1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:02,996 Singapore was the second country in the world where attacks were 2 00:00:02,996 --> 00:00:04,669 coming from. I have to pause for the emphasis 3 00:00:04,669 --> 00:00:06,496 there. Because it's not a target, it's 4 00:00:06,496 --> 00:00:08,970 the source. Today's guest is Joseph Yap, 5 00:00:08,970 --> 00:00:11,790 founder of Otonata. With over two decades optimizing 6 00:00:11,790 --> 00:00:14,436 corporate Operations and Supply Chain, Joseph now helps 7 00:00:14,436 --> 00:00:17,598 individuals protect the one place they never expected to be 8 00:00:17,598 --> 00:00:19,440 vulnerable: their homes. Let's understand why. 9 00:00:19,945 --> 00:00:21,810 Why Singapore? Since the eighties, the 10 00:00:21,810 --> 00:00:24,120 Singapore government has been very actively promoting 11 00:00:24,120 --> 00:00:26,960 information technology. Everyone has multiple devices. 12 00:00:26,990 --> 00:00:29,390 Washing machines. You've got fridges, robot 13 00:00:29,390 --> 00:00:31,714 vacuums, security cameras. The attack surface is just gonna 14 00:00:31,714 --> 00:00:33,585 keep growing. For low income households, you 15 00:00:33,585 --> 00:00:36,290 get high speed fiber access. So there's a term that really 16 00:00:36,290 --> 00:00:38,060 disturbed me now. It's called residential proxy. 17 00:00:38,120 --> 00:00:41,150 The hackers are using people's houses and monetizing them. 18 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:44,723 One of my friends was very proud that he bought a media player 19 00:00:44,723 --> 00:00:47,030 from a very small shop that was $50. 20 00:00:47,060 --> 00:00:49,806 But you could access everything. It reminded me of a quote that 21 00:00:49,806 --> 00:00:52,465 if you can't work out what the product is, you are the product. 22 00:00:52,495 --> 00:00:54,745 You are the proxy. You are the service. 23 00:00:54,745 --> 00:00:56,575 They're selling access to your network. 24 00:00:56,725 --> 00:00:58,945 Are you now saying that we are all being hacked? 25 00:00:58,975 --> 00:01:01,615 Probably, yeah. If I looked at the statistics 26 00:01:01,615 --> 00:01:04,425 now, botnet they counted over 700,000 devices attacking at the 27 00:01:04,425 --> 00:01:06,775 same time. It hit 30 terabits per second. 28 00:01:06,835 --> 00:01:09,055 It's like downloading all of Netflix within minutes. 29 00:01:09,055 --> 00:01:12,335 With AI, the barrier to entry for hacking now is super low. 30 00:01:12,415 --> 00:01:14,920 Some of the best known ransomware gangs are run by 31 00:01:14,920 --> 00:01:16,680 teenagers. You can ask ChatGPT, you can ask 32 00:01:16,680 --> 00:01:19,124 Gemini, you can ask Claude. If someone broke into the home 33 00:01:19,124 --> 00:01:21,402 network, it's like they have access to your house, but you 34 00:01:21,402 --> 00:01:23,305 don't know that they're there. It's very freaky if someone's 35 00:01:23,305 --> 00:01:25,130 standing behind you but you don't know them. 36 00:01:25,280 --> 00:01:28,760 And they're there 24/7, watching everything that you do. 37 00:01:45,203 --> 00:01:47,649 Hey, quick pause. My goal with Tech Lead Journal 38 00:01:47,649 --> 00:01:50,233 is simple. Learn from the best in tech, so 39 00:01:50,233 --> 00:01:53,603 we can all grow together. If this resonates with you, hit 40 00:01:53,603 --> 00:01:56,897 subscribe to follow the channel. It's the biggest way for you to 41 00:01:56,897 --> 00:01:59,468 support the show and help us keep bringing great guests and 42 00:01:59,468 --> 00:02:01,919 insights to you. Thanks for being here, and let's 43 00:02:01,919 --> 00:02:04,097 get back to it. Okay. 44 00:02:04,127 --> 00:02:06,399 Hi everyone. Welcome back to another 45 00:02:06,399 --> 00:02:09,917 in-person podcast recording. Today I have