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This is epicenter episode 376 
with guest Aaron, right? 

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I am suggesting that you on your
listening to epicenter the 

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00:00:21,600 --> 00:00:24,100
podcast where we interview 
crypto, Founders, Builders and 

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thought leaders. 
On this show, we dive deep. 

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Learn how things work, at a 
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Concepts, and long-term trends. 

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And if you're new to the 

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podcast, be sure to subscribe on
Apple podcast Spotify or 

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wherever you listen. 
Today our guest is Aaron, right?

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He's a professor at the Cardozo 
School of Law. 

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He's the co-founder of open law 
and he's an expert on the legal 

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treatment of dows. 
In fact, he co-authored a book 

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called blockchain and the law 
with Primavera de filippi. 

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I believe it was last year, that
that book came out last year. 

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He participated in the launch of
the Lao, the LA Whoa, It's a 

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dowel that is organized, as a 
legal entity, it's an LLC in 

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Delaware and its back to both 30
projects in the theorem 

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ecosystem since it came into 
existence. 

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So we had a really interesting 
conversation about Dows and how 

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they're treated in existing 
legal Frameworks although we 

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mostly focused on the US. 
We talked at length about the 

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legal status of dowsing Wyoming.
There's some really interesting 

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developments going on there. 
As I'm sure you're probably 

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aware prior to this 
conversation, I had only like a 

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Understanding of what Wyoming is
doing in the space. 

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But it's really cool actually 
that they're making it possible 

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for a doubt to be registered and
recognized by law and that they 

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have the Frameworks also to kind
of simplify this registration 

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process. 
I think it's like a very good 

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sign for the ecosystem. 
We also spend some time 

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discussing the different types 
of videos that exist and 

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different applications that 
exist in this ecosystem and we 

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speculated about the types of 
exciting applications that could

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emerge in the future. 
The personally I think dowels 

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are just One of the most 
interesting things in the space 

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and one of my first encounters 
with this concept, the concept 

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of an autonomous organization 
was this pretty famous Mike her 

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and talk from 2013 at the 
touring festival. 

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At least it's famous in my mind 
because it really inspired me 

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and it's it was the thing I 
think that really made me want 

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to get into the crypto space 
back in 2014 or wherever it was 

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when I got into it. 
And he describes this autonomous

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organization that runs a fleet 
of self-driving cars and it's 

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like super far out and 
futuristic. 

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So if you haven't seen this 
talk, if you're new to crypto 

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and perhaps don't know about the
stalker, perhaps don't even know

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who my current is, you should 
check it out. 

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The link is in the show notes of
course towels have come a long 

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way since those early Concepts 
and most owls now have 

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governance tokens. 
And well you know where you can 

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easily trade governance tokens 
on one inch. 

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It's my go-to decks aggregator 
and I know that when I use one 

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inch I'm The best price for my 
trade across all dex's and M&M's

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to start. 
Using one inch, go to epicenter,

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rocks / 1 inch. 
And with that, here's our 

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conversation with Aaron, right? 
Welcome to have to Center. 

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We're here with Aaron right 
today, Aaron. 

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You are the co-founder of open 
Dot and one of the founders of 

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the Lao and basically, a thought
leader in the Dow space and the 

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Digger Block Chain space. 
In general. 

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It's a pleasure to actually have
you on. 

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Can you can you tell us a little
bit about your background? 

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Yeah, absolutely. 
And thanks so much for having me

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on as I noted before, I've been 
a longtime listener. 

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So it's great to to be able to 
join the podcast. 

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My background is a bit 
interesting. 

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I have a background in law and 
and Technology. 

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I'm a professor at Cardozo law 
school in New York before. 

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Joining kurtosis faculty. 
I started a company and sold it 

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to the for-profit sister project
to look at Pedia. 

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So I spent quite a bit of time 
in the Wikipedia ecosystem and I

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have been deeply involved in the
blockchain ecosystem. 

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As since about 2011, when I 
started falling down the Bitcoin

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Rabbit Hole, I had the pleasure 
of playing a small role to help 

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launch aetherium and work 
through some of the issues 

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there. 
I've also had the pleasure of 

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working with lots of other great
folks. 

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In, in the ecosystem, I 
co-authored a book with 

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Primavera. 
T Philippi Tame Impala. 

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See, I was able to help out a 
number of great projects when 

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they were starting or early on 
including working with juban at 

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consensus working with some of 
the folks on the chain-link 

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team. 
Also working with folks and 

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other other great teams over the
years, from my research with 

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Primavera and thinking about 
kind of this emerging blockchain

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ecosystem, I've been able to 
help build and co-founder 

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project called open In law which
is thinking about what I view 

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is, the Third Leg of kind of the
commercial revolution that we're

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building. 
We have Bitcoin and as kind of a

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first e currency, etherium of 
easiest and axiomatic smart 

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Contracting platform and the 
last leg and kind of the 

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cypherpunk dream has always been
a ricardian Contracting system 

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which is this idea of linking 
together, traditional legal 

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agreements digitizing them 
cryptographically, securing them

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and hopefully Providing a sort 
of interface for that 

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traditional world or meatspace 
world that that I think we still

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and have it. 
So that's been a really great a 

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great opportunity to work with 
so many great teams and 

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obviously built some hopefully 
important technology and kind of

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related to that. 
And we've been applying some of 

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the tools we developed on open 
law to start building out, a 

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network of dowse. 
The first doubt that we launched

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was the the loud and which I'm 
sure will get into. 

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We've also launch another Dow 
called Flamingo, Dow just more 

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nf2, you focus. 
And we have about three or four 

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more that I think you'll see 
over the next couple weeks, and 

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months that are that are in the 
hopper. 

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It's a quit. 
So you've been in the ecosystem,

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a very long time. 
So you were here when the Dow 

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that the entire, the Dow thing 
went down. 

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We're you interested in Dallas 
before that or did that kind of 

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kick it off for you? 
Yeah, I mean I actually was an 

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Avid Reader of the coin magazine
way back in the day and I 

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remember Jane Larimer writing 
about decentralized autonomous 

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corporations, which was kind of 
the precursor to dowse. 

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I thought that that was a 
Fascinating concept. 

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This is the thought being that 
you could use at that time, the 

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Bitcoin blockchain, and an 
interesting implementation 

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called colored coins, to begin 
to represent the organizational 

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structure of a corporation. 
So using a blockchain to kind of

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record interest in the entity 
using those interests to think 

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about how to transfer assets, 
how to build controls into a 

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corporation, using smart 
contracts. 

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I thought it was absolutely 
fascinating and kind of all 

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click together so not 
surprisingly Rising when when 

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vitalik and and others began to 
veto Venture towards a theory on

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and dowse. 
Became an important part of that

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story, right, Das appear in the 
white paper. 

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There was lots of conversations 
around as that they threw in 

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community. 
I began to think about. 

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I was equally fascinated, and 
the dial itself was really the 

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first expression of that 
interest, right? 

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So, etherium was just recently 
launched for the most part, even

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though, Take some time to get 
the on test Nets and the whole 

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bunch of other technical 
hurdles. 

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But, you know, I really thought 
it was great that Kristoff and 

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and team began to really push 
here. 

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They wanted to build. 
What was in the white paper? 

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They wanted to explore what 
these new digital organizations 

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can look like. 
And the Dow is really the first 

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great experiment in that area. 
I remember, even before the Dow 

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launched seeing certain demos 
and other things by this locket,

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team dealing with You know, 
etherium / iot related devices, 

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which I thought were incredibly 
cool and and I think to 

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everybody's surprise though, the
Dow just was much more 

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successful than I than I think 
anybody would have imagined, 

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right? 
It was supposed to be kind of a 

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small experiment, it became a 
massive experiment and then it 

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had a kind of a spectacular 
finish which I think was was 

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great in terms of animating 
people's minds about the 

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possibilities of ethereum. 
But at the same time 

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highlighting, A number of the 
challenges and pitfalls both 

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Technical and then over the 
subsequent months as you know 

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lawyers and other folks began to
get some regulatory challenges 

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as well. 
So you know I think it was a the

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first great use case for 30mm 
was Dows. 

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And I do think people had a bit 
of PTSD, ow after the Dow, and 

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they were kind of afraid to play
around and dive in and start to 

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start to see what this ecosystem
could look like. 

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There was obviously developer 
teams like the Aragon. 

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Team and the Dow sex team that 
were that were pushing forward, 

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but I think people put it to the
side, you know, as we saw token 

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sales, and other other kind of 
crypto economic systems, begin 

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to be explored and 20s 16, 17 
and 18, but they're back, right?

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As are coming back into Focus. 
There's a lot of activity in the

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Dow space that I think, you 
know, folks are beginning to pay

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attention to. 
And if you are a developer, or 

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are somebody that's interested 
in blockchain technology, I 

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imagine that. 
It's With your time to start to 

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dig in here and think of that, 
what may be coming over the next

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couple months and years. 
We certainly come a long way and

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when you talk about like colored
coins and these things back in 

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back in the early days like 
really takes me down memory lane

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right alike. 
And also I think I was also very

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kind of Marvel that this idea 
that you know things objects and

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also more ephemeral things like 
like corporations could be 

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managed by some sort of an 
autonomous organization and if 

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you remember in the beginning 
and you can have loser this, A 

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lot of the interest in Dows was 
coming from this idea of 

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managing devices, like physical 
devices with lock. 

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It was one example of this, but 
even before that, it was my Kern

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who given this really 
interesting talk about 

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autonomous agents. 
And, you know, how you could 

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basically have like a car, drive
itself, and be its own 

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autonomous economic agent, a lot
of the introspect them seem to 

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be coming from this place of 
wanting to govern physical 

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objects or having doubts, 
governed, physical objects that 

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turns out that at what the 
primary use case is meant to 

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govern software projects, govern
things like investment funds, 

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and things like that. 
Where do you think? 

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The initial, the initial vision 
for dowse perhaps was wrong? 

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Or why do you think that this 
iot vision of a doubt, didn't 

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quite come to fruition? 
And rather, we were governing 

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things like software, and an 
investment vehicles. 

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What where was the disconnect 
there in your view? 

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Yeah, I don't know if there was 
a disconnect, right. 

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I think we're I think it's both 
right. 

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I think we're going to see Dow's
manage human Endeavors, right? 

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People getting together and 
wanting to do something more 

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productive, you know, and 
hopefully beneficial to society.

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And I think at the same time and
that might hurt and talk, I 

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think that was at a London meet 
up or something along those 

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lines. 
It's fantastic. 

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If you haven't taken a look at 
it, I think you should. 

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It's definitely worth your time.
And I think that That that's the

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end point, right? 
And so Das will operate on a 

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spectrum from helping to 
coordinate human activity. 

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And over time as the technology 
matures also increasingly 

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coordinate machine related 
activity as well. 

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And then the notion is that 
these software based systems are

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natural fits to create 
efficiencies when it comes to 

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coordinating human activity. 
And at the same time, due to 

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their decentralized and 
autonomous and automatic nature,

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or also going to be useful for 
coordinating. 

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Jeans and I don't think we're 
there yet. 

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I don't think the iot ecosystem 
is necessarily there yet, 

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although we obviously see lots 
of continued growth there. 

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I don't think the scalability of
thorium or other blockchain BAE 

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Systems, is there quite yet? 
And Trust, because once you're 

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managing a device, particularly 
something like an automobile, 

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which can hurt people, you're 
going to want really strong 

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security guarantees and I think 
that the last piece is this, you

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know, kind of real world to 
crypto or real world to Smart 

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contract divide. 
I don't know if anybody is 

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Firmly tackle that yet, right, 
but this locket folks were 

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playing around with some early 
examples with that and and I 

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don't, I haven't seen as much 
interest in that yet my sense is

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when we get to blockchain 2.0 or
blockchain 3.0, which I think 

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we're kind of Meandering towards
folks will begin to pick up 

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those technical challenges 
again. 

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But you know, at a high level I 
think gals are a very, very big 

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umbrella and tent. 
There are going to govern both 

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the coordination of people and 
the coordination of machine. 

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And I think we're just really 
taking the first steps in that 

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direction after, you know, 
taking some steps getting 

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knocked out. 
And now, we're dusting ourselves

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off as an ecosystem and kind of 
pushing forward. 

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Mmm. 
Yeah, I think for the physical 

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objects, I think liability is 
probably one of the biggest 

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challenges to get passing. 
There are some practical 

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examples of this. 
Like, if you look at say what 

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are they like booze. 
You know, the scooters that you 

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see all over like major cities. 
I think have probably some 

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similar legal challenges around 
liability and like even I mean, 

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I know that, for example, here 
in France, a question about 

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who's responsible, if those 
they're damaged, right? 

250
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Like You hold someone 
accountable for damaging one of 

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those scooters. 
If, in fact, I mean, they're 

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owned by company, but there are 
sort of in the public space so 

253
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probably quite a few legal 
questions around that. 

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Yeah, a thousand percent, right?
So questions when it comes to 

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machines, is who's responsible, 
if somebody gets hurt and, and 

256
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in many ways, it's not that 
dissimilar with more autonomous 

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organizations. 
So one way to think about Dows 

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is to break them down, into 
subcategories one would be more 

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of a decentralized organization 
so when we're humans are really 

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in charge the second one which I
had considered it be the pure 

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Dow is where the algorithm kind 
of sits in the center so if that

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algorithm is coordinating 
activity, Responsible, if it's 

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coordinating physical objects. 
Should the algorithm itself be 

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responsible? 
Or should the manufacturer be 

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responsible for? 
These are kind of meta questions

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that I think policy folks that 
are looking into technology or 

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grappling with and will grapple 
with it in the blockchain 

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contacts but also as it comes to
other forms of autonomous 

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idevices right. 
Like an autonomous car, where 

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self-driving car being kind of 
first. 

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I think major example, they're 
both sort will sort through it. 

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I think there's some Um, some 
folks that are thinking about 

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where that liability should 
attach and humans tend to find 

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somebody responsible for 
something, if people get hurt or

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something goes wrong, one inch 
is a decentralized exchange. 

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Aggregator that sources 
liquidity from the top dex's in 

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00:15:34,200 --> 00:15:38,400
the M&M's to save you money and 
time on swaps 1-inch finds the 

278
00:15:38,400 --> 00:15:41,700
best possible training. 
Paths across over 20 supported 

279
00:15:41,700 --> 00:15:45,400
liquidity, protocols and splits 
them up across multiple Market 

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00:15:45,400 --> 00:15:47,300
depths. 
I started using one inch last 

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summer and since then it's 
become my Gee aggregator, I use 

282
00:15:50,300 --> 00:15:52,700
it every time. 
I need to make a swap, they 

283
00:15:52,700 --> 00:15:56,100
recently launched V2, which has 
a brand new API it greatly 

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improves their routing 
algorithm. 

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And my favorite part about the 
V2 is the new UI. 

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It's super clean and easy to use
these improvements ensure that 

287
00:16:04,300 --> 00:16:07,100
you get the best rates on your 
swaps with the lowest possible 

288
00:16:07,100 --> 00:16:09,200
response time. 
So the next time you need to 

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00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:12,100
make a swap, forget about 
getting the best rate or 

290
00:16:12,100 --> 00:16:15,000
optimizing, your gas fees. 
Make it easy on yourself, just 

291
00:16:15,000 --> 00:16:17,900
use one inch and you can let 
them know that we sent you by 

292
00:16:17,900 --> 00:16:22,300
goto epicenter. 
Rocks / 1 inch that's one Inc. 

