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This is epicenter episode 448, 
where the guests Ed felten. 

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Welcome to epicenter, the show 
was shocked about Technologies 

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project and people driving 
decentralisation and the 

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blockchain revolution. 
I am greatly concerned. 

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I'm here with Brian Fabian creme
and today, we're speaking with 

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Ed felten who is the co-founder 
of a Bertram which is a road up 

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Solution on top of aetherium and
we will talk about this in great

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detail in just a bit. 
But before we talk At about a 

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Bertram we would like to tell 
you about our sponsors this 

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00:00:46,100 --> 00:00:48,700
week. 
So first of all, we have gnosis 

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safe. 
So if nurses safe is a security 

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standard for web, three, be 
Imagining the future of 

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ownership and value 
coordination. 

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It works as a multi signature, a
smart contract account and is 

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compatible across popular ebm 
chains. 

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It's totally programmable to 
give the power to, you know, 

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customized permission and access
that user limits and Ensure. 

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Your maximum security while 
doing so secures over 60 billion

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dollars worth of assets and 
Cadence equally to individual 

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dollars institutions and 
Enterprises. 

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So try kenosis safe out today 
and to secure your assets 

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available on here. 
IAM optimism polygon BSE, 

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Avalanche Orbiter is it. 
Yes, very good. 

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And so to do that go to 
Geonosis. 

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Stash saved Ohio. 
We also brought to you by 

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Tallyho Tallyho is really 
finding the wallet as a public 

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good. 
You can think of it like a 

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community-owned alternative to 
Madam asked where said, 'who, 

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you can enter the metaverse with
a web three wallet. 

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That's fully Community owned and
operated and it's the first 

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wallet. 
That's also a dow Kelly, host 

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commitment to community 
ownership and public goods, 

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stretches beyond the wallet, in 
January the because they became 

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the first ones of ether JS and 
open source JavaScript library, 

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helping developers connect to a 
theorem. 

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And they recently, We announced 
the pledge to commit two and a 

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half percent of their total 
tokens applied to get coin 

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Aqueduct. 
Head over to Tallyho dark at to 

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try the Tallyho Community 
Edition and play around with its

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features before its upcoming 
version, 1 launch, and the 

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launch of the Dow and our last 
one. 

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Sponsor, stay quiet, stay quiet.
Is your new favorite 

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multi-chain, Mobile Wallet? 
That puts the power of of web 3 

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at your fingertips. 
In just a few tabs you can say 

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can't manage your assets on 
over. 22 built-in protocols 

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including oil, major EVMS. 
Nani VMS and there it was like a

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Bertram. 
Stake wallet is adding new 

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features at light speed so you 
always have the best support 

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across all chains. 
Just in the last two weeks, 

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they've shipped 3''tab, BNB 
chains, taking and Harmony. 

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Once taking fake wallet, has 
also a pretty good nft support 

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on a mobile wallet and you can 
view all your and FTS in one 

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place and it's about to become 
the first mobile while it with a

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Bertram and ft support as well. 
Watch out for an Osment, a 10 

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ft, a New York City on June 
20th. 

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You can download say quality 
today on iOS or Android at 

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stake, what it .f? 
I spelled steak like The Meat 

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fantastic and it is such a 
pleasure to have you on. 

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Thanks for having me and you are
You are an OG cypherpunk. 

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You have been doing this longer 
than all of us. 

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Tell us a little bit about 
yourself and tell us what crypto

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free blockchain. 
Sure, yes. 

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I've been working in. 
I've been playing around with 

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software for a long time, 
actually since the 1970s, 

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believe it or not, And got 
involved in security and privacy

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and cryptography. 
Research going back to the 90s. 

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I spent quite a few years at 
teaching at Princeton University

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and computer science department 
and a lot of my research there 

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was around cryptography and 
security and getting into ideas 

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of digital money. 
Even before this sort of 

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explosion of cryptocurrency 
started with, you know what 

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satoshi's original Bitcoin 
paper. 

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But I got interested in 
cryptocurrencies and blockchain 

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really early and started doing 
research in the area. 

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And, yeah, that's kind of what 
led up to to Arbitron. 

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But, you know, over the years, 
I've been involved in a lot of 

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different security things as a 
researcher and also maybe 

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surprisingly to folks in this 
space, as working in the 

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government, as well. 
So, yeah. 

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And I think a Lot of that is 
really help me get a perspective

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on what's Happening Now. 
And crypto space, you used to be

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the deputy CTO of the USA. 
So, forgive me this question, 

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but I'm not American. 
And what what does what does the

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CTO? 
And the deputy CTO get to do. 

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Sure. 
So basically as Deputy CTO I was

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a member of the White House 
staff and Senior advisor to the 

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president, then President Obama 
and basically the job of the 

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CTO. 
And Deputy CTO is to advise the 

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president and the president's 
advisors about things having to 

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do with technology. 
So, we were not building stuff, 

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we weren't running systems. 
We weren't the ones whose pagers

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would go off in the middle of 
the night. 

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There was some kind of an 
incident. 

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We were producing words and 
advice, but rooted in an 

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understanding of technology. 
So if, you know, there was some 

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kind of security breach 
somewhere, or if there was a 

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policy issue around technology, 
then we would work on it. 

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So as an example, I worked some 
on encryption policy. 

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Should the government regulate 
or ban an end to end encryption.

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I worked on AI, and machine 
learning. 

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If I was one of the folks who 
drove the national National 

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policy initiative on AI and 
machine learning back in those 

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days and things like that. 
So basically advising senior 

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government people and including 
up to and including the 

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president kind of an amazing job
to have. 

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And did you do any crypto 
related work as part of that as 

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well? 
Yeah. 

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Did some you know this was very 
early days in terms of 

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government figuring out thinking
about crypto but one of the 

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things I was working on is 
trying to get people across the 

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different Departments of the US 
government to start talking 

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about crypto and what they 
should do help help make sure 

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that the different parts of 
government of the executive 

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branch understood what was going
on. 

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And and we're starting down the 
road of thinking about what they

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should do. 
Whether it's, you know, people 

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thinking about. 
Should we have He's Central 

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Bank, digital dollar, as well 
as, you know, people who did 

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things like consumer protection 
and various kinds of Regulation.

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Make sure that they understood 
what was going on, and we're 

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going to take a thoughtful 
approach to it. 

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So I was involved in sort of 
early attempts to get that 

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conversation going with in the 
US government. 

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So I'm curious because you 
mentioned before that like, you 

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know, you had to sort of 
perspective on on crypto and 

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blockchain, you know that was 
like maybe different because of 

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you know the work you did before
I'm curious if you can talk a 

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little bit more about that sort 
of you know when you discover 

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Bitcoin like what was your 
perspective and how has it 

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changed, as the industry has 
evolved. 

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Yeah, so yes, let me tell you a 
little bit about that. 

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Well, that particular that 
commented how my working 

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government has has affected my 
views on this, first of all, I 

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have been a regulator or I've 
worked in a regulatory agency. 

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I worked at the Federal Trade 
Commission for a while, which 

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was as their a chief 
technologist which is in the US,

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government is the main agency 
that protects people against 

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fraud commercial fraud and 
scams. and so, you know, that 

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mindset of how do we make sure 
that companies are not just 

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stealing from people, you know, 
the The equivalent of something 

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like what in the crypto world 
would be a rug Pole or some kind

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of other? 
You know, really fraudulent 

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activity, and sort of thinking 
about what do you need to do to 

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help protect people against 
that. 

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And what is the role of 
government in trying to shut 

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down the Bad actors and try to 
get the money back and give it 

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to the people who it was stolen 
from? 

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And so I got some perspective 
from dealing with some of the 

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types of Fraud and scams that 
were going on online in those 

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days, that was like, 2011 and 
12. 

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So then I did that for a little 
while, then he went back to 

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being an academic and during 
that academic time, starting 

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around 2012 is when I 13 is when
I discovered Bitcoin and got 

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really interested in this, this 
stuff as a research topic and I 

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questions of how people could 
protect themselves. 

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And how you could know that 
something that some software was

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telling you what's going to 
happen, was actually going to 

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happen was part of that plus 
just like Standing basic 

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questions like is proof of work 
incentive compatible. 

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That is like does it actually in
sent minors to behave in a 

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Cooperative way? 
This turns out to be much more 

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complicated question than you 
might think. 

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But anyway, then sometimes 
certain early on I learned about

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smart contracts and this idea 
that you could do run software 

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on top of a blockchain and I 
thought this was the coolest 

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thing ever and got really 
excited about the tech 

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especially one, you know it as a
vehicle for For building 

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software because I like been 
involved in and seeing the 

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development or sort of early 
development of internet and web 

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technology and saw sort of that 
stuff. 

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Go through. 
It's very early commercial birth

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and, and some growth, and some 
Growing Pains. 

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So I'm like, okay, this is gonna
happen with smart contracts. 

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This is going to be huge as a 
software platform that in turn, 

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led me to thinking about. 
Well, like what are the 

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technical? 
Barriers to that technology? 

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Knology actually getting used by
a billion people. 

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And well, one of the big 
technical barriers, that seemed 

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obvious at the time was 
scalability, and that in turn is

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what led to the work. 
Then sort of the birth of 

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arbitrary in early 2014, sort 
of, as an attempt to try to 

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solve the problem of how to 
scale this technology up so that

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it could get the use that I 
figured at the I think a lot of 

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people did at the time that it 
was going to demand. 

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So let's talk about average room
and just stupid that. 

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But basically, thinking back 
about the very early, P2P the 

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community or the pre blockchain 
P2P Community, there are large 

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reservations or you know 
holdouts that are very skeptical

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of blockchain Technology as a 
whole. 

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Why do you think that is? 
Also, I think it's a bunch of 

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things and we saw some of this 
with the early like the early 

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web Technologies. 
I mean, we have to admit that 

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some of the things that go on in
this space are basically just 

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scams there people who are who 
are dishonest or people who 

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think they're honest but are 
actually doing things that are 

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really dangerous. 
So this idea that it's kind of 

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a, you know, a wild west that 
people are doing all kinds of 

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Are risky and scammy, and 
dangerous things along with a 

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lot of legitimate and exciting, 
building. 

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That pretty much reminds me of 
the early internet days and 

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there was a bunch of skepticism 
there, but I think there's FX 

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respect skepticism in our space 
of our space and it's for a 

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bunch of reasons. 
I think like there's a natural 

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skepticism about new tech areas,
especially ones that have a lot 

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of venture capital pouring into 
them. 

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There's a natural skepticism 
about any You know, about 

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finance and finance as a field 
and the kind of people who hang 

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out in that space and in the 
tech space, right? 

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Like right now check people are 
kind of out of fashion, the idea

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that that like people who are 
building and running Tech, 

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things are like dangerous and 
antisocial and the tech industry

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might not be good for the world.
Like I don't buy that at all, 

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but it is kind of a fashionable 
View. 

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00:13:04,800 --> 00:13:08,100
And I think we get some of that 
plus we get some of what happens

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because we're new and people are
trying a lot of a lot of things.

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And some of them fail and then I
think there's this other 

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dimension to it, which I can't 
quite explain that. 

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It's kind of become fashionable 
in some circles to say that, 

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like, everything happening in 
the blockchain space, is just a 

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giant Ponzi scheme, which I 
think to anyone who's into space

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and paying attention is 
obviously wrong. 

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But, you know, I think it's 
become fashionable in some 

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circles to say, this is all 
bogus and nothing. 

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Nothing. 
Still going on but you know I 

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think could not be further from 
the truth. 

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There are there are some people 
in this space who are liars and 

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dangerous and so on. 
But there's also a ton of people

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doing really interesting and 
solid work and you know and 

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00:13:59,100 --> 00:14:02,800
that's what that's what will 
last just like in the early 

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internet. 
There are a lot of people trying

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00:14:04,400 --> 00:14:07,500
crazy things and nobody 
remembers them but you know, 

232
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people do. 
Were those who actually built 

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valuable stuff over time. 
Yeah, absolutely. 

234
00:14:15,700 --> 00:14:18,600
Well, let's let's talk to you 
mentioned 2014, right? 

235
00:14:18,600 --> 00:14:23,900
You had this kind of early 
scaling work, you did that, you 

236
00:14:23,900 --> 00:14:25,500
know, kind of later became 
arbitration. 

237
00:14:25,500 --> 00:14:27,600
Can you talk a little bit about,
you know, what was that? 

238
00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:32,500
2014 project. 
Yeah, well, so it started just 

239
00:14:32,500 --> 00:14:36,500
with the idea, the idea of which
I think today, we would call 

240
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layer to, which was that you 
could have something, that was 

241
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basically a chick that if you 
had a base chain, which had 

242
00:14:45,300 --> 00:14:49,400
smart contracts or something 
like it on the base chain that 

243
00:14:49,400 --> 00:14:54,600
you could build a chain above it
or off on the side and then 

244
00:14:54,600 --> 00:14:59,000
anchor, the security of that 
second chain sort of, in the 

245
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first chain. 
So you I have this thing where 

246
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you could have a chain running 
off on the side that it would 

247
00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:07,600
use only a little bit of the 
capacity of the base chain, but 

248
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if you did it, right, you could 
sort of inherit the security of 

249
00:15:10,200 --> 00:15:13,500
the base chain. 
So that was kind of the key idea

250
00:15:13,500 --> 00:15:17,700
to move almost all of the work 
off the main chain, but have 

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just enough functionality on the
main chain to maintain security 

252
00:15:22,300 --> 00:15:25,400
and the key idea that enabled 
that was what's now called 

253
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interactive fraud proofs, which 
is basically a way of resolving 

254
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a dispute Butte between two 
parties about what is the 

255
00:15:32,300 --> 00:15:35,900
correct outcome of a computation
and do that in a way that is 

256
00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:39,600
that involves very little work, 
sort of on the base layer, the 

257
00:15:39,600 --> 00:15:45,000
in early 2014 is when that idea 
is sort of came along and for 

258
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most of 2014, I had a diagram on
my whiteboard in my office at 

259
00:15:49,000 --> 00:15:52,200
Princeton that had sort of a DOT
was a diagram that sort of 

260
00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:55,900
showed the steps of an 
interactive fraud proof, and 

261
00:15:55,900 --> 00:16:00,700
then in the fall of 2014. 
Master. 

262
00:16:01,200 --> 00:16:04,500
There was one of my colleagues 
are pandering, Noreen on taught 

263
00:16:04,500 --> 00:16:08,900
a course on on blockchain 
technology on blockchain Tech 

264
00:16:08,900 --> 00:16:11,100
and all the students in the 
course had to do a course 

265
00:16:11,100 --> 00:16:13,700
project where they would design 
or build something. 

266
00:16:14,200 --> 00:16:18,000
So, a group of, I think six 
students got together and they 

267
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five or six, and they decided to
build a version of this thing 

268
00:16:22,800 --> 00:16:27,700
that I had on my whiteboard. 
And one day sitting around a 

269
00:16:27,708 --> 00:16:29,800
table, we came up with the name 
arbitral forum. 

270
00:16:29,900 --> 00:16:32,300
It. 
And so they built a kind of her 

271
00:16:32,300 --> 00:16:36,200
very early prototype Arbitron 
which didn't quite work, and 

272
00:16:36,200 --> 00:16:39,100
didn't have the features of 
anything like today system. 

273
00:16:39,100 --> 00:16:41,000
Obviously, you know, it over 
eight years. 

274
00:16:41,000 --> 00:16:45,200
This system has evolved a lot, 
but basically, the first version

275
00:16:45,200 --> 00:16:48,300
they built in Fall of 2014 and 
you can actually go on YouTube. 

276
00:16:48,300 --> 00:16:50,700
And if you search for something 
like Arbitron Princeton 

277
00:16:50,700 --> 00:16:55,500
students, or something like 
that, you'll see a video of 

278
00:16:55,500 --> 00:16:58,700
their course presentation. 
At the end of that semester that

279
00:16:58,700 --> 00:17:03,400
they gave in January. 115 and 
they talk about, you know, basic

280
00:17:03,400 --> 00:17:06,500
ideas that you might still 
recognized in arbitrament today.

281
00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:09,900
So that was the very first 
version of arbitration. 