with me Joseph Yap. 46 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:13,707 He's gonna share something very interesting today about 47 00:02:13,707 --> 00:02:16,710 cybersecurity. But we are not going to talk 48 00:02:16,710 --> 00:02:20,126 about cybersecurity as you may have heard it a lot of times, 49 00:02:20,126 --> 00:02:22,230 you know, with organizations and things like that. 50 00:02:22,290 --> 00:02:26,855 But this is actually at your personal home or your personal 51 00:02:26,855 --> 00:02:28,940 usage. So there are some statistics 52 00:02:28,940 --> 00:02:31,840 that I think kind of like mind blowing to me when he first 53 00:02:31,840 --> 00:02:34,740 shared it with me. So, yeah, I think let's just 54 00:02:34,740 --> 00:02:37,245 discuss it later. So welcome, Joseph, to the show. 55 00:02:37,805 --> 00:02:39,425 Thanks very much. Good to be here. 56 00:02:40,025 --> 00:02:42,882 So, Joseph, in the beginning, I always love to maybe invite my 57 00:02:42,882 --> 00:02:45,729 guest share a little bit about your career, especially the 58 00:02:45,729 --> 00:02:48,150 turning points that you think we all can learn from you. 59 00:02:48,485 --> 00:02:52,629 Okay. Yeah, so I started very much in 60 00:02:52,629 --> 00:02:54,277 communications and journalism actually. 61 00:02:55,152 --> 00:02:59,912 My initial background academically was more about 62 00:02:59,912 --> 00:03:02,690 journalism interviewing. Being on the other side of the 63 00:03:02,690 --> 00:03:04,858 table. I've changed career paths quite 64 00:03:04,858 --> 00:03:08,857 a bit along the way, but I found that for every change that I 65 00:03:08,857 --> 00:03:11,962 made, there was always something that I had learned before that I 66 00:03:11,962 --> 00:03:15,682 could leverage to a new role. So in terms of, yeah, turning 67 00:03:15,682 --> 00:03:19,088 points, I think changing career paths and finding that actually 68 00:03:19,088 --> 00:03:22,858 there's stuff I can carry over from a previous role was quite 69 00:03:22,858 --> 00:03:26,582 helpful. I've also found that over the 70 00:03:26,582 --> 00:03:31,530 20+ years of corporate life, one of the biggest learnings that I 71 00:03:31,530 --> 00:03:35,554 had was thinking about people. It's funny to say this out loud, 72 00:03:35,554 --> 00:03:39,784 but in the space that I've been, which is really to do with 73 00:03:39,784 --> 00:03:43,824 operations and supply chain, we often forget that businesses are 74 00:03:43,824 --> 00:03:46,672 run by people, organizations are run by people. 75 00:03:47,402 --> 00:03:52,637 My expertise of familiarity has been with processes and trying 76 00:03:52,637 --> 00:03:55,277 to simplify and stabilize things. 77 00:03:56,117 --> 00:03:58,812 But unfortunately, if you don't think about the people aspect of 78 00:03:58,812 --> 00:04:01,397 that, things will always go wrong, right? 79 00:04:01,397 --> 00:04:05,598 So one of the big lessons that I had were from, yeah, a corporate 80 00:04:05,598 --> 00:04:07,698 career has always been to do with people. 81 00:04:07,788 --> 00:04:12,130 And I think one of the biggest lessons that I had in my last 10 82 00:04:12,130 --> 00:04:14,718 years or so was dealing with complexity. 83 00:04:15,414 --> 00:04:18,353 So going back to what I said about people, when you're not 84 00:04:18,353 --> 00:04:21,880 managing processes with thinking about people and how much effort 85 00:04:21,880 --> 00:04:26,188 it can take someone to make a lot of micro decisions, how much 86 00:04:26,188 --> 00:04:28,054 fatigue they can put someone through. 87 00:04:28,774 --> 00:04:32,219 I had an example where someone I worked with, she would wake up 88 00:04:32,219 --> 00:04:35,902 in a panic at 3 am in the morning to write something down. 89 00:04:35,902 --> 00:04:38,602 Because while she was thinking about something going to sleep, 90 00:04:38,602 --> 00:04:40,592 she fell asleep. And then she suddenly remembered 91 00:04:40,592 --> 00:04:42,952 that, oh my God, I need to do this tomorrow morning. 