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This is epicenter episode 496 
where the guests been defunct? 

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Chesco. 
Welcome to epicenter the show 

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which talks about the 
Technologies project and people 

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are driving decentralisation at 
the back chain Revolution. 

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I'm Tiffany can dance. 
And today, I'm speaking with any

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Francesco who is the CEO of 
scope, lift and creative Umbra, 

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the Privacy layer for each 
raised token transfers, then if 

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the pattern of you on Yeah, 
thank you so much for having me.

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Really appreciate it. 
Excited to chop shouldn't quit. 

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So, I think the very, very 
clear. 

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First question here is tell us 
about yourself. 

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Who are you? 
How did you get into this space?

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And is it true? 
You are originally an aerospace 

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engineer. 
Yeah, sure absolutely. 

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Yes, I am originally an 
aerospace engineer. 

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So believe it or not. 
We are growing up. 

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I was kind of a nerd and so I 
was interested in. 

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I know really shocking unusual 
in this space very unusual but 

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but so I was interested in 
computers from a very early age.

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I just kind of like, played 
around and started teaching 

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myself to program. 
I was also interested in like 

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Aviation and Aerospace. 
And, you know, Masa and all that

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kind of stuff. 
And so I went to School for 

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aerospace engineering because I 
was very excited about that and 

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I really enjoyed kind of the 
coursework and the, you know, 

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the sort of like overall idea of
doing aerospace engineering and 

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then when I got out of school, I
went to work at a large 

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aerospace engineering firm here 
in the States. 

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And what I learned pretty 
quickly is that the reality of 

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aerospace engineering at least 
of these big firms is very 

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different from kind of the you 
know, idealistic view that I had

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as a young kid going to study 
at. 

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So in reality you know, 
Aerospace Cheering for good 

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reason is very slow. 
Basically, you know, you can 

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work on a project in their craft
project for for many years. 

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Before I can come to fruition. 
There are a lot of people 

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involved in any given project. 
And in general, especially 

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again, at these big firms. 
Things are very bureaucratic and

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slow-moving and it also turns 
out that at these big firms 

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engineering firms, traditional 
engineering firms really, in 

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general, they desperately need 
more people to program because 

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there's all kinds of stuff that 
needs to be done software wise, 

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building software, but it's hard
to get people. 

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People that have the knowledge 
to build the software but also 

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have the engineering side of 
things. 

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And So, within this large firm, 
I was doing all software 

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engineering work anyway. 
And what I realized was that I 

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wasn't loving my job. 
I loved, I really enjoyed the 

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programming side of things, the 
software side of things, but I 

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didn't like was the bureaucracy,
the top heaviness, the 

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slow-moving side of things. 
And so I left a Boeing and went 

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into kind of, I basically 
started freelancing and then 

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eventually grew my company scope
lift into a Something firm, add 

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up shop for lack of a better 
word and this was probably 

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around 2012 2013 at the time I 
was not doing work in crypto but

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I was following crypto so I had 
found Bitcoin. 

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I had was really fascinated by 
it and I was following the 

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project I was doing stuff on the
side you know for fun. 

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I like built a mining rig and I 
was mining Dogecoin believe it 

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or not like at probably at a 
loss in my house but like paying

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more for the electricity than 
then the dose groan. 

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I was mining but but I was 
Following it there wasn't really

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much of a crypto industry of the
time except for like a few 

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companies out there. 
So it was really when aetherium 

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launched that I sort of got 
really excited about crypto 

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because I realized this was it 
went from like oh this is an 

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interesting kind of interesting.
Kind of you know thing digital 

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scarcity that's been invented to
do. 

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This is like a whole new 
platform. 

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And as a software engineer, I 
can build things on top of this.

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And this is going to allow us to
create all brand new kinds of 

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software that do things. 
We In previously do before. 

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And so that kind of when I 
learned about smart contracts 

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and saw aetherium coming 
together that like light bulb 

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kind of went off. 
And so, again, I continue to 

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sort of follow the projects, 
I've been tinkering with 

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etherium and smart contracts and
then it really wasn't until 20, 

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the boom of 2017. 
It's a like 2018. 

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When I started picking up 
projects scope, which started 

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picking a project by this time, 
it was a small consultancy and 

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we started picking up actual 
crypto projects and by 2019 I 

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decided to really Shift The Firm
100% into focusing on crypto. 

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So we wound up our Legacy 
projects are web to and kind of 

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we were doing some native mobile
work as well and decided to 

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focus 100% on crypto sort of 
having to start from the ground 

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up with business development and
all that kind of stuff. 

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But but really it's been an 
awesome ride because as you 

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know, the space in, you know, 
since 2019, the space has 

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changed an enormous amount and 
we've had the opportunity in 

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that time to really contribute 
to a whole bunch of stuff in the

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air. 
I am ecosystem in particular and

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some other ecosystems as well. 
But mainly were focused in 

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aetherium and and that's been 
really gratifying and a lot of 

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fun. 
And yeah, that's kind of a 

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long-winded explanation to a 
question. 

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I didn't take any chance about 
some of the projects you've 

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contributed to and over the 
years. 

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Yeah absolutely. 
We've done a lot of work with a 

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lot of great projects. 
You've been lucky to get the 

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contribute to you know projects 
certainly the your audience 

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would have heard of optimism get
coin. 

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We've done a ton of work with 
them, you know, swap endowments 

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mobile, a bunch of other really 
really cool projects. 

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And then of course, we also have
done some of our own internal 

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projects over the years with 
varying degrees of success. 

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And the one that has a decent 
amount of has probably the most 

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traction of the internal stuff 
that we've built is. 

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Umbra. 
Umbra is also the project we 

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here to talk about today. 
And but maybe before we dive 

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into that, how is it kind of 
being a Hired Gun on some some 

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project in kind of scaring that 
with building your own? 

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I imagine that to really 
difficult line to toe Yeah, I 

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mean, yes and no. 
I mean I think me personally and

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I think as a culture that 
company selects for this, we're 

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like we're a seven-person team. 
We're all Engineers, were all 

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very. 
We just like to build things 

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basically. 
I think would be the culture. 

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And so it's like, really a 
culture focused on on, 

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engineering excellence, and you 
come to us with hard problems 

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and we help you solve them is 
kind of the approach that that 

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we take and, you know, I think 
like, I just have fun. 

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We have fun doing that, right? 
So I think it's, I'm always 

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impressed when people Can you 
know find an idea that they're 

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so passionate about like a 
singular project that they're 

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willing to sort of grind on that
for years and years and years, 

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my mind likes to kind of jump 
all over the place. 

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And so it's been awesome to get 
to contribute to a whole bunch 

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of different projects and to, 
you know, have a few things 

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going on at any given time. 
It also just gives us like a 

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really wide view of the space 
because there is so much going 

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on, right? 
And even with that wide view, 

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it's like it used to, you know, 
in 2017 is you could reasonably 

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Like have a sense of everything 
going on with you EMS one 

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person. 
If you were really paying 

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attention by, then it was 
starting to already get hard 

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now, it's like literally 
impossible. 

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You can barely keep an eye on a 
sliver of the activity that's 

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happening and ecosystem at any 
given time. 

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But you know, we get to we get 
to see a relative to maybe other

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folks, we get to see a wide 
breadth of that. 

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So that's a lot of fun. 
Of course, there is some tension

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with our client work and our own
projects that we would like to 

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push forward, but we've been 
really lucky, especially with 

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Umbra to, you know, get funding 
in the Form of Grants from a lot

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of different sources a number of
different sources in the 

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ecosystem. 
And so we've been able to, you 

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know, push that forward. 
While at the same time, valuing 

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it, bouncing it with our client 
work in the ecosystem. 

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In a nutshell, what does Umbra 
set out to do? 

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Yeah, cool. 
So Umbra is a privacy tool, it's

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a stealth address system and 
it's different from some of the 

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Privacy tools that maybe your 
audience would be used to. 

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So it's primarily about 
receiving payments or receiving 

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a transaction set sent to you by
an unknown sender where the fact

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that they've sent it to you 
isn't isn't immediately. 

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What is it? 
Legible on changes in obvious on

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chain. 
So another way to say that is 

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it's about receiving payments. 
We're only The the sender and 

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the receiver know who the 
receiver is, right? 

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So the sender is visible, 
unchain the receiver is stealth,

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that's the stuff where the stuff
address side of things comes 

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into play. 
So unlike some other tools that 

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your audience may be familiar 
with, you know, like tornado 

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cash being the most prominent 
example, for example, would be, 

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it's not a mixer, right? 
So a mixer is, primarily about 

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taking funds that you control, 
but are, you know, doc, Boxed in

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some way there, it's known that 
you control These funds in this 

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address and then moving them 
through the mixer and when they 

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come out the other side of the 
mixer there in an address that 

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you control, but it's no longer 
clear that you're the owner of 

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them. 
So it's breaking the link 

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between address a and address be
both of which are controlled by 

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the same entity, right? 
That's not what I'm red dots. 

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That's what a mixer does and 
we're not a mixer. 

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So Umbra is about. 
I want to receive a payment, it 

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could be e-commerce. 
It could be you know you're 

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paying an invoice because I'm a 
business and we worked together 

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could be you're paying my salary
you know whatever it is. 

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We have some economic 
relationship, you want to pay me

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but we don't all want it to be 
obvious on chain that you have 

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sent this amount of money to me.
So if you use unrwa basically 

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what it looks like, is you've 
sent some tokens or some ether 

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to an address that has never 
been seen before on chain. 

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Now behind the scenes, it turns 
out that I control that address 

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and The I control that address 
and as soon as you've sent those

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funds they're essentially 
custody need by me and could not

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you couldn't recover them. 
No one else could recover them? 

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Only. 
I have the ability to remove 

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them from that stealth address 
that they've been sent to. 

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But on chain who that address is
controlled by is not visible or 

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legible at all. 
So, that's sort of a quick 

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summary of what I'm running 
Abel's. 

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So if I look at my regular 
saying meta mask and it, let me 

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derive a de facto unlimited 
number of addresses from a 

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single seat raised, right? 
So basically if we coordinate 

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ahead of time, what I could do 
is I could just ban, I could 

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just make a new address from the
seed phrase that I've already 

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using and give you that. 
But what Umbra actually does it 

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actually lets you kind of. 
I mean Differently. 

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Where talk about how it works in
just a bit, but if the name you 

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would generate a new address on 
my behalf, right? 

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Yeah, that's a great. 
That's exactly right. 

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That's a great way to think 
about it, right? 

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So yes, like the Privacy sort of
trade-offs that you get from 

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Umbra are the same as if you if 
I you were going to pay me and I

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generated a fresh address, you 
know, just went into metal mask 

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and clicked add new or created 
some some private keys and 

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imported It, Whatever generated 
a fresh address and then sent 

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that address to you and then you
sent the funds that address, 

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that's that's the Privacy, the 
trait, the Privacy properties 

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that you would get from that. 
Interaction are the Privacy 

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properties that you get from 
Umbra. 

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The difference is that, it's a 
non-interactive protocol. 

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In other words, we don't have to
do that. 

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Out-of-band coordination, in 
order for you to get a fresh 

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address. 
That only I control, you can as 

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you alluded to effectively 
generate a fresh address on my 

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behalf that only I can control 
but still looks completely 

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completely unused and new on 
chain and it basically looks 

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like a regular dress on chain. 
And if it 100% looks like 

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regular dress lunch and there's 
nothing there's nothing special 

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about it because it is a it is a
special address just generated 

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using some cryptography. 
Okay, so waiting is saying, I 

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want to pay you say 15 died or 
whatever. 

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00:12:20,400 --> 00:12:24,300
How do I go about creating the 
zebras and that you will end 

226
00:12:24,300 --> 00:12:27,100
only you and have the private 
key tool. 

227
00:12:28,500 --> 00:12:29,000
Cool. 
Yeah. 

228
00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:32,600
So do you want to dive into this
from at the technical level at 

229
00:12:32,600 --> 00:12:35,000
like the user experience level 
like where you want to start 

230
00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:37,200
with this because yeah yeah I 
think that's a great question. 

231
00:12:37,300 --> 00:12:40,600
Let's let's get the maths 
straight first and then he can 

232
00:12:40,600 --> 00:12:42,400
go through the user experience 
after. 

233
00:12:43,600 --> 00:12:45,600
Okay, cool. 
So I'm going to describe the way

234
00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:47,600
that it works in. 
I'm route today and the 

235
00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:50,400
principle is the same read. 
The underlying math principles, 

236
00:12:50,400 --> 00:12:52,700
the same, there are slightly 
different constructions like 

237
00:12:52,700 --> 00:12:55,600
ways that you could put it 
together and so like different 

238
00:12:55,600 --> 00:12:57,600
stealth address schemes might 
have slightly different 

239
00:12:57,600 --> 00:13:01,000
constructions, but I'm going to 
describe the one that we use in 

240
00:13:01,000 --> 00:13:04,700
Umbra and the underlying you 
know, principles are all the 

241
00:13:04,700 --> 00:13:07,300
same regardless of the exact 
implementation details. 

242
00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:11,300
So to do that, I'm gonna have to
back up a little bit and talk 

243
00:13:11,300 --> 00:13:13,100
about elliptic curve 
cryptography. 

244
00:13:13,300 --> 00:13:15,900
Which is the kind of 
cryptography that underlies, 

245
00:13:15,900 --> 00:13:17,800
basically all of the cerium, 
right? 

246
00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:21,500
So elliptic curve, cryptography 
is asymmetric cryptography. 

247
00:13:21,500 --> 00:13:25,300
In other words, you have not 
just, you know, with symmetric 

248
00:13:25,300 --> 00:13:28,300
cryptography, you have a private
key and you use that private key

249
00:13:28,300 --> 00:13:31,100
to encrypt something, and then 
you use that key to decrypt 

250
00:13:31,100 --> 00:13:33,500
something. 
So the key is the secret and the

251
00:13:33,500 --> 00:13:36,500
key lets you encrypt it. 
And decrypt it right? 

252
00:13:36,500 --> 00:13:38,700
In asymmetric asymmetric 
cryptography. 

253
00:13:38,700 --> 00:13:41,700
You have a private key and you 
have a public key, right? 

254
00:13:41,700 --> 00:13:44,500
And so that it and those Those 
two things are a pair, right? 

255
00:13:44,500 --> 00:13:46,700
So for every private key, 
there's an Associated, public 

256
00:13:46,700 --> 00:13:50,400
key and vice versa. 
And if you have the public key, 

257
00:13:50,400 --> 00:13:54,100
you can derive the private key. 
But you can use the public key 

258
00:13:54,100 --> 00:13:57,300
to encrypt something. 
So to take some text or data and

259
00:13:57,300 --> 00:13:59,100
encrypt it, so that it can't be 
viewed. 

