1 00:00:30,000 --> 00:00:32,500 This episode of epicenter is brought to you by kenosis, an 2 00:00:32,500 --> 00:00:34,900 open platform for businesses to create their own prediction 3 00:00:34,900 --> 00:00:37,400 Market applications on top of the theorem Network. 4 00:00:37,800 --> 00:00:40,400 They recently launched unisex a challenge. 5 00:00:40,400 --> 00:00:43,200 Inviting developers to build apps on top of the closest 6 00:00:43,200 --> 00:00:47,800 platform to learn more. Go to epicenter, .t V / gnosis 7 00:00:47,800 --> 00:00:52,900 X. Hi, welcome to epicenter. 8 00:00:53,200 --> 00:00:55,900 The show is talks about the Project's startups and 9 00:00:55,900 --> 00:00:59,300 Technologies, driving the decentralization and blocks in 10 00:00:59,300 --> 00:01:02,500 revolutions. My name is Maja toy, and today, 11 00:01:02,500 --> 00:01:05,300 we have a new show host joining epicenter. 12 00:01:06,500 --> 00:01:12,200 His name is sunny and he works with the cosmos project and we 13 00:01:12,200 --> 00:01:13,900 hope that he'll make a great show host. 14 00:01:13,900 --> 00:01:17,100 And you, and you like his questions, shun Sunny, welcome 15 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:20,300 to the show and give us a brief intro about yourself. 16 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:22,300 Hi everyone. Yeah, thank you for the 17 00:01:22,300 --> 00:01:25,300 introduction here. My name is sunny and I am 18 00:01:25,300 --> 00:01:29,200 currently a researcher working on the cosmos and tender in 19 00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:32,300 projects. I first started like you know 20 00:01:32,300 --> 00:01:35,000 learning a lot about blockchain through the epicenter podcast, I 21 00:01:35,008 --> 00:01:39,100 was like my main go-to and some excited to be on it for the 22 00:01:39,100 --> 00:01:42,600 first time and starting off as a host instead of a guess which is 23 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:46,800 kind of cool. So for this show, we have 24 00:01:46,800 --> 00:01:49,100 Charles hoskinson back on epicenter. 25 00:01:49,700 --> 00:01:52,200 You're going to focus our conversation on Cardinal, 26 00:01:52,700 --> 00:01:54,300 Charles, welcome back to the show. 27 00:01:54,600 --> 00:02:00,400 It's a pleasure to be on guys. So we had you for the first time 28 00:02:00,400 --> 00:02:05,100 on in episode 1, 44. This was right a few weeks after 29 00:02:05,100 --> 00:02:08,699 the Dow hack happen and aetherium spirit into helium 30 00:02:08,699 --> 00:02:15,100 classic and and, and cerium. And give us an idea how it's 31 00:02:15,100 --> 00:02:17,600 been since then. What's what's been going on in 32 00:02:17,600 --> 00:02:20,300 your life? Well, you know, I still like 33 00:02:20,300 --> 00:02:24,000 long walks on the beach and, you know, things like that but no, 34 00:02:24,000 --> 00:02:26,500 but levity aside day it's been pretty crazy, you know. 35 00:02:26,500 --> 00:02:29,700 I which case grown from a few dozen people to about 130 36 00:02:29,700 --> 00:02:33,100 people, we operate 10 countries. Now we work on a lot of 37 00:02:33,100 --> 00:02:36,400 projects, we work on Zen cash. We work on a theorem classic and 38 00:02:36,400 --> 00:02:39,200 the one we're increasingly becoming known for is cardano. 39 00:02:39,900 --> 00:02:42,700 So the cardano project is, is like a leviathan. 40 00:02:42,700 --> 00:02:47,100 It's got dozens of researchers and engineers and we're doing a 41 00:02:47,108 --> 00:02:50,200 little bit of everything. Suppose, I should give you guys 42 00:02:50,200 --> 00:02:52,800 since my first time I was on here was with the theorem 43 00:02:52,800 --> 00:02:56,300 classic a brief update there. When I came on epicenter, we 44 00:02:56,300 --> 00:02:59,700 were just kind of talking hypotheticals like ìoh K wants 45 00:02:59,700 --> 00:03:03,800 to build a wallet and I which K is going to hire some developers 46 00:03:03,800 --> 00:03:06,700 and you know we're gonna go do some cool stuff. 47 00:03:06,900 --> 00:03:09,300 Well we did that. We actually hired seven 48 00:03:09,300 --> 00:03:13,100 full-time, Scala developers and what we were able to do with 49 00:03:13,100 --> 00:03:16,600 those developers is build a full scholar client so it's about 50 00:03:16,600 --> 00:03:20,400 twelve thousand lines of code. So, full node In fact, not only 51 00:03:20,400 --> 00:03:24,200 we released it, we're actually on the next version 1.1, which 52 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:27,000 has some performance improvements and Bug fixes and 53 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:29,000 things like that. It's gone through a full 54 00:03:29,000 --> 00:03:31,200 security audit from cadell ski security. 55 00:03:31,200 --> 00:03:34,900 And at the moment, I think it's the most concise and the only 56 00:03:34,900 --> 00:03:38,500 functional etherium client implemented, whether it be e TC 57 00:03:38,500 --> 00:03:42,000 or ethereum. So that teams really had a heck 58 00:03:42,000 --> 00:03:44,200 of a lot of fun. We learned a huge amount in the 59 00:03:44,200 --> 00:03:47,000 process of building a client. And now we've kind of gotten to 60 00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:48,900 the point where we have to make a decision. 61 00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:52,800 Either kind of retire the client or to scale up the team and 62 00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:55,900 start making some substantive changes to the etherium classic 63 00:03:55,900 --> 00:03:58,700 ecosystem. So there's kind of a loose 64 00:03:58,700 --> 00:04:01,500 governance structure that's been forming that Barry Silver 65 00:04:01,500 --> 00:04:03,800 brought together with a bit of funding and we'll have some 66 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:07,300 discussions there and if we can get funding will scale up mantis 67 00:04:07,300 --> 00:04:10,800 and take it to the next level if not we'll continue maintaining 68 00:04:10,800 --> 00:04:14,300 and leaving a few developers on it as an alternative that people 69 00:04:14,300 --> 00:04:17,399 can download. But mission accomplished, we 70 00:04:17,399 --> 00:04:19,500 said we were going to hire some people we Said we were going to 71 00:04:19,500 --> 00:04:23,000 build a node we went and did that and it took it took a whole 72 00:04:23,000 --> 00:04:26,800 year and it was a huge learning experience for us, that's really 73 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:28,100 awesome. Yeah I mean I've actually used 74 00:04:28,100 --> 00:04:31,600 the Mantis client before and it's a pretty good user 75 00:04:31,600 --> 00:04:35,600 experience honestly. So what do you guys think is 76 00:04:35,600 --> 00:04:38,800 like you know before we drop more into cardano like what do 77 00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:42,300 you think is you guys are still relatively focus on a theorem 78 00:04:42,300 --> 00:04:45,500 classic as well. How do you see the relationship 79 00:04:45,500 --> 00:04:48,100 between cardano and etherium classic looking like going 80 00:04:48,100 --> 00:04:49,900 forward? I know that you guys are 81 00:04:49,900 --> 00:04:52,600 building did etherium classic support into the Daedalus 82 00:04:52,600 --> 00:04:54,200 wallet, right? Right, right. 83 00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:55,500 Well, Daedalus. Is eventually going to be a 84 00:04:55,508 --> 00:04:57,600 platform. So the goal is to Daedalus is to 85 00:04:57,600 --> 00:04:59,900 start looking a lot like Android and that you have one, click 86 00:04:59,900 --> 00:05:03,200 install and developers are able to kind of package and bundle 87 00:05:03,200 --> 00:05:06,500 their own daps or their own wallets, and there's an obvious 88 00:05:06,500 --> 00:05:09,400 way of doing that and it's a really difficult to build an 89 00:05:09,400 --> 00:05:11,500 architecture this way, that's secure and, you know, 90 00:05:11,500 --> 00:05:14,100 user-friendly and developer friendly and so forth. 91 00:05:14,100 --> 00:05:17,100 So there's a lot of discussions there but yeah, Daedalus does 92 00:05:17,100 --> 00:05:20,200 support mantis as it. Does cardano as well. 93 00:05:21,100 --> 00:05:23,100 So what's the relationship between the two projects? 94 00:05:23,100 --> 00:05:25,800 We kind of view them? As is different styles of 95 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:29,600 cryptocurrencies, etherium classic because of the 96 00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:32,500 economics, the culture and the ecosystem looks a lot like a 97 00:05:32,500 --> 00:05:35,800 better Bitcoin. It's basically it's got Supply 98 00:05:35,800 --> 00:05:38,000 mechanics like Bitcoin. It's got proof of work. 99 00:05:38,000 --> 00:05:40,000 It's going to stay on proof-of-work forever. 100 00:05:40,000 --> 00:05:42,900 So if you your cut from that cloth and you like that Klaus, 101 00:05:43,200 --> 00:05:45,700 it's like a better type of commodity and it's still a 102 00:05:45,707 --> 00:05:48,700 simple aspects, like, you know, silver does more than gold, you 103 00:05:48,700 --> 00:05:50,000 know. Are both Commodities. 104 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:52,800 And you know, people look at them along those lines, whereas 105 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:55,800 cardano's like the whole banana. It's got a governance system, 106 00:05:55,800 --> 00:05:59,500 it's got It's a p.o. that POS versus proof of work, it's going 107 00:05:59,500 --> 00:06:03,100 to have multi-party computation. It's got you know side chains 108 00:06:03,100 --> 00:06:04,400 built-in. It's going to have lots of 109 00:06:04,400 --> 00:06:06,800 computing Stacks. So really what cardano's about 110 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:10,500 is doing more than just being a store value that has some 111 00:06:10,500 --> 00:06:14,100 utility attached to it. It's about saying, let's say, I 112 00:06:14,100 --> 00:06:16,900 go to Ethiopia and I want to rip out the entire Financial stack 113 00:06:16,900 --> 00:06:20,000 of the country and replace it with a So currency framework. 114 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:22,600 What would that look like? So it requires you to answer a 115 00:06:22,608 --> 00:06:24,400 lot of questions. Like, what's the relationship 116 00:06:24,400 --> 00:06:26,900 between permission Ledger's and permissionless, Ledger's? 117 00:06:27,500 --> 00:06:30,000 How do you actually have voting built in so you can make changes 118 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:31,900 to it. You're not necessarily going to 119 00:06:31,900 --> 00:06:35,100 be immutable and every single case, you're not necessarily 120 00:06:35,100 --> 00:06:37,400 going to be private in every single case, in these types of 121 00:06:37,400 --> 00:06:39,400 things. And there's some sort of system 122 00:06:39,400 --> 00:06:42,300 to reconcile of that. So it's a much broader scope and 123 00:06:42,300 --> 00:06:44,500 therefore requires a kind of different technology in a 124 00:06:44,508 --> 00:06:47,700 different philosophy. So we believe in both and we 125 00:06:47,700 --> 00:06:50,500 maintain both in Our portfolio and, you know, for the 126 00:06:50,500 --> 00:06:53,100 foreseeable future will continue to support these projects 127 00:06:53,900 --> 00:06:56,600 especially cardano for being paid to that one. 128 00:06:57,100 --> 00:07:00,100 We just to point out, I spent over a million dollars on E TC. 129 00:07:00,100 --> 00:07:01,500 I haven't been paid anything yet. 130 00:07:01,500 --> 00:07:05,100 So it'll principles principles are getting pretty expensive. 131 00:07:05,200 --> 00:07:08,100 Yeah, yeah. So I mean, you know, last time 132 00:07:08,100 --> 00:07:10,300 you guys were on the podcast you mentioned that one of the things 133 00:07:10,300 --> 00:07:14,100 you liked about I ohk. Was that you guys were able to 134 00:07:14,100 --> 00:07:17,900 focus on very like general research rather than having to 135 00:07:17,900 --> 00:07:19,900 focus on a specific. Perfect project. 136 00:07:20,400 --> 00:07:23,400 And you know now it seems that you know you are working on 137 00:07:23,400 --> 00:07:27,400 other projects as well but there is r.l. generally a large focus 138 00:07:27,400 --> 00:07:30,900 on cardano and so what were the what kind of decisions LED you 139 00:07:30,900 --> 00:07:33,400 to make that change? And like, how do you think 140 00:07:33,400 --> 00:07:36,900 that's going to affect the future of I ohk and stuff? 141 00:07:38,100 --> 00:07:42,600 So what happens is that you kind of have cryptocurrencies come in 142 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:45,500 and stages, or Generations, or phases, whatever you want to 143 00:07:45,500 --> 00:07:47,400 call them. And every time they calm, they 144 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:50,200 tend to introduce a collection of new Concepts. 145 00:07:50,600 --> 00:07:53,700 So you know, Bitcoin came in really Bitcoin wasn't trying to 146 00:07:53,707 --> 00:07:55,400 actually be money or a payment system. 147 00:07:55,700 --> 00:07:57,100 It was something much more simple. 148 00:07:57,100 --> 00:07:59,000 It was a collective delusion problem. 149 00:07:59,300 --> 00:08:03,000 So basically the goal was to convince people that these magic 150 00:08:03,000 --> 00:08:06,300 internet tokens somehow back by math or actually worth real 151 00:08:06,300 --> 00:08:08,200 money. And we Can buy and sell and 152 00:08:08,200 --> 00:08:11,800 trade them right. So so basically, it took a few 153 00:08:11,800 --> 00:08:15,000 years for that to set in and really the Turning Point year 154 00:08:15,000 --> 00:08:18,700 was 2013 and at that point like Bitcoin was here to stay people 155 00:08:18,700 --> 00:08:20,400 said okay this is not going to go away. 156 00:08:21,000 --> 00:08:23,500 This is a real thing but then immediately people said we'll 157 00:08:23,500 --> 00:08:26,400 hang on a second here. This is just a push payment 158 00:08:26,400 --> 00:08:28,800 system that's really slow and really expensive and not very 159 00:08:28,800 --> 00:08:31,200 user-friendly. I want to do a lot more with it. 160 00:08:31,200 --> 00:08:34,400 Can I do a lot more and then we had this Grand conversation 161 00:08:34,400 --> 00:08:37,200 about how do we augment it? So like we saw things like that. 162 00:08:37,299 --> 00:08:40,500 Coins and master coin. We saw all coins like NXT for 163 00:08:40,500 --> 00:08:43,100 example, and they all brought a lot of innovation, but at the 164 00:08:43,100 --> 00:08:44,400 end of the day, we need to programmability. 165 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:47,500 We needed is like when Java can JavaScript came to the web 166 00:08:47,500 --> 00:08:50,400 browser. So you know if italic and I and 167 00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:53,300 others we created a theorem and the goal of etherium was to say 168 00:08:53,300 --> 00:08:56,400 OK give control over these sub protocols that run on a 169 00:08:56,408 --> 00:08:58,700 blockchain to the developer and give them an easy way of doing 170 00:08:58,700 --> 00:09:00,300 that. And that's another proof of 171 00:09:00,300 --> 00:09:03,300 concept and so a lot of people thought we were crazy and in 172 00:09:03,300 --> 00:09:05,600 fact a lot of people still think the theorem is crazy. 173 00:09:05,800 --> 00:09:08,500 That's fair although a lot of People still think that Bitcoin 174 00:09:08,500 --> 00:09:11,400 is crazy. So, you know, that's fair to and 175 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:15,200 so basically theorem comes out as the next big generation and 176 00:09:15,200 --> 00:09:18,300 they kind of introduced the notion of smart contract, you 177 00:09:18,300 --> 00:09:21,800 know this notion of more complex computation in the transaction 178 00:09:22,000 --> 00:09:24,600 and then all these emergent structures that you can kind of 179 00:09:24,600 --> 00:09:26,200 build from it. Alright. 180 00:09:26,200 --> 00:09:29,500 So now that Generations done it set people seem to agree. 181 00:09:29,500 --> 00:09:31,500 It's a good idea. There's a lot of competitors 182 00:09:31,500 --> 00:09:34,500 like Neo and he owes and others that are coming out or are 183 00:09:34,500 --> 00:09:37,200 already are out in Market and we're now entering a third 184 00:09:37,400 --> 00:09:40,300 Generation where we say, okay the delusions good we like that 185 00:09:40,800 --> 00:09:44,200 computation is probably a pretty good idea but how do we do these 186 00:09:44,200 --> 00:09:47,200 things at a scale of millions of users to billions of users? 187 00:09:47,200 --> 00:09:50,000 If they're actually going to be useful for people s there's 188 00:09:50,000 --> 00:09:52,400 probably going to be hundreds to thousands of cryptocurrencies 189 00:09:52,400 --> 00:09:53,800 long-term. I don't think we're going to see 190 00:09:53,800 --> 00:09:57,800 the great Cambrian Extinction. You know we're you know, we lose 191 00:09:57,800 --> 00:09:59,600 all these cryptocurrencies. They're still going to be a lot 192 00:09:59,600 --> 00:10:01,800 around because you know everything humans. 193 00:10:01,800 --> 00:10:04,400 Do we do a lot of. We have lots of languages, we 194 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:07,800 have lots of cultures, we have lots of governments and And we 195 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:10,800 have lots of religions is really hard for human beings to agree 196 00:10:10,800 --> 00:10:13,300 or consolidate on anything and so it's something as 197 00:10:13,300 --> 00:10:16,500 controversial as money or your financial life is probably not 198 00:10:16,500 --> 00:10:19,100 going to consolidate it run just one universal standard. 199 00:10:19,200 --> 00:10:22,400 So as a consequence you know you need interoperability you need 200 00:10:22,400 --> 00:10:26,600 ability to actually move value in data and preserve certain 201 00:10:26,600 --> 00:10:30,000 things like security and privacy as you Traverse the internet of 202 00:10:30,000 --> 00:10:31,500 value and you could between all these things. 203 00:10:31,500 --> 00:10:33,600 So there's a scalability component, there's 204 00:10:33,600 --> 00:10:35,900 interoperability component and it's things like a theorem 205 00:10:35,900 --> 00:10:39,900 classic or Bitcoin. A shiv really brought to the 206 00:10:39,908 --> 00:10:41,900 Forefront. There's a governance can problem 207 00:10:41,900 --> 00:10:43,300 as well. Where are you? 208 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:47,100 As we move Beyond just a couple of nerds who like meet up and, 209 00:10:47,300 --> 00:10:50,300 you know, they enjoy talking to each other over slack to an 210 00:10:50,300 --> 00:10:53,200 actual system, which has millions to billions of users 211 00:10:53,200 --> 00:10:56,700 and has control over your financial life and all the 212 00:10:56,700 --> 00:11:00,000 facets of that maybe including your identity and your property, 213 00:11:00,800 --> 00:11:03,400 you need some form of a democratic process to make 214 00:11:03,400 --> 00:11:06,300 decisions of where the system is going to go and how do you pay 215 00:11:06,300 --> 00:11:07,900 for things? And so Fourth. 216 00:11:07,900 --> 00:11:11,100 Now whether that's meta to the system, meaning that there's 217 00:11:11,100 --> 00:11:13,700 some sort of meta consensus or it's embedded within an existing 218 00:11:13,700 --> 00:11:16,500 government or it's built on blockchain, there's a lot of 219 00:11:16,500 --> 00:11:19,300 debates about that and so you see projects for example like 220 00:11:19,300 --> 00:11:22,400 Dash and tasos or cardano, we view that on blockchain 221 00:11:22,400 --> 00:11:25,100 governance for at least some things is probably a good idea. 222 00:11:25,600 --> 00:11:28,300 Other projects like Bitcoin for example a lot of people have 223 00:11:28,300 --> 00:11:31,000 been arguing to keep that off chain and you know have some 224 00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:34,900 sort of you know open source consensus material rise around 225 00:11:34,900 --> 00:11:37,900 and I think vitalik is also been a bit skeptical of Munching 226 00:11:37,900 --> 00:11:40,100 governance as well. So these are kind of the three 227 00:11:40,100 --> 00:11:42,800 design criteria that we've, you are required for the next 228 00:11:42,800 --> 00:11:45,500 generation of cryptocurrency. Keep what we know and love. 229 00:11:45,500 --> 00:11:47,700 So keep the collective delusion. Keep it weird. 230 00:11:48,200 --> 00:11:50,900 Keep the keep the computation, that's pretty cool. 231 00:11:51,400 --> 00:11:55,700 But then also go ahead and move into a domain where you get 232 00:11:55,700 --> 00:11:57,300 faster. As you get more users, you can 233 00:11:57,300 --> 00:11:59,800 talk to all the different cryptocurrencies and you have 234 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:02,300 some way of sorting out who pays and who decides. 235 00:12:02,600 --> 00:12:07,400 So that was really the, the 2015 idea for the cardano, In a 236 00:12:07,408 --> 00:12:10,200 nutshell, these were the the kind of business requirements 237 00:12:10,200 --> 00:12:14,300 that super high level, then what had to be decided is well, how 238 00:12:14,300 --> 00:12:17,000 the hell do we do that? So, we spent the first two years 239 00:12:17,000 --> 00:12:18,900 kind of thinking really carefully about a lot of deep 240 00:12:18,900 --> 00:12:20,700 Tech. We started a really deep 241 00:12:20,700 --> 00:12:23,300 research agenda and we started tons of different threats 242 00:12:23,300 --> 00:12:25,500 threats. Like better consensus algorithms 243 00:12:25,600 --> 00:12:31,200 threads on consent, on voting threads on things like, you 244 00:12:31,200 --> 00:12:34,000 know, better crypto Primitives like making us resistance of 245 00:12:34,008 --> 00:12:37,200 quantum computers, you know threads? 246 00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:40,200 Things like side chains and so forth. 247 00:12:40,200 --> 00:12:42,000 And what we've been doing is gradually. 