1 00:00:00,100 --> 00:00:04,400 This is epicenter episode 171 with guest vitalik boot Aaron. 2 00:00:35,600 --> 00:00:37,900 this episode of epicenter is brought to you by the Merkel 3 00:00:37,900 --> 00:00:41,200 week, a blockchain conference training, seminar and hackathon 4 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:43,800 taking Us in Paris from March 9th to 12th. 5 00:00:44,000 --> 00:00:47,000 Learn from leading experts and get certified on Building Block 6 00:00:47,000 --> 00:00:49,600 Chain, applications designed to enhance organizational. 7 00:00:49,600 --> 00:00:52,900 Governance get your tickets at Merkel week.com and use the 8 00:00:52,900 --> 00:00:56,500 promo code epicenter to get 30% off early bird tickets. 9 00:00:57,500 --> 00:01:00,500 And by Jax, Jax is a user-friendly wallet that works 10 00:01:00,500 --> 00:01:02,200 across. All your devices and handles 11 00:01:02,200 --> 00:01:06,500 both Bitcoin and either go to ja double x dot IO and embrace the 12 00:01:06,500 --> 00:01:08,300 future of cryptocurrency wallets. 13 00:01:12,200 --> 00:01:14,800 Hello, and welcome to acne Center the show, which talks 14 00:01:14,800 --> 00:01:17,200 about Technologies, projects and startups, driving 15 00:01:17,200 --> 00:01:19,200 decentralization. And the global blockchain 16 00:01:19,200 --> 00:01:21,400 Revolution. My name is Fran, Fabian, Kahn, 17 00:01:22,300 --> 00:01:26,400 and I met Roy baby ever. We are glad to welcome Vitali 18 00:01:26,400 --> 00:01:31,200 twittering back to the show. We'll talk about the do folk 19 00:01:31,800 --> 00:01:35,300 Casper sharding, interoperability ZK, Schnapps 20 00:01:35,800 --> 00:01:38,400 and the application space of blocks, in technology with him 21 00:01:39,000 --> 00:01:41,700 generally, we have our guests, you know, introduce themselves. 22 00:01:41,800 --> 00:01:43,600 Yes. But I think with Alec, doesn't 23 00:01:43,600 --> 00:01:46,700 need an introduction in our space, so I'll probably just 24 00:01:46,700 --> 00:01:51,700 dispense with that formality and perhaps we could just jump in 25 00:01:51,700 --> 00:01:58,700 and talk about the video for. So the attack and the resulting 26 00:01:58,700 --> 00:02:02,600 folk of the etherium system. So from the outside like we have 27 00:02:02,600 --> 00:02:05,600 all seen what happened and I thought it would be a good 28 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:09,199 opportunity to know what was it like what were those what was 29 00:02:09,199 --> 00:02:12,700 that month like to be in your A shoes with Alex. 30 00:02:12,700 --> 00:02:15,100 So maybe if you could tell us your version of The Story. 31 00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:24,600 So 2016 June 17th at 3 p.m. local time I was in Shanghai and 32 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:28,800 it was just another normal day. I was visiting China, it's 33 00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:34,300 liking to a few of our local partners and at one point I got 34 00:02:34,300 --> 00:02:40,400 a message on. Yes, I believe Skype in one of 35 00:02:40,400 --> 00:02:43,400 our kind of semi-public. Scott, you escape get her 36 00:02:43,400 --> 00:02:45,300 channels. That just said, hey, you know, 37 00:02:45,300 --> 00:02:49,600 someone should check this out. It looks like the balance of the 38 00:02:49,600 --> 00:02:53,000 Dao is decreasing. So someone should check this out 39 00:02:53,300 --> 00:02:56,500 and I immediately went and checked it out and the balance 40 00:02:56,500 --> 00:03:01,100 said it was her 9.5 million ether and he immediately got 41 00:03:01,100 --> 00:03:03,000 concerned. They started working at a 42 00:03:03,008 --> 00:03:05,800 definitely seems like ether is getting drained fairly quickly. 43 00:03:06,100 --> 00:03:10,500 So like a sent off a message to some other people from our team 44 00:03:10,900 --> 00:03:17,300 and over the course of about 15 minutes like help Christian 45 00:03:17,600 --> 00:03:19,600 Kristoff, Anna and a couple other people. 46 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:24,400 What in like tried to see what was happening and it's fairly 47 00:03:24,400 --> 00:03:27,600 quickly became clear that likes. Yes, this was very very bad. 48 00:03:28,300 --> 00:03:34,400 And at that point the A fairly large number of people, like in 49 00:03:34,900 --> 00:03:39,600 the etherium foundation, eith course salak kind of came fairly 50 00:03:39,600 --> 00:03:41,900 rapidly started and of talking to each other and trying to 51 00:03:41,908 --> 00:03:43,500 figure out kind of what was going on. 52 00:03:43,500 --> 00:03:49,200 What was there any way to try to stop the situation? 53 00:03:49,200 --> 00:03:52,100 Like, is there anything that could be done? 54 00:03:52,100 --> 00:03:55,000 What was happening? What would the consequences be 55 00:03:55,000 --> 00:03:59,200 on? And just like, get an idea of 56 00:03:59,500 --> 00:04:03,600 everything in general. So we had about two or three 57 00:04:03,600 --> 00:04:08,700 hours of worth of here, early, frantic calls and Skype 58 00:04:08,700 --> 00:04:11,900 discussions at the end of that week. 59 00:04:13,100 --> 00:04:16,899 That first blog post came out, where we basically a said, what 60 00:04:16,899 --> 00:04:21,000 had happened, we suggested the soft pork and hard Fork strategy 61 00:04:21,800 --> 00:04:31,900 then after that we go developers started going on, going off to 62 00:04:31,900 --> 00:04:38,600 actually implement the soft board and I was kind of trying 63 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:44,900 to be online and like trying to be as helpful as as much as I 64 00:04:44,900 --> 00:04:46,800 could. But like even still there is 65 00:04:47,500 --> 00:04:50,400 quite a lot of and there are limits to what I could you 66 00:04:50,400 --> 00:04:55,700 personally because I was first of all like I'm not actually one 67 00:04:55,700 --> 00:04:58,800 of the go developers and I don't have too much experience with 68 00:04:58,800 --> 00:05:02,800 either the language or the clients so that like, I've made 69 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:06,300 a few one line patches, but I'm not the sort of person who Look, 70 00:05:06,300 --> 00:05:09,900 actually be able to be the right one to practically implements 71 00:05:09,900 --> 00:05:16,100 likes in actual software patch. So you know again Jeff and his 72 00:05:16,100 --> 00:05:18,100 team. We're working very hard on that 73 00:05:18,100 --> 00:05:22,000 for several days. You know, I think it was the 74 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:25,600 basic kind of scaffolding was done in about one or two but no, 75 00:05:25,600 --> 00:05:29,600 as usually spent quite a bit of extra time, test going over it 76 00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:34,400 and testing it and making sure everything works well and that 77 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:38,300 was in parallel. And we were trying to kind of 78 00:05:38,300 --> 00:05:41,300 get an idea of what the community thought that we should 79 00:05:41,300 --> 00:05:44,600 do. And I remember there were at 80 00:05:44,600 --> 00:05:48,900 least initially some informal kind of poles that were 81 00:05:48,900 --> 00:05:52,700 happening on Reddit, the results will pull that was happening in 82 00:05:52,700 --> 00:05:55,700 the Chinese community. And you know being in China 83 00:05:55,700 --> 00:06:01,300 myself I yeah quite a bit ended up kind of passing messages back 84 00:06:01,300 --> 00:06:06,800 and forth between like the various different like the On 85 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:08,400 reach out and read it and so forth. 86 00:06:09,300 --> 00:06:12,800 And, like, on both sides, it seems fairly clear that there 87 00:06:12,800 --> 00:06:18,500 was, at least initially, something like, 80, 80 to 85 88 00:06:18,500 --> 00:06:20,900 percent support for the sophomoric and about 64, the 89 00:06:20,900 --> 00:06:24,000 hard work. So, you know, we basically took 90 00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:28,000 that as, you know, we have a mandate from the community to 91 00:06:28,500 --> 00:06:35,300 definitely try a kind of any non hard for krauts to resolving 92 00:06:35,300 --> 00:06:38,200 this issue. Operation if at all possible. 93 00:06:38,500 --> 00:06:44,300 So we get wrote up the code for the soft work, after about a 94 00:06:44,300 --> 00:06:50,400 week, pushed it out. And then at the same time, there 95 00:06:50,400 --> 00:06:52,900 is a lot of other efforts that were happening with the 96 00:06:52,900 --> 00:06:57,000 developers that were trying to go into like, inspects the 97 00:06:57,000 --> 00:06:59,100 geocode. See if there is like some way of 98 00:06:59,100 --> 00:07:02,100 counter-attacking try and like, figure out all this other like 99 00:07:02,100 --> 00:07:05,600 strategies, we can use to pull the attacker down can you? 100 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:08,100 And of drain, the the child's yo-yo. 101 00:07:08,100 --> 00:07:09,500 Can the attacker drain the child? 102 00:07:09,500 --> 00:07:13,900 Zo that your dreams and so forth and the what we figured out 103 00:07:13,900 --> 00:07:17,500 basically, as that you could potentially have this game but 104 00:07:17,500 --> 00:07:20,700 and if you have the soft work, then you could prevent the 105 00:07:20,700 --> 00:07:24,300 attacker from retaliating and so you could win, but without the 106 00:07:24,300 --> 00:07:29,500 soft work, it was purely. Uncool like fear League kind of 107 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:35,500 Unclear of especially initially. And like, it seemed like it 108 00:07:35,500 --> 00:07:40,300 might be possible to just keep the money frozen forever, or it 109 00:07:40,300 --> 00:07:44,000 might be. There's always the risk that 110 00:07:44,000 --> 00:07:47,200 like, someone will discover even more bugs inside of it. 111 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:50,600 And, you know, I mean, Green's here, it's basically stronger 112 00:07:50,600 --> 00:07:54,100 started recommending against trying to kind of play those 113 00:07:54,100 --> 00:07:57,300 kinds of complex games and he's through started pushing for 114 00:07:57,300 --> 00:08:00,200 just, you know, doing a hard fork and getting it getting it 115 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:04,600 over. With then the post came out. 116 00:08:04,600 --> 00:08:08,200 But basically said, you know, the soft pork was kind of deems 117 00:08:08,200 --> 00:08:11,900 to be unsafe and at that point, the soft work effort was 118 00:08:11,900 --> 00:08:15,800 abandoned. It's in parallel. 119 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:19,400 I know the there was that one Chinese team that was working on 120 00:08:19,700 --> 00:08:21,700 building carbon vote and pushing it out. 121 00:08:21,900 --> 00:08:26,800 And carbon vote, I believe, started running out like roughly 122 00:08:26,800 --> 00:08:29,800 around the same time as the, the soft work mode. 123 00:08:30,800 --> 00:08:35,900 Or the soft work attempt failed and that was about two weeks in, 124 00:08:35,900 --> 00:08:39,500 and after the software failed, or still about three weeks left, 125 00:08:39,500 --> 00:08:44,000 before us to do the hard work, and sort of within that time 126 00:08:44,000 --> 00:08:47,500 people were scrambling to try to figure out the hard work, 127 00:08:47,500 --> 00:08:50,000 specification plan, the hard work figure. 128 00:08:50,000 --> 00:08:53,700 Like figure out what the consensus tests are figure out, 129 00:08:53,700 --> 00:08:58,300 what else would need to be tested and do some extra Network 130 00:08:58,300 --> 00:09:02,600 test because you know, just Because of the possibility of 131 00:09:02,600 --> 00:09:07,000 about this one, this work would go less smoothly than something 132 00:09:07,000 --> 00:09:09,600 like the translation for from Frontier to Homestead. 133 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:14,200 If then, you know, the votes started coming in on carbon 134 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:17,300 vote. And I remember on Reddit, it 135 00:09:17,300 --> 00:09:21,800 seems kind of very chaotic and least for myself personally. 136 00:09:21,800 --> 00:09:24,900 Mm, mm, you know, I was surprised actually didn't 137 00:09:24,900 --> 00:09:28,100 receive any like, like serious death threats. 138 00:09:28,100 --> 00:09:31,200 I mean, I received a bunch of a lot of messages from trolls, and 139 00:09:31,200 --> 00:09:36,600 I still do, but like, nothing on the order of, you know, of like, 140 00:09:36,600 --> 00:09:41,600 actually, the threatening to kill me which is I guess kind of 141 00:09:42,200 --> 00:09:46,300 a nice Silver Lining then, you know, eventually the carbon vote 142 00:09:46,300 --> 00:09:51,700 showed that result of about EDU. Five percent in favor of the 143 00:09:51,700 --> 00:09:55,500 fork and like that's a result that I kind of accepted because 144 00:09:55,500 --> 00:09:58,900 it also seems to roughly line up with like a lot of the other 145 00:09:58,900 --> 00:10:00,500 polls that were happening at the time. 146 00:10:00,700 --> 00:10:04,000 So like I saw mining pools were around like 75 percent in favor. 