260
00:13:59,300 --> 00:14:02,800
And then once that's encrypted 
with the public key only the 

261
00:14:03,000 --> 00:14:05,600
owner of the private key can 
decrypt it, right? 

262
00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:09,300
So this is what we use and 
things like, you know, you know,

263
00:14:09,300 --> 00:14:12,000
private chat apps, right? 
Like signal or whatever, right? 

264
00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:16,100
So eyes You know the app does 
this process where you can see 

265
00:14:16,100 --> 00:14:19,700
my public key and then you sent 
you take, you write a message, 

266
00:14:19,700 --> 00:14:22,100
the app and Crips it with my 
public key senses to me. 

267
00:14:22,300 --> 00:14:25,800
I'd decrypt it once on its on my
device with my private key when 

268
00:14:25,800 --> 00:14:28,800
it went over the wire, nobody 
could read it, right? 

269
00:14:29,200 --> 00:14:32,200
So that's the same cryptography 
that underlies all of it cerium 

270
00:14:32,500 --> 00:14:36,200
and the private key and the 
public key in, these scenarios 

271
00:14:36,200 --> 00:14:40,500
are just a big numbers, right? 
So they're big integers and your

272
00:14:40,500 --> 00:14:42,800
theory of address, the etherium 
address that you have in metal 

273
00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:48,900
mask, Is derived from the public
key of the associate of the 

274
00:14:48,900 --> 00:14:51,400
private key, right? 
So it's actually the hash of 

275
00:14:51,400 --> 00:14:55,500
your of your public key just 
defines your etherium address. 

276
00:14:55,500 --> 00:14:58,200
And so when you send a 
transaction on the theorem, you 

277
00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:01,800
sign it with that private key 
with the private key and then 

278
00:15:01,800 --> 00:15:04,500
you broadcast it out and people 
running nodes, have to validate 

279
00:15:04,500 --> 00:15:07,300
that the signature is correct 
and then execute, whatever 

280
00:15:07,300 --> 00:15:09,200
actions. 
It has to include it in the 

281
00:15:09,200 --> 00:15:11,800
blockchain. 
Okay, sorry for that, that 

282
00:15:11,800 --> 00:15:14,500
background but I think it's 
important Established what I'm 

283
00:15:14,500 --> 00:15:17,800
going to talk about next, which 
is how getting back to how Umbro

284
00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:20,100
works, right? 
So the way that it turns out, 

285
00:15:20,100 --> 00:15:22,300
right, and this is just a 
property of the math but it 

286
00:15:22,300 --> 00:15:26,200
turns out with in elliptic curve
cryptography, you have this big 

287
00:15:26,200 --> 00:15:28,400
number for your private key in 
this big number for your public 

288
00:15:28,400 --> 00:15:31,900
key, and the math. 
That's going on isn't like 

289
00:15:31,900 --> 00:15:35,000
normal math, right? 
It's not like the math, where we

290
00:15:35,500 --> 00:15:37,700
where we multiply numbers 
together, right? 

291
00:15:37,700 --> 00:15:40,200
The way that we really learned 
to do it and in grade school, 

292
00:15:40,200 --> 00:15:42,000
right? 
It's a different kind of math 

293
00:15:42,000 --> 00:15:45,200
called elliptic Curved math. 
Basically and I will get into 

294
00:15:45,200 --> 00:15:47,100
exactly what that is and how it 
works. 

295
00:15:47,100 --> 00:15:49,500
Because it's out, it's even 
further outside of the scope 

296
00:15:49,500 --> 00:15:52,000
than the stuff I've already 
described, but basically, it 

297
00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:55,500
turns out the way that it the 
way, the the properties of this 

298
00:15:55,500 --> 00:15:57,500
math. 
And the way that it works is if 

299
00:15:57,500 --> 00:16:00,900
you take the number, that is 
your private key and you pick 

300
00:16:00,900 --> 00:16:05,400
another number, a random number 
and you multiply it by that 

301
00:16:05,400 --> 00:16:07,500
random number. 
So private key times, random 

302
00:16:07,500 --> 00:16:10,200
number gives you another new 
number, right? 

303
00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:13,200
If you use that number, you can 
use that number. 

304
00:16:13,300 --> 00:16:17,200
Sir, private key and generate a 
new public key right with me so 

305
00:16:17,200 --> 00:16:19,900
far as I making sense. 
So private key times random 

306
00:16:19,900 --> 00:16:23,600
number nu nu number new private 
key, right? 

307
00:16:23,800 --> 00:16:26,100
So if it turns out, if you go 
back to that original private 

308
00:16:26,100 --> 00:16:30,700
key the associated public key, 
if you take that public key and 

309
00:16:30,700 --> 00:16:33,600
you multiply it by the same 
random number, right? 

310
00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:37,800
Then the public, the, the 
resulting number that you get 

311
00:16:37,900 --> 00:16:43,100
the resulting public key that 
you get, is the public key that,

312
00:16:43,200 --> 00:16:46,600
Dates with or is paired with 
that private key that we got in 

313
00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,500
the first step, right? 
So in fact, the way that under 

314
00:16:49,500 --> 00:16:53,600
works is in the earth so what 
you as the sender do or what the

315
00:16:53,600 --> 00:16:57,100
software does on your behalf 
behind the scenes, is it takes a

316
00:16:57,100 --> 00:17:00,800
public key associated with the 
receiver in multiplies it by a 

317
00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:04,300
big random number and it 
generates a new public key from 

318
00:17:04,300 --> 00:17:07,000
that operation and again this is
all elliptic curve math that's 

319
00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:10,500
going on. 
Not normal math and then what 

320
00:17:10,500 --> 00:17:12,700
the user on the other side, the 
receiver can do. 

321
00:17:13,500 --> 00:17:16,500
Take that same if you can 
communicate that same random 

322
00:17:16,500 --> 00:17:18,900
number to the user will talk 
about that in a second. 

323
00:17:19,000 --> 00:17:22,300
But if you if you somehow send 
that other that random number to

324
00:17:22,300 --> 00:17:25,700
the user, they can take it, 
multiply it by their private key

325
00:17:26,000 --> 00:17:29,800
and get the private key for the 
associated public key that we 

326
00:17:30,000 --> 00:17:32,500
that you calculated as the 
sender in the first step. 

327
00:17:32,500 --> 00:17:36,600
So, again, a little confusing 
but hopefully that sort of made 

328
00:17:36,600 --> 00:17:37,900
sense, I'll let you ask some 
questions. 

329
00:17:38,800 --> 00:17:41,600
Yes, absolutely. 
So, but that still leaves me to 

330
00:17:41,600 --> 00:17:44,300
get the random number two. 
You encrypt, right? 

331
00:17:44,300 --> 00:17:47,600
Because if I send it to you 
unencrypted, then anyone can 

332
00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:52,000
just try out, which public he 
belongs to it, right? 

333
00:17:52,900 --> 00:17:53,500
Right. 
Yeah. 

334
00:17:53,500 --> 00:17:55,100
So you might be wondering, this 
is exactly. 

335
00:17:55,100 --> 00:17:57,500
So you basically the question 
you're asking is okay, that 

336
00:17:57,500 --> 00:17:59,900
sounds that sounds neat but what
good has it done? 

337
00:18:00,200 --> 00:18:03,200
Because I still have to send you
that random number before. 

338
00:18:03,200 --> 00:18:06,000
You can figure out how to 
generate the new address, the 

339
00:18:06,000 --> 00:18:08,300
new public key, which Associates
with the stealth and dress the 

340
00:18:08,300 --> 00:18:10,700
new Dress. 
So how do you, how do we do 

341
00:18:10,700 --> 00:18:11,900
that? 
I still have to send it to you 

342
00:18:11,900 --> 00:18:14,000
and I might, you might as well 
have just sent me an address, 

343
00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:15,200
right? 
So like what have we, what do we

344
00:18:15,200 --> 00:18:17,200
gain by doing all this this 
math. 

345
00:18:17,500 --> 00:18:20,500
So what I'm Britt. 
So what Umbra does to make? 

346
00:18:20,500 --> 00:18:22,900
This non-interactive is 
remember, we talked about how 

347
00:18:22,900 --> 00:18:26,400
these public and private key 
pairs allow for this asymmetric 

348
00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:29,700
encryption, right? 
So effectively what we do then 

349
00:18:29,700 --> 00:18:34,700
is we take the public key and we
use it to encrypt that random 

350
00:18:34,700 --> 00:18:39,600
number that we just created and 
we used Generate the new address

351
00:18:39,900 --> 00:18:44,000
and then we once we've encrypted
that random number, we take that

352
00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:47,300
encrypted data that nobody can 
decrypt accept you as the holder

353
00:18:47,300 --> 00:18:51,200
of the private key. 
And we announce it on chain 

354
00:18:51,200 --> 00:18:53,400
through an event in a smart 
contract, right? 

355
00:18:53,400 --> 00:18:55,400
So Umbra is a smart contract 
system. 

356
00:18:55,400 --> 00:18:57,900
There's an Associated smart 
contract, your funds flow 

357
00:18:57,900 --> 00:18:59,200
through that. 
So, our contract when you make 

358
00:18:59,200 --> 00:19:03,400
the payments and we make an 
announcement at event, that gets

359
00:19:03,800 --> 00:19:08,400
broadcast on chain with that 
encrypted data. 

360
00:19:08,600 --> 00:19:10,500
Side of it. 
And so then what you do as the 

361
00:19:10,500 --> 00:19:15,400
receiver, when you use Umbra, is
you come you log on and you look

362
00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:17,500
at all the payments that have 
happened through Umbra. 

363
00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:20,100
Every event, that's occurred 
through Umbra since the last 

364
00:19:20,100 --> 00:19:23,700
time you use the app and then 
you basically tried to decrypt, 

365
00:19:23,700 --> 00:19:26,300
each one, and you're not going 
to be able to decrypt, most of 

366
00:19:26,308 --> 00:19:29,000
them, but you will be able to 
decrypt, the ones that are 

367
00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:32,600
payments to you and so when you 
decrypt them, you get that 

368
00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:35,900
random number that you need and 
you can use it along with your 

369
00:19:35,900 --> 00:19:39,100
private key to generate the 
private key for for the new 

370
00:19:39,100 --> 00:19:41,000
stealth address that received 
the funds. 

371
00:19:41,700 --> 00:19:46,500
And so we basically USE events 
on aetherium and indexing those 

372
00:19:46,500 --> 00:19:49,100
events processing those events 
locally on your computer because

373
00:19:49,300 --> 00:19:55,100
we want to keep it privately 
obviously to enable the this 

374
00:19:55,100 --> 00:19:57,800
data to be communicated in a 
non-interactive way. 

375
00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:02,700
Okay, I think I found out so 
far, isn't it? 

376
00:20:02,700 --> 00:20:06,100
An awful lot of overhead for you
to kind of look at every single 

377
00:20:06,100 --> 00:20:10,100
event not knowing whether this 
may be decrypted message for 

378
00:20:10,100 --> 00:20:11,800
you. 
So basically if this is 

379
00:20:11,800 --> 00:20:15,100
something that kind of is used 
at scale, is that even 

380
00:20:15,100 --> 00:20:19,800
computationally feasible? 
Yeah, yeah, really good 

381
00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:22,200
question. 
So in computer science terms, 

382
00:20:22,200 --> 00:20:25,700
this is like an O of n problem. 
So it's a linear it scales 

383
00:20:25,700 --> 00:20:29,300
linearly, right? 
So that's not terrible but it's 

384
00:20:29,300 --> 00:20:31,300
not great, right? 
What it means is every time 

385
00:20:31,300 --> 00:20:34,700
someone sends a transaction 
every other user of the system 

386
00:20:34,700 --> 00:20:37,200
is going to have to decrypt 
attempts to decrypt that 

387
00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:41,400
transaction when they go to 
receive their own payments. 

388
00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:44,900
So the way there are there are a
couple kind of approaches that 

389
00:20:44,900 --> 00:20:47,700
you can use to deal with that. 
And I would kind of put them 

390
00:20:47,700 --> 00:20:49,100
into buckets. 
Right? 

391
00:20:49,100 --> 00:20:53,900
One bucket is like sort of like 
researchy sort of things, right?

392
00:20:53,900 --> 00:20:57,100
So you can think of like gossip 
protocols and different things 

393
00:20:57,100 --> 00:20:59,900
that we can do like research 
that we can do to take this 

394
00:20:59,900 --> 00:21:02,600
linear problem and make it like 
an O log. 

395
00:21:02,600 --> 00:21:05,600
N problem again in computer 
science der terms, right? 

396
00:21:05,700 --> 00:21:09,900
So one that is more scalable and
those are there is research 

397
00:21:09,900 --> 00:21:12,200
being done on that and we're 
very interested in that we're 

398
00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:14,600
kind of following and paying 
attention and would like to give

399
00:21:14,600 --> 00:21:17,900
a percent really contribute to 
it in the future but then the 

400
00:21:17,900 --> 00:21:19,700
other bucket. 
Lesions and these are the ones 

401
00:21:19,700 --> 00:21:22,400
that we've pursued so far and 
there's still a bunch of more of

402
00:21:22,400 --> 00:21:25,700
them that we can pursue to make 
things more efficient, are what 

403
00:21:25,700 --> 00:21:28,400
I would call, like, the 
engineering hack bucket of 

404
00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:30,600
solutions, right? 
And so, these are solutions that

405
00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:34,900
don't make the, they don't, they
don't solve the problem in that.

406
00:21:34,900 --> 00:21:39,300
It's still a linear as still an 
O of n problem, but they can 

407
00:21:39,300 --> 00:21:42,000
take a lot. 
They can do a lot of things to 

408
00:21:42,000 --> 00:21:45,200
improve the user experience, 
basically, reduce the constant 

409
00:21:45,200 --> 00:21:50,500
time cost that comes With with 
with doing this, right? 

410
00:21:50,600 --> 00:21:53,300
So in the long run, you know, if
we were going to scale this up 

411
00:21:53,300 --> 00:21:56,000
to every payment on Earth, which
by the way, I don't think it 

412
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:59,200
needs to, or should like there 
are there are a lot of different

413
00:21:59,200 --> 00:22:01,400
privacy Solutions and different 
ones are appropriate for 

414
00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:03,600
different use cases, right? 
And so Umbra has a set of 

415
00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:06,100
trade-offs that are valuable in 
certain situations but not 

416
00:22:06,100 --> 00:22:08,500
necessarily everyone. 
But if we were to scale this up 

417
00:22:08,500 --> 00:22:12,000
to every payment on Earth, we 
need one of those sort of, like 

418
00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:16,000
research, you solutions to come 
through in order to make this 

419
00:22:16,000 --> 00:22:20,100
scalable, but we can get really 
far Far with what I would call, 

420
00:22:20,100 --> 00:22:21,600
the kind of like engineering 
hacks. 