92 00:04:43,490 --> 00:04:44,750 And then she couldn't go back to sleep. 93 00:04:45,455 --> 00:04:49,949 So the process that they were working with was so complicated 94 00:04:49,949 --> 00:04:54,389 that there was so much burden on people to take the 95 00:04:54,389 --> 00:04:58,494 responsibility onto themselves. So one of the, yeah, lessons I 96 00:04:58,494 --> 00:05:03,085 had from corporate world was we have to work out how to make it 97 00:05:03,085 --> 00:05:06,475 easier for people not to deal with so much complexity and put 98 00:05:06,475 --> 00:05:09,557 the burden on themselves. So when I think about the 99 00:05:09,557 --> 00:05:12,641 developing processes now, a lot of it is around, one, what is 100 00:05:12,641 --> 00:05:16,648 the value add? And two, how do I minimize the 101 00:05:16,648 --> 00:05:20,132 ability for human error for something to go wrong because of 102 00:05:20,132 --> 00:05:20,713 that? Yeah. 103 00:05:22,148 --> 00:05:25,833 Before we continue, I want to tell you about our sponsor, 104 00:05:25,833 --> 00:05:29,065 Cyberhaven. AI is exfiltrating your data in 105 00:05:29,065 --> 00:05:30,787 fragments. Not one big breach. 106 00:05:31,027 --> 00:05:34,492 A prompt here, a screenshot there, a quiet export into a 107 00:05:34,492 --> 00:05:37,549 shadow AI tool. Every week, AI makes your team 108 00:05:37,549 --> 00:05:39,727 faster and your data harder to see. 109 00:05:39,997 --> 00:05:43,435 Files are moved to new SaaS apps, models are trained on 110 00:05:43,435 --> 00:05:47,197 sensitive inputs, and legacy DLP is blind to the context that 111 00:05:47,197 --> 00:05:50,407 matters most. On February 3rd at 11:00 AM 112 00:05:50,407 --> 00:05:54,425 Pacific Time, Cyberhaven is unveiling a unified DSPM and DLP 113 00:05:54,425 --> 00:05:57,297 platform. Built on the original data 114 00:05:57,297 --> 00:06:00,902 lineage, so security teams get x-ray visions into how data 115 00:06:00,902 --> 00:06:04,062 actually moves and can stop risky usage in real time. 116 00:06:04,332 --> 00:06:08,122 Watch the launch live at cyberhaven.com/techleadjournal. 117 00:06:08,292 --> 00:06:11,542 That's cyberhaven.com/techleadjournal. 118 00:06:11,950 --> 00:06:13,990 And now let's get back to our episode. 119 00:06:14,417 --> 00:06:15,992 Well, thank you for sharing the story. 120 00:06:15,992 --> 00:06:19,612 I think sometimes we didn't realize at work, right? 121 00:06:19,612 --> 00:06:23,357 We are so maybe stressful, anxious, right, thinking about 122 00:06:23,357 --> 00:06:26,657 what we need to do for work. And sometimes we just think it 123 00:06:26,657 --> 00:06:29,407 is like something, you know, like a habit or something 124 00:06:29,407 --> 00:06:31,681 normal. But I guess, the onus is for the 125 00:06:31,681 --> 00:06:35,592 leaders to actually think how to improve the process, not to make 126 00:06:35,592 --> 00:06:40,064 people's life harder, I guess. And I like actually that you 127 00:06:40,064 --> 00:06:43,052 said that you have switched career path multiple times. 128 00:06:43,082 --> 00:06:46,370 Maybe one thing that piqued my interest is like you said you 129 00:06:46,370 --> 00:06:49,556 started from journalism. Is there any skill that from 130 00:06:49,556 --> 00:06:53,507 journalism that you take on and on in other multiple careers as 131 00:06:53,507 --> 00:06:57,497 well? I wouldn't say necessarily a 132 00:06:57,497 --> 00:07:00,907 skill but a desire to be curious and to learn. 133 00:07:02,227 --> 00:07:05,707 So I've taken on several roles where I knew nothing about the 134 00:07:05,707 --> 00:07:08,587 role when I first took it up. I mean, I give you an example. 