147 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:08,000 I saw support for the hard Fork increased after the soft work 148 00:10:08,000 --> 00:10:16,800 failed and so like I knew that the a strong majeste wrong, 149 00:10:16,800 --> 00:10:18,600 super majority of the care of the community. 150 00:10:18,600 --> 00:10:22,700 It was definitely in favor. In favor of it, going ahead and 151 00:10:23,400 --> 00:10:28,400 we three days before the deadline, so three days before 152 00:10:28,400 --> 00:10:31,200 the attack or would be able to make their next move together to 153 00:10:31,500 --> 00:10:35,000 navigate. Get the money out, we release 154 00:10:35,000 --> 00:10:38,500 the code. And people, I installed the code 155 00:10:38,500 --> 00:10:43,500 and I remember when the hard work was just about to take 156 00:10:43,500 --> 00:10:47,900 place, we were all in Cornell at a, a worksheet Workshop that we 157 00:10:47,900 --> 00:10:49,800 were organizing together with ice. 158 00:10:49,900 --> 00:10:54,400 Three and the a fusee cash, people were present and at like 159 00:10:54,400 --> 00:10:58,300 9, 20 am 40 minutes before the first day of the workshop that 160 00:10:58,300 --> 00:11:02,500 will block one point, nine two million hits and everything 161 00:11:02,500 --> 00:11:04,800 seems to kind of go through smoothly. 162 00:11:05,100 --> 00:11:08,800 So that was the first part and then obviously three days later, 163 00:11:08,800 --> 00:11:14,000 the whole like the whole kind of Classics inside of the situation 164 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:20,200 started to kind of take hold and it things kind of Continued 165 00:11:20,200 --> 00:11:25,800 going from there for a while. So looking back on that original 166 00:11:25,800 --> 00:11:28,200 problem is one of the original thing was very, you know, this 167 00:11:28,200 --> 00:11:32,800 Unstoppable, World computer, you know, no censorship, no 168 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:34,600 immutable. You know, there were so some of 169 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:41,200 the core Promises of ethereum and, you know, looking back on 170 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:44,500 that today we have him classic, we have it here, IAM, I have 171 00:11:44,500 --> 00:11:49,400 heard many people say this is, you know, irreparably damaged 172 00:11:49,400 --> 00:11:51,000 tissue. Substantially damaged the 173 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:52,800 theorem. I'm not sure if I agree with 174 00:11:52,800 --> 00:11:56,300 that personally but I'm curious. What is your point of view you 175 00:11:56,300 --> 00:12:00,200 feel like this is done lasting damage to whom? 176 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:03,000 Do you feel like it was mostly just a valuable learning 177 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:06,700 experience and if you're a fine or how do you how do you look 178 00:12:06,700 --> 00:12:09,300 back on that event? I am first of all I think a 179 00:12:09,308 --> 00:12:14,900 theory I'm is definitely fine and I think like outside of she 180 00:12:14,900 --> 00:12:20,000 really kind of small group of people that are like really Lee 181 00:12:20,000 --> 00:12:23,000 strongly into the sort of Purity morality of, you know, if it 182 00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:24,600 stains once, then, it's gone forever. 183 00:12:24,600 --> 00:12:27,700 I think, like, most people are even people who disagreed with 184 00:12:27,700 --> 00:12:31,300 the decision enormous. And many of them are kind of 185 00:12:31,500 --> 00:12:34,300 fine with it. And I think I like over time, 186 00:12:34,300 --> 00:12:37,000 they're starting to see that, you know, they, if you are young 187 00:12:38,600 --> 00:12:45,000 Kind of governance as a stabilizing more and more and 188 00:12:45,200 --> 00:12:47,400 that the project is continuing to move forward. 189 00:12:47,800 --> 00:12:51,100 But in terms of kind of what's extreme consequences, I think 190 00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:56,600 there's quite a bit of good and there's quite a bit of bad so I 191 00:12:56,600 --> 00:12:59,700 want to say yeah I like on the good side. 192 00:12:59,700 --> 00:13:06,000 I think the hack ended up doing wonders for the progress of 193 00:13:06,200 --> 00:13:08,200 safe. Smart contract program. 194 00:13:09,200 --> 00:13:12,600 After that after that happens, I guess I noticed that, you know, 195 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:16,400 within the next two months, there were at least five teams 196 00:13:16,400 --> 00:13:18,800 that showed up that we're all trying out various different 197 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:21,500 approaches that improving smart contract programming safety. 198 00:13:21,900 --> 00:13:24,100 Whether it's better language is whether it's better development 199 00:13:24,100 --> 00:13:26,500 environments, whether its formal verification, you know? 200 00:13:26,500 --> 00:13:32,300 It's it really was this kind of big huge sign to the academic 201 00:13:32,300 --> 00:13:34,500 Community. The basically said look this 202 00:13:34,500 --> 00:13:38,500 problem is real and you know, there's money at stake and This 203 00:13:38,500 --> 00:13:41,900 e is a place where you can contribute, you know, with the 204 00:13:41,900 --> 00:13:44,200 knowledge that you have been figuring out over the last 30 205 00:13:44,200 --> 00:13:47,200 years, right here, right now. And I think that's something 206 00:13:47,200 --> 00:13:50,900 that's getting that's gotten quite a few people excited and 207 00:13:50,900 --> 00:13:54,700 on the negative side there was obviously a bunch of PR Fallout 208 00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:01,700 and I think obviously on net - but I think the great majority 209 00:14:01,700 --> 00:14:04,700 of the negativity is that your beauty to the hack itself and 210 00:14:04,700 --> 00:14:07,800 look and not necessarily any of the decisions that followed it. 211 00:14:09,000 --> 00:14:11,900 So, I swing at the time, even when it was quite controversial, 212 00:14:11,900 --> 00:14:14,900 you know, was this a good thing was, is a bad thing. 213 00:14:14,900 --> 00:14:17,900 You know, some people were saying I did sort of Damages, 214 00:14:17,900 --> 00:14:22,000 this immutability idea and stuff, but I think if one took a 215 00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:25,100 step back, and if I'm, if one isn't so deep in this whole 216 00:14:25,100 --> 00:14:28,900 crypto community and looks at this, then it was very clear to 217 00:14:28,900 --> 00:14:35,200 me that the fork was The choice that would be looked at more 218 00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:38,700 positively than just letting the theft proceed, right? 219 00:14:38,700 --> 00:14:40,600 Because otherwise, it would have been a huge thing. 220 00:14:40,600 --> 00:14:44,700 Like another man cocks 150 million stolen like this is much 221 00:14:44,700 --> 00:14:48,500 more like, okay, Community rallies together on this theft 222 00:14:48,500 --> 00:14:50,700 and that kind of sounds like a good story, right? 223 00:14:50,700 --> 00:14:53,500 If you sort of a man outside, I'm like, okay, maybe it's not 224 00:14:53,500 --> 00:14:55,500 so secure. But you know, at least even in 225 00:14:55,500 --> 00:14:57,900 the sea centralized Network, they can come together and do 226 00:14:57,900 --> 00:14:59,400 something about something like that. 227 00:15:00,400 --> 00:15:04,300 If you believe in like certain kinds of Of kind of Applied, 228 00:15:04,300 --> 00:15:08,700 social Chaos Theory, as, you know, always some kind of modern 229 00:15:08,900 --> 00:15:11,100 sort of philosophers trying to explain things like the 230 00:15:11,100 --> 00:15:14,300 financial crisis do then you would say that, you know, a 231 00:15:14,300 --> 00:15:17,600 major crisis is in any ecosystem is inevitable. 232 00:15:18,100 --> 00:15:21,600 And, you know, you also say that, you know, the facts that 233 00:15:21,600 --> 00:15:25,300 our major crisis happened at a time when the community was well 234 00:15:25,300 --> 00:15:31,200 coordinated enough to basically undo about like 85% of the 235 00:15:31,200 --> 00:15:34,100 theft, is that like, actually a really Only lucky an amazing 236 00:15:34,100 --> 00:15:37,900 thing and you know realistically that's not an opportunity that 237 00:15:37,900 --> 00:15:42,000 we're likely to have quite so easily in the future. 238 00:15:44,500 --> 00:15:47,200 Let's take a short break to talk about the Merkel week of 239 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:50,400 blockchain training seminar conference and hackathon taking 240 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:53,500 place here in Paris for March 9. To 12. 241 00:15:53,500 --> 00:15:57,000 The Merkel week is organized by Eureka certification and it's 242 00:15:57,000 --> 00:16:00,600 event that is designed to help entrepreneurs developers and 243 00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:04,000 decision-makers gain practical experience using blockchain 244 00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:07,000 Technologies to build distributed governance in the 245 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:09,100 organization's. So it's a four-day event. 246 00:16:09,100 --> 00:16:11,100 And it's broken up into two parts. 247 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:15,300 First March 9th, there's a full day training, Are featuring an 248 00:16:15,300 --> 00:16:18,900 impressive list of speakers including Gavin would William 249 00:16:18,900 --> 00:16:20,300 McGregor. And Peter Todd. 250 00:16:20,300 --> 00:16:22,500 You get the full list of speakers over at Merkel 251 00:16:22,500 --> 00:16:25,200 week.com. And as an attendee you'll get to 252 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:29,300 participate in training courses and demonstrations for Bitcoin 253 00:16:29,300 --> 00:16:32,000 and aetherium. And these are designed to help 254 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:37,000 you build and test, blockchain applications meant to enhance. 255 00:16:37,300 --> 00:16:40,500 Operational efficiency in your businesses and organizations. 256 00:16:40,800 --> 00:16:44,600 Then over the weekend for March, 10 to 12, you can put All that 257 00:16:44,600 --> 00:16:47,900 knowledge to practical, use by participating in the hackathon. 258 00:16:48,100 --> 00:16:50,600 And here, you're going to get the work with other developers 259 00:16:50,600 --> 00:16:53,200 designers and entrepreneurs and you're going to come together 260 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:57,700 and you're going to work on real I've Bitcoin and aetherium 261 00:16:57,800 --> 00:17:00,800 applications under the clothes mentorship of those leading 262 00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:02,900 experts. And by the way, there's a 10,000 263 00:17:02,900 --> 00:17:05,599 Euro prize for the top three teams in the hackathon. 264 00:17:06,200 --> 00:17:09,800 So come join us come spend the weekend here in Paris for the 265 00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:13,400 Merkel week from March 9 to 12. I remember all you listeners in 266 00:17:13,400 --> 00:17:16,300 UK, that's all We a two-hour trip on the Eurostar so don't 267 00:17:16,300 --> 00:17:19,099 miss out. So get your tickets over at 268 00:17:19,099 --> 00:17:22,900 Merkel week.com and be sure to use the promo code epicenter at 269 00:17:22,900 --> 00:17:28,000 the top of the checkout page for 30% off your early bird tickets. 270 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:30,900 And that offer is valid until March 3rd. 271 00:17:31,100 --> 00:17:33,800 So we'd like to thank the Merkel week and Eureka certification 272 00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:38,700 for their support of a cetera. Taylor bhakti topic of deos for 273 00:17:38,700 --> 00:17:41,800 the time, being only to pick it up later towards the end of the 274 00:17:41,800 --> 00:17:46,000 show on the do4 was perhaps. Not intended for the what you 275 00:17:46,000 --> 00:17:50,000 are intending for is a folk to move with helium from proof of 276 00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:54,800 work today to proof of stake. So, let's kind of move into a 277 00:17:54,808 --> 00:17:58,200 discussion on, why, why? That's the plan, right? 