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This is epicenter episode. 425 
with guest Guy is a skinned. 

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Welcome to epicenter the show 
which talks about the 

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Technologies projects and people
driving decentralisation and the

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blockchain revolution. 
I'm Sonia Agarwal. 

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And I'm here with Frederick 
Ernst. 

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And today, we're talking with 
guys just skinned, who is the 

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founder of secret Network, which
is a, well, not really a new but

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it's actually a quite a, you 
know, Around for a long time 

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actually, and we actually had 
guy on what maybe four years 

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ago. 
I think 2018 and back, then the 

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project was called Enigma. 
And so since then it's gone 

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through a number of evolutions 
and became what it is today, 

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called secret network, but still
focus on the same mission of 

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bringing private smart 
Contracting to the Crypt averse.

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So what we'll talk a lot about 
with guy about secret network, 

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but first we'd like to tell you 
a little bit about us. 

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Sponsors for the week. 
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their version 5, which has a new
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more gas friendly and now 
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theorem permit messages. 
They also recently added support

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for Avalanche polygons and PSC 
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Are your crypto assets sitting 
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Start earning rewards and 
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security by staking. 
With course one ass, taking 

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provider, securing over five 
billion dollars in assets. 

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Over 25, decentralized networks,
including Solana Cosmos a 

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theorem and secret Network 
interested in running. 

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Your own branded nodes. 
The manage white label note as a

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service offering leverages 
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and proven infrastructure, 
enabling you to participate 

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directly in decentralized 
Networks. 

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If you have been a loyal Solana 
delegator with course one, make 

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sure you check your wallets in 
the first-ever major nft drop by

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any. 
Validator course, one will be 

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dropping over. 3,600 exclusive 
enter keys to its Salon Adela 

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Gators, according to their 
delegation profile in December 

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20 21, but if you missed out on 
this airdrop, don't worry, you 

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can still participate in the 
upcoming airdrops for Cosmos 

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change by simply delegating the 
chorus 1 notes head over now to 

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Coruscant. 
To begin your stating Journey. 

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So guys, welcome back onto the 
show, you know, as I mentioned, 

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you've bet you were here long 
time ago back in 2018. 

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And so, you know, hopefully, 
we've gained a few listeners in 

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that time. 
And so maybe for like, any of 

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the newer listeners who maybe 
didn't listen to the previous 

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episode, you know, can you can 
maybe start off with telling us 

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a little bit about your 
background and how you got 

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involved in crypto? 
Sure. 

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So first of all, thank you for 
having me. 

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Again. 
It has been a long time. 

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So I'm excited to be here. 
Epicenter is always been my 

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favorite podcast about myself. 
I've been in the crypto space 

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for you know, six since 2013, 
2014 depends on how you count 

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2014 is really worried. 
When I dived in. 

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I started, I started grad school
at MIT and there was just before

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I started grad school. 
There was this. 

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MIT Bitcoin hackathon, which 
will build a cool product for 

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this is like pre cerium even and
we want that hackathon and that 

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got me kind of like excited and 
I like what we can do with this 

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technology and I went to my 
professor and tell them. 

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Look, I wanna I want to focus 
like my research, my work on 

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this like emerging technology. 
So, you know, fast forward in. 

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It beat. 
I very quickly became Stood in, 

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you know, how how blockchain can
have inherent privacy. 

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Not just in the transactional 
sense, not just be like the Z 

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cash or Minerva way or 
transferring assets with 

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privacy. 
But if we're thinking about 

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blockchain is like, you know, 
these these more involved like 

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replicated State machines more 
involved decentralized Cloud 

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computers. 
Then show leaders need to be a 

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way to handle sensitive data in 
those. 

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Web 30 applications. 
So I focus on that. 

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I focus my entire research on 
it. 

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I wrote a few papers. 
They got a bunch of citations 

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pretty, pretty substantial 
citations. 

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And that kind of led to the 
illegal project, which I spun 

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out as a company, 2016. 
And then in 2017, we did within 

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Nico and we started building 
that Network 2017 we did. 

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And And token sale for enigma 
with the idea of building a 

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network, not necessarily 
blockchain, but a network that 

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allows it to run 
privacy-preserving computations 

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and you know somewhere between 
20 around 2019. 

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We kind of realize that it's not
working the best way that was 

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about the same time that Cosmos 
was about. 

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I think either just released her
there is decay. 

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I was about to release the res 
Decay. 

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I was really fascinated. 
I was actually very fascinated 

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by ten American senses. 
And then I looked into the SDK 

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and said wow, this is this is 
like much better. 

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Like we should be using that and
then we pretty much a scratch 

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everything and then it's kind of
like the between end of 2019 and

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2020. 
Just like rebuild our 

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architecture around Cosmos SDK. 
And every 2020 released, you 

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know, secret Network, we use a 
different brand to kind of 

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distinguish. 
It, it had a new coin called 

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secret. 
And then in September 2020, we 

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actually launched like the, the,
the Privacy capability. 

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So basically, in secret Network 
you have the ability to run 

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encrypted smart contracts. 
We're both the inputs, the 

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inputs, the the contract State 
and the outputs are many 

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decrypted and you can basically 
build end-to-end decentralized 

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applications with privacy and 
the network has been growing 

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substantially sense. 
I think one of the bigger Cosmos

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that changed today and yeah, 
that's that's kind of like the 

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history from 2014 to 2020. 
Thank you. 

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That was very comprehensive and 
I'd like to dig into the switch 

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to Cosmos. 
So basically, you said that the 

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cosmos SDK was just a lot better
than your previous technologies.

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That can you kind of expand on 
that a little bit. 

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Yeah, I mean look our core 
offering our core capabilities 

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is like how do we build privacy 
into smart contracts and pre 

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Cosmos like like, you know, 
there was an option to four key 

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Theory or more do that. 
But that really didn't that 

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didn't really work well and we 
didn't want to do it. 

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So we started building our own 
P2P stack, are on some, some 

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kind of consensus a, it wasn't 
really consensus because We were

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relying on the female form for 
consensus, but we spent like I 

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think 80% of our development are
testing like building that 

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infrastructure that, you know, 
it was just a waste of time like

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like that's not what we're going
to focus on and then Cosmos gave

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a great SDK truth be told at the
time. 

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I think it improved today. 
But anytime the SDK was great. 

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The documentation was horrible, 
so it took us longer to get Like

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fully on board than working with
Kosmos, then we could have have 

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like today but still like all 
the parts are there and instead 

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of like focusing on building the
P2P live and a consensus little,

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we have that forgiven and we can
just focus on the other aspects 

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of our technical stack. 
So, how whether the reactions 

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from the community, when you 
rebranded and switch, Tex Tex? 

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So people were confused. 
We were selling ourselves for a 

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long time as an l23. 
Fiery. 

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Mm is an L2 to other other 
changes. 

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Like, at that time, people did 
not believe in it in a cross 

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chain world. 
Like, everything was like, it is

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smart content. 
That relates to Smart. 

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Contracts was like, no, no, no, 
everything has to be on the 

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etherium, like, what are you 
guys doing? 

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So, we got mixed reviews, but we
didn't care. 

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Not that much. 
I mean, it's always better to 

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get good feedback. 
But like we just knew this was 

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the, this was the right 
approach. 

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And I think, you know, in the 
test of time, it's pretty proven

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that this was the the right 
course of action. 

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We've looking back. 
Is there anything you would have

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changed and how you how that 
process went? 

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There's one element, which I 
think the jury is still out on. 

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So, at that time, cause them 
wasn't was just started on, it 

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was still a prototype as well. 
We've actually helped cause and 

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wasn't quite a bit like one of 
our team members became a cult 

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contributor to cousin was them 
and I think there was a big 

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question like whether we are 
doubling down on closing walls 

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and webassembly or focusing, 
Evm, which is kind of what if 

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Mars is now trying to do. 
My gut feeling, is that, you 

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know, we made the right call. 
I do think that during the 

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cousin was a webassembly fruit, 
is the better approach. 

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I feel that that's what caused 
Moses is, consolidating around. 

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So I think it was the right 
decision, but I'm still not 

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sure. 
I think we'll know that in a 

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year or two. 
Would it be possible, you know, 

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to like first you could Network 
to support multiple VMS in the 

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future or is you know, is the 
goal really do? 

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Like focus on like, you know, 
you lose composability benefits 

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and stuff. 
Like if you start to do that. 

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Yeah, it gets complicated. 
You most likely lose 

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composability and we're not 100%
sure like it. 

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Maybe it's a matter of effort. 
So supporting multiple VMS is a 

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lot of effort once you stuck 
with one. 

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Now we can do it. 
But you know, we are still is 

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fairly small team in terms of 
the developers. 

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Not the Apple system is big one 
in terms of code developers will

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still small. 
So nacho that's like where we 

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want to put our effort in. 
Maybe. 

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And in that case. 
Yes, we start to run run across 

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problems, like composability. 
Other types of like 

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Integrations. 
Yeah, it becomes there will be 

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trade-offs for sure. 
So guys, I'm let's talk about 

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the secret Network. 
So that is, if I understand 

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correctly and there's currently 
50 nodes. 

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So, basically, how is it 
determined? 

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How many nodes can participate, 
70? 

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Sorry. 
Okay, and why is there an exact 

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number? 
Right. 

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So we initially we set it to 50 
notes. 

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The reason was that, you know, 
in our Network, one thing. 

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I didn't mention that, you know,
this is One requirement for 

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rounding. 
The validate, only secret 

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Network that other networks 
don't need, and that is you have

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to use sgx. 
We use secure enclaves to 

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achieve privacy that combined 
with like security and 

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encryption protocols. 
And there is Some some costs 

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associated to it. 
So like, you know, if you run it

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without sgx, it's not like 
orders. 

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It's not like, you know multiple
times faster, but you do get 

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some some speed reduction. 
And so we thought that starting 

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with like, you know, 50 nodes 
basically smaller than I think 

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the 100 or 150 that cause most 
shows and other changes chose. 

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We felt that was the right 
number. 

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It wasn't an issue until like 
the last six. 

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Also in around six months ago, 
when the network was starting to

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grow really fast. 
Like we got, a lot of people 

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want to become validators and 
that's why there was a network 

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vote to increase that to 70 
reasons. 

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00:13:03,100 --> 00:13:06,800
So you're right was 50, but 
recently, it was increased to 72

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00:13:06,800 --> 00:13:11,500
to a vote. 
And I do think we will, I think 

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we'll extend it over time. 
We've also a lot of our work for

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the next scene is around 
improving. 

