1 00:00:00,300 --> 00:00:05,900 This is epicenter episode 405 with guests, Joe Andrews and 2 00:00:05,900 --> 00:00:22,400 Zach Williamson. Hi, welcome to epicenter of the 3 00:00:22,407 --> 00:00:24,600 podcast where we interview crypto Founders, Builders and 4 00:00:24,600 --> 00:00:26,300 thought leaders. My name is Sebastian quechua, 5 00:00:26,300 --> 00:00:30,800 and I'm here with Dave Ocha, who's a new co-host on the 6 00:00:30,800 --> 00:00:33,200 epicenter team. So Dave is the co-founder of 7 00:00:33,200 --> 00:00:34,800 Osmosis. So he works very closely with 8 00:00:34,800 --> 00:00:38,800 Sonny's been working with Sonny for several years on like Sitka 9 00:00:38,800 --> 00:00:42,800 and other projects, so Dave welcome, welcome to the 10 00:00:42,800 --> 00:00:45,200 epicenter host roster. He tell us a little about 11 00:00:45,200 --> 00:00:47,400 yourself and introduce yourself to the audience. 12 00:00:48,400 --> 00:00:50,300 Thanks Sebastian. I'm Dave. 13 00:00:50,300 --> 00:00:52,800 The as Josh mentioned. I'm a co-founder of Moses with 14 00:00:52,800 --> 00:00:53,600 Sonny. Yeah. 15 00:00:53,600 --> 00:00:56,400 There's also another collab Center hosts, which probably 16 00:00:56,400 --> 00:01:00,100 know I also like run the proof, stick validator sicko which 17 00:01:00,100 --> 00:01:03,500 McNeely validates Cosmos trains and that's why I've been working 18 00:01:03,500 --> 00:01:06,600 with Sonny for a number of years that I used to work on Tanner 19 00:01:06,600 --> 00:01:09,700 McCoy and calls us DK. And I guess now working both 20 00:01:09,700 --> 00:01:12,800 these actively N+ Moses prior to us, Moses. 21 00:01:12,800 --> 00:01:15,800 I was like doing a lot of research on how to improve 22 00:01:15,800 --> 00:01:19,700 snark, recursion and like, how to build starts with a 23 00:01:19,900 --> 00:01:21,700 Alessandra Piazza and like, my other, great Folks. 24 00:01:21,700 --> 00:01:24,600 At UC Berkeley. So privacy is starts acting a 25 00:01:24,607 --> 00:01:27,500 very near and dear to my heart. So, uh, I'm pretty excited to 26 00:01:27,500 --> 00:01:31,400 the podcast today with plastic. Yeah, it's I think it's really 27 00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:33,700 fitting that you're here because today we're speaking with Joe 28 00:01:33,700 --> 00:01:37,600 Andrews and Jacque Williamson head of product and CTO at a 29 00:01:37,600 --> 00:01:41,100 search protocol. And so we had Zach and Tom. 30 00:01:41,100 --> 00:01:46,400 Another team member on the podcast in March of last year. 31 00:01:46,800 --> 00:01:49,000 And so we're here for an update today. 32 00:01:49,400 --> 00:01:52,700 Thanks for joining us, guys. This is the pleasure to be here. 33 00:01:53,000 --> 00:01:53,900 Yeah. Thanks for having us. 34 00:01:55,100 --> 00:01:59,000 So before we talk Joe and Zach about Aztec and the evolutions 35 00:01:59,100 --> 00:02:01,200 for that project since lat we last had the bond. 36 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:04,000 I'd like to tell you what our sponsors for this week with 37 00:02:04,000 --> 00:02:05,500 Paris pop. You can beat the bear market 38 00:02:05,500 --> 00:02:09,300 price with every single block. 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On over 25 decentralized 49 00:02:34,700 --> 00:02:38,900 networks, including Solana Cosmos and ethereum is one of 50 00:02:38,900 --> 00:02:41,200 the most trusted staking providers in the ecosystem. 51 00:02:42,000 --> 00:02:44,400 If you're interested in running your own branded notes, they 52 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:47,900 have a managed white label node as a service offering which 53 00:02:47,900 --> 00:02:50,600 leverages courses highly available improving 54 00:02:50,600 --> 00:02:52,600 infrastructure. Enable you to participate 55 00:02:52,600 --> 00:02:54,500 directly. We in decentralized networks at 56 00:02:54,500 --> 00:02:57,500 over to chorus dot one, to start your staking Journey today. 57 00:02:58,700 --> 00:03:01,400 So since last time we had you on, how is the company grown? 58 00:03:01,400 --> 00:03:05,400 And you know, what's been the evolution of Aztec in the last 59 00:03:05,400 --> 00:03:08,800 year, or so? Yeah, it will quite quite, a 60 00:03:08,808 --> 00:03:10,300 lot, has happened in the last year. 61 00:03:11,000 --> 00:03:15,200 I believe the last time we chatted, we just published our 62 00:03:15,900 --> 00:03:19,000 latest picture overview, search plunk. 63 00:03:19,700 --> 00:03:23,300 And since then, we put it into practice by releasing the first 64 00:03:23,700 --> 00:03:28,300 private layer to, on ethereum, using that research. 65 00:03:29,600 --> 00:03:33,500 It's a network that allows users to Shield the theory of another 66 00:03:33,500 --> 00:03:38,300 tokens and send it privately and that's been the Main, the main 67 00:03:38,300 --> 00:03:41,500 focus of the company for the last year and now we're now that 68 00:03:41,500 --> 00:03:43,600 that's done. We really want to bigger and 69 00:03:43,800 --> 00:03:46,600 slightly more ambitious, things that we yeah happy to dig into 70 00:03:47,300 --> 00:03:50,600 as well. Yeah, I mean, last time you were 71 00:03:50,600 --> 00:03:54,800 on, we talked a lot about, you know, how the Sheila 72 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:58,400 transactions contract worked and like, how that works for the 73 00:03:58,400 --> 00:04:01,200 user and also under the hood, but we did talk about defy 74 00:04:01,200 --> 00:04:04,000 little bit and I think that, you know, looking at what you guys 75 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:06,600 are doing now, that's definitely like more on your radar. 76 00:04:07,300 --> 00:04:09,900 How has the growth in defy in the last year? 77 00:04:09,900 --> 00:04:15,100 Or so like help shift your focus has it, you know was it Wizards 78 00:04:15,100 --> 00:04:18,800 an accelerator and shifting your focus more towards defy or where 79 00:04:18,800 --> 00:04:20,300 are you? Already sort of on that track. 80 00:04:20,500 --> 00:04:23,700 Tell us about that Journey. Yeah, definitely said. 81 00:04:23,700 --> 00:04:27,800 I think the explosive growth of defy, really shifted our Focus 82 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:31,300 from focusing on kind of more web to use cases and it's 83 00:04:31,300 --> 00:04:36,000 created a market for previously. On web 325 was only kind of low 84 00:04:36,000 --> 00:04:39,300 tens or hundreds of millions. There wasn't that much of a need 85 00:04:39,300 --> 00:04:42,500 for privacy, but now we're in their kind of fifty to a hundred 86 00:04:42,500 --> 00:04:45,500 billion of Market Capital locked inside defy. 87 00:04:45,500 --> 00:04:47,200 There's a huge need for privacy there. 88 00:04:47,200 --> 00:04:50,800 So it's definitely shifted our focus and the product offering 89 00:04:50,800 --> 00:04:52,500 as well and the networks capable. 90 00:04:52,700 --> 00:04:55,100 That is the focus. Pretty much entirely on D5 with 91 00:04:55,100 --> 00:04:58,400 the upcoming release. Cool. 92 00:04:59,100 --> 00:05:01,500 So for people who are not familiar with a stack, give us 93 00:05:01,500 --> 00:05:05,200 the high-level overview of what you guys are working on and we 94 00:05:05,200 --> 00:05:09,000 can kind of go from there. Show these plastic, he's is 95 00:05:09,000 --> 00:05:12,700 state-of-the-art. Cryptography to enable users to 96 00:05:12,700 --> 00:05:15,600 hide their identity when transacting on etherium right 97 00:05:15,600 --> 00:05:17,500 now. One of the main, probably one of 98 00:05:17,500 --> 00:05:20,900 the main problems with transacting on blockchains, is 99 00:05:20,900 --> 00:05:25,200 the fact that everything is public, which means that's 100 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:27,800 everything that you do. Everything every transaction 101 00:05:27,800 --> 00:05:31,300 that you make is viewable by the entire world. 102 00:05:31,600 --> 00:05:34,100 Now this this isn't a necessarily he's much of a 103 00:05:34,108 --> 00:05:36,000 problem and people that are standing around with 104 00:05:36,000 --> 00:05:39,200 cryptocurrency, but one when we Been moving to a world where 105 00:05:39,700 --> 00:05:42,500 more and more financial transactions are being moved on 106 00:05:42,500 --> 00:05:43,700 chain. Because if its value in the 107 00:05:43,707 --> 00:05:47,400 settlements, there it started. Bigger problem is going to be in 108 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:51,000 our opinion, the problem over the next few years, with regards 109 00:05:51,000 --> 00:05:54,200 to blockchain. And so, and we're here to solve 110 00:05:54,200 --> 00:05:58,900 it. We use a niche market ography 111 00:05:59,100 --> 00:06:04,600 called the zero dollars, proofs to enable users to prove the 112 00:06:04,600 --> 00:06:06,000 correctness of their transactions without having to 113 00:06:06,008 --> 00:06:09,300 actually critical information. Summation to The Wider World. 114 00:06:09,600 --> 00:06:11,800 Things like the identity of the amounts are transferring the 115 00:06:11,800 --> 00:06:12,900 assets. They're transferring. 116 00:06:13,700 --> 00:06:15,800 We're yeah, we're steadily building out our technology and 117 00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:19,300 architecture to support more and more use cases. 118 00:06:21,100 --> 00:06:23,600 What kind of use cases? This is a this is open that 119 00:06:23,600 --> 00:06:26,600 because like Sheila transactions are cool, you know? 120 00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:29,900 And there's lots of in people be working on that recently. 121 00:06:29,900 --> 00:06:33,200 We had terminated cash although they've gotta think like a quite 122 00:06:33,200 --> 00:06:38,500 different approach. But you know, what does a zero 123 00:06:38,500 --> 00:06:42,500 knowledge, like a ZK, ZK, roll-up effectively. 124 00:06:43,300 --> 00:06:46,200 What is what does that enable in terms of new types of use cases? 125 00:06:48,000 --> 00:06:52,200 I think this culminated in March with the release of CK money and 126 00:06:52,200 --> 00:06:57,200 zk- the front end on top of ZK. ZK, roll up, and it enables for 127 00:06:57,200 --> 00:07:00,700 the first time. Let the rim transaction to exist 128 00:07:00,700 --> 00:07:03,200 fully privately. So, you have Ironclad privacy 129 00:07:03,200 --> 00:07:06,000 guarantees, very similar to the Z cash protocol. 130 00:07:06,200 --> 00:07:09,500 The circuit is going to use a similar underlying kind of set 131 00:07:09,500 --> 00:07:11,800 of nullifiers to get strong privacy guarantees. 132 00:07:12,000 --> 00:07:14,900 But for the first time that transaction is actually cheaper 133 00:07:14,900 --> 00:07:18,500 than a layer one bathroom transaction, so, For us it's the 134 00:07:18,500 --> 00:07:22,100 seismic shift where users don't have to choose between privacy 135 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:27,100 and kind of being on a theorem and being kind of in a world 136 00:07:27,100 --> 00:07:29,000 where lots of people are building applications. 137 00:07:29,000 --> 00:07:31,000 You can have kind of your cake and eat it. 138 00:07:31,000 --> 00:07:32,700 So to speak. You can have privacy. 139 00:07:32,700 --> 00:07:35,400 But on the Chain whether it's the most developer activity. 140 00:07:37,000 --> 00:07:39,400 I can expand a little bit as well with regards to the zkc. 141 00:07:39,400 --> 00:07:43,000 Karela at the core of approach. This section is the idea that 142 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:46,600 well, instead of sending to the little chain, like the basic 143 00:07:46,600 --> 00:07:47,700 information about your transaction. 144 00:07:47,700 --> 00:07:50,100 You know who you are, who you're sending has sending cryptic to, 145 00:07:50,600 --> 00:07:53,200 instead you serve, you send a signal screw. 146 00:07:53,400 --> 00:07:55,100 So, basically say, well, here's my old encrypted banners. 147 00:07:55,100 --> 00:07:56,300 And here's my new kept the balance. 148 00:07:56,600 --> 00:07:59,200 And I can prove to you mathematically that I follow the 149 00:07:59,200 --> 00:08:01,300 rules of the blockchain, you know, I've deducted something 150 00:08:01,300 --> 00:08:03,400 for my balance and added it to somebody else's pants, but I'm 151 00:08:03,407 --> 00:08:06,100 not going to tell you who I am. Who I'm sending my money to or 152 00:08:06,100 --> 00:08:09,600 how much my Was however, zero has proved a very expensive, 153 00:08:09,900 --> 00:08:12,800 computationally expensive to check requires a lot of like 154 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:16,200 dich cryptographic operations, which means that it costs a lot 155 00:08:16,200 --> 00:08:18,300 of gas. So the question one of the 156 00:08:18,308 --> 00:08:20,900 questions is how you get well in general, how to get cheap 157 00:08:20,900 --> 00:08:23,000 transactions on a theory. But for us, the question is, how 158 00:08:23,000 --> 00:08:25,200 to get cheap relatives. I can slowly filling and the 159 00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:30,000 solution is is a little bit of inception ask, but you you go 160 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:33,299 wonderful deeper, instead of sending zeros, proofs to to the 161 00:08:33,299 --> 00:08:37,000 blockchain, which represent private transactions you Create 162 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:39,299 a zero knowledge proof, which proofs of correctness of a large 163 00:08:39,299 --> 00:08:42,500 number of materials proofs, and allows you to send one kind of 164 00:08:42,500 --> 00:08:44,200 Mega transaction to the ethereum blockchain. 