135 00:07:08,587 --> 00:07:12,355 I led a procurement function for a while in a construction 136 00:07:12,355 --> 00:07:14,407 company. Never worked in construction. 137 00:07:14,797 --> 00:07:19,924 I did procurement before, but I ended up becoming the lead for 138 00:07:19,924 --> 00:07:22,847 timber in construction. Didn't know anything about 139 00:07:22,847 --> 00:07:24,161 timber, didn't know anything about construction. 140 00:07:24,161 --> 00:07:26,411 But it was really interesting to me. 141 00:07:26,951 --> 00:07:29,861 And I dove really deep into that subject matter. 142 00:07:30,581 --> 00:07:34,074 Within two years, I became the company subject matter expert in 143 00:07:34,074 --> 00:07:37,804 timber. And not only that, I helped the 144 00:07:37,804 --> 00:07:40,574 company win the Forest Stewardship Council Builder of 145 00:07:40,574 --> 00:07:44,117 the Year Award. So they went from not being on 146 00:07:44,117 --> 00:07:48,459 the radar to being the best known builder for green timber. 147 00:07:49,199 --> 00:07:52,463 So I found that being a journalist helped me, gave me 148 00:07:52,463 --> 00:07:56,537 the skills to ask why, and to be curious and learn about 149 00:07:56,537 --> 00:08:00,403 something so that when, yeah, down the path, other career 150 00:08:00,403 --> 00:08:05,928 paths that I took, I had the skills and the, I guess the 151 00:08:05,928 --> 00:08:09,053 interest to chase the story down to ask why. 152 00:08:09,383 --> 00:08:11,323 Why is it like this? And be curious about it. 153 00:08:11,323 --> 00:08:15,599 So I think journalism helped me develop a few tool sets to be 154 00:08:15,599 --> 00:08:19,177 able to talk to people to be curious about what they do and 155 00:08:19,177 --> 00:08:20,019 why. Yeah. 156 00:08:20,619 --> 00:08:23,979 Yeah, I find asking good questions, asking questions, 157 00:08:23,979 --> 00:08:26,709 knowing the why seems simple, right? 158 00:08:27,159 --> 00:08:29,249 We think it's stupid, like you come up with a lot of questions, 159 00:08:29,249 --> 00:08:32,126 but actually there's a lot of insights just by coming up with 160 00:08:32,126 --> 00:08:34,200 the questions. And I learn a lot by 161 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:36,619 interviewing people, right? Even in your preparation, you 162 00:08:36,619 --> 00:08:39,067 know, thinking of what questions, what good questions 163 00:08:39,067 --> 00:08:41,774 you would ask for the guest. I think it's also very 164 00:08:41,774 --> 00:08:43,546 difficult. And good conversations will 165 00:08:43,546 --> 00:08:46,186 start from the curiosity that you mentioned, right? 166 00:08:46,186 --> 00:08:47,506 The questions that you ask. Yeah. 167 00:08:47,506 --> 00:08:50,516 Completely agree. So let's just dive in into the 168 00:08:50,516 --> 00:08:52,276 topics that we want to discuss today, right? 169 00:08:52,276 --> 00:08:55,426 So I think in the first place, you wanna share something about 170 00:08:56,116 --> 00:08:58,126 Singapore state of cybersecurity. 171 00:08:58,426 --> 00:09:01,276 I think this is also coming from a report by Cloudflare. 172 00:09:01,336 --> 00:09:05,490 And it mentioned that Singapore is one of the top most DDoS 173 00:09:05,490 --> 00:09:07,666 attack sources country in the world. 174 00:09:07,756 --> 00:09:10,920 So tell us a little bit more about this mind-blowing 175 00:09:10,920 --> 00:09:13,396 statistics. So I think I have to pause for 176 00:09:13,396 --> 00:09:16,975 the emphasis there. Because it's not a target, it's 177 00:09:16,975 --> 00:09:18,241 the source. Yeah. 178 00:09:18,571 --> 00:09:21,253 And I found this super interesting 'cause when I first, 179 00:09:21,253 --> 00:09:26,606 when it first came on my radar, Singapore was among the top 10, 180 00:09:26,606 --> 00:09:29,281 firstly, and then slowly increasing. 