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00:16:22,300 --> 00:16:24,900
H would like to thank one inch 
for their support of the 

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00:16:24,900 --> 00:16:29,500
podcast. 
If you look at that, was one of 

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the Hallmarks is that your that 
those are able to make decisions

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with various stakeholders, 
right? 

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So basically, if you look at 
blockchains in the way they 

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could be described as super low 
throughput towels. 

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00:16:45,500 --> 00:16:50,500
So basically you coordinate on a
new version of a consensus 

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00:16:50,500 --> 00:16:52,800
algorithm, or you can stay on 
the old one. 

301
00:16:52,800 --> 00:16:55,000
And basically, then you and 
basically, the way that it 

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00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:58,900
decision is made Has you folk 
and the the folk that kind of 

303
00:16:59,200 --> 00:17:02,700
that fears legitimate to most 
people is legitimate? 

304
00:17:03,100 --> 00:17:07,599
So ideally you want to make a 
lot more decisions than whether 

305
00:17:07,599 --> 00:17:09,900
to upgrade the consensus 
protocol. 

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So what are the options here? 
So I imagine I mean if you look 

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at that house they often deal 
with low participation and 

308
00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:21,800
there's you know, problem around
the bandwidth for of the 

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00:17:21,800 --> 00:17:26,500
attention of individual people. 
How do you make sure that a Our 

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can effectively create decisions
between so many different 

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00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:34,700
stakeholders. 
Yeah, I mean, this is a good 

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question and a challenge that I 
think both developers and other 

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00:17:40,100 --> 00:17:42,700
folks that are interested in 
dowser going to have to sort 

314
00:17:42,700 --> 00:17:46,100
through. 
So on the one hand you have to 

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00:17:46,100 --> 00:17:48,800
our dead like structures that's 
a debate as to whether or not 

316
00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:52,900
Bitcoin and or etherium or and 
should be classified as Dows. 

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00:17:52,900 --> 00:17:56,900
And my mind, I do view them as 
those You know, where you have 

318
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this code base and consensus 
algorithm and other aspects of 

319
00:18:01,908 --> 00:18:05,000
the of the blockchain that's 
kind of coordinating human 

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00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:09,900
decisions at the edges. 
And and or you have other forms 

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00:18:09,900 --> 00:18:12,900
of dads but I would call more 
decentralized organizations 

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00:18:12,900 --> 00:18:15,200
where human decision-making is 
kind of bored. 

323
00:18:15,200 --> 00:18:19,100
The Forefront and people are 
beginning to use blockchain 

324
00:18:19,100 --> 00:18:23,600
technology in order to to 
coordinate their activity at the

325
00:18:23,600 --> 00:18:26,600
same time and one of the major 
benefits That's what ours is 

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00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:28,300
that they lower transaction 
costs, right? 

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00:18:28,300 --> 00:18:30,100
The thought is by using smart 
contracts. 

328
00:18:30,100 --> 00:18:33,300
By using blockchain technology 
by using other aspects, you can 

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00:18:33,300 --> 00:18:36,500
reduce the cost and friction of 
coordination. 

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00:18:37,000 --> 00:18:39,900
So the transaction costs go down
at the same time. 

331
00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:42,900
There's one transaction cost 
that you can't limit with 

332
00:18:42,900 --> 00:18:45,200
blockchain technology and that's
attention right. 

333
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:48,400
So there's there's a cost to 
accumulating information to 

334
00:18:48,400 --> 00:18:52,300
assembling it to processing it 
to taking and making decisions 

335
00:18:52,300 --> 00:18:54,800
related to a certain 
organization. 

336
00:18:55,500 --> 00:18:58,100
And that's That's why I think in
part we see low participation 

337
00:18:58,100 --> 00:19:00,400
rates, not everybody is going to
be engaged. 

338
00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:03,800
They're not going to invest 
their time and energy to 

339
00:19:03,800 --> 00:19:06,100
actually get up to speed on 
certain decisions. 

340
00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:09,200
So you see in some days that the
participation rates are very, 

341
00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:11,300
very low. 
And in my mind that's not 

342
00:19:11,300 --> 00:19:13,900
surprising when we spent. 
And when I spend time in the 

343
00:19:13,900 --> 00:19:17,400
Wikipedia ecosystem, it was 
very, very hard to get people to

344
00:19:17,400 --> 00:19:18,500
edit anything. 
Right? 

345
00:19:18,500 --> 00:19:22,600
Even click the edit button to 
change one word on Wikipedia. 

346
00:19:22,900 --> 00:19:27,800
It was about 2% of Users of 
Wikipedia would actually click 

347
00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:30,300
the edit button and a fraction 
of a percent would actually make

348
00:19:30,300 --> 00:19:32,500
an edit. 
So it's not surprising 

349
00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:34,700
particularly online environments
that people are not going to be 

350
00:19:34,700 --> 00:19:38,000
actively participating. 
Many people just like to lurk 

351
00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:43,500
and read and kind of process. 
I think, though we see something

352
00:19:43,500 --> 00:19:45,500
a little bit different and some 
of the devs that we put 

353
00:19:45,500 --> 00:19:48,600
together, most notably in the 
layout and also Flamingo, where 

354
00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,000
the participation rates are 
higher, there are like 60 to 

355
00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:53,200
70%. 
I think that's in part because 

356
00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:57,200
the amount of assets that that 
folks are assembling together is

357
00:19:57,200 --> 00:19:59,000
higher. 
So there's more at stake, right?

358
00:19:59,000 --> 00:20:03,200
So they're able to enter more 
committed to actually taking 

359
00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:06,100
actions or weighing in on 
certain things because there's a

360
00:20:06,100 --> 00:20:09,400
financial incentive for them to 
do so and because they've put up

361
00:20:09,400 --> 00:20:12,300
they've contributed a fair 
amount of capital as part of 

362
00:20:12,300 --> 00:20:14,300
this Collective. 
So I think that that's one way 

363
00:20:14,300 --> 00:20:18,800
that that some of these 
Solutions may be addressed, it 

364
00:20:18,800 --> 00:20:21,900
could just be making sure that 
people put enough at stake in 

365
00:20:21,900 --> 00:20:25,400
order to guarantee a sufficient 
amount of participation at the 

366
00:20:25,400 --> 00:20:28,500
same I think we're seeing other 
experiments where they're 

367
00:20:28,500 --> 00:20:32,300
flipping kind of the question. 
And so, the folks at Connie I 

368
00:20:32,300 --> 00:20:34,200
know are looking at this. 
And I think it's quite 

369
00:20:34,200 --> 00:20:36,700
interesting. 
They're basically saying that, 

370
00:20:36,700 --> 00:20:39,700
if you put up something up for 
proposal, it will pass. 

371
00:20:39,800 --> 00:20:43,200
Unless people vote against it. 
So they're changing the dynamic,

372
00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:46,000
which I think is clever and 
smart. 

373
00:20:46,200 --> 00:20:53,100
So if people aren't violently 
opposed to a certain activity or

374
00:20:53,100 --> 00:20:55,700
something that's going on, 
within a dow things will move. 

375
00:20:55,800 --> 00:20:58,600
Forward right? 
You have an implied consensus 

376
00:20:58,600 --> 00:21:01,900
around that but the folks that 
are participating are paying 

377
00:21:01,900 --> 00:21:04,200
attention at that point in time,
if they see something that goes 

378
00:21:04,200 --> 00:21:06,300
wrong, they're able to block 
that. 

379
00:21:06,600 --> 00:21:09,400
I think we're also seeing other 
forms of governance mechanisms, 

380
00:21:09,400 --> 00:21:14,100
whether that's weighing 
different conviction, related to

381
00:21:14,100 --> 00:21:17,800
a certain activity that people 
are going to experiment with to 

382
00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:19,500
kind of solve this attention 
issue. 

383
00:21:19,800 --> 00:21:24,300
But the big barrier my mind at 
least, is this the cost of 

384
00:21:24,300 --> 00:21:25,700
attention, right. 
There's coffee. 

385
00:21:26,800 --> 00:21:30,000
Associate an affiliate with it. 
And that's, that's something 

386
00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:33,500
that we're going to need to 
figure out ways to deal with. 

387
00:21:34,600 --> 00:21:37,200
But the nice thing about the 
house is that we can actually 

388
00:21:37,200 --> 00:21:40,000
play around with these Mechanics
for the first time, we have a 

389
00:21:40,008 --> 00:21:44,700
Sandbox or an ecosystem, where 
we can take these governance 

390
00:21:44,700 --> 00:21:47,700
related decisions and not the 
complex governance related 

391
00:21:47,700 --> 00:21:50,600
decisions that we have for kind 
of core blockchains, but smaller

392
00:21:50,600 --> 00:21:53,200
groups of people and we can 
begin to play around with 

393
00:21:53,200 --> 00:21:56,400
different ways to address that. 
So if we want to optimize My 

394
00:21:56,400 --> 00:21:59,400
eyes for high participation, but
we can play around with 

395
00:21:59,400 --> 00:22:02,800
different approaches and 
implementations to do that. 

396
00:22:02,900 --> 00:22:05,200
Maybe we don't want that, right?
That's what the folks at Colin 

397
00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:07,500
are beginning to think about 
maybe we don't want, we have to 

398
00:22:07,508 --> 00:22:09,800
assume, there's not gonna be 
high participation, you know, 

399
00:22:09,800 --> 00:22:11,500
maybe we need to do with it at 
that point in time. 

400
00:22:11,600 --> 00:22:15,100
Maybe we use markets and some 
sort of prediction Market to 

401
00:22:15,100 --> 00:22:16,900
make decisions, right? 
Lots of folks are interested in 

402
00:22:16,900 --> 00:22:20,000
that as well, but at least now 
we have the framework to begin 

403
00:22:20,000 --> 00:22:22,300
to explore those things and 
that's very different than the 

404
00:22:22,300 --> 00:22:25,700
traditional world. 
And that's in part why I find 

405
00:22:25,700 --> 00:22:28,600
this face A so interesting. 
These governance decisions which

406
00:22:28,600 --> 00:22:31,200
are very hierarchical 
hierarchical in a sense of like 

407
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:34,900
a corporation or fairly 
hierarchical when it comes to a 

408
00:22:34,900 --> 00:22:37,200
traditional fund structure, 
they've been kind of set in 

409
00:22:37,200 --> 00:22:41,200
stone over the past 52. 
Several hundred years and now we

410
00:22:41,200 --> 00:22:44,500
have the opportunity to begin to
play around and experiment with 

411
00:22:44,500 --> 00:22:47,900
new forms and my senses through 
that experimentation. 

412
00:22:48,000 --> 00:22:50,100
Even though we don't know the 
right answer, we'll figure out, 

413
00:22:50,100 --> 00:22:53,500
better ways to begin to govern 
ourselves and hopefully make 

414
00:22:53,500 --> 00:22:55,600
better decisions. 
And I think particularly in 

415
00:22:55,600 --> 00:23:00,500
today's That's certainly needed 
across the board, no matter 

416
00:23:00,500 --> 00:23:04,700
where we are. 
Hmm, so around 10 years ago. 

417
00:23:04,700 --> 00:23:09,700
So in Europe, there was this 
huge wave of euphoria in it 

418
00:23:09,700 --> 00:23:12,900
circles for liquid democracy, 
where basically you would 

419
00:23:12,900 --> 00:23:16,300
delegate your vote, depending on
the topic. 

420
00:23:16,300 --> 00:23:19,100
Two different people. 
Do you think something something

421
00:23:19,100 --> 00:23:22,300
like this has a future in the 
context of the house? 

422
00:23:23,700 --> 00:23:25,100
Yeah. 
I mean, I think we're starting 

423
00:23:25,100 --> 00:23:27,700
to see the threads of that. 
So A more traditional lawyer 

424
00:23:27,700 --> 00:23:30,200
would call that proxy. 
Voting as a proxy voting is 

425
00:23:30,200 --> 00:23:33,600
existed in corporate and 
corporate context for quite some

426
00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:36,000
time. 
So you can provide somebody else

427
00:23:36,000 --> 00:23:37,900
that authorization to vote on 
your behalf. 

428
00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:42,000
The problem when it comes to 
more traditional corporations or

429
00:23:42,000 --> 00:23:47,000
legal entities, there's a lot of
expense and cost in providing a 

430
00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:50,100
third party, with the ability to
vote on your behalf. 

431
00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:53,000
There's a lot of difficulty and 
expense and kind of aggregating 

432
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:55,900
those You have to usually use a 
third-party service to implement

433
00:23:55,900 --> 00:23:59,200
like some sort of shareholder 
Vote or other other voting 

434
00:23:59,200 --> 00:24:01,100
scheme. 
So it's quite expensive on a on 

435
00:24:01,100 --> 00:24:04,200
a blockchain or in aetherium. 
It's super easy, right? 

436
00:24:04,300 --> 00:24:07,500
You pretty much have to put an 
address assigned, a transaction 

437
00:24:07,500 --> 00:24:11,000
pay a little bit of gas and then
that person can be your proxy. 

438
00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:15,000
So on the my like V2, smart 
contracts, that we helped put 

439
00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:18,700
together at that, undergird, the
loud, and also Flamingo. 

440
00:24:18,700 --> 00:24:21,700
We already have delegated 
voting, other doubt Frameworks 

441
00:24:21,700 --> 00:24:24,300
have it as well. 
And we're Waiting to see in some

442
00:24:24,300 --> 00:24:27,100
of these organizational values 
related to open source 

443
00:24:27,100 --> 00:24:31,300
technology things that are 
trying to manage defy protocols 

444
00:24:31,300 --> 00:24:34,300
or other emerging blockchain 
protocols we're starting to see 

445
00:24:34,300 --> 00:24:37,200
Services built on top of it. 
So boardroom is a good example 

446
00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:41,100
there where they're beginning to
make it easier for you to 

447
00:24:41,100 --> 00:24:43,200
basically back a protocol 
politician. 

448
00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:47,500
So that that person can make and
or take a an action on your 

449
00:24:47,500 --> 00:24:49,900
behalf. 
So I think that it's there. 

450
00:24:50,200 --> 00:24:53,000
The substrate is there right? 
Basic core. 

451
00:24:53,200 --> 00:24:56,500
Oceans are there but the tooling
isn't yet mature. 

452
00:24:56,500 --> 00:25:00,400
The ecosystem and as has not yet
mature but I do think we'll 

453
00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:04,000
start to see things that are 
what I think you could call 

454
00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:07,000
Liquid democracy or kind of a 
more advanced form of proxy 

455
00:25:07,000 --> 00:25:10,900
voting emerge in part and I 
think that that could be a good 

456
00:25:10,900 --> 00:25:12,700
solution to solve this 
information problem, right? 

457
00:25:12,700 --> 00:25:15,300
If you are a protocol 
politician, if you're somebody 

458
00:25:15,300 --> 00:25:17,800
that's aggregated a lot of votes
from other folks that are 

459
00:25:17,808 --> 00:25:20,400
participating in the house, then
you may have an incentive to 

460
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:22,900
actually cut through that 
information, you cut through the

461
00:25:22,900 --> 00:25:24,500
noise. 
As of whatever information these

462
00:25:24,500 --> 00:25:27,800
days are producing and invest 
your time and resources to 

463
00:25:27,800 --> 00:25:30,700
making good decisions. 
So I think it's I think it's a 

464
00:25:30,700 --> 00:25:33,700
super fascinating part of kind 
of emerging dial governance. 

465
00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:38,000
Do you think there's an upper 
limit to how many people can 

466
00:25:38,000 --> 00:25:40,600
coordinate within a doubt? 
Yeah. 