165 00:08:44,200 --> 00:08:46,400 That proves the correctness of hundreds. 166 00:08:46,400 --> 00:08:48,600 If not thousands of individual private transactions. 167 00:08:48,900 --> 00:08:52,200 That's what a ZK, ZK. Roll-up is we taken to calling 168 00:08:52,200 --> 00:08:54,300 it a private roll up because it rolls off the tongue a little 169 00:08:54,300 --> 00:08:58,600 easier. It's like you're doing 100 proof 170 00:08:58,700 --> 00:09:01,100 of a bunch of transactions, but those transactions are 171 00:09:01,108 --> 00:09:03,900 themselves, like using zero knowledge proof still like be 172 00:09:03,900 --> 00:09:07,300 valid or like get privacy. Exactly. 173 00:09:07,700 --> 00:09:10,200 Correct yet. It'll set the The Entity 174 00:09:10,500 --> 00:09:13,300 creating that meta magazine has proved doesn't need to know any 175 00:09:13,300 --> 00:09:17,300 secret special information. So isn't this process like 176 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:21,100 starts, it's really expensive. So, how is this being done or 177 00:09:21,100 --> 00:09:22,100 house? Like this? 178 00:09:22,200 --> 00:09:27,300 Our Gator is sequencer doing, like be able to do without a 179 00:09:27,300 --> 00:09:31,300 high fees. Well, that's being this being a, 180 00:09:31,500 --> 00:09:34,800 that's the question and the something that we've been 181 00:09:34,800 --> 00:09:38,300 spending the last two to three years, focusing pretty intently 182 00:09:38,300 --> 00:09:41,000 on them. And we had to make several 183 00:09:41,600 --> 00:09:44,000 relatively significant advances in the state of the art. 184 00:09:44,000 --> 00:09:46,600 When it comes to use kinds of criticisms to get there, 185 00:09:47,200 --> 00:09:49,500 specifically we needed a great as urinals proving system. 186 00:09:49,500 --> 00:09:52,300 That was fast enough that you could make these gargantuan 187 00:09:52,300 --> 00:09:58,600 proofs because yeah, generally if you want to create a zero. 188 00:09:58,700 --> 00:10:01,600 North proof of a computation, the act of making that proof is 189 00:10:01,600 --> 00:10:04,200 going to be about a hundred thousand to a million times 190 00:10:04,900 --> 00:10:07,200 slower than the original pre-construction. 191 00:10:07,200 --> 00:10:10,500 So so actually verifying journals, Prix inside as well as 192 00:10:10,500 --> 00:10:12,800 previous one of these kind of computation like mares. 193 00:10:13,700 --> 00:10:17,300 One of the one of the advantages that we have is as a company is 194 00:10:17,300 --> 00:10:19,900 what we are chief scientist is alright that was like, he's one 195 00:10:19,900 --> 00:10:21,900 of the best in the one of those photographers in the industry 196 00:10:21,900 --> 00:10:24,700 and together. We've not just published the 197 00:10:24,700 --> 00:10:28,600 plant cryptosystem which was one of the which is one of the 198 00:10:28,800 --> 00:10:34,100 Extremely fast, Zs knock, but we've been able to modify and 199 00:10:34,100 --> 00:10:38,300 update and and mold operating system to, to engineer it, to be 200 00:10:38,300 --> 00:10:41,000 to be tailored towards our specific needs. 201 00:10:41,300 --> 00:10:44,800 And so that meant that we have a lot of agency to make the 202 00:10:44,800 --> 00:10:47,400 previous term, particularly good for things like verifying zeros, 203 00:10:47,400 --> 00:10:50,700 proofs and doing very quite Advanced too difficult 204 00:10:50,700 --> 00:10:53,900 computations. And that's that's really why 205 00:10:53,900 --> 00:10:56,700 we've been able to create this kind of construction on the 206 00:10:56,700 --> 00:11:01,200 theory, but you currently do. It's the this District as going 207 00:11:01,200 --> 00:11:04,400 to be have as the only one. That's actually very viable on 208 00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:07,000 the theorem blockchain given the limited cryptography. 209 00:11:07,000 --> 00:11:08,800 You can do inside a smart contract. 210 00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:11,300 Super cool. I've never been following the 211 00:11:11,300 --> 00:11:13,200 story of plunk. I remember when the paper first 212 00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:17,600 came out and made like such huge waves during a snark temper of 213 00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:18,500 that year. Yeah. 214 00:11:18,700 --> 00:11:20,500 What's the story of the name clock? 215 00:11:20,500 --> 00:11:24,400 Like it's such an interesting name inches is one way of 216 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,300 putting it. Yeah, so it was originally it 217 00:11:27,300 --> 00:11:31,400 was a placeholder name. So we really live a struggling 218 00:11:31,400 --> 00:11:35,200 to come up with a decent over the name for the paper and, and 219 00:11:35,200 --> 00:11:39,300 I suggested function as a bit of a laugh partially, because As 220 00:11:39,300 --> 00:11:41,600 you said it was this this month's not temper like over the 221 00:11:41,600 --> 00:11:44,800 last few months in that in that year 2019 and quite a lot of 222 00:11:45,500 --> 00:11:47,800 seminal cryptography. Papers have been released and 223 00:11:47,800 --> 00:11:51,900 welcome had like big ambitious names, you know, like powerful 224 00:11:51,900 --> 00:11:55,700 names things like, you know, Sonic could dark some stocks and 225 00:11:55,700 --> 00:12:00,900 Marlon and and and I just I felt like it would be I thought 226 00:12:00,900 --> 00:12:03,000 basically our thought be funny. So it's an electron. 227 00:12:03,300 --> 00:12:07,000 It's British slang for cheap, low quality wine, and I feel 228 00:12:07,000 --> 00:12:10,300 like there's a lot of similarity because You know, I understand, 229 00:12:10,600 --> 00:12:13,600 you know, get getting getting to the bottom of funk requires 230 00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:17,400 making questionable Life Choices bit like bit like, you know, 231 00:12:17,400 --> 00:12:19,300 real Plank and and and, you know, it gives you a headache. 232 00:12:19,300 --> 00:12:20,300 If you spend too much time with it. 233 00:12:20,300 --> 00:12:23,600 So basically, okay. So basically we call the plot be 234 00:12:23,600 --> 00:12:25,300 published at your prints generally. 235 00:12:25,300 --> 00:12:29,200 Print takes like a week or so that you press this big like 236 00:12:29,200 --> 00:12:31,300 this website. That is a repository of 237 00:12:31,300 --> 00:12:34,000 cryptography papers generally takes about a week or so, so to 238 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:37,400 approve a paper for Elites who thought and it says publishing 239 00:12:37,400 --> 00:12:40,500 now deal with the name later. A publicist, whatever night. 240 00:12:40,700 --> 00:12:43,400 And then people started tweeting about it and say, hey, what's 241 00:12:43,400 --> 00:12:45,300 this Punk thing? And so basically the kind of 242 00:12:45,300 --> 00:12:47,000 work that I do about it, and we figured it was a bit chilly to 243 00:12:47,000 --> 00:12:48,800 change it and, you know, it's kind of funny. 244 00:12:48,800 --> 00:12:54,400 So, here we are today. But it got kind of like 245 00:12:54,400 --> 00:12:56,800 backwards name right there because I do yes. 246 00:12:56,800 --> 00:12:59,800 Yes, it's quite obvious. So yes, I think one of the only 247 00:12:59,800 --> 00:13:02,900 useful well not useful. One is one of the one of the 248 00:13:02,900 --> 00:13:05,800 main skills that I picked up from a degree in particle. 249 00:13:05,800 --> 00:13:09,500 Physics was elaborately named acronyms that stands for 250 00:13:09,700 --> 00:13:13,100 permutations over the branch base. 251 00:13:13,100 --> 00:13:17,900 That's the opinion. The L4 EG medical with me. 252 00:13:17,908 --> 00:13:20,600 All day canvassing, non-interactive arguments of 253 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:23,600 knowledge, and the a is silent. That's great. 254 00:13:24,400 --> 00:13:26,900 I love it. I hope it can push for Snorks as 255 00:13:26,900 --> 00:13:28,600 Edwardsville Starks. I don't know. 256 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:32,100 We've lost this one though. Okay, medical and scared. 257 00:13:32,300 --> 00:13:34,800 It's eight. I mean, it's me, it would be 258 00:13:34,800 --> 00:13:37,000 nice, wouldn't it? Yeah, we got a few years of 259 00:13:37,000 --> 00:13:39,300 inertia to push back against unfortunately. 260 00:13:41,100 --> 00:13:44,600 So last time you were on, we talked about defying before, we 261 00:13:44,600 --> 00:13:47,600 did this interview, I listen to that episode. 262 00:13:47,600 --> 00:13:50,600 And one of the things that we talked about was, you know, 263 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:53,900 privacy and defy. And, you know, you mentioned 264 00:13:53,900 --> 00:13:57,200 that privacy makes defy paranoid. 265 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:03,600 And the way you described that is by by using a, by using maker 266 00:14:03,600 --> 00:14:06,700 as an example. Could you elaborate on what you 267 00:14:06,700 --> 00:14:10,200 meant there? And you know how privacy you do 268 00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:12,800 more? Idly are at least privacy 269 00:14:12,800 --> 00:14:16,700 Technologies, break certain applications in defy. 270 00:14:18,500 --> 00:14:21,900 Yeah, absolutely. So so yeah to expand on that 271 00:14:23,300 --> 00:14:26,900 parrot, Paradise. So what basically the question, 272 00:14:26,900 --> 00:14:28,800 what are the questions which is relevant when it comes to 273 00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:31,400 privacy protections? Action is how in the blazes? 274 00:14:31,400 --> 00:14:33,200 Do you make a private defense protocol? 275 00:14:33,600 --> 00:14:36,800 Because it'd be really nice to have a private version of make a 276 00:14:36,808 --> 00:14:40,400 double, you can make a CD p and nobody knows how much it is. 277 00:14:41,200 --> 00:14:44,100 And you'll be nice to do things like have a privately privately 278 00:14:44,100 --> 00:14:46,300 centralized exchange where you have a private order book, but 279 00:14:46,300 --> 00:14:49,300 you can still match trades, but the Problem with these 280 00:14:49,300 --> 00:14:52,300 approaches, is that in a private world? 281 00:14:53,400 --> 00:14:57,600 You can't have public State because modifying a public very 282 00:14:57,600 --> 00:14:59,500 public State variable leaks information about what you're 283 00:14:59,500 --> 00:15:01,800 doing. For example, things like, you 284 00:15:01,800 --> 00:15:04,700 know, swap you for your sort, you need to understand the total 285 00:15:04,700 --> 00:15:06,900 amount, the total Supply. You have a bit of an asset to 286 00:15:06,900 --> 00:15:09,100 perform such an established liquidity, you have. 287 00:15:09,300 --> 00:15:12,700 And so, if you deposit into a liquidity pool, then you're 288 00:15:12,700 --> 00:15:14,200 changing the total metal liquidity. 289 00:15:14,200 --> 00:15:15,800 That's public variables. So people can see what you've 290 00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:17,500 deposited. That's not private. 291 00:15:18,200 --> 00:15:21,000 Similarly, for make a deal if you create a collateralized debt 292 00:15:21,000 --> 00:15:23,700 position that's private. That means it's encrypted. 293 00:15:23,800 --> 00:15:27,100 And so how in the blazes is anybody supposed to figure out 294 00:15:27,200 --> 00:15:29,000 if you're becoming undercapitalized? 295 00:15:29,100 --> 00:15:30,400 And if they are how they're supposed to liquidate your 296 00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:33,600 position because it's encrypted only only, the CB Creator knows 297 00:15:33,600 --> 00:15:35,900 how to decrypt it, and they're not going to help you liquidate 298 00:15:35,900 --> 00:15:38,700 their position. So that's one of the fundamental 299 00:15:38,700 --> 00:15:42,800 problems with with privacy and the parent icons. 300 00:15:42,800 --> 00:15:45,400 For example, you could create a private, make a dowel where, you 301 00:15:45,400 --> 00:15:48,100 know, you have a CD P where the weather's ubiquitous. 302 00:15:48,300 --> 00:15:50,200 Constantly kind of scent effectively, Chris of Life. 303 00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:52,900 They have to continuously prove that their CDP is over 304 00:15:52,900 --> 00:15:54,400 collateralized, because they're the only person who can create 305 00:15:54,400 --> 00:15:56,900 this proofs, and if they don't save the proof, there is proof 306 00:15:56,900 --> 00:15:59,000 of life in the, you know, like a day or two, then they get then 307 00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:00,700 there's the bad happens to their position. 