282
00:17:11,599 --> 00:17:14,500
What was the base layer that it 
was build on back then? 

283
00:17:16,700 --> 00:17:18,900
Well, that was the funny thing. 
There wasn't really a base 

284
00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:20,700
layer. 
We had to just assume that there

285
00:17:20,700 --> 00:17:23,800
would be one. 
So the idea back then is you had

286
00:17:23,800 --> 00:17:26,599
to build something that kind of 
simulated the base layer. 

287
00:17:28,099 --> 00:17:29,700
Yeah. 
So this was before Theory and 

288
00:17:29,700 --> 00:17:33,600
was you know, was at the point 
where you could use it. 

289
00:17:35,300 --> 00:17:38,900
So yeah there wasn't really a 
base layer at that point. 

290
00:17:39,000 --> 00:17:42,000
We knew there was going to be 
one and that you know we had a 

291
00:17:42,000 --> 00:17:45,800
design that what could be sort 
of agnostic as to what base 

292
00:17:45,800 --> 00:17:51,000
layer it was Much later when we 
decided to commercialize the 

293
00:17:51,000 --> 00:17:53,400
technology when we started our 
company, we said, okay, 

294
00:17:53,400 --> 00:17:56,100
aetherium is the place to go for
a lot of, you know, for a lot of

295
00:17:56,100 --> 00:17:57,200
reasons. 
We can talk about later. 

296
00:17:57,200 --> 00:17:59,400
Maybe. 
Yeah. 

297
00:17:59,400 --> 00:18:01,900
But initially it was agnostic 
and we just had a kind of 

298
00:18:01,900 --> 00:18:05,800
simulated base layer underneath.
I'm curious. 

299
00:18:06,200 --> 00:18:12,600
What's this idea of like it kind
of like a layer 2 was this like 

300
00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:15,500
the first time this came up I 
mean I know lightning Network 

301
00:18:15,500 --> 00:18:19,200
wasn't like that much later but 
I think it's maybe try to 2015 

302
00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:22,500
or something that lightning 
whether other ideas like this 

303
00:18:22,500 --> 00:18:28,100
around. 
I mean, I don't know of the idea

304
00:18:28,100 --> 00:18:32,300
of a layer to being out there 
before I would hesitate to 

305
00:18:32,300 --> 00:18:33,900
claim. 
I was the first one to think of 

306
00:18:33,900 --> 00:18:40,100
it but but you know because good
ideas pop up everywhere and 

307
00:18:40,200 --> 00:18:44,600
repeat his face. 
There was something not too 

308
00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:49,100
different from there was a much 
less efficient and probably less

309
00:18:49,100 --> 00:18:54,900
practical thing that was related
to the interactive fraud proofs.

310
00:18:55,300 --> 00:19:01,700
That was in academic paper from 
2011, from by Ron Kennedy and 

311
00:19:01,700 --> 00:19:07,300
some other people called referee
delegation of computation. 

312
00:19:08,400 --> 00:19:14,400
So I would say, you know, this 
sort of emerged out of a cloud 

313
00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:19,200
of ideas that were out there and
you know as a researcher I often

314
00:19:19,200 --> 00:19:21,600
felt like there were ideas 
swimming around in my head 

315
00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:24,600
trying to find the right way to 
latch onto each other to make a,

316
00:19:25,100 --> 00:19:27,200
you know, a like a design, or a 
solution. 

317
00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:30,500
And I feel like that's kind of 
what happened at least for me at

318
00:19:30,500 --> 00:19:33,800
that time that there were ideas 
that people were talking and 

319
00:19:33,800 --> 00:19:36,800
thinking about, and like this 
particular combination of ideas 

320
00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:39,600
and the way that it could, you 
could use it to scale. 

321
00:19:39,600 --> 00:19:43,100
Smart Start of gelled around 
that time. 

322
00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:48,600
So anyway, so 2015, right? 
The students finished this 

323
00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:51,400
project. 
And so we have this thing which 

324
00:19:51,400 --> 00:19:57,600
is We're a sort of early pre 
prototype proof of Concepts 

325
00:19:57,600 --> 00:20:01,700
things, sort of existed. 
And this is where this this sort

326
00:20:01,700 --> 00:20:04,000
of story. 
Evolution of Arbitron collides 

327
00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:10,800
with my story about working in 
government because my sort of my

328
00:20:10,800 --> 00:20:13,700
life took a detour not long 
after that, which is I got 

329
00:20:13,700 --> 00:20:15,700
invited to go work at the White 
House. 

330
00:20:16,700 --> 00:20:19,900
And so I did you don't say no to
that kind of offer and so 

331
00:20:19,900 --> 00:20:23,000
arbitrary, just kind of got put 
on the Shelf during the whole 

332
00:20:23,200 --> 00:20:28,100
I'm, you know, being like a 
somewhat senior member of the 

333
00:20:28,100 --> 00:20:31,900
White House staff is the most 
all-consuming job I've ever 

334
00:20:31,900 --> 00:20:34,900
seen. 
And so there's no time for 

335
00:20:34,900 --> 00:20:40,900
anything else afterwards in 
January of 2017, at the end of 

336
00:20:40,900 --> 00:20:43,400
that Administration, they pushed
all of our staffers out the 

337
00:20:43,408 --> 00:20:46,000
door. 
And I went back to being an 

338
00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:50,600
academic and while I was there 
trying to sort of get my 

339
00:20:50,600 --> 00:20:52,600
bearings again and figure out 
what I was going to do for 

340
00:20:52,600 --> 00:20:54,300
research. 
Each these two, one day, these 

341
00:20:54,300 --> 00:20:58,600
two grad students, very km and 
Steven goldfeder walk into my 

342
00:20:58,600 --> 00:21:02,700
office and say, hey, remember 
that arbitrary thing from before

343
00:21:02,700 --> 00:21:06,000
you went off to the government. 
I was like, oh yeah, that was, I

344
00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:08,800
thought that was fun and so they
were they said, let's do that 

345
00:21:08,800 --> 00:21:11,500
again. 
So like they came to me and said

346
00:21:11,500 --> 00:21:15,200
they wanted to work on this 
project with me and like turn it

347
00:21:15,200 --> 00:21:21,700
into a more sort of mature and 
complete system and A year and a

348
00:21:21,708 --> 00:21:25,500
half later, we were the three 
co-founders of of off chain 

349
00:21:25,500 --> 00:21:27,000
labs. 
This is a company that's built, 

350
00:21:27,000 --> 00:21:28,300
the commercial version of our 
victims. 

351
00:21:28,300 --> 00:21:31,800
So that was sort of the Revival 
of arbitrary, which it was sort 

352
00:21:31,800 --> 00:21:34,600
of really came from the two of 
them coming back and sort of 

353
00:21:34,600 --> 00:21:36,700
reminding me of this and say we 
should do this. 

354
00:21:38,000 --> 00:21:40,100
And then one thing led to 
another, we had an academic 

355
00:21:40,100 --> 00:21:45,000
paper that we published in 2018,
summer of 2018 and then like 

356
00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:48,000
almost immediately afterwards 
before we formed the company, 

357
00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:51,800
because it looked like something
that had commercial potential 

358
00:21:51,800 --> 00:21:55,200
and we wanted to like actually 
get it out there into the hands 

359
00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:59,400
of users. 
Yes, if I interesting and 

360
00:21:59,400 --> 00:22:02,800
basically, I think the stress 
level of being a crypto founder 

361
00:22:02,800 --> 00:22:06,700
is put into perspective by 
having, you know, an even more 

362
00:22:06,700 --> 00:22:10,200
stressful, job beforehand. 
So I think you played this very 

363
00:22:10,200 --> 00:22:14,500
well. 
Yeah, just like there's frankly 

364
00:22:14,500 --> 00:22:18,400
no comparison because what we do
today is important, it's 

365
00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:20,800
important to us, it's important 
to a lot of other people. 

366
00:22:20,800 --> 00:22:24,400
We take the responsibility of 
building this technology, really

367
00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:30,500
seriously. 
But you know, the mistakes when 

368
00:22:30,500 --> 00:22:33,100
you're an advisor to the 
president of the United States 

369
00:22:33,100 --> 00:22:38,400
are higher that, like many of 
the decisions that he made or 

370
00:22:38,400 --> 00:22:41,500
issues, he worked on were 
literally life and death for 

371
00:22:41,500 --> 00:22:46,400
other people and being involved 
in responding to issues like, 

372
00:22:46,600 --> 00:22:52,200
you know, terrorism, and or 
even, you know, even discussions

373
00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:56,900
around Economic Policy where 
you're talking about, do you 

374
00:22:56,900 --> 00:22:59,900
know, Where the decisions that 
are getting made can affect 

375
00:22:59,900 --> 00:23:03,100
whether tens or hundreds of 
thousands of people have jobs, 

376
00:23:04,300 --> 00:23:08,400
whether people lose their homes 
and have health care and all the

377
00:23:08,400 --> 00:23:11,700
sorts of things, right being 
around, people who deal with 

378
00:23:11,700 --> 00:23:14,000
those issues. 
Every day, it makes the the 

379
00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:19,500
problems of the startup founder 
seen see mild by comparison. 

380
00:23:19,600 --> 00:23:23,100
I often tell people that that 
job completely recalibrated my 

381
00:23:23,100 --> 00:23:26,800
sense of of stress. 
So, you know, this seems like a 

382
00:23:26,808 --> 00:23:31,100
breeze By comparison. 
I'm happy to hear that. 

383
00:23:31,100 --> 00:23:36,500
I will try that in my next life.
So let's talk about how you guys

384
00:23:36,500 --> 00:23:39,800
set it on using etherium as a 
base layer. 

385
00:23:41,700 --> 00:23:44,600
Yeah, yeah. 
So, you know, we knew we wanted 

386
00:23:44,600 --> 00:23:47,600
to use. 
We wanted to pick a base layer 

387
00:23:48,500 --> 00:23:52,500
and aetherium seemed like so. 
And of course, this is one of 

388
00:23:52,500 --> 00:23:55,300
the steps from being an academic
prototype where you say, hey 

389
00:23:55,300 --> 00:23:57,300
look, this is a super General 
thing. 

390
00:23:57,300 --> 00:23:59,100
It can run on top of any base 
layer. 

391
00:23:59,300 --> 00:24:03,700
It as, you know, basic smart 
contract functionality, but it's

392
00:24:03,700 --> 00:24:05,700
going to be a product. 
It's got to run into on an 

393
00:24:05,700 --> 00:24:07,800
actual thing. 
And so the theory and seemed 

394
00:24:07,800 --> 00:24:10,200
like the obvious choice for a 
bunch of reasons. 

395
00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:14,900
First of all, you know it was it
had had and still has the most 

396
00:24:14,900 --> 00:24:17,400
developers and the most users 
and so on. 

397
00:24:18,100 --> 00:24:22,200
I'm smart contract based 
technology. 

398
00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:26,800
We really like the etherium 
community and sort of the way 

399
00:24:26,800 --> 00:24:30,100
that it's governed and the sort 
of the opening openness of it 

400
00:24:30,100 --> 00:24:33,800
and we really liked it as a 
community and we felt like it 

401
00:24:33,800 --> 00:24:36,900
was a place where we could be 
comfortable, where the sort of 

402
00:24:36,900 --> 00:24:40,200
thing, this sort of experience 
we were trying to build would be

403
00:24:40,200 --> 00:24:43,000
consistent with what you Therian
Community was going to do. 

404
00:24:43,800 --> 00:24:45,700
And we've always from the 
beginning scene, what we're 

405
00:24:45,700 --> 00:24:50,000
doing as not a sort of as a 
complement to etherium to try to

406
00:24:50,000 --> 00:24:53,900
make a theory and better. 
So it seemed really obvious from

407
00:24:53,900 --> 00:24:55,600
the beginning. 
The theorem was where we wanted 

408
00:24:55,600 --> 00:25:00,100
to be, that we had to focus on 
something and and pretty much 

409
00:25:00,100 --> 00:25:03,600
every criteria. 
And if they're in look like the 

410
00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:06,500
best place to be. 
We also thought you know, just 

411
00:25:06,500 --> 00:25:12,100
from a pure sort of in terms of 
like the the need for what we 

412
00:25:12,100 --> 00:25:14,100
were doing that. 
If barium was going to be the 

413
00:25:14,100 --> 00:25:18,700
system that hit congestion and 
an increasing in transaction 

414
00:25:18,700 --> 00:25:24,100
fees, first part, you know. 
Partly because of technical 

415
00:25:24,100 --> 00:25:26,400
attributes of a theory but also 
because just there were so many 

416
00:25:26,400 --> 00:25:29,700
people there and the community 
was growing in such a nice way. 

417
00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:37,400
Jana makes a lot of sense. 
But let's let's talk a little 

418
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:40,100
bit about roll ups because I 
think Roll-Ups is something 

419
00:25:40,100 --> 00:25:45,200
that, you know, most listeners 
will, like, have some kind of 

420
00:25:45,200 --> 00:25:48,100
awareness of, you know, they've 
heard of it, but at the same 

421
00:25:48,100 --> 00:25:51,400
time, probably don't quite 
understand it. 

422
00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:54,300
So can you explain what are 
roll-ups? 

423
00:25:56,300 --> 00:25:57,300
Sure. 
Yeah. 

424
00:25:57,300 --> 00:26:04,600
So Roll Up is a, is a chain that
operates as an independent chain

425
00:26:04,600 --> 00:26:10,300
but that has its security 
anchored in of an existing Big 

426
00:26:10,300 --> 00:26:15,000
Chain in our case aetherium. 
And so the key idea is that we 

427
00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:19,100
keep the data, this sort of 
input data of the transactions. 

428
00:26:19,100 --> 00:26:23,000
What are the transactions that 
users submit and those get 

429
00:26:23,000 --> 00:26:29,300
recorded on the etherium chain? 
It, but we moved the computation

430
00:26:29,300 --> 00:26:32,300
and the storage. 
Basically, the heavy lifting of 

431
00:26:32,500 --> 00:26:37,400
operating the chain off onto a 
separate Place onto the separate

432
00:26:37,400 --> 00:26:41,900
arbitration that has its own 
nodes, and its own its own 

433
00:26:41,900 --> 00:26:47,200
systems participating in it. 
But the key thing that makes 

434
00:26:47,200 --> 00:26:53,200
Roll-Ups I think really nice is 
that they're at least ones, like

435
00:26:53,200 --> 00:26:58,100
ours is that they can. 
Great trust lessly meaning that 

436
00:26:58,400 --> 00:27:03,500
all the data that you need in 
order to be a first-class actor 

437
00:27:03,500 --> 00:27:05,500
in the system. 
In order to know exactly what 

438
00:27:05,500 --> 00:27:07,600
the chain has done and 
participate fully in the 

439
00:27:07,600 --> 00:27:12,800
protocol, that's all recorded on
the etherium chain and then the 

440
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:17,800
settlement of transactions that 
happen on the roll up. 

441
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:22,000
Those are also somehow settled 
back to the L1 chain so that the

442
00:27:22,000 --> 00:27:27,200
etherium chain nose. 
What is the State route of our 

443
00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:30,100
layer to chain. 
So, what that means is, you get 

444
00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:33,600
better performance and lower 
cost because we move a lot of 

445
00:27:33,608 --> 00:27:38,300
the stuff off the etherium chain
where gas and transactions are 

446
00:27:38,500 --> 00:27:41,600
are pretty expensive, because 
there's a lot of demand, but we 

447
00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:44,900
still can anchor the security of
the roll-up chain in aetherium. 

448
00:27:45,100 --> 00:27:48,600
So, if you trust a theory, mm, 
and you believe at least one 

449
00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:51,100
member of our community is 
honest. 

450
00:27:51,700 --> 00:27:53,300
Then you can trust our chain as 
well. 

451
00:27:53,400 --> 00:27:55,300
So that's sort of the value 
proposition. 

452
00:27:55,500 --> 00:27:58,200
Not only of arbitrary, but of 
Roll-Ups generally, you can 

453
00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:01,100
inherit the security of the 
layer 13, mm chain. 

454
00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:04,700
But at the same time, you can 
move most of the work off of it,

455
00:28:05,100 --> 00:28:07,700
and so transactions are a lot 
cheaper. 