421
00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:25,900
In terms of still providing a 
useful and acceptable user 

422
00:22:25,900 --> 00:22:28,800
experience in the sort of like 
short to medium term. 

423
00:22:29,100 --> 00:22:31,400
And so, that's kind of where we 
are today and and I can dive 

424
00:22:31,400 --> 00:22:33,100
into like, what some of those 
ours. 

425
00:22:33,200 --> 00:22:35,200
Some of the ones we've done 
already, some of the ones were 

426
00:22:35,200 --> 00:22:38,000
looking at in the future. 
But but yeah, that's kind of the

427
00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:42,300
high level answer. 
So, and in my understanding of 

428
00:22:42,300 --> 00:22:46,800
what I clean for me, I answer is
that the computation still needs

429
00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:48,800
to be done in the background 
somewhere. 

430
00:22:49,100 --> 00:22:52,300
It's just done such that it 
doesn't bother the user so much.

431
00:22:52,300 --> 00:22:54,700
Is that correct? 
Yeah, yeah. 

432
00:22:54,700 --> 00:22:57,300
So, so like, let me let me dive 
into like some of those 

433
00:22:57,400 --> 00:22:59,800
possibilities, right? 
So one of them is the one that 

434
00:22:59,800 --> 00:23:03,100
you may be alluded to, right? 
So when I described the system 

435
00:23:03,100 --> 00:23:07,600
earlier I said that we take the 
public key and we use that to 

436
00:23:07,600 --> 00:23:09,700
generate the style of the dress.
And then we also So take the 

437
00:23:09,700 --> 00:23:12,700
public key and we use that to 
encrypt the data in reality and 

438
00:23:12,700 --> 00:23:14,200
Umbra. 
The way that we do it is we 

439
00:23:14,200 --> 00:23:17,300
actually have two separate 
public keys and when you set up 

440
00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:20,600
Umbra, as to be a receiver to 
receive payments, you generate 

441
00:23:20,600 --> 00:23:23,400
to private key to public, 
private key Pairs. 

442
00:23:23,700 --> 00:23:26,900
And you publish the public, the 
to public keys in a registry. 

443
00:23:27,300 --> 00:23:31,100
And one of those is a spending 
key, and the other is the 

444
00:23:31,100 --> 00:23:33,400
viewing P. 
So the first one is used to 

445
00:23:33,400 --> 00:23:36,700
generate the stealth addresses. 
The viewing key is used to do 

446
00:23:36,700 --> 00:23:38,800
the encryption and decryption of
these. 

447
00:23:39,500 --> 00:23:42,900
And so, what that means is one 
option that you have and in 

448
00:23:42,900 --> 00:23:45,800
perfect option, for sure. 
But at least an option is, you 

449
00:23:45,800 --> 00:23:50,500
can give some third party that 
viewing key so that they can do 

450
00:23:50,500 --> 00:23:54,100
the monitoring and decrypting on
your behalf and then just let 

451
00:23:54,100 --> 00:23:57,300
you know when you've received a 
payment, but that third-party is

452
00:23:57,300 --> 00:24:00,100
not able to withdraw your funds.
So obviously you've given up 

453
00:24:00,100 --> 00:24:04,300
your privacy to that third party
but you haven't given up control

454
00:24:04,300 --> 00:24:05,900
of your funds to that third 
party. 

455
00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:08,900
And there are a lot of there are
now that that isn't perfect for 

456
00:24:08,900 --> 00:24:09,600
everyone. 
Right. 

457
00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:11,000
There are plenty of people who 
are going to say, well, that's 

458
00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:13,200
not a trade-off. 
I, I want to make but there are 

459
00:24:13,600 --> 00:24:15,800
plenty of people who might say 
that that actually does work for

460
00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:17,700
them. 
So for example, if you're using 

461
00:24:17,700 --> 00:24:21,200
this for like receiving payments
or you know, invoice payments or

462
00:24:21,200 --> 00:24:23,800
salary payments or something 
like that, you know, just like 

463
00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:26,900
today, you're probably okay with
your invoicing software company 

464
00:24:26,900 --> 00:24:30,700
or your bank or whatever, 
knowing about your about your 

465
00:24:30,700 --> 00:24:32,600
salary, payment or your invoice 
payment. 

466
00:24:33,100 --> 00:24:35,200
You, if you're okay with them 
knowing that you just don't want

467
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:38,600
it, like broadcast and legible 
to literally everyone who knows 

468
00:24:38,600 --> 00:24:39,900
how to go to eat. 
Right. 

469
00:24:39,900 --> 00:24:43,500
So it might be an acceptable 
privacy trade-off for you to 

470
00:24:43,500 --> 00:24:47,600
give a trusted third party, the 
ability to see what you've been 

471
00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:49,900
paid, but not withdraw the 
funds. 

472
00:24:50,000 --> 00:24:51,900
Right? 
In fact that's an improvement 

473
00:24:51,900 --> 00:24:53,800
over today. 
Where your bank literally kind 

474
00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:55,000
of sees. 
They're not really your funds 

475
00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:57,200
at. 
All right there the bank's until

476
00:24:57,200 --> 00:25:00,200
you until you with Jala. 
So that's one sort of like 

477
00:25:00,200 --> 00:25:05,600
simple simple, low-tech solution
to this problem, putting that 

478
00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:07,600
aside and talking about. 
Well what if I'm an individual 

479
00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:09,200
user who doesn't want to give up
my privacy? 

480
00:25:09,300 --> 00:25:11,400
What options do I have? 
There's still a bunch of stuff 

481
00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:13,800
up there. 
So one of them obviously is just

482
00:25:13,800 --> 00:25:18,000
like caching right? 
So once you've decrypted like 

483
00:25:18,200 --> 00:25:20,900
etherium is, you know, past 
blocks are immutable, right? 

484
00:25:20,900 --> 00:25:23,500
So once we've scanned an event, 
once we don't ever have to scan 

485
00:25:23,500 --> 00:25:26,000
that one again. 
And so if you use Umbra to 

486
00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:29,000
receive payments regularly like 
every week or two weeks or a 

487
00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:31,800
month, you're only going to have
to scan the events from the last

488
00:25:31,800 --> 00:25:35,400
time and decrypt the events from
the last time that you actually 

489
00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:38,000
use them. 
Another obvious one is just 

490
00:25:38,000 --> 00:25:40,500
parallelization. 
Write these Are totally 

491
00:25:40,500 --> 00:25:44,100
independent things, right? 
And so computers are getting 

492
00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:48,200
more and more parallel like your
MacBook, you know, these days 

493
00:25:48,200 --> 00:25:52,500
has like 32 cores or more. 
And so we can blast those across

494
00:25:52,500 --> 00:25:55,400
all the processors on your 
phone, or your computer and 

495
00:25:55,500 --> 00:25:57,900
decrypt them in parallel, 
they're not contingent on each 

496
00:25:57,900 --> 00:26:00,100
other at all. 
And so that, that's a big help. 

497
00:26:00,100 --> 00:26:03,800
In reducing the time, there's 
another solution called view 

498
00:26:03,800 --> 00:26:05,600
tags. 
This is something that actually 

499
00:26:05,600 --> 00:26:08,000
comes from mineiro. 
We don't have this implemented 

500
00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:09,200
currently, but it's something 
that we're looking. 

501
00:26:09,300 --> 00:26:12,300
Looking into and I won't get 
into the details there. 

502
00:26:12,300 --> 00:26:15,000
But basically it's a it's a 
constant time speed up where you

503
00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:19,900
can get as much as maybe like a 
6X constant time speed up on the

504
00:26:19,900 --> 00:26:22,600
decryption and the kind of short
explanation of it is like 

505
00:26:22,600 --> 00:26:26,600
there's sort of like a two-step 
process, one of them is is 

506
00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:30,200
computationally inexpensive. 
And then the other is the actual

507
00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:33,300
description, the process that we
do today and you can do the 

508
00:26:33,300 --> 00:26:38,200
computationally, inexpensive 
step to basically rule out big 

509
00:26:38,200 --> 00:26:41,700
chunks of the Actions. 
Before, actually doing the full 

510
00:26:41,700 --> 00:26:45,500
computationally expensive, step 
to see if it's definitely one 

511
00:26:45,500 --> 00:26:47,900
for you. 
And so you can like rule out 56 

512
00:26:47,900 --> 00:26:50,800
of the transactions before you 
even do the expensive step. 

513
00:26:50,900 --> 00:26:53,400
And then only decrypt, the 
expect, the the six that are 

514
00:26:53,400 --> 00:26:55,400
left so you get a big speed up 
there. 

515
00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:59,200
So this is just like a, you 
know, a short sampling of some 

516
00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:00,100
of the things that are out 
there. 

517
00:27:00,100 --> 00:27:03,100
But there's a there's a lot of 
juice to squeeze in terms of 

518
00:27:03,100 --> 00:27:08,100
making this fast enough to work 
for users today. 

519
00:27:08,100 --> 00:27:10,900
Before we hit Hit the limit, you
know, again, in the like 

520
00:27:10,900 --> 00:27:13,300
medium-term, these approaches 
can get us pretty far. 

521
00:27:14,900 --> 00:27:18,500
So, let me recap, and then kind 
of, let's go over the music. 

522
00:27:18,700 --> 00:27:23,400
So just to kind of reiterate how
it works. 

523
00:27:23,400 --> 00:27:30,200
So I want to send you funds. 
So you have a, you have an 

524
00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:34,000
address, you have the public 
address and basic. 

525
00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:38,100
I generate a random number and 
multiply your address by that. 

526
00:27:38,100 --> 00:27:41,700
Random number, then I encrypt 
the random number to send it to 

527
00:27:41,700 --> 00:27:47,900
you and then you can generate 
The private key true that new 

528
00:27:47,900 --> 00:27:53,200
public key that I had generated 
with the random books and I can 

529
00:27:53,200 --> 00:27:56,500
send funds to that to that 
dress. 

530
00:27:56,900 --> 00:27:58,700
Yeah, that was a good good 
summary. 

531
00:27:59,500 --> 00:28:05,200
If the public key that you 
generate that, I go off of, I 

532
00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:09,200
said, just a standard etherium 
address. 

533
00:28:09,200 --> 00:28:14,000
So, basically, if I, if you give
me your meta, Masky and can I 

534
00:28:14,008 --> 00:28:18,200
perform This, but where exactly 
does umbrella actually come in. 

535
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:20,500
Yeah, yeah. 
Really good question. 

536
00:28:20,500 --> 00:28:24,400
So as we said earlier, as like 
elliptic curve, cryptography is 

537
00:28:24,400 --> 00:28:26,100
what underlies, all etherium, 
right? 

538
00:28:26,100 --> 00:28:30,200
So your address any address that
you use in master whenever is, 

539
00:28:30,700 --> 00:28:36,600
is backed by a standard public 
key on like like the ones that 

540
00:28:36,600 --> 00:28:39,900
we use in Umbra. 
Now the the address itself is 

541
00:28:39,900 --> 00:28:42,400
actually the hash of that public
key. 

542
00:28:42,700 --> 00:28:45,600
And so if you know anything 
about hash functions, You can 

543
00:28:45,600 --> 00:28:48,100
Traverse a hash function. 
You can verify it if you have 

544
00:28:48,100 --> 00:28:50,200
the plain text, but you can't 
take a hash and figure out what 

545
00:28:50,200 --> 00:28:51,400
the plain text was. 
Right? 

546
00:28:51,400 --> 00:28:54,900
So if I give you just an address
that isn't actually enough 

547
00:28:54,900 --> 00:28:57,700
information for you to know what
the public key of that adjusts 

548
00:28:57,700 --> 00:29:01,500
is so the public key has to be 
shared somewhere. 

549
00:29:01,700 --> 00:29:05,400
Now, it turns out when you sign 
a transaction and send it to the

550
00:29:05,400 --> 00:29:09,000
ethereum network, you 
effectively at that point reveal

551
00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:11,100
the public key of the address. 
Right. 

552
00:29:11,100 --> 00:29:14,500
And so once at least one 
transaction has been broadcast 

553
00:29:14,600 --> 00:29:18,400
just on the network for a given 
address, we can recover the 

554
00:29:18,400 --> 00:29:21,700
public key that underlies that 
address and then we can use it 

555
00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:26,300
in Umbra to do everything that 
we just described that is 

556
00:29:26,300 --> 00:29:29,000
possible in Umbra like that 
nothing about the way. 

557
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:30,800
I'm roadworks prevents you from 
doing that. 

558
00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:33,900
And in fact, we even support it 
in our front end but we support 

559
00:29:33,900 --> 00:29:38,100
it behind a flag that we call 
like an advanced mode flag. 

560
00:29:38,100 --> 00:29:41,500
And we put like all kinds of 
friction in front of the user 

561
00:29:41,500 --> 00:29:45,200
before we allow them to do that.
The reason is because As the 

562
00:29:45,200 --> 00:29:48,700
receiver, the only way for you 
to receive your funds is to take

563
00:29:48,700 --> 00:29:53,900
the private key associated with 
your address and to then put put

564
00:29:53,900 --> 00:29:58,000
that private key into a wallet 
or like the front end of unread 

565
00:29:58,000 --> 00:30:00,300
that supports looking for these 
transactions. 

566
00:30:00,300 --> 00:30:01,400
Right? 
That gives you all the 

567
00:30:01,400 --> 00:30:04,200
functionality and so obviously 
we don't want users pasting 

568
00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:07,900
their private Keys into like 
random front ends even our own, 

569
00:30:07,900 --> 00:30:09,300
right? 
It's just not a good security 

570
00:30:09,300 --> 00:30:12,200
practice that we want users 
getting in the habit of doing 

571
00:30:12,500 --> 00:30:14,800
and so we allow you to do it. 
If you know what, you're Doing 

572
00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:17,100
like our app is open source. 
You can pull it down locally, 

573
00:30:17,100 --> 00:30:18,800
run it locally, paste your 
private key in there. 