278 00:17:58,600 --> 00:18:02,800 So recently, you publish this article, which was called which 279 00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:06,200 outlined your proof of stake design philosophy, right? 280 00:18:06,900 --> 00:18:12,200 And in that article, you you laid out for basically the 281 00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:16,200 grounds for, at least, Attempting the move to proof of 282 00:18:16,200 --> 00:18:19,700 stake. So can you explain why why you 283 00:18:19,700 --> 00:18:24,500 want to take such a transition in our Network that is live and 284 00:18:24,500 --> 00:18:26,200 has over a billion dollars in value. 285 00:18:27,500 --> 00:18:30,700 Sure. So I would say, proof of stake 286 00:18:30,700 --> 00:18:33,000 has a couple of major advantages. 287 00:18:33,300 --> 00:18:39,100 So the one that people bring up a lot, is that it really reduces 288 00:18:39,600 --> 00:18:44,300 one of the biggest weaknesses of proof of work which is the very 289 00:18:44,300 --> 00:18:47,500 large and going to be any fishing, say, Hardware costs 10 290 00:18:47,500 --> 00:18:52,100 electricity consumption. So if you look at something like 291 00:18:52,400 --> 00:18:55,700 the Bitcoin Network like it burns hundreds of millions of 292 00:18:55,700 --> 00:18:59,500 dollars a year in Capital depreciation costs, the 293 00:18:59,500 --> 00:19:05,100 electricity costs, and maintenance costs, all to 294 00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:08,100 maintain this network, and the computations that these miners 295 00:19:08,100 --> 00:19:10,000 are doing. But they're basically just kind 296 00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:13,200 of pointless busy work right there, just problems that are 297 00:19:13,500 --> 00:19:16,500 created for the sake of being hard. 298 00:19:17,000 --> 00:19:20,300 And, you know, it's like it's not really providing any kind of 299 00:19:21,100 --> 00:19:22,900 any kind of extra value to society. 300 00:19:22,900 --> 00:19:25,900 It's basically just doing this sort of busy work for the 301 00:19:25,900 --> 00:19:29,100 purpose of Proving to the Bitcoin Network that the mind 302 00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:32,400 the mind are capable of doing the basic work exists and isn't 303 00:19:32,400 --> 00:19:34,500 like some kind of some kind of civil attacker. 304 00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:38,700 And I mean personally, I've never really been comfortable 305 00:19:38,700 --> 00:19:42,900 with like that aspect of either etherium or Bitcoin, and I've 306 00:19:42,900 --> 00:19:45,800 been always kind of interested in seeing, you know, are there 307 00:19:45,800 --> 00:19:50,100 Solutions, are there ways to kind of reduce the inefficient 308 00:19:50,100 --> 00:19:54,200 energy consumption and back in 2013, I was really interested in 309 00:19:54,400 --> 00:19:57,100 various things like proof of storage useful proof-of-work, 310 00:19:57,600 --> 00:20:00,100 Which is the idea of coming up with a proof of work algorithm 311 00:20:00,100 --> 00:20:03,100 that simultaneous, we does various forms of scientific 312 00:20:03,100 --> 00:20:06,300 computation. What you could imagine a 313 00:20:06,300 --> 00:20:09,000 proof-of-work that like simultaneously does some kind of 314 00:20:09,000 --> 00:20:14,000 machine learning or you know protein folding or whatever like 315 00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:17,600 their ideas around, like proof of Excellence which involves 316 00:20:17,600 --> 00:20:23,200 like coming up with proofs of humans trying to solve like 317 00:20:23,600 --> 00:20:25,500 mathematical problems or other things. 318 00:20:25,500 --> 00:20:27,100 They're difficult for humans to solve. 319 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:29,200 And like their various other ideas. 320 00:20:29,700 --> 00:20:33,900 And eventually it kind of came to realize a proof of stake is 321 00:20:33,900 --> 00:20:36,000 just like the simplest and most visible one. 322 00:20:36,800 --> 00:20:41,800 So that's one argument. And I mean, it's also important 323 00:20:41,800 --> 00:20:45,000 to note that the are this kind of argument of avoiding waste 324 00:20:45,000 --> 00:20:46,800 actually has two sides to it, right. 325 00:20:47,100 --> 00:20:52,400 One of them is just a via kind of social arguments that wasting 326 00:20:52,400 --> 00:20:55,700 electricity is bad wrecking, the environment as bad and so forth. 327 00:20:56,000 --> 00:21:00,800 And I mean On the environmental side and probably say that the 328 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:05,600 in external environmental costs of Hardware in manufacturing or 329 00:21:06,300 --> 00:21:09,200 from something that's under appreciated and maybe even worse 330 00:21:09,200 --> 00:21:12,200 than the external cost of the electricity consumption. 331 00:21:13,000 --> 00:21:17,700 But the second side of the coin is that if you're not extending 332 00:21:17,700 --> 00:21:21,700 as many resources on consensus algorithm, then that means that 333 00:21:21,700 --> 00:21:24,600 the protocol does not have the issue as many other coins. 334 00:21:24,900 --> 00:21:29,800 And that means that the the end of cryptocurrency and a 335 00:21:29,808 --> 00:21:33,300 blockchain protocol can be more deflationary, right? 336 00:21:33,300 --> 00:21:38,400 And like in general people kind of like that or oh yeah. 337 00:21:38,400 --> 00:21:43,700 Like there is there's definitely a trade-off because I might you 338 00:21:43,700 --> 00:21:47,200 know, if you don't have any block rewards at least in the 339 00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:49,700 context of proof of work. Then you know, you don't have 340 00:21:49,700 --> 00:21:53,400 enough security to run the watching but at the same time 341 00:21:53,400 --> 00:21:56,600 like if you can come up with a way to have higher levels of 342 00:21:56,600 --> 00:21:59,600 security and and not increase issuance, then that's something 343 00:21:59,600 --> 00:22:01,900 that most people are willing to take. 344 00:22:02,800 --> 00:22:05,900 So that's one side, the other side which is also interesting 345 00:22:05,900 --> 00:22:08,800 is that my opinion is that proof of stake. 346 00:22:08,800 --> 00:22:13,700 Blockchains actually are more secure against kind of like very 347 00:22:13,700 --> 00:22:17,900 large and serious attackers. And the argument that I raised 348 00:22:17,900 --> 00:22:22,600 here is that with proof-of-work like okay you know you there is 349 00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:27,200 some cost to producing more a sex than the rest of the network 350 00:22:27,200 --> 00:22:32,000 combined and you using those a six to pull off a 51% attack. 351 00:22:32,200 --> 00:22:33,900 Back, right? And that cost is like somewhere 352 00:22:33,900 --> 00:22:41,100 around 200 million dollars. Now, the problem is that There 353 00:22:41,100 --> 00:22:45,800 is, if you can do that then for a fairly small additional 354 00:22:45,800 --> 00:22:49,100 increments and cost you can do what I call a spawn camping 355 00:22:49,100 --> 00:22:53,100 attack, which is basically an attack where you attach a 51% 356 00:22:53,100 --> 00:22:56,500 attack the watch in the soon as it starts recovering, you 51% 357 00:22:56,500 --> 00:23:00,200 attack it again and then you 51% attack it again and so forth. 358 00:23:00,700 --> 00:23:04,800 And the end result is that you basically destroy all the trust 359 00:23:04,800 --> 00:23:07,900 in the system. Now generally, when you bring 360 00:23:07,900 --> 00:23:11,300 this up to, you know, people like Bitcoin chords A, they say 361 00:23:11,500 --> 00:23:14,600 oval, if that starts happening, then, you know, we can just hard 362 00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:17,700 work to a new kind of proof of work, and we can basically make 363 00:23:17,700 --> 00:23:21,800 all those Asics useless but the problem is that, okay, let's say 364 00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:25,900 I'm an attacker who hasn't but 250 million dollars or whatever 365 00:23:25,900 --> 00:23:28,600 enough resources to spawn Camp Bitcoin wants. 366 00:23:28,900 --> 00:23:34,200 Well once you move away from a 6 and then on to general purpose, 367 00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:37,600 Hardware, then I can probably spend another like hundred 368 00:23:37,600 --> 00:23:39,400 million dollars. Like it's going to be a less 369 00:23:39,400 --> 00:23:42,400 than 250 be. Because the hardware 370 00:23:42,400 --> 00:23:45,800 accumulation is going to start from scratch but let's say I'll 371 00:23:45,800 --> 00:23:48,000 probably people into spending over a hundred million dollars 372 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:51,000 the 51% attack and spawn Camp Bitcoin again. 373 00:23:51,300 --> 00:23:55,000 Now the problem is though is that the second time around you 374 00:23:55,000 --> 00:23:57,600 can't hard for a different proof of work algorithm anymore 375 00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:00,800 because the second time around everyone is mining with general 376 00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:03,600 purpose, hardware. And so if you do another more 377 00:24:03,600 --> 00:24:07,200 hard for Works than like, this spawn camping attack is going to 378 00:24:07,208 --> 00:24:10,300 be able to continue. So the conclusion of this I 379 00:24:10,400 --> 00:24:15,900 think we is that realistically. There actually is a finite cost 380 00:24:16,100 --> 00:24:20,200 that a well resources accurate can pay to essentially kill off 381 00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:22,500 a proof-of-work box unit for good rate. 382 00:24:22,500 --> 00:24:26,900 And in my opinion this is actually quite unsettling, 383 00:24:26,900 --> 00:24:31,600 right? And my opinion is that one of 384 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:35,800 the really nice things about the kind of cypherpunks spirit in 385 00:24:35,800 --> 00:24:40,100 general, is that it focuses on this idea of attack. 386 00:24:40,300 --> 00:24:42,500 Defense asymmetry in cryptography, right? 387 00:24:42,500 --> 00:24:47,700 So if you look at it and systems you know the world in general 388 00:24:47,700 --> 00:24:51,000 right now, the cost of attack is generally much lower than the 389 00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:53,400 cost of Defense right? Building a building cost, five 390 00:24:53,400 --> 00:24:56,000 million dollars, making an idea to blow it up. 391 00:24:56,000 --> 00:25:03,800 My pasta no less than 50,000 and like Most kind of adversarial 392 00:25:03,800 --> 00:25:06,600 environments in the world are actually operating this way but 393 00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:10,100 with a few exceptions and one of the major exceptions actually is 394 00:25:10,100 --> 00:25:12,500 cryptography, you know, like one of the really nice things about 395 00:25:12,500 --> 00:25:17,800 cryptography is that I personally Dan Stein messages 396 00:25:17,800 --> 00:25:21,400 with a public key and I can do this at a very low cost. 397 00:25:21,400 --> 00:25:25,400 You know there's a signature costs like 0.0001 cents worth of 398 00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:30,300 electricity to produce. But the cost of actually 399 00:25:30,300 --> 00:25:34,600 cracking that signature is so large that, you know, not even a 400 00:25:34,608 --> 00:25:38,100 major national governments and even a chance of doing it and 401 00:25:38,108 --> 00:25:43,200 like, that's something that's like extremely powerful and but, 402 00:25:43,400 --> 00:25:45,200 you know, that kind of Sucker Punch Spirit. 403 00:25:45,300 --> 00:25:48,600 If you look at the proof of work that sets the systems, it 404 00:25:48,600 --> 00:25:51,000 doesn't carry over like at all right? 405 00:25:51,000 --> 00:25:56,200 So the cost of attacking a proof-of-work watch in is always 406 00:25:56,200 --> 00:25:58,900 necessarily going to be A less than the cost of Defending it 407 00:25:59,500 --> 00:26:02,700 and like, it can't be more. And the reason basically is 408 00:26:02,700 --> 00:26:06,000 that, you know, if you want a 51% attack of watch in, then 409 00:26:06,200 --> 00:26:09,400 that means they have to have spent more on Hardware plus 410 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:11,300 electricity than everyone else combined. 411 00:26:11,500 --> 00:26:14,400 But then, you know, oh, wait, that already means that if you 412 00:26:14,400 --> 00:26:18,000 can spend more money attacking than the network has spent 413 00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:20,500 defending, then you can win and 30s. 414 00:26:20,500 --> 00:26:23,500 Think we can spend much less because like a large portion of 415 00:26:23,500 --> 00:26:26,000 those electricity costs have already been spent and you don't 416 00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:27,200 and you're never going to see them again. 