248 00:12:42,000 --> 00:12:44,500 Now closing out those threads turning them to actual 249 00:12:44,500 --> 00:12:46,900 peer-reviewed white papers, and then converting those into 250 00:12:46,900 --> 00:12:49,500 specifications and then gradually implementing those and 251 00:12:49,500 --> 00:12:51,100 putting them into a production system. 252 00:12:51,300 --> 00:12:53,700 So the first version of that system came out in September of 253 00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:57,500 2017, kind of runs like Ripple, it's a walk delegation version 254 00:12:57,500 --> 00:13:00,800 of Ouroboros, it's a lot simpler than the papers we've recently 255 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:03,000 published. And over time we're just going 256 00:13:03,000 --> 00:13:05,900 to more and more decentralized system and that eventually 257 00:13:05,900 --> 00:13:08,300 add-on components like are so I In components, that we can link 258 00:13:08,300 --> 00:13:10,300 our smart contract layer and so forth. 259 00:13:10,500 --> 00:13:13,200 And that will be coming in the next few months to years, 260 00:13:13,500 --> 00:13:15,900 depending on the features. So that's good. 261 00:13:15,900 --> 00:13:18,300 High-level summary of I think what we're doing. 262 00:13:19,000 --> 00:13:20,300 I see so to like break that apart. 263 00:13:20,300 --> 00:13:24,700 So like yeah it's a lot right? Yeah, yeah. 264 00:13:24,700 --> 00:13:28,700 So like, you know you guys had a lot of ideas on like what like 265 00:13:28,700 --> 00:13:31,100 needs to be done to make a third-generation blockchain and 266 00:13:31,100 --> 00:13:34,100 then use now cardano is basically the amalgamation of 267 00:13:34,100 --> 00:13:36,700 like okay let's take all of these ideas and like make a 268 00:13:36,700 --> 00:13:38,200 prototype. Show that like these things 269 00:13:38,200 --> 00:13:40,700 actually mesh together and work together and we can make a 270 00:13:40,708 --> 00:13:44,000 production system using these so temporary. 271 00:13:44,200 --> 00:13:46,800 It's important to point out that there are other projects are 272 00:13:46,800 --> 00:13:48,600 chasing this. But usually what they do is they 273 00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:51,100 chase a particular Dimension like EOS and Iota. 274 00:13:51,100 --> 00:13:53,300 For example, really chasing the scalability side. 275 00:13:53,300 --> 00:13:56,700 They say oh we can do lots of TPS and then interoperability 276 00:13:56,700 --> 00:13:59,600 you have projects like a Theon and ripple for example with 277 00:13:59,600 --> 00:14:02,100 inter Ledger and they're really trying to talk about that 278 00:14:02,100 --> 00:14:04,200 internet of value and then in terms of governance you see 279 00:14:04,200 --> 00:14:07,800 projects like Dash and pesos. So I think there's Is consensus 280 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:10,600 in the space that at least one or more of these dimensions are 281 00:14:10,608 --> 00:14:12,600 really important. I think we're the only one that 282 00:14:12,600 --> 00:14:14,500 tends to view them so interconnected that you kind of 283 00:14:14,500 --> 00:14:16,800 have to do all three at the same time, right? 284 00:14:16,800 --> 00:14:19,900 So scalability, governance and interoperability those seem to 285 00:14:19,900 --> 00:14:23,300 be like the three key things. So I guess maybe we should like 286 00:14:23,300 --> 00:14:26,600 dive into some of them. Let's start with governance, 287 00:14:26,600 --> 00:14:28,700 right? Can you give us a bit of a short 288 00:14:28,700 --> 00:14:31,700 summary about your governance mechanism for cardano? 289 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:33,900 Yeah, so that's still under design it. 290 00:14:33,900 --> 00:14:37,700 So we have a team led by a professor in Diversity named 291 00:14:37,700 --> 00:14:41,400 ping Chang and we've done a few videos there on our YouTube page 292 00:14:41,500 --> 00:14:45,100 but basically the idea is that you have to combat a couple of 293 00:14:45,100 --> 00:14:47,800 demons at the same time. So one thing that you have to 294 00:14:47,800 --> 00:14:52,300 combat is the who gets to decide demon and that's a really 295 00:14:52,300 --> 00:14:55,300 difficult question. So you know we tend to be beings 296 00:14:55,300 --> 00:14:58,800 of desired fairness so we tend to be egalitarian and say all 297 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:00,700 well everybody ought to be equal and so forth. 298 00:15:00,700 --> 00:15:04,400 But the reality is people aren't in terms of skills, time 299 00:15:04,400 --> 00:15:06,100 expertise, these types of things. 300 00:15:06,300 --> 00:15:09,100 So it's really Difficult to build a voting system because 301 00:15:09,100 --> 00:15:11,800 you can either overview and then you end up having mop roll. 302 00:15:11,800 --> 00:15:15,000 So you get very poor decisions that are made or you can end up 303 00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:18,900 creating a very Ivory Tower pristine group, of voting people 304 00:15:19,000 --> 00:15:22,000 who end up making your betters or making decisions on your 305 00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:23,600 behalf. And that's, that's quite bad 306 00:15:23,600 --> 00:15:25,000 too. So you have to kind of find a 307 00:15:25,008 --> 00:15:27,700 sweet spot and this is, you know, not a new problem. 308 00:15:27,700 --> 00:15:30,200 It's something that political theorists have been talking 309 00:15:30,200 --> 00:15:32,400 about for hundreds of years and they've come up with numerous 310 00:15:32,400 --> 00:15:35,200 different voting systems. You know, everything from what 311 00:15:35,200 --> 00:15:37,800 are called, linear preference, ordering systems were For any 312 00:15:37,800 --> 00:15:39,400 decision. You don't pick one, you pick a 313 00:15:39,408 --> 00:15:42,300 collection and you rank them. So conjure say and board are 314 00:15:42,300 --> 00:15:45,700 examples of that to things like liquid democracy and liquid 315 00:15:45,700 --> 00:15:48,100 feedback. So we said, you know, liquid 316 00:15:48,100 --> 00:15:50,700 democracy, seems really cool. So this kind of delegating your 317 00:15:50,700 --> 00:15:52,800 vo. So you know, you say all right 318 00:15:52,800 --> 00:15:55,400 well let's talk about two events, the to elucidate the 319 00:15:55,408 --> 00:15:57,500 example. So everybody in the beginning 320 00:15:57,500 --> 00:16:03,600 its let's say the same flow and in the votes are situational so 321 00:16:03,600 --> 00:16:07,100 you know, Bob has, you know, is proposing a nuclear. 322 00:16:07,300 --> 00:16:10,100 Our plan design and you're allowed to vote on it, for 323 00:16:10,100 --> 00:16:12,700 whatever reason why most people aren't nuclear Engineers. 324 00:16:12,700 --> 00:16:15,400 So they're probably not going to have a very informed opinion 325 00:16:15,400 --> 00:16:17,500 that they're going to talk more about the bike shed in front of 326 00:16:17,508 --> 00:16:20,200 the nuclear plant in the actual design of the nuclear plant. 327 00:16:20,500 --> 00:16:23,400 So what if you could delegate your vote to Bill, who's your 328 00:16:23,400 --> 00:16:26,700 neighbor who happens to be an engineer, you respect a lot and 329 00:16:26,700 --> 00:16:29,900 done this for 25 years gray. But then let's say there's 330 00:16:29,900 --> 00:16:33,500 another vote and that votes on, I don't know, you know, your 331 00:16:33,500 --> 00:16:36,700 roof, you know, or zoning laws or something like that and 332 00:16:36,700 --> 00:16:39,400 getting your a big debate with Bill and your you don't want to 333 00:16:39,408 --> 00:16:41,800 give me your phone. So in ordinary, representative 334 00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:45,200 democracy, what you tend to do is just give one third party 335 00:16:45,200 --> 00:16:48,300 like a congressman or a senator power for a period of time and 336 00:16:48,300 --> 00:16:51,300 then they go and decide on your behalf for better for worse and 337 00:16:51,300 --> 00:16:54,800 a delegate of democracy system you can delegate real time. 338 00:16:54,800 --> 00:16:56,900 So you can say, okay, for this particular photo, give it to 339 00:16:56,900 --> 00:16:58,300 bill. For this particular vote, I gave 340 00:16:58,300 --> 00:17:01,500 it to Bob and so forth and there's a lot of theory behind 341 00:17:01,500 --> 00:17:05,099 why that would make more sense. Just as an example, if you had a 342 00:17:05,108 --> 00:17:08,200 delegated voting class in the u.s. election, If for the 343 00:17:08,200 --> 00:17:10,599 presidency, then you know, Donald Trump would have a 344 00:17:10,599 --> 00:17:12,400 really, really hard time getting elected. 345 00:17:12,400 --> 00:17:14,300 Why? Because most people would 346 00:17:14,300 --> 00:17:16,800 delegate their votes to local leaders in their communities. 347 00:17:17,000 --> 00:17:19,800 And so Trump is not talking to the general American public 348 00:17:19,800 --> 00:17:21,599 anymore. He's actually talking to a 349 00:17:21,599 --> 00:17:23,800 voting class. That's been specially selected 350 00:17:23,800 --> 00:17:26,000 to analyze him. So when he says we're going to 351 00:17:26,008 --> 00:17:28,900 make America great, you'll say, well what exactly are you going 352 00:17:28,900 --> 00:17:30,200 to do? And he has to go into policy, 353 00:17:30,200 --> 00:17:32,600 specifics. And he can't do that, right? 354 00:17:32,600 --> 00:17:35,300 Get, he's built his whole campaign on low information. 355 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:39,100 So, you know, there's A lot of people seem to feel that liquid 356 00:17:39,100 --> 00:17:41,300 feedback. Look, democracy is a good idea. 357 00:17:41,500 --> 00:17:43,300 So we said, okay, let's try that. 358 00:17:43,400 --> 00:17:47,100 So, we're going to push a paper out for CCS come around. 359 00:17:47,100 --> 00:17:50,000 May we were hoping to get it out in February, but the universe 360 00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:52,300 will composability stuff. Took a little longer to get done 361 00:17:52,300 --> 00:17:55,200 but it has some details on exactly how we think that would 362 00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:57,400 work and involves a lot of complex math. 363 00:17:57,600 --> 00:18:01,500 But if you're curious of how it basically works, we did a video, 364 00:18:01,700 --> 00:18:04,600 it's about 45 minutes long and it goes into kind of details of 365 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:06,900 how the crypto works and how we view the system. 366 00:18:06,900 --> 00:18:08,900 And so, Fourth but that's one demon. 367 00:18:08,900 --> 00:18:12,300 The who gets to decide demon and you make voting proportional to 368 00:18:12,300 --> 00:18:14,300 your stake in the system. That's that's the obvious 369 00:18:14,300 --> 00:18:16,300 starting point but you can change that metric or 370 00:18:16,300 --> 00:18:18,800 re-weighted based on other facts and circumstances. 371 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:22,000 The second demon is the demon of rational ignorance and this is 372 00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:25,100 the harder of the two to solve. So what is rational, ignorance 373 00:18:25,100 --> 00:18:29,200 will rational, ignorance is basically where the value you 374 00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:33,400 get from, knowing something is less than the time. 375 00:18:33,400 --> 00:18:36,600 It takes to know that thing. So for example, let's talk about 376 00:18:36,600 --> 00:18:37,300 health care. R. 377 00:18:37,600 --> 00:18:40,800 The American Healthcare System is horrendously complicated. 378 00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:43,600 It would take you literally years to decades to understand 379 00:18:43,600 --> 00:18:45,400 all the facets and ins outs of it. 380 00:18:45,600 --> 00:18:48,700 So, if somebody comes to you and says, hey Sally on what you make 381 00:18:48,700 --> 00:18:51,400 a decision on whether you know, universal healthcare is a good 382 00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:54,100 idea or Obamacare is a good idea or something like that. 383 00:18:54,100 --> 00:18:56,500 The only way you can actually really have an informed decision 384 00:18:56,500 --> 00:18:58,200 is to invest those years of effort. 385 00:18:58,300 --> 00:19:00,800 And what is the output of it? Your vote counts. 386 00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:04,000 Exactly. The same as my vote, and you 387 00:19:04,008 --> 00:19:07,000 exactly the same as the crazy hobos vote in the streets. 388 00:19:07,200 --> 00:19:09,700 San Francisco. So, then you get a little 389 00:19:09,700 --> 00:19:12,000 disenfranchised. You say, hang on a second here. 390 00:19:12,200 --> 00:19:16,200 I got exactly the same payoff for putting a lot more work. 391 00:19:16,200 --> 00:19:18,500 So what's the rational Behavior to not? 392 00:19:18,500 --> 00:19:20,900 Stay informed. That's why we tend to focus on 393 00:19:20,900 --> 00:19:23,400 Wedge issues and elections because they're very easy to 394 00:19:23,400 --> 00:19:25,300 have an opinion on an urn understand. 395 00:19:25,400 --> 00:19:28,100 But in general, they aren't they, you know, they aren't very 396 00:19:28,100 --> 00:19:30,800 substantive, you know, like the things that really have a big 397 00:19:30,800 --> 00:19:34,000 impact over your life or things like foreign policy and Health 398 00:19:34,000 --> 00:19:36,600 Care policy and retirement policy and so forth. 399 00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:38,500 Not gay rights or abortion rights. 400 00:19:38,500 --> 00:19:41,400 These are issues that affect small minorities but those 401 00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:44,500 issues are much easier to understand than you know, the 402 00:19:44,500 --> 00:19:47,600 complex intricacies of the Syrian Conflict, for example. 403 00:19:47,800 --> 00:19:49,900 So most voters tend to stay ignorant. 404 00:19:49,900 --> 00:19:51,200 Yeah. What is this relevant to the 405 00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:53,400 cryptocurrency? Space will just look at basic 406 00:19:53,400 --> 00:19:55,600 debate. We've been having like the block 407 00:19:55,600 --> 00:19:58,300 size or the difference between proof of work or proof of steak. 408 00:19:58,300 --> 00:20:00,600 Or should we bail something out, or not? 409 00:20:00,700 --> 00:20:02,800 These are very complicated issues, and they have many 410 00:20:02,800 --> 00:20:05,600 different dimensions to them. They take a huge amount of time 411 00:20:05,600 --> 00:20:08,800 to become informed about Most people just either vote with 412 00:20:08,800 --> 00:20:11,100 their wallet, meaning, whatever they think, is going to give 413 00:20:11,100 --> 00:20:13,600 them the most money, or they just vote along Cults of 414 00:20:13,600 --> 00:20:16,500 Personality where they just say, well, what did vitalik think or 415 00:20:16,500 --> 00:20:18,600 Charleston incurred, an think, or something like that, or a 416 00:20:18,608 --> 00:20:21,200 dries thing, and they just kind of go along that particular 417 00:20:21,200 --> 00:20:23,300 line. So the problem of rational 418 00:20:23,300 --> 00:20:26,600 ignorance has a heck of a lot harder to solve than the who 419 00:20:26,600 --> 00:20:30,200 gets to decide problem and there's been some ideas like 420 00:20:30,200 --> 00:20:33,400 maybe you incentivize people to be a voting class like Dash has 421 00:20:33,400 --> 00:20:36,800 masternodes for example or you know maybe you can create some 422 00:20:36,800 --> 00:20:38,400 sort of Bounty system or something. 423 00:20:38,500 --> 00:20:42,100 So we don't have quite a solution yet for that side of it 424 00:20:42,100 --> 00:20:44,100 and we don't really need a solution at the moment because 425 00:20:44,100 --> 00:20:47,000 the voting parts of cardano won't be out until probably 426 00:20:47,000 --> 00:20:49,900 2019. It's one of the last components 427 00:20:49,900 --> 00:20:52,800 were going to pull into the system as we could you know turn 428 00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:56,700 things on but we will you know touch that topic and the Mets 429 00:20:56,700 --> 00:20:59,300 paper that's being released and then we're going to try to 430 00:20:59,300 --> 00:21:01,500 experiment with some things. The other thing is that we're 431 00:21:01,500 --> 00:21:03,500 not in this game alone. Everybody who runs a 432 00:21:03,500 --> 00:21:07,000 cryptocurrency kind of has to deal with this in some capacity. 433 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:10,000 So what I'd love to do is start a dialogue with a lot of other 434 00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:12,700 project leaders and try to create some you know Common 435 00:21:12,700 --> 00:21:15,800 Notions or at least some Universal standards that we can 436 00:21:15,800 --> 00:21:19,700 follow about these things. But those are the two demons. 437 00:21:20,000 --> 00:21:22,700 We're I'd say we're in the research Spectrum. 438 00:21:22,700 --> 00:21:25,800 We're at Ouroboros or consensus. Algorithm is very Advanced, it's 439 00:21:25,800 --> 00:21:28,100 near done. Whereas, the Voting is, you 440 00:21:28,100 --> 00:21:31,700 know, in the early phases. I'd say, you know, 20 30 % along 441 00:21:31,700 --> 00:21:34,500 that research Spectrum. So we're not we're not really 442 00:21:34,700 --> 00:21:37,400 too far along, but there are some videos we have look Liquid 443 00:21:37,400 --> 00:21:38,100 democracy? Look. 444 00:21:38,100 --> 00:21:39,900 Good feedback in Google, rational ignorance. 445 00:21:39,900 --> 00:21:42,200 And it'll give you a really good sense of what are some of the 446 00:21:42,208 --> 00:21:44,100 challenges. Another thing is, there's 447 00:21:44,100 --> 00:21:47,300 actually a course on Coursera. If you're really interested in 448 00:21:47,300 --> 00:21:51,900 democracy, I think it's from University of Michigan and it's 449 00:21:51,900 --> 00:21:54,100 securing digital democracy, or something like that. 450 00:21:54,100 --> 00:21:56,100 And then there's another class on voting theory that they 451 00:21:56,100 --> 00:21:58,900 occasionally run and these are really good classes and they 452 00:21:58,900 --> 00:22:01,600 kind of give you a high level view of, you know, how these 453 00:22:01,600 --> 00:22:03,400 things work. And also some of the things to 454 00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:05,000 think about that. You probably have never thought 455 00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:07,000 about before, and it's a really fascinating. 456 00:22:07,200 --> 00:22:10,600 Topic. Like in the governance, aspect 457 00:22:10,600 --> 00:22:13,400 you. You talk about like these two 458 00:22:13,400 --> 00:22:15,400 issues. One is the issue of rational 459 00:22:15,400 --> 00:22:18,300 ignorance, which is, how do you incentivize the voters to 460 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:20,400 actually invest the effort to vote? 461 00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:25,700 Well, and the second is the issue of deciding who gets to 462 00:22:25,700 --> 00:22:29,600 vote right. Now, many people would say that 463 00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:32,000 it with proof of stake. There's a third, very 464 00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:36,500 fundamental problem of, of governance and voting and that 465 00:22:36,500 --> 00:22:41,900 problem is somehow that Like in a traditional proof of stake 466 00:22:41,900 --> 00:22:46,700 system, you you need to stake your coins and then participate 467 00:22:46,700 --> 00:22:49,800 in consensus and then you'll make more coins, right? 468 00:22:50,200 --> 00:22:53,400 So in the early days of cryptocurrency, people used to 469 00:22:53,400 --> 00:22:57,200 worry about the rich, get richer problem right now. 470 00:22:58,700 --> 00:23:02,400 Now, but when we start to have governess decisions about the 471 00:23:02,400 --> 00:23:07,900 system, and the voters are these takers The rich get richer 472 00:23:08,300 --> 00:23:11,300 problem gets magnified. What I mean to say is let's say 473 00:23:11,300 --> 00:23:18,100 like the inflation rate in card. I know is I don't know 2% If I'm 474 00:23:18,100 --> 00:23:20,200 really rich, I family ate a rich. 475 00:23:20,300 --> 00:23:25,000 I want the inflation rate to be much higher because like, I will 476 00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:29,500 stake, my Ada, I will run the validators, take my Ada, and I 477 00:23:29,508 --> 00:23:33,600 want the inflation rate to be high, so I'll get more Ada and 478 00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:36,700 I'll, you know, consolidate my position of having a lot of ADA. 479 00:23:37,300 --> 00:23:41,600 Whereas somebody that has very little Ada, might not run a 480 00:23:41,600 --> 00:23:46,000 validate themselves and slowly they will get diluted out now. 481 00:23:46,700 --> 00:23:50,000 The decision of what should be the inflation rate in a system 482 00:23:50,000 --> 00:23:54,300 is dependent on governance and then governance in governance. 483 00:23:54,300 --> 00:23:57,400 If I have a lot of ADA, I have a lot of voting power. 484 00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:03,100 So don't you see this? As a problem that when, when you 485 00:24:03,100 --> 00:24:06,900 have, the people that have steak vote on governance decisions, 486 00:24:07,500 --> 00:24:10,200 you might somehow magnify the rich get richer problem. 487 00:24:10,300 --> 00:24:11,800 Yeah. So seems like a prom on the 488 00:24:11,800 --> 00:24:14,700 surface but actually if you if you break into the analysis, 489 00:24:14,700 --> 00:24:21,800 it's a bit more complicated. So first off the, this rich, 490 00:24:21,800 --> 00:24:24,500 people are going to vote on, whatever they feel is going to 491 00:24:24,500 --> 00:24:28,400 produce value for them. And the reality is, he's short 492 00:24:28,400 --> 00:24:31,500 term value, is not as much as you'd think what they look more 493 00:24:31,500 --> 00:24:33,700 long-term, why? Because these markets are 494 00:24:33,700 --> 00:24:35,900 traditionally thin. So even if you could do 495 00:24:35,900 --> 00:24:38,400 something to temporarily increase the price 10 or 20 496 00:24:38,400 --> 00:24:42,200 percent at a long-term deficit, if you hold 10 or 15% of the 497 00:24:42,208 --> 00:24:44,300 supply, you can never divest that amount. 