1 00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:15,800 Welcome to the epicenter of the show is talks about the 2 00:00:15,808 --> 00:00:18,800 Technologies projects and people driving decentralization and the 3 00:00:18,808 --> 00:00:21,100 blockchain revolution. I'm suggesting cuchillo and I'm 4 00:00:21,100 --> 00:00:23,900 here today with Medicare and just today, we're speaking with 5 00:00:23,900 --> 00:00:27,400 botafogo who is CEO of more for labs, more for labs is building 6 00:00:27,400 --> 00:00:30,000 the Morpher protocol, which is a default protocol that allows As 7 00:00:30,008 --> 00:00:34,500 you to improve your borrow and lend apy on on lending 8 00:00:34,500 --> 00:00:36,900 protocols. So before we talk to Paul, I'd 9 00:00:36,900 --> 00:00:40,700 like to tell you about our sponsors this week, Omni is your 10 00:00:40,700 --> 00:00:44,800 new favorite multi chain wallet on me, supports more than 25 11 00:00:44,800 --> 00:00:49,100 protocol so you can access all of your access your assets in 12 00:00:49,100 --> 00:00:51,100 one place. But what's really special about? 13 00:00:51,100 --> 00:00:53,300 Omni is what you can do inside the wallet. 14 00:00:53,300 --> 00:00:56,900 If you want to get yield Omni allows you to get the best apis 15 00:00:56,900 --> 00:00:59,900 with zero fees in three Taps if you need to swap. 16 00:01:00,500 --> 00:01:02,900 On the Aggregates all major Bridges and X's. 17 00:01:03,100 --> 00:01:06,000 So you can bridge and swap across all supportive. 18 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:08,600 Networks in one transactions directly in your wallet. 19 00:01:08,700 --> 00:01:15,400 If you love and FTS Omni offers the best ft support any wall. 20 00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:18,700 It has so you can collect and manage your favorite and ftes 21 00:01:19,100 --> 00:01:23,200 across all chains in one place. Omni truly is the easiest way to 22 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:26,400 use web three and it's fully external meaning, you never have 23 00:01:26,400 --> 00:01:29,500 to trust anyone of your assets, other than yourself, and they 24 00:01:29,500 --> 00:01:31,500 support legislation ER, give Omnia. 25 00:01:31,500 --> 00:01:35,600 Try at Omni dot app. So Paul thanks for joining us 26 00:01:36,300 --> 00:01:38,500 today. It's been a long time coming and 27 00:01:38,500 --> 00:01:41,600 so yeah, happy to have you here. Yeah, definitely. 28 00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:45,200 Thanks for having me. I'm super excited to join today. 29 00:01:45,200 --> 00:01:48,700 As I mentioned before, I've been listening for a center for as 30 00:01:48,700 --> 00:01:51,500 long as I was into crypto. So very excited to be here 31 00:01:51,500 --> 00:01:53,600 today. Super nice. 32 00:01:53,700 --> 00:01:56,100 So, how long exactly is that boy? 33 00:01:56,100 --> 00:01:59,900 Tell us about your background and what do you have to be 34 00:01:59,900 --> 00:02:02,400 formal foe? Yeah, definitely. 35 00:02:02,400 --> 00:02:05,800 I think my journey in crypto began when I was in high school 36 00:02:05,800 --> 00:02:08,800 and like, basically, you know, it was pure technical interest 37 00:02:08,800 --> 00:02:11,500 into blockchain up first. So is more into consensus 38 00:02:11,500 --> 00:02:18,500 algorithms and, and in Bitcoin in 2015-16 and really went into 39 00:02:18,500 --> 00:02:20,900 my stutters, did it, computer, science and math. 40 00:02:21,700 --> 00:02:25,500 Did a lot of work into like blockchain technology and how 41 00:02:25,600 --> 00:02:29,200 there's consensus algorithm could scale and ended up being 42 00:02:29,200 --> 00:02:32,200 interested. Specifically in if Theorem and 43 00:02:32,200 --> 00:02:34,300 more. The application layer is smart 44 00:02:34,300 --> 00:02:41,300 contracts and and then D Phi and D Phi was really to me it's such 45 00:02:41,300 --> 00:02:44,000 an interesting use case of blockchain Technology. 46 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:48,200 That's a I could not do anything else but work into that space so 47 00:02:48,200 --> 00:02:52,100 I just thought I'd put some research efforts there and yeah, 48 00:02:52,100 --> 00:02:54,100 this is how you know step by step. 49 00:02:54,100 --> 00:02:58,500 I came to to play around a protocols and I mean play around 50 00:02:59,000 --> 00:03:01,600 theoretically I mean like playing was the Concepts of the 51 00:03:01,600 --> 00:03:05,500 protocol. I never really used defy in my 52 00:03:05,500 --> 00:03:08,000 previous, you know, before going into awful. 53 00:03:09,000 --> 00:03:13,100 And then I started designing protocols, like more for it and 54 00:03:13,100 --> 00:03:15,700 came to do more for laps to drop them off a protocol. 55 00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:18,500 So that's how I got into this basically. 56 00:03:19,600 --> 00:03:24,400 How come you never use / beforehand despite the fact that 57 00:03:24,400 --> 00:03:26,400 you were quite knowledgeable about about it? 58 00:03:26,400 --> 00:03:29,700 So busy what was missing for you to actually go, you know, 59 00:03:29,700 --> 00:03:35,200 headfirst into it and I think it was as simple as gas costs. 60 00:03:35,900 --> 00:03:39,500 You know at the time I was like and I never invested in crypto 61 00:03:39,900 --> 00:03:43,000 specifically because I was too young to do. 62 00:03:43,000 --> 00:03:47,100 So at the time, like I did not pass my 18 years old and 63 00:03:47,300 --> 00:03:49,700 basically when I went into, To crypto. 64 00:03:50,000 --> 00:03:54,300 I like I could see you know all those girls exploding but they 65 00:03:54,300 --> 00:03:58,800 could not participate which was quite frustrating but then when 66 00:03:58,800 --> 00:04:03,200 time comes to play around with defy I was like gas price was 67 00:04:03,200 --> 00:04:06,600 completely out getting my season portfolio basically. 68 00:04:07,000 --> 00:04:10,100 So that's probably the reason why but, you know, in practice I 69 00:04:10,108 --> 00:04:12,300 was more interested in Reading why peppers. 70 00:04:12,300 --> 00:04:15,800 And and you know, trying to make sense of what, you know, you 71 00:04:15,800 --> 00:04:19,100 just hope was doing and what weights different from Some 72 00:04:19,100 --> 00:04:22,700 traditional Finance what it brings to traditional Finance. 73 00:04:22,700 --> 00:04:24,300 What could it? You know, what value? 74 00:04:24,300 --> 00:04:26,900 It could bring to the world in general, I think it's not a 75 00:04:26,907 --> 00:04:29,400 question. We asked sufficiently often 76 00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:32,300 especially in Defy. Is like, what is the specific 77 00:04:32,300 --> 00:04:36,100 added value that we bring to the end-user like if device Cal's to 78 00:04:36,400 --> 00:04:40,100 to make billions of users? But yeah, I was it was more 79 00:04:40,100 --> 00:04:43,100 intellectual interest. I would say that, you know, 80 00:04:43,100 --> 00:04:47,400 playing around So, I remember when you guys were just getting 81 00:04:47,400 --> 00:04:51,500 started and you you gave a talk at the Kiln office. 82 00:04:52,100 --> 00:04:54,500 I think it was probably one of the first talk to you gave and 83 00:04:55,700 --> 00:04:57,700 you know, explaining the concept of Morpho. 84 00:04:57,700 --> 00:05:01,800 And you know what are the things that I thought was just like 85 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:07,000 wild about your story and the story of the team is that when 86 00:05:07,100 --> 00:05:10,100 more for launch, you guys are all still in school. 87 00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:17,700 And in fact, I think the idea for Morpho came from one of your 88 00:05:17,707 --> 00:05:19,700 professors. Can you maybe just retell that 89 00:05:19,700 --> 00:05:23,800 story and yeah? How the, how the idea come to 90 00:05:23,800 --> 00:05:27,700 be? And that definitely, I think so. 91 00:05:27,700 --> 00:05:33,200 Back in I would say 2020, I had really two passions like the 92 00:05:33,200 --> 00:05:35,500 first one was blockchain technology and the second one 93 00:05:35,500 --> 00:05:39,000 was enterpreneurship. And so you know intrapreneurship 94 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:42,500 we often tell you like you have to get some sort of unfair 95 00:05:42,500 --> 00:05:47,300 Advantage such that You have something that you're that make 96 00:05:47,300 --> 00:05:50,200 you, you know, different from others and make you stand out. 97 00:05:50,200 --> 00:05:53,000 And this is how you become successful in entrepreneurship 98 00:05:53,300 --> 00:05:56,100 and was that in mines. I really love blockchain to, it 99 00:05:56,100 --> 00:06:01,000 made sense to develop change stuff and I decided to my goal 100 00:06:01,000 --> 00:06:02,400 at the time was pretty ambitious. 101 00:06:02,400 --> 00:06:06,500 Was like, I want to be the most knowledgeable entrepreneur about 102 00:06:06,500 --> 00:06:09,100 blockchain about the technical specifics about blockchain in 103 00:06:09,100 --> 00:06:11,800 France. And so I decided to take every 104 00:06:11,800 --> 00:06:15,600 single course unlike Sarah. A whole course on blockchain and 105 00:06:15,600 --> 00:06:19,800 defy in Paris that existed. So I had like, you know, maybe 106 00:06:19,800 --> 00:06:24,100 10 or 11 courses on top of my existing courses at University 107 00:06:24,500 --> 00:06:28,700 that I would take. And I came to to meet some of 108 00:06:28,700 --> 00:06:33,600 the best researchers in that space in Paris and and together, 109 00:06:33,600 --> 00:06:36,600 we formed a think tank. And in that think tank we we 110 00:06:36,600 --> 00:06:40,400 basically met every, you know, twice, every every week, and 111 00:06:40,400 --> 00:06:44,300 basically, you know, just chat and discuss about mechanisms. 112 00:06:44,300 --> 00:06:45,900 What? I can do better about them and 113 00:06:46,100 --> 00:06:50,800 then I would say like more for is a construction, a collective 114 00:06:50,800 --> 00:06:53,800 construction of so many different ideas that all came 115 00:06:53,800 --> 00:06:59,700 together and that the premise of it was during the same tank and 116 00:06:59,700 --> 00:07:03,100 like we had so many people saying hey like okay compound is 117 00:07:03,100 --> 00:07:05,900 doing the things this way when it's out there doing this this 118 00:07:05,900 --> 00:07:09,500 way and what are the technical limitation to be able to have, 119 00:07:09,700 --> 00:07:13,400 you know, better 100% Capital efficiency while still being 120 00:07:13,400 --> 00:07:16,500 liquid? This kind of Russians and we 121 00:07:16,500 --> 00:07:18,000 ended up with the premise of more for. 122 00:07:18,000 --> 00:07:20,700 And then I said, okay, like let's get serious about this 123 00:07:20,900 --> 00:07:25,500 confounded more for labs and really regrouped a team of focal 124 00:07:25,500 --> 00:07:27,500 Founders. That as you mentioned were 125 00:07:27,700 --> 00:07:31,500 students at the time, which was quite funny. 126 00:07:31,600 --> 00:07:37,300 But I mean somehow, you know, spending 10 years, 20 years in 127 00:07:37,300 --> 00:07:41,200 investment Banks can sort of, you know, probably constrain 128 00:07:41,200 --> 00:07:45,100 your branch too much such that you would not think of No, doing 129 00:07:45,100 --> 00:07:50,600 things and defy the same way, a student with no experience in 130 00:07:50,700 --> 00:07:52,600 traditional Finance. I mean, no professional 131 00:07:52,600 --> 00:07:57,000 experience would do this, is this is how we started. 132 00:07:57,100 --> 00:08:02,200 And, actually, until six months ago, I was still going to school 133 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:07,000 and I just finished my head of state internship few, few few 134 00:08:07,000 --> 00:08:10,400 months ago. And I'm here to get my diploma, 135 00:08:10,400 --> 00:08:12,800 by the way, but that's, that's another story. 136 00:08:14,100 --> 00:08:15,200 Yeah. That's incredible. 137 00:08:15,200 --> 00:08:20,200 And you guys, you know, I think it's also been really 138 00:08:20,500 --> 00:08:25,600 interesting about your journey is that that like you guys have 139 00:08:25,600 --> 00:08:29,900 built this protocol and just a few months ago, closed a very 140 00:08:29,900 --> 00:08:35,000 impressive finding around with some pretty, top-tier VCS, how 141 00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:38,200 did that come to be? And what was the, what was the 142 00:08:38,299 --> 00:08:41,500 kind of Journey to getting, you know, a sixth easy, and all 143 00:08:41,500 --> 00:08:43,299 these, all these investors on board? 