417 00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:31,100 So the nice thing about proof of stake is that I feel like it 418 00:26:31,100 --> 00:26:33,300 actually does come close to replicating this kind of 419 00:26:33,300 --> 00:26:38,300 cypherpunk spirit because you instead of having this kind of 420 00:26:38,500 --> 00:26:40,600 Spawn camping, vulnerability, you know. 421 00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:42,800 Sure. Someone could get 51% attack 422 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:45,000 approved steak watching. Okay, fine. 423 00:26:45,400 --> 00:26:50,000 Now one of the key property is that we're trying to design into 424 00:26:50,000 --> 00:26:53,000 Casper. Is this idea of what I call 425 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:56,100 auditable, Byzantine fault tolerance which actually does go 426 00:26:56,100 --> 00:26:58,700 a bit beyond visited faults. Or it's because auditable. 427 00:26:58,700 --> 00:27:01,800 This is your fault tolerance. Doesn't just say, you know, if 428 00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:04,600 the network broke, that means that more than one-third of the 429 00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:07,800 nodes are Byzantine. It actually means if the network 430 00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:12,300 breaks then more than one-third of the nodes are Byzantine and, 431 00:27:12,300 --> 00:27:15,500 you know, who to blame, right? So you have cryptographic proof 432 00:27:15,700 --> 00:27:19,000 that you can use in order to show that, you know, oh, you 433 00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:22,000 know these know these validators are the ones that were 434 00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:26,200 responsible for the 51% attack. And when you can do is you can 435 00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:30,400 just like coordinate a Work on the community level and you can 436 00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:33,700 just like to continue the chain and those validators can get 437 00:27:33,700 --> 00:27:36,600 their deposits destroyed and you can you just keep going from 438 00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:39,300 there, right? So the cost of the attacker 439 00:27:39,300 --> 00:27:42,200 would be something like you know a hundred million dollars worth 440 00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:46,800 of ether of all these deposits that got Burns but the cost of 441 00:27:46,808 --> 00:27:49,800 the network would basically just be oh hey it's just an 442 00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:53,500 unexpected, hard work like it would maybe be two or three 443 00:27:53,500 --> 00:27:57,900 times as bad as what would happen if we're what It's back 444 00:27:57,900 --> 00:28:01,400 in November, when we have that, I can set this failure between 445 00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:04,000 gas and Purity but like it's not that much worse, right? 446 00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:07,300 Like okay. You know, people would know what 447 00:28:07,300 --> 00:28:10,200 happened, people know what to expect, you know the watch had 448 00:28:10,200 --> 00:28:12,000 would need to continue these values. 449 00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:16,500 We get slashed and life goes on and sure the attacker can keep 450 00:28:16,500 --> 00:28:18,300 on attacking yet again and again. 451 00:28:18,600 --> 00:28:21,400 But you know, the attacker would have to buy another 10 million 452 00:28:21,400 --> 00:28:23,800 ether and keep on doing this each and every time, right? 453 00:28:23,800 --> 00:28:28,400 So The equation is a really tilted in favor of the defender 454 00:28:28,400 --> 00:28:32,700 here and like I would even say one of the other nice properties 455 00:28:32,700 --> 00:28:36,300 of this kind of approach is that because such a system would be 456 00:28:36,300 --> 00:28:40,400 able to just like honey badger recover from 51% attack. 457 00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:43,200 So. Well, I would argue that a 51% 458 00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:46,800 attack would actually increase the value of the underlying 459 00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:50,700 cryptocurrency it because people would realize, oh wait, you 460 00:28:50,700 --> 00:28:55,200 know, the it's there was an attacker in this and some A 461 00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:58,200 bunch of ether got burned and so the rest of it is going to be 462 00:28:58,208 --> 00:29:02,300 worth more, right? So because of that, I think like 463 00:29:02,900 --> 00:29:05,600 the process of even trying to buy up enough ether to pull the 464 00:29:05,600 --> 00:29:10,200 attack off, would end up going to ironically enough increasing 465 00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:13,600 the price. So like a kind of conjecture is 466 00:29:13,600 --> 00:29:16,300 that people would realize this and I basically no one would 467 00:29:16,300 --> 00:29:19,500 even try like doing at least that kind of attack Vector at 468 00:29:19,500 --> 00:29:22,400 all. And people would focus their 469 00:29:22,400 --> 00:29:29,100 energies on relatively a attack vectors like finding software 470 00:29:29,100 --> 00:29:32,400 bugs in operating systems that let them like hack into people's 471 00:29:32,400 --> 00:29:35,000 computers or you know, whatever else people can do now. 472 00:29:35,400 --> 00:29:38,100 So, like, that's the general thing that we're trying to go 473 00:29:38,100 --> 00:29:40,900 towards. I mean, there's also obviously a 474 00:29:40,908 --> 00:29:46,700 lot of kind of specific things that we wanted to do so But one 475 00:29:46,700 --> 00:29:51,500 of the things that we've been doing a lot in the last probably 476 00:29:51,500 --> 00:29:55,500 four months is we've been making a really serious effort at 477 00:29:55,500 --> 00:30:02,200 trying to understand kind of abstractly incentive 478 00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:05,100 compatibility in the context of a crib. 479 00:30:05,100 --> 00:30:08,500 So we can all make protocols. So just thinking, like a very 480 00:30:08,500 --> 00:30:13,800 abstract sense, you know, how given any protocol that of, how 481 00:30:13,800 --> 00:30:15,600 would you think about figuring out? 482 00:30:15,700 --> 00:30:19,200 How to incentivize for the participants and the thing that 483 00:30:19,200 --> 00:30:23,300 we realized is that we, we came up with a method or a 484 00:30:23,308 --> 00:30:26,000 combination of a couple of methodology is right, where, 485 00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:28,700 like, one of them, is this notion of auditable, fault, 486 00:30:28,700 --> 00:30:32,200 tolerance, where you would try to create systems where if the 487 00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:35,200 system breaks and you absolutely know who's at fault and you know 488 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:37,300 that they unambiguous. We did stuff like that. 489 00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:40,300 Then you can just destroy their entire deposit, right? 490 00:30:40,300 --> 00:30:42,100 Because, you know, you can eat, you know, that they did 491 00:30:42,100 --> 00:30:43,900 something bad, and you can finalize them. 492 00:30:43,900 --> 00:30:45,500 If and if you're going to penalize them, you might as 493 00:30:45,500 --> 00:30:46,600 well. All penalize them, by all the 494 00:30:46,600 --> 00:30:50,200 way to answer the max. Now, that's one side of it. 495 00:30:50,200 --> 00:30:54,400 It ends design, it gets us algorithms that have this 496 00:30:54,500 --> 00:30:57,200 inaudible bft property is something that's fairly 497 00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:02,200 important. Now, Another interesting 498 00:31:02,700 --> 00:31:07,300 situation that we came up with is what if you have a situation 499 00:31:07,300 --> 00:31:10,100 where the, some valid data, or some participants, in a 500 00:31:10,108 --> 00:31:13,500 consensus protocol, cause the consensus protocol, it's either, 501 00:31:13,500 --> 00:31:16,400 fail, where have reduced performance but you don't know 502 00:31:16,400 --> 00:31:18,700 exactly which one. Let's say that you can nail it 503 00:31:18,700 --> 00:31:22,400 down till one of two. Then the approach that we ended 504 00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:27,000 up two diverging on is in that case, you penalize both, right? 505 00:31:27,000 --> 00:31:30,500 So if you can nail it down to one of n, you No eyes all out of 506 00:31:30,500 --> 00:31:34,200 them. Now, the reason why this is nice 507 00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:36,900 is because like first of all, it achieves this nice incentive 508 00:31:36,900 --> 00:31:41,700 compatibility property. And it also has the really good 509 00:31:41,700 --> 00:31:46,000 side benefit of being a very effective fixed or or mitigation 510 00:31:46,000 --> 00:31:48,000 against things like selfish minding, right? 511 00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:53,500 Because like basically if you can show that if you follow this 512 00:31:53,500 --> 00:31:59,600 methodology, then any deviation from optimal, protocol Behavior, 513 00:31:59,700 --> 00:32:01,500 ER and by also protocol Behavior. 514 00:32:01,500 --> 00:32:04,000 Like, imagine like something like the Bitcoin area theory on 515 00:32:04,000 --> 00:32:06,400 blockchain. You know, miners just for always 516 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:09,100 creating blocks one right on top of the previous brightest. 517 00:32:09,100 --> 00:32:11,700 Hablo previous, no sales, no uncle is just like a straight 518 00:32:11,700 --> 00:32:14,800 chain, like you can show that if you fold this methodology and 519 00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:18,900 when you design your incentives, then any deviation from optimal 520 00:32:18,900 --> 00:32:23,200 Behavior will not be profitable to anyone in like your will lead 521 00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:25,300 to anyone who might be out false move. 522 00:32:25,300 --> 00:32:28,900 Move easing money, right? And so you know, if you follow 523 00:32:28,900 --> 00:32:33,500 this approach, Then all these kind of large classes of attacks 524 00:32:33,500 --> 00:32:35,500 become something that you don't really have to worry about 525 00:32:35,500 --> 00:32:37,400 anymore. And this is a methodology that 526 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:38,600 you could apply to proof of work. 527 00:32:38,600 --> 00:32:40,700 You could apply to, perhaps take like good applying water 528 00:32:40,700 --> 00:32:43,500 contexts. This is the methodology of 529 00:32:43,500 --> 00:32:46,400 incentive compatibility, you're referring to, but I mean, inside 530 00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:49,500 that compatibility is like a generic game theoretic term. 531 00:32:49,500 --> 00:32:52,800 That just basically means, you know, the mechanism in 532 00:32:52,800 --> 00:32:58,900 encourages validators or what participants to act in ways that 533 00:32:58,900 --> 00:33:01,400 are that. Kind of promotes the goal that 534 00:33:01,400 --> 00:33:06,200 you will that you wants to have but this is our methodology at 535 00:33:06,200 --> 00:33:08,200 trying to achieve incentive compatibility. 536 00:33:09,600 --> 00:33:13,300 So this is obviously super exciting and I made much agree 537 00:33:14,200 --> 00:33:17,700 that proof-of-work security model is kind of flawed and if 538 00:33:17,700 --> 00:33:20,500 you think in the longer term, it's really unclear how Bitcoin 539 00:33:20,500 --> 00:33:23,200 is going to be secure with it yesterday or we recorded an 540 00:33:23,200 --> 00:33:28,000 episode with about, you know, Bitcoin fee market and unlimited 541 00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:30,900 and how that's going to work. But I think what's clear their 542 00:33:30,900 --> 00:33:34,700 right is that it's unclear how that's going to work. 543 00:33:36,300 --> 00:33:41,900 But what's the timeline here when We actually expect Casper 544 00:33:41,900 --> 00:33:45,200 to be implemented and what do you see as some of the risks? 