456
00:28:08,100 --> 00:28:13,900
And you can have more capacity 
So just a kind of clarify days, 

457
00:28:14,300 --> 00:28:17,300
so let's say today I'm sending a
transaction on you hear em, you 

458
00:28:17,300 --> 00:28:20,300
know, I just sent you on here we
can check on each of scan. 

459
00:28:20,300 --> 00:28:23,900
Okay that's just my transaction 
but in this case I would send 

460
00:28:23,900 --> 00:28:26,900
the transaction you know to a 
bunch of arbitrary. 

461
00:28:26,900 --> 00:28:29,000
Mm nodes 1, 2 1. 
Yeah 21. 

462
00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:29,900
Arbitrary node. 
Yeah. 

463
00:28:29,900 --> 00:28:33,300
So let me talk about the user 
experience of this, right? 

464
00:28:33,300 --> 00:28:34,700
So if you're using a theory am, 
right? 

465
00:28:34,700 --> 00:28:38,600
Like you said your, maybe use 
your using a wallet and your 

466
00:28:38,600 --> 00:28:41,000
wallet has the address of some 
know. 

467
00:28:41,100 --> 00:28:46,200
Foods that URL of some node in 
it so that when when you approve

468
00:28:46,200 --> 00:28:50,200
a transaction your wallet puts 
your puts your signature or your

469
00:28:50,200 --> 00:28:54,500
address is signature on it, your
wallet will send that to two and

470
00:28:54,500 --> 00:28:57,000
a three node right? 
And then the etherium magic 

471
00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,800
happens on some time later you 
get back over, you see see the 

472
00:28:59,800 --> 00:29:01,800
result of your transaction, 
right? 

473
00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:05,900
If you're using arbitrary, mmm, 
it's basically the same user 

474
00:29:05,900 --> 00:29:08,400
experience. 
In a sense, you can use the same

475
00:29:08,400 --> 00:29:13,200
wallet and you instead of 
putting the address of an 

476
00:29:13,200 --> 00:29:17,100
aetherium node instead of your 
wallet having addressed him in a

477
00:29:17,100 --> 00:29:19,600
theorem known and sending the 
transaction to the etherium 

478
00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:21,600
node. 
Your wallet is the address of an

479
00:29:21,600 --> 00:29:24,600
arbitrary node and it sends the 
transaction to the arbitrary 

480
00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:26,900
node. 
So, we've done the work to make 

481
00:29:26,900 --> 00:29:29,800
arbitrary mm compatible with the
theory, mm. 

482
00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:33,800
So that the same transactions 
will run on it, you send 

483
00:29:33,800 --> 00:29:36,900
literally the same bits that 
your wallet would have sent to 

484
00:29:36,900 --> 00:29:41,200
the theory of node, it can send 
to the orbitrim node and Is 

485
00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:46,100
developing a smart contract to 
run on Arbitron, they'll send 

486
00:29:46,100 --> 00:29:48,700
literally the same bits that 
they would send to an ethereum 

487
00:29:48,700 --> 00:29:51,400
node in order to deploy the 
contract. 

488
00:29:51,900 --> 00:29:55,900
So you achieve a level of 
compatibility in the user 

489
00:29:55,900 --> 00:29:58,500
experience? 
What happens after your 

490
00:29:58,500 --> 00:30:02,600
transaction gets to that node is
a bit different and I can walk 

491
00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:05,400
through kind of what are the 
steps if you like. 

492
00:30:06,700 --> 00:30:11,400
But in terms of user experience 
or developer experience It 

493
00:30:11,400 --> 00:30:15,600
should it's designed to feel 
just like using aetherium accept

494
00:30:16,100 --> 00:30:18,600
that transaction. 
Fees are lower and response, 

495
00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:22,300
time is shorter. 
So yeah so if you so let me walk

496
00:30:22,300 --> 00:30:24,200
through what actually happens 
with your transaction. 

497
00:30:25,500 --> 00:30:28,500
There's kind of a front end and 
a back end of a system. 

498
00:30:28,500 --> 00:30:30,500
Like Arbitron, there's sort of 
two phases. 

499
00:30:30,500 --> 00:30:34,000
The first one is sequencing and 
that's all about the system. 

500
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:37,800
Receiving your transaction, 
putting all the transactions 

501
00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:40,600
into order. 
You know, one in front of the 

502
00:30:40,600 --> 00:30:44,900
other and then recording those 
ordered transactions and then 

503
00:30:44,900 --> 00:30:48,000
there's the second phase which 
is the execution and settlement 

504
00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:51,800
phase, which is the, which is 
the phase that figures out. 

505
00:30:51,800 --> 00:30:55,100
What is the result of executing?
Those transactions in the 

506
00:30:55,100 --> 00:30:58,100
sequence that came out of the 
first base, right? 

507
00:30:58,300 --> 00:31:00,900
So let's talk about like a 
typical transaction. 

508
00:31:00,900 --> 00:31:05,900
So user makes a transaction 
using a, some user interface on 

509
00:31:05,900 --> 00:31:08,700
their wallet, eventually, they 
click that button on their 

510
00:31:08,700 --> 00:31:11,900
wallet that It says to use to 
send the transaction, right? 

511
00:31:12,100 --> 00:31:14,500
So that puts their digital 
signature on the transaction, 

512
00:31:14,500 --> 00:31:17,300
the transaction gets sent to an 
arbitrary node. 

513
00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:21,000
The arbitrary node will forward 
that transaction automatically 

514
00:31:21,000 --> 00:31:24,600
to the arbitrary sequencer which
is a component that's receiving 

515
00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:29,600
transactions from all over the 
place and the sequencer emits an

516
00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:34,900
ordered sequence of transactions
so it publishes a feed of a 

517
00:31:34,900 --> 00:31:39,200
real-time feed of transactions 
and so the know. 

518
00:31:39,400 --> 00:31:42,600
That you sent your transaction 
to might be subscribed to that 

519
00:31:42,600 --> 00:31:45,700
feed. 
So the node will see your 

520
00:31:45,700 --> 00:31:49,000
transaction in the feed. 
See what the result is, and send

521
00:31:49,000 --> 00:31:52,400
that back to you immediately. 
It's usually around one second. 

522
00:31:53,300 --> 00:31:56,700
So and users love this, this 
part of the system, right? 

523
00:31:57,700 --> 00:32:03,200
So then the sequence of the 
arbitrament sequencer will later

524
00:32:03,200 --> 00:32:06,600
take your transaction and a 
bunch of transactions that came 

525
00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:09,200
in around the same time and put 
them all in. 

526
00:32:09,300 --> 00:32:13,500
Into a batch which is just like 
a bunch of the data of all the 

527
00:32:13,500 --> 00:32:15,100
different transactions packed 
one. 

528
00:32:15,100 --> 00:32:18,700
After the other, it will 
compress that batch using a 

529
00:32:19,300 --> 00:32:24,100
using a, you know, a common 
compression algorithm and it 

530
00:32:24,108 --> 00:32:27,100
will take that compressed batch 
and post it on the etherium 

531
00:32:27,100 --> 00:32:33,000
Chain as a theorem called data. 
And the reason that's important,

532
00:32:33,200 --> 00:32:39,600
is that that data is that What 
the transactions were and what 

533
00:32:39,700 --> 00:32:43,800
order the sequencer put them 
into is like fully recorded and 

534
00:32:43,800 --> 00:32:47,900
notarized on the etherium Chain,
so everyone has access to it and

535
00:32:47,900 --> 00:32:51,900
there's no dispute about 
possible about what what the 

536
00:32:51,900 --> 00:32:54,900
transactions were or in what 
order tell us about the 

537
00:32:54,900 --> 00:32:56,200
sequencer. 
Sure. 

538
00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:59,300
So yeah. 
So the sequencer right now is a 

539
00:32:59,300 --> 00:33:04,300
centralized component that are 
the we the arbitral team run and

540
00:33:04,300 --> 00:33:06,100
the sequencer follows a first 
come first. 

541
00:33:06,300 --> 00:33:09,200
Served policy for putting the 
transactions in order that is 

542
00:33:09,200 --> 00:33:12,100
first transaction to arrive, 
Java transaction, arrives 

543
00:33:12,100 --> 00:33:17,700
earlier gets to be earlier in 
the ordering and So currently 

544
00:33:18,300 --> 00:33:22,600
it's the sequencer is trusted to
establish an order on the 

545
00:33:22,600 --> 00:33:25,600
transactions but it's not 
trusted for any other purpose. 

546
00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:30,400
In particular, the sequence are 
can't create transactions out of

547
00:33:30,400 --> 00:33:32,200
nothing. 
This transactions have to be 

548
00:33:32,200 --> 00:33:35,700
signed by the user right in the 
sequencer can't forge those 

549
00:33:35,700 --> 00:33:39,000
digital signatures. 
The sequencer could try to throw

550
00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,400
some transactions away but 
there's a there's an anti 

551
00:33:42,400 --> 00:33:45,400
censorship mechanism that people
can use to force their 

552
00:33:45,400 --> 00:33:48,800
transactions into the sequence. 
Even if the sequencer isn't 

553
00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:52,200
cooperating, the sequence are 
currently is a centralized 

554
00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:56,000
component and we've you know 
it's in our roadmap to To 

555
00:33:56,000 --> 00:33:58,700
decentralize the sequencer so 
that you have a committee of 

556
00:33:58,700 --> 00:34:02,100
sequencers and as long as a 
majority of those are honest 

557
00:34:02,100 --> 00:34:04,500
than you get a fear of your 
sequence. 

558
00:34:05,700 --> 00:34:10,300
Yes, is one question I have in 
this is so the transacted a 

559
00:34:10,300 --> 00:34:14,500
transaction information right? 
It gets put into I guess each 

560
00:34:14,500 --> 00:34:17,699
etherium block away. 
It gets put into the theorem 

561
00:34:17,900 --> 00:34:22,900
chain you know on some 
regularity but as an arbitrary 

562
00:34:22,900 --> 00:34:26,500
user does that mean I also have 
to sort of you know, Like the 

563
00:34:26,500 --> 00:34:30,199
confirmation or like the 
finality of my transaction is 

564
00:34:30,199 --> 00:34:34,400
like when it gets recorded on 
ethereum, or can I rely on it 

565
00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:40,400
before that? 
Yeah, so that you get definite 

566
00:34:40,400 --> 00:34:43,400
finality when your transaction 
is recorded on aetherium. 

567
00:34:44,000 --> 00:34:49,199
And so the and the main time 
Factor there is just the 

568
00:34:49,199 --> 00:34:53,300
etherium finality time, right? 
So if you're going to wait for, 

569
00:34:53,300 --> 00:34:56,600
it's a 20 etherium blocks for 
finality, you know, that's about

570
00:34:56,600 --> 00:34:59,900
five minutes. 
So all the sequencer also 

571
00:34:59,900 --> 00:35:04,900
publishes this real-time feed of
transactions and that's the 

572
00:35:04,900 --> 00:35:07,700
sequencers. 
Promise that Will record the 

573
00:35:07,700 --> 00:35:10,900
transactions in that order. 
And so, if you trust that 

574
00:35:10,900 --> 00:35:13,300
promise, then you can use the 
result. 

575
00:35:13,300 --> 00:35:18,100
Then you can use those 
sequencers real-time feed to to 

576
00:35:18,100 --> 00:35:21,700
know what the result of your 
transaction, what the ordering 

577
00:35:21,700 --> 00:35:25,000
of transactions will be and your
transaction will show up in that

578
00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:30,000
feed in a bout a second. 
So most in practice most 

579
00:35:30,400 --> 00:35:33,600
applications choose to have 
their, you choose to have their 

580
00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:36,200
you. 
I rely on that sequencer fee but

581
00:35:36,200 --> 00:35:39,300
you are testing the sequencers 
promise of order. 

582
00:35:39,500 --> 00:35:42,300
But again it's only ordering 
it's not what the transactions 

583
00:35:42,300 --> 00:35:46,900
are that you have to that that 
you'd be trusting their so 

584
00:35:46,900 --> 00:35:49,700
that's your choice. 
Basically you can get one second

585
00:35:50,000 --> 00:35:53,400
soft finality which means 
finality a unless the sequencer 

586
00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:56,700
is lying to you sequencers 
making you a promise to record 

587
00:35:56,700 --> 00:35:58,800
the data in that order in the 
sequencer. 

588
00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:03,000
Always has the power to keep 
that promise. but fundamentally 

589
00:36:03,000 --> 00:36:05,700
you're relying on it to keep the
promise, if you're relying on 

590
00:36:05,700 --> 00:36:11,000
that feed or you can wait until 
the transaction sequence is 

591
00:36:11,000 --> 00:36:13,900
recorded on the etherium chain 
and that is going to take as 

592
00:36:13,900 --> 00:36:20,500
long as it there in finality 
does So the sequence then sends 

593
00:36:20,500 --> 00:36:24,700
the compressed data to the 
theorem main chain. 

594
00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:29,000
So I mean, it has to pay gas for
that and basically, there's no 

595
00:36:29,000 --> 00:36:35,100
there's no way of forcing 
validators or - to include a 

596
00:36:35,107 --> 00:36:38,000
transaction, right? 
So how do you guys make sure 

597
00:36:38,300 --> 00:36:41,400
that you can? 
You can definitely have that 

598
00:36:41,400 --> 00:36:49,100
call data on every etherium dock
Yeah, so the first so this gets 

599
00:36:49,100 --> 00:36:52,000
to what happens in the second 
sort of the back end phase or 

600
00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:57,800
the execution phase of the 
protocol and there's kind of two

601
00:36:58,700 --> 00:37:01,700
ways of thinking about this. 
But the key idea in the, in this

602
00:37:01,700 --> 00:37:05,000
sort of the execution phase is 
that you have this sequence of 

603
00:37:05,000 --> 00:37:08,700
transactions and everybody knows
and agrees on what the sequence 

604
00:37:08,700 --> 00:37:09,800
is. 
Because it's recorded on a 

605
00:37:09,808 --> 00:37:14,300
theory right now. 
Given that sequence Of 

606
00:37:14,300 --> 00:37:17,200
transactions. 
There's there's something called

607
00:37:17,200 --> 00:37:20,500
the state transition function. 
The state transition function is

608
00:37:20,500 --> 00:37:25,600
a deterministic function, which 
takes the next transaction and 

609
00:37:25,600 --> 00:37:30,100
the current state of the chain 
and produces some changes to the

610
00:37:30,100 --> 00:37:34,200
state of the chain possibly. 
And then also, possibly emits a 

611
00:37:34,200 --> 00:37:38,300
block on the arbitrary chain, so
that's a fully deterministic 

612
00:37:38,300 --> 00:37:39,700
function. 
And what that means is the 

613
00:37:39,700 --> 00:37:42,400
result of. 
It depends only on the current 

614
00:37:42,400 --> 00:37:46,900
state and the This transaction. 
And of course, the current state

615
00:37:46,900 --> 00:37:50,100
only depends on the Genesis 
State and all of the 

616
00:37:50,100 --> 00:37:53,100
transactions in between. 
Right, so the current state and 

617
00:37:53,100 --> 00:37:56,800
any time is fully determinable 
from the sequence of 

618
00:37:56,800 --> 00:37:59,400
transactions that have been 
recorded and that's actually 

619
00:37:59,400 --> 00:38:01,200
really important. 
One of the things that makes 

620
00:38:01,200 --> 00:38:03,900
this a rollup is it? 
Anybody can start with the 

621
00:38:03,900 --> 00:38:07,700
Genesis state of the arbitral 
chain and replay all of the 

622
00:38:07,700 --> 00:38:11,800
transactions just on by 
themselves without needing to 

623
00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:15,900
sync to anything and then know 
what the Current state is but 

624
00:38:15,900 --> 00:38:19,700
also if you're in real time, if 
you're a node and you're just 

625
00:38:19,700 --> 00:38:22,100
watching to see which 
transactions arrive in the 

626
00:38:22,100 --> 00:38:25,700
sequence, you can execute that 
state transition function 

627
00:38:25,700 --> 00:38:29,300
yourself without needing to 
synchronize or get to consensus 

628
00:38:29,300 --> 00:38:33,100
with anybody and you can know 
what the correct result of 

629
00:38:33,100 --> 00:38:36,800
executing that sequence of 
transactions is right? 