144 00:08:44,100 --> 00:08:45,500 Yeah, I think it's a good question. 145 00:08:45,500 --> 00:08:50,300 So maybe first just like to mention that it was during a 146 00:08:50,300 --> 00:08:52,500 market conditions that were quite favorable. 147 00:08:52,800 --> 00:08:55,400 Of course, it does not do it at everything, but like, that's 148 00:08:55,400 --> 00:08:58,900 probably not something that would be as easily doable. 149 00:08:59,100 --> 00:09:02,300 I don't mean it was easy, it was hard to do, but it was maybe 150 00:09:02,300 --> 00:09:05,100 even harder in those market conditions, obviously. 151 00:09:05,600 --> 00:09:10,100 But basically, at the time we just had the concepts but it was 152 00:09:10,100 --> 00:09:14,200 such a zero to one in terms of mechanism design and Observe 153 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:18,400 like how the team internally at mobs is conceptualizing. 154 00:09:18,400 --> 00:09:22,100 And thinking about Defy is like maybe we'll have the chance to 155 00:09:22,100 --> 00:09:25,700 talk about it was radically different from what other 156 00:09:25,700 --> 00:09:29,000 Protocols are doing in terms of you know Landing but also in 157 00:09:29,000 --> 00:09:33,400 terms of Dexter's excetera. So we really wanted to be very 158 00:09:33,400 --> 00:09:37,700 very Innovative and at the same time so we had very very 159 00:09:37,700 --> 00:09:42,600 Innovative mechanisms and at the same time we had a products that 160 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:45,800 made so much each sense. Right again we'll probably talk 161 00:09:45,800 --> 00:09:50,000 about it but it was a pure Improvement of something that 162 00:09:50,000 --> 00:09:53,500 already had a huge markets and probably the biggest Market 15 163 00:09:53,500 --> 00:09:55,400 in hold. If I at the time which was 164 00:09:55,400 --> 00:10:00,000 basically collateralized lending on Aven and compounds and Morpho 165 00:10:00,400 --> 00:10:04,400 is literally like a improvements of that. 166 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:08,600 And so this is where like hey like this thing is working, it 167 00:10:08,600 --> 00:10:10,700 has a huge Market, this is Ivan compound. 168 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:14,600 But more for is here is I have like fresh new The think about 169 00:10:14,600 --> 00:10:17,500 things differently, but on top of that, they provide a product 170 00:10:17,500 --> 00:10:19,600 that is same risk. Parameters. 171 00:10:19,600 --> 00:10:22,300 Same liquidity. And has better rates so that 172 00:10:22,300 --> 00:10:25,600 could not fail. And I mean, this is what they 173 00:10:25,600 --> 00:10:28,300 said to them. When investing, at least really, 174 00:10:28,300 --> 00:10:30,300 I think this is like, pretty much the story. 175 00:10:30,900 --> 00:10:34,100 It was the rounds last round of funding that we did, is mainly 176 00:10:34,100 --> 00:10:36,600 composed of American visas, which I think is worth 177 00:10:36,600 --> 00:10:39,800 mentioning because we struggled in Europe before being 178 00:10:39,800 --> 00:10:43,700 successful in the u.s. like the story somehow had more. 179 00:10:43,900 --> 00:10:49,000 Or fit with the US visas like European business was like, 180 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:52,800 we're probably, you know, maybe not as, as well as from the does 181 00:10:52,800 --> 00:10:55,000 the American ones, but I just thought it was interesting to 182 00:10:55,000 --> 00:10:59,800 see how of a gap that was between the reaction in the u.s. 183 00:10:59,800 --> 00:11:02,500 versus in Europe. So, yeah, I'd probably 184 00:11:02,500 --> 00:11:04,900 something. I don't know, some sort of fits, 185 00:11:04,900 --> 00:11:07,100 it is, I don't really explain it to be on it. 186 00:11:08,300 --> 00:11:11,000 Cool. So we've talked a bit about the 187 00:11:11,000 --> 00:11:13,400 setting. Let's dig into the protocol 188 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:17,600 maybe before we kind of get into the weeds in a nutshell. 189 00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:20,900 You already said that. Basically, it's a protocol that 190 00:11:20,900 --> 00:11:24,800 centers around lending and borrowing and it strictly 191 00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:31,200 improves on compound and Ava why these are 40 claim and so can 192 00:11:31,200 --> 00:11:35,500 you talk about what the protocol does in a nutshell? 193 00:11:36,400 --> 00:11:38,800 Yeah, absolutely. So Morphers The Landing protocol 194 00:11:39,200 --> 00:11:43,200 so basically, you'll Annenberg crypto assets on mofo the same 195 00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:45,500 way you would do. And I have a compound order, 196 00:11:46,000 --> 00:11:48,800 whatever Landing protocol of a collateralized lending protocol 197 00:11:48,800 --> 00:11:52,300 bag system in D5. So basically, when you're 198 00:11:52,300 --> 00:11:56,800 Landing, there is a bar that comes that put some collateral 199 00:11:56,800 --> 00:12:01,800 to work and borrow your money, and it's a very low risk low 200 00:12:01,800 --> 00:12:06,800 rewards profile, because every loan that is taken, is Cured by 201 00:12:06,800 --> 00:12:10,100 some collateral. So in case the collateral cannot 202 00:12:10,100 --> 00:12:13,600 be backing the fully the loan, then the liquidation happened. 203 00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:17,300 And so in every case, the lender should, if equations are 204 00:12:17,300 --> 00:12:20,500 working, well, be able to have some sort of risk free. 205 00:12:20,900 --> 00:12:24,100 Yeah, yells. So in terms of product, this is 206 00:12:24,100 --> 00:12:27,200 what it is. And now, what's different from 207 00:12:27,200 --> 00:12:31,900 Ivan compound is, actually that mofo is built on top of a van 208 00:12:31,900 --> 00:12:35,300 compound. So if you have compound, you 209 00:12:35,300 --> 00:12:38,100 have an instant Morpho called more for compounds. 210 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:40,100 That is working on top of contact. 211 00:12:40,700 --> 00:12:44,500 Same thing for a be, there is other protocol and there is more 212 00:12:44,500 --> 00:12:47,800 for every protocol that is built on top of morph have a. 213 00:12:48,700 --> 00:12:53,300 And basically, why is that? So it's because morph is going 214 00:12:53,300 --> 00:12:56,000 to optimize our way and it's going to optimize Combi. 215 00:12:56,200 --> 00:12:58,400 So, the question is, what do we have to optimize? 216 00:12:59,200 --> 00:13:03,200 And if you go to our website or to camp on website, if you look 217 00:13:03,200 --> 00:13:08,400 at the rates you you quickly, Is that you have a huge spread 218 00:13:08,500 --> 00:13:12,500 between the landing and the borrowing rates, like 1% to land 219 00:13:12,500 --> 00:13:14,400 or 3% to borrow. Okay. 220 00:13:15,300 --> 00:13:19,600 Basically, the reason why that spread is is because those 221 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:24,200 protocols the weather work. Deeply needs to have a ton of 222 00:13:24,300 --> 00:13:29,500 either liquidity in them that is not put to work and that is 223 00:13:29,500 --> 00:13:33,100 going to induce this bread. So it's let's say Capital 224 00:13:33,100 --> 00:13:38,100 inefficiency, we can dig into that baby if But without getting 225 00:13:38,100 --> 00:13:41,400 into the details that have, you know, this is Matt realized by a 226 00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:44,900 spreads which more for is going to optimize by just taking the 227 00:13:44,900 --> 00:13:46,500 mid right. For example, and say, hey 228 00:13:46,800 --> 00:13:50,100 instead of landing at one, using more farther, you'll be lending 229 00:13:50,100 --> 00:13:52,300 it to. And instead of borrowing a free, 230 00:13:52,300 --> 00:13:54,000 you'll be buying at two or more far away. 231 00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:58,600 So that's the overall concept. You get better rates on Avedon, 232 00:13:58,600 --> 00:14:03,300 more fun, more flavor than a V and you preserve all the, the 233 00:14:03,300 --> 00:14:05,300 risk parameters that you had an IV. 234 00:14:05,300 --> 00:14:08,200 So you get the same. Cultural factors and and sort of 235 00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:11,400 this sort of things and you get access to the same liquidity, 236 00:14:11,400 --> 00:14:14,500 which is like billions of dollars on eBay. 237 00:14:15,900 --> 00:14:21,100 How do you manage to actually get the apy down from the borrow 238 00:14:21,100 --> 00:14:26,100 AP wire from compounding up from the Lend apy from compound. 239 00:14:27,300 --> 00:14:30,400 Yes, that's a good question. So in order to understand that 240 00:14:30,500 --> 00:14:33,700 we have to explain how the mechanism Works in a vase. 241 00:14:33,700 --> 00:14:37,000 So basically don't have a or compound basically lets head a 242 00:14:37,000 --> 00:14:41,200 pool because they're working. Very, very similarly, you have 243 00:14:41,400 --> 00:14:44,400 basically many lenders or it's applying to the same pool of 244 00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:50,100 capital and you have very few bars and those powers are paying 245 00:14:50,100 --> 00:14:52,600 three and those lenders are earning one. 246 00:14:52,700 --> 00:14:57,700 And the reason why that is is because the numerous land I'll 247 00:14:57,700 --> 00:15:01,600 going to share the earnings generated by the few borrows, 248 00:15:01,800 --> 00:15:05,800 the three is going to divide it into multiple ones, given across 249 00:15:05,800 --> 00:15:09,200 all the put. So yields generated by Burrows 250 00:15:09,200 --> 00:15:12,600 is diluted across all the book. It says, the reason why more for 251 00:15:12,600 --> 00:15:14,800 is more Capital. Efficient is based basically 252 00:15:14,800 --> 00:15:21,000 saying, hey, your are lending producer, you are borrowing from 253 00:15:21,100 --> 00:15:23,900 from other, for example, you're learning from IV, when 254 00:15:23,900 --> 00:15:27,000 basically, you could be lending and borrowing at to, like, I'm I 255 00:15:27,008 --> 00:15:30,000 mean, the concept is simple, like, I'm landing at 2%, 256 00:15:30,000 --> 00:15:32,600 someone's. He really could take my my load 257 00:15:32,700 --> 00:15:36,000 my deposit for 2% of a boring API. 258 00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:39,500 And this is what more for does more for is building. 259 00:15:39,500 --> 00:15:42,600 A peer-to-peer matching engine that is built on top of the 260 00:15:42,600 --> 00:15:45,900 landing pool that enables Landing pool users to be much 261 00:15:45,900 --> 00:15:48,100 product here. Whenever there is an opportunity 262 00:15:48,300 --> 00:15:51,300 to increase their rate, either A lender or to decrease the rates 263 00:15:51,300 --> 00:15:54,700 in there are Barra, so it's a small Improvement it represents. 264 00:15:54,700 --> 00:15:59,000 Basically, what it means is instead Of having a diluted 265 00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:01,000 share of the capital that is put to work. 266 00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:04,400 They get older Capital that is put to work which results in an 267 00:16:04,400 --> 00:16:09,300 increase of like plus 0.5 + 1 % EP Y, which is reasonable in 268 00:16:09,300 --> 00:16:13,000 this market conditions, to be honest, how people dealt with 269 00:16:13,000 --> 00:16:16,400 the spread before more followers, were there any other 270 00:16:16,400 --> 00:16:21,300 Solutions or like other attempts to try to reduce this spread? 271 00:16:21,300 --> 00:16:24,600 I mean, you guys are doing it by matching 40's and lenders 272 00:16:24,600 --> 00:16:26,500 directly in a sort of peer-to-peer way. 273 00:16:27,000 --> 00:16:33,100 Are there other approaches that one can can Implement here to 274 00:16:33,100 --> 00:16:36,600 have a better efficiency of capital when doing lending? 275 00:16:37,500 --> 00:16:40,000 Yeah, absolutely. There's many different ways that 276 00:16:40,000 --> 00:16:42,300 could work. We went through a very specific 277 00:16:42,300 --> 00:16:47,000 implementation before Morpho. One of, the reason why nobody 278 00:16:47,000 --> 00:16:51,800 went for something, I would say more for similar is because 279 00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:56,200 actually this spreads was hidden by liquidity mining. 