545 00:33:47,800 --> 00:33:53,000 I'm guessing right now. I like it. 546 00:33:53,000 --> 00:33:56,100 Like, it's hard to tell, but like start of next year, seems 547 00:33:56,100 --> 00:34:00,700 like possible. Like, in general, the kind of 548 00:34:00,900 --> 00:34:05,200 pipeline that we have to go through a rate is step one 549 00:34:05,400 --> 00:34:08,400 finalize. The algorithm step to make a 550 00:34:08,408 --> 00:34:12,000 test Network and simultaneously. Do a bunch of like academic a 551 00:34:12,500 --> 00:34:14,699 verification. And auditing of the algorithm 552 00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:16,800 step 3. And once we're happy with it, It 553 00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:19,600 implemented across all seven of the clients, then, probably run 554 00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:22,400 another test that for, with it for like three or four months 555 00:34:22,400 --> 00:34:26,500 and then finally release, right? So, at each of those stages is 556 00:34:26,500 --> 00:34:30,100 something that takes time could potentially have delays has its 557 00:34:30,100 --> 00:34:31,900 own issues. Just as, you know, we went, it 558 00:34:32,000 --> 00:34:35,800 went through when we're launching Frontier back in 2015, 559 00:34:36,900 --> 00:34:41,500 and each one of those stages has like some risks to it. 560 00:34:42,400 --> 00:34:45,199 I feel like right now, we're getting close to the points 561 00:34:45,199 --> 00:34:49,800 where the Research and like algorithm specification stage is 562 00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:55,800 coming close to resolution. Now, I mean, I know you had Rick 563 00:34:55,800 --> 00:34:59,300 on your show and like a, you know, that was definitely a 564 00:34:59,308 --> 00:35:02,700 great episode and he talks a lot about some other fancy Casper 565 00:35:02,700 --> 00:35:06,000 future. So like, like subjective 566 00:35:06,000 --> 00:35:10,000 consensus and various other things that he involved were 567 00:35:10,000 --> 00:35:12,300 thinking about. So one of the challenges is 568 00:35:12,300 --> 00:35:14,100 going to be as that we're going to have to come up with a red 569 00:35:14,100 --> 00:35:16,400 wine. We're basically say this is the 570 00:35:16,700 --> 00:35:18,700 Set of features that we're happy with for now. 571 00:35:19,100 --> 00:35:23,900 And, you know, some of us are going to focus on getting this 572 00:35:23,900 --> 00:35:27,900 into aetherium and like making sure that the real men look 573 00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:31,200 alive Network can benefit from it as soon as possible, you 574 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:33,800 know, obviously subject like safety, constraints, and so 575 00:35:33,800 --> 00:35:37,800 forth. And at the same time, Continue 576 00:35:37,800 --> 00:35:41,200 your research on that. If can we improve Casper and we 577 00:35:41,500 --> 00:35:44,600 make it have more and more of these nice properties over time 578 00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:48,400 and there was are two tracks that I've been the kind of 579 00:35:49,800 --> 00:35:52,600 starting to happen in parallel already but and you know like 580 00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:55,400 specks or definitely probably going to continue happening. 581 00:35:55,800 --> 00:36:00,100 So look in general I think book or research especially in the 582 00:36:00,100 --> 00:36:03,400 longer term is really kind of multi-threaded where you know 583 00:36:03,400 --> 00:36:06,300 you have like something myself researching some aspects of 584 00:36:06,300 --> 00:36:08,400 Casper. One side of Library, researching 585 00:36:08,400 --> 00:36:11,400 some aspects of Casper and Hillside, then some research on 586 00:36:11,400 --> 00:36:14,500 shorting happening, then some research on protocol 587 00:36:14,500 --> 00:36:18,100 economically, it's events. Some, you know, things like are 588 00:36:18,600 --> 00:36:22,800 making correct incentives for managing contracts storage size 589 00:36:22,800 --> 00:36:25,100 in general, kind of state size, account creation account, 590 00:36:25,100 --> 00:36:29,600 salvation from privacy and 0 0 at all, which proofs and like, 591 00:36:29,600 --> 00:36:34,000 all those other issues. So, what all of those are things 592 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,000 that were kind of thinking about the same time, I mean Two of 593 00:36:37,000 --> 00:36:38,700 them. I think have from the risk that 594 00:36:38,700 --> 00:36:44,700 adds up being a much harder problem than we thought on the. 595 00:36:44,700 --> 00:36:51,200 Once we get to Testing and I think it's definitely going to 596 00:36:51,200 --> 00:36:58,400 be a challenge to actually develop the test Network like a 597 00:36:58,800 --> 00:37:01,800 run and make sure that it does everything to our satisfaction 598 00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:05,700 look that's all General more of a kind of software development 599 00:37:05,700 --> 00:37:08,600 and engineering challenge and then implementing it across all 600 00:37:08,600 --> 00:37:10,900 seven clients like running the tests and so forth. 601 00:37:10,900 --> 00:37:12,300 That's another set of challenges. 602 00:37:13,000 --> 00:37:16,100 May look once said the yeah we're confident about the 603 00:37:16,100 --> 00:37:19,100 algorithm itself. None of the rest is like house. 604 00:37:19,100 --> 00:37:21,200 That much fundamental uncertainty in it, it's 605 00:37:21,200 --> 00:37:24,800 basically just this kind of Fairly long and kind of and kind 606 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:27,500 of incremental SWOG that might take less time. 607 00:37:27,500 --> 00:37:33,000 It might take more time. Today's magic worth is steak, 608 00:37:33,100 --> 00:37:37,200 that's es ta ke it over to. Let's talk with one.com to sign 609 00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:39,900 in enter the magic word and claim your part of the listener 610 00:37:39,900 --> 00:37:50,500 reward. One of the terms that one hears 611 00:37:50,800 --> 00:37:55,400 their to Casper is this idea of consensus by back, right? 612 00:37:56,200 --> 00:38:00,400 So this is generally like the way I tend to think is once you 613 00:38:00,400 --> 00:38:04,800 have a system where you can define a set of public Keys as 614 00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:09,500 validators of sums, some form, a lot of systems end up taking the 615 00:38:09,500 --> 00:38:12,900 approach that they go to traditional Byzantine fault all 616 00:38:12,900 --> 00:38:16,500 this literature, right? Like you have consensus 617 00:38:16,500 --> 00:38:19,200 algorithms like packed, Tickle Byzantine fault tolerance. 618 00:38:19,200 --> 00:38:21,600 And the families are derived from there. 619 00:38:22,600 --> 00:38:25,500 And so, once you have validators defined, you can use all of 620 00:38:25,508 --> 00:38:29,900 these traditional algorithms to implement consensus, but with 621 00:38:29,900 --> 00:38:33,100 Caspar one hears of this, I new idea which is score, which is 622 00:38:33,100 --> 00:38:36,900 consensus by bet. And what we'd like to know is 623 00:38:36,900 --> 00:38:41,600 what is consensus by bet? And is this a point of focus for 624 00:38:41,600 --> 00:38:45,600 you right now? so, the general idea behind 625 00:38:45,600 --> 00:38:50,100 consensus by bat is basically that you can think of validator 626 00:38:50,100 --> 00:38:55,700 signatures as being commitments that say I am willing to get 627 00:38:55,700 --> 00:38:59,900 some reward in chin, hit a history that has property X 628 00:39:00,200 --> 00:39:02,800 where a property X might say, you know, it contains some 629 00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:05,100 particular block or you could say in some particular State 630 00:39:05,100 --> 00:39:09,500 Route in exchange for I undergoing some penalty, in all 631 00:39:09,500 --> 00:39:14,500 chains that do not contain X and the theory, basically, it Is 632 00:39:14,700 --> 00:39:19,200 that you can be kind of both mimic proof of work and 633 00:39:19,300 --> 00:39:20,900 including resolving proof of work. 634 00:39:20,900 --> 00:39:25,500 Still think it's take issues and potentially go even further by 635 00:39:25,500 --> 00:39:28,100 basically having a consensus algorithm that consists of that 636 00:39:28,100 --> 00:39:31,400 would deter is having the opportunity to make these kinds 637 00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:34,100 of bets great. And like in the original 638 00:39:34,100 --> 00:39:39,200 formulation you can think of a bed is basically saying plus X 639 00:39:39,200 --> 00:39:44,900 in Chains where that contain what's a sub State Route s. - 640 00:39:44,900 --> 00:39:48,600 why in chains that do not contain that state bird and you 641 00:39:48,607 --> 00:39:51,700 can think of validators as having the ability to make these 642 00:39:51,700 --> 00:39:54,400 bets at different odds, where you can think of the odds, as 643 00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:56,600 being, like the ratio between the X to the Y. 644 00:39:56,800 --> 00:40:01,800 So, for example, if x is 1 and Y is a penalty of star minus 1, 645 00:40:02,100 --> 00:40:04,900 then it would make sense to make that bet. 646 00:40:04,900 --> 00:40:07,900 If you think that as has at least a 50% chance of being in 647 00:40:07,900 --> 00:40:10,900 the history that ends up winning, but if you get a bet 648 00:40:10,900 --> 00:40:13,800 that's that's so has no X being Plus. 649 00:40:13,900 --> 00:40:17,100 For an SBA -16. Then that would only make sense 650 00:40:17,100 --> 00:40:18,800 when you think there's an 80% chance. 651 00:40:19,300 --> 00:40:21,800 And so the idea is that you would give the voters the 652 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:29,100 opportunity to make these bets and They would start making 653 00:40:29,100 --> 00:40:32,300 those bets now initially, you know, there might be a fork, 654 00:40:32,300 --> 00:40:34,800 there might be, or there might be like a choice, you know? 655 00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:37,300 Do you chew a state, where else would you stay true tea? 656 00:40:37,700 --> 00:40:39,900 Initially, that would do this would be fairly confusing but 657 00:40:39,900 --> 00:40:42,400 only make 50, 50 beds, in One Direction or the other. 658 00:40:42,500 --> 00:40:45,200 But eventually once it becomes clear, which one's winning 659 00:40:45,800 --> 00:40:49,300 validators, will be able to make Bets with progressively higher 660 00:40:49,300 --> 00:40:53,000 and higher odds on one of them and eventually they'd be willing 661 00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:56,600 to make about some Maximum odds that basically say, In exchange 662 00:40:56,600 --> 00:41:00,000 for a medium reward in history. Containing as I am willing to 663 00:41:00,000 --> 00:41:02,100 lose all my money. And all history is that do not 664 00:41:02,100 --> 00:41:05,800 contain X. So, they just like fully commit 665 00:41:05,900 --> 00:41:08,200 their money to this particular chain. 666 00:41:08,600 --> 00:41:13,600 And that's when, you know, that that particular hit a chain or a 667 00:41:13,600 --> 00:41:16,900 up to that particular checkpoint is kind of quote finalized, so 668 00:41:16,900 --> 00:41:21,200 that was the original idea. Now, we have been recently D 669 00:41:21,200 --> 00:41:24,200 emphasizing that and for a couple of reasons. 670 00:41:24,400 --> 00:41:27,600 I mean, one of them is that That people in general, are not 671 00:41:27,600 --> 00:41:30,800 comfortable with where he's not fully comfortable with taking 672 00:41:30,800 --> 00:41:32,100 all of this. Kind of risk that. 673 00:41:32,300 --> 00:41:34,000 Oh, you know what? If something really, really 674 00:41:34,000 --> 00:41:37,200 unexpected happens and what if I made some bets that were 99.9 675 00:41:37,200 --> 00:41:39,900 percent confidence but it turns out I was wrong and now I 676 00:41:39,908 --> 00:41:43,500 suddenly lose a bunch of money. So you know, it does, impose 677 00:41:43,500 --> 00:41:47,300 extra risks on validators and engine validators would have to 678 00:41:47,300 --> 00:41:50,400 be compensated for those risks. So that was one concern. 679 00:41:50,900 --> 00:41:54,300 The other concern is that one of the property is that we're 680 00:41:54,300 --> 00:41:57,700 trying to keep in our Is this notion of balancing the griefing 681 00:41:57,700 --> 00:42:00,400 Factor? So what I mean by that is that 682 00:42:00,500 --> 00:42:05,000 puts the the way the griefing factor is basically like a 683 00:42:05,000 --> 00:42:09,500 coefficient that says you know, how easy is it to bullish? 684 00:42:09,500 --> 00:42:11,600 So we attack other validators in the system. 685 00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:15,600 So if the greed factor is 5 then what that means is that there 686 00:42:15,600 --> 00:42:20,400 exists ways for malicious actress, the spends $1 in order 687 00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:23,500 to make some some with Target Lewis, five dollars. 