308 00:16:01,500 --> 00:16:04,900 And so they're always getting around this, we wouldn't be 309 00:16:04,900 --> 00:16:06,400 doing what we're doing. If we didn't think that we 310 00:16:06,408 --> 00:16:09,300 could, we could provide practical and valuable privacy 311 00:16:09,600 --> 00:16:13,100 to defy. The the Holy Grail solution is 312 00:16:13,900 --> 00:16:17,700 to use multi-culti computations where, for example, if you want 313 00:16:17,700 --> 00:16:20,500 it, If you want a, for example, a decentralized exchange with a 314 00:16:20,508 --> 00:16:22,800 private order book, but you can still match trades. 315 00:16:22,900 --> 00:16:25,000 Amongst people in theory. You can do that through 316 00:16:25,000 --> 00:16:27,800 multi-part computations where you have, like a ring of 317 00:16:27,808 --> 00:16:29,400 individuals. They will have their own orders 318 00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:32,800 and prices that are all encrypted and they slowly engage 319 00:16:32,800 --> 00:16:36,900 in these NPC's with one another to kind of drip feed information 320 00:16:36,900 --> 00:16:40,600 about their orders to counterparties that have 321 00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:44,700 matching orders and innovate. You can, you can achieve very 322 00:16:44,700 --> 00:16:46,500 high quality high quality ability of its kind of 323 00:16:46,500 --> 00:16:48,800 approaches. However, the Texture of these 324 00:16:48,800 --> 00:16:51,900 approaches is is absolutely enormous and we're nowhere near 325 00:16:52,400 --> 00:16:56,200 the point today where you can, you can bootstrap you kinds of 326 00:16:56,200 --> 00:16:59,100 these kinds of protocols, you know, hardly hardly anybody in 327 00:16:59,100 --> 00:17:02,100 the world who can, who can develop them to be efficient 328 00:17:02,100 --> 00:17:04,400 enough to work. And and so you don't. 329 00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:06,300 You don't have that kind of that Mass Appeal that you have a 330 00:17:06,300 --> 00:17:08,700 theory where you know, anyone can code up a smart contract, 331 00:17:09,200 --> 00:17:11,599 but we do have a much simpler solution for privacy when it 332 00:17:11,599 --> 00:17:15,700 comes to defy which we could expand on. 333 00:17:16,700 --> 00:17:19,700 That would be a I don't know. Preempt any questions, then, 334 00:17:20,599 --> 00:17:22,500 please go ahead. Let me explain. 335 00:17:22,599 --> 00:17:24,800 So yeah, so, how do you get? So how do you, how do you, how 336 00:17:24,800 --> 00:17:29,400 do you get private defy? Well, the the the simple answer 337 00:17:29,400 --> 00:17:33,200 is you don't basically you. Leave you make you keep the 338 00:17:33,208 --> 00:17:35,400 default protocol public, you know, you know swap. 339 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:37,000 Make it out. You leave them where they are. 340 00:17:37,100 --> 00:17:38,900 Yeah, hang out, on layer 1, completely public. 341 00:17:38,900 --> 00:17:40,000 Everyone can see what's going on. 342 00:17:40,000 --> 00:17:44,100 And what you do is you make the assets private, you ensure that 343 00:17:44,100 --> 00:17:47,600 individuals have that their Holdings of various 344 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:49,500 cryptochrome. Is anonymous. 345 00:17:49,900 --> 00:17:52,900 So if, for example, let's consider the make it up addition 346 00:17:52,900 --> 00:17:56,600 again, imagine, you know, you know, make those public. 347 00:17:56,600 --> 00:17:59,100 So you can see, when I see the piece created, you can see its 348 00:17:59,100 --> 00:18:00,200 value. You can see what it comes on the 349 00:18:00,200 --> 00:18:02,800 colors liquidated, but you don't know who upholds it. 350 00:18:04,000 --> 00:18:06,100 And that's very high quality previously because at that time, 351 00:18:06,100 --> 00:18:08,800 it could be anybody. And so, the most important thing 352 00:18:08,800 --> 00:18:12,900 isn't to an opera need to make that the the D5 protocols 353 00:18:12,900 --> 00:18:14,800 private. It's not to make the the 354 00:18:16,100 --> 00:18:18,700 effectively, like the sites, which interact with the value 355 00:18:18,700 --> 00:18:22,100 private import things, to make the value holders private and 356 00:18:22,100 --> 00:18:25,600 give them an anima anonymity. And and that's how we're 357 00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:27,800 planning on doing a non on achieving privacy. 358 00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:32,900 So it's like a you have you hide all the addresses then you kind 359 00:18:32,900 --> 00:18:34,600 of public hearing when you do a trade. 360 00:18:34,700 --> 00:18:38,300 It's what's public. Is that a this amount is going 361 00:18:38,300 --> 00:18:41,900 from some a dress that has some the right thing does public 362 00:18:41,900 --> 00:18:44,400 action and it goes back to a new like price. 363 00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:45,700 Exactly. Yeah, so you can see in the 364 00:18:45,700 --> 00:18:48,200 video, you can see like, you know, 10/10, for example, like, 365 00:18:48,200 --> 00:18:50,600 you know, 10 teeth is gone from my dress question mark question, 366 00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:53,600 mark, question mark is going to you to swap got a bunch of doing 367 00:18:53,600 --> 00:18:55,400 that's going back to address question mark question mark, 368 00:18:55,400 --> 00:18:59,400 question mark. And so That kind of quite we 369 00:18:59,400 --> 00:19:00,700 think quite effectively solves a problem. 370 00:19:00,700 --> 00:19:03,100 You know, these these protocols can still exist in all the 371 00:19:03,100 --> 00:19:06,000 little their magnificent complexity, without having to 372 00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:09,000 kind of re white V, right. Themselves to be private, but 373 00:19:09,000 --> 00:19:11,700 you still get the benefits of privacy that users care about. 374 00:19:12,400 --> 00:19:15,700 I've got an analogy of it. Be helpful for the listeners. 375 00:19:15,700 --> 00:19:19,700 We internally, we call it the D5 bus, so you kind of see that the 376 00:19:19,700 --> 00:19:22,800 Aztec roll up contractors being like a bus station and there's 377 00:19:22,800 --> 00:19:26,100 all these buses that have kind of tinted windows and you can 378 00:19:26,100 --> 00:19:28,500 see the front of the bus. It says I'm going to use Up to 379 00:19:28,500 --> 00:19:32,900 swap if die and people can get on the bus and you can't see 380 00:19:32,900 --> 00:19:35,600 who's getting on the bus, but it will go to UNI swap. 381 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:37,300 Take the F. Do you need to open? 382 00:19:37,300 --> 00:19:40,500 It will bring back a load of died on the return journey of 383 00:19:40,500 --> 00:19:43,600 the bus, and give it back to the users in the asset Network. 384 00:19:43,900 --> 00:19:47,600 And so, so I think is a good analogy for kind of showing how 385 00:19:47,600 --> 00:19:50,700 this network interacts with the rest of the, the defy ecosystem. 386 00:19:50,700 --> 00:19:54,100 And whilst most giving strong privacy guarantees to everyone 387 00:19:54,100 --> 00:19:56,700 who's on that bus or in that transaction. 388 00:19:58,600 --> 00:20:02,500 So from a user perspective, I just want to like walk us as I 389 00:20:02,508 --> 00:20:04,800 understand it, walk through the transaction flow here. 390 00:20:05,500 --> 00:20:09,500 I want to trade on you swap, in order to do that. 391 00:20:09,700 --> 00:20:11,200 Let's say I want to trade like, eat for die. 392 00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:14,600 I send the eith to the Aztec contract. 393 00:20:14,800 --> 00:20:18,800 I get into the bus effectively then that tree gets made. 394 00:20:18,800 --> 00:20:22,200 And then I'll get say die back at some point. 395 00:20:22,500 --> 00:20:26,100 Couldn't someone just be watching my address and see that 396 00:20:26,100 --> 00:20:29,800 I interacted with the contract? I Acted with, as you call it, 397 00:20:29,800 --> 00:20:33,200 this, you know, swap bus and just deduct that. 398 00:20:33,200 --> 00:20:34,900 I've just made a trade on. You just swap. 399 00:20:34,900 --> 00:20:39,400 I mean says a bit more. It's a bit kind of AP to direct 400 00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:42,600 deposit like that in the same transaction. 401 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:45,800 That would be kind of a way to link your lair one address to to 402 00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:48,400 that trait, but the floor actually is a bit more. 403 00:20:48,900 --> 00:20:51,800 It's going to one more step so users have funds already on the 404 00:20:51,808 --> 00:20:54,000 Aztec Network. So they're already shielded. 405 00:20:54,400 --> 00:20:58,100 So you would have in a separate transaction, your teacher, even 406 00:20:58,100 --> 00:20:59,300 yours. Make it as you get you. 407 00:21:00,000 --> 00:21:03,300 And then you have these encrypted, you txo notes on 408 00:21:03,300 --> 00:21:06,900 Aztec and you can use those to interact with any L1 smart 409 00:21:06,900 --> 00:21:08,600 contract through our defy Bridge. 410 00:21:08,900 --> 00:21:11,900 As in this case, you're choosing trap interact with the uni swap 411 00:21:12,200 --> 00:21:15,500 each dipole. So you kind of send a 412 00:21:15,508 --> 00:21:19,300 transaction that says, I want to put one equally into the next 413 00:21:19,400 --> 00:21:23,100 bus. Going to the that ball and the 414 00:21:23,100 --> 00:21:26,400 owner of that teeth could be anyone who's ever deposited e to 415 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:29,800 the Aztecs Park on track. See identity is completely 416 00:21:29,800 --> 00:21:33,500 hidden throughout that process. The roll-up provider will then 417 00:21:34,100 --> 00:21:37,300 bundle all those transactions with any other user who wants to 418 00:21:37,300 --> 00:21:40,700 do the same trade. So, say Zach also wants to trade 419 00:21:40,700 --> 00:21:42,300 to Rican. A few other. 420 00:21:42,300 --> 00:21:44,000 People are also getting on the bus. 421 00:21:44,000 --> 00:21:46,900 So we'll send an aggregate then transaction from the role of 422 00:21:46,900 --> 00:21:51,100 contract out to UNI swap say five even total and we'll bring 423 00:21:51,100 --> 00:21:55,300 back die to the Aztec roller contract, and that will then be 424 00:21:55,300 --> 00:21:57,900 dispersed in zero-knowledge notes. 425 00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:02,100 To the holders who participated kind of in that transaction. 426 00:22:02,100 --> 00:22:05,900 So you're actually not getting the proceeds at the Depot 427 00:22:05,900 --> 00:22:08,300 interaction on layer one. You're getting it in encrypted 428 00:22:08,300 --> 00:22:12,000 form on there too, which is how the strong privacy guarantees 429 00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:15,200 kind of maintained through that. Think it's quite an interesting 430 00:22:15,200 --> 00:22:17,000 way of doing it and that can talk about the actual 431 00:22:17,000 --> 00:22:19,500 cryptography because it was a bit of a breakthrough moment for 432 00:22:19,500 --> 00:22:22,300 us to actually get their identities hidden through the 433 00:22:22,300 --> 00:22:23,400 process. Hmm. 434 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:27,400 Okay, so it uses the same note system as like the previous 435 00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:28,300 version. I think that's what I miss. 436 00:22:29,500 --> 00:22:31,900 The new systems actually not graded Forum because the old 437 00:22:31,900 --> 00:22:34,300 Aztec just had confidential note. 438 00:22:34,300 --> 00:22:38,100 So here, both the balance and the owner is encrypted. 439 00:22:38,400 --> 00:22:41,300 So that's what gives us kind of the anonymity. 440 00:22:41,300 --> 00:22:43,500 What we need to do these transactions. 441 00:22:45,300 --> 00:22:48,100 I was looking like from user perspective, you know, right now 442 00:22:48,500 --> 00:22:51,400 as a connect better, masking yourself website and just press 443 00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:54,000 about to do a transaction. So is it? 444 00:22:54,000 --> 00:22:55,700 Like I said, it's still pretty similar. 445 00:22:55,700 --> 00:23:00,200 We're on on like the Aztec site. There's still a fact, my wallet 446 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,900 and just do the trade that the transaction like does all these 447 00:23:03,900 --> 00:23:07,900 three steps like go to L1 Swap and go back to L2. 448 00:23:09,300 --> 00:23:12,200 Yes, sir. So we have a kind of we call it 449 00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:15,100 CK money, and it's kind of like a Showcase of what's possible 450 00:23:15,100 --> 00:23:17,900 with drastic SDK. And so the next kind of three 451 00:23:17,900 --> 00:23:21,400 months, the, the main venue for these trades will be seeking 452 00:23:21,400 --> 00:23:24,100 money and you'll be able to connect metal mask. 453 00:23:24,100 --> 00:23:26,400 Kind of, it will show you either. 