280 00:16:56,700 --> 00:17:02,100 So As of contacts into certain 20 21, 22 lending. 281 00:17:02,100 --> 00:17:05,599 Protocols spend a lot of money Distributing tokens to their 282 00:17:05,599 --> 00:17:10,200 users and you had a 1%, you know, USD, see if you are your 283 00:17:10,200 --> 00:17:14,700 three percent barring a peony Rose to see, but on each side of 284 00:17:14,700 --> 00:17:18,900 the market would get distributed to percent in which case you'll 285 00:17:18,900 --> 00:17:21,200 get a much better. If you are in this spread, I 286 00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:24,300 would say virtually or artificially is disappearing. 287 00:17:24,800 --> 00:17:28,000 And probably the reason why no one came Umm, you know, for a 288 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:32,000 solution like more for before is because there were doubtful 289 00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:36,100 about the fact that we was was ever going to stop a day or not. 290 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:41,000 And and we really started innovation of mofo by betting 291 00:17:41,100 --> 00:17:44,200 that you know rewards I wouldn't we're not going to stand like 292 00:17:44,200 --> 00:17:46,800 forever, right? This is basically Protocols are 293 00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:50,100 losing money and meeting rewards so they could not do that 294 00:17:50,100 --> 00:17:52,600 forever which they stopped pretty much the day. 295 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:56,900 We will not we launched more for so so that would be one of 296 00:17:57,000 --> 00:18:00,800 Reasons why, second reason, why would probably be the complexity 297 00:18:00,800 --> 00:18:02,800 of it. It's not so easy to do 298 00:18:03,200 --> 00:18:06,200 obviously, but does not mean like the one would have ever 299 00:18:06,200 --> 00:18:09,700 done it especially if we manage to do it, to do it, but I said 300 00:18:09,700 --> 00:18:12,800 those are the two biggest fraction to actually make it. 301 00:18:13,800 --> 00:18:18,300 Okay, so I kind of, I want to talk about how it works on a 302 00:18:18,300 --> 00:18:21,300 nitty-gritty level, before I go to like the economics of it. 303 00:18:21,300 --> 00:18:22,400 Does it work for you? Boy. 304 00:18:23,300 --> 00:18:26,000 Absolutely fantastic. So let's talk about the matching 305 00:18:26,000 --> 00:18:29,000 engine. So basically say, I want to post 306 00:18:29,000 --> 00:18:33,200 a position to lend some Capital. What do I do? 307 00:18:33,200 --> 00:18:36,300 Do I post a message or do I already? 308 00:18:36,400 --> 00:18:38,900 I mean, do I have to pay gas for my transaction? 309 00:18:39,700 --> 00:18:40,500 Yes. Absolutely. 310 00:18:40,500 --> 00:18:46,900 So the matching engine is fully And so, basically more for is a 311 00:18:46,900 --> 00:18:51,200 smart contract, it's completely unchanged and it's a smart 312 00:18:51,200 --> 00:18:54,500 contract plugged on top of RV or compounds. 313 00:18:55,500 --> 00:18:58,600 Where users instead of interacting with Ava directly 314 00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:02,400 and using the supplied borrow withdrawal repay functions of 315 00:19:02,400 --> 00:19:05,200 the problem is, it would be using the supply border with 316 00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:07,400 Israel, repay functions of more flow. 317 00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:11,400 And then more for is going to, let's say as a lender, let's 318 00:19:11,400 --> 00:19:14,100 have the very first person to land on Awful. 319 00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:18,200 I'm going to deposit 100 die. I'm going to be put in the list 320 00:19:19,000 --> 00:19:23,600 or any kind of data structure and my liquidity is going to be 321 00:19:23,600 --> 00:19:27,300 put on the pool. So I'm yielding at 1% which is 322 00:19:27,300 --> 00:19:31,200 the apy of the port and there is no country party to match me. 323 00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:35,200 So basically, like there is there was no other way, just 324 00:19:35,500 --> 00:19:39,700 more full puts you into the Parlor, but you are in the list. 325 00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:45,000 And, and now bar comes in. And when the bar, It comes in is 326 00:19:45,000 --> 00:19:47,000 going to say hey I want to borrow. 327 00:19:47,000 --> 00:19:50,100 What's a deposit some he's as collateral and is going to 328 00:19:50,100 --> 00:19:53,100 borrow 100. I and both ways going to look 329 00:19:53,100 --> 00:19:55,500 into this data structure so let's say it's a cute to 330 00:19:55,500 --> 00:19:59,600 simplify and say okay the first member of that Q is posting 331 00:19:59,900 --> 00:20:04,100 liquidity on our way. Let's withdraw this liquidity 332 00:20:04,400 --> 00:20:09,000 from a v in order to give it directly to the borrow and this 333 00:20:09,000 --> 00:20:13,400 is how, you know, broadly, the matching engine works. 334 00:20:14,800 --> 00:20:19,400 Okay, so when I post something to the queue, it's immediately 335 00:20:19,400 --> 00:20:24,300 matched against our compound. And if there's a counterparty 336 00:20:24,300 --> 00:20:27,700 within Morpho, I am matched against the counterparty. 337 00:20:27,700 --> 00:20:31,300 And basically, the over collateralization of the lending 338 00:20:31,300 --> 00:20:35,600 pool on our compound that kind of results in the, in the 339 00:20:35,600 --> 00:20:37,600 healed. Being split several ways, 340 00:20:37,600 --> 00:20:43,000 between different lenders, goes to the soul lender, that is now 341 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:46,700 match peer-to-peer EPS that kind of a good summary. 342 00:20:47,300 --> 00:20:50,200 Yes, I think it's a nice way to think about it. 343 00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:54,600 Yes. How do you stop people from 344 00:20:55,100 --> 00:20:59,800 submitting, lots of small orders that the borrower will then have 345 00:20:59,800 --> 00:21:03,500 to pay gas for matching? Yes, that's an excellent 346 00:21:03,500 --> 00:21:05,200 question. And that's actually the reason 347 00:21:05,200 --> 00:21:08,800 why you can do for a first-in first-out model as I was 348 00:21:08,800 --> 00:21:13,700 describing and actually you have different ways you can. 349 00:21:14,000 --> 00:21:17,100 Solve the problem one way would be. 350 00:21:17,200 --> 00:21:21,900 Okay, let's just do a pool inside of pool, and this way, 351 00:21:21,900 --> 00:21:26,100 you don't need any q and is just, you know, a pool with a 352 00:21:26,100 --> 00:21:31,400 higher utilization of the capital, and so, but that works. 353 00:21:31,400 --> 00:21:33,900 But at the same time for different reasons, it's not 354 00:21:33,900 --> 00:21:35,900 optimal in terms of capital efficiency. 355 00:21:37,100 --> 00:21:40,100 So the Q does not work. Because basically, someone can, 356 00:21:40,100 --> 00:21:43,700 as you mentioned, Supply One sense, like 1,000 times. 357 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:47,400 And basically DDOS the the matching engine. 358 00:21:47,900 --> 00:21:50,100 So you have to come up with different ideas. 359 00:21:50,300 --> 00:21:54,600 One of the most simple one and this is the one that we started 360 00:21:54,600 --> 00:21:58,300 with is basically to sort of part of the list. 361 00:21:58,900 --> 00:22:01,700 So in the blockchain environment, you have a limited 362 00:22:01,700 --> 00:22:04,600 complexity that you have available in order to do 363 00:22:04,600 --> 00:22:07,100 operations. Otherwise gas would basically 364 00:22:07,100 --> 00:22:10,900 explode. And so we came up with what we 365 00:22:10,900 --> 00:22:15,600 call, Semi sorting lists web server The list, we're basically 366 00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:18,600 it's trivial. We just have a hip, the 367 00:22:18,600 --> 00:22:24,000 basically, a data structure that is able to get us, the biggest 368 00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:29,700 users across like the top ten and then the rest is a fearful. 369 00:22:29,700 --> 00:22:33,600 So, basically, when they Loop into the matching engine, I'll 370 00:22:33,600 --> 00:22:36,600 get to, you know, if I'm borrowing, I'll be much first 371 00:22:36,600 --> 00:22:39,300 with the biggest lender second with the second. 372 00:22:39,300 --> 00:22:42,800 Biggest lender, etc, etc. So I'm sure that I'm going to 373 00:22:42,800 --> 00:22:44,300 get liquidity out. Out of it. 374 00:22:44,300 --> 00:22:46,900 And I won't be DDOS. And then I, when I go into the 375 00:22:46,900 --> 00:22:51,500 fearful, and so this is kind of, you know, the simplest 376 00:22:51,500 --> 00:22:55,800 implementation and that's a, you know, solve the specification of 377 00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:58,100 the problem that we were given in the first place. 378 00:22:58,100 --> 00:23:01,300 And this is the one we decided to to implement. 379 00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:05,200 This is other more complex and interesting way to solve the 380 00:23:05,200 --> 00:23:07,800 problem that we've been working on as well. 381 00:23:08,500 --> 00:23:12,800 Okay, so basically larger lenders at lower rates, are 382 00:23:12,800 --> 00:23:15,500 prioritized I understand correctly. 383 00:23:15,600 --> 00:23:19,300 And then basically my question kind of that follows from that, 384 00:23:19,300 --> 00:23:24,500 if they're later, comes a better lender borrower, to the to 385 00:23:24,500 --> 00:23:27,300 Morpho, is everything else, reshuffled? 386 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:30,600 No, it is not in the current implementation of more food is 387 00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:33,300 not. So, basically, if you get 388 00:23:33,300 --> 00:23:38,300 matched, no one can match. You, even though the proposed, a 389 00:23:38,300 --> 00:23:41,600 better rate, like something actually, in more for, you can't 390 00:23:41,600 --> 00:23:44,300 really prepare the raid. There is one period of Pure joy 391 00:23:44,300 --> 00:23:47,100 for everybody. But you can, you know, this is a 392 00:23:47,100 --> 00:23:50,300 limit of the design, right? It would be better, of course, 393 00:23:50,300 --> 00:23:54,000 if everybody was able to, you know, get more competitive about 394 00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:57,900 their rates and every time I re-propose something, that is 395 00:23:57,900 --> 00:24:00,900 better, everything gets reshuffled, such that the market 396 00:24:00,900 --> 00:24:03,100 is more efficient, but the limits here. 397 00:24:03,100 --> 00:24:05,900 And the reason why we decided not to go for this kind of 398 00:24:05,900 --> 00:24:09,900 solution is simply gas cause it's like doing it on layer 1. 399 00:24:10,400 --> 00:24:13,900 Maybe it's doable on other chainsaw related to like Like, 400 00:24:13,900 --> 00:24:17,600 there's a strain or or, you know, seek a saying or this kind 401 00:24:17,600 --> 00:24:19,900 of things. But on layer 1, it's very hard 402 00:24:19,900 --> 00:24:22,800 to, you know, come up with a I would say constant time 403 00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:26,400 algorithm that they're all those kind of matching computer pure. 404 00:24:27,400 --> 00:24:30,800 So that was probably the reason why we we decided not to have 405 00:24:30,800 --> 00:24:33,700 this reshuffling mechanism, even though it's a, it's a good 406 00:24:33,700 --> 00:24:36,300 Improvement to have. Obviously, if you don't take gas 407 00:24:36,300 --> 00:24:43,300 goes into consideration, When you blend in a traditional like, 408 00:24:43,300 --> 00:24:49,400 Javier compound, your liquidity is being posted up to, and it's 409 00:24:49,400 --> 00:24:54,300 basically collateralizing all of the loans that that are that are 410 00:24:54,308 --> 00:24:58,800 being taken out by borers. As you said earlier, there is so 411 00:24:58,800 --> 00:25:02,000 much more liquidity that is covering, so its capital in the 412 00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:06,100 efficient, but that means that as a, as a borrower, I can come 413 00:25:06,100 --> 00:25:10,100 in and out of that market. And and and I can sort of always 414 00:25:10,100 --> 00:25:13,600 be borrowing assets across this pool of collateral. 