688 00:42:23,700 --> 00:42:26,500 If the griefing factor is will say One half. 689 00:42:26,700 --> 00:42:28,500 Then that means that the malicious actors would have 690 00:42:28,500 --> 00:42:31,500 spent $2 to make the honest Acuras, don't lose $1. 691 00:42:32,000 --> 00:42:37,000 And what I realized is that if you assume an attacker that 692 00:42:37,000 --> 00:42:41,400 controls the majority of the steak, then the griefing facts 693 00:42:41,400 --> 00:42:44,400 are on this kind of system could in some models. 694 00:42:44,400 --> 00:42:46,900 Potentially be ends up being very high. 695 00:42:47,200 --> 00:42:51,900 Basically because look at these. Yeah, evaluators would story 696 00:42:51,900 --> 00:42:55,500 kind of expanding, pushing out to infinity or pushing out 697 00:42:55,500 --> 00:42:57,700 there. Outs to toward kind of in an 698 00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:01,800 infinite odds on one side and then you would suddenly come 699 00:43:01,800 --> 00:43:07,000 kind of with overwhelming odds. And how to flip the bed though, 700 00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:11,500 the winning? Kind of state over to some other 701 00:43:11,500 --> 00:43:15,000 answer and then all of a sudden it looks like there's consensus 702 00:43:15,000 --> 00:43:17,000 happening around the other answer but then there's people 703 00:43:17,000 --> 00:43:19,800 that made all their bets in the original Direction and they all 704 00:43:19,800 --> 00:43:22,900 end up losing a bunch of money. So what for several reasons we 705 00:43:22,900 --> 00:43:25,500 ended up be emphasizing that approach? 706 00:43:25,800 --> 00:43:28,100 And the approach that we're thinking of right now actually, 707 00:43:28,100 --> 00:43:32,200 is one that is much closer to a traditional Byzantine fault or 708 00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:37,300 we could set this algorithms except that with a few different 709 00:43:37,400 --> 00:43:41,300 kind of changes to the algorithms that a few changes to 710 00:43:41,300 --> 00:43:43,500 the security model. It's the one of the changes to 711 00:43:43,500 --> 00:43:46,200 the security model. For example, is that we don't 712 00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:48,900 just care about fault tolerance, we care, but auditable, fault 713 00:43:48,900 --> 00:43:51,100 tolerance, mean. There's also like a slightly 714 00:43:51,100 --> 00:43:52,600 different definition of liveness. 715 00:43:52,600 --> 00:43:57,600 There's also a few other small changes but That's roughly the 716 00:43:57,600 --> 00:44:02,100 approach that we're looking at. So that's very interesting that 717 00:44:02,100 --> 00:44:05,200 you're looking now. More towards traditional 718 00:44:05,300 --> 00:44:09,400 Byzantine fault tolerance literature in order to finalize 719 00:44:09,400 --> 00:44:12,900 a consensus algorithm. I thought one other difference 720 00:44:12,900 --> 00:44:19,700 that, that struck me as, as unique in in Casper, is that in, 721 00:44:19,700 --> 00:44:22,700 in much of the traditional Byzantine fault, tolerance, 722 00:44:22,700 --> 00:44:27,200 literature, pbft. Those systems prioritize 723 00:44:27,400 --> 00:44:32,400 consistency over T. So what that means is in case 724 00:44:32,400 --> 00:44:34,700 there in case, there's a network partition. 725 00:44:35,500 --> 00:44:37,900 For example, let's say the communication with China is 726 00:44:37,900 --> 00:44:42,400 broken of China and the West is broken off, then if it's Bitcoin 727 00:44:42,400 --> 00:44:45,900 blocks will keep on producing on the western side and the Chinese 728 00:44:45,900 --> 00:44:47,100 side. So that is a system that 729 00:44:47,100 --> 00:44:49,500 prioritizes availability over consistency. 730 00:44:49,800 --> 00:44:52,900 System is still available but you have two different 731 00:44:52,900 --> 00:44:57,000 blockchains now and then traditional Byzantine photons to 732 00:44:57,000 --> 00:45:00,500 deter many consensus algorithms are It is consistency or 733 00:45:00,500 --> 00:45:03,100 availability, which means no new blocks, will be produced. 734 00:45:03,100 --> 00:45:08,200 So the system grinds to a halt but the blockchain doesn't Fork 735 00:45:08,800 --> 00:45:14,200 now now with his Casper. What I keep hearing is that you 736 00:45:14,200 --> 00:45:18,100 want to prioritize, availability over consistency, and you like, 737 00:45:18,100 --> 00:45:20,800 walk us through, why? You are making that choice. 738 00:45:20,800 --> 00:45:25,100 And what part of traditional literature, fits that kind of 739 00:45:25,300 --> 00:45:30,500 description. Sure, so and The main reason I'd 740 00:45:30,500 --> 00:45:33,500 say why we care about availability is because I mean, 741 00:45:33,500 --> 00:45:37,500 first of all in a public blog shared context, like one-third 742 00:45:37,500 --> 00:45:39,200 of our data is just dropping off line. 743 00:45:39,200 --> 00:45:43,100 At the same time, is a very real possibility, like for the 744 00:45:43,100 --> 00:45:46,100 petitions could happen. No words could just get lazy. 745 00:45:46,100 --> 00:45:49,600 I've lots of things could happen and saying that, if that happens 746 00:45:49,600 --> 00:45:52,100 to the network, just like, halts is unacceptable. 747 00:45:52,600 --> 00:45:56,600 So, people were just really wants to have this property that 748 00:45:56,600 --> 00:45:59,200 of like maintaining what proof of work. 749 00:45:59,300 --> 00:46:04,400 Work has where, you know, as long as there are at least some 750 00:46:04,400 --> 00:46:06,300 know. It's that wants to keep the 751 00:46:06,300 --> 00:46:07,900 chain going to chain keeps going. 752 00:46:08,400 --> 00:46:11,800 Now, then, of course, there's a question of like, how does that 753 00:46:11,800 --> 00:46:16,600 and kind of mesh together with traditional bft algorithms which 754 00:46:16,600 --> 00:46:22,600 are SEC consistency, favoring, and There's kind of two general 755 00:46:22,600 --> 00:46:24,400 approaches that kind of combining the two. 756 00:46:24,800 --> 00:46:29,200 So in general, I would describe Casper as being an availability, 757 00:46:29,200 --> 00:46:32,500 favoring algorithm. That also tells you how much 758 00:46:32,500 --> 00:46:36,400 consistency you have, right? So, the, your kind of nice thing 759 00:46:36,400 --> 00:46:40,800 of about that definition, is that in some sense? 760 00:46:40,800 --> 00:46:45,600 You do have fun of as much of both, as you can get, you know, 761 00:46:45,600 --> 00:46:50,000 a for as much of both as you know, the algorithm things like 762 00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:55,000 this year, be Theory. Allow you to have, but and the 763 00:46:55,600 --> 00:46:58,600 way that this ends up working, is that well? 764 00:46:58,800 --> 00:47:01,600 So once again, one of two approaches where one of them is 765 00:47:01,600 --> 00:47:04,200 that you have some basic algorithm that is availability 766 00:47:04,200 --> 00:47:07,100 favoring. So, for example, if you look at 767 00:47:07,200 --> 00:47:09,900 like, a lot of the older proof of stake algorithms, that would 768 00:47:10,700 --> 00:47:13,400 rely on this notion of what proof of work style, validators 769 00:47:13,400 --> 00:47:15,000 making blocks on top of each other. 770 00:47:15,500 --> 00:47:17,500 That looks at is availability, paper great look. 771 00:47:17,500 --> 00:47:20,100 That keeps going even if there's only 1% of the nodes that are 772 00:47:20,100 --> 00:47:24,300 offline, But it doesn't have any notion of finality and then 773 00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:26,700 basically would take this available with you bring back 774 00:47:26,700 --> 00:47:30,000 bone and you would kind of layer a consistency. 775 00:47:30,000 --> 00:47:33,200 Favoring finality layer on top of it and the idea would be that 776 00:47:33,200 --> 00:47:36,500 if you have more than two thirds of nodes that are online then, 777 00:47:36,700 --> 00:47:39,200 but both things would work and, you know, you would have your 778 00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:41,000 availability would have your consistency. 779 00:47:41,300 --> 00:47:45,700 Now if more than a third of nodes drop-off line, then the 780 00:47:45,800 --> 00:47:50,000 consistency favoring finality, layer would just stop 781 00:47:50,000 --> 00:47:51,500 finalizing. You know, what? 782 00:47:51,500 --> 00:47:53,300 We repeatedly try and try and try again. 783 00:47:53,300 --> 00:47:57,100 It would fail every time, but the availability, favoring chain 784 00:47:57,100 --> 00:47:59,500 will keep on going. And what this means is that the 785 00:47:59,500 --> 00:48:04,200 chain keeps going but clients on the that like users, that use 786 00:48:04,200 --> 00:48:08,000 the chain and even applications or even smart contracts that are 787 00:48:08,000 --> 00:48:11,300 sitting on the Chain, would all be aware of the fact that they 788 00:48:11,300 --> 00:48:14,700 were sitting on a chain, which, suddenly has lower your aunties 789 00:48:14,700 --> 00:48:17,400 of security at least passed some particular points and there 790 00:48:17,400 --> 00:48:19,600 would be able to, like, make choose to make their own 791 00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:21,600 judgments about what? How the With that. 792 00:48:21,800 --> 00:48:24,700 So basically look, individual applications will also be able 793 00:48:24,700 --> 00:48:27,600 to choose what their own trade offs between consistency and 794 00:48:27,600 --> 00:48:31,400 availability are now, the second approach, it has similar 795 00:48:31,400 --> 00:48:34,800 properties but instead of having two separate mechanisms, it has 796 00:48:34,800 --> 00:48:37,800 one mechanism. And in that one mechanism, you 797 00:48:37,800 --> 00:48:40,800 would have what's called a subjective finality threshold. 798 00:48:41,100 --> 00:48:44,500 So, for subjective find out a threshold basically means that 799 00:48:45,900 --> 00:48:51,100 Instead of having a fixed work hard in protocol threshold of 800 00:48:51,100 --> 00:48:55,400 like, for example, it you need to have two thirds of all nodes. 801 00:48:55,400 --> 00:48:57,300 Sign up for pair in. Order for anyone to start 802 00:48:57,300 --> 00:48:59,500 signing, I commit, you would try it. 803 00:48:59,500 --> 00:49:03,600 So I can make all of those things endogenous, or you'll 804 00:49:03,600 --> 00:49:06,600 make all those things. Just like be choices that get 805 00:49:06,600 --> 00:49:09,900 made by validators. We get made by users and so 806 00:49:09,900 --> 00:49:13,200 individual users would pick kind of like how many prepares their 807 00:49:13,200 --> 00:49:16,000 Satisfied by how many commits to Bye-bye. 808 00:49:16,400 --> 00:49:21,400 And the idea here would be that if let's say all of a sudden 40% 809 00:49:21,400 --> 00:49:24,300 of those drop off line and if there is common knowledge of 810 00:49:24,300 --> 00:49:26,700 this, or if there's a proximate called the knowledge of this, 811 00:49:26,900 --> 00:49:30,000 then the chain can actually keep finalizing things. 812 00:49:30,400 --> 00:49:35,600 In the sense that You have this guarantee that says that as long 813 00:49:35,600 --> 00:49:39,300 as the forty percent that are offline actually are offline, 814 00:49:39,300 --> 00:49:44,000 then you know people can lower their finality thresholds and 815 00:49:44,000 --> 00:49:46,200 within that context, you can finalize things. 816 00:49:46,200 --> 00:49:51,200 So we have a guarantee that says you know either things like the 817 00:49:51,200 --> 00:49:54,700 chain keeps on going, it consistently asked before that 818 00:49:54,700 --> 00:49:58,700 sounds really, really cool know that you have kind of both of 819 00:49:58,700 --> 00:50:00,800 those advantages. Write that on the one hand 820 00:50:00,800 --> 00:50:03,400 applications know what's Going on, and they can be risk 821 00:50:03,400 --> 00:50:05,300 assessments made and you know exchanges. 822 00:50:05,300 --> 00:50:07,000 No. Okay, we have to be careful. 823 00:50:07,000 --> 00:50:09,600 We have to wait, we have to wait for extra confirmation, etc, 824 00:50:09,600 --> 00:50:13,200 etc. But at the same time, the chain 825 00:50:13,200 --> 00:50:17,400 keeps going even when there's petitions, even when there's all 826 00:50:17,400 --> 00:50:20,600 kinds of issues, I think that really kind of combines The Best 827 00:50:20,600 --> 00:50:22,300 of Both Worlds. So, I'm really excited to hear 828 00:50:22,300 --> 00:50:23,900 that. That's possible. 