498 00:24:44,300 --> 00:24:47,000 And if you do long-term damage to the See you're actually 499 00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:49,100 costing yourself money. You'll make a little money in 500 00:24:49,100 --> 00:24:52,800 the short term but you hurt yourself on the back end so the 501 00:24:52,800 --> 00:24:55,900 decision making the rational decision-making analysis of, 502 00:24:56,000 --> 00:24:59,400 what I do, if I'm a custodian of the system and I hold a lot of 503 00:24:59,400 --> 00:25:03,700 it is a bit muddled and it's not just what will maximize my 504 00:25:03,700 --> 00:25:07,600 utility day, two or day three, but maybe a longer term view. 505 00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:12,700 S, let's say you have problems like a 51% attack through your 506 00:25:12,700 --> 00:25:16,300 plutocracy, you can always fire your stakeholders. 507 00:25:16,400 --> 00:25:18,700 By a fork. And that's something you can't 508 00:25:18,700 --> 00:25:22,000 do with a, with a proof of work system. 509 00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:25,500 See this is endogenous consensus versus exact doggedness, 510 00:25:25,500 --> 00:25:28,900 exogenously consensus. So external versus internal. 511 00:25:29,100 --> 00:25:32,300 So when your security comes from an external provider, they own 512 00:25:32,300 --> 00:25:34,800 all the hardware and if you fire them by changing the 513 00:25:34,800 --> 00:25:37,400 proof-of-work algorithm, you have to kind of rebuild your 514 00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:39,400 entire security base from the ground up. 515 00:25:39,400 --> 00:25:42,100 But let's say Bob and a proof of stake system has 51 percent of 516 00:25:42,108 --> 00:25:45,100 the steak, the 49 percent minority which would say is much 517 00:25:45,100 --> 00:25:47,600 more diverse and they're actually doing everything and 518 00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:50,200 Bob just happens to have a pile of coins and he does nothing but 519 00:25:50,200 --> 00:25:53,000 he's a malicious. You can just Fork the currency, 520 00:25:53,000 --> 00:25:57,000 create cardano to, and remove Bob, completely from the set. 521 00:25:57,100 --> 00:25:59,000 Now, what have you done? You've removed the malicious 522 00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:01,200 actor. The remaining people are honest 523 00:26:01,200 --> 00:26:05,900 and you actually have a, much more secure system now, and, you 524 00:26:05,900 --> 00:26:09,200 know, your, you haven't lost any security, you actually gain 525 00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:11,300 security from that event, whereas, you can never do that 526 00:26:11,300 --> 00:26:12,800 type of a thing with proof of work. 527 00:26:13,100 --> 00:26:15,800 Now, getting onto the, the voting set of things, you know, 528 00:26:16,100 --> 00:26:20,000 the Obvious to do voting for changing system-level parameters 529 00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:22,500 like inflation or something like that would be proportional to 530 00:26:22,500 --> 00:26:26,600 your stake in the system and that's fine to do. 531 00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:29,900 But you can create other parameters in the system. 532 00:26:29,900 --> 00:26:32,700 For example you could create the notion of a good citizen in the 533 00:26:32,700 --> 00:26:34,300 system, like a reputation system. 534 00:26:34,300 --> 00:26:37,600 Like I've relayed lots of data or when your systems become more 535 00:26:37,600 --> 00:26:39,700 complicated than just consensus as a service. 536 00:26:39,700 --> 00:26:42,300 When you could have other things like trusted data, feeds or 537 00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:45,100 multi-party computation providers, or these types of 538 00:26:45,100 --> 00:26:47,900 things. Then in those particular cases, 539 00:26:47,900 --> 00:26:51,400 you could and get points and those could then biased your 540 00:26:51,400 --> 00:26:53,700 voting power. So it could end up that the 541 00:26:53,700 --> 00:26:56,200 person who has the most steak doesn't necessarily be the most 542 00:26:56,200 --> 00:26:59,900 powerful person system rather. It's the most useful person in 543 00:26:59,900 --> 00:27:03,100 the system, but that's complicated metric to construct. 544 00:27:03,100 --> 00:27:05,700 So we have to do is start somewhere in the most obvious 545 00:27:05,700 --> 00:27:08,400 places to start where the people have the greatest Financial 546 00:27:08,400 --> 00:27:11,500 incentive to participate in the system for the long-term growth 547 00:27:11,500 --> 00:27:14,200 and well-being of the system. There's another thing I like to 548 00:27:14,208 --> 00:27:15,900 point out is called the lump fallacy. 549 00:27:16,400 --> 00:27:19,500 Is it something comes up in economics where people tend to 550 00:27:19,500 --> 00:27:22,100 believe that. All the wealth ever created is 551 00:27:22,100 --> 00:27:25,100 already been created, and it's just about proportions and how 552 00:27:25,100 --> 00:27:27,100 much did Bob get versus Bill get? 553 00:27:27,300 --> 00:27:30,500 And it's a big misconception. You'll see it a lot in a 554 00:27:30,500 --> 00:27:33,000 specially liberal politics, where people say, well, look how 555 00:27:33,000 --> 00:27:35,400 much money these billionaires are getting, you know, 556 00:27:35,400 --> 00:27:37,300 proportionate to the rest of the people. 557 00:27:37,300 --> 00:27:40,000 And oh God, these evil people. The rich aren't paying their 558 00:27:40,000 --> 00:27:42,600 fair share. Wealth is created. 559 00:27:42,700 --> 00:27:44,300 Wealth is created through actions. 560 00:27:44,300 --> 00:27:46,000 Wealth is created through productivity. 561 00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:50,300 So when you are participating in consensus it's not a rich gets 562 00:27:50,300 --> 00:27:53,200 richer thing, you're performing a service for the network and 563 00:27:53,208 --> 00:27:57,000 the network is paying you to perform that service and this is 564 00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,400 complicated stuff, it's not just the state. 565 00:27:59,400 --> 00:28:02,000 Eventually it could be a decentralized file system, it 566 00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:04,100 could be computation as a service which is effect 567 00:28:04,100 --> 00:28:06,500 effectively. What ethereum is it can be 568 00:28:06,500 --> 00:28:09,900 relaying huge sums of data. Like if EOS does live up to its 569 00:28:09,900 --> 00:28:13,800 claims of performance, it could end up moving GB every second of 570 00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:17,100 data, okay? So you're being To provide these 571 00:28:17,100 --> 00:28:20,300 Services, which is producing wealth, its producing value for 572 00:28:20,300 --> 00:28:22,900 everybody and therefore, corns of being minted to pay you. 573 00:28:23,100 --> 00:28:26,000 The last point is that the same hundred people who control the 574 00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:29,100 wealth are going to be the same hundred people year, two and 575 00:28:29,100 --> 00:28:34,200 year, three people sell tokens, you know, if people just held 576 00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:37,000 onto their Bitcoins forever, then the original miners would 577 00:28:37,200 --> 00:28:38,800 have had, you know, much much more. 578 00:28:38,800 --> 00:28:40,800 But the reality is people run businesses. 579 00:28:40,800 --> 00:28:43,200 They tend to sell things. So you're going to see a lot of 580 00:28:43,300 --> 00:28:45,000 rotation of value. Why? 581 00:28:45,000 --> 00:28:46,600 Because there's tons of volatility Leti. 582 00:28:47,100 --> 00:28:50,900 You know so if your coin goes up a 5x or 10x you don't say boy I 583 00:28:50,900 --> 00:28:53,900 should hold on to this because I can get you know Perpetual 2% 584 00:28:53,900 --> 00:28:56,100 return you say. I don't think this 5x or 10x is 585 00:28:56,100 --> 00:28:58,000 sustainable. I'm going to go liquidate 30 or 586 00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:01,700 40 or 50 percent of my Holdings and lock in my 5x or 10x. 587 00:29:01,700 --> 00:29:03,200 I'm so lucky. What does it mean? 588 00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:05,100 You've just Diversified Holdings. 589 00:29:05,500 --> 00:29:10,000 So, in all things, whether it's a start-up or or any 590 00:29:10,000 --> 00:29:14,000 cryptocurrency, what we've seen is a gradual deconsolidation of 591 00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:17,300 Holdings, Bill Gates, for example, with About 64 percent 592 00:29:17,300 --> 00:29:19,200 of the company. When he started it he only has 593 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:21,800 5%. Now, he could have held onto 594 00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:23,500 that chair. You could have never done looted 595 00:29:23,500 --> 00:29:26,900 himself or dilute himself as small as possible and kept going 596 00:29:26,900 --> 00:29:30,200 long, Microsoft, but he realized that diversification matters and 597 00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:33,000 that's generally what's probably going to happen with most people 598 00:29:33,000 --> 00:29:35,300 who are involved. Cryptocurrencies, is that, as 599 00:29:35,300 --> 00:29:37,400 volatility goes up and down, they liquidate. 600 00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:40,000 And then you see a gradual deconsolidation, which is much 601 00:29:40,000 --> 00:29:42,200 greater than the particular inflation rate. 602 00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:45,300 But, you know, these are different things, you know, with 603 00:29:45,300 --> 00:29:48,500 proof of work. Youyou kind of Kick the Can down 604 00:29:48,500 --> 00:29:51,000 the road and you hide inconvenient truths. 605 00:29:51,500 --> 00:29:56,000 It's inconvenient to the Bitcoin space that 10 people, 10 pools 606 00:29:56,000 --> 00:29:58,400 control, more than 51% of the hash power. 607 00:29:59,000 --> 00:30:01,500 And I don't know these pools. I can't be these pools. 608 00:30:01,500 --> 00:30:03,200 They saw. What anybody can buy a miter. 609 00:30:03,400 --> 00:30:07,300 Yeah, but if its patented and it has a very bespoke supply chain 610 00:30:07,500 --> 00:30:10,800 and people are using subsidized power, that's not a fair game. 611 00:30:11,400 --> 00:30:13,600 I remember I bought a butterfly Labs minor. 612 00:30:13,700 --> 00:30:17,900 I got it a year and a half after I put the pre Order n and they 613 00:30:17,900 --> 00:30:21,200 were testing them testing them, they were mining with my minor 614 00:30:21,200 --> 00:30:23,400 for until it was no longer profitable and they shipped it 615 00:30:23,400 --> 00:30:26,200 to me that's not a fair game. It's a rigged game. 616 00:30:26,600 --> 00:30:30,000 So you know what we do is we say all well, you know, there's this 617 00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:32,600 implicit notion of control and it's very butterflies and 618 00:30:32,600 --> 00:30:34,600 rainbows and people like it. But then instead what you've 619 00:30:34,600 --> 00:30:39,100 done is given it to some silent, small group and was proof of 620 00:30:39,100 --> 00:30:41,900 steak, you have to explicitly, have this conversation of who 621 00:30:41,900 --> 00:30:44,600 should be in control, how many people, why should they be in 622 00:30:44,600 --> 00:30:46,400 control? What are their Elves. 623 00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:48,400 How do we ameliorate certain things? 624 00:30:48,500 --> 00:30:52,300 So, if the rich are malicious, you have the nuclear option of 625 00:30:52,300 --> 00:30:55,500 forking them out. If you have other options of 626 00:30:55,500 --> 00:30:58,600 introducing metrics to dilute their power like a proof of 627 00:30:58,600 --> 00:31:02,100 usefulness, for example, and then you have social metrics 628 00:31:02,100 --> 00:31:05,100 that can be applied as well and if their malicious the price 629 00:31:05,100 --> 00:31:08,100 will go down as well. So generally the best outcome is 630 00:31:08,100 --> 00:31:11,500 to just have them behave following the protocol as it's 631 00:31:11,600 --> 00:31:13,800 as it's written and I think that's a much better way of 632 00:31:13,800 --> 00:31:15,900 going about things? Because it's out in the open. 633 00:31:15,900 --> 00:31:18,600 It's Blissett you're going to not get it right the first time 634 00:31:18,600 --> 00:31:20,500 around but you can fine. Tune the system. 635 00:31:20,500 --> 00:31:23,200 There's going to be a lot of opinions on how things ought to 636 00:31:23,208 --> 00:31:25,900 be done, whether it be a delegated proof of steak or a 637 00:31:25,900 --> 00:31:28,400 bonded, proof of steak, or a proof of stake system. 638 00:31:28,700 --> 00:31:32,700 And it's very darwinian in a certain respect rather than just 639 00:31:32,700 --> 00:31:35,700 pretending like there's this God mode that's somewhere off in the 640 00:31:35,700 --> 00:31:38,200 rainbow and they're always going to act honestly and behaved 641 00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:41,700 properly and don't worry about it, they'll just be there for 642 00:31:41,700 --> 00:31:44,500 you and they become actually barriers to change as we've seen 643 00:31:44,500 --> 00:31:47,400 with the Bitcoin Network. So that's my big rant. 644 00:31:49,200 --> 00:31:52,500 This episode of epicenter is brought to you by gnosis gnosis 645 00:31:52,500 --> 00:31:54,900 is an open platform for businesses to create their own 646 00:31:54,900 --> 00:31:56,700 prediction markets on the theory Network. 647 00:31:57,100 --> 00:31:59,500 Prediction markets are powerful tools for aggregating 648 00:31:59,500 --> 00:32:03,000 information about the expected outcome of future events. 649 00:32:03,300 --> 00:32:06,400 So this can be used for things like information-gathering 650 00:32:06,500 --> 00:32:10,100 incentivizing, behaviors, making governance decisions or even 651 00:32:10,100 --> 00:32:13,000 creating Insurance products. So, in order to turn kenosis 652 00:32:13,000 --> 00:32:15,900 into the most powerful forecasting tool in the world, 653 00:32:15,900 --> 00:32:19,200 they recently launched gnosis X, it's a challenge that It's 654 00:32:19,200 --> 00:32:21,800 developers to build applications on top of the platform. 655 00:32:22,100 --> 00:32:25,500 And the best applications per category will be rewarded up to 656 00:32:25,500 --> 00:32:29,000 one hundred thousand dollars in gno tokens. 657 00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:32,000 So throughout the year, kenosis will announce different 658 00:32:32,000 --> 00:32:34,200 categories for the challenge and the current challenge has 659 00:32:34,200 --> 00:32:37,600 categories for science, Nardi token, diligence and blockchain 660 00:32:37,600 --> 00:32:39,900 project. Integration analysis also 661 00:32:39,900 --> 00:32:43,100 provides the SDK, which allows you to easily, get started with 662 00:32:43,100 --> 00:32:44,300 everything you need to get coding. 663 00:32:44,500 --> 00:32:46,700 And they also provide dedicated support channels throughout the 664 00:32:46,708 --> 00:32:48,800 challenge for teams and solar Builder. 665 00:32:48,900 --> 00:32:52,300 Hours are up for the challenge, get started now to learn more, 666 00:32:52,500 --> 00:32:56,500 and to sign up, go to epicenter .t V, / kenosis X. 667 00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:59,200 We like to thank gnosis for their support of epicenter. 668 00:33:00,300 --> 00:33:02,200 So, one of the things that you mentioned, that was actually 669 00:33:02,200 --> 00:33:06,600 very interesting is, like, the idea of if the, this is one of 670 00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:09,300 my biggest benefits of proof of stake over work with work as 671 00:33:09,300 --> 00:33:11,100 well. Is that when people do something 672 00:33:11,100 --> 00:33:14,100 malicious, we can just easily hard Fork them out. 673 00:33:14,300 --> 00:33:16,600 Right? And my here's question is about 674 00:33:16,600 --> 00:33:18,800 what happens if they try to abuse the governance system? 675 00:33:19,600 --> 00:33:23,000 One thing that I've actually watched the Whiteboard video. 676 00:33:23,000 --> 00:33:24,500 By the way, I love your guys's whiteboard. 677 00:33:24,500 --> 00:33:28,100 Videos are awesome, which one with Ben Chang the one with. 678 00:33:28,100 --> 00:33:30,200 Yes, the one on the governance and stuff. 679 00:33:30,500 --> 00:33:34,300 And so one of the things that you guys that he mentioned was 680 00:33:34,300 --> 00:33:39,400 that you use the ideas that the Voting is going to be in like 681 00:33:39,400 --> 00:33:43,400 zero knowledge and and so this actually is an interesting 682 00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:45,900 question because we've actually had this discussion at Cosmos as 683 00:33:45,900 --> 00:33:51,100 well is should voting be pivot or transparent and like we're 684 00:33:51,100 --> 00:33:52,800 actually going down the route of like. 685 00:33:52,900 --> 00:33:56,700 So what do you think is the effect of having private voting, 686 00:33:56,700 --> 00:33:59,800 where you actually lose that transparency and potentially 687 00:33:59,800 --> 00:34:03,000 that accountability? So let's say there's a boat and 688 00:34:03,000 --> 00:34:07,800 a lot of people decide to, like, increase a bunch of money for 689 00:34:07,800 --> 00:34:10,600 themselves, not in some, you know, convoluted way, not 690 00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:13,100 talking with that clear. But you know, how do we make 691 00:34:13,100 --> 00:34:14,900 sure that we figure out who vote? 692 00:34:14,900 --> 00:34:17,400 Who was the one who voted that? So we can hold them accountable. 693 00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:19,900 Maybe not either through like Protocol by hard for. 694 00:34:19,900 --> 00:34:21,600 Can we at least socially accountable? 695 00:34:22,199 --> 00:34:24,699 Okay, that's a great question. So first, it's important 696 00:34:24,699 --> 00:34:26,300 understand that there's a spectrum of voting. 697 00:34:26,300 --> 00:34:29,199 So you start with things like SRO style, things like 698 00:34:29,199 --> 00:34:31,600 membership-based, self-regulatory, organizations 699 00:34:31,900 --> 00:34:35,400 and those are very fluid and things can change in a single 700 00:34:35,400 --> 00:34:36,900 meeting. Then you have like 701 00:34:36,900 --> 00:34:39,600 municipalities, right? And these are like your local 702 00:34:39,600 --> 00:34:42,400 mayor and your County Council and you can go and complain to 703 00:34:42,400 --> 00:34:44,600 the County Council. They take a vote, maybe they 704 00:34:44,600 --> 00:34:46,800 meet every two weeks or three weeks and they can change things 705 00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:49,400 fairly quickly. Then you have your status Please 706 00:34:49,500 --> 00:34:51,800 and those move at their own pace but they're still somewhat of a 707 00:34:51,900 --> 00:34:53,699 democratically accessible to people. 708 00:34:53,900 --> 00:34:56,100 Then you actually have your federal government side of 709 00:34:56,100 --> 00:34:57,700 things and that's much more bureaucratic. 710 00:34:57,700 --> 00:35:00,300 It's much more difficult to get things done and then you have 711 00:35:00,300 --> 00:35:04,200 even further the Constitution where you say, okay, from a, to 712 00:35:04,200 --> 00:35:07,100 change the Constitution, it's only been done in America about 713 00:35:07,100 --> 00:35:10,400 two dozen times and over our entire 200-year history. 714 00:35:10,400 --> 00:35:12,600 So, that's a real challenging thing to change. 715 00:35:12,900 --> 00:35:16,400 So we have to do is say certain parameters in my system live in 716 00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:22,100 different spots, so Things like user experience taste texture, 717 00:35:22,100 --> 00:35:26,300 feel, you know, nice to have features, like HD wallets those 718 00:35:26,300 --> 00:35:28,600 types of things. Probably live towards the Estero 719 00:35:28,600 --> 00:35:31,500 style side, so they don't even necessarily require a vote. 720 00:35:31,500 --> 00:35:33,700 That's just you. The developer making decisions 721 00:35:33,700 --> 00:35:36,800 of what's best for your users and there's some ambiguity in 722 00:35:36,800 --> 00:35:39,300 and wiggle room in the protocol to allow you to have that kind 723 00:35:39,300 --> 00:35:42,300 of flexibility other things. Like, for example, monetary 724 00:35:42,300 --> 00:35:45,100 policy or how you achieve consensus or the voting system 725 00:35:45,100 --> 00:35:47,800 mechanics themselves, those are much more towards the 726 00:35:47,800 --> 00:35:49,400 Constitution. Inside. 727 00:35:49,700 --> 00:35:53,700 Okay, so that requires a lot more consent that a lot more 728 00:35:53,700 --> 00:35:56,500 time. It's a it's a lot more drawn out 729 00:35:56,500 --> 00:35:59,700 process than it would to be able to change something like that. 730 00:35:59,700 --> 00:36:01,200 So you have to find that entire Spectrum. 731 00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:03,100 So that's the first step. Second step is shoot. 732 00:36:03,100 --> 00:36:06,600 You have a blind vallot, which is anonymous voting, or should 733 00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:09,600 you have transparent voting? Now I've seen arguments on both 734 00:36:09,600 --> 00:36:11,500 sides. For example, Switzerland, they 735 00:36:11,500 --> 00:36:13,800 have a can tunnel system. So there are true Confederacy 736 00:36:13,800 --> 00:36:16,100 and some of the Canton still do public votes. 737 00:36:16,500 --> 00:36:20,200 So you can actually go Out. And, you know, it there's a 738 00:36:20,207 --> 00:36:22,900 voting day and people shout out their vote and they go into 739 00:36:22,900 --> 00:36:24,900 groups. There's also other public voting 740 00:36:24,900 --> 00:36:28,500 systems like America, we have caucuses, for example, and a lot 741 00:36:28,500 --> 00:36:31,400 of these caucuses, you go into groups and who supports Ron Paul 742 00:36:31,400 --> 00:36:35,000 and who supports Romney who supports McCain and so forth. 