415 00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:18,600 So as a lender, if I'm matched with a borer and now that borer 416 00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:22,500 wants to take their collateral out, how is my loan now being 417 00:25:22,500 --> 00:25:26,100 collateralized knowing that it's just like peer-to-peer thing 418 00:25:26,100 --> 00:25:29,900 rather than boring against this massive pool of collateral. 419 00:25:30,300 --> 00:25:36,300 Yeah, that's an excellent question and that's probably the 420 00:25:36,300 --> 00:25:40,000 first Cornerstone to the The more for protocol and how all 421 00:25:40,000 --> 00:25:41,500 this mechanism, you know, unwrapped. 422 00:25:41,500 --> 00:25:44,800 So I'm going to attempt this as simply as possible. 423 00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:47,600 Please, you know, feel free to ask me, intermediate questions 424 00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:50,400 here if you need it. But basically, let's get the 425 00:25:50,400 --> 00:25:53,200 intuition for an example first. So, if we come back to this 426 00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:56,500 example, where Alice was providing 100 died and Bob 427 00:25:56,500 --> 00:26:00,000 providing 1e in order to borrow 100,000 mofo. 428 00:26:00,500 --> 00:26:02,100 Basically, What's Happening Here? 429 00:26:02,300 --> 00:26:07,600 Is that Alice her 100 die is going to get in. 430 00:26:07,800 --> 00:26:11,500 Into the pockets of Bob and Bob can basically, you know, since 431 00:26:11,500 --> 00:26:15,000 the, the old oak electron is much prettier Bob can just, you 432 00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:18,700 know, turn the Hafiz is machine go offline and do whatever you 433 00:26:18,700 --> 00:26:22,200 want with the 100. I, and at this point in time, 434 00:26:22,900 --> 00:26:26,300 let's say, Alice is alone. There is no die like more food 435 00:26:26,300 --> 00:26:31,300 as access to know die. So how could she be, you know, 436 00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:35,400 able to withdraw and and this is what more of a Souls is like, 437 00:26:35,600 --> 00:26:40,300 how do you have 100%? So the efficiency without, you 438 00:26:40,300 --> 00:26:46,200 know, while staying liquid. And so what happens here when 439 00:26:46,200 --> 00:26:48,800 Alice is going to click, the withdraw button is the 440 00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:51,700 following. So Alice triggers the, which 441 00:26:51,700 --> 00:26:56,000 will function and more for is going first to unmatch Alice. 442 00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:59,400 And Bob say okay, I listen Bob are not even are not match 443 00:26:59,400 --> 00:27:01,400 anymore because Alice is about to Israel. 444 00:27:01,900 --> 00:27:06,300 So more for these to reconnect, Bob with someone and Bob is 445 00:27:06,300 --> 00:27:08,900 going to be reconnected with the The pool itself. 446 00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:13,400 So what's happening here is that mofo is going to take a loan of 447 00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:19,900 100 died on the bull, with the east of Bob and give that 100 448 00:27:19,900 --> 00:27:23,400 die to Alice such that Alice can withdraw at any time. 449 00:27:23,900 --> 00:27:29,200 So basically, yes, we have 100% Capital efficiency, there is no 450 00:27:29,200 --> 00:27:34,400 die, but since the borrow that is taking on the die, has put 451 00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:38,900 some collateral. Then, this collateral can be To 452 00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:44,100 the actually boring on compounds and and match the position such 453 00:27:44,100 --> 00:27:46,100 that Alice can withdraw at any time. 454 00:27:46,100 --> 00:27:48,600 I hope that was clear. I can go into, you know, 455 00:27:48,700 --> 00:27:50,900 different explanations of that if necessary. 456 00:27:51,100 --> 00:27:54,900 So basically, then what's happening is that compound or 457 00:27:54,900 --> 00:27:59,800 Ave is acting as a backup mechanism in. 458 00:28:00,200 --> 00:28:05,200 So, you fall back to you fall, back to compounder Ave rates. 459 00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:09,100 If there is no lender, So if there's no, yeah, there's no 460 00:28:09,100 --> 00:28:13,500 lender to back your position. Exactly. 461 00:28:13,800 --> 00:28:15,200 Yeah. I think it's interesting. 462 00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:16,700 And maybe I did not mention sufficiently. 463 00:28:16,700 --> 00:28:18,800 Clearly in the beginning is important to mention that 464 00:28:19,100 --> 00:28:23,200 mournful not always offers the pure pure pure, which is in the 465 00:28:23,200 --> 00:28:25,900 middle. It's offers the pure pure pure, 466 00:28:25,900 --> 00:28:29,400 if a match is found from the borrower and the lender side and 467 00:28:29,400 --> 00:28:32,900 if comfortably accountability leaves or is there is no 468 00:28:32,900 --> 00:28:36,000 counterparty available, then there is a full back to the 469 00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:38,400 underlying pool. So basically, in terms of Acts. 470 00:28:38,700 --> 00:28:41,600 It's a landing protocol. That provides the same 471 00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:46,600 respirators, the same liquidity, and at least the same rates as 472 00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:49,000 are they right? Worst case scenario, you get the 473 00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:53,200 other yields from a borrower or from A lender perspective and in 474 00:28:53,200 --> 00:28:55,300 average you'll be much peer-to-peer and enjoy a better 475 00:28:55,300 --> 00:28:59,300 rate. So if you look at oven compound, 476 00:28:59,500 --> 00:29:05,400 the reason why the borrow and lend apis are different from 477 00:29:05,400 --> 00:29:07,000 one. Another is to ensure there is 478 00:29:07,000 --> 00:29:08,700 sufficient exit the quiddity, right? 479 00:29:08,700 --> 00:29:12,000 Because basically the user experience, if you want to 480 00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:15,200 withdraw your funds from a pool and you can't because it's still 481 00:29:15,200 --> 00:29:19,300 borrowed and you can't fool three payment unless it's unless 482 00:29:19,800 --> 00:29:24,000 the loan is underwater, you can't withdraw your funds and 483 00:29:24,000 --> 00:29:27,200 basically what will happen, then There's that the raids are just 484 00:29:27,200 --> 00:29:32,100 until it is economically unviable to kind of keep paying 485 00:29:32,100 --> 00:29:35,200 the interest on those loans and so on but it's a bad situation 486 00:29:35,200 --> 00:29:38,700 for the lender because you're under the impression that in 487 00:29:38,700 --> 00:29:41,600 principle you can exit at any time. 488 00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:47,500 And that's why that's why the rates are so different because 489 00:29:47,500 --> 00:29:49,900 basically they have to make the poor bigger. 490 00:29:49,900 --> 00:29:55,600 So that basically, in like 99.5 percent of cases, everyone who 491 00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:58,900 wants to Exit can exit, the put asthma for your kind of 492 00:29:58,900 --> 00:30:01,700 piggybacking off of that mechanism. 493 00:30:01,700 --> 00:30:06,400 So basically you're using the Ava and compound exit liquidity 494 00:30:07,900 --> 00:30:14,600 and kind of take the most lucrative deals, the land and 495 00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:19,200 borrowed years of large of large lenders and borrowers because 496 00:30:19,200 --> 00:30:23,100 those are prioritized of large lenders, and kind of skim that 497 00:30:23,100 --> 00:30:27,900 off the top. Yes, so I assume you guys are 498 00:30:27,900 --> 00:30:30,100 done contact with carbon compound. 499 00:30:30,100 --> 00:30:33,800 How do they feel about this? Yes, I think it's an excellent 500 00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:37,000 question and this is a question I get asked all the time is. 501 00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:41,400 I mean, this is true, that's more for the way. 502 00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:45,900 It's design is taking volume from a VA and, and from Compound 503 00:30:45,900 --> 00:30:50,700 on the borrowing and the landing site and more for is, you know, 504 00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:54,300 it's a bit of a weird relationship because it's a bit 505 00:30:54,300 --> 00:30:58,000 competitive in the sense that we're taking market shares, but 506 00:30:58,000 --> 00:31:05,200 on the other ends more for is, you know, Printing, you raised. 507 00:31:05,500 --> 00:31:08,700 I mean rights that are not have sufficient, like actual 508 00:31:08,700 --> 00:31:12,500 efficiency that is enabled him to defy rates that were not 509 00:31:12,500 --> 00:31:15,500 possible before. And so, this is interesting 510 00:31:15,500 --> 00:31:19,600 because basically we're unlocking you use cases, news 511 00:31:19,600 --> 00:31:22,100 usage. We're basically lenders, would 512 00:31:22,100 --> 00:31:25,700 not come at 1%, but they would come at too and thanks to more 513 00:31:25,700 --> 00:31:29,600 for their now coming. And, and I have a, is getting 514 00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:32,100 the, a little bit of a share of that. 515 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:34,300 That through the full-back borrowing volume or the 516 00:31:34,300 --> 00:31:36,600 full-back lending room. And if you look at compound, for 517 00:31:36,600 --> 00:31:40,600 example, I don't know if that's still the case, but at least for 518 00:31:40,600 --> 00:31:44,000 many months, this year more for was the biggest bar of compound. 519 00:31:44,500 --> 00:31:49,600 And that's very interesting because actually compound does 520 00:31:49,600 --> 00:31:51,600 not have so many organic berries. 521 00:31:51,800 --> 00:31:54,400 When you look at this, the the data of compound most borrowers 522 00:31:54,400 --> 00:31:57,000 and compound, which is the most important thing for compound 523 00:31:57,000 --> 00:32:01,300 because they bring the money in is actually artificial Burrows, 524 00:32:01,500 --> 00:32:04,300 farming. W most of the time, not always, 525 00:32:04,300 --> 00:32:07,800 but most of the time. And so more for actually, proved 526 00:32:07,800 --> 00:32:12,300 to be the biggest bar to the biggest money bringer to the, to 527 00:32:12,300 --> 00:32:15,300 the compound protocol. So, you know, I I don't want to 528 00:32:15,308 --> 00:32:17,100 hide the fact that more face competitive. 529 00:32:17,100 --> 00:32:20,000 It is to some extent, but it's also growing the pie for 530 00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:22,900 everybody. And I think like Roberts from 531 00:32:22,900 --> 00:32:26,800 from compounds and and standing from from IV got this right? 532 00:32:27,100 --> 00:32:31,600 And, you know, I had the chance to talk to Robert's like to DM 533 00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:33,300 him. About this a few times. 534 00:32:33,300 --> 00:32:38,200 And I think, you know, he and he and Stanny Express sometimes as 535 00:32:38,200 --> 00:32:41,800 themselves about it very briefly, but I think this is the 536 00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:45,700 right way to think about it. I hope that was clear as a as an 537 00:32:45,700 --> 00:32:47,600 explanation. Yeah, that's clear. 538 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:53,300 Do you have any actual data about how many of the users your 539 00:32:53,300 --> 00:32:56,300 vampire, talking away from compound and oven? 540 00:32:56,300 --> 00:32:59,300 How many you are actually organically bringing to the 541 00:32:59,300 --> 00:33:03,700 table? I never fetch the data, but I 542 00:33:03,700 --> 00:33:05,500 should definitely. I think that's interesting. 543 00:33:05,900 --> 00:33:10,200 And I think, you know, the market would decide in the ends 544 00:33:10,700 --> 00:33:13,300 and in any case morph is inevitable. 