467
00:25:40,600 --> 00:25:44,100
This is a good question. 
So and here you can go back to 

468
00:25:44,100 --> 00:25:47,400
some famous economist. 
So, Ronald coase actually, wrote

469
00:25:48,300 --> 00:25:51,500
not just about transaction cost 
but he also wrote about 

470
00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:54,800
transaction costs and Jensen, 
how they form and other 

471
00:25:54,800 --> 00:26:00,900
structured, he has a some pretty
prescient writings on this topic

472
00:26:01,000 --> 00:26:06,100
where he noted, that when the 
cost of organizing and when the 

473
00:26:06,100 --> 00:26:08,100
ability to disseminate 
information related to an 

474
00:26:08,108 --> 00:26:13,300
organization is reduced, so you 
can think of that as the smart 

475
00:26:13,300 --> 00:26:15,900
contract based out Frameworks 
that people putting together, 

476
00:26:15,900 --> 00:26:19,400
and then the internet as a means
of propagation, it suggests that

477
00:26:19,400 --> 00:26:21,700
you should have organizations 
that are much larger in scale 

478
00:26:22,100 --> 00:26:24,700
and that's why I think. 
You've seen some folks say that 

479
00:26:24,700 --> 00:26:26,900
Dow's at some point. 
Should be able to coordinate, 

480
00:26:26,900 --> 00:26:30,200
you know, tens hundreds, 
hundreds of thousands, if not 

481
00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:35,400
millions of people, I do think 
that the entropy and the the 

482
00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:39,100
complexity of organizations that
are much, much larger May 

483
00:26:39,100 --> 00:26:43,500
provide some sort of Upward 
Bound, but I do think we can get

484
00:26:43,500 --> 00:26:47,600
to dowse that are of that size 
assuming that scalability 

485
00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:50,600
Solutions are implemented. 
There's Innovations when it 

486
00:26:50,608 --> 00:26:54,200
comes to governance mechanisms 
and I I think naturally they'll 

487
00:26:54,200 --> 00:26:57,400
gravitate towards larger 
organizations that being said, 

488
00:26:58,200 --> 00:27:00,900
in in the lab and also Flamingo.
It's a, it's a much smaller 

489
00:27:00,900 --> 00:27:03,500
group of people. 
So do they US legal regulations?

490
00:27:03,500 --> 00:27:07,500
It's capped at 99 members. 
And, and we found that even 

491
00:27:07,500 --> 00:27:11,800
though it's not five people, 
it's kind of like a smaller 

492
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:16,600
roving band of folks that it 
actually is working pretty well,

493
00:27:16,600 --> 00:27:18,200
right. 
As noted before we have 

494
00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:20,500
participation rates at our high 
much higher than what you see in

495
00:27:20,508 --> 00:27:23,800
other Dows. 
And you also, Have some form of 

496
00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:27,200
cohesion, but I do think that at
some point, as are going to get 

497
00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:29,700
quite large. 
And, and that's not surprising, 

498
00:27:29,700 --> 00:27:30,800
right? 
We have corporations that are 

499
00:27:30,808 --> 00:27:32,600
quite large to. 
So if you look at some of the 

500
00:27:32,608 --> 00:27:35,600
largest corporations in the 
world, you may not be fans of 

501
00:27:35,600 --> 00:27:37,500
those corporations. 
You may not like their products,

502
00:27:37,500 --> 00:27:39,600
but they're coordinating 
hundreds of thousands of people,

503
00:27:39,700 --> 00:27:43,500
whether that's like a McDonald's
or like a Walmart or even a 

504
00:27:43,508 --> 00:27:46,600
government, right there, they're
coordinating the activity of 

505
00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:48,200
lots and lots and lots of 
different people. 

506
00:27:48,200 --> 00:27:50,200
So I don't see. 
Conceptually wide as wouldn't be

507
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:55,600
able to do the same thing. 
I think the framework component 

508
00:27:55,600 --> 00:27:58,200
of this is is what's most 
interesting here. 

509
00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:02,000
It's sort of a governance system
to end all governance systems 

510
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:06,700
because the governance system 
itself can evolve to cater the 

511
00:28:06,700 --> 00:28:12,500
needs of how it scales. 
So setting aside platform 

512
00:28:12,500 --> 00:28:16,200
scaling solute problems. 
Like so like the ability for 

513
00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:20,900
theorem, for example, to process
transactions at scale, the the 

514
00:28:20,900 --> 00:28:26,500
governance system itself can 
Evolve as the size of the number

515
00:28:26,500 --> 00:28:29,300
of participants Grows, Right? 
So we're talking about this 

516
00:28:29,300 --> 00:28:34,500
earlier, a governance model that
implements a gini coefficient, 

517
00:28:34,500 --> 00:28:38,200
for example that is malleable 
based on the inequality of 

518
00:28:39,100 --> 00:28:41,900
wealth in the system but you 
could also think of a governance

519
00:28:41,900 --> 00:28:44,900
system that evolves based on the
number of participants so it 

520
00:28:44,900 --> 00:28:48,800
could start off for example as a
very sort of stake based system.

521
00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:52,700
But as you start approaching 
higher bounds of users that 

522
00:28:52,800 --> 00:28:56,000
Turns into something, more akin 
to a democracy where you have 

523
00:28:56,000 --> 00:29:00,300
like a one-person one-vote type 
of system, Ivan person. 

524
00:29:00,300 --> 00:29:04,100
I think this is just like the 
most fascinating aspect of this,

525
00:29:04,100 --> 00:29:08,600
is that it's governance 
technology for governance as 

526
00:29:08,600 --> 00:29:11,200
well from a from a meta 
perspective. 

527
00:29:12,600 --> 00:29:15,100
Yeah, absolutely. 
And I think the other areas 

528
00:29:15,100 --> 00:29:17,400
outside of, I think those are 
really great examples. 

529
00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:21,300
I do think that was can also 
explore multi token models, 

530
00:29:21,300 --> 00:29:22,900
which I think are under 
exploded. 

531
00:29:22,900 --> 00:29:25,200
At this point, we're starting to
see some projects that are 

532
00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:29,100
taking in a bit more there. 
But I do think multi-tow can 

533
00:29:29,100 --> 00:29:31,400
models. 
Could be helpful to start to 

534
00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:35,000
segregate people in 2002, maybe 
different groups or folks that 

535
00:29:35,008 --> 00:29:37,300
have different rights or 
weighing in on different 

536
00:29:37,300 --> 00:29:40,600
decisions, which can allow for 
specialization and maybe cut 

537
00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:43,300
through some of the some of the 
noise or The challenges of 

538
00:29:43,300 --> 00:29:45,600
coordination. 
So it's a playground, right? 

539
00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:48,100
It's a governance. 
It's a governance framework, 

540
00:29:48,100 --> 00:29:51,500
governance playground. 
We have the ability to do the 

541
00:29:51,500 --> 00:29:53,900
same thing to organizations. 
Like we've done to software 

542
00:29:53,900 --> 00:29:58,300
which is evolved over time and 
that's important and something 

543
00:29:58,500 --> 00:30:02,000
that that I do think is going 
to, you know, to go back to your

544
00:30:02,000 --> 00:30:04,000
question before, you know, 
coordinate a whole bunch of 

545
00:30:04,008 --> 00:30:07,500
different people, start to seep 
into lots of different places 

546
00:30:08,300 --> 00:30:10,400
because it's probably more 
efficient, right? 

547
00:30:10,400 --> 00:30:13,500
If you have better governance 
and you have lower, Cause I 

548
00:30:13,508 --> 00:30:16,400
built the ability to operate 
these organizations of our cost.

549
00:30:16,800 --> 00:30:19,400
That should be in the long Arc 
of History. 

550
00:30:19,500 --> 00:30:21,900
The endpoint for organizations, 
right? 

551
00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:24,300
There's probably not going to be
a reason to have a corporation, 

552
00:30:24,300 --> 00:30:26,800
or an LLC, or some of the 
existing organizations we have 

553
00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:28,800
today. 
If you have something that can 

554
00:30:28,800 --> 00:30:31,900
get propagated around the globe 
is entirely digitally, native 

555
00:30:32,300 --> 00:30:36,000
has you know, lower costs to 
operate and also has the ability

556
00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:39,400
to actually solve some of the 
corporate governance or just 

557
00:30:39,400 --> 00:30:42,100
governance in general issues, 
that that we know that they 

558
00:30:42,100 --> 00:30:44,000
exist. 
Organizations have developers 

559
00:30:44,000 --> 00:30:46,200
can experiment and figure out 
the kind of right approach. 

560
00:30:46,200 --> 00:30:52,400
Their tag is straight how a 
Mikey token, Dow might work. 

561
00:30:53,500 --> 00:30:55,900
Yes, this is something. 
We've talked quite a bit about. 

562
00:30:56,100 --> 00:30:59,500
So, you know, there's lots of 
legal challenges, obviously 

563
00:30:59,500 --> 00:31:01,900
around the house and I'm sure we
will dive into that at some 

564
00:31:01,900 --> 00:31:05,300
point, you know, one question 
is, if there's a profit that's 

565
00:31:05,300 --> 00:31:08,400
made who should be entitled to 
that prophet in the US. 

566
00:31:08,400 --> 00:31:11,300
And in other jurisdictions, we 
say that only folks that are 

567
00:31:11,900 --> 00:31:14,400
wealthy accredited. 
Investors should be able to hold

568
00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:16,700
those tokens trade, those tokens
Etc. 

569
00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:19,600
And while those are in my 
opinion, Dreadful policies that 

570
00:31:19,600 --> 00:31:22,700
is just kind of the the law of 
least my land. 

571
00:31:23,200 --> 00:31:27,500
And the many other folks land 
with a multi token model though,

572
00:31:27,500 --> 00:31:32,000
you could support those 
requirements where by folks that

573
00:31:32,008 --> 00:31:35,800
may be entitled to distributions
are let's say accredited or 

574
00:31:35,800 --> 00:31:37,900
wealthy and able to satisfy the 
requirements. 

575
00:31:37,900 --> 00:31:40,200
But maybe you want other folks 
to weigh in on governance. 

576
00:31:40,200 --> 00:31:43,900
So you could have a multi token 
model where you split economic 

577
00:31:43,900 --> 00:31:47,100
rights from governance rights. 
And that may be kind of a first 

578
00:31:47,100 --> 00:31:50,400
step towards the democratization
of some of these organizations 

579
00:31:50,400 --> 00:31:55,000
where you're gaining the benefit
and the The wisdom of a group of

580
00:31:55,000 --> 00:31:57,200
people that may be interested in
a project whether it's an open 

581
00:31:57,200 --> 00:32:02,300
source project or otherwise that
can weigh in on decisions but at

582
00:32:02,300 --> 00:32:06,200
the same time the value transfer
is kind of held by another 

583
00:32:06,200 --> 00:32:08,100
party. 
You can almost think about it 

584
00:32:08,100 --> 00:32:11,700
and I have a u.s. perspective 
here as a separation between the

585
00:32:11,708 --> 00:32:14,700
house and the Senate, right? 
You can have the house, the 

586
00:32:14,700 --> 00:32:17,400
folks that have the governance 
Road saying, hey you should be 

587
00:32:17,400 --> 00:32:19,600
paying attention to. 
This is important to us, we 

588
00:32:19,600 --> 00:32:22,800
believe in this project but 
anything dealing with acids are 

589
00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,400
transferring Let's go through 
another house right there, the 

590
00:32:25,400 --> 00:32:28,900
folks that have another token 
and maybe that's a decent way to

591
00:32:29,700 --> 00:32:34,000
a navigate, some some legal 
requirements, and be ensuring 

592
00:32:34,300 --> 00:32:35,800
appropriate, separation of 
powers. 

593
00:32:37,900 --> 00:32:41,900
We've already said wait a little
bit into into the legal model of

594
00:32:41,900 --> 00:32:44,900
the house now, so, I mean, 
obviously, the legal framework 

595
00:32:44,900 --> 00:32:47,600
has come. 
I don't want to say a long way 

596
00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:50,800
but it's come some way since the
Dow. 

597
00:32:51,300 --> 00:32:56,400
So if you speak with legal doll 
people that they typically 

598
00:32:56,700 --> 00:32:59,400
distinguish between wrapped and 
unwrapped hours. 

599
00:32:59,500 --> 00:33:02,800
Can you explain to us what the 
distinction he is? 

600
00:33:04,100 --> 00:33:06,900
Sure. 
So there's a always been a 

601
00:33:06,908 --> 00:33:09,600
question when it comes to Davos 
as to what they would be 

602
00:33:09,600 --> 00:33:14,300
characterized under the law and 
what are some of the tricky 

603
00:33:14,300 --> 00:33:17,700
legal questions that may emerge?
The first time I learned to 

604
00:33:17,700 --> 00:33:20,700
these questions or some great 
programs at MIT put together 

605
00:33:20,900 --> 00:33:23,300
right before. 3M launched 
looking at Bitcoin and 

606
00:33:23,300 --> 00:33:26,600
aetherium, another blockchain 
technology, and we began to have

607
00:33:26,600 --> 00:33:29,000
a conversation about. 
Well, let's, let's assume that a

608
00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:31,900
doubt exists, what would it be 
characterized as at least in the

609
00:33:31,908 --> 00:33:35,600
US and many other Parts of the 
globe, they be characterized as 

610
00:33:35,600 --> 00:33:40,200
general Partnerships which which
means that each partner would be

611
00:33:40,200 --> 00:33:43,500
responsible for the activities. 
The other partners both from a 

612
00:33:43,508 --> 00:33:45,800
liability perspective and 
potentially also from a 

613
00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,000
financial perspective. 
So that's not a great place to 

614
00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:50,200
start. 
So folks began to think about 

615
00:33:50,200 --> 00:33:52,500
well, how can we limit that and 
they looked at different 

616
00:33:52,500 --> 00:33:56,900
organizations that exist today, 
and looked at organizations like

617
00:33:56,900 --> 00:34:00,700
a limited liability company or 
some coops or other other forms 

618
00:34:00,700 --> 00:34:03,700
of organizations and began to 
think about Why don't we use 

619
00:34:03,700 --> 00:34:08,300
this vehicle as illegal rapper? 
Will wrap it and there's more 

620
00:34:08,300 --> 00:34:11,000
traditional entity, but the 
engine of it will actually be 

621
00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:14,800
administered entirely or 
primarily through software or 

622
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:16,400
some sort of software based 
system. 

623
00:34:16,900 --> 00:34:20,800
So that's the idea of kind of a 
wrapped Dow where you you have a

624
00:34:20,800 --> 00:34:24,300
doubt that's embedded within a 
traditional legal entity but 

625
00:34:24,300 --> 00:34:28,100
it's operating the way that 
folks that want to participate 

626
00:34:28,100 --> 00:34:30,900
in Dow's, enter the developers 
of the Dow's are intending. 

627
00:34:30,900 --> 00:34:37,100
I operating via software R and 
we've seen some, some early 

628
00:34:37,100 --> 00:34:41,199
experiments in that vein. 
So from kind of these more 

629
00:34:41,199 --> 00:34:44,500
academic conversations we've 
seen over the past couple years,

630
00:34:44,800 --> 00:34:47,500
folks, like, Ross Campbell was 
on the open. 

631
00:34:47,500 --> 00:34:49,800
Lawn team? 
Who set these up and the Dior 

632
00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:53,900
team begin to explore. 
What wrapped Dows would look 

633
00:34:53,900 --> 00:34:57,700
like in the US and then 
obviously with the Lao and 

634
00:34:57,700 --> 00:34:59,700
Flamingo. 
Flamingo, Dow, we've been 

635
00:34:59,700 --> 00:35:03,000
pushing on that some more the 
way they tend to work. 