743 00:36:35,000 --> 00:36:37,800 And we all had to deal with that for those who are in dull those 744 00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:41,200 elections and you get various degrees of you know outcomes the 745 00:36:41,200 --> 00:36:44,000 problem with a transparent system when you're talking about 746 00:36:44,000 --> 00:36:47,700 money is that what say there's a delegation in one particular 747 00:36:47,700 --> 00:36:51,500 delegate ends up getting a A lot of influence, let's say Andreas 748 00:36:51,900 --> 00:36:53,900 you know, if for Bitcoin or something like that and there's 749 00:36:53,900 --> 00:36:55,600 a voting system and everybody likes Andreas. 750 00:36:55,600 --> 00:36:57,700 So he ends up getting like 30% of all the votes. 751 00:36:58,200 --> 00:37:01,100 Well, if that's publicly known what you've basically done, is 752 00:37:01,100 --> 00:37:04,200 painted a big red Target on his back. 753 00:37:04,700 --> 00:37:07,500 So now he's got to look over his shoulder and say like, oh shit, 754 00:37:07,500 --> 00:37:10,000 you know, I gotta worry about my security like what if somebody 755 00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:14,000 kidnaps his girlfriend or his kids or whatever, if he has 756 00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:16,900 children, I don't know. But, you know, they they try to 757 00:37:16,900 --> 00:37:20,400 cover tack or some and They know, yes, thirty percent so 758 00:37:20,400 --> 00:37:23,400 they can use the wrench or use some in a blackmail, or 759 00:37:23,400 --> 00:37:25,700 something like that, and so, he'll go and vote. 760 00:37:25,700 --> 00:37:27,900 But he's no longer voting with his own, free will or 761 00:37:27,900 --> 00:37:29,800 conscience. He's voting being coerced. 762 00:37:29,800 --> 00:37:32,000 Whereas, if you have a private ballot, the advantage there is 763 00:37:32,000 --> 00:37:34,700 that you can never be able to conduct that attack because it's 764 00:37:34,700 --> 00:37:38,600 difficult to know, depending on how Anonymous you are, who these 765 00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:42,600 people tend to be, except for, you know, you personally making 766 00:37:42,600 --> 00:37:44,600 that decision of to whom to delegate to. 767 00:37:44,900 --> 00:37:48,700 So, and I average, you eliminate a vector of attack for your 768 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:51,900 Item. Now, if you are clever about how 769 00:37:51,900 --> 00:37:54,900 you sort out, system-level parameters on that Spectrum from 770 00:37:54,900 --> 00:37:58,000 this or all the way to the Constitution level set up, you 771 00:37:58,000 --> 00:38:00,900 still gain the benefit of not changing things quickly. 772 00:38:00,900 --> 00:38:02,300 That ought not to be changed weekly. 773 00:38:02,300 --> 00:38:05,300 Like the inflation example that was brought up earlier, that's a 774 00:38:05,308 --> 00:38:07,700 constitutional level change, and if that's going to happen, 775 00:38:07,700 --> 00:38:10,300 that's something that probably require multiple votes over a 776 00:38:10,300 --> 00:38:12,100 long Arc of time. And there's a lot of 777 00:38:12,100 --> 00:38:14,200 mitigations, a lot of opportunity for debate and 778 00:38:14,200 --> 00:38:17,400 discussion, and if it does get committed, it's something that 779 00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:19,600 commit gets committed, the months to Years, time frame. 780 00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:22,400 For example, with the theorem classic, we kind of did this. 781 00:38:22,700 --> 00:38:26,000 We had to make a decision about monetary policy, and we also had 782 00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:27,400 to make a decision about the difficulty. 783 00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:31,000 Bob this process took a year and a half to go through from start 784 00:38:31,000 --> 00:38:33,300 to finish and these things are just now being locked in. 785 00:38:33,600 --> 00:38:36,100 So you know, system level changes whether you have an on 786 00:38:36,100 --> 00:38:38,900 blockchain or off blockchain governance mechanism. 787 00:38:39,100 --> 00:38:41,900 They ought to take a heck of a lot of time and be a very open 788 00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:44,800 process with lots of debates. And what ends up happening is 789 00:38:44,800 --> 00:38:47,500 the better arguments tend to float to the top over time and 790 00:38:47,500 --> 00:38:50,200 it changes public. Yin and the probability of a 791 00:38:50,207 --> 00:38:56,900 vote maliciously succeeding all those rounds ends up failing and 792 00:38:56,900 --> 00:38:59,200 you know, there's a lot of ideas on, you know, the best way of 793 00:38:59,200 --> 00:39:01,600 doing this, the venetians had a voting system where they kind of 794 00:39:01,600 --> 00:39:04,700 randomly sorted people and had multiple rounds and the ideas. 795 00:39:04,700 --> 00:39:07,500 You'd never know which person the bribe and so forth. 796 00:39:07,500 --> 00:39:10,100 So it's a really amazing how much ingenuities come through. 797 00:39:10,300 --> 00:39:12,900 But at the end of the day, it's also an empirical thing where 798 00:39:12,900 --> 00:39:15,700 you have Theory and you think, you know what's going to happen 799 00:39:15,700 --> 00:39:17,800 and you think, you know, who's going to be rational and how 800 00:39:17,800 --> 00:39:20,400 they're going to be rational. But you just have to launch it 801 00:39:20,700 --> 00:39:23,300 and you actually have to see how it works in practice and where 802 00:39:23,300 --> 00:39:26,000 it's gone wrong and so forth. There's also a participatory 803 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:29,700 problem where these systems assume a rational majority and 804 00:39:29,700 --> 00:39:33,500 these systems assume reasonable participation and the reality is 805 00:39:33,500 --> 00:39:36,900 that most democratic processes tend to fall apart when 806 00:39:36,900 --> 00:39:39,200 participation Falls below a certain threshold. 807 00:39:39,300 --> 00:39:41,600 That's why things like delegation are so powerful 808 00:39:41,800 --> 00:39:47,400 because you probably can't get everybody to participate, but 809 00:39:47,400 --> 00:39:50,300 it's a lot easier to get people. At least delegate their vote to 810 00:39:50,300 --> 00:39:53,200 somebody. You know, the American election 811 00:39:53,200 --> 00:39:55,600 going back to that. If you look at like two thousand 812 00:39:55,600 --> 00:40:00,800 verses 2004 versus 2008, versus 2012 2016 and you chart, the 813 00:40:00,800 --> 00:40:03,200 total amount of people who were eligible to vote versus the 814 00:40:03,200 --> 00:40:04,800 percentage of who actually voted. 815 00:40:04,900 --> 00:40:09,100 It's declining a cycle by cycle by cycle, but if people had a 816 00:40:09,107 --> 00:40:13,100 delegate of ability, the, the conjecture would be that you 817 00:40:13,107 --> 00:40:15,800 would see a relatively high level of participation there, 818 00:40:16,000 --> 00:40:18,000 because the people who are going to vote, are going to vote 819 00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:20,500 anyway. But then that Delta between the 820 00:40:20,500 --> 00:40:22,800 people eligible, not most of them would still probably 821 00:40:22,800 --> 00:40:25,700 delegate to community leaders or people that they know and trust. 822 00:40:25,700 --> 00:40:29,900 And you'd get a much richer conversation, probably out of 823 00:40:29,900 --> 00:40:32,200 that that process, but that's a conjecture. 824 00:40:32,200 --> 00:40:34,500 And the only way to verify the conjecture is empirically. 825 00:40:34,500 --> 00:40:37,600 So you have to run a system and take a look at participation and 826 00:40:37,600 --> 00:40:40,800 quality participation. So we do have some data, we 827 00:40:40,800 --> 00:40:44,500 study the dash Treasury System. We took a look at the master 828 00:40:44,500 --> 00:40:47,100 node counts and which ballots were being proposed and we wrote 829 00:40:47,100 --> 00:40:49,500 a big paper on its if you die which case Search and look at 830 00:40:49,500 --> 00:40:52,400 our library, you can see the dash treasury report, we wrote 831 00:40:52,400 --> 00:40:55,200 and there was some good, some bad and some ugly there in that 832 00:40:55,200 --> 00:40:58,800 we discovered them. There was very little funding 833 00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:02,800 diversity from when we studied that, meaning that the same 834 00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:06,000 groups of people tended to be the ones submitting the ballots 835 00:41:06,000 --> 00:41:08,700 and getting the ballots. Now that can either be because 836 00:41:08,700 --> 00:41:12,600 the ecosystem is still very young and there's a Founder 837 00:41:12,600 --> 00:41:15,800 Effect where people tend to true true trust the internal group of 838 00:41:15,800 --> 00:41:18,500 people to get it done. And it hasn't Diversified yet or 839 00:41:18,500 --> 00:41:21,600 it could Be an endemic failure of the of the voting system 840 00:41:21,600 --> 00:41:24,200 itself. And really the only way to, you 841 00:41:24,200 --> 00:41:27,700 know, understand that is to kind of look at it month by month and 842 00:41:27,700 --> 00:41:31,000 see if you're getting a trend of increasing diversity or it 843 00:41:31,000 --> 00:41:33,500 staying relatively stagnant. If is staying stagnant, is 844 00:41:33,500 --> 00:41:35,700 probably a structural problem with the system. 845 00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:41,500 So we'll link to the dash governance system analysis in 846 00:41:41,500 --> 00:41:45,200 the in the show notes so our listeners can can follow up on 847 00:41:45,200 --> 00:41:48,200 it. So Charles yeah. 848 00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:51,200 It it does seem like card. I know you have done a lot of 849 00:41:51,200 --> 00:41:54,800 research on on governance and we look forward to what you end up 850 00:41:54,800 --> 00:41:57,900 implementing their understand correctly. 851 00:41:57,900 --> 00:42:03,100 That governance is slated for 2007 time in 2019, not 2018. 852 00:42:03,400 --> 00:42:06,200 Yeah, the big focus of 2018 is smart contracts and 853 00:42:06,200 --> 00:42:08,900 decentralization. Yeah, that you kind of have to 854 00:42:08,908 --> 00:42:11,800 do things in order. 2017 was, let's get a product and Market. 855 00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:15,600 Yay, it's really hard to get scientist to do that. 856 00:42:15,600 --> 00:42:18,400 So, you know, how long is a piece of string, so we got Byron 857 00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:22,200 out in 2017 and 2018 is moved to specification driven 858 00:42:22,200 --> 00:42:25,200 development, fully decentralized system, and then turn on gogin, 859 00:42:25,200 --> 00:42:28,200 which is our smart contract system, and get all that rolling 860 00:42:28,200 --> 00:42:29,700 out. And that's a huge coordination 861 00:42:29,700 --> 00:42:31,600 problem. Then 2019 is about performance 862 00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:34,900 and governance and so basically, take the system start charting 863 00:42:34,900 --> 00:42:37,000 the system and then turn on the government's. 864 00:42:37,100 --> 00:42:40,700 Has gradually. There's also a user education 865 00:42:40,700 --> 00:42:42,900 component to it. So you need if you're gonna have 866 00:42:42,900 --> 00:42:46,000 an effective governance system to have leaders materialize, so 867 00:42:46,000 --> 00:42:48,600 you need meetup groups to form. You need people to understand 868 00:42:48,600 --> 00:42:50,700 the philosophy of the system and why we're building it. 869 00:42:50,700 --> 00:42:52,900 You people understand the underlying technology and 870 00:42:52,900 --> 00:42:56,100 develop an intelligent opinion or otherwise we'll end up 871 00:42:56,100 --> 00:42:57,500 happening. Is you'll have a beautiful 872 00:42:57,500 --> 00:43:00,000 voting system but nobody actually ends up using it. 873 00:43:00,000 --> 00:43:02,600 What they do is just say what a Charles say, or what a Dunkin 874 00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:05,100 say or what it, aggelos saying. So I'll just vote for that. 875 00:43:05,400 --> 00:43:08,700 So you need about Here are two of Community Management and 876 00:43:08,700 --> 00:43:10,900 growth and development, to create diversity, and what you 877 00:43:10,900 --> 00:43:13,600 have diversity. Then you actually get a pretty 878 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:16,100 vibrant ecosystem. So, it would be 879 00:43:16,100 --> 00:43:18,500 counterproductive in my view to have a voting system at the 880 00:43:18,500 --> 00:43:20,200 moment. It would, it would be just a 881 00:43:20,207 --> 00:43:23,800 voting system in name only. So 2019 is what we feel and then 882 00:43:23,800 --> 00:43:28,100 if you know there's any delays 2020 is when we do that we have 883 00:43:28,100 --> 00:43:30,200 an additional year specifically for that. 884 00:43:30,500 --> 00:43:33,700 Okay. So right now is it going to stay 885 00:43:33,700 --> 00:43:39,100 say that like the focus is on unlike Oof of steak and having a 886 00:43:39,100 --> 00:43:41,700 system in which different stakeholders actually, validate 887 00:43:41,700 --> 00:43:44,900 the blockchain. Yeah, and proof of stick is such 888 00:43:44,900 --> 00:43:48,100 a heart problem, you know, we got a cosmos guy here, so your 889 00:43:48,100 --> 00:43:50,900 keenly aware of it as well. And you know, the problem with 890 00:43:50,900 --> 00:43:54,300 proof of stake is that you're trying to take something that 891 00:43:54,300 --> 00:43:57,400 ordinarily takes enormous amounts of money and energy and 892 00:43:57,400 --> 00:44:00,600 resources, and coordination, and reduce it down to something that 893 00:44:00,600 --> 00:44:03,600 doesn't require all that your sense of sizing it, but that you 894 00:44:03,600 --> 00:44:05,900 want to get all the benefits. So it's like, saying, I want to 895 00:44:05,900 --> 00:44:07,600 eat the cake but I don't want to get fat. 896 00:44:07,900 --> 00:44:10,000 You know, that's that's a basically, what proof of stake 897 00:44:10,000 --> 00:44:12,500 is saying. So the first thing we had to 898 00:44:12,800 --> 00:44:15,200 First and is, what are we even trying to accomplish? 899 00:44:15,200 --> 00:44:17,000 And that's the first question that was asked. 900 00:44:17,000 --> 00:44:19,600 So what is security? What is a ledger? 901 00:44:19,600 --> 00:44:21,700 What is a blockchain? You know, this a basic question 902 00:44:22,000 --> 00:44:24,800 and surprisingly that question wasn't answered until we wrote a 903 00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:28,400 paper record gkl 15 where we Define a basically, what a 904 00:44:28,408 --> 00:44:30,900 ledger is and we created some security properties for it. 905 00:44:31,100 --> 00:44:35,000 Then we had to create a Baseline and say well does proof-of-work 906 00:44:35,000 --> 00:44:37,900 provide that and the answer is yes, proof of work provides a 907 00:44:37,908 --> 00:44:40,600 secure Ledger as defined. So so you kind of have a basis 908 00:44:40,600 --> 00:44:42,700 of saying like this is what we're trying to accomplish. 909 00:44:42,800 --> 00:44:45,000 The blockchain. And this is what proof-of-work 910 00:44:45,000 --> 00:44:46,500 can do. And yes, proof of work is 911 00:44:46,500 --> 00:44:48,000 stickier. Great job, Satoshi. 912 00:44:48,400 --> 00:44:51,800 So then, the natural question asked, is under any assumption 913 00:44:51,800 --> 00:44:54,900 realistic or not can proof of stake achieve, that same level 914 00:44:54,900 --> 00:44:59,300 of security and that's step one. And so or Boris was published in 915 00:44:59,300 --> 00:45:01,800 2016 and it was very impractical protocol. 916 00:45:01,800 --> 00:45:04,300 When it first came out, it was tightly synchronized and had 917 00:45:04,300 --> 00:45:06,700 some undesirable characteristics about. 918 00:45:06,700 --> 00:45:09,200 But it was basically a proof of concept for saying that the 919 00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:11,300 security models models are identical. 920 00:45:11,300 --> 00:45:14,100 So they're both provably secure. Whatever you get from proof of 921 00:45:14,100 --> 00:45:15,200 work. In terms of what it can 922 00:45:15,200 --> 00:45:18,300 construct, you get the same thing in terms of proof of steak 923 00:45:18,300 --> 00:45:20,800 or what Atkins constructs. That's a good starting point. 924 00:45:20,900 --> 00:45:24,000 So you have Theory and then the next step is, how do we go from 925 00:45:24,000 --> 00:45:27,300 Theory to practicality? How do we actually take this 926 00:45:27,300 --> 00:45:30,000 thing and put it into a real-life system and something 927 00:45:30,000 --> 00:45:33,000 that works. So most of 2017 and about half 928 00:45:33,000 --> 00:45:35,900 of this year has been consumed with that practicality question. 929 00:45:36,100 --> 00:45:38,800 So you move from a synchronized model to a semi synchronized 930 00:45:38,800 --> 00:45:40,400 model. You move to a model where an 931 00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:43,700 attacker can corrupt clients whenever they And you move to a 932 00:45:43,700 --> 00:45:46,000 model where you can bootstrap from the Genesis block. 933 00:45:46,000 --> 00:45:48,800 You don't need a checkpoint, you move to a model where you have 934 00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:52,600 composable security proofs, you move to a model where you know 935 00:45:52,600 --> 00:45:54,500 you have a delegation system built-in. 936 00:45:54,500 --> 00:45:56,900 So if a person doesn't want to show up they can delegate their 937 00:45:56,900 --> 00:46:00,000 stake to stake pool. You move to a model where your 938 00:46:00,000 --> 00:46:03,100 random number generation is not done with an NPC but it can be 939 00:46:03,100 --> 00:46:05,800 done with random Oracle but and so it's much faster, but it's 940 00:46:05,800 --> 00:46:08,900 still, you know, you resistant against grinding attacks and 941 00:46:08,900 --> 00:46:12,300 things like that and it requires you to add a lot more crypto and 942 00:46:12,300 --> 00:46:15,600 like the RFC and perfect forward secrecy and these types of 943 00:46:15,600 --> 00:46:17,200 things that it's not an easy task. 944 00:46:17,300 --> 00:46:20,100 So the follow-up of Ouroboros was another paper cold or 945 00:46:20,100 --> 00:46:23,600 Sprouts where we did about half of the heavy lifting and we've 946 00:46:23,600 --> 00:46:26,800 just released a paper today. Call the workforce Genesis, it's 947 00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:29,000 on the couch get website. Also just tweeted it and we'll 948 00:46:29,000 --> 00:46:31,800 be presenting both of those at your Crypt in Israel here in 949 00:46:31,808 --> 00:46:35,700 about a week and this basically seals off most of the 950 00:46:35,700 --> 00:46:37,800 practicality concerns. At this point, there's still 951 00:46:37,800 --> 00:46:41,000 some little lingering things we have to clean up, but we feel 952 00:46:41,000 --> 00:46:43,800 this plus a delegation scheme is All that's necessary for 953 00:46:43,800 --> 00:46:46,900 actually having a production proof of stake protocol in a 954 00:46:46,900 --> 00:46:49,300 system. Now the next step is 955 00:46:49,300 --> 00:46:51,600 performance. So where do you go from there? 956 00:46:51,700 --> 00:46:53,900 You know, you've built this beautiful thing you can drop it 957 00:46:53,900 --> 00:46:55,800 in Bitcoin but run just fine with it. 958 00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:58,500 Any blockchain which run just fine with it and run forever 959 00:46:58,800 --> 00:47:02,000 and, you know, as long as we've got our economic incentives 960 00:47:02,100 --> 00:47:06,100 aligned properly, you still can't scale as new users. 961 00:47:06,100 --> 00:47:07,400 Join in. It's still in the replicated 962 00:47:07,400 --> 00:47:10,400 system format. So you need to chard and there's 963 00:47:10,400 --> 00:47:12,000 a lot of opinions on how to do that. 964 00:47:12,000 --> 00:47:14,700 So, there's It's like Amna Ledger for example or thunder 965 00:47:14,700 --> 00:47:17,300 Ella and others from the academic circles and these guys 966 00:47:17,300 --> 00:47:19,600 have come up with some Concepts and there's some engineering 967 00:47:19,600 --> 00:47:22,000 ideas like you guys a cosmos that think are doing some 968 00:47:22,000 --> 00:47:24,600 things. And Casper, certainly has some 969 00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:27,100 ideas with plasma. So everybody has kind of their 970 00:47:27,100 --> 00:47:29,200 own idea of how should we Shard EOS? 971 00:47:29,200 --> 00:47:31,300 For example, I think put Byzantine agreement on top of 972 00:47:31,300 --> 00:47:35,200 the pause and it's less about can you chard? 973 00:47:35,200 --> 00:47:37,100 And it's more about what it's a trade-off profile. 974 00:47:37,400 --> 00:47:40,000 Usually, what ends up happening is you go from 50 percent 975 00:47:40,000 --> 00:47:43,600 Byzantine resistance to a third to a quarter, Got how aggressive 976 00:47:43,600 --> 00:47:45,100 you do things. The other thing is that 977 00:47:45,100 --> 00:47:48,800 performance tends to decline very rapidly as you Shard, if 978 00:47:48,800 --> 00:47:50,800 there are Byzantine actors. So if everybody's following the 979 00:47:50,808 --> 00:47:54,400 protocol and every absolutely honest and great protocol 980 00:47:54,400 --> 00:47:57,700 screams it's beautiful and if your Google or Amazon that's 981 00:47:57,700 --> 00:47:59,400 that's your normal operations, right? 