545 00:33:13,700 --> 00:33:16,200 So we'll have to do with it anyway, whatever the result is, 546 00:33:17,300 --> 00:33:21,100 He's kind of glossed over the fact that in matching borrow us, 547 00:33:21,100 --> 00:33:26,300 to lend us directly, you're also taking rewards from the port, so 548 00:33:26,300 --> 00:33:29,000 basically you not only are you taking share but you're also 549 00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:33,900 making the rewards on the poor smaller than they otherwise 550 00:33:33,900 --> 00:33:36,600 would be right? Yes. 551 00:33:36,800 --> 00:33:41,200 Maybe you can add a little bit of reflection on that is users. 552 00:33:41,700 --> 00:33:44,900 So first mouthful, if a user is put on the boot, if no 553 00:33:44,900 --> 00:33:47,600 counterpart is matched. Then the user is put down the 554 00:33:47,600 --> 00:33:51,000 pool and is earning rewards more for is not taking any cuts on 555 00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:53,300 that and it's just giving it back to the user. 556 00:33:53,900 --> 00:33:57,400 And so, so muffled just give the comparative to the, to the 557 00:33:57,400 --> 00:33:59,500 lender, or the borrower that did not find a match. 558 00:33:59,500 --> 00:34:03,100 If the user is matched, then the user is out of compound and 559 00:34:03,100 --> 00:34:05,800 experiencing a better rate. Better native rate like in 560 00:34:05,800 --> 00:34:10,300 Native you know in the East for example and in which case the 561 00:34:10,300 --> 00:34:14,900 lender or the borrower is actually removed from the pool. 562 00:34:14,900 --> 00:34:17,900 So there's more Rewards Remaining for the rest of the 563 00:34:17,900 --> 00:34:19,500 book. I don't know if that's clear. 564 00:34:20,400 --> 00:34:23,100 Well yes but the it that they're removed from the poor because 565 00:34:23,100 --> 00:34:27,800 100% of the money they're lending is borrowed. 566 00:34:27,900 --> 00:34:32,600 So basically if that were to be, I mean I mean this is I don't 567 00:34:32,600 --> 00:34:35,199 think this computes what you mean? 568 00:34:35,199 --> 00:34:37,300 No, I think says there is a bar coming. 569 00:34:37,300 --> 00:34:40,900 So, and extracting A lender, or the opposite from the pool. 570 00:34:41,400 --> 00:34:45,500 In which case those users that were previously earning rewards 571 00:34:45,600 --> 00:34:47,600 are not earning Rewards. Boards anymore and my father are 572 00:34:47,600 --> 00:34:49,600 not earning the country words there are much credit. 573 00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:52,900 I totally understand that part. But so basically to me, the 574 00:34:52,900 --> 00:34:56,199 question, is the borrower that comes in a new? 575 00:34:57,000 --> 00:35:01,800 What that borrow otherwise have gone to our or compound or what 576 00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:04,400 they have just refrained from taking a loan. 577 00:35:04,400 --> 00:35:07,000 So basically, if they had refrained from taking a loan, I 578 00:35:07,008 --> 00:35:08,800 totally get your line of argument. 579 00:35:08,900 --> 00:35:12,800 But basically I'm skeptical that people who actually come to 580 00:35:12,800 --> 00:35:17,000 Morpho, wouldn't otherwise have defaulted to going to our Ave or 581 00:35:17,000 --> 00:35:20,800 compound. Oh yeah, I think like you're 582 00:35:20,800 --> 00:35:22,500 right. Like it depends on the use case 583 00:35:22,500 --> 00:35:26,900 like there's some places where you only want to add yourself 584 00:35:26,900 --> 00:35:31,900 with to borrow if the rates is lower and in some cases where 585 00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:35,100 you would have gone anyway to have a because like whatever the 586 00:35:35,100 --> 00:35:38,800 race you want to borrow and in which case you go to Morphine 587 00:35:38,800 --> 00:35:43,000 which case this is the vampire set of things but there is a not 588 00:35:43,000 --> 00:35:47,600 vampire set of things where you can only offer to borrow at 1% 589 00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:52,400 or You just have a use case at 1% in which case you come to two 590 00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:54,400 more full. And there is the fullback of 591 00:35:54,400 --> 00:35:58,100 that if there is no match, that is found or only a part of the 592 00:35:58,100 --> 00:36:01,500 match that is found that is for biking to to have a for the bar 593 00:36:01,500 --> 00:36:02,100 inside. Sure. 594 00:36:02,100 --> 00:36:03,900 Absolutely. If your price that you're price, 595 00:36:03,900 --> 00:36:07,800 I told I totally get that. Let's, let's talk about the 596 00:36:07,900 --> 00:36:12,400 preferential treatment of larger lenders, right? 597 00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:16,600 So basically on compound and Ava, everyone kind of gets the 598 00:36:16,600 --> 00:36:21,300 same Rewards In proportion to how much money they put up 599 00:36:21,300 --> 00:36:27,300 whereas for, for more fo ways. I met first because of, you 600 00:36:27,300 --> 00:36:31,400 know, gasps efficiencies because everything is unchain, it's and 601 00:36:31,400 --> 00:36:33,600 it's not, it's not a pool mechanism. 602 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,800 What happens to small lenders? Is it even, is it even feasible 603 00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:40,200 or attractive for them to actually come to Morpho? 604 00:36:41,200 --> 00:36:42,600 Yes, that's an excellent question. 605 00:36:42,600 --> 00:36:46,400 So maybe first something that I want to end the line is that 606 00:36:46,800 --> 00:36:50,100 it's a difficult like it's a it's a different of the 607 00:36:50,100 --> 00:36:54,000 mechanism that we had to sort users is because we have we were 608 00:36:54,000 --> 00:36:58,100 so constraints about a serum that we had to sort about of the 609 00:36:58,100 --> 00:37:00,700 YouTube. But, you know, ideally, we would 610 00:37:00,700 --> 00:37:03,800 not want any previous trip, preferential treatment on the 611 00:37:03,800 --> 00:37:08,800 size of the notes. Now, this is solved by having 612 00:37:09,500 --> 00:37:12,500 small lenders. Regrouping together in a single 613 00:37:12,500 --> 00:37:17,000 smart contracts which happens usually like usually you know, 614 00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:19,800 end users are not interacting as well as are interacting with 615 00:37:19,800 --> 00:37:23,400 protocols that are themselves. Interacting with more for, it 616 00:37:23,400 --> 00:37:26,700 means in which case they had can have like you know bigger size 617 00:37:26,700 --> 00:37:29,100 and have more chances to be much all together. 618 00:37:29,600 --> 00:37:32,700 So that's one thing. And yeah, I don't want to teach 619 00:37:32,700 --> 00:37:37,000 too much about what we're doing but like the problem is sort of 620 00:37:37,000 --> 00:37:40,800 a okay? And what happens if someone On 621 00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:46,100 from this larger, this pool of people who kind of just got 622 00:37:46,100 --> 00:37:50,300 together to kind of co-invest in Morpho, what happens if one of 623 00:37:50,300 --> 00:37:52,700 them wants out, how do you get them out? 624 00:37:53,600 --> 00:37:55,600 Oh yeah. Basically one lender. 625 00:37:56,200 --> 00:38:02,600 So to the eyes of Morpho, this V is just a normal user and so 626 00:38:02,600 --> 00:38:05,500 they can withdraw our share of like a mofo, you can withdraw 627 00:38:05,500 --> 00:38:08,300 our share of what you have. So okay, let's get to work shall 628 00:38:08,300 --> 00:38:09,900 withdraw. Yes. 629 00:38:10,600 --> 00:38:14,100 Okay, quit that's super good. When you guys take a borrow 630 00:38:14,100 --> 00:38:18,600 position on Ave or compound. Like you mentioned earlier that 631 00:38:18,600 --> 00:38:22,400 you were one of the largest borders on compound, you're 632 00:38:22,400 --> 00:38:26,200 earning compound. Like comp rewards for that. 633 00:38:26,900 --> 00:38:29,700 Can you talk a little bit about what those tokens are used for? 634 00:38:29,700 --> 00:38:32,400 And I think more broadly, I'd like to understand the token on 635 00:38:32,400 --> 00:38:37,200 mix of Morpho because as a Morpho user, you're also earning 636 00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:40,300 more more for tokens. And so, what's the interplay 637 00:38:40,300 --> 00:38:42,400 here? R between that and you know, 638 00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,800 broader token Onyx and how they work. 639 00:38:45,800 --> 00:38:49,300 Yeah, I think we're very like minimalist in terms of talking 640 00:38:49,300 --> 00:38:53,000 design and that what we want to achieve visit again like we 641 00:38:53,000 --> 00:38:55,900 really want to, you know, every proposal that we're going to 642 00:38:55,900 --> 00:38:59,900 make on the Dow to have even evolution of the token is is 643 00:38:59,900 --> 00:39:02,500 going to be very minimalist. And we want that. 644 00:39:02,500 --> 00:39:05,500 Every step that we take makes sense is actually useful for the 645 00:39:05,500 --> 00:39:08,500 protocol and its users. So coming back to your question, 646 00:39:08,500 --> 00:39:14,000 is the comp tokens are all redistributed to compound a to 647 00:39:14,000 --> 00:39:15,900 the motherfucker. Company users. 648 00:39:16,200 --> 00:39:20,200 So if I'm landing and my position somehow, you know, 649 00:39:20,200 --> 00:39:22,800 abstractly is ended up on the pool. 650 00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:26,000 Then I'm running those rewards and morph is going to account 651 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:28,000 for those and is going to give them back to you. 652 00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:32,700 So there is no cut or whatsoever that is taken by more for like 653 00:39:32,700 --> 00:39:37,400 this is not the idea so that's one thing that this is the 654 00:39:37,400 --> 00:39:40,200 second thing about the morph targets that on top of that, 655 00:39:40,300 --> 00:39:42,400 whether your match whether you're not match, your always 656 00:39:42,400 --> 00:39:47,500 get more for targets. It to you to your lender and 657 00:39:47,500 --> 00:39:52,000 borrower positions and those are kinds are not transferable for 658 00:39:52,000 --> 00:39:55,300 the moment, please. And basically, the idea here and 659 00:39:55,300 --> 00:39:58,000 the motivation is not, you know, to increase the apy. 660 00:39:58,000 --> 00:40:03,100 I'm a firm non-believer on yield powered by Garden sockets. 661 00:40:04,600 --> 00:40:07,300 However, it's your to decentralize the protocol. 662 00:40:07,700 --> 00:40:13,500 Like in my opinion, it makes sense to have daos and protocols 663 00:40:13,500 --> 00:40:17,400 governed by Investors contributors and users. 664 00:40:17,400 --> 00:40:20,900 Like it's in my opinion, a good equilibrium to have the three of 665 00:40:20,900 --> 00:40:24,200 those that can have a say in the governance and the long term. 666 00:40:24,500 --> 00:40:27,700 So that was important to us to, you know, kick starts in some 667 00:40:27,700 --> 00:40:33,700 way, some sort of liquidity mining program as it is done on 668 00:40:33,700 --> 00:40:35,900 Morpho. And there is also this good 669 00:40:35,900 --> 00:40:41,100 effect of bootstrapping rights in the very you know, the first 670 00:40:41,100 --> 00:40:44,100 millions that we had I think more for now is almost at half a 671 00:40:44,100 --> 00:40:46,200 billion. The difference millions that we 672 00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:51,500 had was like 100% of it. Not I 100% bit like maybe 99% of 673 00:40:51,500 --> 00:40:55,400 it was analyzed. Like we interpreted it as 674 00:40:55,500 --> 00:40:58,100 liquidity, Manning right. Which is not the case. 675 00:40:58,100 --> 00:41:02,200 Now is like because we had Fair volumes were able to, you know, 676 00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:05,800 discuss more Integrations. And I think this is the way talk 677 00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:08,600 and should be used. I want to talk about the 678 00:41:08,600 --> 00:41:11,000 governance in a little bit of more. 679 00:41:11,000 --> 00:41:13,800 Vo Dao. I have one last question for the 680 00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:17,100 protocol, sorry, to kind of dig deep here. 681 00:41:17,200 --> 00:41:21,500 So obviously a cool part of a landing, protocols is 682 00:41:21,800 --> 00:41:25,200 liquidation. So if a position is underwater 683 00:41:25,900 --> 00:41:29,900 and the borrower is matched with a lender, typically, you could 684 00:41:30,100 --> 00:41:34,300 anyone can kind of liquidate that position and and take a cut 685 00:41:34,300 --> 00:41:40,000 off of the cholesterol. So I mean I assume I think it's 686 00:41:40,000 --> 00:41:44,000 exactly the same unlawful but obviously sometimes it goes 687 00:41:44,000 --> 00:41:46,400 wrong. So basically sometimes there's I 688 00:41:46,400 --> 00:41:49,500 mean there's still some risk involved so sometimes prices 689 00:41:49,500 --> 00:41:53,000 crash too fast or no one actually liquid AIDS because gas 690 00:41:53,000 --> 00:41:57,200 costs are too high or something and on compound and other. 