181 00:09:29,863 --> 00:09:31,951 In the... I think it was earlier this 182 00:09:31,951 --> 00:09:36,917 year, Singapore was the second country in the world where 183 00:09:36,917 --> 00:09:39,493 attacks were coming from. So it's not attacks too. 184 00:09:39,943 --> 00:09:44,025 I mean, you hear a lot in the media about, you know, 185 00:09:44,025 --> 00:09:46,780 cybercrime, scams. Singapore lost a billion dollars 186 00:09:46,780 --> 00:09:50,531 last year to scams. But you never, nearly never hear 187 00:09:50,531 --> 00:09:53,255 about Singapore being a source of cyber attacks. 188 00:09:53,525 --> 00:09:56,495 You hear about Myanmar, Cambodia, the Golden Triangle, 189 00:09:56,495 --> 00:10:00,149 where all the scam centers are. So when I first came across that 190 00:10:00,149 --> 00:10:03,235 information from Cloudflare, and keep in mind, it's not just 191 00:10:03,235 --> 00:10:07,010 their report about it, it's actually they have the data and 192 00:10:07,010 --> 00:10:11,017 the breakdown, the stats, right? So when I first looked at that, 193 00:10:11,017 --> 00:10:16,045 and I dug into it, the number one country in the world was, at 194 00:10:16,045 --> 00:10:19,077 that point, Indonesia, and then Singapore was number two. 195 00:10:20,007 --> 00:10:23,689 But you know, Indonesia is a much bigger country, much bigger 196 00:10:23,689 --> 00:10:26,097 population, okay. Singapore was a lot smaller. 197 00:10:26,577 --> 00:10:28,887 But when you look at the breakdown of where the attacks 198 00:10:28,887 --> 00:10:32,347 were coming from, the number one source at the point in time was 199 00:10:32,347 --> 00:10:36,267 DigitalOcean, which is hosting VMs, you know, a lot of servers. 200 00:10:36,267 --> 00:10:38,981 Singapore is a lot digitalized services, so I get that. 201 00:10:39,861 --> 00:10:42,681 But then you look further down the track, it's Singtel and then 202 00:10:42,681 --> 00:10:46,633 Starhub, and these are, this is where people's internet 203 00:10:46,633 --> 00:10:50,261 connections are. And what that occurred to me was 204 00:10:50,261 --> 00:10:53,621 actually, it's not one specific part of Singapore that's that 205 00:10:53,621 --> 00:10:55,840 where the attacks are coming from. 206 00:10:55,840 --> 00:11:01,660 It's across the entire trench. So that was earlier this year. 207 00:11:01,930 --> 00:11:06,447 I looked up the statistics for the last six months, effectively 208 00:11:06,447 --> 00:11:10,924 in the top, I believe it's top six, in the last six months, 209 00:11:10,924 --> 00:11:13,942 between Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam, 20% of attacks are 210 00:11:13,942 --> 00:11:15,632 coming from these three countries. 211 00:11:16,382 --> 00:11:18,977 And when you think about proportion versus the rest of 212 00:11:18,977 --> 00:11:21,972 the world, I mean sources of attack, Singapore rates above 213 00:11:21,972 --> 00:11:24,618 China. You look at the amount of 214 00:11:24,618 --> 00:11:27,421 technology that's in China versus the Singapore and the 215 00:11:27,421 --> 00:11:29,602 size, but the attacks are coming from Singapore. 216 00:11:29,602 --> 00:11:31,960 I thought, huh, this is really interesting. 217 00:11:31,960 --> 00:11:33,970 It's concerning 'cause no one's talking about it. 218 00:11:34,510 --> 00:11:37,292 But at the same time, it's a very interesting space. 219 00:11:37,292 --> 00:11:40,352 And, you know, my curious mind goes, hmm, why? 220 00:11:40,442 --> 00:11:42,782 Why, what's, what makes it so interesting? 