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Like the vam and like, you know,
making that work faster and I 

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think as we do it, I will be 
easier to grow the number of 

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00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:30,500
nodes guy. 
I think probably about more than

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00:13:30,500 --> 00:13:35,600
50% of the listenership familiar
with what s GX is, but maybe for

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00:13:35,600 --> 00:13:40,200
the rest. 
Can you in a nutshell, explain 

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what? 
A trusted, execution environment

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is and what kind of trusted 
execution environment sgx is 

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Sure. 
So I trusted execution 

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environment basically is, is 
kind of like a segregated piece 

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in like your process or your 
memory, which basically is 

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complete like completely walled 
out for anything else happening 

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00:14:04,700 --> 00:14:08,100
in that system and no one can 
probe into it. 

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00:14:08,100 --> 00:14:12,300
Not even the person owning that 
physical machine. 

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00:14:12,600 --> 00:14:16,400
It's essentially a generalized 
how it will let you know. 

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How do wallet. 
Is essentially a piece of 

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Hardware where it allows you to 
run one computation which is to 

228
00:14:22,600 --> 00:14:28,200
sign from the actions, but but 
you can't probe into that wallet

229
00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:31,400
and actually extract the 
sensitive data, which is the 

230
00:14:31,400 --> 00:14:35,200
private key. 
So sgx works very similarly, but

231
00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:39,000
it allows you to run any kind of
computation and then any data 

232
00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:44,500
that you push into that Enclave 
into that trusted execution. 

233
00:14:44,500 --> 00:14:47,300
Environment can't actually be 
seen. 

234
00:14:47,500 --> 00:14:51,700
By anyone not even the validator
running the running the machine 

235
00:14:52,200 --> 00:14:55,000
just one quick note. 
There are different kinds of, 

236
00:14:55,000 --> 00:14:57,900
you know, trusted execution, 
environments, pretty much any 

237
00:14:57,900 --> 00:15:04,400
big vendor today, like like the 
that's building processors has a

238
00:15:04,400 --> 00:15:06,900
version of it. 
So arm has a version. 

239
00:15:07,100 --> 00:15:09,800
Intel has a version It's called 
sgx. 

240
00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:12,900
That's what we're using right 
now and AMD has its own version.

241
00:15:14,300 --> 00:15:17,900
How does the network know 
whether the notes? 

242
00:15:18,100 --> 00:15:21,300
Trust execution? 
Environment is legitimate. 

243
00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:24,600
Right. 
So that's one of the first 

244
00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:28,800
things that we did. 
We build a registration 

245
00:15:28,800 --> 00:15:31,600
protocol. 
So that that's where we kind of 

246
00:15:31,600 --> 00:15:37,500
diverge from like normal Cosmos.
So when you add your when you 

247
00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:41,300
join us a new validator in our 
Network, essentially you need to

248
00:15:41,308 --> 00:15:44,500
go through a registration 
process before you can start to 

249
00:15:44,500 --> 00:15:48,800
validate blocks. 
So what you would do is you 

250
00:15:48,800 --> 00:15:56,500
would run some code that we 
wrote inside of your trust and 

251
00:15:56,500 --> 00:16:00,600
execution environment. 
And that code basically says, it

252
00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:08,200
generates like a keeper, right? 
A private and public key people 

253
00:16:08,500 --> 00:16:12,900
and then The Enclave signs it 
it's a process called remodeled 

254
00:16:12,900 --> 00:16:18,100
remote at the station. 
And then like the the remote at 

255
00:16:18,108 --> 00:16:21,500
the station, the signature over 
the generations. 

256
00:16:21,600 --> 00:16:28,400
Public key that blob of 
information is the posted on 

257
00:16:28,400 --> 00:16:32,900
chain as a proof that you're 
running, a genuine Enclave. 

258
00:16:32,900 --> 00:16:38,300
So, essentially sgx and other 
systems. 

259
00:16:38,600 --> 00:16:45,300
They basically allow you to 
verify externally that a 

260
00:16:45,300 --> 00:16:49,300
computation has happened inside 
of The Enclave. 

261
00:16:49,500 --> 00:16:51,500
It, you know, with correspond to
a specific. 

262
00:16:51,600 --> 00:16:55,200
Perfect piece of code and it 
read correctly, any train on a 

263
00:16:55,200 --> 00:16:58,000
genuine enclave. 
And now that's been put on 

264
00:16:58,000 --> 00:17:01,900
chain. 
Everyone can validate that, you 

265
00:17:01,900 --> 00:17:06,300
know, that new validator is 
running a secure Enclave. 

266
00:17:06,599 --> 00:17:11,300
They generated this keeping 
inside of The Enclave. 

267
00:17:11,300 --> 00:17:14,700
So the private key and the well,
the public is interested, but 

268
00:17:14,700 --> 00:17:17,500
the private key that was 
generated never left The 

269
00:17:17,500 --> 00:17:22,800
Enclave. 
Okay, and now The validator can 

270
00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:28,700
basically take that information 
take that the the publicly know 

271
00:17:29,000 --> 00:17:37,300
that this was done in a, genuine
enclave, and encrypted and crypt

272
00:17:37,300 --> 00:17:41,800
some kind of surgery, shared 
seed shared, see that all 

273
00:17:41,800 --> 00:17:49,500
validators share and put them 
Krypton seed on the on the 

274
00:17:49,500 --> 00:17:51,400
blockchain. 
Now the validator, that's right.

275
00:17:51,500 --> 00:17:54,700
Registered can complete the 
registration by taking that 

276
00:17:54,700 --> 00:17:59,300
encrypted seed because we know 
that the private key for that 

277
00:17:59,300 --> 00:18:01,900
only leaves in the Arc Length. 
We know that the validator can 

278
00:18:01,900 --> 00:18:04,300
actually the crib that's it and 
see it. 

279
00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:10,100
They pull the pull it inside of 
their enclave and they decrypted

280
00:18:10,100 --> 00:18:13,600
their and now it's you know, 
it's an ongoing process and in 

281
00:18:13,600 --> 00:18:17,300
you validate or that comes in 
both for the process and you get

282
00:18:17,300 --> 00:18:20,700
into a system that the base, 
Sid. 

283
00:18:21,900 --> 00:18:26,200
Is shared by all enclaves. 
They've been vetted. 

284
00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:33,500
And now and now using that seed,
you can derive new keys that 

285
00:18:33,500 --> 00:18:38,000
again, only the and playful can 
actually use to decrypt stuff 

286
00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:40,100
and I would formation coming 
from the outside. 

287
00:18:40,200 --> 00:18:44,500
You can use, you can use using 
those keys again, all of them 

288
00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:47,900
returned to the base entropy 
from that seed, you can use it 

289
00:18:47,900 --> 00:18:51,400
from the outside to encrypt 
stuff and then send it to the 

290
00:18:51,500 --> 00:18:56,100
Doris enclaves. 
I hope that's not too dense. 

291
00:18:56,100 --> 00:18:57,900
I don't know if if anything is 
confusing. 

292
00:18:57,900 --> 00:19:00,600
I mean it feel free to ask for 
clarifications. 

293
00:19:01,100 --> 00:19:03,500
I think I just follow up on 
this. 

294
00:19:03,700 --> 00:19:08,600
So just does this process. 
I mean, it sounds like magic 

295
00:19:08,600 --> 00:19:10,400
little bit. 
So this is p. 

296
00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:16,100
This is process actually work 
without relying on the 

297
00:19:16,100 --> 00:19:21,200
excitation of Intel whichever 
chip manufacturer you're using. 

298
00:19:21,800 --> 00:19:27,300
So basically can the secure 
Enclave prove that it's not 

299
00:19:27,300 --> 00:19:33,900
being watched or how exactly to 
you come by that at the station.

300
00:19:34,400 --> 00:19:39,000
So the initial legislation part 
does rely on intelligence. 

301
00:19:39,300 --> 00:19:44,900
It's called Intel is V. 
I can't remember the Intel 

302
00:19:44,900 --> 00:19:48,500
service verification. 
I can remember the acronym, but 

303
00:19:48,500 --> 00:19:51,400
it does rely on 'i'll tell to 
basically. 

304
00:19:51,500 --> 00:19:56,100
Say look, we have like that 
signature that remote at the 

305
00:19:56,100 --> 00:20:00,500
station, which is essentially 
signature is from a genuine 

306
00:20:00,500 --> 00:20:02,800
Enclave that, you know, we 
manufactured. 

307
00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:07,800
Now, I do believe that in the 
next version of sgx, which we 

308
00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:12,000
are working on, including 
there's flexibility that, like 

309
00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:17,000
there's ways to do it without 
without actually going remotely 

310
00:20:17,300 --> 00:20:20,200
to endure servers. 
We have not implemented that 

311
00:20:20,200 --> 00:20:25,800
yet, but if As it does exist, 
that said the process that we 

312
00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:30,000
are generating that we're 
generating, you know, a private 

313
00:20:30,000 --> 00:20:34,000
key and a public key pill 
instead of The Enclave does mean

314
00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:37,500
that we only have to do it once 
for every validator and then 

315
00:20:37,500 --> 00:20:41,600
that point the network can 
really kind of like self manage 

316
00:20:41,600 --> 00:20:44,300
yourself sovereign. 
Quick. 

317
00:20:44,300 --> 00:20:46,400
Can I follow up again on the 
sgx? 

318
00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:49,800
So basically, if I have a 
consumer notebook, what that 

319
00:20:49,800 --> 00:20:54,900
typically have an SG H, XO, what
I have to buy a special computer

320
00:20:55,300 --> 00:20:59,900
to actually have that included. 
It used to be the case. 

321
00:21:00,000 --> 00:21:03,000
That is actually that is 
actually something that, you 

322
00:21:03,008 --> 00:21:07,000
know, our network has an 
infrastructure committee, which 

323
00:21:07,000 --> 00:21:09,600
basically checks like at all 
times like water. 

324
00:21:09,600 --> 00:21:11,900
Disappointed, hard words, and 
what you need? 

325
00:21:12,700 --> 00:21:16,500
I think to be fair, like we can 
talk philosophically if that's 

326
00:21:16,500 --> 00:21:20,700
the right direction, but to be 
fair, it seems that a lot of 

327
00:21:20,700 --> 00:21:22,900
alligators are becoming more 
professionals. 

328
00:21:22,900 --> 00:21:24,800
So they're running they're not 
running notebooks. 