574
00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:21,600
If you want feeling better about
that, we're not logging it or 

575
00:30:21,600 --> 00:30:23,000
something like that. 
If you know how to audit the 

576
00:30:23,008 --> 00:30:25,700
code yourself, Etc. 
But it's not something anybody 

577
00:30:25,700 --> 00:30:28,300
should do normally. 
And so, the way we have it set 

578
00:30:28,300 --> 00:30:32,300
up is when you come to the 
unwrapped as a as a default 

579
00:30:32,300 --> 00:30:34,400
user, if you don't go through 
the trouble of turning on this 

580
00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:37,800
advanced mode, you sign a very 
specific message, a 

581
00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:40,100
human-readable message, it says 
like, you know, this this 

582
00:30:40,100 --> 00:30:43,800
message is used to generate your
Umbra Keys, you sign that 

583
00:30:43,800 --> 00:30:48,200
message and We use the signature
to generate to public-private 

584
00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:50,800
key pairs the viewing key, and 
the spending key to be talked 

585
00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:54,600
about before, and what this 
allows you to do is we generate 

586
00:30:54,600 --> 00:30:57,000
those keys from the signature 
from your address. 

587
00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:01,100
And so only you as your as the 
wallet holder can generate those

588
00:31:01,100 --> 00:31:04,200
keys. 
But, you know, you don't have to

589
00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:05,800
back up any new key material, 
right? 

590
00:31:05,800 --> 00:31:08,600
So if your seat phrase is backed
up somewhere, you know, in a 

591
00:31:08,608 --> 00:31:10,700
safe or wear it on a piece of 
Steel. 

592
00:31:11,300 --> 00:31:14,500
Then you know you're fine as 
long as you can recover that. 

593
00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:18,500
That address, you can sign that 
message and recover your a funds

594
00:31:18,500 --> 00:31:20,200
as well. 
So, no new key material comes 

595
00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:23,700
into play, but it's still not 
actually the underlying key 

596
00:31:23,700 --> 00:31:26,300
that's used for all of your 
other aetherium stuff. 

597
00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:29,000
And then once we've generated 
that public-private keep those 

598
00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:32,900
two public-private key pairs. 
We publish the to public keys in

599
00:31:32,900 --> 00:31:34,600
a registry. 
So it's just a really simple 

600
00:31:34,600 --> 00:31:37,600
contract that you store. 
You know, you take your address,

601
00:31:37,600 --> 00:31:41,500
you associated with to public 
keys and then as a sender, you 

602
00:31:41,500 --> 00:31:44,500
would come and you would look up
your the software looks up. 

603
00:31:44,600 --> 00:31:47,400
In that registry the address and
pulls the public key for the 

604
00:31:47,400 --> 00:31:50,100
viewing p and the spending key, 
you know, uses the spending key 

605
00:31:50,100 --> 00:31:52,900
to generate the address uses the
viewing key to encrypt it and 

606
00:31:52,900 --> 00:31:55,900
announce it on Umbra. 
So that's the, the kind of 

607
00:31:55,900 --> 00:31:57,200
scheme. 
And the approach that we've 

608
00:31:57,200 --> 00:32:01,800
taken for kind of like a user 
safety user safety reasons. 

609
00:32:03,300 --> 00:32:06,900
But Amber is only weapon, but 
can I download this as a desktop

610
00:32:06,900 --> 00:32:09,700
app because that would kind of 
alleviate a lot of your security

611
00:32:09,700 --> 00:32:12,400
concerns know. 
Yeah, really good question. 

612
00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:15,800
Right now, it's only a web app 
and we hosted in the front end 

613
00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:17,400
ourselves. 
We've explored before, maybe 

614
00:32:17,400 --> 00:32:19,400
packaging it up. 
You know like using some of 

615
00:32:19,408 --> 00:32:21,500
these Technologies like 
electronic or what not to like 

616
00:32:21,500 --> 00:32:24,600
packaged apps up so that they 
can run locally on the desktop. 

617
00:32:24,700 --> 00:32:26,500
That's probably something that 
we should look into more in the 

618
00:32:26,500 --> 00:32:29,200
future. 
We're also, actually, sometimes 

619
00:32:29,200 --> 00:32:31,900
soon, it's on our roadmap to 
deploy Umbra. 

620
00:32:32,300 --> 00:32:37,200
To like a decentralized storage 
solution, which you know, 

621
00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:39,000
doesn't really alleviate the 
exact problem that you were 

622
00:32:39,008 --> 00:32:41,900
describing, but is is something 
that I think is also useful. 

623
00:32:42,100 --> 00:32:43,500
The app is also open source, 
right? 

624
00:32:43,500 --> 00:32:45,800
So if you're a developer and you
know, like the basics of you 

625
00:32:45,800 --> 00:32:49,300
know, and p.m. and stuff like 
that, you can pull the up down 

626
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:51,300
and get and spin it up and run 
it locally. 

627
00:32:51,300 --> 00:32:53,000
But right now, we don't have a 
desktop app. 

628
00:32:53,000 --> 00:32:55,400
It's probably something that we 
should explore some time in the 

629
00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:58,300
future. 
Okay, so let's talk about the 

630
00:32:58,300 --> 00:33:00,900
uses again. 
So, the receiver and the sender,

631
00:33:01,400 --> 00:33:07,200
do they both need to be Umbra 
uses at least in men in the non 

632
00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:09,900
Advanced note? 
Yeah, good question. 

633
00:33:09,900 --> 00:33:13,900
So just to back up real quick, I
want to add something that I 

634
00:33:13,900 --> 00:33:16,700
should have also included. 
We hope in the future that like 

635
00:33:16,700 --> 00:33:20,300
this stealth address Tech like 
the stuff that underlies Umbra 

636
00:33:20,400 --> 00:33:23,400
will also be integrated in 
wallets so that users can use it

637
00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:25,400
directly in the wallet. 
So I think in the long run 

638
00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:28,800
that's like the The ideal gold 
standard of how users would 

639
00:33:28,800 --> 00:33:30,300
interact with this. 
This could stuff. 

640
00:33:30,300 --> 00:33:32,400
It would just be like an option 
in your wallet. 

641
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:34,700
So again, you wouldn't even have
to worry about those private 

642
00:33:34,700 --> 00:33:36,600
Keys. 
All the keys existing anywhere 

643
00:33:37,000 --> 00:33:39,000
anywhere else. 
And that's sort of why we 

644
00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,800
develop Umbra as more of a 
protocol as opposed to like just

645
00:33:42,800 --> 00:33:44,400
adapt. 
We have a front end, we have a 

646
00:33:44,400 --> 00:33:47,100
first-party front end, but it's 
really just a set of standards 

647
00:33:47,100 --> 00:33:50,100
that anybody can plug into and 
we should talk more about our 

648
00:33:50,100 --> 00:33:54,600
work to do in the future to talk
about to make an EIP to 

649
00:33:54,600 --> 00:33:58,400
standardize the IP to push. 
For exactly that future. 

650
00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:02,500
But so getting back to the 
question that you asked, which 

651
00:34:02,500 --> 00:34:04,900
is what is the user experience 
like for the sender and the 

652
00:34:04,900 --> 00:34:08,300
receiver, do they both have to 
be like a user's so right now 

653
00:34:08,300 --> 00:34:11,000
the receiver in order to receive
payments again if you're not 

654
00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:13,500
going to do this advanced mode 
thing which we again recommend 

655
00:34:13,500 --> 00:34:19,199
against the receiver has to do 
one transaction per Network to 

656
00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:24,300
publish their public-private key
pair that is used in the rest of

657
00:34:24,300 --> 00:34:26,000
the system. 
So if I want to receive payments

658
00:34:26,000 --> 00:34:30,100
with um, First Step that I have 
to do is go to Umbra click setup

659
00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,000
and it'll say, you know, sign 
this message, click sign in meta

660
00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:36,400
mask and then it'll say submit 
this transaction. 

661
00:34:36,400 --> 00:34:39,400
It's a very low gas cost 
transaction, we've optimized it 

662
00:34:39,500 --> 00:34:43,600
as much as possible, compressing
the public Keys Etc and then you

663
00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:47,100
accept that you pay the network 
fee and it publishes those 

664
00:34:47,100 --> 00:34:50,600
public Keys as a one-time thing 
after that you can receive as 

665
00:34:50,600 --> 00:34:52,400
many payments as you want from 
Umbra. 

666
00:34:52,699 --> 00:34:55,400
And then what you would do as 
someone who wants to get paid 

667
00:34:55,400 --> 00:34:58,100
with Umbra is you would you 
would send you would tell your 

668
00:34:58,100 --> 00:35:00,700
sender. 
Hey, can you pay me via Umbra? 

669
00:35:00,700 --> 00:35:03,100
Just go to this. 
This dap go to this app, go to 

670
00:35:03,100 --> 00:35:05,000
app, that a DOT cash and pay me 
there. 

671
00:35:05,700 --> 00:35:08,400
And so, as a sender, you go to 
the website and you click on 

672
00:35:08,400 --> 00:35:12,300
send and you get a form that 
just has like to address token 

673
00:35:12,300 --> 00:35:14,300
amount, right? 
Very, very straightforward. 

674
00:35:14,400 --> 00:35:17,300
You don't have to do any set up.
All you have to do is fill in 

675
00:35:17,300 --> 00:35:21,700
those fields and click Send and 
it sends the tokens right out 

676
00:35:21,700 --> 00:35:25,200
where the or The Ether 
underlying it via on Brett, you 

677
00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:26,400
don't need to know any of the 
details. 

678
00:35:26,500 --> 00:35:29,300
Of all the stuff that we just 
described the software is taking

679
00:35:29,300 --> 00:35:32,500
care of all that for you 
automatically unchain, it looks 

680
00:35:32,500 --> 00:35:37,000
just like, well, yeah, we just 
talk a little bit more about 

681
00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:39,900
what it looks like on chain 
tokens versus ether Etc. 

682
00:35:39,900 --> 00:35:42,900
But for you as a user is just 
like another transaction. 

683
00:35:42,900 --> 00:35:47,000
Interacting with a contract, the
gas fees are only slightly above

684
00:35:47,100 --> 00:35:51,000
what the gas cost would be for a
normal transaction. 

685
00:35:51,000 --> 00:35:53,500
Again like this is one of the 
advantages of Amro compared to 

686
00:35:53,500 --> 00:35:56,300
other privacy Solutions like 
zero knowledge proof. 

687
00:35:56,400 --> 00:35:59,900
Are super cool and awesome and 
have a lot of really cool use 

688
00:35:59,900 --> 00:36:02,200
cases. 
But currently, at least, they're

689
00:36:02,200 --> 00:36:06,100
very expensive to validate on 
aetherium, right? 

690
00:36:06,100 --> 00:36:08,600
I'll maybe some pre compiles in 
the future, we'll make that 

691
00:36:08,600 --> 00:36:10,100
cheaper. 
But right now, you know, 

692
00:36:10,100 --> 00:36:13,000
validating, ZK piece at the 
Smart contract, level is 

693
00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:14,700
expensive. 
We're not using Z. 

694
00:36:14,700 --> 00:36:16,300
KP s. 
There's no you know, 

695
00:36:16,300 --> 00:36:19,300
zero-knowledge magic happening. 
And so the gas costs both for 

696
00:36:19,300 --> 00:36:23,300
sending and receiving are 
minimally minimal compared to 

697
00:36:23,500 --> 00:36:25,000
just sending and receiving in 
the clear. 

698
00:36:25,100 --> 00:36:30,100
So Yeah, that's that's a quick 
overview of the user experience 

699
00:36:30,100 --> 00:36:31,400
for the receivers in the 
sender's. 

700
00:36:33,100 --> 00:36:39,200
So if I do this via your web 
app, what's the information that

701
00:36:39,200 --> 00:36:42,500
you can get us, ambra can glean 
from that. 

702
00:36:42,500 --> 00:36:46,700
So basically if if you say send 
funds to me and you say, send it

703
00:36:46,700 --> 00:36:53,400
to F and studies obviously Umbra
where know who's sending what to

704
00:36:53,400 --> 00:36:59,000
whom, because the address is 
kind of generated some aside for

705
00:36:59,000 --> 00:37:02,500
you, right? 
So the address is generated not 

706
00:37:02,500 --> 00:37:05,000
service, I'd know it's generated
client-side, right? 

707
00:37:05,000 --> 00:37:09,700
So yeah, so the web app is doing
all the generation now for 

708
00:37:09,700 --> 00:37:12,100
malicious and we published code 
in our front end. 

709
00:37:12,100 --> 00:37:15,000
That isn't doing what we say is 
doing or is logging things back 

710
00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:18,300
to our server or whatever. 
Then obviously we can we can get

711
00:37:18,300 --> 00:37:21,200
that information but we're not 
and you don't have to trust us 

712
00:37:21,200 --> 00:37:22,300
on that. 
You can go look at the open 

713
00:37:22,300 --> 00:37:26,100
source version and run it 
locally yourself to validate 

714
00:37:26,100 --> 00:37:30,300
that but yeah, everything is 
done client side so as for us, 

715
00:37:30,400 --> 00:37:34,900
Us as Umbra, we can't. 
What's what's visible to us as 

716
00:37:34,900 --> 00:37:38,000
what's visible to everyone else?
Which is you sent a transaction 

717
00:37:38,200 --> 00:37:41,000
to a stealth address at stealth?
The dress looks like a brand-new

718
00:37:41,000 --> 00:37:44,100
adjust on chain, we don't know 
who controls that stuff, the 

719
00:37:44,100 --> 00:37:47,200
dress, and we'll never know who 
controls that stuff, the dress 

720
00:37:47,200 --> 00:37:50,500
unless unless they intentionally
docks themselves or do something

721
00:37:50,500 --> 00:37:53,000
stupid on the withdrawal, side 
of things, which is something we

722
00:37:53,000 --> 00:37:54,800
should. 
We should talk about about 

723
00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,500
preserving your privacy, as a 
receiver, but, but yeah, and 

724
00:37:58,500 --> 00:38:00,300
same with the description as a 
receiver. 

725
00:38:00,500 --> 00:38:02,300
All of that is happening 
client-side. 

726
00:38:02,300 --> 00:38:04,800
So, unless of course, like we 
talked about earlier, you 

727
00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:07,900
delegate your viewing key to a 
third party intentionally and as

728
00:38:07,900 --> 00:38:09,900
far as I know, there's no 
service is doing that right now.

729
00:38:09,900 --> 00:38:13,000
We've thought about building one
ourselves and giving users that 

730
00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:15,300
option. 
But so far we haven't and not 

731
00:38:15,300 --> 00:38:17,600
sure if the demand is there for 
that, or not at this point. 

732
00:38:18,300 --> 00:38:20,800
But unless you tell unless you 
delegate that to someone else 

733
00:38:20,900 --> 00:38:24,200
intentionally, then everything 
is done client side. 