221 00:11:43,082 --> 00:11:46,392 What makes Singapore so special or susceptible to being the 222 00:11:46,392 --> 00:11:49,347 source? Again, like, just the emphasis 223 00:11:49,347 --> 00:11:51,473 here, right? So because in the news we always 224 00:11:51,473 --> 00:11:54,392 hear about, you know, scam attacks, victims, right, of 225 00:11:54,392 --> 00:11:56,542 cybersecurity. You know, be it, I dunno, 226 00:11:56,542 --> 00:11:57,617 ransomware, whatever that is, right? 227 00:11:57,677 --> 00:12:01,277 But your emphasis here is actually the source of attack 228 00:12:01,277 --> 00:12:04,317 comes from Singapore. And this could come from your, 229 00:12:04,317 --> 00:12:06,995 our typical, you know, internet provider like Singtel and 230 00:12:06,995 --> 00:12:10,103 StarHub and DigitalOcean, which is like, kind of like a cloud 231 00:12:10,103 --> 00:12:13,337 SaaS service. So maybe let's understand why. 232 00:12:14,177 --> 00:12:15,647 Why? Why Singapore? 233 00:12:15,647 --> 00:12:17,117 Why Indonesia? Why Vietnam? 234 00:12:17,117 --> 00:12:20,447 Because we always associate cyber crime with, you know, top 235 00:12:20,447 --> 00:12:24,453 countries like North Korea, China, like US and things like 236 00:12:24,453 --> 00:12:26,753 that. So why is Singapore specifically 237 00:12:26,753 --> 00:12:30,349 or these three Southeast Asian countries, which seem harm 238 00:12:30,349 --> 00:12:33,023 harmless? So I think the key point of 239 00:12:33,023 --> 00:12:35,277 clarification here is even though that's where the attacks 240 00:12:35,277 --> 00:12:38,458 are being launched from, it doesn't mean that there are, 241 00:12:38,458 --> 00:12:41,963 there's a huge crime community in Singapore of hackers. 242 00:12:42,203 --> 00:12:44,470 They're all controlling things, they are attacking from 243 00:12:44,470 --> 00:12:45,803 Singapore. But this is the launch. 244 00:12:45,863 --> 00:12:47,423 This is the launch points for the attacks. 245 00:12:47,733 --> 00:12:50,731 And also, again, specifically, a lot of these attacks are DDoS 246 00:12:50,731 --> 00:12:53,748 attacks at the moment, which means that it's a distributed 247 00:12:53,748 --> 00:12:57,873 denial of service attack which is kind of coordinating hundreds 248 00:12:57,873 --> 00:13:01,837 of thousands of devices to all attack one point at the same 249 00:13:01,837 --> 00:13:05,315 time, to disrupt them, to try and shut down the traffic or to 250 00:13:05,315 --> 00:13:07,514 overload them. So that's one specific type of 251 00:13:07,514 --> 00:13:10,700 attack. Singapore is in that list 252 00:13:10,700 --> 00:13:14,276 because primarily, and this is my expectation, 'cause I haven't 253 00:13:14,276 --> 00:13:16,845 interviewed a hacker to ask them why are you doing this? 254 00:13:17,685 --> 00:13:19,956 I think even if I tried, they probably wouldn't get back to 255 00:13:19,956 --> 00:13:21,950 me. But my expectation is there's 256 00:13:21,950 --> 00:13:25,336 two reasons why Singapore is such an attractive spot to be a 257 00:13:25,336 --> 00:13:28,358 source of attacks. The first is capability. 258 00:13:28,358 --> 00:13:31,970 So since the eighties, the Singapore government has been 259 00:13:31,970 --> 00:13:35,715 very actively promoting information technology and 260 00:13:35,715 --> 00:13:38,905 information economy. Everything's digitalized. 261 00:13:38,905 --> 00:13:42,975 There's a lot of services that are online, you know, paperless 262 00:13:42,975 --> 00:13:46,877 society since, you know, for the last 40 years that trend has 263 00:13:46,877 --> 00:13:49,627 been consistently growing and it doesn't look like it's gonna 264 00:13:49,627 --> 00:13:53,395 slow down anytime soon. What that means is that everyone 265 00:13:53,395 --> 00:13:56,266 has access, everyone has multiple devices, and everyone 266 00:13:56,266 --> 00:13:58,705 is used to having that connectivity. 