829 00:50:23,900 --> 00:50:27,200 And that's the direction that you guys are taking here. 830 00:50:29,500 --> 00:50:31,900 Let's take a short way to talk about Jax. 831 00:50:31,900 --> 00:50:35,100 Jax is a multi coin wallet created by the people at the 832 00:50:35,100 --> 00:50:37,200 central. Now, in the past, if you had a 833 00:50:37,207 --> 00:50:40,900 whole bunch of cryptocurrencies, it was a pain to handle them. 834 00:50:40,900 --> 00:50:44,400 You either had to leave them on an exchange, which is insecure 835 00:50:44,600 --> 00:50:47,600 or you had to have all these different wallets which was a 836 00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:50,200 hassle. Fortunately now with checks 837 00:50:50,200 --> 00:50:54,900 those medieval days of darkness misery and suffering are over 838 00:50:55,100 --> 00:50:58,400 Jack supports multiple cryptocurrencies and new ones 839 00:50:58,400 --> 00:51:01,100 are being added. But it's not just storing 840 00:51:01,100 --> 00:51:03,400 cryptocurrencies. You can do with Jax while you 841 00:51:03,400 --> 00:51:07,700 can also exchange directly from with inside the wallet, thanks 842 00:51:07,700 --> 00:51:09,400 to their shape-shift integration. 843 00:51:10,400 --> 00:51:13,900 And since there's only one seed Jack's makes it super easy to 844 00:51:13,900 --> 00:51:15,900 back up and sink to your other devices. 845 00:51:16,200 --> 00:51:20,600 Jack's works with Windows. Mac OS, Linux, Android iOS. 846 00:51:20,800 --> 00:51:23,200 And has browser extensions for Firefox and chrome. 847 00:51:23,500 --> 00:51:25,600 So, go to Jack's dot IO. That's j. 848 00:51:25,600 --> 00:51:28,400 A double x dot IO to download the wallet and get started 849 00:51:28,400 --> 00:51:30,400 today. We'd like to thank Jacks for the 850 00:51:30,400 --> 00:51:34,500 support of epicenter. Let's move on to another topic 851 00:51:34,500 --> 00:51:39,100 that we wanted to cover. So you wrote a really nice short 852 00:51:39,200 --> 00:51:44,300 paper 30-page paper. Something for R3 about the chain 853 00:51:44,300 --> 00:51:47,200 interoperability and I'll change the interoperability of ink is a 854 00:51:47,200 --> 00:51:51,700 topic that's become much more present. 855 00:51:51,700 --> 00:51:56,000 Much More Much More tension on that and we have a whole bunch 856 00:51:56,000 --> 00:51:59,200 of projects in this space. I mean, there's of course people 857 00:51:59,200 --> 00:52:02,400 with intellectual that has been working on this area. 858 00:52:02,600 --> 00:52:06,200 For a long time. There is also some more novel 859 00:52:06,400 --> 00:52:12,700 proposals like the polka dot proposal by the East core team 860 00:52:13,100 --> 00:52:16,900 and and then also the one I am partially involved in which is a 861 00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:21,300 cosmos Cosmos proposal so the whole bunch of different ones. 862 00:52:21,600 --> 00:52:26,200 So would you mind is running as to just what are the main 863 00:52:26,200 --> 00:52:31,200 challenges and approaches to making blockchains really 864 00:52:31,200 --> 00:52:34,100 interoperable? So that One, can move value. 865 00:52:34,100 --> 00:52:36,300 See mostly around build applications. 866 00:52:36,300 --> 00:52:39,500 That may be involve components that live on different 867 00:52:39,500 --> 00:52:46,500 blockchains Sure. So in general there in as I 868 00:52:46,500 --> 00:52:51,100 described in the paper, there's several kind of major ways that 869 00:52:51,100 --> 00:52:54,400 you can achieve interoperability and there's several major 870 00:52:54,400 --> 00:52:57,300 categories of things that you can use interoperability for. 871 00:52:57,900 --> 00:53:01,000 And so you can think of those look there's also different ways 872 00:53:01,000 --> 00:53:04,100 of making the categorization. So there are some of the kind of 873 00:53:04,100 --> 00:53:06,300 more computer science, theoretically, or correlation, 874 00:53:06,300 --> 00:53:10,000 which is about what kinds of relationships between events on 875 00:53:10,000 --> 00:53:12,600 chain and events on chain bg1. To create. 876 00:53:12,600 --> 00:53:15,900 And then there is the more kind of application layer. 877 00:53:15,900 --> 00:53:18,400 One of you know what, exactly even using this for. 878 00:53:19,200 --> 00:53:22,900 So then there's the kind of various different Technologies, 879 00:53:23,600 --> 00:53:25,200 right? So first, they talk about notary 880 00:53:25,200 --> 00:53:29,500 schemes, which are basically kind of multisig federation's 881 00:53:29,500 --> 00:53:31,400 and that's the trust model. That's very simple to 882 00:53:31,400 --> 00:53:33,600 understand, you know, if you trust the majority of people to 883 00:53:33,600 --> 00:53:36,600 the Federation, then you can kind of trust that Federation to 884 00:53:36,600 --> 00:53:38,500 say what happened here. What happened here? 885 00:53:38,800 --> 00:53:40,600 If something happens here do something there. 886 00:53:40,600 --> 00:53:42,500 If something happens to your do. I think here. 887 00:53:43,100 --> 00:53:46,700 Then the second model is described as this concept of 888 00:53:46,700 --> 00:53:50,900 hash walking which is a generalization of the tier known 889 00:53:50,900 --> 00:53:55,100 protocol from minnow the Bitcoin kind of forums back in 2012 and 890 00:53:55,100 --> 00:54:00,600 2013. And the idea behind hash walking 891 00:54:00,600 --> 00:54:05,300 is basically use this kind of scheme where you make an event a 892 00:54:05,400 --> 00:54:09,500 or you make an advance on chain a and Advantage can be both be 893 00:54:09,500 --> 00:54:12,900 dependent on someone revealing. Secret number that has some 894 00:54:12,900 --> 00:54:15,200 particular hash. And the idea is that if the 895 00:54:15,200 --> 00:54:18,500 number gets revealed then, you know, either party would be able 896 00:54:18,500 --> 00:54:23,100 to paste the number in and make things happen on both chains. 897 00:54:23,400 --> 00:54:26,600 And if that number doesn't get revealed, then no, neither of 898 00:54:26,607 --> 00:54:30,100 those things can happen and if you try to make the event happen 899 00:54:30,100 --> 00:54:32,600 on one side of the shade, then the process of doing that 900 00:54:32,600 --> 00:54:35,000 reveals the secret number and so the other party can take the 901 00:54:35,000 --> 00:54:37,900 secret number and kind of transplanted into a transaction 902 00:54:37,900 --> 00:54:40,400 on the other chain. So it's this fairly kind of 903 00:54:40,400 --> 00:54:44,700 simple technique. And it can do quite a lot, so we 904 00:54:44,707 --> 00:54:48,300 can do cross Gene exchanges for example, but it does have one 905 00:54:48,300 --> 00:54:50,900 major limitation. And the way I describe the 906 00:54:50,900 --> 00:54:55,500 limitation is that it can't do what it can do, what I call 907 00:54:55,500 --> 00:55:00,000 cross dependency, but it can't do what I call causation, right? 908 00:55:00,000 --> 00:55:03,400 So across dependency basically says, you make an advantage and 909 00:55:03,400 --> 00:55:07,100 a and interventions can be both be dependent on some other event 910 00:55:07,100 --> 00:55:09,000 C. And this case C is like 911 00:55:09,000 --> 00:55:11,200 revealing the revealing some secret number. 912 00:55:11,900 --> 00:55:16,300 But what they can't do is make an advance on chain, a generally 913 00:55:16,300 --> 00:55:18,000 caused an event on chain being read. 914 00:55:18,000 --> 00:55:21,200 So for example, in particular, if there's an event function, e 915 00:55:21,200 --> 00:55:24,300 that's not caused by individual, it's possibly smart contracts. 916 00:55:24,600 --> 00:55:27,600 Then you know, smart contracts, can't keep secrets and so this 917 00:55:27,600 --> 00:55:29,400 protocol, can't grow even work at all. 918 00:55:29,700 --> 00:55:33,000 Great. So in those cases, you have to 919 00:55:33,000 --> 00:55:36,500 move Beyond hash walking into other constructions. 920 00:55:36,500 --> 00:55:39,800 And like, the third me major category of technology that I 921 00:55:39,800 --> 00:55:43,800 talked about is relays And you know we've already have BTC 922 00:55:43,800 --> 00:55:48,100 relay for about a year which is basically a Bitcoin light client 923 00:55:48,100 --> 00:55:50,300 that lives inside of your theory on blockchain. 924 00:55:50,400 --> 00:55:54,600 So if the aureum contracts can verify Bitcoin transactions and 925 00:55:54,600 --> 00:55:57,600 they can do things conditional on bitcoin transactions taking 926 00:55:57,600 --> 00:56:01,100 place and this allows for this other kind of kind of causal 927 00:56:01,100 --> 00:56:03,200 interoperability between the Bitcoin blockchain. 928 00:56:03,200 --> 00:56:06,800 And if you're in blockchain where events on the Bitcoin 929 00:56:06,800 --> 00:56:09,500 blockchain can directly trigger events on the ethereum 930 00:56:09,500 --> 00:56:13,100 blockchain. So I talk Out of all three of 931 00:56:13,100 --> 00:56:16,200 those Technologies and out. They talking about like what you 932 00:56:16,200 --> 00:56:19,000 can do with causality, and what you can do is cross dependency. 933 00:56:19,200 --> 00:56:21,800 So for example, with cross dependency, you can do cross 934 00:56:21,800 --> 00:56:25,500 Gene exchange but you can't move assets across chains. 935 00:56:25,700 --> 00:56:29,200 So if you can't do the equivalent of a side chain but 936 00:56:29,400 --> 00:56:31,900 with causality you can basically do everything. 937 00:56:32,600 --> 00:56:36,700 And you know, I talked about side chains, I would I talk 938 00:56:36,700 --> 00:56:41,400 about kind of fed coin is like in private chain contacts. 939 00:56:41,800 --> 00:56:48,600 I talked about making a contracts or smart contracts in 940 00:56:48,600 --> 00:56:51,000 one chain that are connected to Assets in another chain, and 941 00:56:51,000 --> 00:56:54,100 various other use cases. What, if one of the things you 942 00:56:54,100 --> 00:56:57,000 were writing about in there, an observation you made in your 943 00:56:57,000 --> 00:57:00,000 paper that I thought was very interesting was your point that, 944 00:57:00,000 --> 00:57:03,000 you know, as soon as you start moving assets between Kane's, 945 00:57:03,100 --> 00:57:06,100 there's always a little bit of a, you know, a little bit of a 946 00:57:06,100 --> 00:57:09,200 risk there, right? So there might be some attack 947 00:57:09,200 --> 00:57:11,600 vectors or something can be suppressed. 948 00:57:11,800 --> 00:57:16,300 One chain DDOS or, you know, maybe just one chain gets 51% 949 00:57:16,300 --> 00:57:19,600 attack, so there's all kinds of things and so in a way that the 950 00:57:20,400 --> 00:57:24,400 security of those assets can get, you know, a little bit 951 00:57:24,400 --> 00:57:28,100 weekend and maybe it's not as strong on the Chain where they 952 00:57:28,100 --> 00:57:30,400 move through as opposed to unchain where they originated 953 00:57:30,400 --> 00:57:32,300 on. So what I'm curious about is 954 00:57:32,300 --> 00:57:35,100 what kind of if you look really far in the future and if you 955 00:57:35,100 --> 00:57:40,300 think of thousands and thousands of assets issued on blockchains 956 00:57:40,300 --> 00:57:41,600 and they're being kind of seamless. 957 00:57:41,800 --> 00:57:44,400 Exchange between all kinds of assets. 958 00:57:44,700 --> 00:57:49,400 Do you see you think those will be issued in lots of different 959 00:57:49,400 --> 00:57:53,300 chains that tend to be controlled by maybe the parties 960 00:57:53,300 --> 00:57:57,800 responsible for that asset? What do you think that this this 961 00:57:57,800 --> 00:58:01,800 issue of moving assets and around? 962 00:58:01,800 --> 00:58:05,000 Chains is big enough that there will be a strong incentive to, 963 00:58:05,400 --> 00:58:10,500 you know, issue maybe many of them on some chains and Central 964 00:58:10,500 --> 00:58:16,100 change that Maybe have a lot of security and then moving others 965 00:58:16,100 --> 00:58:18,600 or maybe alter those chains on the third chains, but that 966 00:58:18,600 --> 00:58:23,700 there's a sort of an effect that we have acids and acid issuance 967 00:58:23,700 --> 00:58:26,600 and management. Concentrate on a few chains. 968 00:58:26,600 --> 00:58:31,400 Do you think we will see that? I think I and first of all, you 969 00:58:31,408 --> 00:58:33,800 have to distinguish between different types of assets. 970 00:58:33,800 --> 00:58:36,500 So, for example, you have issuer back to assets, so that you have 971 00:58:36,500 --> 00:58:39,300 kind of pure cryptographic assets like Bitcoin and ether, 972 00:58:39,800 --> 00:58:43,000 and one of the things with issue are back to assets, is that 973 00:58:43,200 --> 00:58:46,100 there is an issuer. And if there's an incentive into 974 00:58:46,100 --> 00:58:49,000 it than the issuer can just issue the many different 975 00:58:49,000 --> 00:58:52,400 versions of the asset on just about every channel they care to 976 00:58:52,400 --> 00:58:56,100 support right? Like you can issue you know the 977 00:58:56,400 --> 00:59:02,600 gold back tokens on a fury Aman. Counterparty on Ripple on NXT on 978 00:59:02,600 --> 00:59:07,800 bitshares and like on any system that supports people being able 979 00:59:07,800 --> 00:59:11,400 to issue tokens at the same time and realistically, you might as 980 00:59:11,400 --> 00:59:15,200 well do that for any system where you know the potential 981 00:59:15,200 --> 00:59:19,200 revenue is for the issuer are greater than the costs of like 982 00:59:19,200 --> 00:59:24,300 basically doing the integration and teaching, their customer 983 00:59:24,300 --> 00:59:26,500 support staff how to handle that particular chain. 