630
00:38:37,000 --> 00:38:39,600
And there is a single correct 
result because the state 

631
00:38:39,600 --> 00:38:41,800
transition function is fully 
deterministic. 

632
00:38:42,300 --> 00:38:46,500
So most of the time, What nodes 
do is they watch the sequence 

633
00:38:46,900 --> 00:38:50,100
and then they execute the state 
transition function themselves 

634
00:38:50,100 --> 00:38:55,100
privately and any honest party 
can do that by executing the 

635
00:38:55,100 --> 00:38:57,900
protocol and you could do that 
using a you know software that 

636
00:38:58,100 --> 00:39:00,500
will give to you for free and 
you can like click the source 

637
00:39:00,500 --> 00:39:04,700
code for and so on. 
So that's how all honest parties

638
00:39:04,700 --> 00:39:08,600
can know what the result of 
executing the chain is, and 

639
00:39:08,600 --> 00:39:10,800
that's sort of the common case 
of what happens. 

640
00:39:11,500 --> 00:39:15,900
But at this point, every honest 
party in the universe and 

641
00:39:15,900 --> 00:39:20,500
principal knows what the correct
outcome of the chain is except 

642
00:39:20,600 --> 00:39:22,400
the etherium chain, doesn't 
know. 

643
00:39:22,900 --> 00:39:25,500
And the reason the etherium 
chain doesn't know is it doesn't

644
00:39:25,500 --> 00:39:29,700
have enough gas to execute all 
of the arbitrament transactions,

645
00:39:30,200 --> 00:39:31,400
right? 
The whole point of something 

646
00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:34,700
like arbitrament Able to do more
work than aetherium can do. 

647
00:39:35,800 --> 00:39:39,100
And sort of you know by 
definition follows from that 

648
00:39:39,100 --> 00:39:42,900
that etherium. 
Can't emulate the folks the full

649
00:39:42,900 --> 00:39:47,500
execution of the arbitral chain.
So we have this other piece we 

650
00:39:47,500 --> 00:39:51,300
call the roll up protocol which 
is how participants in the 

651
00:39:51,308 --> 00:39:57,800
protocol can can cooperatively 
convince or prove to the 

652
00:39:57,800 --> 00:40:01,600
etherium chain, what the result 
of executing these transaction 

653
00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:05,000
is, in other words like what is 
the block? 

654
00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:08,600
Ha, ha. 
Of the of of, you know, the next

655
00:40:08,600 --> 00:40:14,400
block of the arbitrament chain. 
So there's a so we have the 

656
00:40:15,000 --> 00:40:16,800
settlement protocol which does 
that. 

657
00:40:17,500 --> 00:40:20,700
So does that sort of make sense 
there's like, to two aspects of 

658
00:40:20,700 --> 00:40:22,300
this. 
If you're an honest party, you 

659
00:40:22,300 --> 00:40:25,700
can just watch the sequence and 
execute everything for yourself.

660
00:40:25,800 --> 00:40:28,100
And you know what the unique 
correct answer is. 

661
00:40:28,900 --> 00:40:31,800
But also on the side, there's 
this protocol going on to 

662
00:40:31,800 --> 00:40:34,400
convince the etherium chain, 
what the result is. 

663
00:40:35,600 --> 00:40:39,400
And that's necessary for things 
like bridging or if some party 

664
00:40:39,400 --> 00:40:42,500
wants to be able to wants to The
result without needing to 

665
00:40:42,700 --> 00:40:44,900
emulate everything themselves, 
right? 

666
00:40:44,900 --> 00:40:47,300
You can go to the ethereum chain
and say, look, the etherium 

667
00:40:47,300 --> 00:40:53,500
chain has confirmed or not sort 
of notarized a particular block 

668
00:40:53,500 --> 00:40:57,100
header hash for the Arboretum 
chain and so, you know, that 

669
00:40:57,100 --> 00:41:00,900
that's good. 
And how do you make sure that 

670
00:41:01,100 --> 00:41:04,300
the block had a hash is included
in each etherium block? 

671
00:41:04,300 --> 00:41:07,900
So, I mean, basically you have 
no control over the miners right

672
00:41:07,900 --> 00:41:10,300
or the validator. 
So, in principle, they could 

673
00:41:10,300 --> 00:41:12,800
exclude you. 
Right. 

674
00:41:12,800 --> 00:41:15,700
So it's not included in every 
etherium block. 

675
00:41:15,700 --> 00:41:18,200
It's just included, periodically
in practice. 

676
00:41:18,200 --> 00:41:20,600
It's every few hours. 
There's a checkpoint of the 

677
00:41:20,600 --> 00:41:25,200
arbitral chain will get recorded
onto the ethereum chain, and so,

678
00:41:25,200 --> 00:41:26,900
you don't need to get it into 
every block. 

679
00:41:26,900 --> 00:41:29,600
You just need to sort of get a 
checkpoint in periodically. 

680
00:41:30,900 --> 00:41:35,400
Okay, so basically the hot 
finality is is then not a minute

681
00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:39,500
like the soft finality, but a 
couple of hours until it's 

682
00:41:39,500 --> 00:41:44,900
included on the main chain. 
So but no actually so finality 

683
00:41:44,900 --> 00:41:49,000
if by finality you mean that 
every honest party knows and 

684
00:41:49,000 --> 00:41:52,200
agrees on what the result is, 
then you have that back in the 

685
00:41:52,200 --> 00:41:55,300
beginning, once your transaction
is sequenced, right? 

686
00:41:55,300 --> 00:41:59,700
Because once your transaction 
has been sequenced, then the 

687
00:41:59,700 --> 00:42:03,500
result of your transaction is is
deterministically. 

688
00:42:03,500 --> 00:42:07,500
Knowable to everyone that is 
every honest party knows what 

689
00:42:07,500 --> 00:42:08,700
their can figure out for 
themselves. 

690
00:42:08,700 --> 00:42:11,700
What the result of your 
transaction is, and this sort of

691
00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:15,000
Of final recording of the 
checkpoint on aetherium. 

692
00:42:15,200 --> 00:42:18,100
This is just a theory. 
Mm, finding out what the correct

693
00:42:18,100 --> 00:42:20,500
result is which everyone else 
already knew. 

694
00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:25,700
The thing is basically, if you 
say you inherit security from a 

695
00:42:25,700 --> 00:42:29,900
theorem, then then basically 
you, you need to you need to 

696
00:42:29,900 --> 00:42:33,800
wait until it's been included in
the main chain. 

697
00:42:34,800 --> 00:42:38,100
Ah, so there's one, there's one 
more piece that I haven't said 

698
00:42:38,100 --> 00:42:40,000
yet, which I hope will close 
this Loop. 

699
00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:45,700
And that, is that this the piece
of the protocol that records 

700
00:42:45,700 --> 00:42:48,100
these checkpoints back onto 
aetherium. 

701
00:42:48,500 --> 00:42:52,900
This piece is fully trustless. 
What that Means is anyone honest

702
00:42:52,900 --> 00:42:57,300
party can force the correct 
result to be recorded and so 

703
00:42:57,300 --> 00:43:02,200
that means that you don't need 
to rely on anyone else to ensure

704
00:43:02,200 --> 00:43:05,300
that your transaction will be 
recorded back onto the etherium 

705
00:43:05,300 --> 00:43:07,400
chain. 
You yourself can force that to 

706
00:43:07,408 --> 00:43:10,300
happen. 
In fact, any any party can force

707
00:43:10,500 --> 00:43:14,100
the correct recording. 
The recording of the correct 

708
00:43:14,100 --> 00:43:16,500
result. 
So if you believe that 

709
00:43:16,500 --> 00:43:18,300
aetherium, it will operate 
securely. 

710
00:43:18,500 --> 00:43:21,600
And if you believe that at least
one participant, To the Arbitron

711
00:43:21,600 --> 00:43:25,800
protocol is honest, then you 
have a guarantee that only the 

712
00:43:25,800 --> 00:43:28,600
correct that the correct result 
and only the correct result will

713
00:43:28,600 --> 00:43:32,200
be recorded on aetherium and so 
you need there to be just one 

714
00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:33,800
honest party and that can be 
you. 

715
00:43:35,200 --> 00:43:41,700
That's assuming the sequencer 
has given the honest has sort of

716
00:43:41,700 --> 00:43:44,400
broadcast honest ordering of 
transactions. 

717
00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:48,200
Well, so the sequencer in 
effect. 

718
00:43:48,200 --> 00:43:53,000
The sequencers, the sequencers 
ordering is well, the sequencers

719
00:43:53,000 --> 00:43:57,700
ordering is By definition, the 
truth of the order of 

720
00:43:57,700 --> 00:44:00,000
transactions. 
In other words, the sequencer 

721
00:44:00,000 --> 00:44:05,900
decides the order and then this 
execution layer determines, what

722
00:44:05,900 --> 00:44:07,800
is the correct result of 
executing? 

723
00:44:07,800 --> 00:44:11,900
The transactions in that order 
sequencer doesn't doesn't make 

724
00:44:11,900 --> 00:44:15,800
any claims about the results of 
executing those transactions. 

725
00:44:16,000 --> 00:44:21,000
It just says Here's a set of 
transactions you can think of it

726
00:44:21,100 --> 00:44:26,200
like a like an ordered mempool 
if you're thinking in analogy to

727
00:44:26,200 --> 00:44:28,400
aetherium right? 
Aetherium has the mempool which 

728
00:44:28,400 --> 00:44:31,400
is all the transactions that 
have been submitted but not yet 

729
00:44:31,400 --> 00:44:35,100
executed, right? 
So the arbitral sequencer 

730
00:44:35,100 --> 00:44:37,600
produces something that's like 
an ordered mempool. 

731
00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:41,200
It's a set of transactions that 
have been submitted and they're 

732
00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:44,700
in some order. 
And then what the execution 

733
00:44:44,900 --> 00:44:49,500
phase of the protocol does is it
takes those transactions And 

734
00:44:49,900 --> 00:44:54,100
runs them or tries to run them 
in order, right? 

735
00:44:54,100 --> 00:44:56,300
So the sequencer has established
an order. 

736
00:44:56,900 --> 00:45:00,800
And then the job of the 
execution and settlement phase 

737
00:45:00,800 --> 00:45:03,400
is to figure out what is the 
one. 

738
00:45:03,400 --> 00:45:07,200
Correct result of executing, 
those transactions in that 

739
00:45:07,200 --> 00:45:12,200
order. 
Yeah, so that makes sense. 

740
00:45:13,100 --> 00:45:18,600
But of course you know you said 
before the sequencer does, you 

741
00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:24,200
know, sort of At first in, you 
know, orders it by the order 

742
00:45:24,200 --> 00:45:28,800
received and of course that's 
something they could lie about 

743
00:45:28,800 --> 00:45:31,800
no. 
Yes, that's right. 

744
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:34,600
The sequencer can lie about 
ordering. 

745
00:45:36,000 --> 00:45:39,800
We believe that a sequencer that
does that regularly would get 

746
00:45:39,800 --> 00:45:44,600
caught but over time, you know, 
as we move to a distributed 

747
00:45:44,600 --> 00:45:49,100
sequencer, the idea is you have 
a set of sequencers and you 

748
00:45:49,100 --> 00:45:52,400
brought you multicast your 
transaction to all of them and 

749
00:45:52,400 --> 00:45:55,700
then each of the sequencers, 
publishes, its order, which it 

750
00:45:55,700 --> 00:45:58,400
claims was the order of arrival 
at it. 

751
00:45:59,200 --> 00:46:03,300
And then there's a kind of, so 
Then you have like the published

752
00:46:03,300 --> 00:46:06,300
sequence of each of the 
sequencer instances and then 

753
00:46:06,300 --> 00:46:09,100
there's a sort of fair merging 
algorithm which merges those 

754
00:46:09,100 --> 00:46:13,400
sequences. 
And it it produces a the fair 

755
00:46:13,400 --> 00:46:17,400
merge algorithm has this 
property which is which is 

756
00:46:17,400 --> 00:46:22,900
roughly that if transaction a is
ahead of transaction be in a 

757
00:46:22,900 --> 00:46:26,800
super majority of those 
sequencers outputs, then it will

758
00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:29,400
be a hit will be ahead of be in 
the merge. 

759
00:46:29,900 --> 00:46:33,900
So if you believe that you know 
a magician that a super majority

760
00:46:33,900 --> 00:46:38,400
of the sequence or instances are
honestly doing first come first 

761
00:46:38,400 --> 00:46:41,800
serve then the sort of hold 
distributed sequencer. 

762
00:46:42,800 --> 00:46:46,500
Part of the protocol will 
produce first come first, serve.

763
00:46:47,900 --> 00:46:51,500
And this will actually in effect
solve the Mev issue, right? 

764
00:46:51,500 --> 00:46:54,400
Basically, we currently the in 
the centralized in the 

765
00:46:54,400 --> 00:46:58,600
centralized sequencer in 
principle, the sequencer could 

766
00:46:58,600 --> 00:47:03,300
extract everything that would on
maintain be known as Mev 

767
00:47:03,700 --> 00:47:05,500
includes but that's not good in 
principle. 

768
00:47:05,500 --> 00:47:07,000
Yes. 
And I mean, I'll take your word 

769
00:47:07,000 --> 00:47:08,300
for it that it currently 
doesn't. 

770
00:47:08,300 --> 00:47:11,100
But basically, if you have that 
sequence, the sequence are 

771
00:47:11,100 --> 00:47:12,900
competition. 
Where basically the relative 

772
00:47:12,900 --> 00:47:18,800
ordering is kind of is Kind of 
compared between lots of 

773
00:47:18,800 --> 00:47:23,300
different sequences that entire 
can of worms is closed, right? 

774
00:47:25,600 --> 00:47:27,700
That's right, that's it. 
That's exactly right. 

775
00:47:27,700 --> 00:47:31,500
Both parts of that and dishonest
sequencer could extract a lot of

776
00:47:31,500 --> 00:47:35,500
value presumably by by 
reordering or by selling 

777
00:47:35,900 --> 00:47:40,000
auctioning off position and so 
on it could that we currently 

778
00:47:40,000 --> 00:47:43,600
run the sequencer and we do not 
do that but long run. 

779
00:47:43,600 --> 00:47:47,800
The solution is to move to 
distributed sequencer and that 

780
00:47:47,800 --> 00:47:50,000
way you don't have to trust any 
one party. 

781
00:47:51,000 --> 00:47:54,600
It is the case now that the 
sequence we produce is visible 

782
00:47:54,600 --> 00:47:58,300
to everyone. 
And so if we cheated blatantly 

783
00:47:58,400 --> 00:48:04,300
it would be evident also you 
know we the arbitral team have a

784
00:48:04,300 --> 00:48:09,500
real incentive to not make our 
system terrible in that way by 

785
00:48:09,500 --> 00:48:13,000
cheating our users but 
nonetheless right obviously 

786
00:48:13,000 --> 00:48:17,300
distributed sequencer is is 
better and that is where we are 

787
00:48:17,300 --> 00:48:20,100
headed. 
And I'm curious since you 

788
00:48:20,100 --> 00:48:23,100
brought up the topic of Mev 
which, you know, I think 

789
00:48:23,100 --> 00:48:25,300
definitely become like a huge 
topic right there. 

790
00:48:25,300 --> 00:48:29,300
Like, lots of people think about
this does sound like pretty 

791
00:48:29,300 --> 00:48:31,500
elegant actually but I'm 
curious. 

792
00:48:31,500 --> 00:48:35,700
Does that actually, you know, it
for the week is said, does that 

793
00:48:35,700 --> 00:48:39,600
fully remove Mev or is there 
still some degree of Meb? 

794
00:48:39,700 --> 00:48:42,900
Yeah. 
Oh, that's a super. 

795
00:48:42,900 --> 00:48:47,100
That's a super deep question 
because it partly depends what 

796
00:48:47,100 --> 00:48:49,600
you mean by Meb. 
Right? 