982 00:47:59,400 --> 00:48:02,100 Because you own all the servers but if you move to an actual 983 00:48:02,100 --> 00:48:05,100 Byzantine setting where people are unreliable or dishonest or 984 00:48:05,100 --> 00:48:07,900 trying to break your network, then you have to really worry 985 00:48:07,900 --> 00:48:10,800 about performance impacts for malicious actors and the types 986 00:48:10,800 --> 00:48:13,200 of attacks that can perform. There's some Some great 987 00:48:13,200 --> 00:48:16,900 research, for example, that was done with ghost inspector, which 988 00:48:16,900 --> 00:48:18,500 are directed acyclic graph ideas. 989 00:48:18,500 --> 00:48:21,300 That obvious ohhara, unit em. Some Lipinski came up with, we 990 00:48:21,300 --> 00:48:23,900 actually Implement a ghost in aetherium showing that while 991 00:48:23,900 --> 00:48:27,200 ghost does improve performance. There are attacks on ghost that 992 00:48:27,200 --> 00:48:30,100 can degrade performance quite rapidly if you're clever 993 00:48:30,100 --> 00:48:31,600 attacker. So, you have to understand 994 00:48:31,600 --> 00:48:33,500 trade-off profile. So, that's the next step in our 995 00:48:33,500 --> 00:48:36,900 research agenda, after we close out the remaining Genesis and 996 00:48:36,900 --> 00:48:39,500 process-related stuff, and that's called Ouroboros Hydra, 997 00:48:39,600 --> 00:48:40,800 because it has many heads, right? 998 00:48:40,800 --> 00:48:44,200 It's going to be sharded and at Point we think we'll it balance 999 00:48:44,200 --> 00:48:46,600 everything properly, it'll have the right trade-off profile. 1000 00:48:46,600 --> 00:48:49,400 Little going to kind of have the right security design and so 1001 00:48:49,400 --> 00:48:50,700 forth. But the nice part about the 1002 00:48:50,700 --> 00:48:53,600 approach we've been following is that every step of the way we've 1003 00:48:53,600 --> 00:48:56,000 been doing it with peer review, and with proper security 1004 00:48:56,000 --> 00:48:58,800 modeling. So, what happens usually, when 1005 00:48:58,800 --> 00:49:00,700 you're building these protocols is if you want to add another 1006 00:49:00,700 --> 00:49:04,400 MacGuffin, another feature to your protocol, then what ends up 1007 00:49:04,408 --> 00:49:07,100 happening is, you have to regress and go back and say, oh, 1008 00:49:07,100 --> 00:49:09,400 I am I going to break something. But when you actually have a 1009 00:49:09,408 --> 00:49:12,200 solid security foundation and good proofs, and everything is 1010 00:49:12,200 --> 00:49:15,100 composed of Able when you keep adding things, you don't usually 1011 00:49:15,100 --> 00:49:17,100 have those regressions. So you tend to see a lot of 1012 00:49:17,100 --> 00:49:20,100 research acceleration at the tail so you pay a much, higher 1013 00:49:20,100 --> 00:49:23,300 upfront, research cost to get everything started and get that 1014 00:49:23,300 --> 00:49:26,500 pump primed but then what you're rolling, it just it all makes 1015 00:49:26,500 --> 00:49:27,900 sense. It's all composable. 1016 00:49:27,900 --> 00:49:29,700 It's all modular. It's really easy to 1017 00:49:29,800 --> 00:49:31,700 parameterize. It the other thing is that it 1018 00:49:31,700 --> 00:49:33,700 can work in different settings. Like if you want to go to a 1019 00:49:33,700 --> 00:49:37,000 permission setting, it's really obvious, how to do that for like 1020 00:49:37,000 --> 00:49:40,000 a hyper lecture-style scenario. But if you want to go to a 1021 00:49:40,000 --> 00:49:42,900 permissionless settings, there's also an obvious way to At the 1022 00:49:42,900 --> 00:49:45,100 protocol to that you don't have to build to completely new 1023 00:49:45,100 --> 00:49:47,200 protocols for that, for that setup. 1024 00:49:47,400 --> 00:49:50,500 So that's, that's where we're kind of at with, with Ouroboros, 1025 00:49:50,600 --> 00:49:52,900 big team. There's about ten scientists who 1026 00:49:52,900 --> 00:49:55,900 work on it and they do different dimensions off and on and we've 1027 00:49:55,900 --> 00:49:57,800 written, I think six or seven papers. 1028 00:49:57,800 --> 00:50:00,400 I can't remember how many now they're just keep coming out. 1029 00:50:00,400 --> 00:50:03,400 I think, you know, if we ever go out of business, at least we can 1030 00:50:03,400 --> 00:50:04,900 get into the white paper business. 1031 00:50:05,100 --> 00:50:08,900 Yeah. 10 or 20 of these things, every year, something like that. 1032 00:50:09,400 --> 00:50:13,100 But I'm pretty proud of the the direction of the Search, you 1033 00:50:13,100 --> 00:50:17,300 know, the other thing is that this is going to be the age of 1034 00:50:17,300 --> 00:50:19,900 the academic proof of stakes. There's some very tough 1035 00:50:19,900 --> 00:50:22,600 competition coming with thunder token and thunder, Ella. 1036 00:50:22,800 --> 00:50:26,900 There's very tough competition coming with Al Gore and and so 1037 00:50:26,900 --> 00:50:29,900 forth, and these are not protocols written by everyday 1038 00:50:29,900 --> 00:50:31,900 people. I mean, like Sylvia McCauley has 1039 00:50:31,900 --> 00:50:35,100 the touring prize that's Nobel Prize of computer science, and 1040 00:50:35,100 --> 00:50:37,900 he's sitting at MIT surrounded by some of the brightest people 1041 00:50:37,900 --> 00:50:41,000 and a legion of graduate students that, which is die to 1042 00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:43,800 be able to work at his venture. Build something with them. 1043 00:50:44,100 --> 00:50:48,300 So the rigor and the standards and the community expectation, 1044 00:50:48,300 --> 00:50:50,600 for what makes a good proof of stake protocol and what your 1045 00:50:50,600 --> 00:50:54,000 protocol must be able to do is going to dramatically increase. 1046 00:50:54,000 --> 00:50:56,300 I think over the next year or two thanks to, you know, tough 1047 00:50:56,300 --> 00:50:59,500 competition and we're excited to be in that running. 1048 00:51:00,700 --> 00:51:02,900 That's really cool. So yeah I mean I know like when 1049 00:51:02,900 --> 00:51:06,700 I first read the Ouroboros original paper, I was like, kind 1050 00:51:06,700 --> 00:51:09,700 of like this, isn't that? You know interesting then 1051 00:51:09,700 --> 00:51:11,800 prowess came out. I'm like, okay, this this is 1052 00:51:11,800 --> 00:51:14,200 actually, you know, this is usable now, right? 1053 00:51:14,200 --> 00:51:18,100 And so I mean I'm excited to hear what read this Genesis 1054 00:51:18,100 --> 00:51:20,400 paper. Can you tell us a little bit 1055 00:51:21,300 --> 00:51:22,500 about it? Like you? 1056 00:51:22,700 --> 00:51:24,700 I heard you mentioned that you can't you have a way of a 1057 00:51:24,700 --> 00:51:27,400 bootstrapping from Genesis without checkpoints. 1058 00:51:27,600 --> 00:51:30,000 That seems like that's like the Holy Grail, right? 1059 00:51:30,000 --> 00:51:33,000 Yeah. Because like, you know, you know 1060 00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:36,600 for my assumptions like once you're past the on bonding 1061 00:51:36,600 --> 00:51:41,100 period, you know unless you have some sort of verifiable delay 1062 00:51:41,100 --> 00:51:45,100 function like it's really hard to prevent long-range attacks. 1063 00:51:45,100 --> 00:51:47,400 So could you tell us a bit about how you're doing this? 1064 00:51:48,400 --> 00:51:51,400 I'm at a punt on that one, a little bit because we released a 1065 00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:53,500 video today. So there's a 45 minute 1066 00:51:53,500 --> 00:51:56,600 presentation on how reports Genesis Works in. 1067 00:51:56,600 --> 00:51:59,300 We just released a paper and we're going to be doing actual 1068 00:51:59,300 --> 00:52:01,900 presentation on this. Since Euro Crypt in a week. 1069 00:52:01,900 --> 00:52:04,100 So if I talk about it, now I'm going to front run the, the 1070 00:52:04,100 --> 00:52:06,700 year, cremation. But basically, you just have to 1071 00:52:06,700 --> 00:52:09,200 make some assumptions about the nature of the signature scheme, 1072 00:52:09,200 --> 00:52:10,900 and how random numbers are generated. 1073 00:52:11,100 --> 00:52:15,100 And then within that you're able to very creatively construct a 1074 00:52:15,107 --> 00:52:18,900 model where you can get you. When you look at two alternative 1075 00:52:18,900 --> 00:52:21,300 versions of History you can calculate which version of 1076 00:52:21,308 --> 00:52:23,600 history is correct. Proof of work is real simple. 1077 00:52:23,600 --> 00:52:25,800 You know, just do a await calculation. 1078 00:52:25,800 --> 00:52:27,700 You say, ah, this one has more work than the other. 1079 00:52:27,700 --> 00:52:30,300 So that's my longest chain. So this just kind of gives you a 1080 00:52:30,400 --> 00:52:33,000 Every way of doing it using the magic of crypto, but that 1081 00:52:33,000 --> 00:52:36,100 particular crypto is a little involved and it's in the paper. 1082 00:52:36,100 --> 00:52:37,800 So if you're really curious about it, watch the 1083 00:52:37,800 --> 00:52:39,100 presentation. Read the paper. 1084 00:52:39,300 --> 00:52:42,400 If not wait for the Euro Crypt presentation, and then we'll 1085 00:52:42,400 --> 00:52:45,900 talk about it a little bit more openly, but we had to do a lot 1086 00:52:45,900 --> 00:52:48,400 for this paper. Like we had actually two papers. 1087 00:52:48,400 --> 00:52:51,700 We were running at the same time, we wanted to reprove the 1088 00:52:51,700 --> 00:52:54,600 Ouroboros paper using something called Universal composability 1089 00:52:55,400 --> 00:52:57,100 and then we had another team that was working on this 1090 00:52:57,100 --> 00:53:00,000 bootstrap. From Genesis idea actually was 1091 00:53:00,000 --> 00:53:01,700 related. To our side chains, research. 1092 00:53:01,700 --> 00:53:04,200 And so, we were kind of and then, what ended up happening is 1093 00:53:04,200 --> 00:53:05,900 we discover that one needed the other. 1094 00:53:05,900 --> 00:53:09,500 And so, both teams merged and we went ahead and created this 1095 00:53:09,500 --> 00:53:11,300 paper and it was just like a Mad Dash. 1096 00:53:11,300 --> 00:53:14,200 It took a three months of Hardcore work and lots of 1097 00:53:14,200 --> 00:53:17,800 revisions, but we got it out and I think we actually submitted it 1098 00:53:17,800 --> 00:53:21,200 to crypto 18. So we'll show it off at your 1099 00:53:21,200 --> 00:53:23,100 Crypt. And if it gets into crypto, a 1100 00:53:23,100 --> 00:53:25,700 team will be in Santa Barbara and actually have a dedicated 1101 00:53:25,700 --> 00:53:28,000 session of it. But read the video, a read the 1102 00:53:28,008 --> 00:53:29,100 paper. Look at the video. 1103 00:53:29,100 --> 00:53:31,900 And and then Next week, I'll talk more about it. 1104 00:53:32,200 --> 00:53:36,100 Sure another question I have about our bows right. 1105 00:53:36,100 --> 00:53:40,900 Is, what how do you guys decide to go between like, you know, in 1106 00:53:40,900 --> 00:53:44,400 proof of states is usually like the chain based model and the 1107 00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:47,400 PFT base model, right? Answer Cosmos were working on 1108 00:53:47,400 --> 00:53:51,300 like tender moment, which is a very bft Focus way of doing it 1109 00:53:51,600 --> 00:53:54,600 while, or Burrows, and it's descendants. 1110 00:53:54,600 --> 00:53:57,500 Seem all are more on, like the chain base side. 1111 00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:01,100 And I remember like, you know, one of the I've actually had 1112 00:54:01,100 --> 00:54:03,800 this argument with you on Twitter before about like, you 1113 00:54:03,800 --> 00:54:07,200 know, you your claim was like a synchronous. 1114 00:54:07,200 --> 00:54:12,200 Networks are impractical that like you know week synchrony is 1115 00:54:12,200 --> 00:54:15,200 good enough for all real world situations. 1116 00:54:15,400 --> 00:54:16,600 So could you explain a little bit? 1117 00:54:16,600 --> 00:54:19,300 Why of that like thought process there? 1118 00:54:19,400 --> 00:54:23,900 And yeah okay so if you're electing an epic and you have a 1119 00:54:23,908 --> 00:54:26,000 bunch of slot leaders and there's a degree of 1120 00:54:26,000 --> 00:54:29,400 professionalization amongst those lawyers, meaning that if 1121 00:54:29,900 --> 00:54:32,700 you You in reality, you're always going to have some degree 1122 00:54:32,700 --> 00:54:35,700 of federation's. So whether it's a mining pool or 1123 00:54:35,700 --> 00:54:38,300 a steak pool, there's going to be, you know, some actors who 1124 00:54:38,300 --> 00:54:40,500 set up dedicated servers, they run 24/7. 1125 00:54:40,800 --> 00:54:43,700 And in the entire history of the Bitcoin Network, it's been 1126 00:54:43,700 --> 00:54:45,900 Fairly reliable. Blocks are generally produced 1127 00:54:45,900 --> 00:54:47,600 roughly every 10 minutes. There's a little bit of 1128 00:54:47,600 --> 00:54:51,100 variation there, but it's been basically as expected and people 1129 00:54:51,100 --> 00:54:53,300 have been pretty synchronized throughout the entire set up. 1130 00:54:53,600 --> 00:54:55,800 So it's more of a practicality argument where you like 1131 00:54:55,800 --> 00:54:58,500 asynchronous nice to have. But first off, you know, you 1132 00:54:58,500 --> 00:55:00,200 have theoretical things like fish Orleans. 1133 00:55:00,300 --> 00:55:02,700 Patterson, you have to worry about when you're talking about 1134 00:55:02,700 --> 00:55:06,300 asynchrony and S like are you ever going to really be in a 1135 00:55:06,308 --> 00:55:09,800 network operating mode for a system like this where that's 1136 00:55:09,800 --> 00:55:12,400 going to come up? So and practicality semi 1137 00:55:12,400 --> 00:55:15,100 synchrony is sufficient where people may not necessarily show 1138 00:55:15,100 --> 00:55:17,400 up on time but eventually they'll show up with an about 1139 00:55:17,500 --> 00:55:20,900 and that's what prowess is all about is to say, okay, well, you 1140 00:55:20,900 --> 00:55:23,100 know, within a reasonable amount of time, they'll stay 1141 00:55:23,100 --> 00:55:26,300 synchronized and we're semi synchronized and there's a way 1142 00:55:26,300 --> 00:55:28,200 of kind of sorting all of these things out. 1143 00:55:28,300 --> 00:55:31,900 Just like we do with any Normal consensus protocol. 1144 00:55:32,800 --> 00:55:34,400 You know, if you're super worried about it, we could 1145 00:55:34,400 --> 00:55:37,000 probably reprieve everything in an asynchronous model but you 1146 00:55:37,000 --> 00:55:40,100 know, the downside is we'd probably regress a little bit 1147 00:55:40,100 --> 00:55:42,100 and Byzantine resistance. So, we'd probably regress a 1148 00:55:42,107 --> 00:55:45,100 little bit in terms of performance for the system. 1149 00:55:45,300 --> 00:55:49,300 But I mean for all intents and purposes is if our goal is to 1150 00:55:49,300 --> 00:55:51,900 have consolidation around a collection of State pools for 1151 00:55:52,000 --> 00:55:54,800 the large ship Network. We anticipate that things will 1152 00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:57,200 be probably running in a synchronize mode or semi 1153 00:55:57,200 --> 00:55:58,900 synchronous mode. I mean, just to give you an 1154 00:55:58,900 --> 00:56:02,800 example of Bitcoin, There's the karela relay Network and the 1155 00:56:02,800 --> 00:56:04,400 Falcon relay Network for the mining pools. 1156 00:56:04,400 --> 00:56:06,400 Actually, get to see the blocks before everybody else because 1157 00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:08,600 they actually want to tighter couple themselves. 1158 00:56:08,900 --> 00:56:10,900 The other thing is our Network model is different. 1159 00:56:10,900 --> 00:56:13,500 Like we're moving from a traditional Network model to 1160 00:56:13,500 --> 00:56:16,100 something called Rena, recursive internetwork, architecture. 1161 00:56:16,300 --> 00:56:18,900 So from the outside it kind of looks like, UDP going into this 1162 00:56:18,900 --> 00:56:22,100 black box of Madness. But basically because of that 1163 00:56:22,100 --> 00:56:25,300 assumption and how we connect these notes together and because 1164 00:56:25,300 --> 00:56:27,300 you actually have a permissioning system, thanks to 1165 00:56:27,300 --> 00:56:28,900 the election system of Ouroboros. 1166 00:56:29,100 --> 00:56:32,400 You really can create a sink As private network of State Pool, 1167 00:56:32,400 --> 00:56:35,600 operators or slot leaders, that's permissioned because 1168 00:56:35,700 --> 00:56:37,300 they're elected. They have credentials to prove 1169 00:56:37,300 --> 00:56:39,700 they belong there. So you can use a different 1170 00:56:39,700 --> 00:56:42,300 network protocol to guarantee that setup. 1171 00:56:42,400 --> 00:56:43,900 That's why I don't worry about it too much. 1172 00:56:43,900 --> 00:56:46,000 I mean, it's a nice thing to worry about from a theory 1173 00:56:46,000 --> 00:56:48,500 perspective, but at the end of the day, it's kind of a Much Ado 1174 00:56:48,500 --> 00:56:50,000 About Nothing. The other thing is, you can 1175 00:56:50,000 --> 00:56:52,300 hybridize these protocols. That's what EOS did right. 1176 00:56:52,300 --> 00:56:54,200 They serve as chain based models dpos. 1177 00:56:54,200 --> 00:56:57,400 And they're moving with Byzantine agreement on top, so 1178 00:56:57,400 --> 00:56:59,900 you can combine them together if you really want to. 1179 00:56:59,900 --> 00:57:02,500 And there's some evidence that that might be a good idea, 1180 00:57:02,700 --> 00:57:05,800 Elgar, and also looks like it's doing is it's starting was like 1181 00:57:06,300 --> 00:57:08,700 traditional Byzantine agreement and then it found a fast 1182 00:57:08,700 --> 00:57:11,900 sortition process and they dramatically spit things up. 1183 00:57:12,300 --> 00:57:13,600 So, that's kind of the best not answer. 1184 00:57:13,600 --> 00:57:17,200 I can give you to your question. It's like I view it more as a, 1185 00:57:17,200 --> 00:57:19,700 it's not a big concern. And if it is a big concern, we 1186 00:57:19,700 --> 00:57:21,600 have a mitigation strategy for it. 1187 00:57:21,800 --> 00:57:24,400 But in reality, if our network is consistently, running an 1188 00:57:24,408 --> 00:57:27,500 asynchronous mode, there's a more serious problem at hand 1189 00:57:27,500 --> 00:57:29,400 than the consensus protocol were using. 1190 00:57:29,400 --> 00:57:31,200 It's a participant For a problem. 1191 00:57:31,400 --> 00:57:36,000 So the incentives are wrong. So let's challenge like zooming 1192 00:57:36,000 --> 00:57:39,700 out little bit. So you have developed like 1193 00:57:39,700 --> 00:57:42,200 Ouroboros. Now then all over sprouts and 1194 00:57:42,200 --> 00:57:45,700 now Ouroboros Genesis right. Star Trek Wrath of Khan 1195 00:57:45,700 --> 00:57:47,600 references here. Give us Genesis. 1196 00:57:49,300 --> 00:57:52,300 So, actually like this like a lot of teams in this space 1197 00:57:52,300 --> 00:57:54,700 working on proof of stake in in parallel. 1198 00:57:54,700 --> 00:58:00,200 So there's there's Cosmos, which is using Practical Byzantine 1199 00:58:00,200 --> 00:58:03,300 fault tolerance. And other Byzantine fault 1200 00:58:03,300 --> 00:58:05,200 tolerance, algorithms invented earlier. 1201 00:58:05,200 --> 00:58:12,200 And it's like, fitting them with coins and the needs of a Like 1202 00:58:12,200 --> 00:58:15,200 it's it's it's combining practical Byzantine fault 1203 00:58:15,200 --> 00:58:19,000 tolerance with with the fact that the people that want to 1204 00:58:19,000 --> 00:58:22,500 come to consensus, need to be the coin holders at as taking 1205 00:58:22,500 --> 00:58:25,200 coins, right? Then there's Al Gore and which 1206 00:58:25,200 --> 00:58:29,900 is on which we did an episode, which is also using a different 1207 00:58:29,900 --> 00:58:31,700 kind of Byzantine fault tolerance. 1208 00:58:32,200 --> 00:58:35,000 Things called Fast and Furious, Byzantine fault tolerance 1209 00:58:36,400 --> 00:58:40,100 invented a decade back and it's combining it with some clever 1210 00:58:40,100 --> 00:58:43,500 cryptography to decide on who Should be the party's doing the 1211 00:58:43,500 --> 00:58:47,300 PFD. Then there's etherium, which is 1212 00:58:47,800 --> 00:58:52,800 a different flavor of proof of stake, which is, as I said, 1213 00:58:52,800 --> 00:58:56,100 availability, favoring proof of stake rather than consistency, 1214 00:58:56,100 --> 00:59:00,000 favoring proof of stake. So the thing with Cosmos and Al 1215 00:59:00,000 --> 00:59:03,200 Gore and is once a block appears and is confirmed, it's 1216 00:59:03,200 --> 00:59:04,600 confirmed. You can't go back. 1217 00:59:05,000 --> 00:59:08,500 Whereas any cerium is more like proof of work, where chains of 1218 00:59:08,500 --> 00:59:12,300 blocks appear, and you're not sure that they are Confirmed but 1219 00:59:12,300 --> 00:59:14,600 you will be sure that they are confirmed after a while. 1220 00:59:15,400 --> 00:59:20,000 So in this whole kind of ecosystem of projects pursuing 1221 00:59:20,000 --> 00:59:22,900 different approaches. Tell me what like what is 1222 00:59:22,900 --> 00:59:26,300 special about our borrows and how are you differentiated from 1223 00:59:26,300 --> 00:59:29,300 the others? Well, it were Boris, you know, 1224 00:59:29,300 --> 00:59:32,900 everybody always wants to say, oh my my thing is better than 1225 00:59:32,900 --> 00:59:35,800 everybody else's thing and I could care less about everybody 1226 00:59:35,800 --> 00:59:37,800 else's thing. I really, I couldn't care less 1227 00:59:37,808 --> 00:59:41,600 about it. The thing is that it's more 1228 00:59:41,600 --> 00:59:45,900 about saying, look, we have to get the theory, right, we have 1229 00:59:45,900 --> 00:59:47,300 to get the security foundations, right? 1230 00:59:47,300 --> 00:59:50,800 We have to make these Concepts and ideas accessible to the 1231 00:59:50,800 --> 00:59:54,300 university environment. You see what we did is, we 1232 00:59:54,300 --> 00:59:56,800 walked into an environment where if you went to a cryptic, 1233 00:59:57,400 --> 00:59:59,800 Ography conference like crypto or you're a Crip. 1234 01:00:00,000 --> 01:00:01,900 You say, I work in a cryptocurrency space. 1235 01:00:02,100 --> 01:00:06,100 I actually did this. I went up to diffi at crypto and 1236 01:00:06,100 --> 01:00:08,100 I said, Tiffany I work in a cryptocurrency space. 1237 01:00:08,100 --> 01:00:10,900 He grabs his glass of wine and walked away from me. 1238 01:00:11,600 --> 01:00:13,400 He like didn't even say anything. 1239 01:00:13,400 --> 01:00:16,700 You just walked away and I was like, but what just happened? 