691 00:41:57,500 --> 00:42:02,000 Obviously this is a communal has risk because basically this is 692 00:42:02,000 --> 00:42:06,400 just unrepaid debt from from the poor. 693 00:42:06,400 --> 00:42:11,400 So basically this Ross gets redistributed to all lenders. 694 00:42:11,900 --> 00:42:16,500 What happens on more for if a if there's a liquidation failure, 695 00:42:16,600 --> 00:42:21,100 it does the person who's matched with the person with the 696 00:42:21,100 --> 00:42:26,700 borrower that has that mishap happen actually, you know, to 697 00:42:26,700 --> 00:42:30,000 they end up empty-handed. Yeah, that's, that's an 698 00:42:30,000 --> 00:42:34,300 excellent question. So, we often say pure pure 699 00:42:34,300 --> 00:42:37,100 matching because it helps conceptualize the mechanism of 700 00:42:37,300 --> 00:42:42,300 For more fo but in mofo actually you never matched with a single 701 00:42:42,300 --> 00:42:44,600 control party. It's just the state. 702 00:42:44,800 --> 00:42:48,500 It's like I'm in a peer-to-peer and hence States or I'm not in a 703 00:42:48,508 --> 00:42:53,600 peer-to-peer Annette States and so there is it feels like, okay 704 00:42:53,600 --> 00:42:57,300 there is one country party which I'm bearing the risk of, but 705 00:42:57,300 --> 00:43:00,600 this is not the case. Like the way it works is like 706 00:43:00,800 --> 00:43:05,200 when you have your money that is put in the pool, then you bear 707 00:43:05,200 --> 00:43:08,500 the risk of bad depth. Under the /. 708 00:43:09,000 --> 00:43:12,400 Okay, so if Aventura some bad habits, you're also interesting 709 00:43:12,400 --> 00:43:17,900 about it is your position is match peer-to-peer you have 710 00:43:18,300 --> 00:43:21,700 shared loss. So first, something that I want 711 00:43:21,700 --> 00:43:25,500 to mention is that you have the same cultural factors the same 712 00:43:25,500 --> 00:43:30,000 articles Etc as on a v. So there is no specific 713 00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:33,800 parameter that would, you know. But yeah, I think that's 714 00:43:33,800 --> 00:43:35,900 important to mention. But now if we put in the 715 00:43:35,900 --> 00:43:38,300 scenario where for some reason, Reason Liquidators or not. 716 00:43:38,300 --> 00:43:42,400 I would liquidate then the loss is shares or call all more for 717 00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:45,600 users. So it's not specific to one 718 00:43:45,600 --> 00:43:49,700 counterparty but it's a smaller subsets as the other protocol. 719 00:43:50,400 --> 00:43:52,500 Is that designs of the question? Yeah. 720 00:43:52,500 --> 00:43:54,700 That answers the question perfectly. 721 00:43:54,700 --> 00:43:58,700 So kind of it's like a gated community within the within the, 722 00:43:59,600 --> 00:44:01,200 within the other. Okay. 723 00:44:01,500 --> 00:44:03,300 Yeah, no I think I understand that. 724 00:44:03,300 --> 00:44:06,000 I think this also solves a question that I had on the 725 00:44:06,000 --> 00:44:09,300 regulatory side, Because basically, the reason why 726 00:44:09,600 --> 00:44:13,400 protocols, like carbon compound, a huge largely unregulated. 727 00:44:13,400 --> 00:44:16,700 This because you're always just deal with a smart contract. 728 00:44:16,700 --> 00:44:21,600 Whereas, if you have a dark counterparty this kind of this 729 00:44:21,600 --> 00:44:25,900 kind of preferential treatment usually goes away in most 730 00:44:25,900 --> 00:44:28,000 jurisdictions. So kind of actually matching 731 00:44:28,000 --> 00:44:32,500 people peer-to-peer also comes with legal downsides? 732 00:44:33,400 --> 00:44:35,900 Yes absolutely. And I think this is why you know 733 00:44:35,900 --> 00:44:39,900 to the really Eight to talk about Landing protocol and and 734 00:44:39,900 --> 00:44:43,600 the prefer talking about, you know, liquidity pores or, you 735 00:44:43,600 --> 00:44:46,700 know, you don't lend your supply liquidity or you deposit 736 00:44:46,700 --> 00:44:50,000 liquidity. But yeah, here it's a pure pure 737 00:44:50,000 --> 00:44:53,100 States but at the same time I want people to understand. 738 00:44:53,100 --> 00:44:57,800 So I say pure pure matching but but yeah, that's it's clearly a 739 00:44:57,808 --> 00:44:58,900 mutual estate. Yeah. 740 00:45:00,200 --> 00:45:05,200 I'd like to jump to using the product because I, you know, 741 00:45:05,200 --> 00:45:08,600 you're like yesterday I You know, looked at my Instagram app 742 00:45:08,600 --> 00:45:11,800 and I was like, oh hey my Ave positions are not yet on Morpho 743 00:45:11,800 --> 00:45:15,800 and and maybe I should just move them over there and benefit from 744 00:45:15,800 --> 00:45:21,700 better better rates. So, one question I had was when 745 00:45:21,700 --> 00:45:26,000 you're using more fo are like when you say that you use this 746 00:45:26,300 --> 00:45:31,000 phrasing of like enhanced like an enhanced position where your 747 00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:33,700 you basically like you know, more forward. 748 00:45:33,700 --> 00:45:36,900 I feel it's sort of like this Progressive enhancement of like 749 00:45:36,900 --> 00:45:42,400 a Ending pool to a peer-to-peer but you always fall back as a 750 00:45:42,400 --> 00:45:45,200 user. Is it made obvious that you're 751 00:45:45,200 --> 00:45:49,700 lending. Position is either matched on 752 00:45:49,700 --> 00:45:52,900 Morpho or you've Fallen back to compound is that like clear to 753 00:45:52,900 --> 00:45:55,400 the user and also the rate that you're getting? 754 00:45:55,700 --> 00:46:00,900 Yes it's a it's a good question. I think it's hard to have a good 755 00:46:00,900 --> 00:46:04,700 user experience with such a complex you know can is am, I 756 00:46:04,700 --> 00:46:08,200 would say, but basically I'm compound And I have a you have 757 00:46:08,200 --> 00:46:12,300 those sea targets that are basically not so useful, except 758 00:46:12,300 --> 00:46:14,900 for user experience. This is no technical interest in 759 00:46:14,900 --> 00:46:17,700 having a see talking or I tuck and she's just a representation 760 00:46:17,700 --> 00:46:19,400 of something. Yes. 761 00:46:19,400 --> 00:46:23,600 When you have a tokens you you see the token yields like in 762 00:46:23,600 --> 00:46:26,500 your pot, for your, you know, how much it's worse and it's, 763 00:46:26,500 --> 00:46:31,000 you know, a very user friendly Behavior. 764 00:46:32,200 --> 00:46:35,700 Unlawful not all positions are treated equally and because of 765 00:46:35,707 --> 00:46:40,800 the, you don't have like the acid. 20, for example, you could 766 00:46:40,800 --> 00:46:44,000 have in some World, them sort of an FTE that we did. 767 00:46:44,000 --> 00:46:47,100 Think that, that was an even worse, user experience having an 768 00:46:47,100 --> 00:46:50,100 FD and that people might throw it out, you know, not knowing 769 00:46:50,100 --> 00:46:52,300 what it was. So we're like, okay, maybe 770 00:46:52,300 --> 00:46:57,400 that's not a good way to go. And so, basically, this is a 771 00:46:57,400 --> 00:47:02,800 work, the front end has to do. So when you go to instead of, 772 00:47:02,800 --> 00:47:06,200 for example, is a do it extremely well, you did tell you 773 00:47:06,200 --> 00:47:09,500 like what is your average? And if you go to morph was like 774 00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:13,900 interfaces with as well, the one developed by muscle-ups the one 775 00:47:13,900 --> 00:47:18,000 developed by mutative team like we have many, many different 776 00:47:18,000 --> 00:47:21,000 front-ends and usually what they're going to do is going to 777 00:47:21,000 --> 00:47:27,000 say, Hey, you have 100 interior appear, 100 in pool. 778 00:47:27,000 --> 00:47:28,500 Okay. So it's like Alf Alf. 779 00:47:28,500 --> 00:47:30,900 So we're going to make an average of your All of your 780 00:47:30,900 --> 00:47:33,800 rates and such that to use. You're just not feel the complex 781 00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:38,200 care that doesn't make sense. So your position can be spread 782 00:47:38,200 --> 00:47:40,400 out. Yeah so your position can be 783 00:47:40,800 --> 00:47:42,800 half or there. Could be What proportion of your 784 00:47:42,800 --> 00:47:46,400 presents first portion. Reposition that's backed by like 785 00:47:46,400 --> 00:47:50,100 a peer-to-peer learning more fo and the other would be backed by 786 00:47:50,700 --> 00:47:54,100 some some position on compound or exactly. 787 00:47:54,100 --> 00:47:55,700 Yeah. And it's the work of the front 788 00:47:55,700 --> 00:47:58,400 end to average that and make it similar such that you have an 789 00:47:58,400 --> 00:48:01,800 average API. And why is it that there are 790 00:48:01,800 --> 00:48:05,000 like two separate like Morpho compound and more felawe? 791 00:48:05,000 --> 00:48:09,600 Why wouldn't you just be utilizing the liquidity in both 792 00:48:09,600 --> 00:48:13,300 of those pools and sort of finding ways to optimize like, 793 00:48:13,400 --> 00:48:16,900 so basically, like finding the better rate depending on the 794 00:48:16,900 --> 00:48:21,000 assets, you're boring against for the user and sort of just, 795 00:48:21,400 --> 00:48:26,800 you know, adding the ability to add any sort of liquidity, pool 796 00:48:26,800 --> 00:48:30,100 underlying, like, one more photo interface or Tracked. 797 00:48:30,100 --> 00:48:34,300 I think two reasons. The first one is complexity. 798 00:48:34,300 --> 00:48:38,900 Many, many, protocols have tried, you know, aggregating 799 00:48:39,600 --> 00:48:44,300 letting protocols and the mostly all have fails to some extent. 800 00:48:44,700 --> 00:48:49,400 And probably, the reason why is because the not every protocol 801 00:48:49,400 --> 00:48:52,300 share the same risk, and they're not the same, the sense that 802 00:48:52,600 --> 00:48:55,500 they take different collateral factors approaches. 803 00:48:55,500 --> 00:48:57,700 So, it's easier for the landing side of things. 804 00:48:57,700 --> 00:49:03,600 You can say, hey, like, We will select the pull with the more 805 00:49:03,600 --> 00:49:07,000 interesting API, but if you start on so aggregating borrow 806 00:49:07,000 --> 00:49:11,700 positions at the same time, then it becomes, you know, it's hard 807 00:49:11,700 --> 00:49:14,700 because you have to decide on risk is like, you have to 808 00:49:14,707 --> 00:49:16,600 decide, which collateral Factor, I'm going to use. 809 00:49:16,600 --> 00:49:19,300 Like, I'm going to use the clutch on factor of our way of 810 00:49:19,300 --> 00:49:22,700 compound or the most conservative of the to, and as 811 00:49:22,700 --> 00:49:25,100 soon as you say, I'm going to use the most conservative of the 812 00:49:25,100 --> 00:49:26,700 two. You're not an improvement 813 00:49:26,700 --> 00:49:28,300 anymore, you just a different product. 814 00:49:28,300 --> 00:49:30,100 And so in terms of product decisions, Asian. 815 00:49:30,200 --> 00:49:32,300 It was, it was basically a product decision that I took 816 00:49:32,300 --> 00:49:35,400 was, okay. I want to be an improvement of 817 00:49:35,400 --> 00:49:39,800 something. I want to be able to, to improve 818 00:49:39,800 --> 00:49:43,400 something that I know for sure has a market. 819 00:49:43,400 --> 00:49:46,300 And so that's why we decided to separate in order to have like, 820 00:49:46,300 --> 00:49:49,300 no trade-off. However, like this definitely 821 00:49:49,300 --> 00:49:53,000 room for, for you, no more complex mechanisms, where you 822 00:49:53,000 --> 00:49:56,400 could aggregate those different protocols in a more advanced 823 00:49:56,400 --> 00:50:00,500 way, I would say, Hmm. Okay, so this is like a lot of 824 00:50:00,508 --> 00:50:04,100 complexity and aggregating different liquidity pools that 825 00:50:04,600 --> 00:50:06,900 that doesn't exist. They would like, aggregating, 826 00:50:06,900 --> 00:50:09,900 you know, like if there's so many D Phi e like defy adex 827 00:50:09,900 --> 00:50:13,700 aggregators that and that think the problem has been like mostly 828 00:50:13,700 --> 00:50:14,700 solved. Yeah, definitely. 