267 00:13:59,329 --> 00:14:02,265 One key example is if you look at, even for low income 268 00:14:02,265 --> 00:14:05,093 households, it's almost like a minimum basic standard of living 269 00:14:05,093 --> 00:14:07,985 now. Even for a very, very low price, 270 00:14:07,985 --> 00:14:11,123 you get high speed fiber access. A lot of countries around the 271 00:14:11,123 --> 00:14:12,965 world, you don't get that. You don't get the benefit. 272 00:14:13,025 --> 00:14:16,295 'Cause fiber is, you know, gigabits per second, right? 273 00:14:16,295 --> 00:14:20,015 Compared to early dial-up, which is the very, very tiny fraction. 274 00:14:20,405 --> 00:14:24,638 So capability is one big factor. The other one is Singapore is 275 00:14:24,638 --> 00:14:26,030 generally quite a law abiding society. 276 00:14:26,300 --> 00:14:32,300 So people are very well aware of following the rules and are well 277 00:14:32,300 --> 00:14:35,418 respected in the international community for being that law 278 00:14:35,418 --> 00:14:38,116 abiding society. And one of the examples I use is 279 00:14:38,116 --> 00:14:40,554 if you look at the passport, Singapore is one of the best 280 00:14:40,554 --> 00:14:43,770 countries in the world where you get to travel to many countries 281 00:14:43,770 --> 00:14:46,256 visa free. So the reputation of 282 00:14:46,256 --> 00:14:48,776 international standing there and expectations of safety, 283 00:14:48,836 --> 00:14:50,756 Singapore is a really good spot for that. 284 00:14:51,356 --> 00:14:55,587 Now unfortunately, if you are a cyber criminal and you don't 285 00:14:55,587 --> 00:14:59,479 have to worry about the rules and you have access to the 286 00:14:59,479 --> 00:15:04,338 country, that also means that as a country, this is a really good 287 00:15:04,338 --> 00:15:06,264 spot to be attacking from, right? 288 00:15:06,324 --> 00:15:09,432 This is my expect, this is my guess, my expectation, my 289 00:15:09,432 --> 00:15:12,254 hypothesis. So that's why I think from the 290 00:15:12,254 --> 00:15:15,314 statistics that you've seen or that Cloudflare publish, it's 291 00:15:15,314 --> 00:15:18,654 not one specific spot. It's across the entire country. 292 00:15:18,894 --> 00:15:21,750 If you look at where all their attacks are coming from, it's 293 00:15:21,750 --> 00:15:23,292 people's houses. It's servers. 294 00:15:23,772 --> 00:15:25,542 It's anything that you can get your hands on. 295 00:15:25,872 --> 00:15:28,678 I think the other thing I was gonna mention as well was there 296 00:15:28,678 --> 00:15:33,734 is a bit of a consumer culture to buy fancy new devices that 297 00:15:33,734 --> 00:15:37,729 are, oh, internet connected. I dunno how many devices 298 00:15:37,729 --> 00:15:41,258 everyone has in their house now. Average 20 to 40 internet 299 00:15:41,258 --> 00:15:43,892 connected devices. But now you've got washing 300 00:15:43,892 --> 00:15:47,034 machines, you've got fridges, robot vacuums, security cameras. 301 00:15:47,544 --> 00:15:51,060 This is the extra stuff on top of your routers, your smart TV, 302 00:15:51,060 --> 00:15:54,808 your smart speakers. There's just more and more 303 00:15:54,808 --> 00:15:58,812 things that are being built with IoT and smart technology into 304 00:15:58,812 --> 00:16:01,077 it. I mean it's just gonna grow. 305 00:16:01,077 --> 00:16:02,757 The attack surface is just gonna keep growing. 306 00:16:03,012 --> 00:16:06,462 Yeah. Yeah, I still don't have any 307 00:16:06,462 --> 00:16:11,000 counts of how many smart devices or IoT devices in my house, 308 00:16:11,000 --> 00:16:12,894 right? I guess the last, I don't know, 309 00:16:12,894 --> 00:16:16,117 maybe five, 10 years, IoT has been booming, right? 310 00:16:16,117 --> 00:16:20,305 So we can even see like doors, you know, controlled by internet 311 00:16:20,305 --> 00:16:22,763 now. Lights, whatever that is at 312 00:16:22,763 --> 00:16:24,988 home. I think people increasingly, you 313 00:16:24,988 --> 00:16:26,803 know, having these smart devices. 