636
00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:07,600
Is that there are a limited 
liability company in the US and 

637
00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:12,900
at modifies, almost a number of 
the default rules under the law,

638
00:35:12,900 --> 00:35:16,900
which is permitted using a 
contract, a traditional legal 

639
00:35:16,900 --> 00:35:20,400
contract, such that it can set 
up something that's akin to what

640
00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:23,000
people want in a down. 
So what does that tend to mean? 

641
00:35:23,600 --> 00:35:25,800
Well, I can't speak to all the 
projects but I can speak to what

642
00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:28,100
we've done on the land Flamingo 
side. 

643
00:35:28,400 --> 00:35:32,000
It means that when you join the 
Dow, you're not joining as a 

644
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:36,000
partner. 
You're joining without and to 

645
00:35:36,008 --> 00:35:39,400
the extent, limited by law 
without any other fiduciary. 

646
00:35:39,400 --> 00:35:43,900
Duties to your other down 
members, you're agreeing that 

647
00:35:43,900 --> 00:35:46,900
potential conflicts of interest 
or waived so that we can kind of

648
00:35:46,900 --> 00:35:51,000
preserve this arms-length notion
of how does operate. 

649
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,900
We're making clear that the 
underlying smart contracts are 

650
00:35:54,900 --> 00:35:58,200
governing the behavior of folks 
within the organization. 

651
00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:02,700
So it's not as Extreme as what 
we saw with the bow itself where

652
00:36:02,700 --> 00:36:05,700
they put I had a terms of 
service that said the code rules

653
00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:09,500
or something to that effect, but
it's trying to kind of preserve 

654
00:36:09,500 --> 00:36:12,400
that same that same feeling and 
then it's dealing with other 

655
00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:15,600
issues that that lawyers worry 
about things like dispute 

656
00:36:15,600 --> 00:36:18,400
resolution, things like 
representations and warranties 

657
00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:21,500
these very boring basic things. 
That just help clear out some of

658
00:36:21,500 --> 00:36:23,100
the craft if something goes 
wrong. 

659
00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:25,900
And so that, that's how we've 
set it up. 

660
00:36:25,900 --> 00:36:30,400
It's set up as a member managed 
limited liability company with 

661
00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:33,000
the default rules related, to 
those Limited. 

662
00:36:33,100 --> 00:36:36,800
Liability companies operate 
modified such that it can 

663
00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:40,600
accommodate the Dow the US and 
least in my understanding is a 

664
00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:42,700
bit unique here. 
There's no need to have a 

665
00:36:42,700 --> 00:36:46,000
manager of a legal entity in the
u.s. it can be entirely member 

666
00:36:46,000 --> 00:36:48,200
managed. 
They can enjoy limitation of 

667
00:36:48,200 --> 00:36:53,600
liability, which means that 
they're not responsible for for 

668
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:56,800
activities related to the 
organization except to the 

669
00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:59,700
extent that it relates to their 
activities within the 

670
00:36:59,700 --> 00:37:02,900
organization. 
And its it's been growing. 

671
00:37:03,300 --> 00:37:06,900
Pretty quickly in terms of in 
terms of in terms of 

672
00:37:06,900 --> 00:37:10,900
development. 
So I assume that the 99 member 

673
00:37:10,900 --> 00:37:15,200
limit kind of Rises out of that.
What's the constraint here? 

674
00:37:15,200 --> 00:37:17,200
And is there any way to lift 
this? 

675
00:37:18,700 --> 00:37:21,800
So those are not organizational,
corporate law, constrains. 

676
00:37:22,300 --> 00:37:26,400
And instead those are other 
constraints that are in the u.s.

677
00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:29,000
related to Securities laws and a
related statue called the 

678
00:37:29,000 --> 00:37:33,100
investment advisor act. 
So for Dows that want to pull 

679
00:37:33,100 --> 00:37:35,500
capital and deploy it for 
investment purposes. 

680
00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:39,100
There's a couple additional 
concerns. 

681
00:37:39,100 --> 00:37:41,400
One is what are the interests of
the data itself? 

682
00:37:41,800 --> 00:37:43,600
Are they Securities, are they 
not Securities? 

683
00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:46,400
And, I know as a long time 
listener, you guys have spent 

684
00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:48,800
quite some time. 
Looking at, at some Issues 

685
00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:50,900
related to token. 
So I don't think we need to go 

686
00:37:50,900 --> 00:37:53,700
into that but it's not that 
dissimilar from some of those 

687
00:37:53,700 --> 00:37:58,400
challenges that we saw with 
characterizing tokens from the 

688
00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:04,600
2016 to 2018 token sale Euphoria
and then related to that, you 

689
00:38:04,600 --> 00:38:08,200
know, if if you pull together 
capital from a lot of different 

690
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:12,000
people, the u.s. tends to view 
it as a something, akin to like 

691
00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:15,000
a mutual fund and you have to go
public at that point in time. 

692
00:38:15,000 --> 00:38:18,700
So there's some limitations the 
most notable one being If it's 

693
00:38:18,700 --> 00:38:22,700
under 100 people, then those 
requirements don't necessarily 

694
00:38:22,700 --> 00:38:25,800
apply. 
So, those are some other, some 

695
00:38:25,800 --> 00:38:30,100
other kind of parameters that we
kind of had to navigate through.

696
00:38:30,100 --> 00:38:33,200
And so, that's why in the lab 
now you have at its core. 

697
00:38:33,200 --> 00:38:37,000
It's a limited liability company
that defers almost entirely to 

698
00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:40,000
software. 
It deals with all these 

699
00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:42,600
ancillary issues that we saw 
with the Dow, in terms of 

700
00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,900
limitation of liability, in 
terms of questions related to 

701
00:38:44,900 --> 00:38:47,600
fiduciary responsibilities, 
including questions related to 

702
00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:51,700
dispute, And and then at the 
same time to comply with 

703
00:38:51,700 --> 00:38:55,300
Securities and or the investment
adviser acts limited to 99 

704
00:38:55,300 --> 00:38:58,200
members in the abundance of 
caution, we have limited it to a

705
00:38:58,207 --> 00:39:01,700
credit investors. 
Although my personal belief here

706
00:39:01,700 --> 00:39:03,600
is, we shouldn't have needed to 
do that. 

707
00:39:04,200 --> 00:39:06,400
And that's, that's kind of a 
separate issue, but something 

708
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:10,800
that we're hoping to fight for 
the long run and it's growing 

709
00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:13,400
pretty well, you know. 
So the allow as an example 

710
00:39:13,400 --> 00:39:15,600
started with about a half a 
million dollars worth of ether, 

711
00:39:16,500 --> 00:39:20,400
in April this year, At least as 
of today, it's circulating 

712
00:39:20,400 --> 00:39:23,000
around 15 million dollars 
Flamingo. 

713
00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:25,900
Dow has about five million 
dollars in it and just to give 

714
00:39:25,900 --> 00:39:28,000
you a point of comparison that 
you know the Dow when it 

715
00:39:28,000 --> 00:39:29,600
launched at about 50 million 
dollars. 

716
00:39:29,600 --> 00:39:32,900
So using this approach we're 
about halfway to where the Dow 

717
00:39:32,900 --> 00:39:37,200
was just taking a little bit 
slower burn in terms of kind of 

718
00:39:37,207 --> 00:39:40,700
growing up. 
Ecosystem to what extent do you 

719
00:39:40,707 --> 00:39:45,100
think the the Frameworks of the 
libel limited liability company 

720
00:39:45,100 --> 00:39:48,300
can dissolve into the code? 
Like I'm thinking about things 

721
00:39:48,300 --> 00:39:51,800
like, Dispute resolution, for 
example, these are things where 

722
00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:55,500
we've already observed 
significant number of examples 

723
00:39:55,500 --> 00:39:58,100
in the blockchain space where we
have dispute resolution like 

724
00:39:58,100 --> 00:40:01,200
things like like like are gone 
of course they are gone Court. 

725
00:40:01,700 --> 00:40:05,400
When do you think you know we'll
be able to have a sort of like 

726
00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:09,000
legal doubt that exists only as 
a dow is that even where there's

727
00:40:09,000 --> 00:40:14,300
no rapper company around it 
Yeah, I think that dispute 

728
00:40:14,300 --> 00:40:19,300
resolution at least four to be 
enforced, by traditional courts.

729
00:40:19,400 --> 00:40:21,200
It's going to need some sort of 
legal agreement. 

730
00:40:21,200 --> 00:40:23,500
That's attached to it. 
It doesn't necessarily need to 

731
00:40:23,500 --> 00:40:28,300
be a heavy-handed one, but 
there's a certain Provisions 

732
00:40:28,300 --> 00:40:31,500
that if they're in a binding 
contract and if they deferred to

733
00:40:31,500 --> 00:40:35,700
some sort of arbitration system,
whether it's, you know, digital 

734
00:40:35,700 --> 00:40:39,200
based on arbitration system or 
some other more traditional or 

735
00:40:39,200 --> 00:40:41,400
Patrician system, it will be 
deemed enforceable. 

736
00:40:42,200 --> 00:40:46,400
So I do think they'll be pretty 
much like a light light wrappers

737
00:40:46,400 --> 00:40:49,600
around a lot of down structures,
particularly sophisticated ones 

738
00:40:49,600 --> 00:40:53,100
and particularly ones where the 
amount of assets that they want 

739
00:40:53,100 --> 00:41:00,400
to administer or pool are fairly
large, I think until there's an 

740
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:02,800
actual modification of the core 
statues. 

741
00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:07,200
To to permit this, you're going 
to have to have some sort of 

742
00:41:07,200 --> 00:41:10,400
like, Penning on it. 
You know, that being said, if 

743
00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:14,800
you can wrap it, Or wrap a dow 
or at least wrap some sort of 

744
00:41:14,808 --> 00:41:17,300
relationship with and a 
contract. 

745
00:41:17,300 --> 00:41:20,800
And that contract does have an 
arbitration provision in place, 

746
00:41:20,900 --> 00:41:24,400
at least in the u.s. it's pretty
hard to impeach that. 

747
00:41:24,800 --> 00:41:28,300
So the way I view this, in many 
ways is these contracts create 

748
00:41:28,300 --> 00:41:32,300
the space so that people can 
experiment in the digital world,

749
00:41:32,300 --> 00:41:37,000
you can actually begin to kind 
of quarantine out the ability 

750
00:41:37,000 --> 00:41:42,000
for more traditional entities 
like chords Etc 2. 

751
00:41:42,100 --> 00:41:44,800
Then to administer what's going 
on in the online world. 

752
00:41:45,100 --> 00:41:47,800
And with the caveat being that 
it doesn't obviously absolve 

753
00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:50,200
criminal related questions and 
concerns. 

754
00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:53,500
So Right. 
This is something I totally 

755
00:41:53,500 --> 00:41:57,700
neglected is the enforcement 
aspect which of course, for the 

756
00:41:57,700 --> 00:42:00,100
time being at least and probably
for the first table future 

757
00:42:00,300 --> 00:42:03,000
relies on on the state 
enforcing. 

758
00:42:03,000 --> 00:42:05,200
Yeah. 
Exactly. 

759
00:42:05,200 --> 00:42:08,700
Yeah yeah I mean you see some 
early examples and there's some 

760
00:42:08,700 --> 00:42:10,900
great projects where that's 
beginning to get challenge. 

761
00:42:10,900 --> 00:42:12,200
Right. 
So one I do think 

762
00:42:12,200 --> 00:42:15,400
underappreciated thing about 
smart contracts is that they can

763
00:42:15,400 --> 00:42:18,300
in effect enforce, right? 
The question is how do you get 

764
00:42:18,600 --> 00:42:21,800
claim on those assets? 
Yes, smart contract, right? 

765
00:42:22,300 --> 00:42:25,200
So unless people are depositing,
the amounts in dispute into some

766
00:42:25,200 --> 00:42:27,400
sort of smart contract and 
online. 

767
00:42:27,900 --> 00:42:30,100
Dispute resolution provision 
comes in place and that 

768
00:42:30,100 --> 00:42:32,600
arbitrator group of folks has 
the ability to administer those 

769
00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:35,000
assets. 
You're probably are going You 

770
00:42:35,000 --> 00:42:38,300
know, want to file that in the 
traditional Court especially if 

771
00:42:38,300 --> 00:42:40,600
you've lost a tremendous amount 
of money and enforce against 

772
00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:42,900
that. 
So I think I think we'll get 

773
00:42:42,900 --> 00:42:46,400
there but we're not, there's not
enough enough assets that are 

774
00:42:46,500 --> 00:42:48,200
able to be easily managed on 
chain. 

775
00:42:48,200 --> 00:42:53,000
And some of these questions 
related to giving an arbitrator,

776
00:42:53,100 --> 00:42:56,600
the ability to settle a dispute 
or still not fully worked out. 

777
00:42:56,600 --> 00:43:00,200
Although I imagine folks, we'll 
figure that out such that we can

778
00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:03,000
kind of have a full close, this 
loop system, but if that falls 

779
00:43:03,000 --> 00:43:05,900
in place and You wrap it in a 
legal agreement. 

780
00:43:05,900 --> 00:43:10,000
There's not much that a court 
can do to unwrap it if it's done

781
00:43:10,000 --> 00:43:12,600
appropriately. 
And if the decision is 

782
00:43:12,700 --> 00:43:15,700
administered in a reasonable 
way, and there's obviously 

783
00:43:15,700 --> 00:43:18,600
exceptions to that, but it makes
it really, really difficult to 

784
00:43:18,600 --> 00:43:20,000
do that. 
And that means that we can kind 

785
00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:23,400
of move into an entirely digital
framework, which is something 

786
00:43:23,500 --> 00:43:26,300
I'm interested in and kind of 
shed some of the more 

787
00:43:26,300 --> 00:43:29,300
traditional aspects of the legal
system, Etc. 

788
00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:33,700
Let's dive into unwrapped house.
A little bit later. 

789
00:43:33,900 --> 00:43:37,100
But there's also a means to 
basically, in the, in the, when 

790
00:43:37,100 --> 00:43:41,000
you talked about the reptiles, 
you kind of talked about giving 

791
00:43:41,400 --> 00:43:45,000
the dials of legal personality 
of like, some sort of Legacy 

792
00:43:45,100 --> 00:43:47,900
system. 
There's also novel legislation 

793
00:43:47,900 --> 00:43:55,300
that actually seized hours as a 
legal that kind of amused them 

794
00:43:55,300 --> 00:43:58,300
with legal personality in their 
own, right, right. 

795
00:43:58,400 --> 00:44:02,000
And can you talk about The 
legislation that's kind of come 

796
00:44:02,000 --> 00:44:04,300
into Force there. 
That's going to come into Force 

797
00:44:04,300 --> 00:44:08,100
soon and how you see that? 
Yeah sure. 

798
00:44:08,100 --> 00:44:12,400
So in the u.s. there's been a 
couple of attempts at kind of 

799
00:44:12,600 --> 00:44:16,200
Legally recognizing bad as the 
first one it was in a state of 

800
00:44:16,200 --> 00:44:20,600
in the state of Vermont which 
passed an act called the BB 

801
00:44:20,700 --> 00:44:24,300
blockchain based L. 
Say so the BBL see it was a 

802
00:44:24,600 --> 00:44:27,000
really important but pretty 
narrow act. 