454 00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:29,800 If you have aleurone or if you've already kind of use the 455 00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:32,300 Aztec Network, it will show you as you can eat, and you'll be 456 00:23:32,308 --> 00:23:35,200 able to kind of do these various default interactions. 457 00:23:35,300 --> 00:23:38,100 And yet, all of that will be abstracted from the user. 458 00:23:38,700 --> 00:23:43,200 Via SDK the kind of three to six-month goal is the sdks 459 00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:47,400 integrated on a lot of these L1 front-end protocols. 460 00:23:48,100 --> 00:23:51,300 So you can actually just go directly to UNI swap or are they 461 00:23:51,300 --> 00:23:54,400 or some of those protocols and perform have the option to 462 00:23:54,400 --> 00:23:55,900 perform the interaction privately? 463 00:23:57,000 --> 00:23:58,500 Very cool. I feel like this General 464 00:23:58,500 --> 00:24:01,400 approach is like the future of a practical privacy for a D5 465 00:24:01,400 --> 00:24:03,700 things. It's often like, you know, if 466 00:24:03,700 --> 00:24:06,300 you want public information like, you know, constant Park 467 00:24:06,300 --> 00:24:10,300 market makers, our cost function, then you have to have 468 00:24:10,300 --> 00:24:13,500 this false in public. And I'm saying, yeah, I think 469 00:24:13,500 --> 00:24:15,700 it's kind of The Best of Both Worlds because you get the kind 470 00:24:15,700 --> 00:24:20,100 of the transparency of layer 1 D Phi, which is what made it grow 471 00:24:20,100 --> 00:24:23,800 to be so popular, but you also don't have to sacrifice. 472 00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:26,200 What a lot of people take for granted in the web to world is 473 00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:28,000 just basic transaction. Percy. 474 00:24:28,900 --> 00:24:30,300 No one can see my Robin Hood account. 475 00:24:30,300 --> 00:24:32,700 No one can see kind of my Revenue accounts. 476 00:24:32,700 --> 00:24:38,100 I think this allows new types of kind of user experiences that 477 00:24:38,100 --> 00:24:42,100 give you the best of I think our one defy, but also strong user. 478 00:24:42,300 --> 00:24:44,200 Crt's. Yeah. 479 00:24:44,300 --> 00:24:45,600 Sorry. I just want to like, stay on 480 00:24:45,600 --> 00:24:50,700 this defy topic a bit. So in that case, then you need 481 00:24:50,700 --> 00:24:55,600 to create a me like UNICEF. We need to add a like a sty 482 00:24:55,600 --> 00:25:01,100 Keith Aztec die pair I suppose. And if you wanted to trade those 483 00:25:01,100 --> 00:25:04,300 assets. That's one of the one of the key 484 00:25:04,300 --> 00:25:07,800 parts of our precious. That's, we're looking at the 485 00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:11,000 lick, the the kind of evolving layer to landscape in right now. 486 00:25:12,100 --> 00:25:15,400 Kind of the the impetus is on having strict liquidity because 487 00:25:15,400 --> 00:25:19,300 if you want to benefit from the fee reductions that you get from 488 00:25:19,300 --> 00:25:21,500 where operational are to, you've got to move that it - will defy 489 00:25:21,500 --> 00:25:26,000 protocol into the layer 2 and it has a principal balance earlier 490 00:25:26,700 --> 00:25:31,000 liquid asset, pairings Etc. But for us we felt we wanted it 491 00:25:31,000 --> 00:25:36,800 to be very much help. Users want is to leave the the 492 00:25:36,800 --> 00:25:39,000 actual source of the pyncheon layer 1 because that's where 493 00:25:39,000 --> 00:25:41,000 they're going to get their the best prices, but interact with 494 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:45,100 the cheaply. And so even if you have shielded 495 00:25:45,100 --> 00:25:47,700 Aztec assets and you're using our defy bridge to interact with 496 00:25:47,700 --> 00:25:49,700 it that the male element smart contract, like, units, of, 497 00:25:49,700 --> 00:25:51,000 you're still talking to the Unis. 498 00:25:51,000 --> 00:25:52,900 Swaps layer. One liquidity pool. 499 00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:55,500 So the E to die pairing that you're getting and the 500 00:25:55,500 --> 00:25:58,200 associated price. It's still, you'll see it's 501 00:25:58,200 --> 00:25:59,900 still based on the global unit circle. 502 00:26:00,400 --> 00:26:03,900 So in order to perform a name like Performing integration with 503 00:26:03,900 --> 00:26:07,000 that steak. You you you need a facility did 504 00:26:07,000 --> 00:26:09,900 some kind of facility ability to Shield user funds using the 505 00:26:09,900 --> 00:26:13,200 Aztec network, but that won't be tearing affect the prices that 506 00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:18,600 getting from using our protocol. Okay, interesting. 507 00:26:19,100 --> 00:26:23,800 What about collateralization? How would collateralization work 508 00:26:24,300 --> 00:26:27,800 using Aztec? First cdp's to me. 509 00:26:28,300 --> 00:26:32,700 Yeah, like make like like a CDP. For example, yea, it says 2 510 00:26:32,700 --> 00:26:35,800 because 2 methods ready. You can have a sack kind of 511 00:26:36,400 --> 00:26:38,100 mentioned earlier on like a unique. 512 00:26:38,100 --> 00:26:41,800 CDP for you where you don't really benefit from huge gas 513 00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:45,700 savings, but you have a strong privacy guarantees, or you could 514 00:26:45,700 --> 00:26:48,900 have kind of TSE DPS. So you can kind of have a system 515 00:26:48,900 --> 00:26:53,000 where we all agree with a load banded other users that we want 516 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:56,200 to enter into a three month term CDP. 517 00:26:56,400 --> 00:27:00,900 And the LTV ratios can be kept at a certain amount and then 518 00:27:00,900 --> 00:27:02,100 everyone's kind of doing the same thing. 519 00:27:02,100 --> 00:27:06,400 So you can get really strong gas savings as well as prophecy 520 00:27:06,400 --> 00:27:08,700 savings from doing that. So, it depends on kind of the 521 00:27:09,100 --> 00:27:12,300 end-user product. We're starting to see a lot more 522 00:27:12,300 --> 00:27:15,300 fixed rate, kind of protocols come online in defy. 523 00:27:15,300 --> 00:27:21,500 So, I think that's where I think the kind of retail users will 524 00:27:21,500 --> 00:27:24,200 end up, is kind of on, on more Structured Products rather than 525 00:27:24,500 --> 00:27:28,300 wildly slowly swinging. Pause, but that's kind of a I 526 00:27:28,300 --> 00:27:32,500 think your approach to we take with a transition of blends. 527 00:27:35,100 --> 00:27:37,700 I didn't click all like, are you imagining that the collateral is 528 00:27:37,700 --> 00:27:41,100 held, like can just like one big collateral pool held by the 529 00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:43,900 contract or imagine that there's some out like a and like my 530 00:27:43,900 --> 00:27:46,800 share of the pool is private but Hannibal on the role of side. 531 00:27:47,900 --> 00:27:55,500 Yeah, so you could have like Aztec q4e CDP and you could have 532 00:27:55,500 --> 00:27:57,000 different characterization ratios. 533 00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,400 So this will be the hundred and hundred fifty percent cloud 534 00:27:59,400 --> 00:28:02,000 rotation ratio. We all enter on a certain date 535 00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:05,000 and it will be a three month term and kind of that would be 536 00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:08,100 one approach to doing it. And then, in that case, you get 537 00:28:08,100 --> 00:28:12,300 like a much better gas cost per user. 538 00:28:12,900 --> 00:28:17,300 Actually taking out that form of that form of debt. 539 00:28:17,800 --> 00:28:19,700 You could have the case where, if you're a large user and you 540 00:28:19,700 --> 00:28:22,700 don't mind paying kind of the L1 cache, fees yourself. 541 00:28:22,700 --> 00:28:26,400 You can just have free flexibility by entering in kind 542 00:28:26,400 --> 00:28:30,700 of any CDP of your choosing but you wouldn't get any batching in 543 00:28:30,700 --> 00:28:33,400 that circumstance. You'd still get batching on the 544 00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:35,700 cost of privacy. So you'll go to have your 545 00:28:36,200 --> 00:28:40,200 transaction backed with other zero knowledge snarks that are 546 00:28:40,208 --> 00:28:43,000 doing different things that you would pay the full cost of the 547 00:28:43,400 --> 00:28:46,000 entering the CDP position. So you get kind of a bit of 548 00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:49,800 scaling in terms of privacy. Those are but still find, like, 549 00:28:49,800 --> 00:28:52,700 hold the collateral in this or sorry. 550 00:28:52,700 --> 00:28:57,900 You have the loan amount being, it's private as cycle to us, but 551 00:28:57,900 --> 00:29:00,300 just collateral has got to be on chain since. 552 00:29:01,100 --> 00:29:05,000 Yep, you need liquidations, go to see it or yeah. 553 00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:07,900 So, in that case, it would be like, in a single user case. 554 00:29:07,900 --> 00:29:10,400 It would be like smart contract would end up position and that's 555 00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:13,100 what control be like a crate to opcode. 556 00:29:13,100 --> 00:29:17,900 So you have kind of a and use my contract for every kind of CDP 557 00:29:17,900 --> 00:29:19,600 that. Ratings, when I was just one 558 00:29:19,600 --> 00:29:23,900 user kind of behind that, CDP just the source of funds that 559 00:29:23,900 --> 00:29:25,900 do. The initial characterization are 560 00:29:25,900 --> 00:29:30,200 coming from the state network, not from kind of a tainted one 561 00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:34,500 address. Very cool on this like, privacy 562 00:29:34,500 --> 00:29:36,800 idea. So I don't really see caps. 563 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:40,100 There's a problem of people would go from the transparent 564 00:29:40,100 --> 00:29:42,900 pool into the shielded pool and then it can almost immediately 565 00:29:42,900 --> 00:29:44,800 go from shielded pull back to transparent. 566 00:29:44,900 --> 00:29:48,100 Or in this case would be like shielded pool to, you know, salt 567 00:29:48,100 --> 00:29:51,700 trade the exact same balance. I would, how are you thinking 568 00:29:51,700 --> 00:29:55,900 of, like, mitigating like the link ability their of exact 569 00:29:55,900 --> 00:29:59,000 amounts? You know, it's like, he's a full 570 00:29:59,000 --> 00:30:01,800 amount, you know, it's a big problem in a synod positivism. 571 00:30:02,000 --> 00:30:07,200 Location issue in part of it, as ux and design issue because what 572 00:30:07,300 --> 00:30:09,300 because the discrepancies tank is still relatively new. 573 00:30:09,300 --> 00:30:12,400 I think a lot of users don't fully understand how it works 574 00:30:12,400 --> 00:30:15,700 and that you'd be effectively your by when you Shield your 575 00:30:15,700 --> 00:30:20,400 tokens your, the active that of deposit against the Shield, it 576 00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:22,400 was public. So they can see for example, 577 00:30:22,400 --> 00:30:25,800 that, you know, Dave puts anything to Aztec and but, and 578 00:30:25,800 --> 00:30:27,900 then. And so, if you then immediately, 579 00:30:27,900 --> 00:30:29,200 withdraw, its very easy, what's happened? 580 00:30:29,200 --> 00:30:31,800 You know, you see, you see, there's the positive. 581 00:30:31,900 --> 00:30:34,200 Teni interesting. And then in the next block it 582 00:30:34,200 --> 00:30:37,300 was just any traffic tickets. I mean, yeah, it's kind of 583 00:30:37,300 --> 00:30:40,300 obvious. But what you really need to do 584 00:30:40,300 --> 00:30:42,800 is deposit your value into Aztec. 585 00:30:42,900 --> 00:30:46,500 Wait a little bit and then withdraw to a different address. 586 00:30:46,500 --> 00:30:50,300 Your is the one you originally deposited from because let's 587 00:30:50,300 --> 00:30:54,600 say, because we try to encourage through our through our ux UI 588 00:30:54,600 --> 00:30:57,300 people to deposit and relatively fixed amounts like once anyth. 