734
00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:27,100
So if you go to the app, like 
all the decryption is done on 

735
00:38:27,100 --> 00:38:30,200
our side, we don't know which 
stealth addresses, you control. 

736
00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:34,400
Or you don't okay? 
Say I haven't checked in for 

737
00:38:34,400 --> 00:38:38,900
like a month how long will it 
take me to kind of go through 

738
00:38:38,900 --> 00:38:42,300
all the transactions to see 
whether I actually received 

739
00:38:42,300 --> 00:38:44,800
anything? 
Yeah so it depends on the 

740
00:38:44,808 --> 00:38:47,200
network right? 
And Depends because it depends 

741
00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:49,600
on how many transactions other 
people have sent, right? 

742
00:38:49,600 --> 00:38:53,500
So like if we deployed to a new 
network tomorrow and do a couple

743
00:38:53,500 --> 00:38:55,900
tests transactions it'll be like
instinct because it's really 

744
00:38:55,900 --> 00:38:58,700
quick but I think the network 
that currently has the most 

745
00:38:58,700 --> 00:39:01,600
transactions that have gone 
through Is polygon. 

746
00:39:02,600 --> 00:39:05,500
I think it's on the order of low
hundreds of thousands, so maybe 

747
00:39:05,500 --> 00:39:08,600
like, I don't know, maybe 
100,000 200,000 something like 

748
00:39:08,600 --> 00:39:13,200
that in total on polygon, I 
think that's right. 

749
00:39:13,800 --> 00:39:16,600
I think that's roughly write 
something on that order of 

750
00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:19,300
magnitude. 
And right now, I was actually 

751
00:39:19,300 --> 00:39:21,000
just doing some testing with 
this yesterday because we are 

752
00:39:21,000 --> 00:39:22,900
tracking down a small Edge case 
bug. 

753
00:39:23,200 --> 00:39:26,800
And I think on my my computer, 
you know, like kind of a 

754
00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:30,500
middle-of-the-road, 8-core, 
whatever, developer machine, It 

755
00:39:30,500 --> 00:39:33,400
was taking me like three or four
minutes to decrypt, everything, 

756
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:38,000
you know, to fetch the fetch, 
the data that actually takes a 

757
00:39:38,008 --> 00:39:39,900
little bit of time as well. 
They've to fetch the 

758
00:39:39,900 --> 00:39:43,100
announcements and then you have 
to decrypt them and you know it 

759
00:39:43,107 --> 00:39:45,900
was like the total time was 
three or four minutes so that's 

760
00:39:45,900 --> 00:39:49,900
not ideal but obviously with 
like caching and stuff that gets

761
00:39:49,900 --> 00:39:55,100
better and that's currently the 
worst-case scenario for polygon.

762
00:39:56,100 --> 00:39:59,400
One thing that is yeah and one 
thing that's worth noting there 

763
00:39:59,400 --> 00:40:05,000
is that As he said like it gets 
worse as more people send 

764
00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:07,500
transactions. 
And so one thing that we also do

765
00:40:07,500 --> 00:40:11,400
is there's a small toll 
associated with each send that 

766
00:40:11,400 --> 00:40:14,300
you do on a run. 
And the reason is we don't like 

767
00:40:14,400 --> 00:40:17,100
there's a griefing attack that 
you could do. 

768
00:40:17,100 --> 00:40:20,200
If you just you know, whatever. 
Wanted like it does it you can't

769
00:40:20,200 --> 00:40:21,700
steal anything. 
It's not stealing funds or 

770
00:40:21,707 --> 00:40:24,100
anything but you could just make
everyone's life Difficult by 

771
00:40:24,100 --> 00:40:27,600
like wash sending a bunch of, 
you know, transactions through 

772
00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:30,300
to yourself. 
You're not losing any money and 

773
00:40:30,400 --> 00:40:33,600
And but you're adding all these 
events to the sent history that 

774
00:40:33,600 --> 00:40:38,300
now become this sort of like, 
you know this sort of like a 

775
00:40:38,300 --> 00:40:41,300
challenge for everybody else to 
decrypt on their side, right? 

776
00:40:41,300 --> 00:40:44,100
And so there's a small toll 
that's associated with each 

777
00:40:44,100 --> 00:40:47,200
scent that you have to pay and 
that's purely as like a Spam 

778
00:40:47,300 --> 00:40:50,000
mitigation method, right? 
So if you have to pay a couple 

779
00:40:50,000 --> 00:40:51,800
of cents, which is basically 
what we haven't said to you 

780
00:40:51,808 --> 00:40:55,800
right now for each send, then 
you're going to be, you know, 

781
00:40:55,800 --> 00:40:59,100
discouraged from sending 
thousands and thousands of these

782
00:40:59,100 --> 00:41:00,300
which is what it would take to 
make. 

783
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:03,100
A noticeable difference in the 
decryption time and that's only 

784
00:41:03,100 --> 00:41:05,800
on low fee networks. 
By the way, on maenette, the gas

785
00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:07,900
fees themselves are enough 
deterrent to do that. 

786
00:41:07,900 --> 00:41:11,700
But you know, on on roll ups or 
side chains like polygon, the 

787
00:41:11,700 --> 00:41:15,600
fees are low enough that someone
who just felt like, you know, 

788
00:41:16,100 --> 00:41:18,700
felt like causing problems for 
everybody could do that for 

789
00:41:18,700 --> 00:41:20,100
pretty cheap. 
And so we want to make sure we 

790
00:41:20,100 --> 00:41:22,900
have a mechanism to prevent that
Sure. 

791
00:41:22,900 --> 00:41:26,200
What happened to the fetus? 
Yeah, good question. 

792
00:41:26,200 --> 00:41:29,300
Right now, they are just custody
by the contract. 

793
00:41:29,300 --> 00:41:32,200
We have an admin key is the only
admin. 

794
00:41:32,200 --> 00:41:34,600
It's only privileged role in the
system that we have right now, 

795
00:41:35,000 --> 00:41:38,400
that admin has the right to 
withdraw all those Feast. 

796
00:41:38,400 --> 00:41:42,200
But again it's on the order of 
like sense, her scent, you know,

797
00:41:42,200 --> 00:41:44,600
and we've had a few hundred 
thousand transactions across all

798
00:41:44,600 --> 00:41:47,600
of our networks over time, so 
you can kind of do the math on 

799
00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:51,700
how much that is. 
It's not a ton but it's there to

800
00:41:52,000 --> 00:41:55,100
prevent spam now it is an 
interesting question because We 

801
00:41:55,100 --> 00:41:57,800
are working to try to develop an
EIP standard to sort of make 

802
00:41:57,800 --> 00:42:01,100
this like a global standard that
anybody could use. 

803
00:42:01,400 --> 00:42:04,400
And so then the question 
becomes, like, okay, well, what 

804
00:42:04,400 --> 00:42:07,400
that's fine for Umbra, which is 
developed by scope left. 

805
00:42:07,400 --> 00:42:09,600
But what happens when this is 
when we're trying to make this 

806
00:42:09,600 --> 00:42:13,400
into a totally decentralized, 
public good, where do those fees

807
00:42:13,400 --> 00:42:16,000
go? 
Should be just burn them, but 

808
00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:19,100
part of the challenge to is that
you want to be able to adjust 

809
00:42:19,100 --> 00:42:22,100
those overtime. 
Right to say, oh, you know, gas 

810
00:42:22,100 --> 00:42:24,000
has gone up on this roll-up 
Network. 

811
00:42:24,000 --> 00:42:25,600
So we actually even The fee 
anymore. 

812
00:42:25,600 --> 00:42:28,600
We want to set it to 0 well 
that's an admitted privilege as 

813
00:42:28,600 --> 00:42:30,400
well. 
So how do you who gets that? 

814
00:42:30,400 --> 00:42:34,200
If you're trying to play this as
a totally decentralized protocol

815
00:42:34,300 --> 00:42:37,400
which is the goal and so that 
becomes that is one of the 

816
00:42:37,400 --> 00:42:39,800
challenges that we have right 
now and we're trying to figure 

817
00:42:39,800 --> 00:42:44,300
out what the CIP You could also 
just reading from, right? 

818
00:42:44,300 --> 00:42:47,300
I mean there's no network 
effects play here, right? 

819
00:42:47,300 --> 00:42:50,500
So busy, you could just always 
worry deploy and kind of set it 

820
00:42:50,600 --> 00:42:56,200
set and reset the fees. 
Yes, that would be an option. 

821
00:42:56,700 --> 00:43:00,000
I guess the only like challenge 
with that is, you know, it just 

822
00:43:00,000 --> 00:43:03,400
makes the like client software 
more complicated, you know if 

823
00:43:03,400 --> 00:43:05,500
there's like multiple places 
that you have to check if 

824
00:43:05,500 --> 00:43:08,700
there's been payments and stuff 
like that so yeah there's like 

825
00:43:08,700 --> 00:43:12,100
an overhead costs associated 
with it but you're right there's

826
00:43:12,100 --> 00:43:14,800
nothing where it's like there's 
not like a liquidity pool or 

827
00:43:14,800 --> 00:43:16,200
something. 
Like there might be with a defy 

828
00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:20,000
protocol where redeploying 
doesn't you know, a redeployment

829
00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:22,900
has some disadvantage compared 
to the original good point. 

830
00:43:24,000 --> 00:43:27,400
So we've been talking about 
sending III but obviously you 

831
00:43:27,400 --> 00:43:32,000
could also send any y'all see, 
20 token and and then in 

832
00:43:32,000 --> 00:43:36,500
principle, basically, if I 
understand for instance, you 

833
00:43:37,200 --> 00:43:43,200
five optimism tokens, you may be
in a position where you cannot 

834
00:43:43,300 --> 00:43:47,700
withdraw them from the address 
without doxxing yourself because

835
00:43:47,700 --> 00:43:52,500
you have no gas, no, even for 
gas on your dress. 

836
00:43:53,800 --> 00:43:57,600
How do you go about that? 
Yeah, really good question. 

837
00:43:57,600 --> 00:44:02,400
So, basically, there are two 
paths in a contract and one is 

838
00:44:02,400 --> 00:44:05,300
for sending the base asset so 
ether or like Matic, if you're 

839
00:44:05,300 --> 00:44:08,100
on polygon or whatever and then 
the other path is for sending 

840
00:44:08,100 --> 00:44:10,300
your see, 20 tokens and they're 
different for exactly this 

841
00:44:10,300 --> 00:44:11,900
reason. 
And so when you send ether 

842
00:44:11,900 --> 00:44:15,000
through Umbra, what we do is we 
actually take that ether and we 

843
00:44:15,000 --> 00:44:17,600
send it straight to the stealth 
address, right? 

844
00:44:17,700 --> 00:44:20,900
And then you as the receiver, 
you can withdraw from that stuff

845
00:44:20,900 --> 00:44:22,200
to dress. 
But what that really means is 

846
00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:25,600
just sending a transaction As 
that felt address to send the 

847
00:44:25,600 --> 00:44:29,400
ether to wherever else, you want
to send it to, and that's an 

848
00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:31,700
interesting question, we'd think
we'll come back to in the future

849
00:44:31,700 --> 00:44:34,000
but where to send it to but but 
that's that's a separate 

850
00:44:34,000 --> 00:44:36,800
question from the one. 
You asked as a if you receive 

851
00:44:36,800 --> 00:44:39,500
tokens and we did that with 
tokens, let's say we just want 

852
00:44:39,500 --> 00:44:40,900
the token straight to an 
address. 

853
00:44:41,300 --> 00:44:43,300
Like you said, you know, have to
fund that address. 

854
00:44:43,300 --> 00:44:45,100
How do you do that without 
doxing yourself? 

855
00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:47,500
This becomes a challenge because
you have to pay gas fees to 

856
00:44:47,500 --> 00:44:51,000
actually move the tokens. 
So the way that we solve that is

857
00:44:51,100 --> 00:44:53,600
when you send tokens in a row, 
we custody the toe. 

858
00:44:53,800 --> 00:44:56,200
Ends in the address and the 
stealth address. 

859
00:44:56,200 --> 00:44:59,700
The stealth receiver is the only
has to sign a message in order 

860
00:44:59,700 --> 00:45:02,500
to withdraw them, they can 
withdraw them directly. 

861
00:45:02,500 --> 00:45:06,000
So you're not completely relying
on a real area, if you can fund 

862
00:45:06,000 --> 00:45:08,200
this doll to dress without 
dachshund yourself, that's the 

863
00:45:08,200 --> 00:45:09,700
route. 
You can, you can choose to go, 

864
00:45:10,100 --> 00:45:11,600
but by default. 
What's going to happen is you're

865
00:45:11,600 --> 00:45:16,400
going to use a relaying service 
to to withdraw the funds from 

866
00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:19,100
from the contract. 
So you have to sign a message 

867
00:45:19,100 --> 00:45:20,800
with the stealth address that 
received them. 

868
00:45:21,200 --> 00:45:24,300
You have to agree when you send 
a message to pay us, Small fee 

869
00:45:24,300 --> 00:45:27,300
to the relayer to compensate 
them for the gas and then the 

870
00:45:27,300 --> 00:45:30,600
relayer will take your 
transaction and or take your 

871
00:45:30,600 --> 00:45:33,900
signed message and use that to 
submit a transaction on chain. 

872
00:45:34,100 --> 00:45:37,700
That the under contract will 
validate and say, okay, yes, the

873
00:45:37,700 --> 00:45:41,100
stealth address agreed to let 
this relayer withdrawal for them

874
00:45:41,100 --> 00:45:45,600
to pay this fee and send the 
tokens to this new to this other

875
00:45:45,600 --> 00:45:48,000
address, while paying the fee to
the real are. 

876
00:45:48,000 --> 00:45:52,100
So, that's the system that we 
have in place for Umbra for EOC 

877
00:45:52,100 --> 00:45:55,300
20 tokens. 
I mean that makes total sense. 

878
00:45:55,300 --> 00:45:58,800
How do you go about and 
receiving and ft's? 

879
00:45:58,800 --> 00:46:01,100
So basically obviously that 
works for fungible tokens 

880
00:46:01,100 --> 00:46:06,100
because you can just sell you 
know whatever portion of it but 

881
00:46:06,600 --> 00:46:10,900
if you receive an f t, how do 
you send it on? 

882
00:46:11,900 --> 00:46:15,700
Yeah, so the concept of stealth 
addresses work for nft is unlike

883
00:46:15,700 --> 00:46:18,400
other privacy tools, right? 
Because you can send an mft to a

884
00:46:18,408 --> 00:46:22,300
stealth address and the same 
properties apply in that as it 

885
00:46:22,300 --> 00:46:23,400
would be, if you were so many 
tokens. 