829 00:50:14,700 --> 00:50:18,100 I think it's a matter of, you know, risk rewards rather than 830 00:50:18,100 --> 00:50:22,800 just rewards and so it's for that reason it's it's an 831 00:50:22,800 --> 00:50:25,500 additional Dimension and you have to take into account and 832 00:50:25,500 --> 00:50:29,500 aggregation process and then come The navi, we're not made 833 00:50:29,800 --> 00:50:32,800 to, to share the liquidity with a partner. 834 00:50:33,000 --> 00:50:36,400 So when you can borrow on the one, you come around the other. 835 00:50:36,400 --> 00:50:39,900 So it's it's very hard to have this sort of aggregated to its 836 00:50:39,900 --> 00:50:43,800 visible, but it's complex so we thought like, as a first step, 837 00:50:44,100 --> 00:50:46,300 you know, our first protocol should be something fairly 838 00:50:46,300 --> 00:50:48,900 simple, and this is why the matching engine has a lot of 839 00:50:48,900 --> 00:50:52,000 room for improvement. This is why we're not 840 00:50:52,000 --> 00:50:55,100 aggregating, but maybe in the future we'll be able to release 841 00:50:55,100 --> 00:50:58,300 more advanced versions. I totally understand where 842 00:50:58,300 --> 00:51:02,200 you're coming from and basically as a defy user you kind of you 843 00:51:02,200 --> 00:51:05,400 want to be very specific about which protocols you're fine 844 00:51:05,400 --> 00:51:08,100 with. So basically at least you'd 845 00:51:08,100 --> 00:51:13,500 actually have to disclose to the user which protocols you kind of 846 00:51:13,500 --> 00:51:19,100 mix by default and have to have have them, allow them to opt out 847 00:51:19,100 --> 00:51:21,500 of that and so on. So I actually do think that 848 00:51:21,500 --> 00:51:26,200 especially since everything is on Shane, this is probably too 849 00:51:26,200 --> 00:51:32,100 much overhead. Head for not that much reward. 850 00:51:33,000 --> 00:51:35,200 Yeah, definitely. I think this room for, you know, 851 00:51:35,600 --> 00:51:38,900 actual defy middlewares like, you know, you're in finance, 852 00:51:38,900 --> 00:51:40,200 full finances, Etc. Try. 853 00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:43,800 Actually, you know, makes at least the landing side of things 854 00:51:44,100 --> 00:51:47,100 and makes different strategies or rebalance and stuff like 855 00:51:47,100 --> 00:51:48,800 that. But this is like a different 856 00:51:48,800 --> 00:51:51,100 user kind. We really wanted to be as low 857 00:51:51,100 --> 00:51:54,500 level as possible, not just, you know, as close to A Primitive as 858 00:51:54,500 --> 00:51:56,800 we could be. And yeah. 859 00:51:57,100 --> 00:51:59,000 Pretty. And you also you also get 860 00:51:59,000 --> 00:52:01,800 natural rebalancing anyways, right? 861 00:52:01,800 --> 00:52:04,600 So basically, it's not like no one's making the markets as I 862 00:52:04,600 --> 00:52:06,300 mean, there's tons of what's out there. 863 00:52:06,300 --> 00:52:12,500 They're kind of tried to get the years to commensurate numbers. 864 00:52:13,400 --> 00:52:16,200 Yeah, exactly. And actually, maybe one last 865 00:52:16,200 --> 00:52:17,600 thing to mention about that topic. 866 00:52:17,600 --> 00:52:20,600 Bizarre things. Interesting is rates are not so 867 00:52:20,600 --> 00:52:24,000 well, Arbitrage, and the reason why is they're not arbitrary set 868 00:52:24,000 --> 00:52:27,500 because it's not because butterflies Eeyore. 869 00:52:27,500 --> 00:52:29,500 But have not been coded but have been coded. 870 00:52:29,500 --> 00:52:32,800 It's just that they don't have the same appreciation of risk on 871 00:52:32,800 --> 00:52:35,300 every single protocol. And that, yeah, you have a 872 00:52:35,300 --> 00:52:38,800 premium in like, you know, the reputation of a protocol Etc. 873 00:52:39,000 --> 00:52:42,900 And this is like, so complex to factor in a smart contract, 874 00:52:42,900 --> 00:52:45,800 obviously. What's the talk about the 875 00:52:45,808 --> 00:52:47,200 integration? So we already talked about 876 00:52:47,200 --> 00:52:50,800 instead app that was announced like last year. 877 00:52:51,800 --> 00:52:55,900 And what's cool about that is if you have like an Ave position, 878 00:52:56,300 --> 00:53:00,500 you you essentially don't have to unwind that position. 879 00:53:00,500 --> 00:53:03,700 You can just have it be refinanced by Morpho. 880 00:53:03,900 --> 00:53:06,600 I haven't done that yet but I think I'm I think I'm gonna hit 881 00:53:06,600 --> 00:53:09,000 the button on thats pretty soon. But yeah. 882 00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:14,300 What other Integrations do you have to improve the usability? 883 00:53:14,500 --> 00:53:19,600 The and sort of like people's ability to use Morpho, I think 884 00:53:19,600 --> 00:53:24,900 we have a bunch like, we all talking to, you know, you have 885 00:53:24,900 --> 00:53:28,300 to kind of Integrations like protocol Integrations and no 886 00:53:28,300 --> 00:53:30,900 more data and analytics integration. 887 00:53:31,300 --> 00:53:34,100 So, we're talking to a bunch of websites to get more for in 888 00:53:34,400 --> 00:53:39,500 approximately everywhere and you have a lot of funds as well. 889 00:53:39,500 --> 00:53:43,300 Integrating with more for and doing their complex quad stuff 890 00:53:43,300 --> 00:53:45,700 like a hedging and And and stuff like that. 891 00:53:46,200 --> 00:53:51,800 But we have as well, protocols, like V table, coin or genius 892 00:53:51,800 --> 00:53:55,300 dollars table coin that are using their collateral and the 893 00:53:55,300 --> 00:53:58,700 put their collateral to work on the more for protocol. 894 00:53:58,800 --> 00:54:02,900 They say, hey, like we want better yelled for our stable con 895 00:54:02,900 --> 00:54:07,800 users or saving rate or whatever we are going to use, we're going 896 00:54:07,800 --> 00:54:11,200 to use this. And so yes, we have like, for 897 00:54:11,200 --> 00:54:14,600 example, D5 H that can help you, you know, head your Should 898 00:54:14,600 --> 00:54:17,100 systematically. When you're managing units of 899 00:54:17,100 --> 00:54:20,900 the three positions, we have spoon that I was mentioning a 900 00:54:20,908 --> 00:54:25,400 bit before which enables you to diversify your D5 portfolio. 901 00:54:25,900 --> 00:54:30,300 We really have a bunch of those and many coming in the pipeline 902 00:54:30,300 --> 00:54:33,200 as well. But, you know, to be fair and I 903 00:54:33,200 --> 00:54:35,400 think that's a good ending nodes as well. 904 00:54:35,600 --> 00:54:40,000 Is that I feel like there is a ceiling to that gross, as well 905 00:54:40,000 --> 00:54:42,200 as like. Okay, we're like, I think we're 906 00:54:42,200 --> 00:54:45,500 top three Landing protocol at the moment with like like 500 907 00:54:45,500 --> 00:54:49,700 million or close to 500 million in deposits on this area. 908 00:54:50,700 --> 00:54:55,800 But I do feel like, you know, those are just different 909 00:54:55,800 --> 00:55:00,200 equations, 4, d 5 things that are often powered by defy 910 00:55:00,200 --> 00:55:03,400 Dawkins. And I feel like there's like of, 911 00:55:03,400 --> 00:55:08,000 you know, actual real world connected use case in all this. 912 00:55:08,300 --> 00:55:11,000 And I think that's going to be a challenge for us to reconnect, 913 00:55:11,300 --> 00:55:14,100 somehow more food to those real usage. 914 00:55:14,400 --> 00:55:16,000 You know, take the fight to the next level. 915 00:55:17,000 --> 00:55:20,100 Quiz. So, let's kind of shift gears a 916 00:55:20,107 --> 00:55:23,400 little bit and talk about the Morpho business model. 917 00:55:23,900 --> 00:55:26,700 How do you guys make money, you know, other than raising money 918 00:55:26,700 --> 00:55:32,100 from American Reese's? That's, that's a good way. 919 00:55:32,700 --> 00:55:39,000 But of course, joking here. Some overlaps is, is a software 920 00:55:39,000 --> 00:55:45,300 development company making money by doing contributions to Dao. 921 00:55:47,000 --> 00:55:52,900 And so, ideally like the idea, you know, way of making money 922 00:55:52,900 --> 00:55:58,300 for us is basically proposing things to the mall for Dow that 923 00:55:58,300 --> 00:56:02,700 are going to, you know, be proved hopefully and that we are 924 00:56:02,700 --> 00:56:06,200 paid by the Dow to produce This research and enhance the 925 00:56:06,200 --> 00:56:08,700 protocol the same way. Ivy companies is doing it 926 00:56:08,700 --> 00:56:10,800 somewhere. PG Labs is doing it for our way. 927 00:56:11,000 --> 00:56:14,600 For example, that raises the question of how more for makes 928 00:56:14,600 --> 00:56:25,500 money and The answer is mofo in, its current form is able to take 929 00:56:25,500 --> 00:56:30,000 a cut on the Improvement that is made from a v or from compounds. 930 00:56:30,400 --> 00:56:36,600 So it's basically you making one percent apy on an avid 11.5 on 931 00:56:36,600 --> 00:56:39,400 the mofo of it. Then more for is able to take 932 00:56:39,400 --> 00:56:42,600 let's say 20% of that Improvement and taking 0.4 933 00:56:42,600 --> 00:56:44,700 percent of the volume that is matched. 934 00:56:44,800 --> 00:56:46,800 So it's just a kind of the Movement. 935 00:56:46,800 --> 00:56:49,400 There is nothing like that is actually lost. 936 00:56:50,100 --> 00:56:53,500 And this is theoretical, so it's implemented but it's not turned 937 00:56:53,500 --> 00:56:55,200 on. So currently the protocol is not 938 00:56:55,200 --> 00:56:58,300 making money. So, how I mean, basically, if 939 00:56:58,300 --> 00:57:03,400 it's just a fee that's turned on, how do you guard yourselves 940 00:57:03,400 --> 00:57:06,400 against me? Just, you know, taking your code 941 00:57:06,400 --> 00:57:11,700 and fucking it and kind of lowering that 2.1%. 942 00:57:11,700 --> 00:57:16,100 And how do you make sure this there's extra structure? 943 00:57:16,600 --> 00:57:21,000 Value in the protocol itself in the user base and this doesn't 944 00:57:21,000 --> 00:57:23,000 actually end in a race to the bottom. 945 00:57:23,700 --> 00:57:27,000 Yeah, that's a an exam question that I think every decide 946 00:57:27,000 --> 00:57:29,700 contributor should reason about in some way or another. 947 00:57:30,200 --> 00:57:32,300 So you have different ways to make this happen. 948 00:57:32,900 --> 00:57:37,200 One obvious way is to have a be USL license, which is the case 949 00:57:37,200 --> 00:57:39,500 of a very free company for Indians have be free. 950 00:57:40,200 --> 00:57:43,600 This is not the case of more formal for gtn copyleft license. 951 00:57:43,900 --> 00:57:49,500 So you can you can forget, if If you wish to do it and basically, 952 00:57:50,300 --> 00:57:55,800 the reason why I think we wanted to go that route is we believe 953 00:57:55,800 --> 00:58:01,600 in as system grow more and more complex, we believe in network 954 00:58:01,600 --> 00:58:04,500 effects, you know, being able to retain users. 955 00:58:04,500 --> 00:58:08,300 Even if it's at the cost of like a 0.1%. 956 00:58:08,300 --> 00:58:12,600 He and the reason why that is especially true for complex 957 00:58:12,600 --> 00:58:18,300 systems, is that security and You know, the trust in the Dow 958 00:58:18,300 --> 00:58:22,100 and the contributors themselves can be valuable for users, like, 959 00:58:22,100 --> 00:58:25,000 okay, there is a brand behind it and when you look at lending 960 00:58:25,000 --> 00:58:28,400 rates, it's actually interesting to see that for example, of is 961 00:58:28,400 --> 00:58:32,700 capturing a ton of the lending volume even though they're not 962 00:58:32,700 --> 00:58:37,400 offering you know as beneficial rewards as as compound for 963 00:58:37,400 --> 00:58:40,900 example and some underlies it I'm not saying this is what's 964 00:58:40,900 --> 00:58:43,800 happening but I'm just saying that someone that I is it as 965 00:58:43,800 --> 00:58:46,100 basically the network effect of a were people. 966 00:58:46,200 --> 00:58:48,800 Trust more, Avid the brand and everything. 