589 00:30:57,700 --> 00:31:00,800 So the way we would ideally work, like if you're if you're 590 00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:05,000 for an educated, Is you deposit anything to ask Tech, you know, 591 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,200 you wait a few hours and then to a different dress, you withdraw 592 00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:09,700 the 20th nest egg. And that's how youth could have 593 00:31:09,700 --> 00:31:14,400 come from anybody who like, you know, from from now to the dawn 594 00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:17,800 of the process, start start the protocol deposited teeth into a 595 00:31:17,808 --> 00:31:20,600 state called or acquire teeth within the asset Network somehow 596 00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:23,700 perhaps 255. But most of it I think it's just 597 00:31:23,700 --> 00:31:27,900 making sure in the in the in the user interface that the user is 598 00:31:27,900 --> 00:31:31,100 informed of what they're doing. And so that if they're if they 599 00:31:31,100 --> 00:31:34,400 do this this fluid humidity deposit withdraw in the UI goes, 600 00:31:34,400 --> 00:31:36,900 you know, hey you sure you want to do this and Joe, I think you 601 00:31:36,900 --> 00:31:38,800 can you can expand on that a bit. 602 00:31:40,100 --> 00:31:43,600 Yeah, there's a few cases but we're kind of touting this idea 603 00:31:43,600 --> 00:31:46,700 of privacy school. So kind of just really helping 604 00:31:46,700 --> 00:31:50,200 to inform the user of how private a transaction are about 605 00:31:50,200 --> 00:31:54,300 to do is an exact was saying that can be anything from a your 606 00:31:54,400 --> 00:31:56,700 your unshielded to the same address you deposited from. 607 00:31:56,700 --> 00:31:59,000 That's that's not private. And or there's a high link 608 00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:03,000 ability risk there or things. Like if you're kind of and 609 00:32:03,000 --> 00:32:06,700 shielding to a very large significant number of decimal 610 00:32:06,700 --> 00:32:11,100 places, and then there's also So kind of can add to the link 611 00:32:11,100 --> 00:32:15,200 ability of those transactions. The great thing about the kind 612 00:32:15,200 --> 00:32:17,700 of the default bridge and it doesn't fix all of these things, 613 00:32:17,700 --> 00:32:21,300 but it's the first step in the road is the Privacy kind of 614 00:32:21,700 --> 00:32:24,200 starts to become by default not opt in. 615 00:32:24,200 --> 00:32:27,100 And I think they're that the issue was some like other 616 00:32:27,100 --> 00:32:29,000 privacy systems. Is that when you have to choose 617 00:32:29,000 --> 00:32:31,600 between privacy and not having it traditionally, the user 618 00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:34,300 experience has always been worse or always been more expensive. 619 00:32:34,600 --> 00:32:38,000 So it's always been the incentives is to get out of the 620 00:32:38,000 --> 00:32:40,800 Privacy shield and What we're trying to do with the next 621 00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:44,200 couple of versions of Aztec is change that flip it on its head. 622 00:32:44,200 --> 00:32:47,600 So that users should be comfortable keeping their funds 623 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:50,900 in the Aztec Network. And then those kind of 624 00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:54,100 opportunities for a privacy breach should become a bit more 625 00:32:54,100 --> 00:32:56,400 reduced, but you still have to kind of be a bit careful when 626 00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:58,000 you're interacting with the depot bridge. 627 00:32:58,100 --> 00:33:03,200 If you kind of deposit, I don't know, 90% of one token to the 628 00:33:03,200 --> 00:33:06,200 Aztec Network and then there's a defect which trade for 90% of 629 00:33:06,200 --> 00:33:09,000 that that token. You can kind of start to. 630 00:33:09,100 --> 00:33:12,400 Pick figure out what's happening, but where the defect, 631 00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:15,700 which I think comes into his own as if you have kind of smaller 632 00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:18,300 trades that have drip fed into the market over time. 633 00:33:18,700 --> 00:33:23,400 If that trade, is kind of pretty homogeneous compared to, like 634 00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:26,900 the normal size of a transaction on the network for that asset 635 00:33:26,900 --> 00:33:29,000 pair. You have great privacy, and and 636 00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:32,500 that's what the you. I will kind of enforce and try 637 00:33:32,500 --> 00:33:34,600 to guide the user around, where the Privacy School. 638 00:33:36,000 --> 00:33:38,400 Post, very cool. So you're like, detecting these 639 00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,100 cases, where you think it's easy to I can link back and then 640 00:33:42,400 --> 00:33:44,600 giving a warning, right? Then saying look this 641 00:33:44,600 --> 00:33:48,800 transaction is likely linkable. Maybe you want to break it up or 642 00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:51,200 wait some more time. Yes, that's the idea. 643 00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:54,900 And I think, like, on day one. It may be kind of just like on 644 00:33:54,900 --> 00:33:59,300 this possible indicators. It's kind of like strong weak or 645 00:33:59,300 --> 00:34:02,700 kind of extra strong, but we're working on kind of the metrics 646 00:34:02,700 --> 00:34:05,600 to put into it right now, but I think that's because the easiest 647 00:34:05,600 --> 00:34:09,900 way that to identify the user of a potential issue because a lot 648 00:34:09,900 --> 00:34:13,300 of this is just user experience. It's you haven't had to think 649 00:34:13,300 --> 00:34:17,500 about this in a web to world because you have kind of privacy 650 00:34:17,500 --> 00:34:20,100 from everyone except your service provider, but in a web 651 00:34:20,100 --> 00:34:23,500 three World, there are kind of these different cases where you 652 00:34:23,500 --> 00:34:27,199 do need to kind of be notified and users have to kind of accept 653 00:34:27,199 --> 00:34:29,300 different norms. And I think it's on that some 654 00:34:29,300 --> 00:34:32,900 applications to start to think of better user experiences to 655 00:34:32,900 --> 00:34:36,000 notify what data is public and As you can see what. 656 00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:39,100 And this is just one thing. We're trying very cool. 657 00:34:39,100 --> 00:34:41,900 And I guess there's also sort of thing where the amount of 658 00:34:41,908 --> 00:34:45,100 warnings you get really goes down over time as more assets or 659 00:34:45,100 --> 00:34:48,199 more historical records. Are there to be selecting from 660 00:34:48,199 --> 00:34:49,699 definitely. Yeah. 661 00:34:49,707 --> 00:34:51,900 Yeah. As the kind of privacy set 662 00:34:51,900 --> 00:34:54,000 grows. You should see that's a mess 663 00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:56,900 warnings. And yet the, the kind of network 664 00:34:56,900 --> 00:35:00,100 effect around previously announced a network or stronger 665 00:35:00,100 --> 00:35:03,400 and I think also the amount of times you want to kind of leave. 666 00:35:03,400 --> 00:35:06,100 The Aztec network will also Kind of shrink. 667 00:35:06,400 --> 00:35:09,200 So you should kind of have less of these these opportunities to 668 00:35:09,200 --> 00:35:12,300 accidentally break a privacy think we can we can talk a bit 669 00:35:12,300 --> 00:35:15,800 more about like how we get past kind of defy and and the longer 670 00:35:15,800 --> 00:35:18,700 term goal and that would kind of explain a bit more about kind of 671 00:35:18,700 --> 00:35:22,900 how Noir fits into all of this and how long term we think a lot 672 00:35:22,900 --> 00:35:25,400 of lot more applications will happen within the network. 673 00:35:25,400 --> 00:35:27,900 So they'll be less and less chances for those privacy 674 00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:30,200 breaches. Yeah, sure. 675 00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:35,000 I guess John talked about how you're imagining nor and more 676 00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:37,700 privacy or more applications on the private side. 677 00:35:39,700 --> 00:35:42,600 Yeah, so this is this. This kind of default bursting 678 00:35:42,600 --> 00:35:47,500 were building is is merely the stepping stone to our of kind of 679 00:35:47,500 --> 00:35:50,600 a grander aspirations. And it's an architecture that 680 00:35:50,600 --> 00:35:52,300 we're calling is like the working title. 681 00:35:52,300 --> 00:35:55,700 Is that step 3. Well right now with will be 682 00:35:55,700 --> 00:35:58,400 released in March, you can Shield cryptocurrencies. 683 00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:01,100 You can still run privately in the Universal way, which is, 684 00:36:01,100 --> 00:36:05,100 it's useful, but it's doesn't really tap into the massive 685 00:36:05,100 --> 00:36:08,000 ecosystem of innovation. That's happening in the 686 00:36:08,000 --> 00:36:11,300 blockchain space, which is where The defect which comes in but 687 00:36:11,300 --> 00:36:14,900 even that only provides it provides. 688 00:36:15,200 --> 00:36:19,100 Good access to publicly one protocols, but where we think 689 00:36:19,700 --> 00:36:23,000 privacy really starts to shine is that it opens up a whole new 690 00:36:23,000 --> 00:36:25,700 category of interactions that just can't exist today on a 691 00:36:25,700 --> 00:36:28,500 blockchain because of the, because so many so many 692 00:36:28,500 --> 00:36:30,800 applications in for example, like traditional Finance or 693 00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:34,700 payments, or like the kind of use cases. 694 00:36:34,700 --> 00:36:37,500 I like it. Everyday individuals, desire, 695 00:36:38,200 --> 00:36:41,000 require. Strong user privacy guarantees. 696 00:36:41,500 --> 00:36:45,600 And so what we want to do is effectively, recreate the 697 00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:49,100 etherium, smart contract ecosystem inside Aztec, but 698 00:36:49,300 --> 00:36:53,100 where privacy is preserved, so that to give developers 699 00:36:53,200 --> 00:36:56,800 Engineers users, the ability to write their own smart contracts 700 00:36:57,300 --> 00:37:01,200 that have privacy baked into the core so that you can just sooo, 701 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:03,600 not just so you can. It's not just that you can have 702 00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:06,500 a private token, but you can decide how it's transferred who 703 00:37:06,500 --> 00:37:08,600 can own at how to meant it. However, subtle. 704 00:37:08,600 --> 00:37:10,300 It. Because what this really 705 00:37:10,300 --> 00:37:14,600 enables, what was what really excites us is that this is the 706 00:37:14,600 --> 00:37:17,600 first time that you can meaningfully put your identity 707 00:37:17,600 --> 00:37:21,600 on shame and Link it to your crypto currency accounts. 708 00:37:22,100 --> 00:37:24,300 Without splashing your personal information all over the 709 00:37:24,300 --> 00:37:26,300 Internet. It means that you can condition 710 00:37:26,300 --> 00:37:30,100 you prove Parts about yourself without revealing at to anybody 711 00:37:30,100 --> 00:37:32,900 else in the wider world. For example, you know, you can 712 00:37:32,900 --> 00:37:37,900 have you know, an identity token that you that you can have some 713 00:37:37,900 --> 00:37:42,800 some Cryptocurrency that's condition but holding its 714 00:37:42,800 --> 00:37:46,100 conditional having one of these identities, infants, or if it's 715 00:37:46,100 --> 00:37:50,100 more like more, it also opens up like more other Innovative 716 00:37:50,100 --> 00:37:53,800 spaces, like for example, private entities where you can 717 00:37:53,800 --> 00:37:57,200 have some data fields that are private, but you can like prove 718 00:37:57,200 --> 00:38:01,200 Parts about your private entity to other people under certain 719 00:38:01,200 --> 00:38:04,200 conditions. You can have it opens up a whole 720 00:38:04,700 --> 00:38:09,100 Innovative tranche of blockchain based games where you can. 721 00:38:09,200 --> 00:38:11,500 Eating for you can actually have information asymmetry. 722 00:38:11,500 --> 00:38:14,300 So, you know, the players of the game, actually, you can not know 723 00:38:14,700 --> 00:38:17,400 things about their about their counterparts which isn't really 724 00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:21,600 the case with with a fully transparent setting, but all of 725 00:38:21,600 --> 00:38:24,400 these things require programmability requires the 726 00:38:24,400 --> 00:38:27,400 community to decide how they best want privacy to be used in 727 00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:29,200 their applications and to be, and to have the tools and 728 00:38:29,200 --> 00:38:30,700 ability to program it themselves. 729 00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:35,400 And that's where you on a 6-3 comes in, nor is our highly 730 00:38:35,400 --> 00:38:36,900 efficient. See, it's not very Language 731 00:38:36,900 --> 00:38:41,600 spearheaded by by us, but by I kept quite a bit about them and 732 00:38:41,900 --> 00:38:46,100 it's, it's a rust based on text language that compiles directly 733 00:38:46,100 --> 00:38:48,000 to a highly optimized clock seconds. 734 00:38:48,500 --> 00:38:51,900 And we're planning on using that in that in, in a, in a, in a 735 00:38:51,900 --> 00:38:54,300 kind of the next iteration of our protocol design where 736 00:38:54,500 --> 00:38:58,500 instead of our kind of zeeky zeeky roll-up, verifying the 737 00:38:58,500 --> 00:39:00,200 same transaction, type over and over again. 