797
00:48:51,300 --> 00:48:55,500
Certainly timing matters. 
And there are circumstances 

798
00:48:55,500 --> 00:48:59,600
where if Alice can see that the 
thing happens and get a 

799
00:48:59,607 --> 00:49:04,700
transaction in in reaction to it
faster than Bob, can that Alice 

800
00:49:04,700 --> 00:49:10,600
would be benefited, right? 
And so, The ability to react 

801
00:49:10,600 --> 00:49:13,200
quickly to events more quickly 
than other people and get a 

802
00:49:13,200 --> 00:49:15,000
transaction in faster than 
someone else. 

803
00:49:15,000 --> 00:49:19,700
Actually does benefit people and
the thing about it first arrival

804
00:49:19,700 --> 00:49:22,800
policy is that, you know, 
someone can get an advantage by 

805
00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:29,300
being closed in network distance
to to the sequencer course, when

806
00:49:29,300 --> 00:49:31,800
you distribute the sequencer, if
the instances are all over the 

807
00:49:31,800 --> 00:49:34,900
world, you know, that becomes a 
more complicated game. 

808
00:49:34,900 --> 00:49:37,900
So, there are issues around 
ordering the other thing to say 

809
00:49:37,900 --> 00:49:43,900
about Mev is that Or the idea 
that of sort of exploiting order

810
00:49:43,900 --> 00:49:48,200
for in order to get to make 
money, there are circumstances 

811
00:49:48,200 --> 00:49:55,100
where people wear like a regular
user can benefit from either 

812
00:49:55,100 --> 00:49:58,400
reordering or from selling the 
position in the order. 

813
00:49:58,400 --> 00:50:02,300
So here's here's a good example 
suppose that you want to do a 

814
00:50:02,300 --> 00:50:06,400
trade in an amm like say you 
know swap or or or an equivalent

815
00:50:06,400 --> 00:50:09,100
and your trade is big enough 
that it would actually move. 

816
00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:13,100
Move the price in that, you 
know, in that automated market. 

817
00:50:14,200 --> 00:50:18,800
So if the price was sort of at 
the sort of global market 

818
00:50:19,000 --> 00:50:22,500
equilibrium price and your trade
would move the price a little 

819
00:50:22,500 --> 00:50:25,500
way away from that. 
There's an Arbitrage opportunity

820
00:50:25,500 --> 00:50:29,100
that is available to whoever can
get a transaction in immediately

821
00:50:29,100 --> 00:50:33,000
behind yours, right. 
So if you're the person who's 

822
00:50:33,000 --> 00:50:36,600
going to do this first trade, it
sure would be nice. 

823
00:50:36,600 --> 00:50:41,200
So you might say, well, Great. 
I'll do the first trade and then

824
00:50:41,200 --> 00:50:44,100
I'll exploit that Arbitrage 
opportunity, myself and make 

825
00:50:44,100 --> 00:50:46,500
some profit. 
The thing is to exploit the 

826
00:50:46,500 --> 00:50:48,700
Arbitrage opportunity, you have 
to do the opposite of your 

827
00:50:48,700 --> 00:50:52,200
initial trait. 
So you know, if you wanted to do

828
00:50:52,200 --> 00:50:55,400
the initial trade, you're not 
going to do that but there is a 

829
00:50:55,400 --> 00:50:58,000
profitable opportunity to be 
right behind you in the 

830
00:50:58,000 --> 00:51:01,000
sequence. 
And if you could sell that, then

831
00:51:01,000 --> 00:51:03,900
you would actually you could 
actually benefit from it, right?

832
00:51:03,900 --> 00:51:07,800
You the end user and in fact the
economics of this, get a little 

833
00:51:07,800 --> 00:51:10,900
complicated but If you do a 
trade, that is big enough to 

834
00:51:10,900 --> 00:51:14,400
move the market, you've suffered
a little bit of loss due to Stew

835
00:51:14,400 --> 00:51:17,100
slippage. 
In determine out in the in the 

836
00:51:17,100 --> 00:51:20,800
jargon and you can actually 
regain that by selling the 

837
00:51:20,800 --> 00:51:22,800
position right behind you in the
ordering. 

838
00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:28,000
So, there are cases where, like 
clever ordering or bundling of 

839
00:51:28,000 --> 00:51:31,300
transactions can be beneficial 
to users and not just a way to 

840
00:51:31,300 --> 00:51:34,800
sort of a drain value away from 
from users. 

841
00:51:36,000 --> 00:51:38,700
And so personally, I'm a 
Believer in opt-in. 

842
00:51:39,600 --> 00:51:43,200
Transaction bundling and I think
that's the direction this is 

843
00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:46,800
going to go and systems. 
That emphasize fairness that is 

844
00:51:47,000 --> 00:51:51,100
you as a user can submit your 
transaction directly to the 

845
00:51:51,100 --> 00:51:57,700
sequencer and get You know, 
first in first out ordering or 

846
00:51:57,700 --> 00:52:02,800
if you think that there's a, if 
you think that you might benefit

847
00:52:02,800 --> 00:52:05,400
from having your transaction 
bundled with other people's by 

848
00:52:05,400 --> 00:52:10,100
some party, you you trust, you 
could submit your transaction 

849
00:52:10,100 --> 00:52:12,900
through them, send it to them 
and they, you know, produce a 

850
00:52:12,900 --> 00:52:15,600
bundle in and submit it. 
So this gets kind of 

851
00:52:15,600 --> 00:52:19,400
complicated, but the bottom line
is that there are circumstances 

852
00:52:19,400 --> 00:52:22,600
where it's beneficial to users 
to be able to do bundling of 

853
00:52:22,600 --> 00:52:28,200
transactions. and, If that is 
purely voluntary, a thing that 

854
00:52:28,200 --> 00:52:33,000
happens for you because you opt 
into it, I think that's a good 

855
00:52:33,000 --> 00:52:34,900
thing. 
But the idea that someone is 

856
00:52:34,900 --> 00:52:37,000
sitting there watching your 
transactions would like 

857
00:52:37,000 --> 00:52:40,600
reordering it so that they can 
steal some, you know, some 

858
00:52:40,600 --> 00:52:43,900
fractional eat from you every 
time you do a thing that's 

859
00:52:43,900 --> 00:52:46,500
really harmful. 
So yeah. 

860
00:52:46,500 --> 00:52:50,200
So I mean we've been thinking a 
lot about how can we minimize 

861
00:52:50,500 --> 00:52:55,000
Mev and how could we make it so 
that people who want to opt 

862
00:52:55,000 --> 00:52:56,900
into? 
Transaction ordering can do it. 

863
00:52:56,900 --> 00:53:00,000
And we've been trying to build a
kind of ecosystem that allows 

864
00:53:00,000 --> 00:53:02,600
that to happen. 
But a big part of that is this 

865
00:53:02,600 --> 00:53:05,400
sort of first in first out or 
first-come, first-served 

866
00:53:05,700 --> 00:53:08,700
approach to sequencing which we 
think is really important and 

867
00:53:08,700 --> 00:53:12,300
important part of our model and 
makes it not completely 

868
00:53:12,300 --> 00:53:18,400
resistant to Mev but much more 
resistant than alternatives. 

869
00:53:19,500 --> 00:53:20,800
I think that's really 
commendable. 

870
00:53:20,800 --> 00:53:23,700
So, I think, I mean, in this 
space, there's this prevalent 

871
00:53:23,700 --> 00:53:26,800
narrative that Mev is actually 
good because it, secures the 

872
00:53:26,800 --> 00:53:28,400
network. 
And I think this is a false 

873
00:53:28,400 --> 00:53:31,600
narrative and I don't, I don't 
understand why more people don't

874
00:53:31,600 --> 00:53:33,400
call it out. 
Because obviously, it's the 

875
00:53:33,400 --> 00:53:36,700
user, who pays for it. 
If you actually do the analysis 

876
00:53:37,100 --> 00:53:42,800
of how much is spent on Mev, 
it's around one percent of total

877
00:53:42,800 --> 00:53:45,200
transaction volume, so it's 
huge. 

878
00:53:45,200 --> 00:53:47,700
It's actually it's humongous. 
So basically if you guys where 

879
00:53:47,700 --> 00:53:53,700
to To tweak your sequencer. 
You could be enormously rich 

880
00:53:53,700 --> 00:53:56,400
with this. 
But yeah, so it's I mean it's a 

881
00:53:56,400 --> 00:53:58,200
huge. 
It's a huge market. 

882
00:53:58,200 --> 00:54:02,300
And I think basically finding 
finding ways that are provably 

883
00:54:02,300 --> 00:54:05,100
fan that kind of picked with 
that super important. 

884
00:54:05,100 --> 00:54:10,100
I need I feel like I need to do 
a mini rant here because I think

885
00:54:10,107 --> 00:54:13,900
you're exactly right. 
That this like Mev extraction is

886
00:54:13,900 --> 00:54:17,600
it's a tax on users but it's a 
text that's hidden. 

887
00:54:17,600 --> 00:54:21,700
You don't know how much Which 
was extracted from you or when, 

888
00:54:22,900 --> 00:54:27,600
and I think that's not how fees 
that's not how Network should 

889
00:54:27,600 --> 00:54:29,600
fund themselves. 
If you're going to fund your 

890
00:54:29,600 --> 00:54:32,900
network, you should do it from 
fees that are visible to users. 

891
00:54:32,900 --> 00:54:36,800
So you users know what they're 
paying so that it's in that 

892
00:54:37,200 --> 00:54:40,500
wallet pop up that when you do 
this transaction, this is what 

893
00:54:40,500 --> 00:54:42,700
you pay for the transaction that
it's visible. 

894
00:54:43,200 --> 00:54:47,200
And, you know, I'm a big 
believer in that the cost of 

895
00:54:47,207 --> 00:54:50,300
transactions should be visible, 
they should There and they 

896
00:54:50,300 --> 00:54:52,700
should be related to the cost of
operating the network. 

897
00:54:52,700 --> 00:54:54,700
And I think Mev is none of those
things. 

898
00:54:54,900 --> 00:54:58,300
I mean the extraction is not 
visible, it's not designed with 

899
00:54:58,300 --> 00:55:01,500
fairness in mind and there's no 
reason to believe that it 

900
00:55:01,500 --> 00:55:04,300
collects the right amount to 
fund the network, right? 

901
00:55:04,300 --> 00:55:07,000
The right amount is enough to 
actually pay for operating the 

902
00:55:07,000 --> 00:55:11,300
network but not more. 
I just think Mev is really poor 

903
00:55:11,300 --> 00:55:14,500
way of funding anything. 
Yeah. 

904
00:55:14,800 --> 00:55:18,100
Sorry, and with apologies for, 
no, I'm cold. 

905
00:55:19,200 --> 00:55:22,400
Are you on the same page yet? 
This is this is exactly my son. 

906
00:55:22,400 --> 00:55:27,200
So yeah, let's back up a little 
bit and talk about the 

907
00:55:27,200 --> 00:55:30,400
above-average from notes though.
So basically, so basically, when

908
00:55:30,400 --> 00:55:34,400
I have a have a transaction I 
will send it to a node. 

909
00:55:34,700 --> 00:55:36,400
Who is that note, what does it 
do? 

910
00:55:36,400 --> 00:55:39,900
And how is it incentivised? 
Sure the node could be. 

911
00:55:39,900 --> 00:55:43,000
Anyone can run a node, you can 
run a node, you know, you could 

912
00:55:43,000 --> 00:55:44,500
just download the software and 
run it. 

913
00:55:44,500 --> 00:55:48,600
We have some. 
So I mean the answer who is the 

914
00:55:48,600 --> 00:55:53,300
node Is, it could be anybody. 
A lot of people will use a 

915
00:55:53,300 --> 00:55:55,800
service provider, I think it's a
lot like etherium. 

916
00:55:55,800 --> 00:55:59,100
You can run into it yourself, or
you could use a big service 

917
00:55:59,100 --> 00:56:02,500
provider. 
And if your Alchemy or any of 

918
00:56:02,500 --> 00:56:06,700
the companies in that space, 
it's kind of up to you. 

919
00:56:08,100 --> 00:56:11,000
In terms of how they get paid, 
there's different answers to 

920
00:56:11,000 --> 00:56:13,300
that. 
If you run the node yourself, 

921
00:56:13,300 --> 00:56:15,800
you know, you're running it for 
your own reasons and you don't 

922
00:56:15,800 --> 00:56:20,700
have to pay yourself if you're 
using a Herschel service that 

923
00:56:20,700 --> 00:56:23,900
runs nodes. 
Then you know they're going to 

924
00:56:23,900 --> 00:56:25,100
have some kind of business 
model. 

925
00:56:25,100 --> 00:56:26,800
Maybe they have a free tier and 
you pay. 

926
00:56:26,800 --> 00:56:31,200
If you use it a lot, maybe you 
use a node that's run by an 

927
00:56:31,200 --> 00:56:34,000
application provider. 
And their business model is they

928
00:56:34,000 --> 00:56:35,400
want you to use their 
application. 

929
00:56:35,400 --> 00:56:38,200
They have some way of making 
money from their application and

930
00:56:38,400 --> 00:56:40,600
they're going to run a node to 
make that easier for you. 

931
00:56:42,300 --> 00:56:45,000
So I mean, it's essentially the 
same answer is on aetherium. 

932
00:56:45,100 --> 00:56:47,900
It, there needs to be some 
reason for a person to run a 

933
00:56:47,900 --> 00:56:50,300
node and it might just be 
Self-interest. 

934
00:56:51,000 --> 00:56:54,500
It might be part of either. 
It might be a part of a business

935
00:56:54,500 --> 00:56:57,000
model where they're, you know, 
they want people, they want to 

936
00:56:57,000 --> 00:57:00,800
see this activity and happened 
more and so they want to 

937
00:57:00,808 --> 00:57:03,100
facilitate it. 
I know we run, we the arbitral 

938
00:57:03,100 --> 00:57:07,200
team we run. 
We run some some nodes node 

939
00:57:07,200 --> 00:57:11,300
Services ourselves but if I run 
any theory of node I make money 

940
00:57:11,300 --> 00:57:14,700
off of it, right? 
If yeah, if you're mining you 

941
00:57:14,700 --> 00:57:16,100
do. 
Although it's not a great 

942
00:57:16,100 --> 00:57:18,800
business to be in if you're just
have a regular computer, right? 

943
00:57:18,800 --> 00:57:21,500
You can buy mining rig and then 
maybe the economic setup work 

944
00:57:21,500 --> 00:57:23,500
out, it totally. 
But if I mistake of, for 

945
00:57:23,500 --> 00:57:30,100
instance, on East to, yeah, you 
do make some money and we we 

946
00:57:30,100 --> 00:57:32,800
don't have an incentive program 
for nodes. 

947
00:57:33,400 --> 00:57:37,300
We found that we don't really 
need it as of yet. 

948
00:57:37,300 --> 00:57:39,500
So the other thing to say is 
there are different. 

949
00:57:39,600 --> 00:57:42,600
Just like in aetherium their 
different roles that node can 

950
00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:45,800
play can be A regular node which
is mostly servicing user 

951
00:57:45,800 --> 00:57:48,100
requests, keeping track of the 
state. 

952
00:57:48,600 --> 00:57:51,000
It could be what's called a 
validator, which means that it 

953
00:57:51,000 --> 00:57:54,900
participates in the protocol, 
the settlement protocol to 

954
00:57:54,900 --> 00:57:59,500
settle the results of 
transactions to to etherium, or 

955
00:57:59,500 --> 00:58:01,400
could play a special role like 
the sequencer. 

956
00:58:02,000 --> 00:58:03,600
There's only one of those 
someday. 

957
00:58:03,600 --> 00:58:06,700
There will be there will be a 
limited Committee of them 

958
00:58:06,700 --> 00:58:12,700
someday But most nodes are just 
are like non are like nonce 

959
00:58:12,700 --> 00:58:16,200
taking notes in a theory, okay? 
And thus taking notes. 

960
00:58:16,300 --> 00:58:20,600
What about those? 
Just taking notes currently 

961
00:58:21,900 --> 00:58:24,400
right again. 
Anyone can let's see. 