803
00:44:27,000 --> 00:44:31,900
That just said if you have an 
LLC you can designate it. 

804
00:44:31,900 --> 00:44:35,700
A BB L. 
Za launching base LLC and that's

805
00:44:35,700 --> 00:44:37,100
going to be fine under Vermont 
law. 

806
00:44:37,500 --> 00:44:41,200
And I along with other folks 
have been working with some 

807
00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:44,500
state senators in the state of 
Wyoming, which is passed a 

808
00:44:44,800 --> 00:44:48,300
number of bills related to 
blockchain technology, Caitlin 

809
00:44:48,300 --> 00:44:50,600
long. 
I imagine many of many of the 

810
00:44:50,600 --> 00:44:52,600
folks that are listening are 
aware of. 

811
00:44:52,600 --> 00:44:55,600
She's been historically 
spearheading that effort, 

812
00:44:55,600 --> 00:44:58,800
although I think other folks are
jumping in increasingly there as

813
00:44:58,800 --> 00:45:03,600
well. 
And the idea is and this is a 

814
00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:07,000
bill that's been pushed through 
a committee in Wyoming. 

815
00:45:07,600 --> 00:45:10,200
Is that you be able to set up a 
doubt in Wyoming? 

816
00:45:10,200 --> 00:45:13,800
So, you know, x y, z dou. 
So it can actually be called a 

817
00:45:13,808 --> 00:45:16,800
doubt. 
They'll be recognized by the 

818
00:45:16,800 --> 00:45:19,800
state of Wyoming. 
You'll file one document. 

819
00:45:19,800 --> 00:45:22,000
So, instead of extensive 
paperwork, and if you've ever 

820
00:45:22,000 --> 00:45:25,000
set up a business, you get a 
stack of paperwork, that your 

821
00:45:25,000 --> 00:45:27,200
lawyer lawyers will prepare, you
have to sign a whole bunch of 

822
00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:28,800
different things, it's very 
confusing. 

823
00:45:29,300 --> 00:45:32,600
So the thought here is but strip
that all away, you can file one 

824
00:45:32,600 --> 00:45:35,800
document called an articles of 
organization. 

825
00:45:36,100 --> 00:45:39,300
It identifies the Line, smart 
contracts that are managing the 

826
00:45:39,308 --> 00:45:43,000
system. 
Your designating, the Dow is 

827
00:45:43,000 --> 00:45:47,000
either a member managed out or 
one where humans are involved or

828
00:45:47,000 --> 00:45:51,500
an algorithmic, Tau where an 
algorithm is involved, you can 

829
00:45:51,600 --> 00:45:55,300
put in place any legal 
Provisions, that you need to 

830
00:45:55,300 --> 00:45:59,300
either account for things like 
dispute resolution modify 

831
00:45:59,300 --> 00:46:03,400
certain Provisions. 
To just make sure it fits neatly

832
00:46:03,400 --> 00:46:07,300
onto your organization and then 
you can file this document and 

833
00:46:07,400 --> 00:46:09,800
You will have a Dap. 
And what's also interesting 

834
00:46:09,800 --> 00:46:12,500
about what Wyoming is pushing 
towards they've authorized this,

835
00:46:12,500 --> 00:46:16,100
although it's not built yet. 
They want to make it feasible so

836
00:46:16,100 --> 00:46:18,700
that you can file things in 
Wyoming via an API. 

837
00:46:19,400 --> 00:46:23,600
So, I think we're rapidly 
getting towards a future where 

838
00:46:23,600 --> 00:46:28,600
you're going to be able to set 
up an organization hopefully 

839
00:46:28,600 --> 00:46:31,300
from command line, right? 
You'll be able to load up 

840
00:46:31,700 --> 00:46:36,900
terminal type in a couple of 
commands and and push that to 

841
00:46:36,900 --> 00:46:40,300
Wyoming. 
Push some code to aetherium and 

842
00:46:40,300 --> 00:46:44,800
your organization is set up and 
some of the automation tooling 

843
00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:47,000
that's in part. 
Why we built things like open 

844
00:46:47,000 --> 00:46:48,900
La, you should be able to 
automatically generate those 

845
00:46:48,900 --> 00:46:52,600
filing documents as well, right?
That's incredible maybe pay the 

846
00:46:52,600 --> 00:46:56,000
fees in ether as well. 
Like just right there in your in

847
00:46:56,000 --> 00:47:00,400
your gut or you know or USD see 
I don't know or you know but 

848
00:47:00,500 --> 00:47:05,000
something that presumably and 
will hopefully be settled on on 

849
00:47:05,000 --> 00:47:09,500
aetherium and That's amazing and
not only is that amazing that 

850
00:47:09,500 --> 00:47:11,500
you could soon be able to do 
that. 

851
00:47:11,500 --> 00:47:14,500
It's also amazing that the cost 
of setting up the organization 

852
00:47:14,600 --> 00:47:17,000
should go down, right? 
So just like we saw it software 

853
00:47:17,500 --> 00:47:21,600
and if if the agreements 
themselves, this document that 

854
00:47:21,600 --> 00:47:24,100
you need to file become 
standardized or there's a couple

855
00:47:24,100 --> 00:47:26,800
templates that people can use 
the smart contract, code is 

856
00:47:26,900 --> 00:47:28,700
standardized. 
Something like the moloch 

857
00:47:28,700 --> 00:47:33,300
framework or some future 
framework and and the cost that 

858
00:47:33,300 --> 00:47:35,500
Wyoming charges to set up an 
organization or not, 

859
00:47:35,500 --> 00:47:37,200
unreasonable several hundred 
dollars. 

860
00:47:37,500 --> 00:47:40,300
And it may be unreasonable for 
some, but in the scheme of 

861
00:47:40,300 --> 00:47:42,600
things, is a lot better than 
where we are today. 

862
00:47:43,400 --> 00:47:46,500
That's pretty incredible, right?
Instead of spending tens of 

863
00:47:46,508 --> 00:47:48,900
thousands of dollars talking to 
lawyers that are going to run 

864
00:47:48,900 --> 00:47:53,100
you in circles putting together 
agreements that in many ways are

865
00:47:53,100 --> 00:47:57,800
unnecessary or unnecessarily, 
complex, you'll be able to 

866
00:47:57,900 --> 00:48:01,100
hopefully, you know, treat it 
like any other software, just 

867
00:48:01,100 --> 00:48:02,400
another task that you need to 
do. 

868
00:48:03,100 --> 00:48:07,500
Another thing that you can click
off your checklist, What? 

869
00:48:08,700 --> 00:48:12,600
But the very idea of interacting
with any government authority 

870
00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:15,900
over an API is something that I 
never thought I would see in my 

871
00:48:15,900 --> 00:48:19,700
lifetime and living in France. 
I never thought this would be 

872
00:48:19,700 --> 00:48:22,100
something I would see in my 
lifetime but this is very, very 

873
00:48:22,100 --> 00:48:23,400
cool. 
Yeah. 

874
00:48:23,400 --> 00:48:25,500
So you know, the API piece that,
you know, I think they're 

875
00:48:25,500 --> 00:48:27,000
well-intentioned. 
I don't know how far along that 

876
00:48:27,000 --> 00:48:31,000
is in development but I think 
that that that's where we'll get

877
00:48:31,000 --> 00:48:34,900
at some point and then on this 
at the same time I think going 

878
00:48:34,900 --> 00:48:37,200
back to what we were talking 
about before then we'll see. 

879
00:48:37,900 --> 00:48:40,600
Jinan governance and really have
a, hopefully a framework to 

880
00:48:40,600 --> 00:48:42,100
begin to do that kind of just 
Loop in that. 

881
00:48:42,100 --> 00:48:45,600
So, basically, if you talk about
the internal governance of the 

882
00:48:45,600 --> 00:48:49,600
doubt, I assume that the state 
of Wyoming, won't be able to, 

883
00:48:49,600 --> 00:48:51,500
but in there, right? 
So because you could, you can 

884
00:48:51,500 --> 00:48:53,800
have all kinds of internal 
dispute resolution. 

885
00:48:53,800 --> 00:48:57,000
That Wyoming wouldn't be able to
facilitate and that kind of, 

886
00:48:57,400 --> 00:49:00,500
that holds is that so. 
And so basically the legal 

887
00:49:00,500 --> 00:49:04,900
personality that the Dow has is 
only in external circumstances. 

888
00:49:04,900 --> 00:49:07,700
So basically it can enter into a
contract with like it. 

889
00:49:07,900 --> 00:49:09,400
Apply. 
Oh, I'd caught it. 

890
00:49:09,400 --> 00:49:13,100
Can contract people to do things
for it and can open a bank 

891
00:49:13,100 --> 00:49:18,200
account, but I assume there's no
dispute resolution. 

892
00:49:18,200 --> 00:49:22,900
And you can't, you can't sue a 
fellow Dow member in front of a 

893
00:49:22,900 --> 00:49:27,700
Wyoming court for breach of 
contract or whatever I assume. 

894
00:49:28,900 --> 00:49:33,400
I mean, you could, the Wyoming 
courts would have the ability to

895
00:49:33,400 --> 00:49:35,600
administer any disputes for any 
Wyoming entity. 

896
00:49:35,600 --> 00:49:38,900
But in general, the u.s. the 
u.s. loves contracts. 

897
00:49:39,100 --> 00:49:41,500
We love them. 
We think that they're absolutely

898
00:49:41,500 --> 00:49:44,800
fantastic. 
What legal academics will call 

899
00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:48,700
this as private ordering. 
So we enable to a great degree 

900
00:49:48,700 --> 00:49:51,100
and probably to the great 
greatest degree in the world, 

901
00:49:51,100 --> 00:49:53,700
the ability of individuals or 
groups of individuals to 

902
00:49:53,700 --> 00:49:57,200
organize their Affair, using 
contracts, and the state has 

903
00:49:57,200 --> 00:50:02,200
very limited ability. 
A to open that and that includes

904
00:50:02,200 --> 00:50:05,100
to decide how you want to 
administer disputes, you want to

905
00:50:05,100 --> 00:50:08,100
use Aragon court and that's in 
the contract and that's written 

906
00:50:08,100 --> 00:50:11,600
down clearly all folks signed 
it, you're going to use Aragon 

907
00:50:11,600 --> 00:50:13,100
court, right? 
There's there's not going to be 

908
00:50:13,100 --> 00:50:15,200
much much choice. 
So if you walked into Wyoming 

909
00:50:15,800 --> 00:50:18,400
and talk to a judge there, he's 
going to say, well, look in this

910
00:50:18,400 --> 00:50:20,300
contract, you agreed to use 
Aragon court. 

911
00:50:20,300 --> 00:50:22,000
So, what are you doing here, 
right? 

912
00:50:22,100 --> 00:50:23,900
Go to Oregon court and get that 
administered. 

913
00:50:24,000 --> 00:50:26,500
And if you're trying to kind of 
work around that you're not 

914
00:50:26,500 --> 00:50:28,400
going to have much wiggle room 
to do that. 

915
00:50:28,700 --> 00:50:31,900
And in general, the state 
doesn't really get in into the 

916
00:50:31,900 --> 00:50:35,600
Affairs of private Enterprises, 
right? 

917
00:50:35,600 --> 00:50:40,800
Whether that's a corporation you
know, and or a company and what 

918
00:50:40,800 --> 00:50:43,200
that would mean is also a doubt 
that there's obviously lots of 

919
00:50:43,200 --> 00:50:46,400
exceptions to that but in 
general, they're fairly narrow 

920
00:50:47,300 --> 00:50:51,400
and that's exciting that there's
certain abilities though, in 

921
00:50:51,400 --> 00:50:56,700
this statute, for Wyoming to 
basically unregister a dow. 

922
00:50:56,700 --> 00:50:59,500
If it goes completely Haywire, 
And that's something that we 

923
00:50:59,500 --> 00:51:03,200
were concerned about at. 
There's also, if you're going to

924
00:51:03,200 --> 00:51:05,800
have a purely algorithmic 
system, there's a requirement. 

925
00:51:05,800 --> 00:51:08,300
Now, you're getting, you know, 
like a charter from the state of

926
00:51:08,308 --> 00:51:10,100
Wyoming. 
So you have to give something up

927
00:51:10,900 --> 00:51:14,300
and what what we propose that 
folks have to give up to set up 

928
00:51:14,300 --> 00:51:18,200
a entirely algorithmic system. 
So something to kind of manage 

929
00:51:18,200 --> 00:51:21,100
this future. 
Autonomous car that I think 

930
00:51:21,100 --> 00:51:24,100
folks that are thinking about, 
it's just that, it's upgradable,

931
00:51:24,200 --> 00:51:27,500
but in some capacity there has 
to be some ability to upgrade it

932
00:51:27,500 --> 00:51:28,600
as. 
So that's the trade-off that 

933
00:51:28,700 --> 00:51:31,800
That I think the state senators 
at least those on the committee 

934
00:51:32,300 --> 00:51:35,200
that was somewhat reasonable and
that may change over time as it 

935
00:51:35,200 --> 00:51:39,200
goes through committee, Etc. 
But one of the dispute 

936
00:51:39,200 --> 00:51:41,300
resolution things that come to 
mind. 

937
00:51:41,600 --> 00:51:45,100
I don't know if you guys have 
thought about this but what if 

938
00:51:45,100 --> 00:51:49,400
one of the members of the Dow is
another Dow and how does that? 

939
00:51:49,800 --> 00:51:54,300
How would one then handle 
dispute resolution when you have

940
00:51:54,300 --> 00:51:57,100
perhaps like a sort of cascading
doubts, right? 

941
00:51:57,100 --> 00:52:01,900
That Some point have ownership 
in a dow and there's there's a 

942
00:52:01,908 --> 00:52:03,900
dispute that needs to happen 
there, right? 

943
00:52:04,100 --> 00:52:06,700
Or dispute resolution. 
Yeah, well, that, that happens 

944
00:52:06,700 --> 00:52:09,700
all the time right in 
traditional legal Arrangements, 

945
00:52:09,700 --> 00:52:11,200
right? 
Like a corporation can be a 

946
00:52:11,200 --> 00:52:14,800
shoulder and another 
Corporation, or a corporation 

947
00:52:14,800 --> 00:52:17,800
could be a shareholder in an LLC
and the LLC will have an 

948
00:52:17,800 --> 00:52:19,700
agreement that has an 
arbitration provision. 

949
00:52:19,700 --> 00:52:22,800
So you just have to find kind of
the operative agreement to deal 

950
00:52:22,800 --> 00:52:24,800
with the dispute and then you 
look to that. 

951
00:52:24,800 --> 00:52:27,800
So that's why to your previous 
point. 

952
00:52:27,800 --> 00:52:29,800
I just think that there's 
Probably going to be some light 

953
00:52:29,800 --> 00:52:32,900
pinning with some legal 
documents. 

954
00:52:32,900 --> 00:52:35,500
It could be something like what 
we're building on the open up 

955
00:52:35,500 --> 00:52:37,400
side where you're able to, 
automatically generate them for 

956
00:52:37,400 --> 00:52:39,700
more complex, things, it could 
be something even like a terms 

957
00:52:39,700 --> 00:52:43,100
of service or some sort of Click
through like related agreement, 

958
00:52:43,100 --> 00:52:46,100
that that will that will kind of
deal with some of these types of

959
00:52:46,100 --> 00:52:49,500
questions. 
Can I just ask one last question

960
00:52:49,500 --> 00:52:52,500
on the Wyoming framework? 
So basically if your doll goes 

961
00:52:52,700 --> 00:52:56,300
haywire and it's kind of ghee 
registered by Wyoming. 