738 00:39:00,200 --> 00:39:01,500 There's this dislike private transaction. 739 00:39:01,500 --> 00:39:02,700 It's private owners of Brothers directions. 740 00:39:02,700 --> 00:39:08,000 Instead what the role of verifies is a zero, knowledge 741 00:39:08,000 --> 00:39:11,200 proof. That's Work has come from a, 742 00:39:11,200 --> 00:39:14,300 from a one of these circuits that's been written into our and 743 00:39:14,300 --> 00:39:16,700 upload it into our Network by anybody. 744 00:39:16,800 --> 00:39:20,800 Basically, it's the Gnostic Eastern technology, which allows 745 00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:24,200 us to create a fully permissionless, private 746 00:39:24,200 --> 00:39:26,100 programmable. Cryptocurrency Network. 747 00:39:27,300 --> 00:39:31,400 And that's, yeah, that's pretty much once once, where once we 748 00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:33,300 put out the defy pitch. That's where that's where we're 749 00:39:33,300 --> 00:39:36,700 heading with all our energy and attention and resources. 750 00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:40,500 Well, very cool. But I'm packing this is that 751 00:39:40,508 --> 00:39:43,000 there's a bunch of grown-ups. They're soaked for the 752 00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:45,400 programmability ideas. Like I want to be able to put 753 00:39:45,400 --> 00:39:49,600 my, its kind of, is it like the sexy model where I guess, you 754 00:39:49,900 --> 00:39:54,800 know, a couple of things try to do that where you have a public 755 00:39:54,800 --> 00:39:57,700 or you have like a program on chain or on the Ambassador chain 756 00:39:58,100 --> 00:40:00,900 that users can interact with and sort of a private manner, where 757 00:40:01,100 --> 00:40:03,600 this, the contract can maintain both a public State and private 758 00:40:03,600 --> 00:40:06,500 State and you every interactions updates both of these. 759 00:40:07,800 --> 00:40:11,200 Yes, exactly. But where were things? 760 00:40:11,200 --> 00:40:16,300 Things differ is the fact that we've been very much trying to 761 00:40:17,800 --> 00:40:22,100 structure this architecture to look a lot more like a systems 762 00:40:22,100 --> 00:40:23,900 platform. That would be more very familiar 763 00:40:23,900 --> 00:40:27,600 to software Engineers. So it begs it's a kind of eight 764 00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:31,000 familiar, blotching Concepts. Like you have a video questions 765 00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:32,700 actually, have a concept of a call stack of contract. 766 00:40:32,700 --> 00:40:35,100 I can call the contract, you can have one contract with multiple 767 00:40:35,100 --> 00:40:40,100 functions and You can kind of have a reasonably, like somewhat 768 00:40:40,100 --> 00:40:43,400 arbitrarily transaction depth. So you can have, you know, 769 00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:45,400 contract past people, call. It conscious call each other 770 00:40:45,408 --> 00:40:46,900 countries called by the contracts over and over and over 771 00:40:46,900 --> 00:40:51,000 again, you don't have the some of the restrictions that other 772 00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:55,400 systems have, like, sexy, because of the well, their 773 00:40:55,400 --> 00:40:57,800 restrictions come down to the fact that the the protocol was 774 00:40:57,800 --> 00:41:01,600 designed for this kind of limited recursion technology 775 00:41:01,600 --> 00:41:05,300 that was available at the time and think things have moved 776 00:41:05,300 --> 00:41:07,000 along a bit like a little bit. Like there's been a lot of 777 00:41:07,000 --> 00:41:10,100 Development on these like Don cycles of elliptic curves with 778 00:41:10,100 --> 00:41:12,700 this Halo recording system with the stuff and a 16, which means 779 00:41:12,700 --> 00:41:15,200 you can get this kind of arbitrary deaf recursion, where 780 00:41:15,700 --> 00:41:17,700 where you can have, you know, zika, Forest aggregate, 781 00:41:17,700 --> 00:41:18,800 verifies, you give your surroundings. 782 00:41:18,800 --> 00:41:21,500 You can press all the way down and this enables. 783 00:41:21,700 --> 00:41:26,400 Yeah, it enables your, you will see, case knock circuit to 784 00:41:26,500 --> 00:41:30,700 encode an algorithm, which starts to look a lot like VM 785 00:41:30,700 --> 00:41:33,500 base cryptocurrency protocol, where you don't have to like 786 00:41:33,500 --> 00:41:36,800 learn new and like kind of a diff. 787 00:41:36,900 --> 00:41:39,000 Oblique different types of transaction, semantics. 788 00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:41,800 In order to program it. Oh cool. 789 00:41:41,800 --> 00:41:43,700 So it's like starting to look more like basically Reef where 790 00:41:43,700 --> 00:41:46,300 it's solving, the old problem of, really only impact. 791 00:41:46,300 --> 00:41:49,900 One contractor, like small set in one transaction because we're 792 00:41:50,100 --> 00:41:53,700 limited proving tech for some curves, but now, it seemed like, 793 00:41:53,700 --> 00:41:57,800 with the aspect, Unbound, recursion in this is like fixed 794 00:41:57,900 --> 00:42:00,600 you can. Now, in theory, I'm gonna throw 795 00:42:00,600 --> 00:42:02,000 my hands. Okay, we've not built yet. 796 00:42:02,100 --> 00:42:05,500 So that the, the mission for our company is putting this in 797 00:42:05,508 --> 00:42:06,900 practice over the next 12 months. 798 00:42:08,000 --> 00:42:10,500 Poor I guess a question. Maybe this is a bit technical 799 00:42:10,500 --> 00:42:13,600 for folks. But like, how does the proving 800 00:42:13,600 --> 00:42:17,200 work here? We're essentially you're having 801 00:42:17,200 --> 00:42:19,500 a this will give us like large something on multiple 802 00:42:19,500 --> 00:42:22,200 transactions. Interacting the same contract 803 00:42:22,300 --> 00:42:25,100 per block, but they all affect state. 804 00:42:25,600 --> 00:42:27,900 Do you have some like out off chain? 805 00:42:27,900 --> 00:42:31,000 Aggregator like bundle these together and make one proof or 806 00:42:31,000 --> 00:42:34,100 is are some parts that are like available to the block or 807 00:42:34,100 --> 00:42:37,300 opposer for them to do the proofs to get many transactions 808 00:42:37,400 --> 00:42:38,800 to 1. On track for vlog. 809 00:42:40,300 --> 00:42:42,900 Now, it's a good question because you do run into some 810 00:42:42,900 --> 00:42:45,000 some circle decreased conditioners. 811 00:42:45,000 --> 00:42:47,600 When you're dealing with these kind of off chain aggregation 812 00:42:47,600 --> 00:42:50,700 Services, particularly, with the private, with, when protecting 813 00:42:50,700 --> 00:42:55,500 privacy, where if you have multiple individuals, who wants 814 00:42:55,500 --> 00:42:57,600 to talk to the same contract, then they're kind of that. 815 00:42:57,600 --> 00:42:59,700 They want to update their Factory, modifying the steam 816 00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:03,900 database and you can kind of get into problems with in a lot of 817 00:43:03,908 --> 00:43:06,900 people kind of it's bit like lost people wrestler over the 818 00:43:06,900 --> 00:43:10,800 same, the over a single piece of cake and And I will just kick 819 00:43:10,800 --> 00:43:12,300 out a mistake. I don't know. 820 00:43:12,300 --> 00:43:14,200 That's a great way of describing a race condition. 821 00:43:14,400 --> 00:43:18,000 But there's a fairly simple straightforward way of solving 822 00:43:18,600 --> 00:43:22,500 that which is basically to have this aggregated, be the entity 823 00:43:22,500 --> 00:43:27,000 performing State updates. So that when individual centers 824 00:43:27,000 --> 00:43:31,600 actress Tara Gator, they they request State updates to be made 825 00:43:31,700 --> 00:43:34,000 on their behalf. And if they're private, that 826 00:43:34,000 --> 00:43:35,000 they'll be encrypted at the public. 827 00:43:35,000 --> 00:43:38,200 They won't be but it's actually the the aggregator he's doing 828 00:43:38,200 --> 00:43:39,900 them at during the mechanical process. 829 00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:42,800 Of putting these variables inside eight inside a database 830 00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:46,800 modifying, this database values. So yeah, I think I think at this 831 00:43:46,800 --> 00:43:48,200 point it's a relatively soft problem. 832 00:43:48,500 --> 00:43:51,700 Okay, so suddenly privacy leak, in that era Gator already 833 00:43:51,700 --> 00:43:54,600 access, the private database sort of like a private state. 834 00:43:54,600 --> 00:43:58,600 So that's like there's no new information are getting exactly 835 00:43:58,600 --> 00:44:00,300 that. I mean, if they agree that 836 00:44:00,300 --> 00:44:05,400 you'll basically when you create your privacy proof, that that 837 00:44:05,400 --> 00:44:08,100 proof will spit out a bunch of variables, but they're all 838 00:44:08,100 --> 00:44:12,300 encrypted and those variables. Not in the database, but the the 839 00:44:12,300 --> 00:44:14,800 abrogation doesn't have like doesn't know anything about 840 00:44:14,800 --> 00:44:17,100 those those variables to them if they just look like random 841 00:44:17,100 --> 00:44:19,400 numbers. So if they don't need to know 842 00:44:19,400 --> 00:44:22,500 these random the actual data entries to handle State 843 00:44:22,500 --> 00:44:25,500 conflicts. Well, the idea is basically you 844 00:44:25,500 --> 00:44:27,100 don't you don't have a steak conflict. 845 00:44:27,100 --> 00:44:31,000 So well, this may be getting into the weeds but dealing with 846 00:44:31,000 --> 00:44:34,900 private State and public States, they need to be treated 847 00:44:34,900 --> 00:44:37,200 differently. So, with private, the way that 848 00:44:37,200 --> 00:44:41,100 the way, one handles private State modifications is Are you? 849 00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:44,000 Well using this kind of this Bitcoin? 850 00:44:44,000 --> 00:44:45,400 So I'm spent transactional check. 851 00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:48,500 The idea is instead of having an act like a like an accounts 852 00:44:48,500 --> 00:44:52,300 where you, you have a like something like a balance, which 853 00:44:52,300 --> 00:44:57,200 you can modify over time you instead have these notes, that 854 00:44:57,200 --> 00:44:58,700 you cannot be created or destroyed. 855 00:44:58,700 --> 00:45:00,800 And so the base. So this makes the the state 856 00:45:00,800 --> 00:45:02,500 model quite simple because the note can either exists or 857 00:45:02,900 --> 00:45:04,600 doesn't exist. It can't change value. 858 00:45:05,600 --> 00:45:10,300 And so, if you want to perform a state update for if there's a Is 859 00:45:10,300 --> 00:45:12,000 easier to get some privacy variables. 860 00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:16,200 Then you basically you basically you want to create a bunch of 861 00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:19,600 these you to Excellence and you want and you want to delete a 862 00:45:19,607 --> 00:45:22,900 bunch of existing utx sentence. And so, basically, you go down. 863 00:45:22,900 --> 00:45:25,000 If you get a, hey I want to make these you txo notes and I want 864 00:45:25,000 --> 00:45:27,200 to delete this. These other like you take Senate 865 00:45:27,900 --> 00:45:31,100 but the key thing here is that they're all encrypted the, the 866 00:45:31,100 --> 00:45:33,200 notes you'll be in created an encrypted and then it's, you're 867 00:45:33,200 --> 00:45:36,600 destroying. They are, they're encrypted to, 868 00:45:36,800 --> 00:45:39,400 but they're encrypted, but that this is really going to use the 869 00:45:39,400 --> 00:45:42,900 reason I think maybe it is, I'm going to struggle to explain 870 00:45:42,900 --> 00:45:45,000 this properly in the time you have available. 871 00:45:45,200 --> 00:45:49,800 But the basic idea is when you want to destroy a note in Aztec. 872 00:45:50,100 --> 00:45:53,300 The way we might be recorded as being destroyed uses, a 873 00:45:53,308 --> 00:45:56,000 different encryption algorithms the way that we recorded a being 874 00:45:56,000 --> 00:45:58,200 created. So basically the Mark and I are 875 00:45:58,200 --> 00:46:01,400 in our kind of Ledger, which says I noticed be destroyed is a 876 00:46:01,400 --> 00:46:03,100 different gription algorithm to the mahkum ayat, which says a 877 00:46:03,107 --> 00:46:06,600 note has been created. So you can't ever link it like a 878 00:46:06,600 --> 00:46:08,900 destroy notification to accrete its application. 879 00:46:10,000 --> 00:46:13,000 Oh cool. So it's like you're making 880 00:46:13,000 --> 00:46:15,900 everyone has to you to EXO's these private contracts defined 881 00:46:15,900 --> 00:46:19,000 like literally predicates to eat EXO's, but then when you do a 882 00:46:19,008 --> 00:46:22,800 transaction the new utensils to get created, but you break the 883 00:46:22,800 --> 00:46:27,700 linkage like intra batch between inputs and outputs. 