962
00:58:24,400 --> 00:58:29,400
So The protocol allows anyone to
run it, we currently have a 

963
00:58:29,400 --> 00:58:34,800
limited list of parties who are 
doing it but the the direction 

964
00:58:34,800 --> 00:58:40,100
we're going is toward a model 
where anyone can run a validator

965
00:58:40,300 --> 00:58:43,900
and there are some parties who 
are invited to run a validator 

966
00:58:43,900 --> 00:58:47,400
and they are compensated for 
that with you know some funds 

967
00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:51,400
that come from from from the 
user fees from the transaction 

968
00:58:51,400 --> 00:58:55,700
fees because it's trustless and 
anyone kept sorry. 

969
00:58:55,800 --> 00:59:02,100
Anyone can run a validator. 
We actually don't know who in 

970
00:59:02,100 --> 00:59:05,600
general, you, you don't know and
can't know who's running 

971
00:59:05,600 --> 00:59:07,600
validator. 
So that's actually a feature 

972
00:59:08,400 --> 00:59:10,900
that you know, if you put 
yourself in the shoes of a 

973
00:59:10,900 --> 00:59:13,400
person who's thinking of 
cheating and they're going to 

974
00:59:13,400 --> 00:59:16,900
ask, they're asking, is there a 
validator who's going to call me

975
00:59:16,900 --> 00:59:21,600
out and, and take my steak the 
fact that you can't know who 

976
00:59:21,600 --> 00:59:24,400
might be running. 
A validator is actually pretty 

977
00:59:24,400 --> 00:59:28,000
valuable the sir. 
Out of Submarine, validators are

978
00:59:28,300 --> 00:59:30,800
an important aspect of the 
security model. 

979
00:59:32,500 --> 00:59:36,000
So what happens to the 
transaction fees that users pay 

980
00:59:36,200 --> 00:59:40,700
because basically sending 
transactions on a Bertram mean, 

981
00:59:40,800 --> 00:59:43,600
it's substantially cheaper, they
are not then on May net, but 

982
00:59:43,600 --> 00:59:45,500
it's not free. 
It's like on the order of like, 

983
00:59:45,500 --> 00:59:48,900
a dollar per transaction or so. 
Yeah. 

984
00:59:49,100 --> 00:59:55,600
So that the, the short answer is
it goes to pay the costs of 

985
00:59:55,600 --> 00:59:58,800
operating the chain. 
But let me give you the long 

986
00:59:58,800 --> 01:00:02,600
answer which explains what those
are the Biggest cost of 

987
01:00:02,600 --> 01:00:07,000
operating, the chain is 
recording that sequence of 

988
01:00:07,000 --> 01:00:08,900
transactions on the etherium 
change. 

989
01:00:08,900 --> 01:00:15,900
Its aetherium gas, right? 
And so the sequencer pays the 

990
01:00:15,900 --> 01:00:19,500
biggest, the biggest source of 
cost is the L1 gas that the 

991
01:00:19,500 --> 01:00:22,400
sequencer has to pay to record 
the track. 

992
01:00:22,400 --> 01:00:26,900
The biggest part of the fees 
that you pay actually go to the 

993
01:00:26,900 --> 01:00:29,300
sequencer to reimburse it for 
those costs. 

994
01:00:30,700 --> 01:00:37,000
Other fees go to to to to cover 
other parties costs and so 

995
01:00:37,000 --> 01:00:42,200
basically that money all goes to
pay for the sequencers cost. 

996
01:00:42,200 --> 01:00:47,200
It goes to validators and it 
goes to sort of a core set of 

997
01:00:47,200 --> 01:00:53,700
nodes and over time, this will 
over time, we're moving toward 

998
01:00:53,700 --> 01:00:58,400
more transparency in where those
fees go the algorithm for 

999
01:00:58,400 --> 01:01:00,500
determining the feasibility. 
Is is, you know, we're fully 

1000
01:01:00,500 --> 01:01:03,700
transparent about what that is 
and we've talked about why the 

1001
01:01:03,700 --> 01:01:08,800
fees are set the way they are. 
But basically that the short the

1002
01:01:08,800 --> 01:01:12,700
short and the short version of 
that is the fees part of the 

1003
01:01:12,700 --> 01:01:17,500
fees, go to reimbursing, the 
sequencer for L1 gas costs and 

1004
01:01:17,500 --> 01:01:22,600
the rest is L2, gas, which goes 
which is paying for the sort of 

1005
01:01:22,700 --> 01:01:29,800
the core nodes and and and some 
validators so if you think like 

1006
01:01:29,800 --> 01:01:34,900
a transaction fees that uses 
pay, an orbitrim will these kind

1007
01:01:34,900 --> 01:01:40,400
of be proportional to you know 
roughly the same transaction 

1008
01:01:40,400 --> 01:01:45,400
fees that you know likes you 
know, some kind of percentage 

1009
01:01:47,600 --> 01:01:51,800
Well, roughly speaking. 
Yes, that the component of 

1010
01:01:51,800 --> 01:01:54,900
transaction fees that is 
covering L1 gasps. 

1011
01:01:56,300 --> 01:01:59,000
You know how much you have to 
pay for the L1 cost of your 

1012
01:01:59,000 --> 01:02:01,600
transaction? 
That is going to depend on. 

1013
01:02:01,600 --> 01:02:04,300
What is the L1? 
That's basically, right. 

1014
01:02:04,300 --> 01:02:07,200
The old one base fee goes up 
then the sequencer has to pay 

1015
01:02:07,200 --> 01:02:10,300
more to record your transaction.
And you're going to end up or 

1016
01:02:10,300 --> 01:02:13,100
you or other Trends ll2. 
Transactions are going to end up

1017
01:02:13,100 --> 01:02:17,200
paying for that, right? 
So because that's the biggest It

1018
01:02:17,400 --> 01:02:21,400
in practice when the etherium 
gas price. 

1019
01:02:21,600 --> 01:02:26,200
Base fee goes up, the cost of 
arbitrary, transactions goes up 

1020
01:02:26,200 --> 01:02:29,200
as well. 
It lags a little bit for some 

1021
01:02:29,200 --> 01:02:33,000
technical reasons, it takes a 
little while for the arbitral 

1022
01:02:33,000 --> 01:02:36,700
mechanism to adjust but 
fundamentally the Arbitron costs

1023
01:02:36,700 --> 01:02:43,200
follow the etherium gas costs 
and essentially it's the cost of

1024
01:02:43,200 --> 01:02:46,300
recording data. 
Now, the theorem is moving 

1025
01:02:46,300 --> 01:02:50,700
towards Changing its data model 
in ways that reduce the cost of 

1026
01:02:50,700 --> 01:02:52,500
the kind of data that Roll-Ups 
me. 

1027
01:02:53,000 --> 01:02:57,600
And so this so-called this is 
the dunk sharding or Proto dunk 

1028
01:02:57,600 --> 01:03:01,000
sharding stuff that people talk 
about in aetherium research 

1029
01:03:01,000 --> 01:03:03,600
circles. 
And once that gets deployed on 

1030
01:03:03,600 --> 01:03:10,100
aetherium, then the cost of 
recording roll up data on 

1031
01:03:10,100 --> 01:03:14,600
aetherium will get much lower. 
We think and therefore the cost 

1032
01:03:14,600 --> 01:03:17,600
of arbitrary transactions and 
transactions on The Roll-Ups to 

1033
01:03:17,600 --> 01:03:20,600
will go down a lot but that's 
basically right. 

1034
01:03:20,700 --> 01:03:24,400
The first approximation most of 
your transaction fee goes to 

1035
01:03:25,100 --> 01:03:27,700
paying to record your 
transactions data on the old 

1036
01:03:27,700 --> 01:03:32,000
launching. 
You said earlier that basically,

1037
01:03:32,000 --> 01:03:38,500
I can force a settlement on L1 
as and as a participant in are 

1038
01:03:38,500 --> 01:03:40,600
to there. 
Any way I can actually grief 

1039
01:03:40,600 --> 01:03:44,000
with the synthesizer by forcing 
it to settle much more often 

1040
01:03:44,000 --> 01:03:46,700
than it usually would and thus 
driving. 

1041
01:03:46,800 --> 01:03:52,400
Bring up the fees. 
So if you greet, you can post 

1042
01:03:52,400 --> 01:03:59,600
more checkpoints as a validator 
but that's only going to cost 

1043
01:03:59,600 --> 01:04:02,500
you. 
That's only going to cost you 

1044
01:04:02,500 --> 01:04:05,100
money because as a validator if 
you're getting paid as a 

1045
01:04:05,100 --> 01:04:10,900
validated you getting paid per 
time, not paid per per post so 

1046
01:04:11,000 --> 01:04:17,400
that's only going to raise your 
own costs and If, if the 

1047
01:04:17,400 --> 01:04:21,300
checkpoints that you publish our
honest, then it doesn't require 

1048
01:04:21,300 --> 01:04:25,800
anyone else to respond on chain.
This is the optimistic part of 

1049
01:04:26,000 --> 01:04:27,500
arbitrariness, and optimistic 
roll-up. 

1050
01:04:27,500 --> 01:04:31,900
And the optimistic part is the 
idea that if somebody posts a 

1051
01:04:31,900 --> 01:04:38,500
correct checkpoint that everyone
else just does nothing and the 

1052
01:04:38,500 --> 01:04:40,300
system. 
After then there's a then 

1053
01:04:40,300 --> 01:04:43,500
there's a challenge window a 
window of time in which after 

1054
01:04:43,500 --> 01:04:47,100
someone posts a claim about At 
the checkpoint should be, 

1055
01:04:48,200 --> 01:04:51,500
there's a window of time in 
which anyone else can object. 

1056
01:04:52,500 --> 01:04:54,000
Right. 
The person who posted the 

1057
01:04:54,000 --> 01:04:57,300
initial claim is staked on that 
claim and they they will lose 

1058
01:04:57,300 --> 01:05:00,200
that stake, if they're lying, 
but basically there's a window 

1059
01:05:00,200 --> 01:05:04,300
of time in which anyone else can
object to it, and if no one 

1060
01:05:04,300 --> 01:05:06,000
objects. 
After that window of time 

1061
01:05:06,000 --> 01:05:08,900
challenge window has passed, 
then the system will accept it. 

1062
01:05:08,900 --> 01:05:12,400
And that's obviously the common 
case because as a validator, 

1063
01:05:12,400 --> 01:05:14,900
your incentive is to not post a 
false checkpoint. 

1064
01:05:14,900 --> 01:05:17,600
If you do, you're going to lose 
lose, lose your steak. 

1065
01:05:18,800 --> 01:05:21,100
And so your incentive is opposed
to correct, checkpoint. 

1066
01:05:21,100 --> 01:05:22,900
And then everyone else is in. 
Enter visited. 

1067
01:05:22,900 --> 01:05:24,100
Look at that. 
Checkpoint say. 

1068
01:05:24,400 --> 01:05:28,600
Yeah, it's correct. 
I'm going to just wait until for

1069
01:05:28,600 --> 01:05:31,000
the system to accept it and then
the system will accept it. 

1070
01:05:31,000 --> 01:05:35,000
That's sort of the common case, 
but if someone posts a false 

1071
01:05:35,000 --> 01:05:38,200
checkpoint, then you can come in
and say, no, that's wrong. 

1072
01:05:38,200 --> 01:05:41,600
Here's the right result and you 
can stake on that and then 

1073
01:05:41,600 --> 01:05:44,500
there's going to be a challenge 
protocol that happens between 

1074
01:05:44,900 --> 01:05:49,300
the false Staker and you the 
honest acre. 

1075
01:05:50,100 --> 01:05:54,300
You will win that challenge, 
because honest party can always 

1076
01:05:54,300 --> 01:05:57,000
win the challenge protocol. 
That's the sort of a guarantee 

1077
01:05:57,000 --> 01:06:01,300
of the protocol, and then you'll
take half the stake of the loser

1078
01:06:01,300 --> 01:06:05,200
and the other half gets burned. 
So, you as an honest party, can 

1079
01:06:05,200 --> 01:06:09,000
post a correct checkpoint. 
You can do that whether or not 

1080
01:06:09,000 --> 01:06:10,900
anyone else posts, an incorrect 
one. 

1081
01:06:11,600 --> 01:06:15,700
And if anyone disagrees with you
assuming you're behaving, 

1082
01:06:15,700 --> 01:06:18,900
honestly, you will defeat them 
and take their steak. 

1083
01:06:20,300 --> 01:06:23,000
Okay, fair enough. 
But how, as an honest, validator

1084
01:06:23,000 --> 01:06:25,500
a, my incentivize to post a 
checkpoint. 

1085
01:06:25,700 --> 01:06:30,000
Do I get extra credit for that 
word because I incur the gas 

1086
01:06:30,000 --> 01:06:32,700
phase, right? 
That's right. 

1087
01:06:32,700 --> 01:06:34,400
That's right. 
So whoever does that incurs a 

1088
01:06:34,408 --> 01:06:37,500
gas fee and we don't currently 
have a mechanism to reimburse 

1089
01:06:37,500 --> 01:06:41,300
that gas fee. 
Currently we post, we are our 

1090
01:06:41,300 --> 01:06:44,200
team post, correct checkpoints 
ourselves, and we just eat the 

1091
01:06:44,200 --> 01:06:49,300
cost of doing that. 
But if we don't, then someone 

1092
01:06:49,300 --> 01:06:52,100
else can do it and they can they
would have to absorb the cost 

1093
01:06:52,100 --> 01:06:54,900
themselves of posting. 
The checkpoint checkpoint gets 

1094
01:06:54,900 --> 01:07:00,600
posted every few hours, so it's 
not a large cost, it's a it's a,

1095
01:07:00,700 --> 01:07:04,100
you know, medium-sized aetherium
transaction, every few hours. 

1096
01:07:05,700 --> 01:07:10,900
The biggest cost of L1 gas cost 
of the system by far is the data

1097
01:07:10,900 --> 01:07:15,000
recording that the sequencer 
does and it does get reimbursed 

1098
01:07:15,000 --> 01:07:17,700
by fees. 
We will probably eventually move

1099
01:07:17,700 --> 01:07:22,000
to a scheme where the system 
reimburses the gas costs of 

1100
01:07:22,500 --> 01:07:26,400
someone who posts a checkpoint 
as long as they don't post it 

1101
01:07:26,400 --> 01:07:30,200
too. 
Often you started talking about 

1102
01:07:30,200 --> 01:07:34,600
the optimistic part of the 
roll-up, so kind of putting this

1103
01:07:34,600 --> 01:07:37,400
into the larger context. 
So we've actually had several 

1104
01:07:37,400 --> 01:07:40,500
other guests on before to talk 
about, roll up. 

1105
01:07:40,500 --> 01:07:46,500
So basically, we've spoken with 
electric house key from CK sink 

1106
01:07:46,500 --> 01:07:50,600
and Eli band, sun. 
And from the optimism, we've 

1107
01:07:50,600 --> 01:07:55,100
also had the optimism team on. 
So, I understand the fundamental

1108
01:07:55,100 --> 01:08:00,100
difference between ZK roll up. 
So basically you've you post a 

1109
01:08:00,100 --> 01:08:04,400
fundamental proof and basically 
that that proof is final. 

1110
01:08:04,500 --> 01:08:07,700
You get instant finality to only
doesn't work for all kinds of 

1111
01:08:08,000 --> 01:08:13,100
transactions, but whatever. 
And then you have the optimistic

1112
01:08:13,400 --> 01:08:16,899
roll up. 
So how does Was a Bertram 

1113
01:08:17,700 --> 01:08:21,100
designed differently from how 
optimism works. 

1114
01:08:23,600 --> 01:08:25,300
So there's a bunch of 
differences. 

1115
01:08:25,300 --> 01:08:29,200
One of the biggest differences 
with optimism in particular, is 

1116
01:08:29,200 --> 01:08:32,200
that? 
Arbitron is a, our Bertram has a

1117
01:08:32,200 --> 01:08:36,899
fully working and integrated 
fraud proof system that is, and 

1118
01:08:36,899 --> 01:08:39,899
we've had that since the 
beginning, right? 

1119
01:08:39,899 --> 01:08:43,800
So we actually have the fraud 
proof system in existence and 

1120
01:08:43,800 --> 01:08:47,200
turned on and it's integrated 
with the rest of the system. 

1121
01:08:48,500 --> 01:08:53,000
So that's a pretty significant 
difference, you know? 

