is 
distributed building. 

833
00:44:55,200 --> 00:44:57,100
There are different things you 
can build on top of that. 

834
00:44:58,100 --> 00:45:01,300
I want to add one more point on 
a different way of achieving 

835
00:45:01,300 --> 00:45:05,900
censorship resistance, which is 
to give more agency to light 

836
00:45:05,900 --> 00:45:07,900
nodes. 
We talk a lot about light 

837
00:45:07,900 --> 00:45:10,300
clients in the theorem 
Community, but only in the 

838
00:45:10,300 --> 00:45:14,200
context of validating safety, 
but I think the real Real real 

839
00:45:14,200 --> 00:45:18,000
value of like clients is 
actually in their ability to add

840
00:45:18,000 --> 00:45:22,500
to censorship resistance because
you know, they are the most B Li

841
00:45:22,500 --> 00:45:25,900
distributed and if your dad and 
every single phone and if they 

842
00:45:25,900 --> 00:45:28,100
can contribute back to 
censorship resistance, in 

843
00:45:28,100 --> 00:45:32,600
various ways, that would be 
something, which is quite 

844
00:45:32,600 --> 00:45:35,100
preferable. 
How would they contribute to 

845
00:45:35,100 --> 00:45:38,500
censorship resistance? 
So these are schemes were 

846
00:45:38,500 --> 00:45:41,900
working on internally but the 
core idea is something like, for

847
00:45:41,900 --> 00:45:46,200
example, everybody who's holding
Eat in their wallet can be, you 

848
00:45:46,200 --> 00:45:49,100
know, for example, their life 
node will be randomly salty 

849
00:45:49,100 --> 00:45:54,100
shinned into and into an ability
to contribute to the next block 

850
00:45:54,200 --> 00:45:56,300
and this is transmitted widely 
through the network. 

851
00:45:56,300 --> 00:45:59,300
So everybody knows that this is 
like a censorship. 

852
00:45:59,400 --> 00:46:03,600
See our list initiated at light 
nodes by random sortation. 

853
00:46:03,600 --> 00:46:06,100
So you just running a very, very
light thing in your wallet. 

854
00:46:06,400 --> 00:46:09,600
And as long as you hold Keith, 
you're you're eligible to be 

855
00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:13,100
randomly sorted in and you 
propose a transaction and Float,

856
00:46:13,100 --> 00:46:16,200
a mini block. 
Lock that that then goes around 

857
00:46:16,200 --> 00:46:18,600
through the network. 
So there are many ideas for how 

858
00:46:18,600 --> 00:46:21,100
one could do this with very 
light clients. 

859
00:46:21,700 --> 00:46:26,600
But the the matter idea here is 
that we should look deeply to 

860
00:46:26,600 --> 00:46:30,900
how we can cap the very edges of
the network to contribute to 

861
00:46:30,900 --> 00:46:36,100
this sense of presence rather 
than only, you know, few valid 

862
00:46:36,100 --> 00:46:39,200
and olds who are the sent 
Center, who I think the other 

863
00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:42,200
thing that is measured in, all 
this discussion is, you know, we

864
00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:46,300
are in a Flash W things, a Board
for example, how to not let the 

865
00:46:46,300 --> 00:46:50,600
network centralized because 
there is no natural drift to 

866
00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:52,500
decentralization. 
There's only a drift to 

867
00:46:52,500 --> 00:46:56,400
centralization. 
How, how can we enshrine the 

868
00:46:56,400 --> 00:47:00,000
drift to decentralization is 
something, we should think about

869
00:47:00,000 --> 00:47:04,200
much more consciously rather 
than only making it at best 

870
00:47:04,200 --> 00:47:06,000
neutral. 
You know. 

871
00:47:06,000 --> 00:47:09,000
A central network is obviously 
as good as a decentralized 

872
00:47:09,000 --> 00:47:11,800
network in every objective 
metric and is better in some 

873
00:47:11,800 --> 00:47:14,200
ways. 
And this can't, By the way. 

874
00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:17,100
So we can't keep touching more 
and more and more. 

875
00:47:17,400 --> 00:47:21,200
So I think that's a bigger issue
that we all have to deal with is

876
00:47:21,200 --> 00:47:23,500
how to enshrine 
decentralization. 

877
00:47:23,500 --> 00:47:26,600
If we think it's a valid 
principle, if we think that is 

878
00:47:26,600 --> 00:47:28,800
sufficient for one or two run 
everything, we don't need to 

879
00:47:28,800 --> 00:47:30,800
worry about it. 
So I actually agree with 

880
00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:32,000
everything. 
He said, it wasn't very much 

881
00:47:32,000 --> 00:47:34,900
trolling, maybe just not the 
legal analysis and again I'm not

882
00:47:34,900 --> 00:47:37,900
a lawyer. 
This is not big enough with the 

883
00:47:38,000 --> 00:47:41,400
the film's position on the legal
thing and in the fundamental way

884
00:47:41,400 --> 00:47:43,700
that we are all, you know, we 
are not living. 