884 00:46:28,800 --> 00:46:30,200 Yeah, exactly. I mean it's a very it is 885 00:46:30,200 --> 00:46:32,300 extremely submissive. So to how easy catch handle 886 00:46:32,300 --> 00:46:33,500 this. I think they were there very 887 00:46:33,500 --> 00:46:35,600 much kind of Trail Blazers on this with as regards. 888 00:46:37,000 --> 00:46:39,600 Cool, so, okay. So then like nor spin into this, 889 00:46:39,600 --> 00:46:44,700 by making this like DSL for folks, to be able to write these 890 00:46:44,800 --> 00:46:47,700 contracts that aren't in this cute Excel model, compiled 891 00:46:47,700 --> 00:46:50,400 programs. Exactly. 892 00:46:50,400 --> 00:46:54,500 So no I was going to have quite a lot of layers to it because 893 00:46:54,500 --> 00:46:58,400 like the first the first thing that 9 is to solve is that these 894 00:46:58,400 --> 00:47:01,300 programs that people are creating you to be turned into 895 00:47:01,300 --> 00:47:05,100 extremely efficient journalist proofs because one of the main 896 00:47:05,100 --> 00:47:07,300 problems with xenos cryptography is constructing. 897 00:47:07,300 --> 00:47:09,800 His proofs is generally quite. So as I said, it's like early 898 00:47:10,100 --> 00:47:11,900 Factor hundred K to a million times slower than running a 899 00:47:11,908 --> 00:47:14,600 computation. Now, one of the ways that this 900 00:47:14,800 --> 00:47:19,600 is can be sold is by delegating. Roof construction to third 901 00:47:19,600 --> 00:47:21,500 parties. So a lot of scaling solutions 902 00:47:21,500 --> 00:47:24,600 that don't that aren't private take this approach because it's 903 00:47:24,600 --> 00:47:25,900 a bit of a no-brainer, you know, it's hard. 904 00:47:25,900 --> 00:47:27,300 Copy is usually will just send it off to. 905 00:47:27,300 --> 00:47:30,500 So, you know, hundred thirty-two kws machines and it'll, you'll 906 00:47:30,500 --> 00:47:33,700 get it done in a few seconds. But because we'd had we're 907 00:47:33,700 --> 00:47:34,800 dealing with private transactions. 908 00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:36,800 You can't Delegate pre-construction for third party 909 00:47:36,800 --> 00:47:38,500 because then you're leaking information and secrets to that 910 00:47:38,500 --> 00:47:42,000 third party. So in so effectively all of 911 00:47:42,000 --> 00:47:44,700 these programs that have been created and while they're all 912 00:47:44,700 --> 00:47:47,500 took been tend to 0 as proofs, that will accrue construction is 913 00:47:47,500 --> 00:47:49,900 happening. Be Directly by the user. 914 00:47:49,900 --> 00:47:53,100 You know, I people with old laptops crummy phones. 915 00:47:53,900 --> 00:47:58,300 And so you're very constrained in how much horsepower you have 916 00:47:58,300 --> 00:48:00,000 available, which is why you need to be efficient, which is why we 917 00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:03,900 developed a ton of like advance of the with our printing systems 918 00:48:04,600 --> 00:48:07,700 and then, so not. But then you've also got to make 919 00:48:07,700 --> 00:48:09,700 this thing easier to program, which means you've got it, have 920 00:48:09,700 --> 00:48:12,600 the abstract kind of smart contracts, semantics State, 921 00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:17,200 modifications semantics, you know, and all of that Associated 922 00:48:17,500 --> 00:48:20,500 paraphernalia. That's easy to understand to the 923 00:48:20,500 --> 00:48:23,600 user. And so there are two like, to be 924 00:48:23,607 --> 00:48:25,500 crisp and that is still very much a work in progress. 925 00:48:25,500 --> 00:48:27,300 I'm not going to, I'm not going to be arrogant enough to see, 926 00:48:27,300 --> 00:48:30,100 we've solved that problem yet. But but I have every confidence 927 00:48:30,100 --> 00:48:33,600 that we will let me know. I think, the first step is, is 928 00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:36,700 abstract in their cryptography from from the developer, and 929 00:48:36,700 --> 00:48:39,700 then the second step is kind of baking and more functionality, 930 00:48:39,700 --> 00:48:42,300 and that's where the kind of the bit were working on. 931 00:48:42,300 --> 00:48:45,800 But at the moment, you can kind of used more to just kind of 932 00:48:45,808 --> 00:48:50,200 write a snark. But it doesn't really fit in 933 00:48:50,300 --> 00:48:53,400 with the rest of the kind of Aztec roll up ecosystem. 934 00:48:53,400 --> 00:48:55,300 So that's kind of the next focus of the company. 935 00:48:55,500 --> 00:48:59,200 Post, Devo Bridges to build that, that part of things that 936 00:48:59,200 --> 00:49:02,600 they're the actual language kind of early syntax is written, and 937 00:49:02,600 --> 00:49:04,900 we're actively getting feedback on it right now. 938 00:49:04,900 --> 00:49:08,200 As kind of a new way to write snack or prompt circuits. 939 00:49:09,600 --> 00:49:14,000 How important is is that all this to I mean it's sort of 940 00:49:14,000 --> 00:49:17,400 broader adoption of zero knowledge Technologies, you 941 00:49:17,400 --> 00:49:21,400 know, in and outside of crypto. I guess like privacy-preserving 942 00:49:21,400 --> 00:49:23,500 Technologies. Like I think if you take the 943 00:49:23,500 --> 00:49:27,400 average web developer like or even iPhone developer or 944 00:49:27,400 --> 00:49:30,000 whatever. Oh, I think a lot of these 945 00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:33,000 developers have very little understanding of how the zero 946 00:49:33,000 --> 00:49:36,000 knowledge Technologies work and how did Implement them? 947 00:49:36,000 --> 00:49:40,400 And so how important you think this this work is to Broadening 948 00:49:40,400 --> 00:49:44,000 the scope of use cases for, for zero-knowledge deck. 949 00:49:45,800 --> 00:49:48,100 May, I think it's foundational? I mean, we just just have to be 950 00:49:48,100 --> 00:49:51,000 asked us to look at why if they're in became so successful. 951 00:49:51,100 --> 00:49:54,300 It was because anyone could write a smart contract, you 952 00:49:54,300 --> 00:49:56,100 know, you have this incredibly powerful technology. 953 00:49:56,100 --> 00:49:58,400 This just just just do it a letter that has suddenly stopped 954 00:49:58,400 --> 00:50:01,800 becoming, it wasn't this kind of this, this, this incredibly 955 00:50:02,500 --> 00:50:05,400 difficult concept to wrap your head around it, difficult to, to 956 00:50:05,400 --> 00:50:07,900 interact with. But instead went it went from 957 00:50:07,900 --> 00:50:10,500 that to going like, you know, his how you make a 958 00:50:10,508 --> 00:50:13,700 cryptocurrency token, in three lines of solidity code or have 959 00:50:13,700 --> 00:50:14,700 it. However many watts. 960 00:50:15,700 --> 00:50:18,700 And it was very easy to access and I think it's absolutely 961 00:50:18,700 --> 00:50:21,600 essential to propagate zero knowledge proof Sanders. 962 00:50:21,600 --> 00:50:24,700 Kind of good trick photography to a wider audience. 963 00:50:24,800 --> 00:50:27,100 You gotta you gotta explain it in terms that people understand 964 00:50:27,100 --> 00:50:29,700 that are familiar to them and you got to extract the 965 00:50:29,700 --> 00:50:32,000 cryptography away. As you said people, most people 966 00:50:32,000 --> 00:50:34,900 are probably quite ready, like incredibly intimidated by this 967 00:50:34,900 --> 00:50:38,000 comment ography. And, you know, there's the very 968 00:50:38,000 --> 00:50:39,400 comment on that, as, you know, General different group to 969 00:50:39,400 --> 00:50:42,800 control your own crypto, it'll end badly, and I see it as a 970 00:50:42,900 --> 00:50:46,100 photographer. So creating an Action layer, 971 00:50:46,400 --> 00:50:51,300 which presents very complicated. Drip systems as easy as some 972 00:50:51,300 --> 00:50:53,100 programming languages with clearly understandable. 973 00:50:53,100 --> 00:50:57,300 Semantics where the where, you know that whatever you produce 974 00:50:57,500 --> 00:50:59,400 the cryptography behind, it will be sound. 975 00:50:59,400 --> 00:51:02,300 And secure is absolutely essential for the, for the 976 00:51:02,300 --> 00:51:03,700 Westfield adoption of this technology. 977 00:51:05,600 --> 00:51:08,800 And what are the risks here? Because I, you know, we've seen 978 00:51:08,800 --> 00:51:14,000 in in crypto that, you know, the bugs can be catastrophic. 979 00:51:16,200 --> 00:51:21,200 We've also seen so the cascading effects of, you know, layers 980 00:51:21,200 --> 00:51:25,700 upon layers of dependencies, you know, breaking large-scale 981 00:51:25,700 --> 00:51:29,100 applications on the web like recently with like all this npm 982 00:51:29,300 --> 00:51:31,700 kind of stuff that stuff happened around there. 983 00:51:32,700 --> 00:51:36,700 If for a developer, I'm speaking mostly like developers outside 984 00:51:36,700 --> 00:51:39,000 of crypto, but even the people coming into crypto and who are 985 00:51:39,000 --> 00:51:41,300 like some background of development. 986 00:51:42,000 --> 00:51:45,100 How do we ensure that? They use cryptography 987 00:51:45,100 --> 00:51:47,500 responsibly, and that they're using the write that using 988 00:51:47,500 --> 00:51:50,400 libraries, that are vetted and audited? 989 00:51:50,400 --> 00:51:54,000 And even if there are developing at a higher level of 990 00:51:54,000 --> 00:51:58,100 abstraction, but that, you know, someone doesn't use like a 991 00:51:58,107 --> 00:52:01,100 cryptography library and like to build. 992 00:52:01,100 --> 00:52:02,300 I don't know, some kind of messaging app. 993 00:52:02,500 --> 00:52:06,500 Example and exposes everyone's messages or like something 994 00:52:06,500 --> 00:52:09,400 catastrophic like this, right? Like what's the, what's the 995 00:52:09,400 --> 00:52:14,700 right balance of like expertise to General availability or that? 996 00:52:14,700 --> 00:52:18,300 We're looking for here? It's a good question. 997 00:52:18,400 --> 00:52:20,700 And I'm not sure it's one without with that particular 998 00:52:20,700 --> 00:52:23,400 easy answer. Because like the risks are real 999 00:52:23,400 --> 00:52:25,800 and not going to try and trivialize what we're doing. 1000 00:52:25,800 --> 00:52:29,300 I mean, the complexity, the amount of complexity involved in 1001 00:52:29,300 --> 00:52:31,600 these Advanced cryptosystems is absolutely astronomical. 1002 00:52:31,600 --> 00:52:35,000 And then if you add on the, the complexity of a very complicated 1003 00:52:35,000 --> 00:52:38,300 systems level architecture that someone's building using tools 1004 00:52:38,300 --> 00:52:40,700 that have been developed to turn it into a creek into it, like, 1005 00:52:40,700 --> 00:52:44,200 into a journalist proof. Then there are certainly risks 1006 00:52:44,200 --> 00:52:49,300 there, but I think that It's going to be an evolving process. 1007 00:52:49,300 --> 00:52:51,500 You know, I do think that it's obviously there are set there 1008 00:52:51,500 --> 00:52:53,400 are some basic things you can do right now. 1009 00:52:53,400 --> 00:52:56,300 I mean, like you can make sure that at every layer your 1010 00:52:56,300 --> 00:52:59,500 technology stack has been fully audited and that, you know, it's 1011 00:52:59,500 --> 00:53:02,000 been written by the people who are the experts in their fields, 1012 00:53:02,000 --> 00:53:05,500 you know, like we're very lucky as to have our elbows on his 1013 00:53:05,500 --> 00:53:09,100 like, you know, to be able to like tables and but to help us 1014 00:53:09,100 --> 00:53:12,900 with like internal audits, which to be honest before we released 1015 00:53:12,900 --> 00:53:16,800 at our primary objective, reveal, several security. 1016 00:53:17,100 --> 00:53:20,000 Issues that we've done the resolved because this is 1017 00:53:20,000 --> 00:53:22,700 complicated beating a stuff and it's very, very, very easy to 1018 00:53:22,700 --> 00:53:25,400 get it wrong. So I do think that there's going 1019 00:53:25,400 --> 00:53:27,600 to have to be about a bit over a period of time. 1020 00:53:27,600 --> 00:53:31,200 Where once these kind of these Advanced abstraction layers, is 1021 00:53:31,300 --> 00:53:34,400 these programming languages start to become easy to use easy 1022 00:53:34,400 --> 00:53:37,400 to use and will widespread that they will need to be approached 1023 00:53:37,400 --> 00:53:41,200 with caution because I think like we see with the adoption of 1024 00:53:41,200 --> 00:53:44,900 cerium, sometimes the only the only cure is time but like a lot 1025 00:53:44,900 --> 00:53:49,300 of like I don't think I'm being. Unfair, when I say that like the 1026 00:53:49,300 --> 00:53:51,900 solutely smoke entrepreneur in which is widely considered to 1027 00:53:51,900 --> 00:53:55,200 be, you know, somewhat insecure like it's not, if you were to do 1028 00:53:55,200 --> 00:53:56,900 that, if you're going to rewrite a three more layering of them 1029 00:53:56,908 --> 00:53:59,300 scratch, you would design Selena very different way to make it a 1030 00:53:59,308 --> 00:54:02,100 lot more secrets program, but obviously back in 2015, you know 1031 00:54:02,700 --> 00:54:05,000 that the government was doing this for the first time, you 1032 00:54:05,000 --> 00:54:08,000 know, so it's so nobody was aware of the issues that would 1033 00:54:08,000 --> 00:54:11,400 result but that being said today in 2021. 