967 00:58:48,800 --> 00:58:52,100 And so you have, you know, quantitative questions here is 968 00:58:52,100 --> 00:58:54,100 that? How much does that represent in 969 00:58:54,100 --> 00:58:58,300 practice and how much like this network effect is going to 970 00:58:58,300 --> 00:59:01,400 retain value? And how how big the secret could 971 00:59:01,400 --> 00:59:04,300 be Etc. But I think, you know, in the 972 00:59:04,300 --> 00:59:11,800 end we have not built something that is yet to revolutionize the 973 00:59:11,808 --> 00:59:15,700 world and it's this that is legitimate in really extracting, 974 00:59:15,700 --> 00:59:18,400 a lot of other To wit, I think the current thinking is for us, 975 00:59:18,500 --> 00:59:24,800 yes live, thanks to fundraising not turning on a fee because 976 00:59:24,800 --> 00:59:28,800 there is legal or so legal. No considerations on that and 977 00:59:29,200 --> 00:59:32,600 work as much as possible to build something that has, you 978 00:59:32,600 --> 00:59:36,300 know, even greater traction. And where it's actually worth 979 00:59:36,300 --> 00:59:39,000 taking a great attraction and also create a network effect. 980 00:59:39,000 --> 00:59:42,500 So I think we're not, we remove thinking about, you know, 981 00:59:42,700 --> 00:59:46,100 designing things that you know, where I belong. 982 00:59:46,200 --> 00:59:49,500 To get sufficient traction. It's that we should legitimate 983 00:59:49,500 --> 00:59:52,700 to turn on a fee. I want you to propose to turn on 984 00:59:52,700 --> 00:59:55,600 the fee but I think that's not even the case at the moment. 985 00:59:55,600 --> 01:00:00,000 I hope it answers. I went a bit far but I hope it 986 01:00:00,000 --> 01:00:02,100 answers the question. I don't need answers the 987 01:00:02,100 --> 01:00:06,200 question so I actually I also see the stickiness of defy 988 01:00:06,200 --> 01:00:08,200 applications. I think it's, it's really 989 01:00:08,200 --> 01:00:11,300 difficult topic. So what actually makes something 990 01:00:11,300 --> 01:00:14,200 sticky. Clearly, it's not just the best 991 01:00:14,200 --> 01:00:16,600 price or the best security. Artie. 992 01:00:16,600 --> 01:00:21,200 It's kind of like it's user Behavior question, and it's not 993 01:00:21,200 --> 01:00:22,900 100% clear to me. What? 994 01:00:22,900 --> 01:00:25,000 Exactly, actually entails the stickiness. 995 01:00:25,300 --> 01:00:28,900 Yeah, I think there's a lot of know, it all comes back to trust 996 01:00:28,900 --> 01:00:32,200 at some point, which is a bit weird, but that's how it is. 997 01:00:32,200 --> 01:00:35,600 And I do think the example of compound and IVs is a good 998 01:00:35,600 --> 01:00:37,900 example. Like I literally talking to 999 01:00:37,900 --> 01:00:41,600 users, I literally had many calls with people saying, hey, 1000 01:00:41,600 --> 01:00:46,100 I'm never going to put a penny on compounds and I'm like, okay. 1001 01:00:46,200 --> 01:00:50,100 I mean company has been here for a long time, but, and in, you 1002 01:00:50,107 --> 01:00:56,400 know, it's the network effect here is, is, is really playing a 1003 01:00:56,400 --> 01:00:58,800 role. I think it is is Major in terms 1004 01:00:58,800 --> 01:01:01,600 of, you know, how to retain users. 1005 01:01:01,800 --> 01:01:04,900 And also, there are some products well, by Design because 1006 01:01:04,900 --> 01:01:07,200 you have more volume. Your products is working better. 1007 01:01:07,200 --> 01:01:11,300 It's just the case of curve, in that case, So tell us about the 1008 01:01:11,300 --> 01:01:16,100 roadmap and what's coming for more fo. 1009 01:01:16,100 --> 01:01:19,400 I know that a lot of this is governed through governance, but 1010 01:01:19,400 --> 01:01:22,000 what are you most excited about? Yes. 1011 01:01:22,000 --> 01:01:25,500 I think like, you know, everything that will will be 1012 01:01:25,508 --> 01:01:29,200 decided would be decided through governance and will be and will 1013 01:01:29,200 --> 01:01:32,700 be voting excetera when it comes to more for labs and the 1014 01:01:32,700 --> 01:01:36,100 research that we're doing on Landing in general, I would say 1015 01:01:36,100 --> 01:01:39,400 like we've been thinking a lot about what makes sense, what 1016 01:01:39,400 --> 01:01:41,900 does not make sense? Then sin in the centralized 1017 01:01:41,900 --> 01:01:45,000 landing and I'm going to disappoint you a little bit but 1018 01:01:45,500 --> 01:01:49,800 as of now we prefer, you know, keeping things close to the 1019 01:01:49,800 --> 01:01:53,200 chest for the moment in the sense that we really like to 1020 01:01:53,200 --> 01:01:57,500 release things that we are, very sure that they're very neat and 1021 01:01:57,500 --> 01:02:03,400 clean at least scientifically so we'd rather, you know, not tease 1022 01:02:03,400 --> 01:02:06,600 anything for six months. And then really is a big paper 1023 01:02:06,600 --> 01:02:10,300 that we've been working on for more than a year rather than Can 1024 01:02:10,300 --> 01:02:13,200 you know try to figure out road maps, Etc, because it's a 1025 01:02:13,207 --> 01:02:16,400 constantly evolving space. I'm quite doubtful about road 1026 01:02:16,400 --> 01:02:22,300 maps in general. I think you know we are a team 1027 01:02:22,300 --> 01:02:25,600 of 20 a bit more than 20 were mostly researchers. 1028 01:02:25,900 --> 01:02:29,900 So what we're doing is research and what I can said oh is that 1029 01:02:29,900 --> 01:02:32,100 so far? We have not something 1030 01:02:32,100 --> 01:02:37,800 sufficiently cleans and and that we're convinced self, 222 teased 1031 01:02:37,800 --> 01:02:42,200 or really significant the public and also I Have the team of 1032 01:02:42,200 --> 01:02:46,300 researchers that that I really, you know, firmly against the 1033 01:02:46,300 --> 01:02:48,900 fact that we should tease this kind of things because for them 1034 01:02:48,900 --> 01:02:51,200 it's science and that we should not be teasing science and I 1035 01:02:51,200 --> 01:02:55,500 respect that a lot. So I comply to the standards of 1036 01:02:55,500 --> 01:02:58,500 the company and I just don't teach. 1037 01:02:59,500 --> 01:03:01,300 Okay. Then maybe let me kind of zoom 1038 01:03:01,300 --> 01:03:04,000 out a bit. What are your personal hopes for 1039 01:03:04,000 --> 01:03:08,900 the ecosystem for 2023? So my personal hopes are 1040 01:03:09,500 --> 01:03:14,600 rationalizing. So a lot more defy, think 2022, 1041 01:03:14,600 --> 01:03:16,300 and the events, you know, are grim. 1042 01:03:16,400 --> 01:03:20,900 And you know, I obviously I don't wish this would have 1043 01:03:20,900 --> 01:03:24,400 happens to a lot of people that suffered from it, but on the 1044 01:03:24,400 --> 01:03:30,000 other hands it's it has good aspects in the sense that we are 1045 01:03:30,000 --> 01:03:32,000 rationalizing. The mechanisms were designing. 1046 01:03:32,000 --> 01:03:34,500 I think a lot of time has been lost. 1047 01:03:35,400 --> 01:03:38,300 In talking design, what we should have focused on 1048 01:03:38,300 --> 01:03:41,100 mechanisms designed, for example, that's a personal take, 1049 01:03:41,100 --> 01:03:44,700 not the to take of more flowers with I think like we've seen 1050 01:03:44,700 --> 01:03:48,400 mechanisms that are impressively relying on target incentives, 1051 01:03:48,400 --> 01:03:50,400 that inerrancy do not create value. 1052 01:03:50,800 --> 01:03:55,700 And I'm hoping that 2023 is going to once and for all, you 1053 01:03:55,707 --> 01:03:58,800 know, at least largely diminish, the impact of those. 1054 01:04:00,000 --> 01:04:04,400 There's this mechanisms in in this space and how, you know, 1055 01:04:05,200 --> 01:04:09,100 How talents are sometimes, you know, working on those designs, 1056 01:04:09,100 --> 01:04:13,300 what they could be working on more, some some, you know, more 1057 01:04:13,300 --> 01:04:14,800 interesting. Primitives, very simple. 1058 01:04:15,500 --> 01:04:17,700 So I think this is my first hope. 1059 01:04:18,200 --> 01:04:20,800 I also think that this is the perfect cure for building. 1060 01:04:21,600 --> 01:04:23,300 I'm very excited about what's going on. 1061 01:04:23,300 --> 01:04:27,300 Like, I took two teams and that all building something very 1062 01:04:27,300 --> 01:04:29,900 exciting. Like, I'm really excited to see 1063 01:04:29,900 --> 01:04:32,100 like the the different announcements on Twitter that 1064 01:04:32,100 --> 01:04:34,600 are going to be made in the next few months. 1065 01:04:35,500 --> 01:04:39,700 And I would say, My Last Hope is that we regulations. 1066 01:04:39,700 --> 01:04:46,100 Do not say you know, too fast decisions on the topic of defy. 1067 01:04:46,300 --> 01:04:53,300 I think one very important key thing for 2023 is that they take 1068 01:04:53,300 --> 01:04:55,900 the stance of, you know, regulating apps rather than 1069 01:04:55,900 --> 01:04:59,600 protocols. It's a very deep, you know, I 1070 01:04:59,607 --> 01:05:02,400 think this is the way they should behave and if it is the 1071 01:05:02,400 --> 01:05:05,000 don't again personal take that you did not. 1072 01:05:05,100 --> 01:05:08,800 I feel like this could endanger largely the system. 1073 01:05:09,300 --> 01:05:12,200 And finally, I hope for more institutional, you know, 1074 01:05:12,200 --> 01:05:16,400 starting playing around defy. This does not like a good start 1075 01:05:16,400 --> 01:05:20,500 for 2023 because like with the FX heavens and everything people 1076 01:05:20,500 --> 01:05:24,200 do not feel, you know, inclined to get into D Phi again and it's 1077 01:05:24,200 --> 01:05:26,400 soon. But I'm hoping that with, you 1078 01:05:26,400 --> 01:05:28,700 know, cleaner mechanisms no protocols. 1079 01:05:28,700 --> 01:05:31,300 That I have been sufficient, trust like em, especially 1080 01:05:31,300 --> 01:05:34,900 thinking of the nurses. Say, for example, the safe now. 1081 01:05:34,900 --> 01:05:39,700 So A is I think once we have, you know, sufficiently 1082 01:05:39,700 --> 01:05:43,200 battle-tested Primitives like this or you wanna swap, we can 1083 01:05:43,200 --> 01:05:46,200 start thinking about onboarding, like the next order of magnitude 1084 01:05:46,200 --> 01:05:48,500 of Futures. And I'm really hoping one of 1085 01:05:48,500 --> 01:05:52,000 those companies, you know, go big and some on somebody's to 1086 01:05:52,000 --> 01:05:54,400 actually connect us to the rest of the world. 1087 01:05:54,400 --> 01:05:58,400 And yeah I have a lot of Hope in this industry leaders and I hope 1088 01:05:58,400 --> 01:06:02,000 that more for will also you know be part of those very soon which 1089 01:06:02,400 --> 01:06:05,000 is it is in a greater way to do so. 1090 01:06:05,100 --> 01:06:08,800 Much cooler. Thank you so much for coming on 1091 01:06:08,800 --> 01:06:12,500 for that was very interesting. Yeah, definitely I think 1092 01:06:12,500 --> 01:06:15,700 probably one of the most interesting and you know in 1093 01:06:15,700 --> 01:06:17,400 depth first guest I've ever been in. 1094 01:06:17,400 --> 01:06:19,800 So is a pleasure sharing that moment with you guys. 1095 01:06:20,300 --> 01:06:25,200 Hmm thanks Paul. Thank you for joining us on this 1096 01:06:25,200 --> 01:06:27,600 week's episode. We release new episodes every 1097 01:06:27,600 --> 01:06:29,600 week. You can find And subscribe to 1098 01:06:29,600 --> 01:06:33,400 the show on iTunes Spotify, YouTube SoundCloud or wherever 1099 01:06:33,400 --> 01:06:35,800 you listen to podcast. And if you have a Google home or 1100 01:06:35,800 --> 01:06:38,600 Alexa device, you can tell it to listen to the latest episode of 1101 01:06:38,600 --> 01:06:42,300 the epicenter podcast, go to epicenter dot TV /, subscribe 1102 01:06:42,400 --> 01:06:45,200 for a full list of places where you can watch and listen, while 1103 01:06:45,200 --> 01:06:47,500 you're there, be sure to sign up for the newsletter so you get 1104 01:06:47,500 --> 01:06:50,800 new episodes in your inbox as they're released if you want to 1105 01:06:50,800 --> 01:06:53,000 interact with us guests or other podcast. 1106 01:06:53,500 --> 01:06:56,000 You can follow us on Twitter and please leave us a review on 1107 01:06:56,000 --> 01:06:58,700 iTunes helps people find the show and we're always happy to 1108 01:06:58,700 --> 01:07:01,300 read them. Well thanks so much and we look 1109 01:07:01,300 --> 01:06:55,000 forward to being back next week. You can follow us on Twitter and 1110 01:06:55,000 --> 01:06:57,400 please leave us a review on iTunes helps people find the 1111 01:06:57,400 --> 01:06:59,100 show and we're always happy to read them. 1112 01:06:59,900 --> 01:07:02,500 Well thanks so much and we look forward to being back next week.