329
00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:29,700
Anyway, they're running. 
You know, serious server 

330
00:21:29,700 --> 00:21:35,700
infrastructure, again a 
philosophical question, but it 

331
00:21:35,700 --> 00:21:40,500
used to be the case that like 
any notebook would actually have

332
00:21:40,500 --> 00:21:43,500
sgx support. 
But if they do, I think in the 

333
00:21:43,500 --> 00:21:48,800
latest chips have decided to 
only do that only enable that in

334
00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:54,600
servers. 
So the answer is no no longer or

335
00:21:54,600 --> 00:21:57,000
at least new notebooks to not 
support it. 

336
00:21:57,200 --> 00:22:01,000
X as far as I know, but again, I
think it's less of a problem 

337
00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:05,200
because everyone in our sister 
in our Network are like most 

338
00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:07,900
professional validators that are
running servers. 

339
00:22:07,900 --> 00:22:11,400
Anyway. 
Do you know what caused Intel 

340
00:22:11,400 --> 00:22:13,300
to, like sort of reverse 
Direction on that? 

341
00:22:14,900 --> 00:22:17,500
So we have pretty good ties with
you tell. 

342
00:22:19,300 --> 00:22:22,000
I've asked that I didn't get 
like a fully clear answer. 

343
00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:25,500
Like I think that's that's 
something that's very internal 

344
00:22:25,500 --> 00:22:30,700
important for them. 
But my thinking is that you 

345
00:22:30,700 --> 00:22:35,900
know, they want to focus on high
like using sgx and I'm Cliff and

346
00:22:35,900 --> 00:22:40,200
confidential Computing in very, 
very high loads and that works 

347
00:22:40,200 --> 00:22:43,100
better with servers like they 
want companies to provide their 

348
00:22:43,100 --> 00:22:47,300
services. 
Protected by things like sgx and

349
00:22:47,300 --> 00:22:53,300
enclaves less. 
So, originally originally the 

350
00:22:53,300 --> 00:22:57,300
idea of putting hgx, as far as I
know with every computer was so 

351
00:22:57,300 --> 00:23:01,200
that, you know, let's say 
there's the you down like a 

352
00:23:01,208 --> 00:23:04,500
company gives you an agent 
software that you run locally 

353
00:23:04,800 --> 00:23:08,400
not on the server and that 
agent, you know, would run 

354
00:23:08,400 --> 00:23:11,700
inside of an autoclave locally. 
So you is the end user and the 

355
00:23:11,700 --> 00:23:14,500
customer are comfortable that 
you're soft. 

356
00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:18,500
Hasn't been tampered with. 
I think that that didn't become 

357
00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:21,800
like, that didn't pan out as a 
good business Direction, and it 

358
00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:25,400
was just costing them more money
than it was, you know, giving 

359
00:23:25,400 --> 00:23:28,400
them. 
Also has a little bit of a DRM 

360
00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:29,800
solution. 
I remember that was sort of, 

361
00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:32,200
like, one of the things that 
they were pitching early on. 

362
00:23:32,600 --> 00:23:38,800
So only the validators need a, 
you know, so then I guess it's 

363
00:23:38,800 --> 00:23:41,700
like different classes of users.
So to use secret Network, you 

364
00:23:41,700 --> 00:23:46,400
know, I don't need to have a xgx
in my own computer to just be a 

365
00:23:46,800 --> 00:23:53,000
client, but so it gets because 
one is would if I just want to 

366
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:58,700
run a full node, not As a non 
validator, do I still need an SG

367
00:23:58,700 --> 00:24:03,700
x + 2? 
What kind of? 

368
00:24:03,700 --> 00:24:07,900
How does the security model 
change throughout when you're 

369
00:24:07,900 --> 00:24:11,200
not running? 
If you know, if you don't have 

370
00:24:11,200 --> 00:24:15,200
an SG X in your your rely 
relying on about it? 

371
00:24:15,200 --> 00:24:16,800
Like so I guess, you know, one 
on one side. 

372
00:24:16,800 --> 00:24:19,000
I feel like, you know, maybe you
can even improve the like client

373
00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:22,300
security model from normal 
because you can rely on certain 

374
00:24:22,300 --> 00:24:24,600
aspects of the sgx to prove 
that. 

375
00:24:24,700 --> 00:24:26,100
But on the other hand, how do 
ya? 

376
00:24:26,300 --> 00:24:28,900
I guess I'm more interesting. 
Is, how does the Privacy model 

377
00:24:28,900 --> 00:24:36,100
change then? 
I mean, first of all, this was 

378
00:24:36,100 --> 00:24:39,300
mostly for Simplicity like we 
thought about doing like a 

379
00:24:39,308 --> 00:24:43,200
hybrid model, willful notes 
don't I like somewhere between a

380
00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:47,000
light client and a full node and
don't actually have to run as 

381
00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:49,800
GX. 
It was too complicated. 

382
00:24:50,200 --> 00:24:51,600
I mean, it's all we can do it 
again. 

383
00:24:51,600 --> 00:24:57,000
It's a cost-benefit analysis. 
And so, so for now, even for 

384
00:24:57,000 --> 00:25:00,200
notes, need to run. 
Is she ex obviously end users 

385
00:25:00,200 --> 00:25:04,700
and clients like they don't. 
To, they don't need to involve. 

386
00:25:05,400 --> 00:25:07,500
You can check out the how the 
like client would work because I

387
00:25:07,508 --> 00:25:11,500
know this has been a big issue 
in many privacy coins like in Z 

388
00:25:11,500 --> 00:25:14,800
cash, especially where you 
can't, you know, there is no 

389
00:25:14,800 --> 00:25:16,900
light client that exists for 
seek out. 

390
00:25:16,900 --> 00:25:20,200
So is there a like client that 
exists for secret? 

391
00:25:21,900 --> 00:25:26,200
Not really, but like, you know 
when it comes to let specific 

392
00:25:26,200 --> 00:25:29,000
things. 
So like like there's a concept 

393
00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:32,700
of you in keys and pretty much 
anything that's encrypted. 

394
00:25:32,800 --> 00:25:36,000
Like you can give a viewing key 
for example, to capital L. 

395
00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:39,200
And then like, you know, they 
can they can get like read-only 

396
00:25:39,200 --> 00:25:41,100
access to like important 
information. 

397
00:25:41,300 --> 00:25:44,300
So that's usually the way that 
we do be solving. 

398
00:25:44,700 --> 00:25:47,100
But no, there's no proper light 
client yet. 

399
00:25:48,100 --> 00:25:49,800
Yeah, so then back to the 
previous question. 

400
00:25:49,800 --> 00:25:54,200
So like what does. 
So, how do I like what kind of 

401
00:25:54,200 --> 00:25:59,700
privacy guarantees do I get when
I request a when I try to use 

402
00:25:59,700 --> 00:26:04,100
secret Network, like, does the 
validator that I'm sending my 

403
00:26:04,100 --> 00:26:08,100
transaction, the validators, I'm
carrying information from. 

404
00:26:08,100 --> 00:26:11,100
Can they learn about like my 
data? 

405
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:14,500
No, they the valid ID is for 
sure. 

406
00:26:14,500 --> 00:26:17,300
Can't, you know, there's such a 
lemon? 

407
00:26:17,500 --> 00:26:22,200
Formation and sacred itself. 
The coin is is not private. 

408
00:26:22,600 --> 00:26:25,500
So there's such an information 
from that like in many systems. 

409
00:26:25,900 --> 00:26:29,000
But now when you when you send 
your information to a validator 

410
00:26:29,000 --> 00:26:34,300
and then when it's, you know, 
Ron and edit your blog like Dave

411
00:26:34,300 --> 00:26:37,100
puts the state and the outputs, 
they're encrypted. 

412
00:26:37,100 --> 00:26:39,200
They're only being decrypted 
instead of The Enclave. 

413
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:43,100
So like you'd like there's 
there's there's nothing that 

414
00:26:43,100 --> 00:26:48,200
yumi's end and we basically for 
correctness like we We'll take 

415
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:49,600
all of the benefits of tender 
me. 

416
00:26:49,600 --> 00:26:55,200
Because because of the key 
sharing process that I because 

417
00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:58,300
of what I said in the beginning,
when you register you get a 

418
00:26:58,300 --> 00:27:01,500
randomly generated seed, but 
then that's it is used to 

419
00:27:01,500 --> 00:27:04,500
pseudorandomly and 
deterministically. 

420
00:27:05,600 --> 00:27:10,000
Generate like the same set of 
keys for all nodes for all 

421
00:27:10,000 --> 00:27:12,500
computations for everything 
that's going on. 

422
00:27:12,900 --> 00:27:15,800
So consensus doesn't break like 
all. 

423
00:27:16,000 --> 00:27:18,700
All validators. 
Even if they don't see what they

424
00:27:18,700 --> 00:27:21,700
computed, the end of the day, 
like the blocks that are 

425
00:27:21,700 --> 00:27:25,700
producing the the from the 
transactions, the outputs, like 

426
00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:30,300
all of them are the same. 
I guess my question is but if 

427
00:27:30,300 --> 00:27:34,300
I'm querying data of from the 
blockchain, so if I'm so, you 

428
00:27:34,300 --> 00:27:36,300
know, you mentioned this viewing
Keys. 

429
00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:41,200
Like so if I'm asking a, you 
know, I'm querying a note 

430
00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:45,900
saying, hey, I want to know what
my balance in my account. 

431
00:27:45,900 --> 00:27:51,400
Is, who can anyone see that? 
I guess, two things one. 

432
00:27:51,400 --> 00:27:53,900
Can they see that? 
I'm asking for a balance and 

433
00:27:53,900 --> 00:27:56,500
from what token. 
And then to can, they actually 

434
00:27:56,500 --> 00:28:00,500
see the balance of Itself. 
No, yeah, so let's say the 

435
00:28:00,500 --> 00:28:03,500
example of asking for query for 
like a token balance. 

436
00:28:03,900 --> 00:28:07,600
So they would see that the 
certain secret wallet and they 

437
00:28:07,600 --> 00:28:14,000
can see the address of the 
secret wallet is querying for a 

438
00:28:14,000 --> 00:28:16,400
balanced. 
They will not see. 

439
00:28:16,700 --> 00:28:19,400
They will know which token their
current because each token is 

440
00:28:19,408 --> 00:28:24,200
its own like contract. 
But a, they would not be. 