1240 01:00:16,800 --> 01:00:21,600 So the brand of cryptocurrencies is is, is is badly damaged in 1241 01:00:21,600 --> 01:00:24,200 the cryptolocker for community-wide and rightfully so 1242 01:00:24,200 --> 01:00:26,900 because what's happened is you have all these people coming 1243 01:00:26,900 --> 01:00:30,100 around making These magical claims about performance and 1244 01:00:30,100 --> 01:00:32,600 security. They don't do any of the basic 1245 01:00:32,600 --> 01:00:35,800 stuff, like, build a model, write a proof, clearly State 1246 01:00:35,800 --> 01:00:38,700 your assumptions, tell you what you can do, what you can't do. 1247 01:00:39,100 --> 01:00:42,100 So the first goal of the Ouroboros, agenda wasn't to go 1248 01:00:42,100 --> 01:00:45,400 and build the best fastest, most amazing protocol ever. 1249 01:00:45,700 --> 01:00:50,300 It was rather to introduce the entire proof of stake problem 1250 01:00:50,600 --> 01:00:53,800 and the in the grandest possible way to the entire cryptographic 1251 01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:56,400 community, and we've gone to hell of a lot of conferences, 1252 01:00:56,400 --> 01:01:00,100 Financial crypto. Though, Euro Crypt, crypto, a C 1253 01:01:00,100 --> 01:01:03,300 and S, you name it. We've been there and we've had 1254 01:01:03,300 --> 01:01:06,000 hundreds of conversations since, for example, we published the 1255 01:01:06,000 --> 01:01:08,900 Ouroboros paper, I think it's been cited more than 50 times 1256 01:01:08,900 --> 01:01:11,700 seven papers have been derived from in or done things with it 1257 01:01:12,000 --> 01:01:15,200 or built on top of it. And what we've now started as a 1258 01:01:15,200 --> 01:01:17,800 great conversation in the cryptographic community about 1259 01:01:17,800 --> 01:01:20,600 what is the design space of proof of stake in general? 1260 01:01:20,900 --> 01:01:23,100 Like, for example, what are the incentives need to look like if 1261 01:01:23,100 --> 01:01:25,600 you are going to do delegation, what is delegation look like? 1262 01:01:25,600 --> 01:01:28,600 How do you do cold staking? You know, how Ameliorate some of 1263 01:01:28,600 --> 01:01:31,400 these meta concerns, like we haven't discussed this one, but 1264 01:01:31,400 --> 01:01:33,700 it's a big one. How do you handle exchanges? 1265 01:01:34,200 --> 01:01:36,600 They on average, hold double-digit, percentages of the 1266 01:01:36,600 --> 01:01:39,600 entire supply of the currency. They don't own the currency but 1267 01:01:39,800 --> 01:01:42,100 they would technically be eligible to participate in 1268 01:01:42,100 --> 01:01:44,300 consensus with a proof of stake style system. 1269 01:01:44,300 --> 01:01:46,100 Right? That's a big problem. 1270 01:01:46,100 --> 01:01:48,900 That's like they have the they don't own it but they can 1271 01:01:48,900 --> 01:01:51,300 control it and they can derive value from it. 1272 01:01:51,500 --> 01:01:55,400 That's not a concern proof of work has so it was ameliorate 1273 01:01:55,400 --> 01:01:58,100 their strategies to mitigate, but it did But you know, these 1274 01:01:58,100 --> 01:02:00,400 things need to be discussed in a broader context. 1275 01:02:00,400 --> 01:02:02,500 So the first major goal of Ouroboros was just have that 1276 01:02:02,500 --> 01:02:04,300 conversation and pick best practices. 1277 01:02:04,300 --> 01:02:07,000 And we were very pragmatic if there was a better solution like 1278 01:02:07,200 --> 01:02:09,700 we, you know, Snow White, came up with something or tenorman, 1279 01:02:09,700 --> 01:02:11,800 came up, something that we sell, felt was better. 1280 01:02:11,800 --> 01:02:14,500 We take it cited. Put it in and there you go. 1281 01:02:15,400 --> 01:02:18,900 So that's step one. So anybody using our stuff knows 1282 01:02:18,900 --> 01:02:21,700 that really smart people have checked it and that it's gone 1283 01:02:21,700 --> 01:02:23,800 through a very rigorous process and it's kind of created a 1284 01:02:23,808 --> 01:02:27,300 standard step two was in the process of having that. 1285 01:02:27,400 --> 01:02:30,100 Conversation. Try to get a sense of the 1286 01:02:30,100 --> 01:02:34,100 impossibilities or the real difficult to do things it 1287 01:02:34,100 --> 01:02:36,800 because I'm getting. So tired of people posting a 1288 01:02:36,800 --> 01:02:39,500 paper from Andrew from blocks dream about this as y proof of 1289 01:02:39,500 --> 01:02:42,300 stake. Can't happen as if it's Canada 1290 01:02:42,400 --> 01:02:45,100 or something like that. I get so tired of that, you 1291 01:02:45,100 --> 01:02:48,000 know, it's just like guys I would much rather in the 1292 01:02:48,000 --> 01:02:51,200 academic Community have all of our sins be and there are 1293 01:02:51,200 --> 01:02:53,400 numerous sins, right? And we've even discovered some 1294 01:02:53,400 --> 01:02:55,500 like, we have a paper on something called steak bleeding, 1295 01:02:55,500 --> 01:02:57,200 that we discovered along this research. 1296 01:02:57,400 --> 01:02:59,500 Process. So create a way of going about 1297 01:02:59,500 --> 01:03:01,300 explaining what are the trade-offs and what are we 1298 01:03:01,300 --> 01:03:03,800 giving up when we move to the system and let's not have that 1299 01:03:03,800 --> 01:03:05,900 connected to financial incentives or to Cult of 1300 01:03:05,900 --> 01:03:07,900 Personality. Let's try to have that connected 1301 01:03:07,900 --> 01:03:10,700 to an objective truth. So these are ton of to Metta 1302 01:03:10,700 --> 01:03:13,100 advantages of the Ouroboros protocols that third-party 1303 01:03:13,100 --> 01:03:16,200 verification and that kind of Festivus style airing of 1304 01:03:16,200 --> 01:03:20,400 grievances of your protocol. Then in specifics, the nice 1305 01:03:20,400 --> 01:03:23,900 thing about Ouroboros is by its design is very modular, so you 1306 01:03:23,900 --> 01:03:27,000 can go from a permission setting where it kind of looks like POA 1307 01:03:27,000 --> 01:03:30,300 or Like that it runs in like like a mode that you would 1308 01:03:30,300 --> 01:03:33,900 expect to see for something like bft simple to something like 1309 01:03:33,900 --> 01:03:36,500 running an actual global scale permission was Network. 1310 01:03:36,600 --> 01:03:38,900 And there's a way of tuning, the protocol to behave in both of 1311 01:03:38,900 --> 01:03:42,800 these things with kind of a common core to it, and it 1312 01:03:42,800 --> 01:03:45,000 borrows a lot of good best practices. 1313 01:03:45,300 --> 01:03:48,000 You know, like this notion of an epic, this notion of slot 1314 01:03:48,000 --> 01:03:51,500 leaders, great because it allows you to construct a heterogeneous 1315 01:03:51,500 --> 01:03:53,600 Network stack as opposed to homogeneous, once you have 1316 01:03:53,600 --> 01:03:57,200 information system and you can really embed, defend yourself. 1317 01:03:57,300 --> 01:03:59,900 Against DDOS, and a lot of things as a consequence of that 1318 01:03:59,900 --> 01:04:02,200 and there's a Litany of other little basic design principles 1319 01:04:02,200 --> 01:04:05,300 that we've rolled in. The other thing is that we're 1320 01:04:05,300 --> 01:04:08,300 very agile and the way we've been going about Ouroboros, the 1321 01:04:08,300 --> 01:04:10,800 team has gone through. I think six or seven major 1322 01:04:10,800 --> 01:04:14,200 revisions of the the protocol since Inception of 2016. 1323 01:04:14,200 --> 01:04:17,300 And we're probably to go through another six or seven revisions 1324 01:04:17,300 --> 01:04:18,900 over the next year or two as we learn more. 1325 01:04:18,900 --> 01:04:22,200 And every time we do it, we gained some new dimension like 1326 01:04:22,200 --> 01:04:24,200 this bootstrap. From Genesis is a major 1327 01:04:24,200 --> 01:04:27,600 advancement and I think a lot of POS vendors are going Be 1328 01:04:27,600 --> 01:04:29,900 Inspired from our work and modify their protocols 1329 01:04:29,900 --> 01:04:33,100 accordingly to try to capture what we've done so far. 1330 01:04:33,100 --> 01:04:36,000 I think only Al Gore and and Ouroboros have this particular 1331 01:04:36,000 --> 01:04:39,000 property. So that's that's more of a meta 1332 01:04:39,000 --> 01:04:41,000 point. I think to your question of why 1333 01:04:41,000 --> 01:04:43,300 is it better? It's more of a question of what 1334 01:04:43,300 --> 01:04:45,900 does the space as a whole demand. 1335 01:04:46,200 --> 01:04:49,800 What you know if you're an investor or an external person 1336 01:04:49,800 --> 01:04:51,800 the papers are getting too complicated the read. 1337 01:04:51,800 --> 01:04:53,800 The technology is getting too complicated too much 1338 01:04:53,800 --> 01:04:57,000 domain-specific knowledge you have to have the sort fact from 1339 01:04:57,000 --> 01:04:57,700 fiction. Action. 1340 01:04:57,900 --> 01:05:00,600 So rather what you need is trusted third parties or a 1341 01:05:00,600 --> 01:05:03,700 trusted third party process to verify that the things I'm 1342 01:05:03,700 --> 01:05:07,800 saying are actually, right? And so that's why peer review so 1343 01:05:07,800 --> 01:05:10,500 essential second, we need to have better conversations with 1344 01:05:10,500 --> 01:05:12,600 each other. And in the problem is we have 1345 01:05:12,600 --> 01:05:15,300 commercial incentives. Not to have good conversations 1346 01:05:15,300 --> 01:05:18,000 with each other. Because if Bob has created his 1347 01:05:18,000 --> 01:05:20,800 thing and I've created my thing and we have competing tokens, 1348 01:05:20,800 --> 01:05:24,200 Bob doesn't want to make my token better pop wants to make 1349 01:05:24,200 --> 01:05:26,600 his token better. So he's going to be closed off. 1350 01:05:26,900 --> 01:05:30,200 Unless I Got Bob's token. So in the academic world is kind 1351 01:05:30,200 --> 01:05:32,800 of like a fair Commons where we can have these conversations and 1352 01:05:32,800 --> 01:05:35,400 quickly learn from each other and steal from each other to try 1353 01:05:35,400 --> 01:05:38,500 to converge to a collection of good design principles. 1354 01:05:38,700 --> 01:05:41,300 And then third, you have to get much better about. 1355 01:05:41,600 --> 01:05:43,000 What are your business requirements? 1356 01:05:43,000 --> 01:05:46,000 For the cryptocurrency that you're deploying who gets to be 1357 01:05:46,000 --> 01:05:48,700 in charge? Do you want to have finality or 1358 01:05:48,700 --> 01:05:51,200 probabilistic finality? Do what do you want to have for 1359 01:05:51,200 --> 01:05:52,800 these types of systems? What do you need for your 1360 01:05:52,800 --> 01:05:55,100 business domain? Do you need really fast 1361 01:05:55,100 --> 01:05:57,100 settlement or is it okay to have? 1362 01:05:57,300 --> 01:05:59,400 Much longer probabilistic settlement, you know, it's like 1363 01:05:59,400 --> 01:06:01,400 what do you actually need in that that set up? 1364 01:06:01,500 --> 01:06:06,000 And so what we'd rather have is a spectrum of protocols 1365 01:06:06,000 --> 01:06:08,100 Ouroboros. Being one, El Gran, being one 1366 01:06:08,100 --> 01:06:11,100 tenorman, being one another's and then what happens is once 1367 01:06:11,100 --> 01:06:13,200 you collect your business requirements, for the blockchain 1368 01:06:13,200 --> 01:06:17,200 that you need and system. You need, you run the, the you 1369 01:06:17,200 --> 01:06:19,400 spin the wheel. And then it says, Ah, this is 1370 01:06:19,400 --> 01:06:22,100 the flavor that I require for my system. 1371 01:06:22,500 --> 01:06:25,100 And when you adopt that the hope is that because they have a 1372 01:06:25,100 --> 01:06:27,900 common DNA in terms of the rigor, the Already in the 1373 01:06:27,900 --> 01:06:30,900 design, you know, that whatever you're implementing is going to 1374 01:06:30,908 --> 01:06:33,100 work well, for you the system architect. 1375 01:06:33,300 --> 01:06:36,500 So I think this is the process that needs to be followed 1376 01:06:37,900 --> 01:06:40,800 designing consensus. Algorithm is hard guys, and it's 1377 01:06:40,800 --> 01:06:43,900 not a new field. It's been around since the 1970s 1378 01:06:44,700 --> 01:06:46,800 and there's a lot of people who know how to do this. 1379 01:06:46,800 --> 01:06:51,900 Really, really well, what bothers me is when people just 1380 01:06:51,900 --> 01:06:54,200 go and do it and think they're experts at it and they make 1381 01:06:54,200 --> 01:06:59,300 outlandish claims, you know, for example, The hyper Ledger guys. 1382 01:06:59,600 --> 01:07:03,100 They're very grounded. They're very realistic people. 1383 01:07:03,100 --> 01:07:05,500 When I go talk to Christian and I say what are you guys using? 1384 01:07:05,500 --> 01:07:07,700 They say bft simple. Here's why the guys written 1385 01:07:07,700 --> 01:07:09,600 literal. The textbook on distributed 1386 01:07:09,600 --> 01:07:11,600 systems theory. You're either reading that or 1387 01:07:11,600 --> 01:07:13,400 Nancy Lynch's book or something like that. 1388 01:07:13,400 --> 01:07:14,900 It's a good book. Okay. 1389 01:07:15,300 --> 01:07:18,000 And then you go to the EOS guys and they claim they're getting 1390 01:07:18,000 --> 01:07:20,500 two orders of magnitude more performance in this best 1391 01:07:20,500 --> 01:07:22,600 practice, you know, bft protocol. 1392 01:07:22,900 --> 01:07:25,900 And I've seen your thinking is the head of the icr and all 1393 01:07:25,900 --> 01:07:29,000 these scientists at IBM. Competent and a guy with a 1394 01:07:29,000 --> 01:07:31,200 bachelor's degree from vintage. If Virginia Tech is just a 1395 01:07:31,207 --> 01:07:33,600 solvent and he's come up with a system that performs two orders 1396 01:07:33,600 --> 01:07:35,700 of magnitude better. It's crazy. 1397 01:07:35,900 --> 01:07:38,000 And let's say it does perform at this level. 1398 01:07:38,100 --> 01:07:40,600 They're saying they can move blocks around 500, milliseconds 1399 01:07:40,600 --> 01:07:44,900 around the entire Globe takes 300 milliseconds to set a single 1400 01:07:44,900 --> 01:07:49,000 around the entire planets, okay? And and and and then I said, 1401 01:07:49,000 --> 01:07:50,700 well, what independent verification, we have that. 1402 01:07:50,700 --> 01:07:52,700 Did anybody performance Benchmark any of these things? 1403 01:07:52,700 --> 01:07:55,700 The third party firm provide. No, but they just say it. 1404 01:07:56,100 --> 01:07:58,900 Hash graph says stuff. Everybody just says stuff iotus 1405 01:07:58,900 --> 01:08:02,000 this stuff there's no verification that these things 1406 01:08:02,000 --> 01:08:04,200 that people are saying are actually true and oftentimes 1407 01:08:04,200 --> 01:08:05,800 when you deploy them you discover. 1408 01:08:06,000 --> 01:08:08,500 Oh, there was something I was in accounting either. 1409 01:08:08,500 --> 01:08:11,000 I've actually deployed a broken system, that's not secure at 1410 01:08:11,000 --> 01:08:14,400 all, or my system is secure, but it's a hell of a lot slower than 1411 01:08:14,400 --> 01:08:16,800 I claimed, right? I've heard, she people like 1412 01:08:16,800 --> 01:08:19,700 claim, like ten, thousands of TPS and I'm like, where did you 1413 01:08:19,700 --> 01:08:21,399 test that? It's like, oh, on my local 1414 01:08:21,399 --> 01:08:24,399 machine, right? That's not how you test the 1415 01:08:24,399 --> 01:08:27,800 distributed system. No, you know, it's so It's so 1416 01:08:27,800 --> 01:08:29,399 it's so this is my biggest gripe for it. 1417 01:08:29,399 --> 01:08:31,700 So the point of the Ouroboros project is to try to separate 1418 01:08:31,700 --> 01:08:35,399 fact from fiction to try to Fetter eight, the POS problems 1419 01:08:35,399 --> 01:08:39,300 that we're having as a community to try to create a trusted 1420 01:08:39,300 --> 01:08:42,100 Commons, which doesn't have a financial incentive to pick, 1421 01:08:42,100 --> 01:08:44,300 winners and losers. Rather, it's just focused on 1422 01:08:44,800 --> 01:08:46,899 what's right and what's wrong and to try to have an 1423 01:08:46,899 --> 01:08:49,200 intelligent discussion about trade-offs and intelligent 1424 01:08:49,200 --> 01:08:51,700 discussion, about things like performance and benchmarking and 1425 01:08:51,700 --> 01:08:55,500 best practices and so forth. As the inheritor of that our 1426 01:08:55,500 --> 01:08:57,200 conjecture is that the output of this. 1427 01:08:57,300 --> 01:08:59,000 The process will be a really good protocol for 1428 01:08:59,000 --> 01:09:01,200 cryptocurrency. It might not be the best 1429 01:09:01,200 --> 01:09:04,500 protocol for your cryptocurrency but for cardano we feel that it 1430 01:09:04,508 --> 01:09:08,500 will converge to that particular State and every project will 1431 01:09:08,500 --> 01:09:10,899 benefit from our research because it's all out there. 1432 01:09:10,899 --> 01:09:14,000 We try to annotate as much as we can and and anybody's free to 1433 01:09:14,000 --> 01:09:16,100 borrow anything they want, there's no patents. 1434 01:09:16,100 --> 01:09:18,800 It's completely open source. I love Silvio to death. 1435 01:09:18,800 --> 01:09:21,300 He's a good friend. I every time I see him, I 1436 01:09:21,300 --> 01:09:23,800 complain about the patents and I'll Grant I think that's 1437 01:09:23,800 --> 01:09:26,800 counterproductive for the space so we've chosen to follow open 1438 01:09:26,800 --> 01:09:27,700 source philosophy. Safiye. 1439 01:09:27,899 --> 01:09:30,200 And that's what we're trying to accomplish with cardano. 1440 01:09:30,200 --> 01:09:32,600 As a whole, is that every building block in the system, 1441 01:09:32,600 --> 01:09:34,399 whether it be an interoperability building block 1442 01:09:34,399 --> 01:09:37,200 with side, chains or performance, building block with 1443 01:09:37,200 --> 01:09:40,600 Rena and Ouroboros or a governance building block with 1444 01:09:40,600 --> 01:09:43,000 the Treasury System in the voting system. 1445 01:09:43,300 --> 01:09:44,500 That's all out in the open domain. 1446 01:09:44,500 --> 01:09:46,500 It's all through peer review. And you know, if we got some 1447 01:09:46,500 --> 01:09:49,300 wrong you have a different opinion, that's fine, change it. 1448 01:09:49,300 --> 01:09:51,600 But if we got something right, everybody in the world is free 1449 01:09:51,600 --> 01:09:54,100 to use it and it just it makes all of our projects better in a 1450 01:09:54,108 --> 01:09:57,000 certain respect, right? I mean now, that's really good, 1451 01:09:57,000 --> 01:09:58,200 too. Here because I know a lot of 1452 01:09:58,208 --> 01:10:01,800 people like I've heard that like people criticize I reach K and 1453 01:10:01,800 --> 01:10:04,800 cardano as like you're using like academic pedigree as a 1454 01:10:04,800 --> 01:10:08,000 special marketing getting but like I find this is actually a 1455 01:10:08,000 --> 01:10:10,500 really good reason. It's a way of like reaching all 1456 01:10:10,500 --> 01:10:15,100 Branch out to like the more academic community and so that 1457 01:10:15,100 --> 01:10:18,700 sounds really useful and suddenly they don't need us. 1458 01:10:18,700 --> 01:10:20,000 That's what we have to understand. 1459 01:10:20,000 --> 01:10:21,900 Like these cryptographers have their own lives. 1460 01:10:21,900 --> 01:10:25,300 They've been around a lot longer before us man public-key. 1461 01:10:25,300 --> 01:10:29,400 Crypto came out in the 70s. You know what we have done as a 1462 01:10:29,400 --> 01:10:32,900 community is we're kind of co-opting cryptography is brand 1463 01:10:32,900 --> 01:10:36,200 and its really pissing off the cryptographic community because 1464 01:10:36,200 --> 01:10:39,600 they say, look guys, if you're a full stack Ruby developer, you 1465 01:10:39,600 --> 01:10:43,100 are not a cryptographer and just because you can Implement one of 1466 01:10:43,100 --> 01:10:44,500 these. Protocols doesn't mean you can 1467 01:10:44,500 --> 01:10:46,100 design them, and make them secure. 1468 01:10:46,100 --> 01:10:49,000 And what they're doing is they're having like this acid 1469 01:10:49,000 --> 01:10:51,900 flashbacks of the 70s. When the very state of 1470 01:10:51,900 --> 01:10:54,000 cryptography was anybody who knew how to write code was 1471 01:10:54,000 --> 01:10:56,000 implementing their own crypto, and they're violating every 1472 01:10:56,000 --> 01:10:59,600 basic principles, you know, Security via obscurity and, you 1473 01:10:59,600 --> 01:11:02,100 know, they were getting proper random numbers. 1474 01:11:02,100 --> 01:11:04,600 It's like, it's like just horrific when you actually look 1475 01:11:04,600 --> 01:11:06,600 at these things in practice, it's not elitism. 1476 01:11:06,600 --> 01:11:09,500 It's just a science. I mean, it's kind of funny and 1477 01:11:09,500 --> 01:11:11,400 everything else were okay with professionalisation. 1478 01:11:11,400 --> 01:11:15,300 Like, you would like your doctor to actually be certified. 1479 01:11:15,300 --> 01:11:17,800 And you like your doctor to have actually gone through residency 1480 01:11:17,800 --> 01:11:20,500 and proper training, if he's going to perform an operation on 1481 01:11:20,500 --> 01:11:23,800 you, but then in cryptography is like totally okay for somebody 1482 01:11:23,800 --> 01:11:25,900 to have no professional training or knowledge. 1483 01:11:25,900 --> 01:11:28,400 But then go implement. That's going to keep you private 1484 01:11:28,400 --> 01:11:31,500 and secure and prevent, you know the Iranian government from 1485 01:11:31,500 --> 01:11:33,400 knocking on your door and black bagging you because they 1486 01:11:33,407 --> 01:11:36,100 discover you're gay or something or they discover you've been 1487 01:11:36,100 --> 01:11:38,400 using it illegal crypto currency or the same for China. 1488 01:11:39,000 --> 01:11:42,000 Yet it takes an equal amount of training to become a 1489 01:11:42,000 --> 01:11:44,600 cryptographer as it does to become a doctor. 1490 01:11:44,900 --> 01:11:47,900 In fact, in some cases more, you know, you're really at it in 1491 01:11:47,907 --> 01:11:51,100 your 30s. So it's just it's just really. 1492 01:11:51,100 --> 01:11:54,200 And I think what we need to do as a community is respect that 1493 01:11:54,200 --> 01:11:57,400 there are people came before us respect that these are very Hard 1494 01:11:57,400 --> 01:11:59,700 problems and respect that these problems are not going to be 1495 01:11:59,700 --> 01:12:03,800 solved in one grand paper and by one person they're going to be 1496 01:12:03,800 --> 01:12:09,500 salt and stages as a community, over a long Arc of time as we, 1497 01:12:09,700 --> 01:12:12,200 as we build up normal, computer science, right? 