984 00:59:26,800 --> 00:59:31,400 So that's Something that I think issue is different. 985 00:59:31,400 --> 00:59:34,300 We are going to do well in the case of cryptographic assets, 986 00:59:34,300 --> 00:59:37,400 obviously you can't do that and I think there are going to be 987 00:59:37,400 --> 00:59:41,900 some situations where like, you don't want every a cryptographic 988 00:59:41,900 --> 00:59:46,300 asset issuer to actually be in the business of, you know, 989 00:59:46,300 --> 00:59:50,500 keeping track of and supporting all these chains necessarily. 990 00:59:50,700 --> 00:59:54,700 And I think especially for smaller chains, the approach of 991 00:59:54,700 --> 00:59:58,900 like using sidechain like techniques where you actually do 992 00:59:58,900 --> 01:00:01,400 have a portable. All assets and you can kind of 993 01:00:01,600 --> 01:00:03,000 move them from chain 8, H, and B. 994 01:00:03,000 --> 01:00:06,500 And then back to channei, you know, I expect that to be a 995 01:00:06,508 --> 01:00:09,200 paradigm that does end up having to ask some marriage. 996 01:00:09,500 --> 01:00:13,200 Although, in general, I think there are going to be a lawyer, 997 01:00:13,200 --> 01:00:14,800 like, large categories of assets. 998 01:00:14,800 --> 01:00:17,800 That just have one home chain. Get you some, that one home 999 01:00:17,800 --> 01:00:20,200 chain and no one really tries transplanting them anywhere. 1000 01:00:21,200 --> 01:00:23,700 Okay. And so we just did an episode 1001 01:00:23,700 --> 01:00:26,300 about the cosmos as well. And you know, at the 1002 01:00:26,300 --> 01:00:28,800 architecture of Cosmos is that there's kind of just hop, which 1003 01:00:28,800 --> 01:00:31,800 is connected through Essentially side chains to all kinds of 1004 01:00:31,800 --> 01:00:36,200 other chains. So do you think that's a model 1005 01:00:36,200 --> 01:00:37,900 that will see traction? That makes sense. 1006 01:00:37,900 --> 01:00:41,700 So you think it will be more about having maybe bilateral 1007 01:00:41,700 --> 01:00:44,900 connections between all kinds of different chains and not having 1008 01:00:44,900 --> 01:00:49,800 this you know, almost Central Hub or sort of a decentralized 1009 01:00:49,800 --> 01:00:54,100 help I guess in the middle. So I think one very specific 1010 01:00:54,100 --> 01:00:58,500 area where a kind of decentralized crushing solution 1011 01:00:58,500 --> 01:01:01,200 is really needed it. And is really going to have a 1012 01:01:01,207 --> 01:01:04,200 lot of value is specifically exchange between Christian 1013 01:01:04,200 --> 01:01:06,500 assets, right? So I don't even I don't mean 1014 01:01:06,500 --> 01:01:09,500 proper of portability I specifically me and like trading 1015 01:01:09,500 --> 01:01:11,900 a for be like were either for Dogecoin or whatever. 1016 01:01:12,400 --> 01:01:14,500 The reason basically is that, you know, right now, we have 1017 01:01:14,500 --> 01:01:17,300 centralized exchanges for that. Centralized exchange is get 1018 01:01:17,300 --> 01:01:20,300 hacked easily. They have Feed The Fairly High 1019 01:01:20,300 --> 01:01:25,700 fees, they have all sorts of annoyances to them, and it would 1020 01:01:25,700 --> 01:01:28,500 be really nice if we could just like, have a teaspoon, Joy 1021 01:01:28,500 --> 01:01:30,800 solution, right? I think that's something that's 1022 01:01:30,900 --> 01:01:32,500 could be potentially very promising. 1023 01:01:32,500 --> 01:01:36,300 If done well, and I mean, I don't expect there to be one 1024 01:01:36,300 --> 01:01:39,300 solution, there's a roll of all there, I expect people to try 1025 01:01:39,300 --> 01:01:42,400 coming up with various different solutions, and look, some of 1026 01:01:42,400 --> 01:01:44,400 them taking off in some contexts. 1027 01:01:45,100 --> 01:01:48,900 I mean, to some extent, there are network effect here because, 1028 01:01:48,900 --> 01:01:52,000 you know, if you have one system, then it's much easier to 1029 01:01:52,000 --> 01:01:55,800 connect you more blockchains that one system than it is to 1030 01:01:55,800 --> 01:01:57,800 make an entirely new system from scratch. 1031 01:01:57,800 --> 01:02:00,500 But at the same time, you know, you have have things like the 1032 01:02:00,500 --> 01:02:02,200 DC. Real way that can just focus on 1033 01:02:02,200 --> 01:02:05,400 one Lincoln do it well. So now I think we'll see some of 1034 01:02:05,400 --> 01:02:07,700 both. Cool. 1035 01:02:09,000 --> 01:02:12,100 So I yeah the internet of blockchains is going to be like 1036 01:02:12,100 --> 01:02:14,800 I think one of the one of the big themes in the future and 1037 01:02:15,000 --> 01:02:18,700 remains to be seen how exactly it plays out, whether it's a hub 1038 01:02:18,700 --> 01:02:23,100 and spoke model or chains, interacting directly with PT C. 1039 01:02:23,200 --> 01:02:27,500 BT, Lea, moving on from that topic, I'd like to jump to the 1040 01:02:27,500 --> 01:02:32,600 theme of applications. Now I think I think a few months 1041 01:02:32,600 --> 01:02:37,900 back you wrote a Blog article in which You laid out. 1042 01:02:39,100 --> 01:02:43,000 Your view on what applications are going to put things 1043 01:02:43,000 --> 01:02:45,600 blockchain technology is going to be good for, right? 1044 01:02:46,000 --> 01:02:51,000 And you had this idea of that box in technology will be, won't 1045 01:02:51,000 --> 01:02:56,800 have very large killer apps, but will enable a long tail of small 1046 01:02:56,800 --> 01:03:00,800 applications. So I would like to revisit that 1047 01:03:00,800 --> 01:03:04,400 idea and perhaps have it. Have you explained that idea in 1048 01:03:04,400 --> 01:03:10,200 your own words first? I'll just quickly answer So in 1049 01:03:10,200 --> 01:03:14,000 first, it's important to note that the reason why a theory of 1050 01:03:14,008 --> 01:03:16,500 exists in the first place and why I started working on it is 1051 01:03:16,500 --> 01:03:22,200 because I realized that there is such a large number of different 1052 01:03:22,200 --> 01:03:25,300 watchin applications. That you can't just create 1053 01:03:25,300 --> 01:03:28,400 abortion protocol just for every single one of them and like, you 1054 01:03:28,400 --> 01:03:31,800 can't join like explicit. We target applications one by 1055 01:03:31,800 --> 01:03:34,200 one and try and like, Target a feature for each one. 1056 01:03:34,600 --> 01:03:38,000 The only way that you could really Target, the generality is 1057 01:03:38,000 --> 01:03:40,300 by taking The, if you're am approaching just creating a 1058 01:03:40,300 --> 01:03:43,900 programming language, right? So, I would say, the idea for a 1059 01:03:43,900 --> 01:03:48,800 theorem even by itself started with this kind of vision of a 1060 01:03:48,800 --> 01:03:51,200 very diverse array of watching applications. 1061 01:03:51,200 --> 01:03:56,000 That are all kind of Fairly again, individually 1062 01:03:57,400 --> 01:04:00,400 individually, perhaps not significant enough to be worth 1063 01:04:00,400 --> 01:04:03,100 their own watching but collectively very important. 1064 01:04:03,600 --> 01:04:09,600 So, yes, started realizing that, you know, there's All these 1065 01:04:09,600 --> 01:04:14,200 different kinds of applications and after I say, if you're in 1066 01:04:14,200 --> 01:04:18,800 luck of the theorem project. So I kind of became public and 1067 01:04:19,000 --> 01:04:21,300 as people started discovering more and more things you could 1068 01:04:21,300 --> 01:04:25,100 do with it, that opinion that I had just kind of kept on growing 1069 01:04:25,500 --> 01:04:28,800 and at some point I realized that, you know, people ask me, 1070 01:04:29,200 --> 01:04:30,700 what is the killer app for Theory? 1071 01:04:30,700 --> 01:04:32,600 I would just realize there aren't really any good 1072 01:04:32,600 --> 01:04:35,200 candidates. And then, you know, if I started 1073 01:04:35,200 --> 01:04:37,600 asking way the question of weight, but if there aren't any 1074 01:04:37,600 --> 01:04:41,400 killer apps, then, you know, Mm, If You're a worthless and that 1075 01:04:41,400 --> 01:04:44,500 in and then I realized that, you know, oh wait, you know it's 1076 01:04:44,500 --> 01:04:51,900 like the ideas that it's theorem brings in or and the 1077 01:04:51,900 --> 01:04:55,500 implementation of its ideas is valuable but the value doesn't 1078 01:04:55,500 --> 01:04:57,000 come from any one single application. 1079 01:04:57,000 --> 01:05:01,100 The value comes from all the output gatien's put together and 1080 01:05:01,100 --> 01:05:05,200 the interactions between them. And so you know it's about the 1081 01:05:05,200 --> 01:05:08,900 facts that you can have digital assets on the blockchain and And 1082 01:05:08,900 --> 01:05:11,600 you can have your company shares be on the blockchain. 1083 01:05:11,700 --> 01:05:14,600 And once you have a digital also on the blockchain and you have 1084 01:05:14,600 --> 01:05:16,700 competition shows on the blockchain, then all of a 1085 01:05:16,700 --> 01:05:18,400 sudden, it becomes trivial to do. 1086 01:05:18,400 --> 01:05:20,900 Let's say that Equity crowdfunding, but I just like 1087 01:05:20,900 --> 01:05:23,500 doing a smart contract that automatically issued shares in 1088 01:05:23,500 --> 01:05:28,800 exchange for digital, like, let's say, digits, gold or like 1089 01:05:29,000 --> 01:05:31,500 some, what you are still watching, based US dollars, or 1090 01:05:31,500 --> 01:05:34,200 whatever. And, you know, if you look at 1091 01:05:34,300 --> 01:05:37,600 identity Matrix Management on the watching, and if you look at 1092 01:05:37,700 --> 01:05:42,300 certificate revocation, And on the board or and on ethereum and 1093 01:05:42,300 --> 01:05:44,900 like all these different use cases you start realizing that 1094 01:05:44,900 --> 01:05:47,100 like all of them really do serious. 1095 01:05:47,100 --> 01:05:50,700 We complement each other and look the killer app and subsets 1096 01:05:50,700 --> 01:05:54,900 is this kind of combines vision of like all these things working 1097 01:05:54,900 --> 01:05:57,300 together that like some of us call Web 3.0. 1098 01:05:58,400 --> 01:06:01,200 Yeah I would agree with that. Maybe with the one in addition 1099 01:06:01,200 --> 01:06:08,600 to that money and and the sort of digital gold and electronic 1100 01:06:08,700 --> 01:06:13,600 Cash, maybe kind of a killer up on its own, even if out those 1101 01:06:13,600 --> 01:06:15,000 other things. Although of course, those are 1102 01:06:15,000 --> 01:06:21,800 the things also enhanced the utility and power of that. 1103 01:06:22,400 --> 01:06:25,400 We do you see that the same way? I'd agree. 1104 01:06:25,400 --> 01:06:31,900 I mean, I think the the addition of the economical are to the 1105 01:06:32,200 --> 01:06:35,900 kinds of the set of things that you could do in a decentralized 1106 01:06:35,900 --> 01:06:40,600 way, as a very important and fundamental Well, the italic we 1107 01:06:40,600 --> 01:06:45,200 are kind of at the at the time limit and we had a lot of other 1108 01:06:45,200 --> 01:06:47,400 stuff we wanted to talk about actually want to talk about 1109 01:06:47,400 --> 01:06:50,500 charting and we want to talk about CK snarks and how those 1110 01:06:50,500 --> 01:06:54,100 are coming to a theorem. So we won't have to time this 1111 01:06:54,100 --> 01:06:59,000 time but hopefully we can we can have it on again soon to do 1112 01:06:59,000 --> 01:07:01,500 that. I also hope that the recording 1113 01:07:01,500 --> 01:07:03,900 worked out well because there was a little bit of connectivity 1114 01:07:03,900 --> 01:07:07,000 issues, but hopefully with the local recording, it should be 1115 01:07:07,600 --> 01:07:08,600 fine. So thanks. 1116 01:07:08,700 --> 01:07:12,800 So much metallic for coming on and thanks so much for listeners 1117 01:07:12,800 --> 01:07:16,100 for tuning in once again. So a person is part of a so pick 1118 01:07:16,100 --> 01:07:17,300 on network. You can this show? 1119 01:07:17,300 --> 01:07:20,500 And all the shows on, let's talk be kind of calm and if you want 1120 01:07:20,500 --> 01:07:24,000 to support show, you can do that by leaving us iTunes review, 1121 01:07:24,300 --> 01:07:26,400 that helps you people find the show in this very much, 1122 01:07:26,400 --> 01:07:28,500 appreciate it. So thanks so much and we look 1123 01:07:28,500 --> 01:07:30,000 forward to being back next week.