886
00:46:23,600 --> 00:46:25,700
Okay, I see that you've sent it 
to an address but I don't know 

887
00:46:25,700 --> 00:46:27,100
who actually controls that 
address. 

888
00:46:27,100 --> 00:46:31,400
So so unlike, you know, mixers 
or something that rely or choir 

889
00:46:31,400 --> 00:46:34,300
fungibility the Privacy 
properties that you get from 

890
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:37,500
stealth addresses applied to n 
of T, is equally as they do to 

891
00:46:37,500 --> 00:46:38,900
findable tokens, which is pretty
cool. 

892
00:46:39,700 --> 00:46:42,200
There are challenges with, like,
the one that you described, 

893
00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:44,800
right? 
So currently today, the current 

894
00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:47,300
version of anger that we have in
production does not support and 

895
00:46:47,300 --> 00:46:49,800
ftes. 
And this is one of the reasons 

896
00:46:49,800 --> 00:46:54,200
why it doesn't write there are 
solution. 

897
00:46:54,200 --> 00:46:56,700
There are things that you could 
do there the simplest and 

898
00:46:56,700 --> 00:47:00,100
easiest and we do hope to and 
plan to support n ftes in the 

899
00:47:00,100 --> 00:47:01,700
future in future versions of 
Umbra. 

900
00:47:02,000 --> 00:47:03,300
One of the easiest things that 
you could do. 

901
00:47:03,300 --> 00:47:07,300
There would be to give the 
sender the option to include 

902
00:47:07,400 --> 00:47:12,300
some, you know, base assets and 
East along with then of tea when

903
00:47:12,300 --> 00:47:13,900
they sent it, right? 
So instead of it being a 

904
00:47:13,908 --> 00:47:17,300
transaction that just sends the 
end of T, the transaction could 

905
00:47:17,300 --> 00:47:20,300
go through the smart contracts 
and the end of tea and a small 

906
00:47:20,300 --> 00:47:23,300
amount of eith to the stuff, the
dress such that the user. 

907
00:47:23,500 --> 00:47:28,500
On the other side could use that
East to pay for gas to move the 

908
00:47:28,500 --> 00:47:30,900
nft in the future so that would 
probably be the simplest 

909
00:47:30,900 --> 00:47:34,600
solution if you don't want to do
that, then you get into well 

910
00:47:34,600 --> 00:47:37,200
what basically mixing and 
matching privacy tools. 

911
00:47:37,200 --> 00:47:39,800
So how can I fund? 
How can I use some other privacy

912
00:47:39,800 --> 00:47:43,900
tool to fund the stealth address
in a non doxxed way? 

913
00:47:43,900 --> 00:47:48,700
Such that I can then remove the 
the nft without reeling myself? 

914
00:47:50,100 --> 00:47:53,500
You're new to this area, even 
after having received something 

915
00:47:53,500 --> 00:47:57,600
on on a new stuff address and 
there's a myriad of ways to kind

916
00:47:57,600 --> 00:48:02,800
of still, give my identity away.
So what should I do? 

917
00:48:03,100 --> 00:48:05,400
Maybe I can turn around. 
What shouldn't I do? 

918
00:48:06,900 --> 00:48:07,500
Good question. 
Yeah. 

919
00:48:07,500 --> 00:48:11,500
So so the obvious thing that you
shouldn't do is just immediately

920
00:48:11,500 --> 00:48:15,100
send the funds from yourself 
address to a doxxed wallet, 

921
00:48:15,200 --> 00:48:16,600
right? 
If you do that, it's going to be

922
00:48:16,600 --> 00:48:18,900
pretty obvious that this, these 
were fun. 

923
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:22,600
Ones that were sent to you. 
So, and that's actually like a 

924
00:48:22,607 --> 00:48:25,600
lot harder to communicate. 
Then you would think to users 

925
00:48:25,600 --> 00:48:27,100
and this is one of the 
challenges that we've had with 

926
00:48:27,100 --> 00:48:31,000
umbrella, which is the crypto 
Community as a whole has kind 

927
00:48:31,000 --> 00:48:32,800
of. 
Because it was basically, the 

928
00:48:32,800 --> 00:48:37,200
first privacy solution available
mixers were that is the cryptic 

929
00:48:37,200 --> 00:48:41,900
Community has kind of anchored 
on mixers as like, they're their

930
00:48:41,900 --> 00:48:45,500
mental model around what privacy
tools mean in crypto. 

931
00:48:45,600 --> 00:48:50,000
And so, a lot of people think 
like, okay, well, if it Then and

932
00:48:50,000 --> 00:48:52,400
then I take it out. 
Well, it's private or something 

933
00:48:52,400 --> 00:48:54,100
you know? 
Like as if like that's just 

934
00:48:54,100 --> 00:48:56,300
there's like some magic that 
happened in between the two 

935
00:48:56,300 --> 00:48:57,900
things but that's not the case, 
right? 

936
00:48:58,000 --> 00:49:00,300
You sent it to a new address and
so if you want to preserve your 

937
00:49:00,300 --> 00:49:03,300
privacy you have to make choices
that do that. 

938
00:49:03,400 --> 00:49:08,000
Right. 
Right now, there are not a ton 

939
00:49:08,000 --> 00:49:10,400
of great options. 
So one option would be, this is 

940
00:49:10,400 --> 00:49:12,000
probably I would say, the 
biggest challenge that stuff 

941
00:49:12,000 --> 00:49:14,800
Outdoors is still have and I 
think we're exploring a bunch of

942
00:49:14,808 --> 00:49:19,600
possible ways to solve this but 
but there's a you know, there's 

943
00:49:19,600 --> 00:49:23,800
some it's still a challenge. 
So one option would be if you've

944
00:49:23,800 --> 00:49:29,300
received funds to a stealth 
address you can either just 

945
00:49:29,300 --> 00:49:31,700
leave the funds in that stuff 
the dress or withdraw them to a 

946
00:49:31,707 --> 00:49:34,700
new brand new address and just 
continue using that address, 

947
00:49:34,700 --> 00:49:36,100
right? 
So if you receive like a big 

948
00:49:36,100 --> 00:49:38,300
payment of ether or something 
like that, that's like an easy 

949
00:49:38,300 --> 00:49:39,900
thing to do. 
You could then take that he's 

950
00:49:39,900 --> 00:49:43,000
and swap out and, you know, 
invest in defy or do whatever 

951
00:49:43,000 --> 00:49:47,800
and just continue using continue
using that that address and no 

952
00:49:47,800 --> 00:49:48,900
one except the person who sent 
it. 

953
00:49:49,100 --> 00:49:50,800
You knows that you control it, 
right? 

954
00:49:51,900 --> 00:49:54,500
That's fine. 
If you have now that one obvious

955
00:49:54,500 --> 00:49:56,500
question is well, even that 
solution doesn't work for 

956
00:49:56,500 --> 00:49:58,500
tokens, right? 
So what do you do with tokens 

957
00:49:58,700 --> 00:50:01,100
one of the things that we've 
built into the Umbra contracts? 

958
00:50:01,100 --> 00:50:03,400
Is this concept of a post 
withdrawal Hook. 

959
00:50:03,900 --> 00:50:08,600
And the post withdrawal hook 
basically, says, when you take 

960
00:50:08,600 --> 00:50:11,200
your funds out of Umbro, when 
you withdraw your funds from 

961
00:50:11,200 --> 00:50:14,900
Umbra, not only can you move the
funds to some other location, 

962
00:50:15,100 --> 00:50:17,800
but you can take arbitrary 
actions as well. 

963
00:50:17,800 --> 00:50:21,300
So you can Basically do an 
arbitrary transaction on the 

964
00:50:21,300 --> 00:50:24,000
network, in addition to moving 
your fines at the same time and 

965
00:50:24,100 --> 00:50:26,300
you can submit that all through 
the relay as you can pay for the

966
00:50:26,300 --> 00:50:28,800
relayer to do it. 
And so like one example of a 

967
00:50:28,800 --> 00:50:31,400
post withdrawal hook that we 
could build, we actually have 

968
00:50:31,400 --> 00:50:33,500
the contracts for this but we 
haven't integrated into the 

969
00:50:33,500 --> 00:50:36,100
front end yet, but it's a 
question as to whether the ux is

970
00:50:36,100 --> 00:50:38,300
good or not and whether users 
really want it. 

971
00:50:38,300 --> 00:50:41,300
But one of the things we could 
build for example, would be if 

972
00:50:41,300 --> 00:50:45,300
you received, I say you're a sea
of 10,000 die and you want to do

973
00:50:45,300 --> 00:50:48,100
what I just described which is 
just keep using that without, 

974
00:50:48,100 --> 00:50:50,600
you know. 
And without dachshund yourself, 

975
00:50:51,600 --> 00:50:55,100
you could do a post withdrawal 
hook to swap some of that die 

976
00:50:55,100 --> 00:50:59,100
for each. 
So now you have, you know, 9900 

977
00:50:59,900 --> 00:51:03,200
died in a new address with $100 
worth of eith to pay Cassidy's 

978
00:51:03,200 --> 00:51:05,600
and then you can, you know, 
deposited in Ava and Ernie old 

979
00:51:05,600 --> 00:51:07,300
or whatever else you want to do,
right? 

980
00:51:07,400 --> 00:51:10,800
So the broader point is that 
this this idea of a post 

981
00:51:10,800 --> 00:51:14,900
withdrawal hook gives us the 
surface area to integrate and 

982
00:51:14,900 --> 00:51:18,500
the fact that, you know, 
etherium is a Composable chain 

983
00:51:18,500 --> 00:51:21,800
and has all these other things 
available gives us the surface 

984
00:51:21,800 --> 00:51:24,800
area to integrate with other 
things that allow you to make 

985
00:51:24,800 --> 00:51:29,700
privacy-preserving decisions. 
So, another obvious option would

986
00:51:29,700 --> 00:51:32,700
be, you know, there's a bunch of
other privacy tools out there 

987
00:51:33,600 --> 00:51:36,100
that do different things. 
Like just just one that we've 

988
00:51:36,100 --> 00:51:38,300
done some work with them, and 
we're interested in in their 

989
00:51:38,300 --> 00:51:40,500
tool as well as called railgun. 
I don't know if you're familiar 

990
00:51:40,500 --> 00:51:43,200
with with railgun at all, but 
it's an interesting privacy 

991
00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:47,800
solution, but you Aztec would be
Other one that your, that your 

992
00:51:47,800 --> 00:51:49,500
users would be familiar with, 
right? 

993
00:51:49,500 --> 00:51:53,400
So what do you think about those
kinds of solutions their 

994
00:51:53,400 --> 00:51:56,600
Solutions, where you kind of 
have to enter into a shielded 

995
00:51:56,900 --> 00:51:59,700
ecosystem, right? 
And so you could create a post 

996
00:51:59,700 --> 00:52:03,300
withdrawal hook where you 
withdraw your funds, and 

997
00:52:03,300 --> 00:52:07,700
immediately, Shield them into 
some other privacy-preserving 

998
00:52:07,700 --> 00:52:11,100
ecosystem, like, Aztec, or rail 
gun or any other that could that

999
00:52:11,100 --> 00:52:13,100
is or could be developed in the 
future, right? 

1000
00:52:13,700 --> 00:52:16,900
So that's another sort of like 
unchain native solution, The 

1001
00:52:16,900 --> 00:52:20,500
truth is that on I think most of
our users are doing today is a 

1002
00:52:20,508 --> 00:52:24,500
lot less sexy, but is practical 
for a lot of use cases which is 

1003
00:52:24,600 --> 00:52:27,100
they get paid with umbrella like
so that we're doing some work 

1004
00:52:27,100 --> 00:52:28,900
for a doubt, you know, we've 
talked to you as you're doing 

1005
00:52:28,900 --> 00:52:31,300
this, they're getting paid by a 
dow, they don't want that 

1006
00:52:31,700 --> 00:52:34,700
completely legible Unchained, 
the Dow paste them via Umbra and

1007
00:52:34,700 --> 00:52:37,600
then they withdraw their funds 
directly to an exchange, right? 

1008
00:52:37,600 --> 00:52:40,200
And so they send the funds to an
exchange and they cash out to 

1009
00:52:40,200 --> 00:52:43,400
Fiat or send them back on chain 
somewhere else, you know, 

1010
00:52:43,400 --> 00:52:47,600
effectively using the The 
Exchange as As a mixer, 

1011
00:52:48,300 --> 00:52:50,800
obviously, not a very good mixer
because the exchange, no, sir 

1012
00:52:50,800 --> 00:52:52,200
you are, right? 
So, you have to be okay with 

1013
00:52:52,200 --> 00:52:55,100
that, that privacy trade-off. 
But again, for a lot of use 

1014
00:52:55,100 --> 00:52:58,700
cases that is acceptable. 
I mean, even if you okay, with 

1015
00:52:58,700 --> 00:53:03,300
the exchange knowing who you 
are, these days exchanges only 

1016
00:53:03,300 --> 00:53:06,800
give you one deposit, the mess. 
So if you use that trick and 

1017
00:53:06,800 --> 00:53:11,200
it's like one one, one time 
like, yeah. 

1018
00:53:11,200 --> 00:53:13,100
It depends different in 
different exchanges, do 

1019
00:53:13,100 --> 00:53:14,400
different things. 
A lot of them do. 

1020
00:53:14,400 --> 00:53:17,200
Do one positive dress per asset.
Days. 

1021
00:53:17,500 --> 00:53:20,500
You know, if you don't if you 
only ever use it for umbrella, 

1022
00:53:20,500 --> 00:53:23,100
right then it allows you to 
consolidate the payment. 

1023
00:53:23,100 --> 00:53:25,400
So you can say like, okay these 
different payments all must have

1024
00:53:25,400 --> 00:53:27,400
been going to the same entity 
but you still don't know who 

1025
00:53:27,400 --> 00:53:29,000
that entity is what you're 
right. 

1026
00:53:29,000 --> 00:53:32,200
It's a problem. 
So yeah, there are there, this 

1027
00:53:32,200 --> 00:53:34,200
this is, I would say, the 
biggest challenge that stuff 

1028
00:53:34,200 --> 00:53:37,000
address addresses have the 
Privacy properties are really 

1029
00:53:37,000 --> 00:53:38,700
nice. 
In terms of receiving payments 

1030
00:53:38,900 --> 00:53:41,500
in this non-interactive way, 
that aren't obvious on chain, 

1031
00:53:41,700 --> 00:53:45,000
but then it's not necessarily 
easy to make privacy-preserving 

1032
00:53:45,700 --> 00:53:49,600
decisions. 
After that after you've received

1033
00:53:49,600 --> 00:53:51,900
the payments, right? 
And so this is one of the things

1034
00:53:51,900 --> 00:53:53,900
that were working on as I 
alluded to there's this 

1035
00:53:53,900 --> 00:53:56,500
possibility for Integrations via
these withdrawal Hooks. 