962
00:52:56,400 --> 00:52:58,800
What then happens. 
Because I mean basically it's On

963
00:52:58,800 --> 00:53:02,000
the blockchain. 
It doesn't you can't unsummon 

964
00:53:02,000 --> 00:53:03,500
it. 
It's still there. 

965
00:53:03,500 --> 00:53:07,000
So basically it does it no 
longer have legal personality or

966
00:53:07,000 --> 00:53:09,000
what? 
What exactly it doesn't feel 

967
00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:11,800
like if he fights back to a 
general partnership is that it 

968
00:53:11,800 --> 00:53:15,100
or is that exactly? 
Yeah, that's the thought. 

969
00:53:15,100 --> 00:53:18,300
I mean, there's not the state 
can pick it up, take it down, 

970
00:53:18,300 --> 00:53:21,500
right? 
You know, the one thing if it is

971
00:53:21,500 --> 00:53:24,100
upgradeable that could be 
conceivably part of some sort of

972
00:53:24,107 --> 00:53:30,100
court order read that you need 
to Upgraded so that it no longer

973
00:53:30,100 --> 00:53:33,200
is operating, you know, these 
are the edge cases. 

974
00:53:33,200 --> 00:53:36,100
I imagine over over time, those 
edge cases, where we come little

975
00:53:36,100 --> 00:53:38,900
bit more magnified. 
So that that's the concern that 

976
00:53:38,900 --> 00:53:41,300
folks have. 
But as, as you know, and as I'm 

977
00:53:41,300 --> 00:53:44,800
sure many of the folks listening
and no one, something is the 

978
00:53:44,800 --> 00:53:48,100
point theorem or other 
comparable pouch and they 

979
00:53:48,100 --> 00:53:50,400
systems. 
It's hard to put the genie back 

980
00:53:50,400 --> 00:53:52,000
in the bottle, if people want to
use it. 

981
00:53:52,000 --> 00:53:55,400
So that's some of the challenges
This is Oakwood. 

982
00:53:55,400 --> 00:53:59,600
I'm super excited to see how 
this actually plays out and so 

983
00:53:59,600 --> 00:54:02,600
it's going to be wild and so 
what wait what wait, wait wait 

984
00:54:02,600 --> 00:54:07,000
wait. 
What about if a dow summons, 

985
00:54:07,000 --> 00:54:11,800
another Dow and you know through
this this API like creates 

986
00:54:11,800 --> 00:54:16,700
another legal entity can we have
a dow owning a dow in Wyoming. 

987
00:54:17,800 --> 00:54:20,100
Yeah, I don't, I don't, I don't 
see why not, I mean, it's the 

988
00:54:20,107 --> 00:54:22,200
same thing, traditional 
corporate structures. 

989
00:54:22,200 --> 00:54:24,200
You'll have a corporation that 
has a subsidiary. 

990
00:54:24,300 --> 00:54:26,400
Every right. 
So, you know, with the Lao, 

991
00:54:26,400 --> 00:54:29,500
we're already members of other 
dads and that's been immediated 

992
00:54:29,500 --> 00:54:32,400
entirely through just smart 
contract based calls. 

993
00:54:32,400 --> 00:54:34,800
So it's already possible to do 
this. 

994
00:54:34,800 --> 00:54:37,800
So you know, the the low is a 
member of Pi doubt. 

995
00:54:38,100 --> 00:54:42,000
And so the members voted that 
they wanted to join Pi Tau and 

996
00:54:42,000 --> 00:54:44,600
then we did write as a once the 
vote happens, read smart 

997
00:54:44,600 --> 00:54:46,900
contracts or triggered. 
Once the smart contracts were 

998
00:54:46,900 --> 00:54:52,000
triggered, it interfaced with 
the Aragon Dow that undergirds 

999
00:54:52,000 --> 00:54:57,300
pie dough and, and we joined, 
You know, I think it's going to 

1000
00:54:57,308 --> 00:54:58,900
happen. 
There's nothing technically 

1001
00:54:58,900 --> 00:55:01,700
limiting that ability to happen.
Yeah, there's nothing 

1002
00:55:01,700 --> 00:55:04,300
technically limiting it. 
I just wonder what kind of 

1003
00:55:04,300 --> 00:55:07,700
complexities might arise when 
you have little like Dows and 

1004
00:55:07,700 --> 00:55:10,300
child as and child. 
I was being completely automated

1005
00:55:10,300 --> 00:55:15,100
and autonomous themselves. 
Forming new Dows through some 

1006
00:55:15,100 --> 00:55:19,800
sort of an API and then like, I 
don't know, it just seems like 

1007
00:55:20,400 --> 00:55:23,900
like a bee's nest of 
complexities to me with some 

1008
00:55:24,300 --> 00:55:28,000
Some sentient AI administering 
the entire thing. 

1009
00:55:28,200 --> 00:55:32,100
Yeah, I mean, not even an AI 
just it could be pretty simple, 

1010
00:55:32,100 --> 00:55:34,300
business logic. 
I mean, I think like the come 

1011
00:55:34,300 --> 00:55:35,700
back to the mic, her an 
autonomous vehicle. 

1012
00:55:35,700 --> 00:55:39,100
I think, like, in his example, 
there was this, this notion that

1013
00:55:39,100 --> 00:55:42,300
at some point if the vehicle had
sufficient Capital, it could 

1014
00:55:42,300 --> 00:55:45,500
invest in other vehicles and 
those would be sort of 

1015
00:55:45,500 --> 00:55:48,400
autonomous vehicles and 
themselves and they would be 

1016
00:55:48,400 --> 00:55:51,800
like a child vehicle the other. 
So, this this this kind of thing

1017
00:55:51,808 --> 00:55:53,900
is always fascinated me. 
Since I've heard the stories of 

1018
00:55:53,900 --> 00:55:57,600
this kind of Like just wakens 
all those Fascinations again. 

1019
00:55:58,400 --> 00:56:00,600
Yeah. 
Again I don't, I don't think 

1020
00:56:00,600 --> 00:56:03,300
that there's, there's nothing 
conceptually that would limit 

1021
00:56:03,300 --> 00:56:05,400
that there's a couple technical 
requirements in it. 

1022
00:56:05,400 --> 00:56:07,800
You know, the entities need to 
have a registered agent, which 

1023
00:56:07,800 --> 00:56:11,200
is basically, like a point of 
somebody to contact in the state

1024
00:56:11,200 --> 00:56:13,400
of Wyoming so that would have to
be accounted for. 

1025
00:56:14,200 --> 00:56:16,300
But, you know, you don't need to
have a manager. 

1026
00:56:16,500 --> 00:56:19,500
Like there's nothing necessarily
saying that you need to have a 

1027
00:56:19,500 --> 00:56:23,700
manager of an organization you 
need to have you know, some 

1028
00:56:24,300 --> 00:56:26,000
Legal person that would probably
file it. 

1029
00:56:26,000 --> 00:56:28,400
So, that's a big question. 
I don't know what's going to 

1030
00:56:28,400 --> 00:56:32,000
happen with this API and whether
or not they'll be some sort of 

1031
00:56:32,000 --> 00:56:34,900
like technical issue that made 
them a mock-up, what you were 

1032
00:56:34,900 --> 00:56:37,900
just describing. 
But I don't see why you would 

1033
00:56:37,900 --> 00:56:39,500
necessarily not want that to 
occur. 

1034
00:56:40,200 --> 00:56:42,000
We already in enabled humans to 
do that. 

1035
00:56:42,000 --> 00:56:43,200
Why? 
When the sensor to algorithmic 

1036
00:56:43,200 --> 00:56:46,700
system had a the same place same
general ability to do that. 

1037
00:56:47,100 --> 00:56:48,900
I agree. 
Yeah, it's it but it's a good 

1038
00:56:48,900 --> 00:56:50,500
question. 
I don't I haven't fully thought 

1039
00:56:50,500 --> 00:56:52,600
through it but I'm going to make
sure to spend some more time 

1040
00:56:52,600 --> 00:56:54,100
thinking that through over the 
next couple days. 

1041
00:56:54,300 --> 00:56:58,700
Your next book. 
So if you look back at the 

1042
00:56:58,700 --> 00:57:02,900
history of organizations, it 
kind of seems, it seems weird 

1043
00:57:02,900 --> 00:57:05,600
now, but I mean, you didn't 
always have shareholder base 

1044
00:57:05,600 --> 00:57:08,600
organizations, right? 
So basically, if you look at, if

1045
00:57:08,600 --> 00:57:12,800
you look at the Dutch East India
company, that was founded, I 

1046
00:57:12,800 --> 00:57:16,300
would even 1602. 
And that was the first one of 

1047
00:57:16,300 --> 00:57:18,500
those. 
Do you think this is that moment

1048
00:57:18,500 --> 00:57:21,800
again? 
Do you think that was are going 

1049
00:57:21,800 --> 00:57:29,000
to have an Analogous position in
our society and legal system. 

1050
00:57:30,400 --> 00:57:32,500
So my belief is yes. 
Right? 

1051
00:57:32,500 --> 00:57:35,900
For the reasons described 
before, you have an organization

1052
00:57:35,900 --> 00:57:39,000
that can propagate anywhere 
around the globe via the 

1053
00:57:39,000 --> 00:57:42,000
Internet. 
And I do think smart contract 

1054
00:57:42,000 --> 00:57:45,800
based organizations will just be
cheaper and cheaper to 

1055
00:57:45,800 --> 00:57:49,400
administer and presumably over 
the next X number of years, will

1056
00:57:49,400 --> 00:57:53,200
develop Superior governance 
mechanisms and that's a big 

1057
00:57:53,200 --> 00:57:55,800
question and you can disagree 
with that but that's my belief. 

1058
00:57:56,200 --> 00:57:59,900
So I think that this is going to
be the default Vault, almost 

1059
00:57:59,900 --> 00:58:03,000
like how folks argue that 
Bitcoin is the sound is money. 

1060
00:58:03,000 --> 00:58:06,800
And obviously, all money over 
time, at least as the argument 

1061
00:58:06,800 --> 00:58:10,300
goes, well, will gravitate 
towards the soundest money. 

1062
00:58:10,600 --> 00:58:14,700
I personally think that Dows 
will be an are the soundest 

1063
00:58:14,700 --> 00:58:18,700
organization for the digital 
age, and that means that 

1064
00:58:18,700 --> 00:58:20,700
increasingly, I think you're 
going to see more and more 

1065
00:58:20,700 --> 00:58:24,500
organizations, begin to operate 
via Das. 

1066
00:58:24,800 --> 00:58:26,700
And this is not fully 
surprising. 

1067
00:58:26,700 --> 00:58:28,900
So you mentioned the Dutch East 
India Company. 

1068
00:58:29,800 --> 00:58:32,200
But if you even go further back 
in time, people have been 

1069
00:58:32,200 --> 00:58:35,700
setting up organizations of 
different stripes for Millennia.

1070
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:38,900
You know, Romans had limited 
liability entities to deal with 

1071
00:58:38,900 --> 00:58:43,100
trade and shipping. 
Obviously, we saw the adaption 

1072
00:58:43,100 --> 00:58:46,600
and English state-chartered 
corporations, that really led to

1073
00:58:46,600 --> 00:58:50,200
the age of exploration with all 
the benefits and the downsides 

1074
00:58:50,200 --> 00:58:52,300
related to that in the u.s. 
though. 

1075
00:58:52,400 --> 00:58:55,800
You know, we came up with this 
state, chartered corporation 

1076
00:58:55,800 --> 00:58:59,200
that was 1811 in New York. 
So we said, why do I have to ask

1077
00:58:59,400 --> 00:59:01,300
Permission from the state. 
I should just be able to set 

1078
00:59:01,300 --> 00:59:03,700
this up. 
Anytime I want, if I satisfy 

1079
00:59:03,700 --> 00:59:06,700
these requirements, very, very 
American way to approach it. 

1080
00:59:07,100 --> 00:59:09,800
And then corporations became the
dominant form when there was the

1081
00:59:09,800 --> 00:59:15,500
railroad, boom, in the 18, you 
know, the 18 mid to late 1800s 

1082
00:59:15,500 --> 00:59:19,000
in the u.s. it led to the birth 
of preferred stock or different 

1083
00:59:19,000 --> 00:59:22,700
forms of stock that a company 
can have, which is what fuels 

1084
00:59:22,700 --> 00:59:27,300
Venture Capital investing when 
we saw the increasing 

1085
00:59:27,700 --> 00:59:30,100
internationalization. 
Finance. 

1086
00:59:30,100 --> 00:59:33,000
We saw the birth of the limited 
liability company, which is what

1087
00:59:33,000 --> 00:59:37,000
predominates in in the u.s. now 
for many businesses. 

1088
00:59:37,600 --> 00:59:41,000
So I think for each technical 
age and each technical 

1089
00:59:41,000 --> 00:59:44,700
Innovation, we've seen kind of a
subsequent shift in the way we 

1090
00:59:44,700 --> 00:59:48,000
decide to organize our Affairs 
and and I think that that was 

1091
00:59:48,008 --> 00:59:51,100
our that shift for the internet.
There's no reason why you 

1092
00:59:51,100 --> 00:59:53,300
shouldn't have an organization 
that can stretch across the 

1093
00:59:53,300 --> 00:59:56,000
globe. 
That's lightweight that kind of 

1094
00:59:56,000 --> 00:59:58,900
reflects the behaviors of how 
people interact, right? 

1095
00:59:58,900 --> 01:00:00,500
They don't. 
Not necessarily want to join 

1096
01:00:00,500 --> 01:00:04,200
together as a Partners like 
venturing out to do something. 

1097
01:00:04,600 --> 01:00:07,400
They don't want necessarily to 
be have somebody in charge of 

1098
01:00:07,400 --> 01:00:12,100
them and some sort of, you know,
top-down hierarchical way they 

1099
01:00:12,100 --> 01:00:15,400
want something that's looser, 
weren't arm's length and that 

1100
01:00:15,400 --> 01:00:18,300
relies on software, so they can 
actually begin to coordinate 

1101
01:00:18,300 --> 01:00:21,300
things because it's a bit more 
trustworthy than these, you 

1102
01:00:21,300 --> 01:00:23,900
know, paper-based agreements 
that are that are hard to 

1103
01:00:23,900 --> 01:00:27,300
administer expensive to put 
together and, and specific to a 

1104
01:00:27,300 --> 01:00:31,100
particular jurisdiction. 
So, I just don't see how dad's 

1105
01:00:31,100 --> 01:00:33,200
don't win in the long run, and I
think we're starting to see that

1106
01:00:33,200 --> 01:00:35,500
play out. 
I don't know if you've looked at

1107
01:00:35,500 --> 01:00:37,800
the numbers and I do like 
numbers. 

1108
01:00:37,800 --> 01:00:40,600
But if you go to platforms like 
deep down, which is a really 

1109
01:00:40,600 --> 01:00:42,000
great platform. 
If you haven't been there, 

1110
01:00:42,300 --> 01:00:45,300
that's taking a stock. 
If it how ecosystem. 

1111
01:00:45,400 --> 01:00:48,100
At the beginning of this year, 
there was about a little under 

1112
01:00:48,100 --> 01:00:51,700
10 million dollars worth of 
digital assets into house, and 

1113
01:00:51,700 --> 01:00:56,300
it's up to almost 500 million. 
And the last time I saw growth 

1114
01:00:56,300 --> 01:00:58,800
like that, I think it would be 
defy, right? 