441
00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:27,800
They would not know that you're 
craving for a token that we just

442
00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:30,300
know that. 
That you're interacting with the

443
00:28:30,300 --> 00:28:36,300
token contract from this secret 
address, and then the query 

444
00:28:36,300 --> 00:28:39,800
would basically, you know, which
would pull the your balance from

445
00:28:39,800 --> 00:28:42,000
the state, the validator won't 
see it. 

446
00:28:42,000 --> 00:28:45,300
Because like that part happens 
inside of The Enclave. 

447
00:28:45,600 --> 00:28:48,400
Then before releasing it outside
of the autoclave. 

448
00:28:48,700 --> 00:28:52,700
I mean, there's there's kind of 
like for each for each query or 

449
00:28:52,700 --> 00:28:56,100
each transaction. 
There's kind of like, derived 

450
00:28:56,100 --> 00:29:01,600
key between the user The Enclave
that only the article itself can

451
00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:05,500
can see and the user can see. 
So what happens is the Alchemy 

452
00:29:05,500 --> 00:29:09,700
of uses that to encrypt the 
query result inside of the are 

453
00:29:09,700 --> 00:29:13,000
clave for the user and then 
release that. 

454
00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:16,500
So only the user, can 
client-side the privileged 

455
00:29:16,500 --> 00:29:20,400
information, the, the the other 
part is that there's there's a 

456
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:22,800
very key. 
So you can you can share a view 

457
00:29:22,800 --> 00:29:26,000
in Key subject. 
For example, another selfies 

458
00:29:26,400 --> 00:29:30,300
could, you know, could Could get
some kind of read only access 

459
00:29:30,300 --> 00:29:34,800
and can also be creeped, the 
information from a query but 

460
00:29:34,800 --> 00:29:37,900
those are the only parties that 
can actually see the results. 

461
00:29:37,900 --> 00:29:42,500
Either the user or whomever they
gave if you in key to. 

462
00:29:43,600 --> 00:29:45,300
Does that make sense. 
Thank you. 

463
00:29:45,300 --> 00:29:48,200
That's super interesting. 
Yeah, it makes total sense. 

464
00:29:48,700 --> 00:29:53,800
I imagine, I imagine there are 
particular challenges to 

465
00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:58,400
building the user experience 
building, you know, as Fully 

466
00:29:58,400 --> 00:30:02,000
private chain. 
What are those? 

467
00:30:03,700 --> 00:30:06,600
So the there are actually 
several challenges both from a 

468
00:30:06,608 --> 00:30:12,200
developer and and any user from 
user perspective. 

469
00:30:12,200 --> 00:30:13,500
Right? 
Like whenever you're doing 

470
00:30:13,500 --> 00:30:19,100
something, you first have to 
give a view and key permission 

471
00:30:19,100 --> 00:30:22,600
for the wallet. 
Like let's say there's a new 

472
00:30:22,600 --> 00:30:24,200
token. 
So now there's a lot of Click 

473
00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:27,000
where you need to create a view 
in Key for that new token. 

474
00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:30,300
And then, you know, let your 
wallet or the application. 

475
00:30:30,300 --> 00:30:33,300
Use it in some, in some way, 
usually your wallet. 

476
00:30:33,500 --> 00:30:37,300
Just like another click people 
are not often used to it because

477
00:30:37,300 --> 00:30:41,000
it's like only a secret Network,
pretty much, that's something 

478
00:30:41,000 --> 00:30:45,000
that we're working on. 
And recently, we've enabled the 

479
00:30:45,000 --> 00:30:48,700
ability to use permits. 
I'm actually not even the best 

480
00:30:48,700 --> 00:30:52,700
person to explain those like 
that is even still new to me, 

481
00:30:53,000 --> 00:30:55,500
but they make the process much 
easier. 

482
00:30:55,500 --> 00:30:57,300
It's much more automated. 
Basically. 

483
00:30:57,300 --> 00:30:59,800
It's like you don't have to 
create a purely. 

484
00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:03,100
It's much more automated in that
sense. 

485
00:31:04,300 --> 00:31:07,700
So, that's one challenge. 
The other challenge that this 

486
00:31:07,700 --> 00:31:11,800
creates is in many cases. 
You know, let's say there is a 

487
00:31:11,800 --> 00:31:15,400
big nft drop, right? 
And everyone are coming at the 

488
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,300
same time and they want to meet 
their entities. 

489
00:31:17,600 --> 00:31:21,900
Well, they first have to like, 
create viewing keys to see 

490
00:31:21,900 --> 00:31:23,000
those. 
Again. 

491
00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:25,200
This is mostly solved with 
permits. 

492
00:31:25,900 --> 00:31:29,500
But if you're not using permits,
then that that creates like a 

493
00:31:29,500 --> 00:31:35,600
lot of transactions immediately 
on the And we have seen that 

494
00:31:35,700 --> 00:31:41,200
create some let's say difficult 
stress on the network that 

495
00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:43,000
another Network. 
You don't see because you don't 

496
00:31:43,000 --> 00:31:46,400
have that functionality. 
So that's like another challenge

497
00:31:46,700 --> 00:31:52,600
and the third challenge is you 
know, a lot of like if you look 

498
00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:58,700
at Tara another and other 
networks, a lot of them, they 

499
00:31:58,700 --> 00:32:01,500
cached information. 
So, you know, let's say your 

500
00:32:01,500 --> 00:32:05,100
interact with the contract. 
And there's a lot of the same 

501
00:32:05,100 --> 00:32:08,000
qualities. 
There's mostly reads just a few 

502
00:32:08,000 --> 00:32:11,600
rides, so they would cash it. 
Honestly on the centralized 

503
00:32:11,600 --> 00:32:15,400
server to kind of reduce the 
load, the query load from the 

504
00:32:15,400 --> 00:32:20,000
network but here because every 
user have access to only like 

505
00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:22,800
what robe like they're over 
information. 

506
00:32:23,100 --> 00:32:27,800
No one can see the fool like the
full state it and usually each 

507
00:32:27,800 --> 00:32:32,700
user just queries their own row.
You get a lot of again, a lot of

508
00:32:32,700 --> 00:32:35,800
queries. 
Which you cannot cash and that 

509
00:32:35,800 --> 00:32:40,000
creates making optimization 
really, really, really hard. 

510
00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:43,300
I don't think there's a perfect 
solution that we are doing. 

511
00:32:43,300 --> 00:32:46,900
We're doing quite a lot of work 
than to improve. 

512
00:32:47,000 --> 00:32:51,000
But that's I think that's part 
of the cost of, you know, riding

513
00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:54,900
with privacy enabled. 
How about from the developer 

514
00:32:54,900 --> 00:32:58,800
standpoint of view? 
Like can I you know, so, you 

515
00:32:58,800 --> 00:33:00,400
know as as we mentioned cause 
and walls. 

516
00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:03,900
Mm is like, you know, becoming 
sort of the standard across many

517
00:33:03,900 --> 00:33:06,100
Cosmos changes like especially 
like Tara. 

518
00:33:06,300 --> 00:33:10,200
Can I just go take a Tara 
contract and just one click 

519
00:33:10,200 --> 00:33:14,800
redeploy it on to secret Network
or is there sort of additional 

520
00:33:14,800 --> 00:33:18,200
hurdles that we developers have 
to like go through in order to 

521
00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:23,000
make their contracts design 
working with the Privacy models?

522
00:33:25,300 --> 00:33:27,400
Very few. 
Hell that is most of them are 

523
00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:30,100
just like, because of, like, 
echo system tools. 

524
00:33:30,300 --> 00:33:32,000
So, you know, Tara. 
Is there a JS? 

525
00:33:32,000 --> 00:33:36,900
We have secant years, but it's 
pretty much the same thing. 

526
00:33:37,700 --> 00:33:40,400
We've done it. 
Other people have done it. 

527
00:33:40,400 --> 00:33:42,400
It's really simple. 
It's simpler than most people 

528
00:33:42,400 --> 00:33:44,700
think. 
I think that's the biggest 

529
00:33:44,700 --> 00:33:48,600
benefit that you know, we're all
we're all converging to the 

530
00:33:48,600 --> 00:33:52,700
same. 
Like, you know model with cousin

531
00:33:52,700 --> 00:33:54,800
was in words like very, very 
easy to cross. 

532
00:33:55,000 --> 00:33:58,100
Deploy, and actually one of our 
things that we want to do in Key

533
00:33:58,100 --> 00:34:04,800
one is we want to give a very, 
very easy guide on if you deploy

534
00:34:04,800 --> 00:34:08,000
your app on Tara, here's how to 
convert it to secretly. 

535
00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:13,500
Like, you know, five minutes. 
Do I what about like for like, 

536
00:34:13,500 --> 00:34:16,800
how do I Define this like 
viewing restrictions? 

537
00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:18,800
Right? 
Because you know on I'm sure on 

538
00:34:18,800 --> 00:34:20,600
most cause I'm awesome 
contracts. 

539
00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:24,100
Anyone can just query any part 
of a contract here. 

540
00:34:24,100 --> 00:34:27,199
Obviously, I have to add 
additional restrictions to say, 

541
00:34:27,500 --> 00:34:29,699
you know, if you're trying to 
carry this balance, you actually

542
00:34:29,699 --> 00:34:31,300
have to be the owner of this 
balance. 

543
00:34:32,100 --> 00:34:33,900
So are there like additional 
sort of? 

544
00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:37,500
I guess in the view from the 
read functions of the contract. 

545
00:34:37,500 --> 00:34:40,800
I just have to add more a little
bit more, restrictions there, or

546
00:34:40,800 --> 00:34:42,600
is there anything more 
complicated than that? 

547
00:34:44,000 --> 00:34:46,500
I mean, that's again. 
If you want privacy if you want 

548
00:34:46,500 --> 00:34:49,900
to do a lot more selective 
access control stuff like that, 

549
00:34:49,900 --> 00:34:52,500
it is that you need to it. 
That is up to you. 

550
00:34:52,500 --> 00:34:55,400
I mean technically you don't 
have to do them, it would work 

551
00:34:55,400 --> 00:34:58,200
without it. 
But if you if you want to use 

552
00:34:58,200 --> 00:35:01,100
these functionalities, then you 
have to make slight changes. 

553
00:35:01,100 --> 00:35:04,700
Yes, but again, they're not big.
They're usually not big. 

554
00:35:06,200 --> 00:35:09,800
Can I when using secret? 
Can I do? 

555
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:13,400
I do all contracts have to 
execute inside the SG X. 