1036
00:53:56,900 --> 00:53:59,000
And I think it's one of the 
places where we can make a lot 

1037
00:53:59,000 --> 00:54:03,200
of improvements in the future. 
And like I said before, like, I 

1038
00:54:03,200 --> 00:54:06,500
don't think stealth addresses 
are like a are like the Silver 

1039
00:54:06,500 --> 00:54:10,400
Bullet for privacy, like there. 
One tool that has a specific or 

1040
00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:13,700
a set of specific use cases and,
and properties that are useful 

1041
00:54:13,700 --> 00:54:17,200
for certain things. 
And I think in the long term In 

1042
00:54:17,200 --> 00:54:20,300
general for for the etherium 
ecosystem and for crypto 

1043
00:54:20,300 --> 00:54:22,900
ecosystems in general. 
I think the there's not going to

1044
00:54:22,908 --> 00:54:26,500
be like one tool that like oh 
this is how you do privacy. 

1045
00:54:26,500 --> 00:54:28,400
It's going to be more like 
there's a bunch of different 

1046
00:54:28,400 --> 00:54:29,800
tools that give you different 
properties. 

1047
00:54:29,800 --> 00:54:32,800
And you have to sort of know how
to use them in conjunction with 

1048
00:54:32,800 --> 00:54:35,500
each other, to get the level of 
privacy that you want and need 

1049
00:54:36,200 --> 00:54:38,200
for whatever your kind of 
situation is. 

1050
00:54:38,200 --> 00:54:41,800
And I think we can do a lot to 
make that the ux for doing that 

1051
00:54:41,800 --> 00:54:44,500
easier. 
But I think that's sort of the 

1052
00:54:44,500 --> 00:54:48,400
reality of privacy. 
In crypto is that there's always

1053
00:54:48,400 --> 00:54:51,200
going to be multiple tools and 
you'll have to understand the 

1054
00:54:51,207 --> 00:54:54,800
properties of the different 
tools and make decisions to kind

1055
00:54:54,800 --> 00:54:57,000
of like, get the, the level of 
privacy you need. 

1056
00:54:58,600 --> 00:55:01,100
Yeah. 
I mean, as a user I mean to us 

1057
00:55:01,200 --> 00:55:05,000
it seems almost normal, but I 
mean, if you explain it to 

1058
00:55:05,100 --> 00:55:07,700
anyone else it would seem crazy,
right? 

1059
00:55:07,700 --> 00:55:09,300
Basic? 
It's like, yeah. 

1060
00:55:09,300 --> 00:55:15,400
So what actually happens is you 
have several wanted and in your 

1061
00:55:15,400 --> 00:55:18,400
in your different pockets and 
you know, you can try and make 

1062
00:55:18,400 --> 00:55:21,600
some kind of put like five 
dollars from one to the other. 

1063
00:55:21,600 --> 00:55:23,700
Why everyone will know that they
both belong to you. 

1064
00:55:23,700 --> 00:55:27,100
And if you want to, if you want 
to kind of consolidate, you have

1065
00:55:27,100 --> 00:55:29,800
to trick, you have to get it. 
Really big pass. 

1066
00:55:31,000 --> 00:55:34,900
Kind of like the ads tag already
gun, and Allergy, and you have 

1067
00:55:34,900 --> 00:55:37,700
to put it in the past and then 
in the pads, you can, you can 

1068
00:55:37,700 --> 00:55:42,700
exchange money from one, what 
it, into a new word. 

1069
00:55:42,800 --> 00:55:45,500
And then, basically, they have 
said not to abstract away here 

1070
00:55:45,500 --> 00:55:49,500
for the average user, there is 
for sure. 

1071
00:55:49,600 --> 00:55:52,900
And so, the ux, there's a ton of
work to do to make the ux 

1072
00:55:52,900 --> 00:55:54,000
better. 
You know. 

1073
00:55:54,000 --> 00:55:56,400
I think like a couple things I 
would say to that one. 

1074
00:55:56,400 --> 00:55:59,500
Is that? 
All that does sound insane and 

1075
00:55:59,500 --> 00:56:02,900
any is to a certain extent like 
it'll get better, but it's never

1076
00:56:02,900 --> 00:56:04,800
going to be. 
If they were going to be like 

1077
00:56:04,900 --> 00:56:08,600
it's never going to be zero 
friction right like all other 

1078
00:56:08,600 --> 00:56:12,400
things being equal. 
A a solution that gives you more

1079
00:56:12,400 --> 00:56:16,100
privacy is probably going to 
have some additional friction 

1080
00:56:16,100 --> 00:56:19,700
and some additional cost than a 
solution that doesn't write just

1081
00:56:19,700 --> 00:56:21,800
sort of logically that's the 
case. 

1082
00:56:21,800 --> 00:56:24,700
And then so users have to decide
the level of privacy that they 

1083
00:56:24,700 --> 00:56:26,700
want and need and are willing to
pay for. 

1084
00:56:26,700 --> 00:56:28,900
I'm going to put It up for, with
an additional amount of 

1085
00:56:28,900 --> 00:56:33,300
friction, one of the things by 
the way, that is just a reality 

1086
00:56:33,300 --> 00:56:36,900
of the Privacy space, in my 
opinion and learned this 

1087
00:56:36,900 --> 00:56:39,700
firsthand of the Umbra is that 
privacy is one of those things 

1088
00:56:39,700 --> 00:56:43,600
that everyone says they want. 
And everyone says that they're 

1089
00:56:43,600 --> 00:56:46,900
willing to put up with some 
friction or additional cost to 

1090
00:56:46,900 --> 00:56:49,200
get. 
But revealed preference has 

1091
00:56:49,300 --> 00:56:52,100
seemed to be that a large chunk 
of the population. 

1092
00:56:52,100 --> 00:56:56,400
The majority of large majority 
actually doesn't feel that way 

1093
00:56:56,400 --> 00:56:59,200
because if you put In the 
smallest amount of friction or 

1094
00:56:59,200 --> 00:57:02,200
additional cost in their way to 
achieve privacy, they just don't

1095
00:57:02,200 --> 00:57:03,800
do it. 
They choose not to do it. 

1096
00:57:03,900 --> 00:57:09,400
And so yeah, that's just like, 
you know, for some of us like 

1097
00:57:09,400 --> 00:57:11,200
myself, like it just is. 
That's insane. 

1098
00:57:11,200 --> 00:57:12,900
Like, it just like we like why 
would you know? 

1099
00:57:13,100 --> 00:57:15,200
But that does seem to be the 
reality. 

1100
00:57:16,200 --> 00:57:18,100
That's okay. 
Like people can and should make 

1101
00:57:18,100 --> 00:57:21,000
the decisions that they want, 
but we want these tools to exist

1102
00:57:21,000 --> 00:57:24,900
and to have the lowest friction 
and barriers as possible out 

1103
00:57:24,900 --> 00:57:26,300
there. 
The other thing that I'll say 

1104
00:57:26,300 --> 00:57:30,600
about some That makes building a
privacy tool challenging is that

1105
00:57:31,300 --> 00:57:34,100
there are users out there who do
care about privacy and care 

1106
00:57:34,100 --> 00:57:37,400
about a quite a lot. 
And, for whatever reason, maybe 

1107
00:57:37,400 --> 00:57:40,300
their circumstances, maybe just 
their disposition, really want 

1108
00:57:40,300 --> 00:57:42,600
the maximum privacy that they 
can get and they are willing to 

1109
00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:46,600
pay for it. 
It turns out though that it's 

1110
00:57:46,600 --> 00:57:50,200
really hard to talk to those 
people because they value their 

1111
00:57:50,200 --> 00:57:56,100
privacy and so doing user 
research for a privacy tool and 

1112
00:57:56,100 --> 00:57:58,700
understanding the use case, The 
people care about and what 

1113
00:57:58,700 --> 00:58:02,600
they're using, and what they're 
not is really hard because those

1114
00:58:02,600 --> 00:58:04,400
people don't want to talk to you
for good reason, right? 

1115
00:58:04,700 --> 00:58:08,200
So, this is just a general, 
structural problem with creating

1116
00:58:08,200 --> 00:58:10,900
privacy tools. 
It's really hard to understand. 

1117
00:58:10,900 --> 00:58:13,400
Your user base is really 
understand hard to understand if

1118
00:58:13,400 --> 00:58:14,900
you have product Market fit or 
not. 

1119
00:58:16,200 --> 00:58:18,200
And, you know, I don't have a 
great answer to that. 

1120
00:58:18,200 --> 00:58:19,800
We kind of just have to like 
stumble forward. 

1121
00:58:19,800 --> 00:58:22,700
I mean even something like a 
simple as like we write that the

1122
00:58:22,700 --> 00:58:26,200
Umbra app does not have any 
client side analytics in it at. 

1123
00:58:26,200 --> 00:58:29,000
All right. 
And that's because we felt like 

1124
00:58:29,000 --> 00:58:32,700
it doesn't really seem right to 
like, have a privacy tool and a 

1125
00:58:32,700 --> 00:58:35,800
friend for our privacy tool and 
then be like logging every 

1126
00:58:35,800 --> 00:58:38,800
single action that our user 
takes tied to their IP address. 

1127
00:58:38,800 --> 00:58:39,900
Right? 
So we don't do that. 

1128
00:58:40,600 --> 00:58:43,200
But that handicaps us, right? 
Because we don't know like, oh 

1129
00:58:43,200 --> 00:58:45,800
like that feature that we 
shipped our people really using 

1130
00:58:45,800 --> 00:58:49,600
that or not like we don't know 
and we can't tell easily right. 

1131
00:58:49,800 --> 00:58:52,500
You know some things have like a
footprint on chain that you can 

1132
00:58:52,700 --> 00:58:54,200
follow. 
Like okay, we know that people 

1133
00:58:54,200 --> 00:58:56,500
are sending this token because 
we can see the funds flowing 

1134
00:58:56,500 --> 00:58:57,900
through. 
We don't know Assigning them to 

1135
00:58:57,900 --> 00:59:00,600
but they're doing it. 
So obviously, like people wanted

1136
00:59:00,600 --> 00:59:04,700
T to send that token but we 
don't, you know, other than that

1137
00:59:04,700 --> 00:59:07,600
like more detailed intricate 
stuff, we don't know because we 

1138
00:59:07,600 --> 00:59:10,900
choose not to, you know, invade 
our users privacy because it's a

1139
00:59:10,900 --> 00:59:12,800
privacy tool and that would be 
counterproductive, right? 

1140
00:59:12,800 --> 00:59:16,000
So it's just it's just a 
structural. 

1141
00:59:16,100 --> 00:59:18,500
Structural problem with 
developing privacy tools I would

1142
00:59:18,500 --> 00:59:23,300
say in general, I also find that
people usually say they value 

1143
00:59:23,300 --> 00:59:27,100
their privacy but no one 
actually runs their oh no. 

1144
00:59:27,300 --> 00:59:28,600
Road. 
I mean in pure I'll seize 

1145
00:59:28,600 --> 00:59:31,400
everything you do correct. 
Yes. 

1146
00:59:31,400 --> 00:59:34,400
But it's not, it's not that 
difficult to run one but people 

1147
00:59:34,400 --> 00:59:37,500
don't have, right? 
So basically then kind of needs 

1148
00:59:37,500 --> 00:59:44,700
to be quick and same toilet sort
of the same for desktop so I 

1149
00:59:44,700 --> 00:59:47,100
think people should really use 
them. 

1150
00:59:47,700 --> 00:59:52,000
Anyways, I have one more and one
more area that I would kind of 

1151
00:59:52,000 --> 00:59:56,100
like to explore and and that's 
smart wallets and account 

1152
00:59:56,100 --> 00:59:58,700
attraction. 
So My understanding kind of 

1153
00:59:58,900 --> 01:00:05,100
using the stealth address 
moderate, but Wendy wax for Eos,

1154
01:00:05,100 --> 01:00:07,700
right? 
Doesn't wipe for smart contract.

1155
01:00:07,700 --> 01:00:11,900
One it as it does. 
Okay, kinetic, I see you 

1156
01:00:11,900 --> 01:00:13,600
nodding. 
So talk me through it. 

1157
01:00:14,100 --> 01:00:18,600
So sort of like, so this scheme,
the the scheme that we use today

1158
01:00:18,600 --> 01:00:21,700
that I described earlier as we 
have, you used your eoa to sign 

1159
01:00:21,700 --> 01:00:25,500
a message to generate that 
public-private key pair. 

1160
01:00:25,800 --> 01:00:30,600
We effectively do that as As a 
convenience layer thing, right? 

1161
01:00:30,600 --> 01:00:36,000
Like, it's a because we want 
the, we want users to be able to

1162
01:00:36,000 --> 01:00:38,000
use the setup. 
They already have. 

1163
01:00:38,000 --> 01:00:41,200
Which for most people is a while
like metal mask or a while 

1164
01:00:41,200 --> 01:00:44,200
connect Wild on their phone or 
whatever with a Neo, a right. 

1165
01:00:44,300 --> 01:00:46,900
And and so that's sort of like 
the setup that we have today, 

1166
01:00:48,000 --> 01:00:51,900
citing messages but there's no 
reason that that is the way that

1167
01:00:51,900 --> 01:00:54,100
the that you have to generate 
the public-private key pair in 

1168
01:00:54,100 --> 01:00:56,300
that way, right? 
So like you can generate a 

1169
01:00:56,300 --> 01:00:59,900
public/private key pair Anyway, 
that you would like and as long 

1170
01:00:59,900 --> 01:01:03,500
as you publish it in the 
registry and don't lose the 

1171
01:01:03,500 --> 01:01:05,800
associated private Keys then, 
and you're good. 

1172
01:01:06,500 --> 01:01:08,500
And so, there's nothing that 
like prevents this from working 

1173
01:01:08,500 --> 01:01:11,800
with a different wallet. 
And in fact, you know, these 

1174
01:01:12,600 --> 01:01:14,400
accounting structure allowed 
some of the ones that exist. 

1175
01:01:14,400 --> 01:01:16,300
I'm not gonna be able to 
remember the time I have, but 

1176
01:01:16,300 --> 01:01:19,500
there's like a standard for how 
they do message signing. 