1498 01:12:12,200 --> 01:12:15,600 Like basically, we have to be able to like, talk the talk so 1499 01:12:15,600 --> 01:12:20,300 we can, like get the ear of the people who've done it and I'm 1500 01:12:20,300 --> 01:12:22,500 trying to like, start my own saying, but which I've been 1501 01:12:22,500 --> 01:12:25,000 pushing ever since, like the Neo Fiasco, I've been trying to 1502 01:12:25,200 --> 01:12:27,700 start the saying like, don't you The already have. 1503 01:12:27,700 --> 01:12:29,900 Don't roll your own crypto. Don't roll your own consensus. 1504 01:12:29,900 --> 01:12:31,900 I'll go quickly. What did the network break? 1505 01:12:31,900 --> 01:12:34,900 When one note broke? That's yeah, this intolerant. 1506 01:12:34,900 --> 01:12:37,200 Yeah. It was just some weird stuff 1507 01:12:37,200 --> 01:12:39,900 going on. So, another question I have 1508 01:12:39,900 --> 01:12:43,900 about Ouroboros, right? One thing I've always had some 1509 01:12:43,900 --> 01:12:47,100 trouble, understanding, is like, in a lot of proof of stake, 1510 01:12:47,100 --> 01:12:51,600 algorithms, like Snow White or borrows, especially in the 1511 01:12:51,600 --> 01:12:55,000 affinities stuff. There's always just like, huge 1512 01:12:55,000 --> 01:12:59,000 focus on randomness Well, which I never quite understood. 1513 01:12:59,000 --> 01:13:07,100 So, for context and tender, meant we do a just so there's 1514 01:13:07,100 --> 01:13:11,400 every block has a proposer and we have a deterministic round 1515 01:13:11,400 --> 01:13:17,100 robin and like I know who the proposer one block from now, is 1516 01:13:17,100 --> 01:13:19,500 I know which only five blocks and I know it's going to be 2000 1517 01:13:19,500 --> 01:13:23,600 block from now and you know, maybe it has something to do 1518 01:13:23,600 --> 01:13:26,800 with the fact that tender meant like distributes Rewards. 1519 01:13:27,200 --> 01:13:29,900 We to all the values and all the validators are because of the 1520 01:13:29,900 --> 01:13:32,500 bft nature. Everyone is participating in it. 1521 01:13:32,500 --> 01:13:35,000 But like, to me, the biggest thing that I understand 1522 01:13:35,000 --> 01:13:36,500 Randomness is nice. I think the biggest thing that 1523 01:13:36,500 --> 01:13:38,500 can help with is like DDOS prevention. 1524 01:13:39,700 --> 01:13:43,300 But why the huge focus on like the randomness? 1525 01:13:44,500 --> 01:13:47,300 Well, there's partly Legacy partly practicality. 1526 01:13:47,700 --> 01:13:51,800 So most, if you do a literature review, a cryptographic attacks, 1527 01:13:51,800 --> 01:13:55,400 or look where systems have been broken, almost, always there's 1528 01:13:55,400 --> 01:13:57,800 some sort of Random Number issue at the end of the rainbow and 1529 01:13:57,800 --> 01:14:00,600 we're like, we screwed up somewhere and there's some bits 1530 01:14:00,600 --> 01:14:03,100 got leaked or something. And there's a bit more to 1531 01:14:03,800 --> 01:14:05,900 determinism than we'd like to admit. 1532 01:14:06,700 --> 01:14:10,000 So cryptographers are professionally paranoid about 1533 01:14:10,000 --> 01:14:12,600 how clean the randomness is as a basis. 1534 01:14:12,900 --> 01:14:16,400 The other thing is that Our common best practices that exist 1535 01:14:16,400 --> 01:14:19,000 like you can use MPC. For example, to develop random 1536 01:14:19,000 --> 01:14:22,300 is shown makers scheme from crypto. 99 is one, we made a 1537 01:14:22,308 --> 01:14:25,000 modified version of it, that's linear time called scrape. 1538 01:14:26,100 --> 01:14:31,600 But in general, if you say okay the security assumptions in my 1539 01:14:31,600 --> 01:14:36,800 proof rely on, you know, a Pure Source of Randomness then your 1540 01:14:36,800 --> 01:14:40,200 system is not provably secure and less you know, you have 1541 01:14:40,200 --> 01:14:42,800 that. So you have to put a lot of work 1542 01:14:42,800 --> 01:14:45,900 into your Paper and the cryptographic community holds 1543 01:14:45,900 --> 01:14:48,300 you a very high standard to prove that you've done. 1544 01:14:48,300 --> 01:14:51,300 That that's why is almost seems disproportionate a lot of 1545 01:14:51,500 --> 01:14:54,600 efforts put into the explaining that in the paper because it's 1546 01:14:54,600 --> 01:14:57,000 just a community. Expectation requirement no more 1547 01:14:57,000 --> 01:14:59,400 practical sense. There were a Litany of attacks 1548 01:14:59,400 --> 01:15:01,600 in early proof of stake like grinding attacks where you know 1549 01:15:01,600 --> 01:15:06,500 people could buy us their chance of winning to favor them just by 1550 01:15:06,500 --> 01:15:09,700 careful selection of things. And it's like is so you would 1551 01:15:09,700 --> 01:15:12,000 like to make sure that you've ameliorated that it's a 1552 01:15:12,008 --> 01:15:15,900 historical problem in the space but Do it again, it depends on 1553 01:15:15,900 --> 01:15:20,500 your network topology, you know, if your dpos for example and 1554 01:15:20,500 --> 01:15:24,800 it's everything is 21 nodes or 101 or whatever the Quorum set 1555 01:15:24,800 --> 01:15:27,300 is and you kind of know the order that they're doing this, 1556 01:15:27,300 --> 01:15:30,000 whether it be ran, round robin or not, does it really matter as 1557 01:15:30,000 --> 01:15:31,700 much? But Randomness, well, there's 1558 01:15:31,700 --> 01:15:33,300 some question there, but not really. 1559 01:15:34,500 --> 01:15:36,600 Whereas, if you're actually going to elect a true Committee 1560 01:15:36,600 --> 01:15:39,500 of people Porsche proportion to their steak, you kind of have a 1561 01:15:39,508 --> 01:15:42,100 different need for that. The other thing is, if you build 1562 01:15:42,100 --> 01:15:44,700 a source of random is carefully within your Tikal. 1563 01:15:44,700 --> 01:15:47,500 That becomes a cryptographic beacon that you can reuse for 1564 01:15:47,500 --> 01:15:50,000 collection of other activities. So let's say you have Smart 1565 01:15:50,000 --> 01:15:52,500 contracts that require a source of randoms, it's a horrifically. 1566 01:15:52,500 --> 01:15:55,600 Bad idea to have people roll their own source of Randomness 1567 01:15:55,600 --> 01:15:58,100 within a smart contract. In fact, I think there's a paper 1568 01:15:58,100 --> 01:16:02,600 out of Cornell that did an analysis of the rngs in smart 1569 01:16:02,600 --> 01:16:06,100 contracts and they said these things failed miserably or might 1570 01:16:06,100 --> 01:16:08,300 have been out of UIUC. I can't remember which group did 1571 01:16:08,300 --> 01:16:10,600 it, so, it'd be nice as an API to say. 1572 01:16:10,600 --> 01:16:13,600 Hey, we have a beacon built into the protocol and because we've 1573 01:16:13,600 --> 01:16:16,300 done a really Good job of making that as pure as possible, that 1574 01:16:16,300 --> 01:16:19,300 becomes a public utility that the blockchain provides in 1575 01:16:19,300 --> 01:16:21,900 addition to consensus that can be reused for other building 1576 01:16:21,900 --> 01:16:24,300 blocks, whether that be lotteries or player matching 1577 01:16:24,300 --> 01:16:26,300 protocols, or these types of things. 1578 01:16:26,300 --> 01:16:28,600 And, you know, that that's a fair source of Randomness which 1579 01:16:28,600 --> 01:16:31,100 is very valuable for all cryptographic. 1580 01:16:31,200 --> 01:16:34,200 So it's kind of a mixed bag part of it is Legacy because when it 1581 01:16:34,200 --> 01:16:37,300 wasn't a focus things went horribly wrong part of it as a 1582 01:16:37,300 --> 01:16:41,200 community expectation, where literally your paper could 1583 01:16:41,200 --> 01:16:43,300 sometimes not survive, peer review, if you don't spend 1584 01:16:43,300 --> 01:16:45,800 enough time talking, Ink about it and doing things with it, 1585 01:16:45,800 --> 01:16:48,100 part of it as a public good. And part of it as a structural 1586 01:16:48,100 --> 01:16:50,400 property, depending upon how your Quorum is setting up and 1587 01:16:50,400 --> 01:16:52,500 you know how you're voting on people and systems like 1588 01:16:52,500 --> 01:16:55,500 Ouroboros or algorithms. For example, do require up here 1589 01:16:55,500 --> 01:16:58,200 source of Randomness or really good source of Randomness to 1590 01:16:58,200 --> 01:17:00,600 operate with a with proper security. 1591 01:17:01,600 --> 01:17:05,000 Okay. So one of the interesting things 1592 01:17:05,000 --> 01:17:09,300 about our car Dino is most of your implementation is in is in 1593 01:17:09,300 --> 01:17:12,400 Haskell. So you have chosen has Haskell. 1594 01:17:12,400 --> 01:17:15,500 The only other project that has chosen a functional language is 1595 01:17:15,600 --> 01:17:18,200 stasis right with. Oh camel tone. 1596 01:17:18,200 --> 01:17:20,200 Okay, Tina. It also implements their 1597 01:17:20,200 --> 01:17:24,300 blockchain and Haskell and also digital asset Holdings does all 1598 01:17:24,300 --> 01:17:26,400 their stuff in Haskell but that's in the permission side of 1599 01:17:26,407 --> 01:17:30,000 things and Barclays Innovation group is all in Haskell as well. 1600 01:17:30,100 --> 01:17:31,400 I think risk. Black is there? 1601 01:17:31,400 --> 01:17:34,000 So it if you look for it you can find it, but you're right. 1602 01:17:34,000 --> 01:17:36,000 It's not a common language choice. 1603 01:17:36,600 --> 01:17:40,200 So what why did you make that choice? 1604 01:17:40,900 --> 01:17:43,500 What's the add one digital Pascal here? 1605 01:17:44,500 --> 01:17:48,900 Yeah, so it really when it comes down to it, there's first the, 1606 01:17:48,900 --> 01:17:52,800 the imperative versus functional war and I think over time people 1607 01:17:52,800 --> 01:17:55,300 are starting to concede that. Even if you're on the imperative 1608 01:17:55,300 --> 01:17:58,900 side like here, you love your, you love your Java and it just 1609 01:17:58,900 --> 01:18:01,700 never got not love your Java. There are some things that make 1610 01:18:01,700 --> 01:18:03,100 sense to do in a functional sense. 1611 01:18:03,100 --> 01:18:06,400 Like that's why lambdas came to Java is job to a Java 8, right? 1612 01:18:06,900 --> 01:18:09,400 And so a programming in general is becoming increasingly more 1613 01:18:09,400 --> 01:18:12,000 functional because we're at a lot less about resources and 1614 01:18:12,000 --> 01:18:13,400 weird. A lot more about things like 1615 01:18:13,400 --> 01:18:15,200 concur. Currency and weird. 1616 01:18:15,200 --> 01:18:17,600 A lot more things like correctness of behavior and 1617 01:18:17,600 --> 01:18:20,500 conciseness because these you know these repos are just 1618 01:18:20,500 --> 01:18:22,600 getting so big and there's so many things going on. 1619 01:18:23,000 --> 01:18:27,100 So I like functional languages because I just believe that 1620 01:18:27,100 --> 01:18:31,900 they're easier to reason about. I believe that it's easier to 1621 01:18:31,900 --> 01:18:35,100 test implementations and I also believe it's easier to build 1622 01:18:35,100 --> 01:18:37,100 distributed systems and functional languages. 1623 01:18:37,400 --> 01:18:39,400 And actually if you look at a lot of the internet giants, like 1624 01:18:39,400 --> 01:18:42,900 for example Netflix their entire back-end microservices with 1625 01:18:42,900 --> 01:18:47,000 Scala You know if you if you look at Facebook large chunks of 1626 01:18:47,008 --> 01:18:49,900 their systems are running in functional languages or like the 1627 01:18:49,907 --> 01:18:52,100 components that are mission critical have some sort of a 1628 01:18:52,100 --> 01:18:56,100 functional component, same for Google and a certain respect so 1629 01:18:56,900 --> 01:19:00,200 it's less of a decision of well, okay, should we go functional 1630 01:19:00,200 --> 01:19:01,900 imperative for Mission critical software? 1631 01:19:01,900 --> 01:19:04,400 That's distributed that requires lots of testing potential 1632 01:19:04,400 --> 01:19:06,600 verification in my view, it is functional. 1633 01:19:06,700 --> 01:19:09,400 It's more of a question of ok, which functional language occupé 1634 01:19:09,400 --> 01:19:11,600 it and there's a spectrum of functional languages. 1635 01:19:11,600 --> 01:19:13,700 You have hybrid languages like clojure and Scala. 1636 01:19:13,800 --> 01:19:15,600 Allah. And if sharp wear, when you want 1637 01:19:15,600 --> 01:19:18,200 to be imperative, you can be imperative, it's call is great 1638 01:19:18,200 --> 01:19:19,500 at that. Whereas if you want to be 1639 01:19:19,500 --> 01:19:20,900 functional you can be functional. 1640 01:19:21,500 --> 01:19:24,500 Then you have purify languages like oh camel and Haskell or 1641 01:19:24,500 --> 01:19:27,300 very pure in that respect. And that you have even more peer 1642 01:19:27,300 --> 01:19:29,900 languages like Idris which is you know dependently typed 1643 01:19:29,900 --> 01:19:33,000 language that is just mind-bendingly hard to write 1644 01:19:33,000 --> 01:19:37,900 code in so why we chose Haskell was a? 1645 01:19:37,900 --> 01:19:41,100 We have access to the royalty of the Haskell space. 1646 01:19:41,200 --> 01:19:44,300 The inventor of the language, fill waddler amongst Others 1647 01:19:44,800 --> 01:19:46,700 there was a committee that created it works for. 1648 01:19:46,700 --> 01:19:49,700 I 0 HK so when the guy who created the programming language 1649 01:19:49,700 --> 01:19:52,600 happens to work for you, it's like it's probably a pretty good 1650 01:19:52,600 --> 01:19:55,100 idea to at least consider that as a viable candidate for your 1651 01:19:55,100 --> 01:19:57,600 system s. We have access to pretty much 1652 01:19:57,600 --> 01:19:59,600 all of the Haskell consultancy firms. 1653 01:19:59,600 --> 01:20:03,800 Well-typed twig. We've talked to F be complete 1654 01:20:03,800 --> 01:20:05,800 and so forth. So all the people who are 1655 01:20:05,800 --> 01:20:09,100 acknowledged to be like the top 5% of the space, in terms of 1656 01:20:09,108 --> 01:20:14,100 development ability work for us or we consult with us or we talk 1657 01:20:14,100 --> 01:20:16,100 to on a regular basis. Third. 1658 01:20:16,100 --> 01:20:19,600 I think there's a huge value in going Boutique as opposed to 1659 01:20:19,600 --> 01:20:22,400 going mainstream. So we are one of the largest 1660 01:20:22,400 --> 01:20:24,600 Haskell projects in the world and actually one of the most 1661 01:20:24,600 --> 01:20:26,600 valuable and prominent has called project the world. 1662 01:20:26,600 --> 01:20:30,300 So if you go to Haskell Reddit and you you go and say what is 1663 01:20:30,300 --> 01:20:33,800 cardano, everybody in the red. It will know it as a project. 1664 01:20:33,800 --> 01:20:38,100 So basically you know, a lot of people Haskell space like us, no 1665 01:20:38,100 --> 01:20:40,500 us. And means that we have a higher 1666 01:20:40,500 --> 01:20:43,200 probability of getting independent contributors from 1667 01:20:43,200 --> 01:20:46,000 the Haskell. Ready to come in and eventually 1668 01:20:46,000 --> 01:20:47,100 over time. Commit code. 1669 01:20:47,100 --> 01:20:50,300 Reader code. Give us feedback and so forth. 1670 01:20:50,900 --> 01:20:53,700 Another reason is that, we're following formal methods and so 1671 01:20:53,700 --> 01:20:55,600 we start with formal specification that we'll be 1672 01:20:55,600 --> 01:20:58,600 releasing one of the few weeks for our wallet back end. 1673 01:20:58,900 --> 01:21:01,100 And if you want to prove that you've actually correctly 1674 01:21:01,100 --> 01:21:03,300 Implement a code, you kind of really need a functional 1675 01:21:03,300 --> 01:21:06,200 language to do that and you can do with Oak ML and cock. 1676 01:21:06,200 --> 01:21:07,900 You can do with Isabel and Haskell. 1677 01:21:07,900 --> 01:21:10,600 There's differences of opinion of what's better, but you need 1678 01:21:10,600 --> 01:21:12,800 some flavor of that so that we don't really have an option. 1679 01:21:12,800 --> 01:21:15,000 There it would be damned. Here in possible to do it with 1680 01:21:15,000 --> 01:21:17,500 JavaScript or Java or something like that. 1681 01:21:17,600 --> 01:21:19,200 It's really, really, really hard. 1682 01:21:20,100 --> 01:21:22,500 It also noting that conciseness is amazing, just to give you a 1683 01:21:22,500 --> 01:21:25,900 sense of numbers are mantis client for aetherium. 1684 01:21:25,900 --> 01:21:29,400 Classic is only twelve thousand lines of code compare that to 1685 01:21:29,400 --> 01:21:33,000 the C++ Bitcoin client. It's like over 100,000 lines of 1686 01:21:33,000 --> 01:21:37,100 C++ code so it's about a tenth of the size to do something that 1687 01:21:37,100 --> 01:21:40,200 does more as a virtual machine and all this network stuff and 1688 01:21:40,200 --> 01:21:43,300 things that are more advanced than than Bitcoin. 1689 01:21:43,500 --> 01:21:46,500 So yeah More sophisticated protocol and you use 10 times 1690 01:21:46,500 --> 01:21:48,800 less code for a more sophisticated protocol. 1691 01:21:49,100 --> 01:21:51,300 What does it mean? Means that just by lines of 1692 01:21:51,300 --> 01:21:55,100 code, there's much less to do. There's much less to think about 1693 01:21:55,100 --> 01:21:57,900 and it's much easier to write good test, Suites and could test 1694 01:21:57,900 --> 01:22:00,100 coverage for that and reason about the code. 1695 01:22:00,100 --> 01:22:04,300 So the conciseness has a huge maintenance and Technical debt 1696 01:22:04,400 --> 01:22:08,300 value in my view over over for post Nets. 1697 01:22:08,600 --> 01:22:11,800 And so, I really like that now there's a lot of Haskell 1698 01:22:11,800 --> 01:22:14,600 specific things that we really enjoy, and a school is probably 1699 01:22:14,600 --> 01:22:16,900 the most advanced functional language because the community 1700 01:22:16,900 --> 01:22:20,200 is really invest in an enormous amount of time into making GHC 1701 01:22:20,200 --> 01:22:22,600 and other things really Advanced and they put a lot of cool 1702 01:22:22,600 --> 01:22:27,000 things in with the type system. The whole concept of the monad 1703 01:22:27,000 --> 01:22:30,500 is really easy to work with and it gives you a lot of tools for 1704 01:22:30,500 --> 01:22:32,800 modeling concurrency and distributed System Theory. 1705 01:22:33,000 --> 01:22:34,900 There's also actually some beautiful things like Cloud 1706 01:22:34,900 --> 01:22:38,400 Haskell for example which takes all the erlang goodness it was 1707 01:22:38,400 --> 01:22:41,700 OTP and it brings it into the Haskell space so you like that's 1708 01:22:41,700 --> 01:22:43,700 the another language you could look at like Erlanger. 1709 01:22:43,800 --> 01:22:48,200 For example I think eternity is using erlang and that's a great 1710 01:22:48,200 --> 01:22:50,700 language for building a cryptocurrency and as well don't 1711 01:22:50,700 --> 01:22:53,400 have to make any compromises. We have erlang stuff that we can 1712 01:22:53,400 --> 01:22:57,700 pull into Haskell as well. So from a correctness, a concise 1713 01:22:57,700 --> 01:23:01,000 has a testing a community. Oh one last thing 1714 01:23:01,000 --> 01:23:05,400 personnel-wise, if you hire a Haskell developer, they probably 1715 01:23:05,400 --> 01:23:08,400 have a master's degree in computer science or a PhD or at 1716 01:23:08,407 --> 01:23:10,300 very least. They have a lot of professional 1717 01:23:10,300 --> 01:23:12,400 experience. No one starts with Haskell, 1718 01:23:12,600 --> 01:23:15,000 unless they go to edit Uber or Oxford? 1719 01:23:15,000 --> 01:23:17,400 Or you like some really good place, most people start with an 1720 01:23:17,400 --> 01:23:19,400 imperative language and then professionally out of 1721 01:23:19,400 --> 01:23:20,800 frustration. They find functional 1722 01:23:20,800 --> 01:23:23,000 programming, and there's something they like about it. 1723 01:23:23,100 --> 01:23:25,500 So if you hire Haskell developer General, you end up. 1724 01:23:25,600 --> 01:23:28,700 It's a beautiful filter that gives you access to a much more 1725 01:23:28,700 --> 01:23:32,600 experienced group of people that are more mathematically oriented 1726 01:23:32,600 --> 01:23:34,700 they have an easier time reading formal specs, they have an 1727 01:23:34,700 --> 01:23:37,200 easier time reasoning about things and they tend to be a 1728 01:23:37,208 --> 01:23:40,700 little bit greater in the beard. So we wanted to have that added 1729 01:23:40,700 --> 01:23:43,600 filter in our personnel and so we can have smaller teams. 1730 01:23:43,800 --> 01:23:47,700 More experience that are smarter and an overall I think that 1731 01:23:47,700 --> 01:23:51,900 we'll have a better output for our process but you know we do 1732 01:23:51,900 --> 01:23:55,300 more than just Haskell. We also write Scala code and 1733 01:23:55,300 --> 01:23:57,400 then we also write a lot of JavaScript code as well. 1734 01:23:57,400 --> 01:24:00,600 The entire dead list front end is written in JS and we try to 1735 01:24:00,600 --> 01:24:03,400 make that immutable where we can but you know it's still an 1736 01:24:03,400 --> 01:24:05,100 imperative approach and that's a separate team. 1737 01:24:06,000 --> 01:24:08,700 Yeah I mean I think this formal verification focus is really 1738 01:24:08,700 --> 01:24:10,400 great. Like I was a huge fan of pesos 1739 01:24:10,400 --> 01:24:12,700 as well for the same reason. I think that what you got 1740 01:24:12,800 --> 01:24:15,400 especially like When you guys are doing the formal 1741 01:24:15,400 --> 01:24:17,800 verification of your wallet because I don't think I've ever 1742 01:24:17,800 --> 01:24:20,500 seen anyone ever do that before, that would be really cool 1743 01:24:21,300 --> 01:24:23,300 especially, because that's usually one of the points where 1744 01:24:23,300 --> 01:24:26,400 like the easiest attack vectors on on systems. 