1122
01:08:53,000 --> 01:08:55,100
It's not Something that we say 
we're going to integrate in the 

1123
01:08:55,100 --> 01:08:58,000
future. 
In fact, we're proud of this. 

1124
01:08:58,000 --> 01:09:02,800
We are the only Roll-Ups evm 
compatible roll-up system on 

1125
01:09:02,800 --> 01:09:06,200
aetherium that actually has its 
security proof mechanism turned 

1126
01:09:06,200 --> 01:09:09,700
on and working. 
This is one of the harder parts 

1127
01:09:09,700 --> 01:09:15,200
of not only just building a 
fraud proof or correctness proof

1128
01:09:15,200 --> 01:09:18,500
mechanism, but actually getting 
a complete protocol that 

1129
01:09:18,500 --> 01:09:20,899
includes it is pretty hard to 
do. 

1130
01:09:21,399 --> 01:09:25,500
And that's a reason why. 
Why a lot of projects either 

1131
01:09:25,500 --> 01:09:29,100
haven't done it or are just 
promising for the future but 

1132
01:09:29,100 --> 01:09:32,500
we're you know we're proud of 
having every version of Arbitron

1133
01:09:32,500 --> 01:09:34,700
has had fully working in 
integrated products. 

1134
01:09:35,800 --> 01:09:37,100
I think that's a significant 
difference. 

1135
01:09:37,100 --> 01:09:40,700
You can talk about differences 
in design for a long time. 

1136
01:09:40,700 --> 01:09:45,200
The biggest design difference 
between arbitrary and optimism 

1137
01:09:45,200 --> 01:09:50,100
was that we used interactor 
fraud proofs and they used a 

1138
01:09:50,100 --> 01:09:54,000
non-interactive fraud proof 
mechanism that is they had It 

1139
01:09:54,000 --> 01:09:57,800
was an optimistic system, but if
there was a dispute between 

1140
01:09:57,800 --> 01:10:00,100
parties, we would resolve it in 
different ways. 

1141
01:10:01,000 --> 01:10:05,500
But about six months ago, maybe 
a bit more optimism pivoted and 

1142
01:10:05,500 --> 01:10:09,800
started using, or said they 
would use interactive fried 

1143
01:10:09,800 --> 01:10:12,800
proofs, which is the arbitrarily
approach. 

1144
01:10:13,800 --> 01:10:15,900
I mean, I think there's some 
technical differences between 

1145
01:10:15,900 --> 01:10:22,000
how the system works. 
We one of them is the first come

1146
01:10:22,000 --> 01:10:25,400
first served sequencing system 
which you know, we talked about 

1147
01:10:25,400 --> 01:10:29,100
a bunch of before, that's a 
thing that arbitration does and 

1148
01:10:29,100 --> 01:10:31,200
optimism has a different 
approach that involves 

1149
01:10:31,200 --> 01:10:34,000
auctioning off the right to 
reorder transactions. 

1150
01:10:34,500 --> 01:10:39,100
But probably the system that is 
closest in design to arbitral 

1151
01:10:39,100 --> 01:10:41,700
among the ones that are out. 
There is his optimism. 

1152
01:10:42,300 --> 01:10:45,400
And, of course, you know, other 
systems that the other systems, 

1153
01:10:45,400 --> 01:10:49,700
that you mentioned, use, ZK 
technology, which is very Type 

1154
01:10:49,700 --> 01:10:53,300
of thing which and they're the 
main difference is between 

1155
01:10:53,300 --> 01:10:57,300
optimistic and CK is in my mind 
is cost. 

1156
01:10:58,400 --> 01:11:03,400
Optimistic systems are much 
cheaper by orders of magnitude 

1157
01:11:03,600 --> 01:11:07,500
to produce the proof. 
And the reason is that, the 

1158
01:11:07,500 --> 01:11:10,500
whole part of the protocol, 
where you generate a very 

1159
01:11:10,500 --> 01:11:14,800
complicated cryptographic proof 
and you know, the ZK folks 

1160
01:11:14,800 --> 01:11:17,900
always talk about how cheap it 
is to verify the proof. 

1161
01:11:18,400 --> 01:11:23,400
But thing is EK proof is 
extremely expensive and an 

1162
01:11:23,400 --> 01:11:25,900
optimistic system, you don't 
have to do that. 

1163
01:11:26,100 --> 01:11:30,400
The even in the worst case, the 
optimistic system, the cost of 

1164
01:11:30,400 --> 01:11:33,800
proving is much much lower. 
You could you could do proving 

1165
01:11:33,800 --> 01:11:38,800
on an ordinary machine for an 
optimistic system, in the case 

1166
01:11:38,800 --> 01:11:41,700
of a dispute. 
But because of the optimistic 

1167
01:11:41,700 --> 01:11:44,500
nature of it, if there's not a 
dispute, you don't have to 

1168
01:11:44,500 --> 01:11:48,200
produce a proof at all. 
And that, of course, is the 

1169
01:11:48,200 --> 01:11:51,000
common case and it's, it's 
vastly cheaper. 

1170
01:11:52,300 --> 01:11:56,700
Well thanks that's very helpful.
I I wanted to kind of come back 

1171
01:11:56,700 --> 01:11:58,300
to top. 
You have you touched on a little

1172
01:11:58,300 --> 01:12:02,200
bit before which is sort of the 
topic of like economics of it. 

1173
01:12:02,200 --> 01:12:05,300
So we you know, we talked about 
that, you know, this is he and 

1174
01:12:05,300 --> 01:12:08,500
most of the fee goes towards 
paying the L1 gas. 

1175
01:12:09,700 --> 01:12:14,000
But of course there's also, you 
know, L to, you know, some 

1176
01:12:14,000 --> 01:12:15,800
additional fee, right? 
That's there. 

1177
01:12:16,300 --> 01:12:19,700
And so I'd love to maybe speak a
little bit about that. 

1178
01:12:19,700 --> 01:12:21,900
And then, I'm also curious, I 
think so. 

1179
01:12:22,100 --> 01:12:24,800
Optimism, right? 
A, they launched a optimism 

1180
01:12:24,800 --> 01:12:27,700
token. 
I'm curious also, if you have 

1181
01:12:27,700 --> 01:12:32,400
plans for I don't orbitrim token
or like, how do you see sort of 

1182
01:12:32,400 --> 01:12:34,600
the economic system evolved in 
the long run? 

1183
01:12:36,200 --> 01:12:37,600
Sure. 
Yeah, I'll be talking about the 

1184
01:12:37,600 --> 01:12:39,900
fees. 
You know, as I said before the 

1185
01:12:39,900 --> 01:12:44,100
biggest component of these is L1
cost, there is L2 gas, there has

1186
01:12:44,100 --> 01:12:47,200
to be gas, right? 
Because you need the economic 

1187
01:12:47,200 --> 01:12:51,300
need to align incentives for 
users because when a user 

1188
01:12:51,300 --> 01:12:55,300
submits a transaction, they are 
imposing costs on other parties 

1189
01:12:55,900 --> 01:12:58,800
and they're using a resource 
that's limited, namely the 

1190
01:12:58,800 --> 01:13:03,000
throughput of the chain, right? 
So you need to have some kind of

1191
01:13:03,000 --> 01:13:05,700
gas or charging in order to 
align this in. 

1192
01:13:06,200 --> 01:13:08,900
And in order to keep users from 
just spamming the chain with 

1193
01:13:08,900 --> 01:13:12,900
jump transactions, right? 
And so arbitrary, does that in a

1194
01:13:12,900 --> 01:13:14,600
way, that's pretty similar to 
aetherium. 

1195
01:13:15,500 --> 01:13:21,900
We count gas and we the Gatsby 
is normally low. 

1196
01:13:21,900 --> 01:13:25,100
It will go up. 
If the chain is busy, it's 

1197
01:13:25,100 --> 01:13:28,800
congested. 
That is if If people, if the 

1198
01:13:28,800 --> 01:13:33,300
transactions that are arriving, 
are more than the change, the 

1199
01:13:33,300 --> 01:13:37,900
change capacity, then just like 
etherium, we have this automatic

1200
01:13:37,900 --> 01:13:42,900
mechanism that raises the base 
fee, so that you get essentially

1201
01:13:42,900 --> 01:13:47,800
used, use that price mechanism 
to ration, The Limited limited 

1202
01:13:47,800 --> 01:13:51,400
resource, but most of the time 
you're running at that sort of 

1203
01:13:51,400 --> 01:13:56,100
the minimum base fee. 
So that's kind of how those fees

1204
01:13:56,800 --> 01:14:00,500
are Charged and you know, we 
believe in a scheme where the 

1205
01:14:00,500 --> 01:14:04,700
fees should correspond to the 
cost of operating the system and

1206
01:14:04,700 --> 01:14:07,500
that and that that's where that 
that should go in terms of a 

1207
01:14:07,508 --> 01:14:12,600
token, you know, we have not 
launched a token, we have not 

1208
01:14:12,600 --> 01:14:16,600
felt the need to do it all the 
growth that we've gotten is has 

1209
01:14:16,600 --> 01:14:18,500
been organic. 
We haven't paid anyone to use 

1210
01:14:18,500 --> 01:14:21,300
the system. 
You know, we haven't done took 

1211
01:14:21,300 --> 01:14:23,700
anomic stuff to try to get 
people to use this system. 

1212
01:14:23,700 --> 01:14:26,800
We really focused on Building A 
system that meets the needs of 

1213
01:14:26,800 --> 01:14:30,300
users and Developers. 
The one thing we've said for 

1214
01:14:30,300 --> 01:14:34,800
sure is that we are is that if 
we do ever introduced a token 

1215
01:14:34,800 --> 01:14:37,800
it's not going to be something 
that generates friction for 

1216
01:14:37,800 --> 01:14:39,700
users. 
It's not going to be something 

1217
01:14:39,700 --> 01:14:42,800
that every user of the system 
has to have or use our own. 

1218
01:14:42,800 --> 01:14:46,100
We're not going to charge fees 
in an arbitral token. 

1219
01:14:47,600 --> 01:14:50,500
We think that you know there's 
huge advantages both 

1220
01:14:50,500 --> 01:14:53,700
incompatibility and just 
practically for user experience.

1221
01:14:53,700 --> 01:14:59,200
To have the native token of our 
chain be Youth and to have fees 

1222
01:14:59,200 --> 01:15:04,000
charged, anyth. 
You know, we haven't, you know, 

1223
01:15:04,000 --> 01:15:06,900
we haven't found that we haven't
seen the need to introduce a 

1224
01:15:06,900 --> 01:15:12,100
token, you know, we are thinking
about decentralization and how 

1225
01:15:12,100 --> 01:15:14,700
governance could work going 
forward and what are the options

1226
01:15:14,700 --> 01:15:20,600
there. 
But yet it's not it's not it's 

1227
01:15:20,600 --> 01:15:22,700
not a decision. 
We've, you know, we've made to 

1228
01:15:22,700 --> 01:15:27,900
do Because right now those exit,
those fees basically go to like 

1229
01:15:27,900 --> 01:15:31,500
off chain labs and then often 
lab space like the different 

1230
01:15:32,600 --> 01:15:34,600
parties. 
Yeah. 

1231
01:15:35,300 --> 01:15:37,500
Right. 
Well so the sequence or fees get

1232
01:15:37,500 --> 01:15:40,000
go directly to the sequencers 
account. 

1233
01:15:40,400 --> 01:15:44,000
And then the rest, right? 
We distribute to those who are 

1234
01:15:44,300 --> 01:15:47,400
involved in money in running the
network. 

1235
01:15:47,700 --> 01:15:51,300
Yeah, overtime. 
You know, we're moving toward 

1236
01:15:51,300 --> 01:15:57,400
more transparency about that as 
we You know, as we line up, say 

1237
01:15:58,200 --> 01:16:01,800
a suite of paid validators and 
and we're, and we're thinking 

1238
01:16:01,800 --> 01:16:08,200
through how to what's the best 
way to have our community 

1239
01:16:08,200 --> 01:16:11,400
participate in these sort of 
this sort of decision making but

1240
01:16:11,400 --> 01:16:13,900
it's definitely the you know, 
the endpoint that we're aiming 

1241
01:16:13,900 --> 01:16:17,700
for is community participation 
in this and we need to have 

1242
01:16:17,700 --> 01:16:19,800
there needs to be an economic 
model that's sustainable that 

1243
01:16:19,800 --> 01:16:22,400
covers the costs and so on. 
But you know, we want the 

1244
01:16:22,400 --> 01:16:26,800
community feel like they A role 
in in talking through these 

1245
01:16:26,800 --> 01:16:30,600
issues and getting to, as in 
getting to an outcome that that 

1246
01:16:30,600 --> 01:16:36,700
meets their needs. 
Okay, so let's talk about the 

1247
01:16:36,700 --> 01:16:40,600
larger ecosystem and bridges. 
So obviously you didn't design 

1248
01:16:40,600 --> 01:16:43,200
Arbitron as a standalone system,
but it kind of works in 

1249
01:16:43,200 --> 01:16:48,000
conjunction with etherium. 
And there are also Bridges 

1250
01:16:48,000 --> 01:16:51,500
between arbitrary Amanda theorem
to kind of bridge assets. 

1251
01:16:51,500 --> 01:16:55,100
Also I mean basically there are 
no native at Native assets that 

1252
01:16:55,100 --> 01:16:57,200
live on average from, right? 
So basically everything's 

1253
01:16:57,400 --> 01:17:01,900
ridged, I assume There are some 
actually yeah. 

1254
01:17:01,900 --> 01:17:06,400
So there are some there are some
assets that were built natively 

1255
01:17:06,400 --> 01:17:09,900
on Arbitron. 
There's some some applications 

1256
01:17:09,900 --> 01:17:13,200
that are arbitral native that 
have chosen to Mint their their 

1257
01:17:13,200 --> 01:17:16,500
projects tokens on Arbitron. 
So there are some of those but 

1258
01:17:16,800 --> 01:17:20,300
most of the value on arbitrament
has been bridged over from the 

1259
01:17:20,300 --> 01:17:24,300
theorem. 
And how does a so basically you 

1260
01:17:24,300 --> 01:17:28,200
guys build and, and operate 
Bridge, how does that bridge 

1261
01:17:28,200 --> 01:17:31,000
work? 
And how, how do you envisage the

1262
01:17:31,000 --> 01:17:35,300
bridge landscape in the future? 
Yeah, so we have, we have a 

1263
01:17:35,308 --> 01:17:39,400
basic bridge that can Bridge 
Heath and ERC 20s back and forth

1264
01:17:40,300 --> 01:17:45,000
and to bridge from L1 to L2. 
It's a, I think a pretty typical

1265
01:17:45,000 --> 01:17:50,700
kind of architecture. 
So you make a call to a contract

1266
01:17:50,700 --> 01:17:53,100
on L1. 
So if you're say your Positing, 

1267
01:17:53,100 --> 01:17:56,600
'if I'll tell the story in terms
of Youth, but it works pretty 

1268
01:17:56,600 --> 01:17:58,200
similarly, if you're using a 
token. 

1269
01:17:59,600 --> 01:18:04,900
So you make a call to a bridging
contract on L1, and you pay 

1270
01:18:04,900 --> 01:18:09,700
those III to that L1 contract, 
it will hold those eat that will

1271
01:18:09,700 --> 01:18:13,900
lock them up and your call to do
that transfer. 

1272
01:18:13,900 --> 01:18:17,200
You said, what address on the L2
chain? 

1273
01:18:17,200 --> 01:18:19,900
You wanted those. 
He's given to usually your own 

1274
01:18:20,100 --> 01:18:24,600
address, right? 
So, So when that bridge contract

1275
01:18:24,600 --> 01:18:27,000
receives those eith it will lock
them up. 

1276
01:18:27,000 --> 01:18:31,500
And then it will send a trusted 
message up to L2 which causes 

1277
01:18:31,500 --> 01:18:34,900
the same number of each to be 
minted up on the L2 Chain by the

1278
01:18:34,900 --> 01:18:37,200
Arbitron code. 
And then deposited into the 

1279
01:18:37,200 --> 01:18:38,900
account that you asked it to go 
into. 