1177
01:01:19,500 --> 01:01:21,700
Like how you sign a message with
the gnosis say, for whatever 

1178
01:01:21,700 --> 01:01:24,200
like, you know, maybe maybe you 
would know a bit more about that

1179
01:01:24,200 --> 01:01:27,800
actually. 
But, you know, the Yeah, there 

1180
01:01:27,800 --> 01:01:30,300
are ways that you can do that 
now where it gets tricky is like

1181
01:01:30,300 --> 01:01:32,700
some of these wallets they have 
like the idea of like social 

1182
01:01:32,700 --> 01:01:36,000
recovery and stuff like that 
right where it's like you if you

1183
01:01:36,000 --> 01:01:39,000
can completely lose your private
keys and still like get all of 

1184
01:01:39,000 --> 01:01:42,700
your assets back that part 
doesn't work with Umbra because 

1185
01:01:42,700 --> 01:01:45,800
at the end of the day, there is 
a public and a private key. 

1186
01:01:46,600 --> 01:01:48,900
There is a there is a public key
published somewhere and that's 

1187
01:01:48,900 --> 01:01:52,300
the public key that someone is 
using to generate the stealth of

1188
01:01:52,300 --> 01:01:53,600
dress that's receiving the 
funds. 

1189
01:01:53,800 --> 01:01:57,900
And so there has to be a private
key that you like Somewhere, 

1190
01:01:57,900 --> 01:02:02,300
right and don't lose. 
And so if you you know use some 

1191
01:02:02,300 --> 01:02:05,900
wallet that has count 
abstraction and social recovery 

1192
01:02:06,200 --> 01:02:09,800
and you lose the private key 
that's associated with that and 

1193
01:02:09,800 --> 01:02:12,200
the one that you use the private
key that was used to like 

1194
01:02:12,200 --> 01:02:15,000
generate the public key on Umbra
and then someone sends you funds

1195
01:02:15,800 --> 01:02:18,400
just because you social recover,
the rest of your app doesn't 

1196
01:02:18,400 --> 01:02:21,100
mean you're going to be able to 
the rest of your your assets 

1197
01:02:21,100 --> 01:02:23,800
that were stored in. 
That wallet doesn't mean you're 

1198
01:02:23,800 --> 01:02:26,200
going to be able to go get your 
funds that haven't yet been 

1199
01:02:26,200 --> 01:02:28,300
withdrawn from. 
Um, Run out of the system, 

1200
01:02:28,300 --> 01:02:30,200
right? 
Because those funds were sent 

1201
01:02:30,200 --> 01:02:32,500
using a specific public key. 
If you lose that private key, 

1202
01:02:32,500 --> 01:02:34,000
there's nothing that we can do 
right. 

1203
01:02:34,000 --> 01:02:37,500
So I wouldn't say it's not 
possible to use with these you 

1204
01:02:37,500 --> 01:02:40,800
know smart wallets and whatnot. 
It just adds like a layer a 

1205
01:02:40,800 --> 01:02:43,400
little bit of layer of 
complexity and it again at the 

1206
01:02:43,408 --> 01:02:46,100
end of the day, you have to you 
have to retain this this key 

1207
01:02:46,100 --> 01:02:48,700
material, right? 
And if you know today, if you're

1208
01:02:48,700 --> 01:02:51,300
using a Neo a we do that via the
signature so it's not a big 

1209
01:02:51,300 --> 01:02:53,100
deal. 
You already have to retain the 

1210
01:02:53,100 --> 01:02:54,800
key material of your eoa, you're
fine. 

1211
01:02:55,000 --> 01:02:57,400
But when you get into these like
social recovery mechanisms, So 

1212
01:02:57,400 --> 01:03:00,400
what not it? 
It adds a layer of complexity 

1213
01:03:00,400 --> 01:03:04,100
that you have to think about 
Maybe Switching gears a little 

1214
01:03:04,100 --> 01:03:11,100
bit and how do you think we get 
to a world where people care 

1215
01:03:11,100 --> 01:03:13,700
about privacy, right? 
Because with me, if you think on

1216
01:03:13,700 --> 01:03:19,300
it, there had been so many 
Revelations over say the last 20

1217
01:03:19,300 --> 01:03:22,200
years or so. 
Back in the day, people said, 

1218
01:03:22,200 --> 01:03:25,000
you know, why would anyone spy 
on me? 

1219
01:03:25,000 --> 01:03:28,400
And I'm boring? 
I have nothing to hide and so on

1220
01:03:28,900 --> 01:03:33,200
but it's become so apparent that
This is not a blocker even if 

1221
01:03:33,200 --> 01:03:36,200
you're reading boring, lots of 
things can still be learned from

1222
01:03:36,200 --> 01:03:38,400
you and and, and a dime from 
you. 

1223
01:03:38,700 --> 01:03:45,800
And unless you are incredibly 
sophisticated and what do you 

1224
01:03:45,800 --> 01:03:50,200
think it would take for people 
to win back their outrage and 

1225
01:03:50,200 --> 01:03:53,800
kind of asked to take back their
privacy or just take back that 

1226
01:03:53,900 --> 01:03:57,700
and privacy. 
Do you think it's kind of a 

1227
01:03:57,707 --> 01:04:01,300
little bit like you know, the 
analogy with then the Frog it's 

1228
01:04:01,300 --> 01:04:03,500
being No, I didn't buy it. 
Right. 

1229
01:04:03,600 --> 01:04:07,100
So what when's the point you 
kind of jump out is it going to 

1230
01:04:07,100 --> 01:04:11,300
kind of make people care and 
about their own privacy? 

1231
01:04:12,300 --> 01:04:14,200
I don't know if there if there 
was. 

1232
01:04:14,200 --> 01:04:16,700
I wish I knew it, I don't know 
that I don't I don't know. 

1233
01:04:16,700 --> 01:04:18,800
Is the short answer? 
I mean well I have a few 

1234
01:04:18,800 --> 01:04:21,100
thoughts on it like in terms of 
like individuals like 

1235
01:04:21,200 --> 01:04:23,500
quote-unquote, everyday people, 
whatever that that means 

1236
01:04:23,500 --> 01:04:24,500
normies? 
Yeah. 

1237
01:04:24,800 --> 01:04:29,100
Not meant pejoratively at all. 
Like I'm not sure the majority 

1238
01:04:29,100 --> 01:04:31,500
of them are are ever going to 
care and less like thing. 

1239
01:04:31,700 --> 01:04:34,700
Things get really bad in 
whatever jurisdiction or you 

1240
01:04:34,700 --> 01:04:36,300
know particular Locale that 
they're in, right? 

1241
01:04:36,300 --> 01:04:40,600
Like and and and they really are
being targeted in an obvious and

1242
01:04:40,600 --> 01:04:44,000
visceral way that motivates them
to, you know, really start 

1243
01:04:44,000 --> 01:04:47,300
taking it seriously. 
I just, you know, I'm not sure 

1244
01:04:47,500 --> 01:04:49,800
that and so maybe we can move 
the dial a little bit, get a 

1245
01:04:49,808 --> 01:04:52,100
higher percentage of people to 
start caring but I'm not sure 

1246
01:04:52,100 --> 01:04:55,800
that, you know, unless unless 
for you as an individual things 

1247
01:04:55,800 --> 01:04:59,200
get really bad, your most people
are going to care and you know 

1248
01:04:59,200 --> 01:05:02,500
look at it to certain to part of
the answer is like, Maybe that's

1249
01:05:02,500 --> 01:05:03,700
okay. 
Like if people want to make 

1250
01:05:03,700 --> 01:05:06,100
those decisions like that's 
that's their prerogative 

1251
01:05:06,100 --> 01:05:09,500
etcetera, etcetera, you know, to
me, it's like self-evident that 

1252
01:05:09,500 --> 01:05:13,500
you should want better privacy. 
But like, obviously it seems not

1253
01:05:13,500 --> 01:05:15,300
to be for everyone, right? 
That. 

1254
01:05:15,300 --> 01:05:17,000
That's like a self-evidently 
good thing. 

1255
01:05:17,000 --> 01:05:20,400
So, yeah, it's just an 
interesting interesting reality 

1256
01:05:20,900 --> 01:05:23,200
and I'm not sure I have an 
answer on the individual level. 

1257
01:05:23,500 --> 01:05:25,900
One thing that I will note it 
and this is like part of our 

1258
01:05:25,900 --> 01:05:30,200
thesis with a as well, is that 
like whereas individual, you 

1259
01:05:30,200 --> 01:05:34,600
know, people see Seem not to 
unmask care about privacy as 

1260
01:05:34,600 --> 01:05:37,100
much as they quote, unquote 
should whatever that means, 

1261
01:05:37,100 --> 01:05:40,200
right? 
Like it does seem it seems 

1262
01:05:40,200 --> 01:05:43,100
self-evident that businesses and
Commercial applications care 

1263
01:05:43,100 --> 01:05:46,800
about some level of privacy, 
more than a more than maybe the 

1264
01:05:46,800 --> 01:05:49,400
average user does, right? 
So if you're a business and 

1265
01:05:49,400 --> 01:05:52,500
you're having some relationship 
with a vendor and you're paying 

1266
01:05:52,500 --> 01:05:54,600
them some amount, right? 
That's not something that you're

1267
01:05:54,600 --> 01:05:57,200
trying to hide from like a 
nation state, but it isn't 

1268
01:05:57,200 --> 01:05:59,800
something that you want blasted 
out in public for everyone. 

1269
01:05:59,800 --> 01:06:02,500
Right? 
And same with maybe like, Things

1270
01:06:02,500 --> 01:06:06,000
like, paying for things on 
e-commerce, right? 

1271
01:06:06,000 --> 01:06:08,600
Like I think that this is 
another example, where maybe you

1272
01:06:08,600 --> 01:06:10,900
can get like the average user to
care at least a little bit, 

1273
01:06:10,900 --> 01:06:14,200
right? 
Like, okay, would you want every

1274
01:06:14,200 --> 01:06:17,400
single e-commerce? 
Vendor that you used like, is 

1275
01:06:17,400 --> 01:06:18,500
there anything that you buy 
that? 

1276
01:06:18,500 --> 01:06:21,400
Maybe you don't want everyone 
know knowing that you're buying 

1277
01:06:21,400 --> 01:06:23,900
that thing, right? 
Like like maybe it would be 

1278
01:06:23,900 --> 01:06:26,900
better if there was some kind of
privacy payment system, that 

1279
01:06:26,900 --> 01:06:29,800
that kept, that at least not 
completely legible. 

1280
01:06:29,800 --> 01:06:32,700
So, yeah. 
Yeah, I mean I don't know. 

1281
01:06:32,700 --> 01:06:34,800
I don't have a silver bullet 
there. 

1282
01:06:34,800 --> 01:06:37,300
I think certain people are just 
never going to Care. 

1283
01:06:37,300 --> 01:06:40,600
People will care, maybe when 
it's things get really bad and 

1284
01:06:40,600 --> 01:06:43,200
their particular situation, this
is will care. 

1285
01:06:43,200 --> 01:06:45,500
And then some percentage of the 
population does care. 

1286
01:06:45,500 --> 01:06:49,200
And I think we just have to find
ways to make these tools 

1287
01:06:49,200 --> 01:06:52,600
available, so that when and if 
people need them or want them, 

1288
01:06:52,700 --> 01:06:55,500
you know, they have have the 
option and make it as easy as 

1289
01:06:55,500 --> 01:07:00,500
possible to adopt them. 
I think that's, that's a fair 

1290
01:07:00,500 --> 01:07:04,700
assessment. 
So where can people learn more 

1291
01:07:04,700 --> 01:07:08,700
about where can they look at the
code? 

1292
01:07:08,900 --> 01:07:11,200
Where can they join the 
community? 

1293
01:07:12,200 --> 01:07:15,100
Absolutely. 
So you can go to app, dot Umbra,

1294
01:07:15,100 --> 01:07:19,900
dot cash to use the app. 
You can, you know, publish your 

1295
01:07:20,600 --> 01:07:24,100
keys with one cheap transaction,
and then you can receive 

1296
01:07:24,100 --> 01:07:27,300
payments there. 
You can join our Discord, which 

1297
01:07:27,300 --> 01:07:31,700
is linked on the site as well. 
And that is where we do 

1298
01:07:31,700 --> 01:07:34,300
announcements and people chat. 
And you know, if there's ever 

1299
01:07:34,300 --> 01:07:37,000
any tech support or anything 
needed, you can find it there. 

1300
01:07:37,500 --> 01:07:42,700
The GitHub page is also linked 
on the app, but it's scope lift.

1301
01:07:42,700 --> 01:07:47,400
/ Umbra Dash protocol and it's a
mono repo, that has the front 

1302
01:07:47,400 --> 01:07:52,400
end, the smart contracts, and 
the SDK for interacting with 

1303
01:07:52,600 --> 01:07:55,100
those contracts. 
All are hosted there and you can

1304
01:07:55,500 --> 01:07:58,900
check that out if you're a 
developer and then Ambrose on 

1305
01:07:58,900 --> 01:08:03,400
Twitter at Umbra cash and you 
can follow us there for 

1306
01:08:03,400 --> 01:08:04,700
announcements and whatnot as 
well. 

1307
01:08:05,900 --> 01:08:08,000
Perfect. 
Thank you so much for coming on 

1308
01:08:08,000 --> 01:08:10,600
been it's been a pleasant. 
Thank you very much. 

1309
01:08:10,600 --> 01:08:12,400
It's really been a great 
conversation, appreciate it. 

1310
01:08:14,600 --> 01:08:16,500
Thank you for joining us on this
week's episode. 

1311
01:08:16,700 --> 01:08:18,399
We release new episodes every 
week. 

1312
01:08:18,899 --> 01:08:21,700
You can find And subscribe to 
the show on iTunes Spotify, 

1313
01:08:21,700 --> 01:08:24,800
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you listen to podcast. 

1314
01:08:25,100 --> 01:08:28,000
And if you have a Google home or
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1315
01:08:28,000 --> 01:08:30,899
listen to the latest episode of 
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1316
01:08:30,899 --> 01:08:34,100
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1317
01:08:34,100 --> 01:08:36,700
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1318
01:08:36,700 --> 01:08:39,500
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1319
01:08:39,500 --> 01:08:41,899
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1320
01:08:42,200 --> 01:08:44,600
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1321
01:08:44,600 --> 01:08:47,600
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1322
01:08:47,600 --> 01:08:50,700
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1323
01:08:50,700 --> 01:08:53,000
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1324
01:08:44,500 --> 01:08:47,600
Some Twitter and please leave us
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1325
01:08:47,600 --> 01:08:50,700
find the show and we're always 
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1326
01:08:50,700 --> 01:08:53,000
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