556
00:35:13,600 --> 00:35:16,400
So let's say there's some things
that are just like, you know, 

557
00:35:16,800 --> 00:35:20,400
you know because obviously and I
can maybe one thing before like 

558
00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:24,300
regarding that is like how does 
computation, you know, 

559
00:35:24,300 --> 00:35:28,000
expensiveness work, and relative
compared to something, you know 

560
00:35:28,400 --> 00:35:31,500
that, you know, if all the cause
I know one of the big issues 

561
00:35:31,500 --> 00:35:34,000
with got issues but you know, 
one of the restrictions that GX 

562
00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:37,400
is you have like You know, it's 
definitely slower than running 

563
00:35:37,400 --> 00:35:41,400
on our normals on a normal CPU. 
You can't do like can you do 

564
00:35:41,400 --> 00:35:44,300
like hyper that you know 
multi-threading and like you 

565
00:35:44,300 --> 00:35:46,800
have lesser RAM and stuff. 
So what can you tell us a little

566
00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:49,200
bit about some of the 
restrictions that are 

567
00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:50,900
developers? 
Might have there. 

568
00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:57,600
Sure, so it's single-threaded 
but I think most executions in 

569
00:35:57,600 --> 00:35:59,900
Cosmos closing was a war Central
thread. 

570
00:35:59,900 --> 00:36:03,800
Until recently. 
We are working right now on 

571
00:36:03,800 --> 00:36:06,100
adding multi-threaded support 
like that's actually almost 

572
00:36:06,100 --> 00:36:08,900
done. 
So we are going to support multi

573
00:36:08,900 --> 00:36:12,500
threading it as she acts, it 
wasn't trivial but that's one of

574
00:36:12,500 --> 00:36:18,300
the optimizations we're doing 
the the memory issue. 

575
00:36:18,800 --> 00:36:23,000
There's enough memory, but In 
many cases because of the way 

576
00:36:23,000 --> 00:36:26,800
she acts works, then you know, 
you have, you have a lot of like

577
00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:32,000
cache misses and, you know, if 
you if you if you don't like, 

578
00:36:32,000 --> 00:36:36,000
you know, efficiently load 
information inside of the 

579
00:36:36,000 --> 00:36:40,300
enclave and outside, then that 
could take a really long time. 

580
00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:43,800
I think in our profile and we 
saw that like, you know, every 

581
00:36:43,800 --> 00:36:47,400
time we open it on Cliff, we 
loaded the, we reloaded the 

582
00:36:47,408 --> 00:36:50,000
contract that is taken in some 
cases. 

583
00:36:50,000 --> 00:36:53,100
I think like the majority. 
You of time, spent in running 

584
00:36:53,100 --> 00:36:57,300
the execution. 
So yes, the the considerations 

585
00:36:57,300 --> 00:37:01,500
Derek's not review. 
We are slowly improving these 

586
00:37:02,400 --> 00:37:05,500
resolving these amazing and I 
think we're in a much better 

587
00:37:05,500 --> 00:37:07,600
position. 
The Slowdown is not that bad 

588
00:37:07,600 --> 00:37:10,500
today, but it's going to really 
improve in the next year. 

589
00:37:10,900 --> 00:37:14,400
That's, that's one thing, the 
other thing, which is slightly 

590
00:37:14,400 --> 00:37:20,000
in issue is, you know, because 
of because of age, like fgx 

591
00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:23,300
doesn't Force Security reasons. 
It doesn't allow you to use like

592
00:37:23,300 --> 00:37:25,200
standard libraries and stuff 
like that. 

593
00:37:26,100 --> 00:37:32,100
And so like using something like
was mail, which is the go to, I 

594
00:37:32,100 --> 00:37:35,600
guess, interpreter or 
just-in-time compiler for 

595
00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:38,900
running wasn't code. 
And that's what I think cause 

596
00:37:39,100 --> 00:37:42,600
that's what cause there was a 
muse, is natively like we 

597
00:37:42,600 --> 00:37:49,600
couldn't use that not easily. 
So we replace that that took a 

598
00:37:49,607 --> 00:37:54,000
lot of effort, but we replace 
Tweed was me, which is more like

599
00:37:54,000 --> 00:37:58,000
a pure interpreter and that 
works but that is much slower 

600
00:37:58,000 --> 00:38:01,500
than was Mill as well. 
So again, one of our, one of our

601
00:38:01,500 --> 00:38:04,500
things on the to-do list is to 
go back. 

602
00:38:04,700 --> 00:38:08,900
Read the great was male in a way
that is supported by GX. 

603
00:38:10,700 --> 00:38:15,800
So can I then like so then that 
case, like if there is, can I 

604
00:38:15,800 --> 00:38:19,800
ought to have certain contracts 
not run in the sgx. 

605
00:38:20,200 --> 00:38:23,000
We're like, let's say there is 
just, you know, heavy 

606
00:38:23,000 --> 00:38:26,900
computation functions that, you 
know, I have no reason to keep 

607
00:38:26,900 --> 00:38:30,900
private. 
Can I reduce my gas costs by 

608
00:38:30,900 --> 00:38:34,600
writing those not in the sgx? 
Not right now, but that's a 

609
00:38:34,607 --> 00:38:38,800
fantastic idea from a 
scalability perspective than 

610
00:38:38,800 --> 00:38:39,800
here. 
Right? 

611
00:38:39,800 --> 00:38:44,700
Where would you place like the 
limit of where like sgx 

612
00:38:44,700 --> 00:38:48,100
computation can go? 
Like, you know, you know, we 

613
00:38:48,100 --> 00:38:51,600
have a spectrum, you know, like,
you know, like okay, how do you 

614
00:38:51,600 --> 00:38:54,800
think it will? 
Is sgx computation today? 

615
00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:59,800
Like is it can you do more than 
you can in DVM or you know, kick

616
00:38:59,800 --> 00:39:03,500
it ever get to Native 
Cosmopolitan scale or Like even 

617
00:39:03,500 --> 00:39:06,100
Solana style scale. 
Where do you see? 

618
00:39:06,100 --> 00:39:09,200
Like the limits are good? 
Or, you know, assuming you can 

619
00:39:09,200 --> 00:39:10,900
get all these optimizations you 
want. 

620
00:39:10,900 --> 00:39:12,400
Where do you think it will end 
up Landing? 

621
00:39:13,300 --> 00:39:14,700
Yeah. 
I think that won't be an issue. 

622
00:39:14,700 --> 00:39:17,000
I think these are engineering 
challenges and I think at the 

623
00:39:17,000 --> 00:39:20,800
end of the day to slow down, 
there will be slow down. 

624
00:39:21,400 --> 00:39:25,000
It won't be meaningful. 
I think the one place was I'm 

625
00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:30,000
not sure he's wherever in cases 
where you need to access. 

626
00:39:31,100 --> 00:39:33,700
You know, let's say are raised. 
Information. 

627
00:39:33,700 --> 00:39:37,100
Like, you know, you want to 
access like like you want to run

628
00:39:37,100 --> 00:39:41,000
through all of the users at the 
same time that that might be the

629
00:39:41,000 --> 00:39:43,400
only place where I think it's 
going to be problematic at the 

630
00:39:43,400 --> 00:39:45,000
end. 
But everything else I think is, 

631
00:39:45,300 --> 00:39:47,700
you know, we can resolve it in, 
we will resolve it. 

632
00:39:49,100 --> 00:39:51,800
So, secret network is IBC and 
able, right. 

633
00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:57,200
So basically, how does how does 
the secret part work across 

634
00:39:57,200 --> 00:40:00,300
different Cosmo space 
blockchain? 

635
00:40:00,300 --> 00:40:08,600
So can you kind of, can any IBC,
enabled blockchain, query smart 

636
00:40:08,600 --> 00:40:10,600
contract? 
So what, what, how does it work?

637
00:40:11,700 --> 00:40:15,000
So, right now, we kind of did 
what Tara did and I think most 

638
00:40:15,000 --> 00:40:18,000
chains. 
Sorry. 

639
00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:20,600
I don't know if you remember, 
but you and your co-founder with

640
00:40:20,600 --> 00:40:23,500
us, Moses, you gave us the tip 
to do these. 

641
00:40:24,400 --> 00:40:30,100
We we only enabled like, you 
know, sending native Native 

642
00:40:30,100 --> 00:40:33,300
assets on IBC right now between 
chain, two chain. 

643
00:40:33,500 --> 00:40:38,100
We do not support calling one 
contract on our chain. 

644
00:40:38,200 --> 00:40:41,500
And on another, I beseech, a 
that is Something that's going 

645
00:40:41,500 --> 00:40:45,400
to happen in. 
Let's say IB C 2.0 upgrade 

646
00:40:45,400 --> 00:40:48,500
upgrade which is going to happen
sometime in 2022. 

647
00:40:48,500 --> 00:40:53,900
But so far what you can do is 
you can transfer assets, and you

648
00:40:53,900 --> 00:40:55,800
can also do something which we 
are doing. 

649
00:40:55,800 --> 00:41:01,400
Like for example, you can take 
osmo or atom or luna or you see.

650
00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:06,400
And you can turn something to 
our chain and then via ABC and 

651
00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:12,700
then you can wrap them as as as 
Can and that token gives you 

652
00:41:12,700 --> 00:41:14,400
privacy? 
So for example, if you want to 

653
00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:19,500
trade your awesome or privately,
then you can move it to secret 

654
00:41:19,500 --> 00:41:23,000
Network rapid. 
We actually have a UI to do, 

655
00:41:23,000 --> 00:41:25,500
very simply and then you can 
transact with it. 

656
00:41:25,500 --> 00:41:27,800
You can, you know, split it 
different wallets. 

657
00:41:28,000 --> 00:41:31,800
You can edit to secret swab, 
which is our mmm, and trade 

658
00:41:31,800 --> 00:41:33,200
their preferred to something 
else. 

659
00:41:33,200 --> 00:41:35,100
And then you can, you know, exit
back in line. 

660
00:41:35,300 --> 00:41:40,600
You can be unwrapped it and exit
bed for IBC to whatever. 

661
00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:44,500
So changing IBC that you want. 
So those are the capabilities 

662
00:41:44,500 --> 00:41:47,700
that are enabled right now. 
And I was wondering. 

663
00:41:47,900 --> 00:41:52,800
So can you use the sgx to do 
multi-party computation? 

664
00:41:54,900 --> 00:41:57,900
I mean multiple, I mean 
technically what we're doing is 

665
00:41:58,200 --> 00:42:00,900
multi-party computation, but we 
are using this GX. 