1115
01:00:59,000 --> 01:01:03,900
When we Are, you know, and in 
2017 18, when we started seeing 

1116
01:01:03,900 --> 01:01:06,500
the first D5 projects, kind of 
emerge, there was a couple 

1117
01:01:06,500 --> 01:01:09,800
people, you know, a couple 
projects that we're getting some

1118
01:01:09,800 --> 01:01:12,400
traction. 
But I think the Dow ecosystem 

1119
01:01:12,400 --> 01:01:15,500
we're going to, we're going to 
see similar levels of growth. 

1120
01:01:15,700 --> 01:01:17,700
I think that's particularly true
for their dads that you 

1121
01:01:17,700 --> 01:01:20,300
mentioned before those managing,
open source projects. 

1122
01:01:20,800 --> 01:01:24,400
I do think the developers have a
significant amount of demand to 

1123
01:01:24,900 --> 01:01:28,300
either have their assets or the 
entire project kind of managed 

1124
01:01:28,300 --> 01:01:30,500
in a more democratic like 
participatory way. 

1125
01:01:30,600 --> 01:01:32,800
So I think we're going to see a 
lot of growth here. 

1126
01:01:32,800 --> 01:01:36,200
And then as the blockchain 
ecosystem, continues to grow, 

1127
01:01:36,500 --> 01:01:39,200
eclipses, more than a trillion 
dollars in assets, you know, 

1128
01:01:39,200 --> 01:01:42,100
tens if not hundreds of 
trillions of dollars, then it's 

1129
01:01:42,100 --> 01:01:45,200
just going to be difficult for 
organizations to compete and 

1130
01:01:45,200 --> 01:01:48,300
they're going to have to, you 
know, they're gonna have to copy

1131
01:01:48,500 --> 01:01:50,200
just like just like they always 
have done. 

1132
01:01:50,600 --> 01:01:53,600
So that's that. 
That's how I see things blowing 

1133
01:01:53,600 --> 01:01:57,900
up super quick. 
So just before we dive into the 

1134
01:01:57,900 --> 01:02:01,800
current, our ecosystem, And one 
last directly could question on 

1135
01:02:01,800 --> 01:02:03,800
Dallas. 
So basically we've talked about 

1136
01:02:04,500 --> 01:02:09,800
wrapped hours in both Legacy 
rappers and novel rappers. 

1137
01:02:10,200 --> 01:02:13,000
What about unwrapped out? 
So if you don't actually have a 

1138
01:02:13,008 --> 01:02:15,600
legal wrapper for yet our is 
there any way to not 

1139
01:02:15,700 --> 01:02:18,900
automatically default into 
becoming a general partnership? 

1140
01:02:19,600 --> 01:02:20,900
Yeah, so this is the tricky 
part. 

1141
01:02:20,900 --> 01:02:23,700
It's going to depend on whose 
members and it's going to depend

1142
01:02:23,700 --> 01:02:26,000
on all the jurisdictions in 
which they reside. 

1143
01:02:26,600 --> 01:02:31,400
So at least in the US and Europe
that tends to be and I'm not a 

1144
01:02:31,400 --> 01:02:33,500
European lawyer, but this is my 
understanding it, that tends to 

1145
01:02:33,508 --> 01:02:36,000
be a general partnership. 
That that's also why I think it 

1146
01:02:36,000 --> 01:02:38,000
does make sense to have some 
sort of contract in place 

1147
01:02:38,000 --> 01:02:41,600
amongst the members. 
I call those contract Harry 

1148
01:02:41,600 --> 01:02:45,300
endows, so you can have a 
contract. 

1149
01:02:45,300 --> 01:02:47,400
Even if you're not legally 
recognized, governing the 

1150
01:02:47,400 --> 01:02:51,300
Affairs of the different members
and potentially limiting, or 

1151
01:02:51,300 --> 01:02:56,700
waving rights that you think are
sensible as a group to the 

1152
01:02:56,700 --> 01:02:59,300
extent permitted by by law. 
And that's a complex. 

1153
01:02:59,400 --> 01:03:01,500
Question, you know, which will 
governs, you know, what rights, 

1154
01:03:01,500 --> 01:03:03,900
you're able to wave and you 
know, some things you can waive 

1155
01:03:03,900 --> 01:03:05,600
some things you can't when it 
comes to partnership. 

1156
01:03:05,600 --> 01:03:09,000
But at least I think that gives 
you some shot at organizing 

1157
01:03:09,000 --> 01:03:11,300
things and dealing with these 
these risks. 

1158
01:03:11,300 --> 01:03:13,400
It's, you know, being a 
lawyer's, a little bit like 

1159
01:03:13,400 --> 01:03:16,200
being a security researcher. 
You're not thinking about the 

1160
01:03:16,200 --> 01:03:18,500
happy path or thinking about the
bad path, right? 

1161
01:03:18,600 --> 01:03:21,100
And we saw some dramatic bad 
pass with like the Dow itself 

1162
01:03:21,100 --> 01:03:23,200
where there was a big questions 
and if there wasn't the hard 

1163
01:03:23,200 --> 01:03:26,900
work and people really lost 
their shirt, my sense is the 

1164
01:03:26,900 --> 01:03:28,500
courts would have weighed in at 
that point in time. 

1165
01:03:29,600 --> 01:03:33,300
But, you know, dealing with some
of those downside risks, I think

1166
01:03:33,300 --> 01:03:36,000
are important particular for 
trying to build something that's

1167
01:03:36,300 --> 01:03:38,200
potentially massive. 
We're even seeing that the Maker

1168
01:03:38,200 --> 01:03:40,800
Now ecosystem, right? 
As maker died, was becoming more

1169
01:03:40,800 --> 01:03:44,800
and more important as diet is 
becoming a more essential asset 

1170
01:03:44,800 --> 01:03:47,500
to the crypto ecosystem and 
potentially other ecosystems. 

1171
01:03:47,700 --> 01:03:50,700
These types of legal questions 
about who's responsible as the 

1172
01:03:50,700 --> 01:03:52,500
foundation? 
Is it somebody else they're 

1173
01:03:52,500 --> 01:03:55,800
beginning to come into focus and
I do think agreements that are 

1174
01:03:55,800 --> 01:03:59,200
put in place can kind of Stave 
off those forms. 

1175
01:03:59,400 --> 01:04:04,300
I've read called like Regulatory
and tax in the future, so that's

1176
01:04:04,300 --> 01:04:08,600
something folks should consider.
And I think there's some great 

1177
01:04:08,600 --> 01:04:10,700
projects that are already 
considering that, and I think 

1178
01:04:10,700 --> 01:04:13,200
we'll start to see some more. 
We're following that path to 

1179
01:04:13,800 --> 01:04:15,800
because legal recognition is not
for everybody, right? 

1180
01:04:15,800 --> 01:04:20,900
So either philosophically or, 
you know, or otherwise but, you 

1181
01:04:20,900 --> 01:04:24,300
know, we decided to go down that
path and the reason we've kind 

1182
01:04:24,300 --> 01:04:26,700
of thought about it is it's a 
little bit like coinbase. 

1183
01:04:26,700 --> 01:04:29,900
I know coinbase is a bit of a 
touchdown but they took man 

1184
01:04:29,900 --> 01:04:31,800
cocks, right? 
They just copy down Cox and just

1185
01:04:31,800 --> 01:04:33,600
said, hey, let's do it in the 
right way in the US. 

1186
01:04:33,600 --> 01:04:36,700
And in many ways, what we're 
trying to do with the Lao and 

1187
01:04:36,700 --> 01:04:39,400
this ecosystem is, is explore 
the same thing. 

1188
01:04:39,400 --> 01:04:40,800
Like can we do this in the right
way? 

1189
01:04:40,800 --> 01:04:43,800
Just we can push the ecosystem 
forward, you know. 

1190
01:04:43,800 --> 01:04:45,300
We know that that's not going to
be the right approach for 

1191
01:04:45,300 --> 01:04:48,600
everybody though. 
Speaking of ecosystem. 

1192
01:04:48,600 --> 01:04:51,100
So we've talked about lots of 
different doubts. 

1193
01:04:51,100 --> 01:04:54,500
They were, at least mentioned a 
few looking at the different 

1194
01:04:54,500 --> 01:04:57,300
dowse exists. 
Do you have a way to categorize 

1195
01:04:57,300 --> 01:04:59,500
them? 
Like, how would you kind of put 

1196
01:04:59,500 --> 01:05:02,900
them in different for different 
use cases or applications? 

1197
01:05:04,100 --> 01:05:08,100
Yeah so I think I think one 
major category is this idea of 

1198
01:05:08,100 --> 01:05:11,200
using a dow to coordinate an 
open source project? 

1199
01:05:11,400 --> 01:05:14,200
I think we're seeing that first 
emerge in the blockchain 

1200
01:05:14,200 --> 01:05:17,900
ecosystem, 45 projects but I 
don't see any conceptual reason 

1201
01:05:17,900 --> 01:05:21,200
why that should be limited to 
just booked in projects. 

1202
01:05:21,200 --> 01:05:22,900
And I think we're seeing 
interesting experiments like 

1203
01:05:22,900 --> 01:05:25,500
that protocol and some other 
interesting projects that are 

1204
01:05:25,500 --> 01:05:30,000
trying to kind of bring, you 
know, bring comparable models to

1205
01:05:30,000 --> 01:05:33,400
other open source projects. 
So I think that's one area I 

1206
01:05:33,408 --> 01:05:36,600
think the The second area would 
be what we talked about before 

1207
01:05:36,600 --> 01:05:39,800
these, like, based protocols. 
So that's an argument, I tend to

1208
01:05:39,800 --> 01:05:42,400
think that they are kind of do 
like, and structure things like 

1209
01:05:42,400 --> 01:05:45,200
Bitcoin and etherium. 
So, I called as a protocol level

1210
01:05:45,200 --> 01:05:50,300
dowse and and then I think, I 
think that there's a lot of 

1211
01:05:50,300 --> 01:05:53,300
potential use cases around 
pulling Capital. 

1212
01:05:53,700 --> 01:05:56,600
So if you think about a lot of 
Industries at their core, what 

1213
01:05:56,600 --> 01:05:58,100
are they doing? 
They're pulling in deploying 

1214
01:05:58,100 --> 01:06:00,600
Capital. 
So venture, capital is an 

1215
01:06:00,600 --> 01:06:02,900
obvious example there, right? 
People pull together. 

1216
01:06:02,900 --> 01:06:06,400
Capital make He's into projects,
but if you think about media, 

1217
01:06:06,400 --> 01:06:11,000
it's not that dissimilar label 
that maybe funding music or some

1218
01:06:11,000 --> 01:06:12,700
other form of creative Endeavor 
there. 

1219
01:06:12,700 --> 01:06:16,100
If Capital they Folks at decide 
where it gets deployed, they 

1220
01:06:16,200 --> 01:06:19,100
this they cool capital and 
decide work is deployed very 

1221
01:06:19,100 --> 01:06:20,500
similar. 
So I think you're going to start

1222
01:06:20,500 --> 01:06:23,300
to see a lot more Dows in that 
ecosystem. 

1223
01:06:23,300 --> 01:06:25,600
If you think about insurance, 
it's just pulling capital and 

1224
01:06:25,600 --> 01:06:27,800
deploying it. 
If you think about other forms 

1225
01:06:27,800 --> 01:06:29,700
of fun structures, whether 
that's hedge funds, private, 

1226
01:06:29,700 --> 01:06:33,000
Equity, Funds, Etc, pulling in 
deploying capital and really, 

1227
01:06:33,000 --> 01:06:35,500
any corporate. 
I'm is not that dissimilar read,

1228
01:06:35,600 --> 01:06:39,700
if you're running a dive shop, 
you're you're pulling instead of

1229
01:06:39,900 --> 01:06:41,900
intangible Capital its human 
capital read. 

1230
01:06:42,400 --> 01:06:45,200
So and you're pulling human 
capital and deploying it. 

1231
01:06:45,200 --> 01:06:48,300
So I think that the pooling of 
capital is the other major 

1232
01:06:48,300 --> 01:06:50,500
category and that's the one that
we're just beginning to explore 

1233
01:06:50,500 --> 01:06:54,000
with projects, like allow and 
Flamingo, dial and a handful of 

1234
01:06:54,000 --> 01:06:57,400
other examples are too. 
So that's kind of my broad 

1235
01:06:57,400 --> 01:07:01,600
categorization there. 
You also have some sort of 

1236
01:07:01,900 --> 01:07:04,800
coordination to us, right? 
So basically for instance 

1237
01:07:05,100 --> 01:07:08,700
there's keeper Dow which hasn't 
been around that long. 

1238
01:07:08,700 --> 01:07:13,100
So basically for for organizing 
the extraction of Mev is 

1239
01:07:13,100 --> 01:07:15,700
probably how I would 
characterize it. 

1240
01:07:15,900 --> 01:07:19,900
Do you have any other towers 
that are centered around 

1241
01:07:19,900 --> 01:07:25,400
coordination and basically 
division of assets? 

1242
01:07:26,500 --> 01:07:28,300
Yes. 
So I think that this isn't 

1243
01:07:28,500 --> 01:07:31,400
interesting potential new 
frontier for now. 

1244
01:07:31,400 --> 01:07:37,500
So viewing it as almost like a 
like a point for coordination or

1245
01:07:37,500 --> 01:07:40,900
also point for signaling. 
So you can view it as almost 

1246
01:07:40,900 --> 01:07:43,600
like a bit, like a web of trust 
of some sort. 

1247
01:07:43,700 --> 01:07:46,700
So if you're like interested in 
a particular topic or particular

1248
01:07:46,700 --> 01:07:50,800
project, you can, you can see 
douse potentially be useful for 

1249
01:07:50,800 --> 01:07:53,700
curation or dissemination of up 
certain things. 

1250
01:07:53,700 --> 01:07:57,000
So an example, we did this in. 
We're Flamingo die, which is an 

1251
01:07:57,000 --> 01:07:59,900
empty focused out. 
We had a doubt drop where an 

1252
01:07:59,900 --> 01:08:05,100
artist was able to drop onto all
the members and nft that that 

1253
01:08:05,100 --> 01:08:07,200
they created. 
So they use the Dow is kind of 

1254
01:08:07,200 --> 01:08:12,400
like a vetted web of trust of 
folks that were interested in 

1255
01:08:12,600 --> 01:08:15,300
and of tea or digital art 
related things. 

1256
01:08:15,600 --> 01:08:20,100
So I do think that there's going
to be more forms of use cases 

1257
01:08:20,100 --> 01:08:22,500
for dads. 
I just think we're just starting

1258
01:08:22,500 --> 01:08:25,500
to scratch the surface and what 
we're doing is looking towards 

1259
01:08:25,500 --> 01:08:27,200
prevention. 
Models and trying to apply them 

1260
01:08:27,200 --> 01:08:30,399
in the digital context, a little
bit like web one and then we'll 

1261
01:08:30,399 --> 01:08:33,100
start to see some more kind of 
emergent things that we may not 

1262
01:08:33,100 --> 01:08:35,500
be able to think about things 
like you poured out with things 

1263
01:08:35,500 --> 01:08:39,800
like using Das for creation or 
or other other aspects. 

1264
01:08:39,800 --> 01:08:41,700
Like that could also be 
potentially. 

1265
01:08:41,700 --> 01:08:44,300
Interesting. 
So I don't have all the answers 

1266
01:08:44,300 --> 01:08:49,700
but and I definitely don't but I
think that there's lots of 

1267
01:08:49,700 --> 01:08:52,300
ingenious things that will be 
able to do with organizations. 