1034 00:54:11,600 --> 00:54:13,400 I would argue that if you're going to write a smart contract, 1035 00:54:13,400 --> 00:54:15,400 so that is the best language to a certain because it's been 1036 00:54:15,400 --> 00:54:19,200 battle tested and he's barbecues exports is problems that have 1037 00:54:19,200 --> 00:54:22,700 been, you know, found out unfortunately sometimes through 1038 00:54:22,900 --> 00:54:24,700 through, through hacks and attacks, but it means that you 1039 00:54:24,700 --> 00:54:28,900 have this, this large kind of ethology of security practices 1040 00:54:28,900 --> 00:54:32,000 and principles of drawn. Now, we don't have those for 1041 00:54:32,400 --> 00:54:34,800 fers, you can start creating languages because they're 1042 00:54:34,800 --> 00:54:37,600 completely new in their infancy and that book will have to be 1043 00:54:37,600 --> 00:54:39,500 written. And there's a question about 1044 00:54:39,500 --> 00:54:42,100 like how many how much of that book is going to have to be 1045 00:54:42,100 --> 00:54:45,400 written is going to be written ahead of time through thoughtful 1046 00:54:45,400 --> 00:54:48,100 and careful, too. My hand is up assistance the 1047 00:54:48,100 --> 00:54:50,100 built and how much of that book is going to be written 1048 00:54:50,100 --> 00:54:54,600 effectively in cash from people, losing money through hacks and 1049 00:54:54,600 --> 00:54:57,600 exploits. And yeah, it's something that's 1050 00:54:57,600 --> 00:55:00,000 very much one on mind. But I think the only thing you 1051 00:55:00,000 --> 00:55:03,600 could do is what everything develop things Star Eddie may be 1052 00:55:03,600 --> 00:55:07,300 very, very considerate about the technique about the what changes 1053 00:55:07,300 --> 00:55:10,300 you're making to your cryptographic architecture and 1054 00:55:10,300 --> 00:55:12,300 you're getting the best people, the industry to work on it, you 1055 00:55:12,308 --> 00:55:15,300 know, sometimes even auditing isn't good enough or it's 1056 00:55:15,300 --> 00:55:17,600 questionable a because for example People like with the 1057 00:55:17,600 --> 00:55:20,800 kind of cryptography but developing, you know, like cute, 1058 00:55:20,800 --> 00:55:23,800 who can who can audit Advanced Auto plant site. 1059 00:55:23,800 --> 00:55:25,500 Because I mean like, you know, I can count the number of people. 1060 00:55:25,500 --> 00:55:27,600 I trusted you that on the fingers of both my hands and 1061 00:55:27,700 --> 00:55:29,400 they're all busy with their own projects. 1062 00:55:29,700 --> 00:55:33,100 So, you know, I think it's I think it's one of the point of 1063 00:55:33,100 --> 00:55:36,800 this issue sets that can only be solved with time and attention. 1064 00:55:38,500 --> 00:55:41,100 I got one thing as well. It's about the, the amount of 1065 00:55:41,100 --> 00:55:43,900 the protocol for kind of it. If you take the iPhone, 1066 00:55:43,900 --> 00:55:47,200 developer example, like how much of what they're building needs 1067 00:55:47,200 --> 00:55:51,400 to be in Noir and requires those kind of fundamental principle 1068 00:55:51,400 --> 00:55:53,300 guarantees. Like how much of it is can be 1069 00:55:53,300 --> 00:55:57,500 written a letter, one, kind of sin, in terms of like, this 1070 00:55:57,500 --> 00:56:00,700 person is allowed to see and it's about assembling that kind 1071 00:56:00,700 --> 00:56:04,100 of stack of that. I guess different kind of 1072 00:56:04,100 --> 00:56:07,800 languages and different pieces of technology to get the The end 1073 00:56:07,800 --> 00:56:12,200 product that the users need, I think trying to do that all in 1074 00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:14,500 kind of modern-day one would probably lead to a lot of 1075 00:56:14,500 --> 00:56:18,400 catastrophic bugs, but doing bits of it in water, to give the 1076 00:56:18,400 --> 00:56:21,300 Privacy, that's required bit, slow to see, bits of it, don't 1077 00:56:21,300 --> 00:56:24,000 need to be on chain. And I think there's a lot of 1078 00:56:24,000 --> 00:56:27,400 kind of learnings in the space generally from 2017, where 1079 00:56:27,400 --> 00:56:30,000 people were planning on putting social networks on chain and all 1080 00:56:30,000 --> 00:56:32,400 these things that were meant to be built on a blockchain that 1081 00:56:32,400 --> 00:56:35,100 don't need to live there. So I think it's about kind of 1082 00:56:35,600 --> 00:56:40,000 careful design of What needs to live where, and in the stock and 1083 00:56:41,000 --> 00:56:44,300 that will kind of evolved over time and more things will be in 1084 00:56:44,300 --> 00:56:47,000 the private end. That's kind of all that but it's 1085 00:56:47,000 --> 00:56:50,000 about making sure the right things are in the right place to 1086 00:56:50,000 --> 00:56:52,900 kind of do damage, limitation in case something does go wrong. 1087 00:56:54,300 --> 00:56:56,700 Oh, cool, like trying to mitigate the foot guns a year 1088 00:56:56,700 --> 00:56:59,700 where like, you know, but little make it harder to make an 1089 00:56:59,700 --> 00:57:02,900 accident that the, I guess. Such a question of this about 1090 00:57:02,900 --> 00:57:05,300 that appears long like the snark dsls. 1091 00:57:05,300 --> 00:57:09,200 Is that? How much do you expose like 1092 00:57:09,200 --> 00:57:12,000 snark optimizations? Like in the language? 1093 00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:14,700 Like, do you expect just want the big ones like 1094 00:57:14,800 --> 00:57:17,300 non-determinism or like if I know the answer to? 1095 00:57:17,300 --> 00:57:20,300 And if statement dude, I just have how can I use that? 1096 00:57:20,300 --> 00:57:23,000 Sort of computing. The answer or but I guess in 1097 00:57:23,008 --> 00:57:24,000 your case. It's actually a lot. 1098 00:57:24,100 --> 00:57:28,400 More like with all the turbo clunk and lookup table work. 1099 00:57:29,300 --> 00:57:31,400 So it's a general approach that you want to hide this 1100 00:57:31,400 --> 00:57:34,100 complexity, or you want to like, give it as available to like, 1101 00:57:34,100 --> 00:57:38,200 Advanced Developers. The first step is to hide it 1102 00:57:38,200 --> 00:57:41,900 away because it produces a simpler language. 1103 00:57:42,200 --> 00:57:44,600 We can then move now to the next phase, which is to gradually 1104 00:57:44,600 --> 00:57:47,200 exposed the some of the inner workings to to Advanced 1105 00:57:47,200 --> 00:57:48,500 developers who want to play around with it. 1106 00:57:48,800 --> 00:57:52,000 The first that we currently taking is in-house, we're 1107 00:57:52,000 --> 00:57:54,600 writing for the common algorithms that people use marks 1108 00:57:54,600 --> 00:57:58,400 for so, you know, things like binary arithmetic, Insurance 1109 00:57:58,400 --> 00:58:01,200 mistake, you know, hashing algorithms that have to cover 1110 00:58:01,200 --> 00:58:04,100 with my tech digital signatures that kind of thing. 1111 00:58:04,200 --> 00:58:08,200 We're writing our own highly. Optimized gadgets that use the 1112 00:58:08,200 --> 00:58:10,700 latest trunk and lookup table techniques that have a very, 1113 00:58:10,700 --> 00:58:11,800 very small number of constraints. 1114 00:58:12,200 --> 00:58:15,400 And then those are getting exposed in the language as 1115 00:58:15,900 --> 00:58:18,100 primitive of like like primitive up kids. 1116 00:58:18,100 --> 00:58:20,300 So, you know like in why you can you can do a shot of a 1117 00:58:20,300 --> 00:58:23,300 succession of another string and that shot. 1118 00:58:23,300 --> 00:58:25,700 If x is called will go be plugged directly into our 1119 00:58:25,700 --> 00:58:27,900 optimized widget. And so that's that's kind of how 1120 00:58:27,900 --> 00:58:30,600 we abstract away the complexity. But by giving people these 1121 00:58:30,600 --> 00:58:32,900 common building blocks that are already got pre-optimized. 1122 00:58:33,500 --> 00:58:37,700 And the idea is then that the all of the Plex heavy lifting is 1123 00:58:37,700 --> 00:58:41,600 done by they optimize widgets and what's actually programmed 1124 00:58:41,600 --> 00:58:43,700 into our is more is closely for you logic. 1125 00:58:43,700 --> 00:58:45,400 That ties these components together. 1126 00:58:47,000 --> 00:58:48,000 Oh, cool. That make sense. 1127 00:58:48,000 --> 00:58:50,600 Then like yeah, hiding is complexity by you building. 1128 00:58:50,600 --> 00:58:53,700 The expensive components of people are tempted to rewrite 1129 00:58:53,700 --> 00:58:55,100 themselves. Exactly. 1130 00:58:55,100 --> 00:58:57,100 Yeah, we saw it a lot. I mean, a lot of projects, kind 1131 00:58:57,100 --> 00:59:00,400 of put have their own, hash implementations, and kind of 1132 00:59:00,400 --> 00:59:03,800 itself wondering the same work and having a reference 1133 00:59:03,800 --> 00:59:05,400 implementation. I think longer term is 1134 00:59:05,400 --> 00:59:08,500 definitely the the right approach here, but it needs to 1135 00:59:08,508 --> 00:59:11,800 be open source and needs to be kind of reviewed by everyone. 1136 00:59:11,900 --> 00:59:16,300 And we're beginning to that step for it to be kind of clustered. 1137 00:59:16,400 --> 00:59:18,400 So what's your call to action to your audience? 1138 00:59:18,700 --> 00:59:24,200 And where can people find you? Yeah, I think right now if you 1139 00:59:24,200 --> 00:59:27,900 want to do private transactions head-to-head Tzatziki money and 1140 00:59:27,900 --> 00:59:32,100 over the coming six eight weeks. We'll be upgrading UI to enable 1141 00:59:32,100 --> 00:59:35,400 you to do all of your favorite device interactions with strong 1142 00:59:35,400 --> 00:59:37,700 privacy guarantee. So we're looking for kind of 1143 00:59:39,000 --> 00:59:42,100 feedback on the early version of that over the coming months and 1144 00:59:42,200 --> 00:59:44,900 for developers. We've also got a test that if 1145 00:59:44,900 --> 00:59:47,800 you want with your Keen to write out your own defy Bridge 1146 00:59:47,800 --> 00:59:50,300 contracts then head over to our Discord. 1147 00:59:51,200 --> 00:59:56,800 Links in the description after and we can kind of provide you 1148 00:59:56,808 --> 00:59:59,800 with some docs to help build some of these defy Bridges to 1149 00:59:59,800 --> 01:00:01,600 make these private interactions possible. 1150 01:00:02,600 --> 01:00:04,600 If it would be curious and I could beside, you know, had I 1151 01:00:04,600 --> 01:00:06,100 had to, I just go ahead. So I get 1/2. 1152 01:00:06,400 --> 01:00:08,300 Check out nor play around with it. 1153 01:00:08,500 --> 01:00:09,900 We're always searching for more feedback. 1154 01:00:11,300 --> 01:00:15,200 Thanks a lot for coming on and we look forward to you. 1155 01:00:15,200 --> 01:00:18,800 Having you guys on again, at some point in the future to dive 1156 01:00:18,800 --> 01:00:21,100 deeper into how things are progressing. 1157 01:00:22,200 --> 01:00:23,300 Thanks a lot. It's been a pleasure. 1158 01:00:23,900 --> 01:00:25,000 Thank you very much for having us. 1159 01:00:25,000 --> 01:00:29,300 It's been great and Dave. Congratulations on your first on 1160 01:00:29,300 --> 01:00:31,100 your first interview. How did you like? 1161 01:00:31,100 --> 01:00:34,500 It Banks was really fun. I mean aspects, one of my 1162 01:00:34,508 --> 01:00:37,000 favorite projects. I was a very cool to learn more 1163 01:00:37,000 --> 01:00:39,400 of the details of how they're getting private any threat. 1164 01:00:39,400 --> 01:00:41,400 Now. It's fun being on the side of 1165 01:00:41,400 --> 01:00:42,600 the podcast. Yeah. 1166 01:00:42,600 --> 01:00:46,300 Well you did an excellent job. So hopefully we will do this 1167 01:00:46,400 --> 01:00:50,700 many more times. Thank you for joining us on this 1168 01:00:50,700 --> 01:00:53,100 week's episode. We release new episodes every 1169 01:00:53,100 --> 01:00:55,100 week. You can find And subscribe to 1170 01:00:55,100 --> 01:00:58,900 the show on iTunes Spotify, YouTube SoundCloud or wherever 1171 01:00:58,900 --> 01:01:01,300 you listen to podcast. And if you have a Google home or 1172 01:01:01,300 --> 01:01:04,000 Alexa device, you can tell it to listen to the latest episode of 1173 01:01:04,008 --> 01:01:07,100 the epicenter podcast. Go to epicenter dot TV /, 1174 01:01:07,100 --> 01:01:09,500 subscribe for a full list of places where you can watch and 1175 01:01:09,500 --> 01:01:11,800 listen, while you're there, be sure to sign up for the 1176 01:01:11,808 --> 01:01:13,800 newsletter. So you get new episodes in your 1177 01:01:13,800 --> 01:01:17,600 inbox as they're released if you want to interact with us guests 1178 01:01:17,600 --> 01:01:20,000 or other podcast listeners, Or you can follow us on Twitter, 1179 01:01:20,300 --> 01:01:22,800 and please leave us a review on iTunes helps people find the 1180 01:01:22,800 --> 01:01:24,500 show, and we're always happy to read them. 1181 01:01:25,300 --> 01:01:27,900 But thanks so much and we look forward to being back next week.