666
00:42:01,200 --> 00:42:05,200
If the question is whether we 
can do multiply the computation,

667
00:42:05,200 --> 00:42:07,500
like it's pure cryptographic 
form. 

668
00:42:07,900 --> 00:42:11,100
Then I would say that's that's a
very different implementation. 

669
00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:15,100
We can do it. 
It can use sgx to simplify 

670
00:42:15,300 --> 00:42:18,400
something. 
So some element of hgx can you 

671
00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:21,800
know, make the NPC protocols 
that you use simpler? 

672
00:42:22,100 --> 00:42:24,500
Because you know, you can trial 
if you if you take An 

673
00:42:24,500 --> 00:42:27,600
assumption. 
For example, that is GX, you 

674
00:42:27,600 --> 00:42:30,800
know, can protect correctness 
and and you know, whoever's 

675
00:42:30,800 --> 00:42:33,500
running the code inside of an 
autoclave will not break 

676
00:42:33,500 --> 00:42:36,800
protocol. 
So you can use more like, what 

677
00:42:36,800 --> 00:42:41,000
we know is semi, but honest but 
curious protocols, which 

678
00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:45,100
basically assume participant 
will try to link data, but they 

679
00:42:45,100 --> 00:42:48,800
will not change your protocol. 
So again s GX can help us in 

680
00:42:48,800 --> 00:42:53,200
developing like these kind of 
Solutions in a much simpler and 

681
00:42:53,200 --> 00:42:57,000
more scalable way. 
Way, but you know, they're 

682
00:42:57,000 --> 00:42:59,700
they're they're another tool. 
They're not like it's not that 

683
00:42:59,700 --> 00:43:02,200
you get F PC for free. 
It's still a very complicated 

684
00:43:02,200 --> 00:43:05,400
thing to do and you know, we 
talked about scalability so 

685
00:43:05,400 --> 00:43:09,900
much. 
I think MPC for general-purpose 

686
00:43:09,900 --> 00:43:15,500
computations. 
Unfortunately the the cost 

687
00:43:15,500 --> 00:43:19,700
reduction, the, the sort of the 
the cost increase at the speed, 

688
00:43:19,700 --> 00:43:24,200
reduction would be so heavy that
I doubt that a developer would 

689
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:29,600
Use that unfortunately today. 
So, yeah, you know, I think one 

690
00:43:29,600 --> 00:43:32,100
of the interesting things that 
I, you know, how what I see 

691
00:43:32,100 --> 00:43:36,600
secret network is doing in, a 
lot of ways is, you know, I 

692
00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:41,500
think the sgx as a computer 
system like, you know, it 

693
00:43:41,500 --> 00:43:46,700
provides you basically like high
levels of, you know, safety and 

694
00:43:46,700 --> 00:43:51,200
privacy but on its own, it 
never, it doesn't provide like 

695
00:43:51,200 --> 00:43:53,300
this. 
And so one of the things I see 

696
00:43:53,300 --> 00:43:56,000
it as, you know, I picked secret
Network ads, when I explain it 

697
00:43:56,000 --> 00:43:59,200
to people, there's like, I call 
it like, it's like a Date sgx, 

698
00:43:59,200 --> 00:44:01,600
right? 
Where it adds liveness to, to 

699
00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:07,700
the to the sgx platform. 
And like so, you know, one thing

700
00:44:07,700 --> 00:44:11,500
is like, could we start to? 
We also use it for things like 

701
00:44:12,400 --> 00:44:16,000
being a custodian for example, 
so, you know, I think, like, for

702
00:44:16,000 --> 00:44:18,100
example, I know the Avalanche 
Bridge with the area was 

703
00:44:18,100 --> 00:44:21,200
basically running on a single 
sgx right now, which is kind of 

704
00:44:22,100 --> 00:44:25,400
crazy to me. 
But like, you know, partially, 

705
00:44:25,700 --> 00:44:28,500
it's kind of crazy mostly 
because, you know, if If it's a 

706
00:44:28,500 --> 00:44:31,600
single sgx, you know, it could 
have a lot of liveness issues. 

707
00:44:31,600 --> 00:44:34,700
We're like sure entrust, the sgx
a safety properties. 

708
00:44:34,700 --> 00:44:38,400
But if that machine breaks down 
like we're in for a lot of 

709
00:44:38,400 --> 00:44:39,400
trouble. 
Right. 

710
00:44:39,500 --> 00:44:44,500
And so like, could we use the 
secret Network as a distributed 

711
00:44:44,500 --> 00:44:49,700
custodian? 
And that sort of way, I think we

712
00:44:49,700 --> 00:44:53,000
can, and we actually have some G
that are, you know, taking the 

713
00:44:53,200 --> 00:44:57,100
direction. 
We have it available core 

714
00:44:57,100 --> 00:44:59,900
developer called the soft. 
He just meant an interesting 

715
00:44:59,900 --> 00:45:03,600
tweet about how like dolls can 
now control like, you know, 

716
00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:08,400
private keys inside of the of 
their contracts. 

717
00:45:08,600 --> 00:45:13,000
And then we die PC and other 
things like essentially like do 

718
00:45:13,000 --> 00:45:16,900
stuff on other chains through 
the Dow, be cut because it 

719
00:45:16,900 --> 00:45:21,500
controls, you know, the The key 
is in is live - live. 

720
00:45:21,500 --> 00:45:24,300
This is pretty much guaranteed. 
So by the way, I like your 

721
00:45:24,300 --> 00:45:26,000
Peach. 
I'm gonna I'm gonna, I'm gonna 

722
00:45:26,000 --> 00:45:29,600
steal that if that's okay. 
So, here is a. 

723
00:45:29,600 --> 00:45:31,800
So, here's the other part that 
it about, you know, the big 

724
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:37,300
question I have for sgx. 
And so, you know, you know, you 

725
00:45:37,300 --> 00:45:40,400
know, we've worked a lot on 
like, front-running resistance 

726
00:45:40,900 --> 00:45:44,200
related things and like mempool 
privacy, and I know that's like 

727
00:45:44,200 --> 00:45:48,000
something that the sgx also, you
know, Secret at work provides in

728
00:45:48,000 --> 00:45:51,100
a lot of ways, but for me, one 
of the biggest concerns I've had

729
00:45:51,100 --> 00:45:55,000
with, like, the sgx is, you 
know, we see that like there 

730
00:45:55,000 --> 00:45:59,800
seem to be on a semi-regular 
basis, like, Law judge found in 

731
00:45:59,800 --> 00:46:04,100
the sgx and and the sgx and like
people are able to find 

732
00:46:04,100 --> 00:46:07,400
vulnerabilities. 
And you know, in my opinion, how

733
00:46:07,400 --> 00:46:11,500
I see it is like right now the 
the value in finding a 

734
00:46:11,508 --> 00:46:13,800
vulnerability that you know, 
there isn't even that high of a 

735
00:46:14,300 --> 00:46:16,100
benefit right now. 
It's been mostly like, you know,

736
00:46:16,100 --> 00:46:18,500
just academic research teams 
that have been finding these 

737
00:46:18,500 --> 00:46:22,000
vulnerabilities, but you know, 
as there's more, and more 

738
00:46:22,000 --> 00:46:25,100
economic value that's happening.
And, you know, if you can 

739
00:46:25,100 --> 00:46:29,600
extract Mev by breaking the 
security model, Hell of an sgx 

740
00:46:29,600 --> 00:46:35,300
and extract billions of dollars 
of Mev that that's essentially a

741
00:46:35,300 --> 00:46:38,300
billion dollar bounty on 
Breaking the sgx. 

742
00:46:38,300 --> 00:46:41,900
And is that like do you think 
that that's the X can sustain 

743
00:46:41,900 --> 00:46:48,000
that level of security budget? 
I mean, I guess it's, you know, 

744
00:46:48,700 --> 00:46:52,700
I'm speaking from a position. 
I do believe that's the case. 

745
00:46:53,100 --> 00:46:55,600
I do believe for many, many use 
cases. 

746
00:46:55,900 --> 00:46:58,300
That's definitely the case. 
I like the idea that secret 

747
00:46:58,300 --> 00:47:04,500
network is, the biggest honey 
pot for testing secure enclaves 

748
00:47:04,500 --> 00:47:07,300
at scale. 
So far. 

749
00:47:07,700 --> 00:47:11,000
We didn't have problems. 
And, you know, any time there's 

750
00:47:11,000 --> 00:47:15,900
a flaw, we immediately patch it.
And Through a network upgrade, 

751
00:47:16,300 --> 00:47:19,400
you know, you make sure that 
everyone is patched. 

752
00:47:19,400 --> 00:47:22,900
We have a very, very strict 
about it even stricter than most

753
00:47:22,900 --> 00:47:27,700
other players. 
I've seen using a, she acts but 

754
00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:31,600
I guess it's to be seen from my 
perspective. 

755
00:47:31,600 --> 00:47:34,700
Look, as you know, my background
is in cryptography and PC. 

756
00:47:35,000 --> 00:47:40,000
Like I'm very, very much excited
in the future to include other 

757
00:47:40,000 --> 00:47:43,600
kinds of technologies that are 
you know, more cryptographic in 

758
00:47:43,600 --> 00:47:46,300
nature. 
Into secret Network. 

759
00:47:46,600 --> 00:47:50,100
At this point, like I'm more 
concerned that you know, 

760
00:47:50,100 --> 00:47:55,400
developers would not be willing 
to take the slow down and the 

761
00:47:55,400 --> 00:47:59,500
cost increase of using protocol 
for graphic Technologies and 

762
00:47:59,500 --> 00:48:04,600
many of them have other other 
issues and constraints that 

763
00:48:04,600 --> 00:48:08,700
people often Overlook when they 
when they present them. 

764
00:48:09,000 --> 00:48:13,900
So it was it's a it's a 
balancing act like we do. 