1268
01:08:52,300 --> 01:08:54,600
Now that we are effectively 
turning them into software. 

1269
01:08:56,500 --> 01:08:59,600
So what's the outlook here? 
What, where do you see this 

1270
01:08:59,600 --> 01:09:05,200
space evolving in the next say, 
decade and what are some of the 

1271
01:09:05,200 --> 01:09:09,100
risks that you might perceive? 
I mean, one of the risks and 

1272
01:09:09,899 --> 01:09:13,899
felt like a mentioned this in 
the short run down, but I think 

1273
01:09:13,899 --> 01:09:18,500
given the current context with 
the social media censorship that

1274
01:09:18,500 --> 01:09:23,700
we've observed, is there a space
for doused to occupy some some 

1275
01:09:23,700 --> 01:09:26,200
of that space and what are 
potential? 

1276
01:09:26,399 --> 01:09:28,700
Some of the risks that that 
might incur on society. 

1277
01:09:29,100 --> 01:09:31,100
Sorry, I went from a broad 
question to a super narrow 

1278
01:09:31,100 --> 01:09:32,399
question. 
No. 

1279
01:09:32,399 --> 01:09:35,800
Well, you know, from my my 
vantage point, I hope that 

1280
01:09:35,800 --> 01:09:39,800
boxing technology can come and, 
and hopefully address some of 

1281
01:09:39,800 --> 01:09:42,899
the issues that I think we're 
seeing with centralized social, 

1282
01:09:42,899 --> 01:09:46,399
media platforms and other 
services, and hopefully by 

1283
01:09:46,399 --> 01:09:50,100
banding together, in these more 
loose digitally native 

1284
01:09:50,100 --> 01:09:54,700
structures were able to 
replicate if not improve improve

1285
01:09:54,700 --> 01:09:57,400
what we're seeing. 
On social media or otherwise 

1286
01:09:57,400 --> 01:09:59,900
with all the caveats that about 
scalability and all the other 

1287
01:09:59,900 --> 01:10:03,900
issues with some of these 
broader kind of more consumer, 

1288
01:10:03,900 --> 01:10:06,600
Focus applications will have, I 
think the other four days is 

1289
01:10:06,600 --> 01:10:08,700
bright, you know, I think it's 
one of the core use cases. 

1290
01:10:08,700 --> 01:10:11,900
It's something that's animated 
both the Bitcoin and the theorem

1291
01:10:11,900 --> 01:10:14,700
communities for, you know, a 
number of years. 

1292
01:10:14,700 --> 01:10:18,400
Now I think the tooling is 
coming into place so we have 

1293
01:10:18,400 --> 01:10:22,200
shaken off this PTSD. 
How I think Malik Dow was wildly

1294
01:10:22,200 --> 01:10:25,700
Innovative I think I mean and 
team who put that together I 

1295
01:10:25,700 --> 01:10:28,700
Really Deserve Pat on their 
backs because I think it was a 

1296
01:10:28,700 --> 01:10:31,000
tremendous work. 
I think we're going to continue 

1297
01:10:31,000 --> 01:10:33,600
to see some kind of core 
Innovations around the 

1298
01:10:33,600 --> 01:10:35,600
underlying smart contract 
Frameworks. 

1299
01:10:36,100 --> 01:10:40,100
So some issues that dams are 
facing are not just regulatory 

1300
01:10:40,100 --> 01:10:41,200
questions. 
They're actually just 

1301
01:10:41,300 --> 01:10:44,200
nitty-gritty technical issues. 
It's very expensive to deploy a 

1302
01:10:44,200 --> 01:10:45,500
doubt. 
It's very expensive to run it 

1303
01:10:45,500 --> 01:10:48,100
down in terms of gas and other 
other issues. 

1304
01:10:48,500 --> 01:10:52,900
So I do think we're going to see
innovation in that realm, you 

1305
01:10:52,900 --> 01:10:55,000
know, on the open mouth side, 
we've been working on this. 

1306
01:10:55,800 --> 01:10:58,400
We've been putting Together? 
What we consider to be the third

1307
01:10:58,400 --> 01:11:00,700
version of the moloch doubt 
framework, which means that 

1308
01:11:00,700 --> 01:11:05,100
you'll be able to set up a more 
modular Dow, you'll have the 

1309
01:11:05,100 --> 01:11:08,300
ability to vote on governance 
related decisions at no cost and

1310
01:11:08,300 --> 01:11:10,600
transfer assets. 
If there's no evidence of fraud 

1311
01:11:10,600 --> 01:11:14,600
at effectively, the cost of 
transferring that asset which 

1312
01:11:14,600 --> 01:11:18,000
is, you know, a couple bucks of 
gas at least 11, things are not 

1313
01:11:18,300 --> 01:11:22,500
entirely insane which we think 
will lower the cost related to 

1314
01:11:22,500 --> 01:11:24,700
operating Das which is a big 
pain point and a problem that 

1315
01:11:24,700 --> 01:11:26,200
needs to be solved. 
I think. 

1316
01:11:26,300 --> 01:11:29,000
We were talking about earlier in
the show related to the 

1317
01:11:29,000 --> 01:11:33,400
appropriate way to get people 
involved and participating in 

1318
01:11:33,400 --> 01:11:36,500
these structures is something 
that needs to be solved, but I 

1319
01:11:36,500 --> 01:11:40,300
think we're getting close to to 
having at least Frameworks where

1320
01:11:40,300 --> 01:11:43,200
people can begin to experiment 
there and then the last is 

1321
01:11:43,200 --> 01:11:45,600
regulatory questions. 
So we may have figured out a way

1322
01:11:45,600 --> 01:11:48,600
to set these things up, but I'm 
not satisfied. 

1323
01:11:48,600 --> 01:11:50,600
That we can only set up a day 
out in the US. 

1324
01:11:50,900 --> 01:11:53,500
That's under 100 people. 
I want to see those jobs that 

1325
01:11:53,500 --> 01:11:56,300
are tens of thousands of people.
So I do think that there's The 

1326
01:11:56,308 --> 01:12:00,200
long slog of convincing the 
gray-haired and graybeard 

1327
01:12:00,800 --> 01:12:04,000
politicians that that have a 
disproportionate weight on our 

1328
01:12:04,000 --> 01:12:08,000
lives that it's okay for people 
online to organize and do 

1329
01:12:08,000 --> 01:12:10,400
something productive together. 
I think that that's a pretty 

1330
01:12:10,800 --> 01:12:13,400
reasonable argument to make, 
but, and something that does 

1331
01:12:13,400 --> 01:12:17,400
need to be does need to be made 
and hopefully we'll be able to 

1332
01:12:17,400 --> 01:12:20,200
begin to do that. 
Yeah, I mean, but if I buy my 

1333
01:12:20,200 --> 01:12:24,400
regulator hat on for a second, 
you'd great hats, if it's a 

1334
01:12:24,400 --> 01:12:29,700
green hat for some reason, But 
if I put that hat on and and, 

1335
01:12:30,200 --> 01:12:33,000
and I think, okay, well, this is
great. 

1336
01:12:33,000 --> 01:12:38,100
But I mean, a dow can also allow
for extremist groups to organize

1337
01:12:38,400 --> 01:12:42,100
for Dows to also serve purposes 
that are not in the common. 

1338
01:12:42,100 --> 01:12:44,900
Good. 
What is your answer to that 

1339
01:12:45,200 --> 01:12:48,800
concern? 
I think that's always a concern,

1340
01:12:48,800 --> 01:12:50,900
right? 
But people can band together to 

1341
01:12:51,200 --> 01:12:53,700
to do bad things all the time, 
right? 

1342
01:12:53,800 --> 01:12:57,400
And plenty of people set up 
legally recognized entities and 

1343
01:12:57,500 --> 01:12:59,700
perpetuate, a tremendous amount 
of harm to begin with. 

1344
01:12:59,700 --> 01:13:01,200
So I think it's just like 
anything else. 

1345
01:13:01,200 --> 01:13:05,400
If you're putting together a 
doubt, set up an assassination 

1346
01:13:05,400 --> 01:13:08,400
Market or something crazy like 
that wouldn't be a good 

1347
01:13:08,500 --> 01:13:11,200
conversation for some dive into 
those types of questions. 

1348
01:13:11,500 --> 01:13:14,100
You know, there's other 
regulations that you can, you 

1349
01:13:14,100 --> 01:13:16,500
know, there's other regular 
regulations that can apply 

1350
01:13:16,500 --> 01:13:19,000
there. 
And if folks are doing bad 

1351
01:13:19,000 --> 01:13:21,200
activity and can be identified 
and that may become more 

1352
01:13:21,200 --> 01:13:23,900
challenging over time as you 
know cryptographic Primitives 

1353
01:13:23,900 --> 01:13:28,700
become easier to implement Etc. 
Then you know I think we're good

1354
01:13:28,800 --> 01:13:30,400
we're just going to have to 
Grapple with these types of 

1355
01:13:30,400 --> 01:13:31,900
questions. 
I don't know. 

1356
01:13:32,000 --> 01:13:35,000
You can't again put the kind of 
Genie back in the bottle. 

1357
01:13:35,500 --> 01:13:38,100
You just have to kind of deal 
with the hand that's dealt. 

1358
01:13:39,100 --> 01:13:45,100
How much do you think the 
overlap between regulatory reach

1359
01:13:45,100 --> 01:13:47,900
and ours will be? 
So basically if you look at 

1360
01:13:48,100 --> 01:13:53,000
technology where it's now and 
where it's going, you can kind 

1361
01:13:53,000 --> 01:13:58,400
of see that it relies on 
centralized infrastructure 

1362
01:13:58,400 --> 01:14:03,200
increasingly less and we see the
rise of privacy protecting 

1363
01:14:03,200 --> 01:14:06,300
technology on a theorem and 
other platforms. 

1364
01:14:06,700 --> 01:14:10,900
So in principle it would be 
Possible feasible to actually 

1365
01:14:10,900 --> 01:14:14,800
partake in Dallas completely 
anonymously, without being able 

1366
01:14:14,800 --> 01:14:18,500
to be traced. 
Do you think that was well, 

1367
01:14:18,600 --> 01:14:22,900
evade regulatory capture or I 
mean, basically because not only

1368
01:14:22,900 --> 01:14:26,200
as good as they are, if you can 
enforce them, right? 

1369
01:14:26,200 --> 01:14:30,300
Basically, non-enforceable laws.
Don't really I mean, they just 

1370
01:14:30,300 --> 01:14:34,000
described it as a state. 
So how do you resolve that that 

1371
01:14:34,000 --> 01:14:36,200
conundrum? 
It's a great. 

1372
01:14:36,300 --> 01:14:38,300
It's a great question, right? 
We saw early. 

1373
01:14:38,800 --> 01:14:40,800
Examples of this. 
I remember there's a project 

1374
01:14:40,800 --> 01:14:43,700
called Daymond. 
Do it was claiming to be purely 

1375
01:14:43,700 --> 01:14:47,700
Anonymous and trying to explore 
this, you know, this this 

1376
01:14:47,700 --> 01:14:50,200
Vector. 
I think there's always just met 

1377
01:14:50,200 --> 01:14:54,100
a questions just about how 
Anonymous can you actually make 

1378
01:14:54,100 --> 01:14:56,500
things? 
So even with more advanced 

1379
01:14:56,500 --> 01:14:59,600
privacy-preserving tools, like 
tornado cash, we've seen that, 

1380
01:14:59,600 --> 01:15:02,200
there's still holes that people 
can poke through to identify 

1381
01:15:02,200 --> 01:15:04,600
people. 
It's hard to kind of achieve 

1382
01:15:04,600 --> 01:15:08,000
that pure and intimidate. 
I guess that raises the question

1383
01:15:08,000 --> 01:15:11,100
as to whether or not Even though
it's an interesting theoretical 

1384
01:15:11,100 --> 01:15:14,100
question and practice that will 
actually play out, you'll have 

1385
01:15:14,100 --> 01:15:18,600
some completely impervious 
system with no no way to be 

1386
01:15:18,600 --> 01:15:21,800
anonymous things. 
But I think it's an issue. 

1387
01:15:21,800 --> 01:15:23,900
Right. 
I think as more anonymizing 

1388
01:15:23,900 --> 01:15:28,200
technology gets deployed and as 
the coronation tools get better 

1389
01:15:28,600 --> 01:15:31,000
and it can be used for good or 
bad. 

1390
01:15:31,400 --> 01:15:34,100
You hope that people and I tend 
to believe this that people are 

1391
01:15:34,100 --> 01:15:38,800
generally good and if folks are 
perpetuating something bad, 

1392
01:15:39,400 --> 01:15:42,100
They're identifiable. 
There's other tools to do that 

1393
01:15:42,500 --> 01:15:44,700
you know, but this is a risk 
that's been known for a while. 

1394
01:15:44,700 --> 01:15:48,100
We can go back to the crypto. 
Anarchists Manifesto that 

1395
01:15:48,100 --> 01:15:51,400
Timothy may put together where 
he prophesized that you know, 

1396
01:15:51,400 --> 01:15:57,000
strong cryptography, other forms
of of systems, including things 

1397
01:15:57,000 --> 01:16:00,900
that in my mind in my wreaths 
and intimate and kind of 

1398
01:16:01,600 --> 01:16:05,000
prophesize blockchains, this was
written in like the late 1980s, 

1399
01:16:05,100 --> 01:16:08,600
early 1990s are going to create 
a lot of regulatory challenges 

1400
01:16:09,300 --> 01:16:13,300
But in my mind again, you can't 
go backwards, right? 

1401
01:16:13,300 --> 01:16:16,300
So you just have to deal with 
the issues as they as they 

1402
01:16:16,300 --> 01:16:19,900
emerge, I will say that we 
didn't have this pervasive 

1403
01:16:19,900 --> 01:16:23,300
surveillance systems that we've 
been putting in place globally 

1404
01:16:23,300 --> 01:16:27,400
over the past 20 plus years 
before the 1990s. 

1405
01:16:27,400 --> 01:16:30,100
Right? 
So we were able to stop Bad 

1406
01:16:30,100 --> 01:16:33,600
actors then I'm assuming that 
we'd still be able to stop Bad 

1407
01:16:33,600 --> 01:16:37,700
actors in the future even if our
ability to track and Trace 

1408
01:16:37,700 --> 01:16:41,400
things is not as As strong as a 
maybe today. 

1409
01:16:42,800 --> 01:16:46,900
You weren't in the politicians, 
is I think this is a great great

1410
01:16:46,900 --> 01:16:51,300
note to wrap up on techno 
optimistic to the maximum. 

1411
01:16:51,300 --> 01:16:53,700
I love it. 
Fantastic, I'm Aaron. 

1412
01:16:53,700 --> 01:16:56,900
Thank you so much for coming on.
Yeah, thank you so much for 

1413
01:16:56,900 --> 01:16:58,200
having me. 
I really appreciate it. 

1414
01:17:00,500 --> 01:17:02,300
Thank you for joining us on this
week's episode. 

1415
01:17:02,600 --> 01:17:04,200
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1416
01:17:04,800 --> 01:17:07,600
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01:17:07,600 --> 01:17:10,700
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01:17:11,000 --> 01:17:13,900
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01:17:19,907 --> 01:17:22,500
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01:17:25,300 --> 01:17:28,700
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01:17:28,700 --> 01:17:32,000
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01:17:32,000 --> 01:17:34,000
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01:17:34,300 --> 01:17:37,500
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01:17:37,500 --> 01:17:38,800
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