1745 01:24:27,700 --> 01:24:31,400 Another thing I could you tell me a bit more about the K 1746 01:24:31,400 --> 01:24:33,400 framework is I know this is something you guys are focused 1747 01:24:33,400 --> 01:24:37,900 on a lot and it's a very like cutting-edge topic that I don't 1748 01:24:37,900 --> 01:24:42,100 think that many people are not let alone understand like even 1749 01:24:42,100 --> 01:24:45,900 aware of and so Speak a little bit about what made you decide 1750 01:24:45,900 --> 01:24:49,300 to focus on this when there seems to be no other block 1751 01:24:49,300 --> 01:24:52,300 games, there seems to be a huge shift towards like webassembly 1752 01:24:52,300 --> 01:24:55,500 everything, right? And so why the K framework, 1753 01:24:55,500 --> 01:24:57,100 right? Okay. 1754 01:24:57,100 --> 01:25:01,000 So first, you guys should really have Professor grigory row shoe 1755 01:25:01,000 --> 01:25:03,100 on your show. He's based at the University of 1756 01:25:03,108 --> 01:25:05,800 Illinois, wonderful guy. He runs runtime verification, 1757 01:25:05,800 --> 01:25:08,700 and he's worked at Nasa and he's done. 1758 01:25:08,700 --> 01:25:12,100 All these really, really cool things, but he's the creator of 1759 01:25:12,100 --> 01:25:14,600 the K framework and he works very closely, Only with Iowa HK, 1760 01:25:14,600 --> 01:25:18,300 we actually have on contract, 19 people full time for this plank. 1761 01:25:18,300 --> 01:25:21,900 So it's not an insignificant pool of resources but and they 1762 01:25:21,900 --> 01:25:24,300 do amazing work. Okay, so what is K all about K 1763 01:25:24,300 --> 01:25:27,200 is kind of like a meta language. It's a language to build 1764 01:25:27,200 --> 01:25:30,200 programming languages. So languages have syntax and 1765 01:25:30,200 --> 01:25:33,200 they have semantics and syntax are your symbols and your 1766 01:25:33,200 --> 01:25:35,600 letters and these types of things and semantics are when 1767 01:25:35,600 --> 01:25:37,500 you chain them together. What the hell does that actually 1768 01:25:37,500 --> 01:25:39,600 mean? Now it's a formal language. 1769 01:25:39,600 --> 01:25:42,800 So it has to be ambiguity free. And so what ends up happening 1770 01:25:42,800 --> 01:25:46,600 usually, is the Graphic language designer will go ahead and write 1771 01:25:46,600 --> 01:25:49,400 some document and we'll have all the semantics written down in a 1772 01:25:49,400 --> 01:25:52,400 mathy style language and say here are your language 1773 01:25:52,400 --> 01:25:55,500 semantics. So if you encounter a statement 1774 01:25:55,500 --> 01:25:58,200 in a language here's how you're supposed to interpret that and 1775 01:25:58,200 --> 01:26:00,800 then the developer will go implement the language and 1776 01:26:00,900 --> 01:26:04,600 hopefully if they read the spec correctly, the they should be 1777 01:26:04,600 --> 01:26:07,600 one to one. So for any statement that you 1778 01:26:07,600 --> 01:26:09,800 read there should be semantics to cover that. 1779 01:26:10,100 --> 01:26:13,600 Now, in practice this has not historically been the case. 1780 01:26:13,800 --> 01:26:17,200 Even in languages, like C for example, especially for 1781 01:26:17,200 --> 01:26:20,500 languages like C. So what K is all about is saying 1782 01:26:20,500 --> 01:26:22,700 instead of writing your operational semantics of your 1783 01:26:22,700 --> 01:26:27,600 language in a math symbols that you put on paper, right? 1784 01:26:27,600 --> 01:26:31,100 And encode in the K framework and a special type of markup and 1785 01:26:31,100 --> 01:26:34,000 then what will happen is K can actually build your language for 1786 01:26:34,000 --> 01:26:35,100 you. So you have a correct by 1787 01:26:35,100 --> 01:26:38,200 construction implementation of the language, all your tooling. 1788 01:26:38,500 --> 01:26:40,800 Now where it gets really interesting is less about the 1789 01:26:40,800 --> 01:26:43,600 construction of language that's really fascinating from a PL. 1790 01:26:43,800 --> 01:26:45,800 Active and of correctness perspective and it's great for 1791 01:26:45,800 --> 01:26:48,300 research, which gets fastening is translation. 1792 01:26:48,600 --> 01:26:51,000 So what K can do with something called semantic? 1793 01:26:51,000 --> 01:26:53,000 Space compilation. It's something we're working on 1794 01:26:53,000 --> 01:26:56,300 with RV very closely and it's a lot of work is that you can take 1795 01:26:56,300 --> 01:27:00,100 a to find program and translate it into another K to find 1796 01:27:00,100 --> 01:27:01,700 program. So let's say you write the case 1797 01:27:01,700 --> 01:27:04,700 semantics of java which has been done and you write the K 1798 01:27:04,700 --> 01:27:06,600 semantics of C which is also been done. 1799 01:27:06,900 --> 01:27:09,200 Hypothetically using semantic space compilation. 1800 01:27:09,200 --> 01:27:12,100 You can take a c program and translate it into a Java program 1801 01:27:12,100 --> 01:27:14,400 and it runs just like the seat. Program ran. 1802 01:27:14,900 --> 01:27:17,200 Okay. And words this is interesting is 1803 01:27:17,200 --> 01:27:21,100 then that means you can build the ideal perfect virtual 1804 01:27:21,100 --> 01:27:25,500 machine for your cryptocurrency. So in this case it's yellow it's 1805 01:27:25,500 --> 01:27:29,100 the virtual machine that RV designed for cardano and then 1806 01:27:29,300 --> 01:27:32,000 for interoperability all you have to do is just go and write 1807 01:27:32,000 --> 01:27:33,200 the K. Semantics for lots of 1808 01:27:33,200 --> 01:27:37,100 programming languages and the SBC stuff will just translate 1809 01:27:37,100 --> 01:27:39,400 those languages right to your perfect v m. 1810 01:27:39,600 --> 01:27:41,800 So this kind of helps you a bit because you know like the whole 1811 01:27:41,800 --> 01:27:45,000 argument for webassembly is it's not Is the optimal thing for 1812 01:27:45,000 --> 01:27:47,200 cryptocurrencies. It's that a lot of people 1813 01:27:47,200 --> 01:27:49,900 working really hard to make this as interoperable as possible 1814 01:27:49,900 --> 01:27:52,200 with as many programming languages and they have to do a 1815 01:27:52,208 --> 01:27:54,800 lot of work there, but the thing is, it's not fine tuned at all 1816 01:27:54,800 --> 01:27:57,500 for cryptocurrencies so we can do is build something that's 1817 01:27:57,500 --> 01:28:00,200 fine. Tuned for your application and 1818 01:28:00,200 --> 01:28:02,900 then your interoperability strategies, just go and spend a 1819 01:28:02,907 --> 01:28:05,300 few weeks writing semantics down and then you're done forever. 1820 01:28:05,600 --> 01:28:07,700 You just append those to the blockchain in there and if you 1821 01:28:07,700 --> 01:28:10,800 want, if you're curious to see what they look like, just Google 1822 01:28:10,800 --> 01:28:14,700 runtime verification GitHub and you Should or excuse me, K 1823 01:28:14,700 --> 01:28:17,200 framework GitHub. And then you can actually see 1824 01:28:17,400 --> 01:28:20,100 the semantics for Java and the semantics for JavaScript and 1825 01:28:20,100 --> 01:28:21,700 things like that. Now, here's the other cool 1826 01:28:21,700 --> 01:28:24,200 thing, let's say you version your virtual machine, you go 1827 01:28:24,200 --> 01:28:26,800 from version one to version, two ordinarily. 1828 01:28:26,800 --> 01:28:28,800 When you go to version 2, you have to update all the 1829 01:28:28,800 --> 01:28:30,300 compilers. So you kind of have like a 1830 01:28:30,300 --> 01:28:33,700 maximum threshold of comfortable languages, you can support 1831 01:28:33,900 --> 01:28:36,700 because when you update your VM you know, you have to say well 1832 01:28:36,700 --> 01:28:39,200 if I have a thousand languages I have to update a thousand pieces 1833 01:28:39,200 --> 01:28:42,800 of code to get all these things to work with my new version with 1834 01:28:42,800 --> 01:28:44,900 the K framework. Don't do anything. 1835 01:28:44,900 --> 01:28:48,900 You just update the semantics of your VM and then the SBC stuff, 1836 01:28:48,900 --> 01:28:52,100 sort it all out for you so you can support unlimited languages 1837 01:28:52,100 --> 01:28:54,100 and you don't do any additional work whenever you version your 1838 01:28:54,100 --> 01:28:56,100 system, upgrade your system and so forth. 1839 01:28:56,300 --> 01:28:59,400 But guess what? Here's the best part let's say 1840 01:28:59,400 --> 01:29:02,900 for the sake of the argument that webassembly wins out, we 1841 01:29:02,900 --> 01:29:06,300 could write to semantics of webassembly in K and support 1842 01:29:06,300 --> 01:29:08,700 that as well. And so translate to webassembly 1843 01:29:08,700 --> 01:29:10,900 or from yellow. If we if we want to take our 1844 01:29:10,900 --> 01:29:13,400 backyard and seen that like there, I think there existed 1845 01:29:13,400 --> 01:29:14,600 did. They are actually working on 1846 01:29:14,600 --> 01:29:17,100 webassembly semantics and and we're actually also building a 1847 01:29:17,100 --> 01:29:20,500 Kade llvm back end so that we can get basically a handwritten 1848 01:29:20,500 --> 01:29:23,100 code performance from the machine generated code. 1849 01:29:23,400 --> 01:29:26,200 So it's a lot of theory. There's a lot of things involved 1850 01:29:26,200 --> 01:29:29,100 here. It's a deeply involved project. 1851 01:29:29,200 --> 01:29:30,500 That's why there's so many people working on. 1852 01:29:30,500 --> 01:29:34,100 I think all of them have phds or damn near close to it. 1853 01:29:34,200 --> 01:29:36,600 And there's about 10 years of computer science, research. 1854 01:29:36,600 --> 01:29:39,300 That's gone into this particular framework and it's actually 1855 01:29:39,300 --> 01:29:42,400 already been used in practice. It's a practical product runtime 1856 01:29:42,400 --> 01:29:43,600 verification, for example, works. 1857 01:29:43,700 --> 01:29:47,200 With NASA and Boeing and they do verification work with these 1858 01:29:47,200 --> 01:29:50,300 organizations, not small companies and not low Assurance 1859 01:29:50,300 --> 01:29:53,400 settings. So so we're really excited to 1860 01:29:53,400 --> 01:29:56,500 try to bring this into the cryptocurrency space already. 1861 01:29:56,500 --> 01:29:59,200 It's given us, the ability to be very pragmatic, we wrote the 1862 01:29:59,200 --> 01:30:01,800 operational semantics for the KE v m. 1863 01:30:01,800 --> 01:30:04,600 So we actually have etherium semantics and will be launched 1864 01:30:04,600 --> 01:30:06,600 our test net. We're going to actually launch a 1865 01:30:06,700 --> 01:30:09,000 ethereum test that alongside the yellow test that. 1866 01:30:09,000 --> 01:30:11,000 So if you're a solidity developer you have web 3 and 1867 01:30:11,000 --> 01:30:13,500 Viper and all this other stuff. Guess what? 1868 01:30:13,600 --> 01:30:15,600 It's gonna be one to one compatible just as if it was in 1869 01:30:15,600 --> 01:30:18,800 a theorem known, but we didn't actually have to implement that 1870 01:30:18,800 --> 01:30:21,100 virtual machine. It's actually being implemented 1871 01:30:21,100 --> 01:30:23,000 by the K framework. So when we launched our test 1872 01:30:23,000 --> 01:30:25,700 net, it will actually have a correct by construction VM 1873 01:30:25,800 --> 01:30:28,700 that's built right from the semantics, pretty cool stuff. 1874 01:30:28,700 --> 01:30:31,200 No ambiguity, it passes. All the ethereum test vectors 1875 01:30:31,200 --> 01:30:33,400 and it'll be the same for yellow later on. 1876 01:30:33,400 --> 01:30:36,100 We'll start looking at things like proof carrying code and 1877 01:30:36,100 --> 01:30:39,700 things like hooks in the VM that allow formal verification be 1878 01:30:39,700 --> 01:30:42,100 much better. Like, for example, of RV wrote a 1879 01:30:42,200 --> 01:30:46,300 formal semantics for the RC 20 token standard and this is a 1880 01:30:46,300 --> 01:30:49,300 kind of evoke topic right now because some of these ERC 20 1881 01:30:49,300 --> 01:30:52,200 tokens aren't necessarily Implement completely correctly 1882 01:30:52,200 --> 01:30:54,200 and it creates problems so wouldn't be so cool. 1883 01:30:54,200 --> 01:30:57,200 They actually have an artifact that you can have with your ERC 1884 01:30:57,200 --> 01:30:59,500 20 deployment, that verifies that you follow the 1885 01:30:59,508 --> 01:31:02,300 specification, so you get a proof of correctness with that. 1886 01:31:02,300 --> 01:31:05,800 So you know, that your ERC 20 is right, you know, if you have 1887 01:31:05,800 --> 01:31:08,300 billions of dollars of value behind something, Allah owes 1888 01:31:08,600 --> 01:31:11,700 probably a really good idea to, you know, to verify that that 1889 01:31:11,700 --> 01:31:14,500 token is correctly implemented. And these are kinds of things 1890 01:31:14,500 --> 01:31:17,400 that are going to be really easy to do in our view when yellow 1891 01:31:17,400 --> 01:31:19,800 comes out, because we've custom-built the, the VM to 1892 01:31:19,800 --> 01:31:21,900 accommodate that, but we don't have to sacrifice 1893 01:31:21,900 --> 01:31:23,700 interoperability. Now, here's the other really 1894 01:31:23,700 --> 01:31:26,200 cool thing. Let's say that you want our 1895 01:31:26,200 --> 01:31:28,200 virtual machine to support your language. 1896 01:31:28,300 --> 01:31:31,300 Eventually, what you'll be able to do is write the semantics of 1897 01:31:31,300 --> 01:31:34,700 your language in K and then issue a special transaction to 1898 01:31:34,700 --> 01:31:38,900 embed it into the Block Chain itself, then we, as a developer, 1899 01:31:38,900 --> 01:31:41,600 here's how your development experience looks, you write your 1900 01:31:41,600 --> 01:31:45,300 contract in that language. And you go and put a header in 1901 01:31:45,300 --> 01:31:47,900 the thing to go, look up on the blockchain for that particular 1902 01:31:47,900 --> 01:31:49,900 language, and if the semantics of there, it can pull it. 1903 01:31:49,900 --> 01:31:52,300 And then use the SBC mechanics, just translate it to run on the 1904 01:31:52,308 --> 01:31:53,400 yellow. Yellow. 1905 01:31:53,600 --> 01:31:55,400 Don't have to talk to me. Don't have to say, Charles can I 1906 01:31:55,407 --> 01:31:58,200 get support or go and build a complicated compiler or anything 1907 01:31:58,200 --> 01:32:00,000 like that, you just have to write the semantics of your 1908 01:32:00,000 --> 01:32:02,100 language which you already have to do if you're creating a new 1909 01:32:02,100 --> 01:32:04,900 language for example. But now there's a more rigorous 1910 01:32:04,900 --> 01:32:07,600 formal way of doing that where, you know these things there and 1911 01:32:07,600 --> 01:32:09,800 there's a lot of other things like debuggers and, you know, 1912 01:32:09,800 --> 01:32:12,600 all this other framework that will be interoperable between 1913 01:32:12,600 --> 01:32:14,900 each other. So, K is great project. 1914 01:32:14,900 --> 01:32:18,400 K framework is just phenomenal, piece of work and it's being 1915 01:32:18,400 --> 01:32:20,900 incubated at a major computer science institution. 1916 01:32:20,900 --> 01:32:23,000 The University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign is. 1917 01:32:23,200 --> 01:32:27,100 I think that in the top five of all CS schools in the world or 1918 01:32:27,100 --> 01:32:29,700 at least in the United States, it's right up there with MIT and 1919 01:32:29,700 --> 01:32:33,200 Carnegie Mellon and there's and it's known for formal methods 1920 01:32:33,200 --> 01:32:35,700 and pl. This is a big hub for it, so 1921 01:32:36,000 --> 01:32:38,800 it's got kind of the right balance of practicality of 1922 01:32:38,800 --> 01:32:40,700 theory. There's definitely the right 1923 01:32:40,700 --> 01:32:42,300 team working on it. If you guys want to know more 1924 01:32:42,300 --> 01:32:45,000 about it grigory. A wonderful guy to bring on and 1925 01:32:45,000 --> 01:32:48,700 I think he'd be able to give a far more Justice Decay than then 1926 01:32:48,700 --> 01:32:51,800 I could. And that that seems like an 1927 01:32:52,800 --> 01:32:58,100 Federal, she asleep awful invention and thing to adopt for 1928 01:32:58,100 --> 01:33:01,000 smart contracts, right? Because at the end of the day, 1929 01:33:01,000 --> 01:33:03,200 developers going to want to write contracts, the languages 1930 01:33:03,200 --> 01:33:05,100 they want. It's kind of funny when Joe or 1931 01:33:05,100 --> 01:33:06,300 any of these other guys from a theorem. 1932 01:33:06,300 --> 01:33:08,100 So like aetherium is one, it's inevitable. 1933 01:33:08,100 --> 01:33:10,300 You know, we have all the developers is like you have all 1934 01:33:10,300 --> 01:33:12,800 the solidity developers, the language, you created yourself 1935 01:33:12,800 --> 01:33:15,300 but how many Developers. Do you guys have where you have 1936 01:33:15,300 --> 01:33:17,500 a C++ developers? Do you guys have like the vast 1937 01:33:17,500 --> 01:33:20,300 majority of people who write code, do not know how to write 1938 01:33:20,300 --> 01:33:22,700 code or are not writing code for your platform? 1939 01:33:23,000 --> 01:33:25,700 So you need to be pragmatic and create a way to bring those 1940 01:33:25,700 --> 01:33:29,300 people into your ecosystem and that should not be using 1941 01:33:29,300 --> 01:33:31,600 different programming language and throw away all the things 1942 01:33:31,600 --> 01:33:33,800 you've come to know and love and your entire career. 1943 01:33:34,100 --> 01:33:38,800 It is said bring as much of what you you have into our system and 1944 01:33:38,800 --> 01:33:41,200 it should just work now. It doesn't mean it's going to be 1945 01:33:41,200 --> 01:33:43,000 secure, doesn't mean it's going to be practical. 1946 01:33:43,000 --> 01:33:45,300 It doesn't mean We performance that doesn't mean it's going to 1947 01:33:45,300 --> 01:33:48,800 optimize gas cost all of that is like facts and circumstances. 1948 01:33:48,800 --> 01:33:51,000 But it says that you can use the stuff you're already familiar 1949 01:33:51,000 --> 01:33:53,900 with and then you can have a conversation about those other 1950 01:33:53,900 --> 01:33:57,200 questions over time as those communities and merge code. 1951 01:33:57,200 --> 01:34:01,500 So now we have a guest idea to go to the shoe so we'll have 1952 01:34:01,500 --> 01:34:03,400 them. We'll have him on epicenter and 1953 01:34:03,700 --> 01:34:08,200 discuss the create a framework. Charles, thanks a lot for the 1954 01:34:08,200 --> 01:34:11,900 great conversation over the past hour is like, whenever we 1955 01:34:11,900 --> 01:34:14,700 invite, you will learn a lot of Of things that we never knew 1956 01:34:14,700 --> 01:34:18,100 about. I remember the last time you 1957 01:34:18,100 --> 01:34:21,000 came on the show prior to the show, you showed us your 1958 01:34:21,000 --> 01:34:24,600 collection of books and that was mind blowing in itself. 1959 01:34:24,600 --> 01:34:26,700 That that should be an episode, you know, like Charles 1960 01:34:26,700 --> 01:34:30,000 collections of books, I don't know if this one off, did I? 1961 01:34:30,300 --> 01:34:32,600 This is actually one of my favorite math books, it's 1962 01:34:32,700 --> 01:34:35,500 something I read. As an undergrad naive set theory 1963 01:34:35,500 --> 01:34:37,200 from Paul. How most did I show that one off 1964 01:34:37,200 --> 01:34:40,700 last time though? I know that's new to me so so 1965 01:34:40,700 --> 01:34:43,900 it's like if you ever actually become serious and You have to 1966 01:34:43,900 --> 01:34:48,600 take set theory and Math logic. And anyway, how most wrote, this 1967 01:34:48,600 --> 01:34:51,500 is kind of like a primer to help you learn about things like 1968 01:34:51,500 --> 01:34:54,900 Russell's Paradox and but on Starsky and you know, how 1969 01:34:54,900 --> 01:34:56,900 natural numbers are constructed and so forth. 1970 01:34:56,900 --> 01:35:00,000 And how most is one of my favorite authors because he 1971 01:35:00,000 --> 01:35:02,200 followed, what was called the inductive book method. 1972 01:35:02,400 --> 01:35:04,900 So basically what he would do is he right the first chapter and 1973 01:35:04,900 --> 01:35:06,800 then he'd go and write the second chapter and then go back 1974 01:35:06,800 --> 01:35:09,200 and rewrite the first chapter that he go and write the third 1975 01:35:09,200 --> 01:35:11,300 chapter and go back and rewrite the first and the second 1976 01:35:11,300 --> 01:35:12,600 chapter. So if you ever read a book by 1977 01:35:12,600 --> 01:35:15,200 Hamas, the The first chapter is amazing. 1978 01:35:15,300 --> 01:35:16,700 It's like the best thing you've ever read. 1979 01:35:16,700 --> 01:35:18,500 You're like, wow, this guy is such a great author. 1980 01:35:18,600 --> 01:35:21,300 But then something happens that the quality tends to the crime 1981 01:35:21,300 --> 01:35:22,900 is good for championship last year. 1982 01:35:23,200 --> 01:35:26,300 Terrible, the hell, is this guy talking about or something like 1983 01:35:26,300 --> 01:35:29,300 that, but wonderful book, highly recommended. 1984 01:35:29,300 --> 01:35:32,800 And she ever wanted to know about set theory and pianos 1985 01:35:32,800 --> 01:35:34,900 axioms and things like that. Cool. 1986 01:35:35,200 --> 01:35:38,700 So we look, we look forward to having you again, perhaps, when 1987 01:35:38,800 --> 01:35:40,400 you have the next release of card. 1988 01:35:40,400 --> 01:35:43,100 I know, I think that's the Shelly release will probably 1989 01:35:43,100 --> 01:35:45,900 invite. Back and talk more about your 1990 01:35:45,900 --> 01:35:48,500 smart Contracting system and other elements of God. 1991 01:35:48,500 --> 01:35:49,900 I know that we couldn't touch on today. 1992 01:35:50,700 --> 01:35:53,300 So if your listener, thank you for joining us. 1993 01:35:53,300 --> 01:35:57,800 Today, we release new episodes of epicenter every Monday or 1994 01:35:57,800 --> 01:36:02,500 Tuesday, And subscribe to the show on iTunes SoundCloud or 1995 01:36:02,500 --> 01:36:05,200 your favorite podcast app for IOS and Android. 1996 01:36:06,100 --> 01:36:09,400 You can also watch a video version of this show on YouTube 1997 01:36:09,400 --> 01:36:14,200 at youtube.com slash epicenter. Bitcoin, we also Lise recently 1998 01:36:14,200 --> 01:36:18,100 started a guitar Community to hear more from our listeners and 1999 01:36:18,100 --> 01:36:21,300 what they'd like to see. You can find that at epicenter 2000 01:36:21,300 --> 01:36:26,100 .t V / Gator and we always welcome iTunes reviews that 2001 01:36:26,100 --> 01:36:30,900 helps us improve a nitrate on our delivery so do write some 2002 01:36:30,900 --> 01:36:34,300 reviews for us on iTunes and we look forward to being back next 2003 01:36:34,300 --> 01:36:35,300 week. Thank you.