765
00:48:14,000 --> 00:48:16,200
Feel. 
This is the best solution for 

766
00:48:16,200 --> 00:48:20,500
the problem right now. 
We like the idea that it allows 

767
00:48:20,500 --> 00:48:26,100
us to check, you know things at 
scale with high value and then 

768
00:48:26,100 --> 00:48:31,200
you know over time hopefully 
that will help us to make our 

769
00:48:31,200 --> 00:48:37,300
system Enclave sgx specifically 
enclaves in general more and 

770
00:48:37,300 --> 00:48:41,300
more robust. 
But at the end of the day like 

771
00:48:41,500 --> 00:48:46,700
if the technology allows it, The
users and developers demanded 

772
00:48:47,100 --> 00:48:52,100
like I would be super excited to
look again at MPC and even 

773
00:48:52,100 --> 00:48:56,100
homomorphic encryption Solutions
at least to, you know, to some 

774
00:48:56,100 --> 00:48:58,400
aspects. 
And some use cases that are 

775
00:48:58,400 --> 00:49:03,100
being built on our Network. 
And I really want to talk about 

776
00:49:03,100 --> 00:49:05,800
the ecosystem. 
But now I have to follow up 

777
00:49:05,800 --> 00:49:07,000
again. 
Damn, you sonny. 

778
00:49:07,200 --> 00:49:13,100
And so, basically, if I'm a node
in the network, and I am, how 

779
00:49:13,100 --> 00:49:17,300
would I, how would I know? 
How would I find out about the 

780
00:49:17,300 --> 00:49:22,100
fact that some sgx was 
compromised or is being viewed 

781
00:49:22,900 --> 00:49:24,600
by something? 
That's not the sgx. 

782
00:49:24,600 --> 00:49:27,800
I mean, so basically, how, how 
would I catch on? 

783
00:49:28,200 --> 00:49:32,300
I mean, how is there like I say 
I can read The coal mine 

784
00:49:32,300 --> 00:49:35,400
somewhere because basically with
a lot of the shielded protocols,

785
00:49:35,400 --> 00:49:37,800
there's no way to actually do 
check sums, right? 

786
00:49:38,900 --> 00:49:43,700
The ones there's one stirs. 
So first of all, I don't want to

787
00:49:43,700 --> 00:49:46,400
say that most vulnerabilities, 
you know, their academic 

788
00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:50,300
research has and they are way 
way way overblown. 

789
00:49:50,300 --> 00:49:53,800
There's been very few of them. 
Especially the ones in the early

790
00:49:53,800 --> 00:50:01,500
days which which were I think 
devastating and easy to exploit 

791
00:50:01,700 --> 00:50:07,300
Not even or not easy, but like, 
you know possible to exploit not

792
00:50:07,300 --> 00:50:12,500
in the laboratory setting. 
But putting that aside, you 

793
00:50:12,500 --> 00:50:19,500
know, once there's what is 
there's you know, and as GX 

794
00:50:19,500 --> 00:50:23,700
issue, then we can trigger. 
How'd folk. 

795
00:50:23,700 --> 00:50:28,200
We can ask everyone to 
re-register, you know, the 

796
00:50:28,200 --> 00:50:31,500
relationship protocol that we 
mention, we can trigger. 

797
00:50:31,700 --> 00:50:35,600
How it for about or post second 
Enclave, update. 

798
00:50:35,800 --> 00:50:39,500
And then everyone has to 
re-register every out for the, 

799
00:50:39,500 --> 00:50:41,200
that happens. 
Everyone has to go through the 

800
00:50:41,200 --> 00:50:44,800
registration protocol again. 
And at that point, if they are 

801
00:50:44,800 --> 00:50:50,800
now running the fully patched, 
you know, version of DirectX 

802
00:50:50,800 --> 00:50:55,000
interval feel well and software,
then they won't be able to 

803
00:50:55,000 --> 00:50:57,600
register. 
So that's and that's how people 

804
00:50:57,600 --> 00:51:00,200
know like, you know, there's a 
half of kids network it. 

805
00:51:00,600 --> 00:51:02,600
Yeah. 
At so. 

806
00:51:02,600 --> 00:51:05,400
But that's only if it if it's 
brought to your attention, 

807
00:51:05,400 --> 00:51:07,400
right? 
That there is a vulnerability in

808
00:51:07,400 --> 00:51:09,900
the sgx. 
So basically how would I how 

809
00:51:09,900 --> 00:51:12,700
would you find out that there's 
a vulnerability? 

810
00:51:12,700 --> 00:51:17,900
If it's not, you know, someone, 
you know, white or gray hair to 

811
00:51:17,900 --> 00:51:22,000
kind of makes this publicly 
available information. 

812
00:51:22,000 --> 00:51:23,500
It's your question. 
If someone were to fight, 

813
00:51:23,500 --> 00:51:27,400
affordability, it's a blackhead.
They don't disclose these. 

814
00:51:27,400 --> 00:51:29,900
If there isn't the way of it, 
we're not aware of it. 

815
00:51:30,100 --> 00:51:33,500
Then what happened could that 
could have This their service. 

816
00:51:33,500 --> 00:51:36,200
Yes. 
I mean, I there's no there's no 

817
00:51:36,200 --> 00:51:39,700
way to protect against that, you
know, very much like with the Z 

818
00:51:39,700 --> 00:51:44,000
cash. 
Like, you know, publication 

819
00:51:44,000 --> 00:51:48,000
there was a math, equation devil
and you could have done like 

820
00:51:48,000 --> 00:51:51,300
pretty like you could leak the 
keys, if I remember correctly. 

821
00:51:51,500 --> 00:51:54,900
And if someone had found it and 
not disclose it and someone did 

822
00:51:55,100 --> 00:51:58,900
then they could exploit it. 
So, there's no way we would do 

823
00:51:58,900 --> 00:52:03,500
with that in that situation. 
Okay, there's no way to know. 

824
00:52:03,700 --> 00:52:07,300
Okay, quit. 
So, let's move onto to the 

825
00:52:07,300 --> 00:52:09,500
ecosystem. 
So, tell us about the kind of 

826
00:52:09,500 --> 00:52:12,300
applications that are currently 
running on secret Network. 

827
00:52:14,800 --> 00:52:16,700
Yeah, that I'm pretty excited 
about. 

828
00:52:16,700 --> 00:52:22,000
We have a few dex's that our 
FrontRunner resistant, the 

829
00:52:22,000 --> 00:52:23,700
during fairly. 
Okay, not. 

830
00:52:23,700 --> 00:52:26,700
That is great as Moses, but they
are used. 

831
00:52:26,700 --> 00:52:31,000
I'm an avid user of the, the 
fraud is this resistance is 

832
00:52:31,000 --> 00:52:33,400
really cool. 
The Privacy aspect is really 

833
00:52:33,400 --> 00:52:38,100
cool. 
We have over 100 million, a fake

834
00:52:38,100 --> 00:52:40,500
of assets. 
Maybe maybe even I mean maybe 

835
00:52:40,500 --> 00:52:44,800
more depends how you count. 
In our Network that if either or

836
00:52:44,808 --> 00:52:48,700
originated by projects your 
network, or we've been brought 

837
00:52:48,700 --> 00:52:51,600
for me cereal because we have 
any Syrian believe, somebody 

838
00:52:51,600 --> 00:52:55,200
smart chain because we're 
everybody small chain and from 

839
00:52:55,200 --> 00:53:01,400
other IBC, they put networks. 
So a lot of use cases around 

840
00:53:01,500 --> 00:53:06,700
around that. 
Then there's we've released the 

841
00:53:06,700 --> 00:53:12,800
secret 10ft standard which 
basically allows you to You 

842
00:53:12,800 --> 00:53:16,600
know, launched a nasty and it's 
the collections and it's the the

843
00:53:16,600 --> 00:53:20,300
part of me, the secret ft is 
that, you know, you can Define 

844
00:53:20,500 --> 00:53:24,400
private metadata such as Ali. 
The owner can actually see the 

845
00:53:24,400 --> 00:53:28,800
data and that owner can give 
viewing access to other parties.

846
00:53:28,800 --> 00:53:34,200
If so, they choose and where you
know, there's a there's a big 

847
00:53:35,000 --> 00:53:38,500
World published that we 
announced yesterday with credit 

848
00:53:38,500 --> 00:53:41,900
Tarantino that there's an 
auction for him. 

849
00:53:42,000 --> 00:53:46,700
His original screenplay of Pulp 
Fiction, which is something that

850
00:53:46,700 --> 00:53:49,000
no one has ever seen. 
It's like in his hand, right? 

851
00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:53,800
There's a lot of things and 
details about the, the original 

852
00:53:53,800 --> 00:53:57,800
script notes to himself. 
Like, markups markdowns, like 

853
00:53:57,800 --> 00:54:01,400
like, you know, comments stuff 
that hasn't been in the in the 

854
00:54:01,400 --> 00:54:05,100
final movie and understand that 
is been something that he kept 

855
00:54:05,100 --> 00:54:07,700
private for 25 years and now we 
sell in those a secret. 

856
00:54:07,700 --> 00:54:11,600
And if T's and essentially 
that's going to be in an auction

857
00:54:11,600 --> 00:54:13,600
in two. 
Weeks and only the people who 

858
00:54:13,600 --> 00:54:17,800
buy it would be able to see it 
and then, you know, they can 

859
00:54:17,800 --> 00:54:20,600
decide if they want to if they 
want to give access to other 

860
00:54:20,600 --> 00:54:25,400
people or not. 
So that's that's another use 

861
00:54:25,400 --> 00:54:28,000
case. 
There's just a slew like so many

862
00:54:28,300 --> 00:54:31,300
and a few use cases right now. 
There's a Marketplace called 

863
00:54:31,300 --> 00:54:34,600
stash that launched a month ago.
And there's been I think like to

864
00:54:34,600 --> 00:54:39,100
thousands of nft drops and 
there's a new one every day and 

865
00:54:39,100 --> 00:54:41,900
each one of the views like the 
the Privacy aspect. 

866
00:54:42,000 --> 00:54:44,500
It's in very, very interested 
ways. 

867
00:54:46,500 --> 00:54:49,900
There are a few games building 
on our Network and I think what 

868
00:54:49,900 --> 00:54:53,000
we can provide those other 
networks can provide is a we can

869
00:54:53,000 --> 00:54:58,400
allow you to build your games 
with like he did he did this 

870
00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:01,700
game State unchanged. 
So for example, if you do poker 

871
00:55:02,000 --> 00:55:05,500
you can do it fully or chain 
because you can keep the cards 

872
00:55:05,500 --> 00:55:09,400
themselves, you know, private 
for it, each participant until 

873
00:55:09,400 --> 00:55:11,900
the right moment. 
So we see a lot of that. 