1280
01:18:40,400 --> 01:18:43,600
And so and then in the reverse 
Direction, it's kind of a 

1281
01:18:43,600 --> 01:18:49,200
similar thing there is, you make
a call to a trusted pre-compile 

1282
01:18:49,400 --> 01:18:52,300
contract on the L2. 
Orbitrim chain. 

1283
01:18:52,600 --> 01:18:55,300
Saying that you want to transfer
eith that you own on the 

1284
01:18:55,300 --> 01:18:58,300
arbitral Chain down to some 
address on L1. 

1285
01:18:58,700 --> 01:19:01,400
And that will cause a trusted 
message to get sent from the 

1286
01:19:01,400 --> 01:19:05,800
orbitrim code on the orbitrim 
chained to a contract on L1, 

1287
01:19:06,000 --> 01:19:08,400
which will cause those e that 
you deposited back at the 

1288
01:19:08,400 --> 01:19:11,000
beginning of my story to get 
unlocked and paid out. 

1289
01:19:11,300 --> 01:19:13,600
So basically, you lock the 
assets, I know one they get 

1290
01:19:13,600 --> 01:19:17,300
passed up to L2 and get minted 
up there and then you can do the

1291
01:19:17,300 --> 01:19:21,700
reverse operation as well and we
provide a bridge that does that 

1292
01:19:22,900 --> 01:19:25,600
One of the things that's 
important for eith, the story is

1293
01:19:25,600 --> 01:19:28,200
relatively simple for are see 
20s. 

1294
01:19:28,200 --> 01:19:32,600
You need to be a little bit 
careful to make sure that people

1295
01:19:32,600 --> 01:19:39,100
don't that each yes. 
Each token address on l 1 

1296
01:19:39,300 --> 01:19:42,300
corresponds to a single token 
address on the layer 2 Chain. 

1297
01:19:42,600 --> 01:19:44,800
And so you know, we have some 
functionality that lets people 

1298
01:19:44,800 --> 01:19:49,200
do that but basically we provide
a basic bridge and then other 

1299
01:19:49,200 --> 01:19:52,400
people can provide more advanced
bridging services on top. 

1300
01:19:52,600 --> 01:19:55,500
Back. 
And so we see, for example, one 

1301
01:19:55,500 --> 01:19:59,200
of the issues with an optimistic
roll-up is that withdrawing 

1302
01:19:59,200 --> 01:20:03,800
assets from layer to back to 
layer one has a delay and that's

1303
01:20:03,800 --> 01:20:05,800
because of that challenge, 
period, that I talked about 

1304
01:20:05,800 --> 01:20:08,900
before in the protocol Jin 
practices seven days. 

1305
01:20:09,300 --> 01:20:12,200
And so, if you don't want to 
wait seven days for your assets 

1306
01:20:12,200 --> 01:20:16,400
to get from the arbitral chain 
back on to etherium, then there 

1307
01:20:16,400 --> 01:20:21,000
is a number of different fast, 
fast Bridge services that you 

1308
01:20:21,000 --> 01:20:23,800
can use. 
It will basically you can give 

1309
01:20:23,800 --> 01:20:28,200
them assets on the layer to 
chain and they will right away. 

1310
01:20:28,400 --> 01:20:32,300
Omit those assets back to you on
the layer 1 chain, right? 

1311
01:20:32,300 --> 01:20:36,800
And so these third-party 
bridging Services, provide a 

1312
01:20:36,800 --> 01:20:39,700
bunch of value that people like,
but they're kind of built on top

1313
01:20:39,700 --> 01:20:42,500
of the basic bridge that we 
provide, which is the basic way 

1314
01:20:42,500 --> 01:20:44,700
that assets can be moved back 
and forth. 

1315
01:20:45,700 --> 01:20:49,100
Anyway the the service that 
they're providing the liquidity 

1316
01:20:49,200 --> 01:20:52,600
Innovation service and not a 
bridging service, right? 

1317
01:20:52,600 --> 01:20:53,800
Not so much bridging. 
Yeah. 

1318
01:20:53,800 --> 01:20:56,600
But they're also people who 
build Bridges between arbitrary.

1319
01:20:56,600 --> 01:21:00,300
Mm, and other layer, 2 Chains, 
or between arbitrament other L 

1320
01:21:00,300 --> 01:21:02,800
ones. 
Besides etherium, what we 

1321
01:21:02,800 --> 01:21:06,600
provide in our basic bridge is 
just a bridge between aetherium 

1322
01:21:06,600 --> 01:21:11,000
and and and the arbitral chain 
and then other people can build 

1323
01:21:11,000 --> 01:21:14,600
other things around it. 
On top of that. 

1324
01:21:15,000 --> 01:21:17,500
There's a lot of value for users
in those, in those sort of 

1325
01:21:17,500 --> 01:21:19,900
third-party, bridging, and 
liquidity Services. 

1326
01:21:19,900 --> 01:21:25,100
Yeah, absolutely. 
So I have an hour worth of 

1327
01:21:25,100 --> 01:21:26,600
questions about bridges at 
least. 

1328
01:21:26,700 --> 01:21:28,400
Unfortunately, we don't have an 
hour. 

1329
01:21:28,400 --> 01:21:31,700
So basically, I will kind of cut
this down to one question. 

1330
01:21:31,900 --> 01:21:39,300
So, in the future, how do you, 
how do you think about different

1331
01:21:39,300 --> 01:21:43,300
scaling Solutions coexisting? 
Do you think that I mean, will 

1332
01:21:43,300 --> 01:21:46,100
there be roll up to roll? 
Ridges. 

1333
01:21:47,700 --> 01:21:49,900
I mean how do you see that 
working? 

1334
01:21:51,100 --> 01:21:56,200
Yeah I think there will be so 
know there's a huge demand for 

1335
01:21:56,200 --> 01:22:00,900
scaling, and we expect a large 
number of people to come into 

1336
01:22:00,900 --> 01:22:06,000
the space and some, you know web
to companies and others to come 

1337
01:22:06,000 --> 01:22:11,000
in and bring a lot of demand and
as much as you could, you know, 

1338
01:22:11,000 --> 01:22:13,700
as much as we and everyone and a
lot of other teams are doing to 

1339
01:22:13,700 --> 01:22:18,000
try to scale up what you can do 
on one chain, the demand is 

1340
01:22:18,000 --> 01:22:20,100
going to be more than that. 
And so we're going to see I 

1341
01:22:20,100 --> 01:22:22,400
think Chains that are 
coexisting. 

1342
01:22:23,400 --> 01:22:26,000
And some of them will be from 
the same technology from the 

1343
01:22:26,000 --> 01:22:29,400
same provider and some may be 
different Technologies from 

1344
01:22:29,400 --> 01:22:31,600
different providers. 
But anyway, there's going to be 

1345
01:22:31,600 --> 01:22:34,300
a need to Bridge. 
And so I think we're going to 

1346
01:22:34,300 --> 01:22:38,200
see more sophisticated, bridging
systems and more sophisticated, 

1347
01:22:38,200 --> 01:22:41,400
thinking about bridging, I know 
that in our research team were 

1348
01:22:41,400 --> 01:22:45,500
thinking a lot about the multi 
chain future, and how bridging 

1349
01:22:45,500 --> 01:22:48,300
can work, and what is the 
optimal way to do it without 

1350
01:22:48,300 --> 01:22:51,700
sacrificing security and so on? 
And I think we're going to see a

1351
01:22:51,700 --> 01:22:55,600
lot of innovation sort of at the
protocol level in designing 

1352
01:22:55,600 --> 01:22:59,500
better, bridging protocols and 
that's going to provide a ton of

1353
01:22:59,500 --> 01:23:01,000
value. 
Because I do think we're headed 

1354
01:23:01,000 --> 01:23:05,200
for a multi chain of future of 
multiple chains, and not just 

1355
01:23:05,200 --> 01:23:08,800
like a single chain that wins. 
Cool. 

1356
01:23:08,800 --> 01:23:11,900
Well, I mean he's covered a lot 
about arbitrary, right? 

1357
01:23:11,900 --> 01:23:15,000
A lot of different aspects. 
I'm curious maybe sort of as if,

1358
01:23:15,000 --> 01:23:18,500
as a final thing. 
Can you talk a little bit about?

1359
01:23:19,200 --> 01:23:22,300
You know, what are the biggest 
things that are left to do? 

1360
01:23:22,400 --> 01:23:23,900
You know what, what does the 
word arbitrary? 

1361
01:23:23,900 --> 01:23:29,400
I'm roadmap look like So we have
a few things that are coming up 

1362
01:23:29,500 --> 01:23:33,200
soon. 
The first one is our Nitro 

1363
01:23:33,200 --> 01:23:35,700
upgrade. 
So this is kind of a rewrite of 

1364
01:23:35,700 --> 01:23:40,500
our entire software stack which 
is which is going to lower costs

1365
01:23:40,500 --> 01:23:45,100
and increase scalability by a 
large factor and is better in a 

1366
01:23:45,100 --> 01:23:48,200
bunch of ways and that's 
currently on test net but will 

1367
01:23:48,200 --> 01:23:51,200
be migrating. 
Arbitron one are sort of main 

1368
01:23:51,200 --> 01:23:54,000
chain over onto. 
It is a sort of seamless 

1369
01:23:54,200 --> 01:23:58,100
migration and Coming up pretty 
soon. 

1370
01:23:58,100 --> 01:24:02,100
We're not talking dates yet but 
but it won't be too long. 

1371
01:24:02,700 --> 01:24:07,600
After that, we're we're going to
roll out another technology 

1372
01:24:07,600 --> 01:24:12,300
which we call arbitrary many 
trust, which is a way if, if 

1373
01:24:12,300 --> 01:24:15,900
you're willing to make a mild 
trust assumption, in addition to

1374
01:24:15,900 --> 01:24:18,800
trusting aetherium in 
particular, if you're willing to

1375
01:24:18,800 --> 01:24:23,800
trust the to out of n, members 
of the data availability, 

1376
01:24:23,800 --> 01:24:28,500
committee are honest, then We 
can provide you with 

1377
01:24:28,700 --> 01:24:33,800
considerably lower cost by 
moving, the recording of 

1378
01:24:34,000 --> 01:24:37,800
transaction data off of the 
etherium chain and onto a sort 

1379
01:24:37,800 --> 01:24:40,600
of replicated Committee of data 
availability servers. 

1380
01:24:40,600 --> 01:24:42,900
That's arbitrary, many trust and
we're going to be rolling that 

1381
01:24:42,900 --> 01:24:46,900
out as well. 
Those two things are on our 

1382
01:24:47,200 --> 01:24:51,900
shorter-term roadmap after that 
it's really about driving 

1383
01:24:52,600 --> 01:24:56,200
scalability. 
We've, we have a bunch of cool 

1384
01:24:56,200 --> 01:24:58,800
things in the Pipeline, which 
are going to drive scalability 

1385
01:24:58,800 --> 01:25:02,400
up further on a single chain, 
you know, we're thinking a lot 

1386
01:25:02,400 --> 01:25:06,900
about cross chain bridging and 
we're thinking about, you know, 

1387
01:25:06,900 --> 01:25:11,300
ways of supporting a multi-chain
world, because we think the 

1388
01:25:11,300 --> 01:25:15,000
demand is going to be there. 
And I think there's gonna be a 

1389
01:25:15,008 --> 01:25:18,300
lot of innovation in that area. 
That's kind of where we're 

1390
01:25:18,300 --> 01:25:20,200
headed. 
It's mostly about driving scale 

1391
01:25:20,200 --> 01:25:24,500
up and driving costs down, you 
know, I'm fundamentally a tech. 

1392
01:25:24,500 --> 01:25:27,900
I'm fundamentally a tech person.
Not We won in our team is, you 

1393
01:25:27,900 --> 01:25:31,100
know, we to be to be successful 
in the space. 

1394
01:25:31,100 --> 01:25:34,700
You need a lot of different, a 
lot of different types of skill 

1395
01:25:34,700 --> 01:25:38,500
and an activity, and but for me 
it's all about sort of driving 

1396
01:25:38,500 --> 01:25:40,800
the fundamentals of our 
technology forward. 

1397
01:25:41,700 --> 01:25:44,800
And that's really what I'm going
to continue to be to be focused 

1398
01:25:44,800 --> 01:25:46,400
on. 
We have some really, really 

1399
01:25:46,400 --> 01:25:48,500
interesting things in the 
pipeline right now. 

1400
01:25:48,500 --> 01:25:52,800
We're heads down, getting Nitro 
and and any trust to delivered 

1401
01:25:52,900 --> 01:25:54,600
and after that I think it's an 
open field. 

1402
01:25:54,600 --> 01:25:56,700
We're going to do a lot and I 
think we can drive cost. 

1403
01:25:56,900 --> 01:25:58,600
On it a lot and scalability up 
Allah. 

1404
01:26:00,100 --> 01:26:04,200
Perfect sounds exciting. 
It where can people go to find 

1405
01:26:04,200 --> 01:26:08,400
out more about a Bertram? 
Well, you can go to Arbitron dot

1406
01:26:08,400 --> 01:26:12,400
IO and to get information. 
If you're a developer, it's 

1407
01:26:12,400 --> 01:26:16,800
developer dot arbitral. 
Yo, if you want to, you could 

1408
01:26:16,800 --> 01:26:19,300
look at the Block Explorer, our 
block explore if you want to see

1409
01:26:19,308 --> 01:26:20,700
what's happening on our main 
chain. 

1410
01:26:20,700 --> 01:26:24,400
It's Arbus can.i. 
Oh it's that's like the marriage

1411
01:26:24,400 --> 01:26:28,100
of arbitrament ether scan. 
Its that youth are scans teams. 

1412
01:26:28,600 --> 01:26:30,200
Big block Explorer. 
Bye. 

1413
01:26:30,200 --> 01:26:34,600
Dieter scan team that that lets 
you follow arbitrary, you can 

1414
01:26:34,600 --> 01:26:40,500
follow us on Twitter at 
arbitrary more off chain Labs or

1415
01:26:40,500 --> 01:26:42,700
if you're interested in the 
Nitro technology you can 

1416
01:26:42,700 --> 01:26:46,200
probably just Google arbitral 
Nitro and get a bunch of 

1417
01:26:46,200 --> 01:26:49,000
information about about that 
including information on how to 

1418
01:26:49,000 --> 01:26:52,400
get on the test chain that, you 
know, that is our role up Tech 

1419
01:26:52,400 --> 01:26:55,500
of the future and roll up check 
of the near future. 

1420
01:26:56,500 --> 01:26:58,200
So, yeah, that's all available. 
If you're interested in 

1421
01:26:58,208 --> 01:27:06,300
following me, I'm Ed felten Fel,
Tean on Twitter or or, you know,

1422
01:27:06,300 --> 01:27:09,600
you can find me online. 
Fantastic. 

1423
01:27:09,600 --> 01:27:11,700
Thank you, Ed. 
It's been an absolute pleasure 

1424
01:27:11,700 --> 01:27:13,900
to have you on and I learned a 
lot. 

1425
01:27:15,000 --> 01:27:16,800
Thanks a lot for having me. 
This has been fun. 

1426
01:27:17,100 --> 01:27:20,400
Thank you so much. 
And thanks so much for our 

1427
01:27:20,400 --> 01:27:23,100
listeners as well, and we look 
forward to being back next week.

1428
01:27:25,400 --> 01:27:27,200
Thank you for joining us on this
week's episode. 

1429
01:27:27,500 --> 01:27:29,200
We release new episodes every 
week. 

1430
01:27:29,700 --> 01:27:32,500
You can find And subscribe to 
the show on iTunes Spotify, 

1431
01:27:32,500 --> 01:27:35,600
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you listen to podcast. 

1432
01:27:35,900 --> 01:27:38,800
And if you have a Google home or
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1433
01:27:38,800 --> 01:27:41,700
listen to the latest episode of 
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1434
01:27:41,700 --> 01:27:44,900
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1435
01:27:44,900 --> 01:27:47,500
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1436
01:27:47,500 --> 01:27:50,300
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1437
01:27:50,300 --> 01:27:53,700
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1438
01:27:53,700 --> 01:27:56,900
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1439
01:27:56,900 --> 01:27:59,700
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1440
01:27:59,700 --> 01:28:02,800
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1441
01:28:02,800 --> 01:28:03,700
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