885
00:47:43,900 --> 00:47:47,400
No matter what, we are living in
a physical Universe in physical 

886
00:47:47,400 --> 00:47:50,800
nation states. 
And we are dual citizens at best

887
00:47:50,900 --> 00:47:54,900
between this nation and some 
other like etherium matter of 

888
00:47:54,908 --> 00:47:58,200
hours. 
So we have to comply to the loss

889
00:47:58,300 --> 00:48:01,700
of where we are living. 
And I think the the best way to 

890
00:48:01,700 --> 00:48:05,900
counter all these things is to 
actually build systems which 

891
00:48:06,100 --> 00:48:10,000
move more agency to the edges. 
Okay, here's an interesting 

892
00:48:10,000 --> 00:48:11,800
interesting Troll. 
And again I'm not a lawyer. 

893
00:48:11,800 --> 00:48:13,700
So please this is not legal 
advice for you all. 

894
00:48:13,800 --> 00:48:16,500
But like, this is when I 
actually agree with everything 

895
00:48:16,500 --> 00:48:18,100
you said, and I think we're 
going to end up in the same 

896
00:48:18,100 --> 00:48:20,800
place as the internet, right? 
Like, and ultimately, the way 

897
00:48:20,800 --> 00:48:23,100
that nation-states look at this 
kind of stuff when it comes to 

898
00:48:23,100 --> 00:48:25,300
government security, or like 
what are the choice? 

899
00:48:25,300 --> 00:48:27,100
Okay points? 
What can we hit and what are the

900
00:48:27,107 --> 00:48:29,300
costs, right? 
And they want to get the benefit

901
00:48:29,300 --> 00:48:32,500
they need and like they won't 
compromise on that but also at 

902
00:48:32,500 --> 00:48:35,500
as little cost as possible. 
So if there was no ability to 

903
00:48:35,500 --> 00:48:37,600
sense their Google, if that 
didn't work, yes, they would be 

904
00:48:37,600 --> 00:48:39,000
knocking on the fiber providers 
door. 

905
00:48:39,000 --> 00:48:41,700
There's no doubt, they're in my 
mind, but because that would be 

906
00:48:41,700 --> 00:48:44,500
much more costly and detrimental
to like, Raishin, they don't do 

907
00:48:44,500 --> 00:48:46,500
that and I think that's exactly 
what we're going to see in 

908
00:48:46,508 --> 00:48:48,400
blockchains. 
Like they will, they will look 

909
00:48:48,400 --> 00:48:51,800
at it and be sane about this 
kind of stuff and, and that's 

910
00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:54,000
basically the outcome we're 
going to see again, not legal 

911
00:48:54,000 --> 00:48:56,800
advice. 
Yeah, I suppose that's exactly 

912
00:48:56,800 --> 00:49:00,800
my thesis that means that they 
will be able to censor the value

913
00:49:00,800 --> 00:49:03,800
flow and people who subject 
themselves to say that, hey, I'm

914
00:49:03,800 --> 00:49:06,800
not part of this country. 
I'm in some metaphors, they are 

915
00:49:06,800 --> 00:49:10,600
free to do value exchange with 
whoever they want through this 

916
00:49:10,600 --> 00:49:12,900
network. 
Whose information flow is 

917
00:49:12,900 --> 00:49:15,100
unrestricted. 
But value flow will have choke 

918
00:49:15,100 --> 00:49:18,800
points and get restricted. 
That's so maybe we should have 

919
00:49:18,800 --> 00:49:22,600
the validators all being run by 
bun, tag murky and you know, dig

920
00:49:22,600 --> 00:49:26,800
in Spartan more, and on 
validators would always be fun 

921
00:49:26,800 --> 00:49:29,200
again, not the position of flash
pots, but my own personal 

922
00:49:29,200 --> 00:49:34,500
opinion, this is fantastic, 
closing statement. 

923
00:49:35,700 --> 00:49:38,900
Thank you guys so much for 
participating in this family. 

924
00:49:38,900 --> 00:49:45,200
It was super interesting and 
Illuminating and I wish you all 

925
00:49:45,400 --> 00:49:49,200
a really good evening. 
I hope none of you are super 

926
00:49:49,200 --> 00:49:50,300
jet. 
Lagged still. 

927
00:49:50,400 --> 00:50:02,200
So go home sleep and we'll see 
you tomorrow at Defcon 2.