874
00:55:12,500 --> 00:55:18,800
And we actually seen there are 
two defy use cases or those 

875
00:55:18,800 --> 00:55:22,900
private lead coming out this 
month by a company called Sienna

876
00:55:23,400 --> 00:55:26,800
and other. 
There is shade which is going to

877
00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:30,700
be the first privacy-preserving,
stable coin algorithmic stable 

878
00:55:30,700 --> 00:55:33,400
quality. 
It's kind of a mix between a 

879
00:55:33,400 --> 00:55:38,800
little boost, a cow Reserve 
currency and a fully pegs 

880
00:55:38,800 --> 00:55:43,600
privacy-preserving, stable coin 
and They're a bit more lofty 

881
00:55:43,600 --> 00:55:47,000
ideas that I think are just 
going to be, they're going to 

882
00:55:47,000 --> 00:55:49,200
take time to be adopted. 
But I'm really excited about 

883
00:55:49,200 --> 00:55:52,100
them. 
There's data V, which is the 

884
00:55:52,107 --> 00:55:59,400
data is secured in a Marketplace
for all kinds of like use cases.

885
00:55:59,900 --> 00:56:06,400
There's a doctor tried to work 
on put in some form of medical 

886
00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:09,400
data on the blockchain and 
Allah. 

887
00:56:09,400 --> 00:56:11,600
We like Physicians to look into 
that. 

888
00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:16,600
Is a company building credit 
score solution so that you know 

889
00:56:16,900 --> 00:56:19,500
privacy-preserving credit score 
is so, you know, you could do 

890
00:56:19,500 --> 00:56:22,600
maybe like stuff like other 
collateralized loads on the 

891
00:56:22,600 --> 00:56:25,000
blockchain. 
So a lot of things are like 

892
00:56:25,000 --> 00:56:28,900
being built right now. 
Yeah, I think that's really 

893
00:56:28,900 --> 00:56:30,500
cool. 
You know, I think well, you 

894
00:56:30,508 --> 00:56:33,500
know, a lot of these use cases, 
makes a lot of sense. 

895
00:56:33,700 --> 00:56:35,300
What one thing. 
I do want to ask those like, you

896
00:56:35,300 --> 00:56:38,000
know, for the end of T is it 
seems like, you know, and at 

897
00:56:38,000 --> 00:56:40,900
least from my social networks 
and stuff, you know, I've seen a

898
00:56:40,900 --> 00:56:43,900
lot of people are pretty excited
about like the nfc's happening 

899
00:56:43,900 --> 00:56:46,100
on secret Network. 
What wider? 

900
00:56:46,100 --> 00:56:50,800
And of key is really want that 
much privacy, you know, it seems

901
00:56:50,800 --> 00:56:54,100
that usually FPS are mostly 
about status signaling and I 

902
00:56:54,100 --> 00:56:57,200
want people to know that I own 
the the hey check out and look 

903
00:56:57,200 --> 00:57:01,100
at Michael. 
You know vanity is what is sort 

904
00:57:01,100 --> 00:57:03,800
of what's driving the user 
demand behind like private and 

905
00:57:03,800 --> 00:57:08,100
of Teas. 
Well, first of all, you can do 

906
00:57:08,100 --> 00:57:10,000
really interesting things that 
you can do it. 

907
00:57:10,000 --> 00:57:11,700
Like we're just scratching the 
surface. 

908
00:57:11,700 --> 00:57:15,900
So like, you know, there's like 
the there, they're like now 

909
00:57:16,000 --> 00:57:19,200
redacted drops. 
They'll you know, you see you 

910
00:57:19,200 --> 00:57:22,200
can brag that you have data 
Steve see through the watermark 

911
00:57:22,300 --> 00:57:25,400
or low resolution or part of it 
is redacted. 

912
00:57:25,400 --> 00:57:28,400
Just like a redacted Club, but I
think the eyes are redacted, 

913
00:57:28,400 --> 00:57:31,700
stuff like that, but then the 
full picture you see for 

914
00:57:31,700 --> 00:57:34,300
yourself. 
There were secret pods were 

915
00:57:34,300 --> 00:57:36,500
like, you know, the background 
was what? 

916
00:57:36,800 --> 00:57:41,500
Only the order could see, 
there's a secret skulls, which 

917
00:57:41,500 --> 00:57:44,100
created a really interesting 
economic dynamics. 

918
00:57:44,500 --> 00:57:50,400
That idea, was that you meet or 
excavate a skull and that has 

919
00:57:50,400 --> 00:57:52,400
its base properties. 
That's visible. 

920
00:57:52,700 --> 00:57:58,300
But now you have several times. 
Will you can reveal traits like 

921
00:57:58,300 --> 00:58:00,800
one by one that created in 
interesting? 

922
00:58:01,100 --> 00:58:04,200
Economic Dynamic where people 
were like, okay, maybe the 

923
00:58:04,200 --> 00:58:09,800
things that are worth the most 
you just say lead a fully heated

924
00:58:09,900 --> 00:58:12,000
scallop with all the traits. 
Still hit it. 

925
00:58:12,100 --> 00:58:15,600
Oh baby, I reveal like one 
trait, you know, kind of like in

926
00:58:15,600 --> 00:58:17,800
blackjack. 
I got like a really, really rare

927
00:58:17,800 --> 00:58:21,100
trade, but maybe the other words
are like, you know, they're 

928
00:58:21,100 --> 00:58:23,000
crap, but it's not really worth 
that much. 

929
00:58:23,100 --> 00:58:24,700
So, that is an interesting game 
theory. 

930
00:58:24,700 --> 00:58:28,700
Do I sell it down or do I keep 
opening the hopefully really 

931
00:58:28,700 --> 00:58:32,100
decrease the value farther. 
So there's a lot of interesting 

932
00:58:32,100 --> 00:58:33,100
things. 
You can do that. 

933
00:58:33,100 --> 00:58:34,700
You can't do it. 
Nobody lefties. 

934
00:58:34,900 --> 00:58:39,600
And if you want status, The gear
you can, you can't reveal a 

935
00:58:39,600 --> 00:58:43,100
portion or low resolution 
version or you can reveal the 

936
00:58:43,100 --> 00:58:44,400
whole thing. 
That's five. 

937
00:58:44,500 --> 00:58:48,000
There's a dust collection which 
it does reveal the whole thing. 

938
00:58:48,400 --> 00:58:53,300
But then the private better data
is you aided, your telegram 

939
00:58:53,300 --> 00:58:57,000
ahead and that is you to a 
secret chat but no one else can 

940
00:58:57,000 --> 00:59:01,000
know about obviated to. 
So, you know, it's it's, it's an

941
00:59:01,000 --> 00:59:03,700
interesting experiment. 
I feel and with credit 

942
00:59:03,700 --> 00:59:07,000
Tarantino, I can tell you 100%. 
He's been Approach. 

943
00:59:07,000 --> 00:59:11,900
But a lot of Ft companies and 
providers and he said no to all 

944
00:59:11,900 --> 00:59:17,100
of them because he said, what is
the point of me upload? 

945
00:59:17,100 --> 00:59:21,000
These something that is already 
public and then everyone can see

946
00:59:21,000 --> 00:59:24,600
it and download it. 
And then why would anyone buy 

947
00:59:24,600 --> 00:59:26,500
that? 
If they can already get like, 

948
00:59:26,500 --> 00:59:30,500
you know, get a copy of it and 
the idea of like keeping it a 

949
00:59:30,508 --> 00:59:34,300
secret until the first person 
buys it that really clicked with

950
00:59:34,300 --> 00:59:36,500
him and we got that feedback 
from better. 

951
00:59:36,700 --> 00:59:39,300
Of Artie's said Thursday, that 
we talked to. 

952
00:59:39,300 --> 00:59:44,100
So apparently there's a need. 
So Gaia, thank you so much for 

953
00:59:44,100 --> 00:59:46,200
coming on. 
Where can people learn about 

954
00:59:46,400 --> 00:59:48,400
secret Network and find the 
Dachshund? 

955
00:59:49,300 --> 00:59:51,400
Find the grant program and so 
on. 

956
00:59:52,700 --> 00:59:55,200
Right. 
So if you go to secret, does 

957
00:59:55,200 --> 00:59:58,400
that work? 
That's scrt that Network? 

958
00:59:59,100 --> 01:00:02,800
You should be able to find 
pretty much everything that you 

959
01:00:02,800 --> 01:00:09,300
know, you need and then you can 
find, there's the ad, secret 

960
01:00:09,300 --> 01:00:14,800
Network, a Twitter and we have a
Discord and you can follow me at

961
01:00:14,900 --> 01:00:21,600
Ed guys's gy Z Ys on Twitter. 
And if you want to apply for a 

962
01:00:21,600 --> 01:00:26,300
grant, You know, just hit me up 
on Twitter personally or come to

963
01:00:26,300 --> 01:00:30,000
all this code come to the dev 
Channel or the general Channel. 

964
01:00:30,400 --> 01:00:34,400
Say, hey, we have granted, you 
have want to talk about it and 

965
01:00:34,400 --> 01:00:37,000
either myself or one of the team
members will talk to you. 

966
01:00:38,100 --> 01:00:40,200
Perfect. 
Thank you guy. 

967
01:00:40,600 --> 01:00:44,800
Thank you very much. 
Thank you for joining us on this

968
01:00:44,800 --> 01:00:47,200
week's episode. 
We release new episodes every 

969
01:00:47,200 --> 01:00:49,200
week. 
You can find And subscribe to 

970
01:00:49,200 --> 01:00:53,000
the show on iTunes Spotify, 
YouTube SoundCloud or wherever 

971
01:00:53,000 --> 01:00:55,400
you listen to podcast. 
And if you have a Google home or

972
01:00:55,400 --> 01:00:58,200
Alexa device, you can tell it to
listen to the latest episode of 

973
01:00:58,200 --> 01:01:01,300
the epicenter podcast. 
Go to epicenter dot TV /, 

974
01:01:01,300 --> 01:01:03,600
subscribe for a full list of 
places where you can watch and 

975
01:01:03,600 --> 01:01:06,000
listen, while you're there, be 
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976
01:01:06,000 --> 01:01:07,900
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So you get new episodes in your 

977
01:01:07,900 --> 01:01:11,100
inbox as they're released. 
If you want to interact with us 

978
01:01:11,400 --> 01:01:13,700
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979
01:01:13,700 --> 01:01:16,000
on Twitter, and please leave us 
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980
01:01:16,200 --> 01:01:18,500
It helps people find the show, 
and we're always happy to read 

981
01:01:18,500 --> 01:01:20,900
them. 
But thanks so much and we look 

982
01:01:20,900 --> 01:01:22,100
forward to being back next week.