314 00:16:27,062 --> 00:16:30,555 And I think you point out about we have this culture, like 315 00:16:30,555 --> 00:16:34,167 always wanting new devices, new gadgets, new toys. 316 00:16:34,527 --> 00:16:38,397 I think that probably one aspect that drives, you know, this, you 317 00:16:38,397 --> 00:16:41,337 know, source of attack, right? But specifically I think still 318 00:16:41,337 --> 00:16:43,062 we haven't answered the why, right? 319 00:16:43,092 --> 00:16:45,402 Because, okay, Singapore is well connected. 320 00:16:45,402 --> 00:16:49,602 We have good internet bandwidth, people have so many devices. 321 00:16:49,932 --> 00:16:52,272 Are you now saying that we are all being hacked? 322 00:16:53,437 --> 00:16:56,798 Probably, yeah, quite, I guess quite frankly, if I looked at 323 00:16:56,798 --> 00:17:01,048 the statistics now, the last one of the last publicly known ones, 324 00:17:01,048 --> 00:17:05,178 a botnet that was recently revealed to be, I think the 325 00:17:05,178 --> 00:17:07,483 largest botnet, active botnet right now. 326 00:17:07,603 --> 00:17:11,059 They counted over 700,000 devices attacking at the same 327 00:17:11,059 --> 00:17:14,413 time. It hit 30 terabits per second. 328 00:17:15,613 --> 00:17:18,313 If you think about what that translates to, it's like 329 00:17:18,313 --> 00:17:20,772 downloading all of Netflix within minutes. 330 00:17:21,397 --> 00:17:23,766 Wow. That's a massive amount of 331 00:17:23,766 --> 00:17:26,281 volume. And again, if you... just law of 332 00:17:26,281 --> 00:17:29,127 averages, if you take the total volume of the attacks and you 333 00:17:29,127 --> 00:17:32,155 break them down to the countries and the sources, I think I 334 00:17:32,155 --> 00:17:34,873 worked out Singapore was probably about 2% of that. 335 00:17:35,923 --> 00:17:39,034 So if you think about how many households there are here, one, 336 00:17:39,034 --> 00:17:41,473 1.5 million households, 2% is quite a lot. 337 00:17:41,533 --> 00:17:44,691 And that's just one bot at one point in time that could be 338 00:17:44,691 --> 00:17:46,228 identified. It's not hard. 339 00:17:46,288 --> 00:17:49,858 So personally, when I've gone around to people's houses to see 340 00:17:49,858 --> 00:17:53,290 what's on their network, I've already found houses that have 341 00:17:53,290 --> 00:17:56,230 been compromised. So the either device has a back 342 00:17:56,230 --> 00:17:59,546 door or has already been hacked and people haven't really paid 343 00:17:59,546 --> 00:18:03,990 attention to it or realized it. One of the hardest things to do 344 00:18:03,990 --> 00:18:07,102 from a maintenance and admin point of view, unfortunately, is 345 00:18:07,102 --> 00:18:09,048 actually to see what's on your network. 346 00:18:09,438 --> 00:18:13,068 It's not hard in the sense of having access to your router. 347 00:18:13,428 --> 00:18:15,588 It's hard in the sense of thinking that you even have to 348 00:18:15,588 --> 00:18:17,844 do it and then, you know, you just wanna connect to something 349 00:18:17,844 --> 00:18:19,608 and just leave it and you forget about it. 350 00:18:19,848 --> 00:18:23,376 The natural tendency, as I said earlier, is that for humans we 351 00:18:23,376 --> 00:18:27,100 just want to plug it in and have fun with it, but you forget that 352 00:18:27,100 --> 00:18:29,628 actually everything that you plug in has to be maintained. 353 00:18:30,098 --> 00:18:33,758 One big learning that I had in the last 10 years or so was that 354 00:18:34,058 --> 00:18:35,588 physical things have an end of life. 355 00:18:35,618 --> 00:18:38,341 Devices have an end of life, but we don't really think about that 356 00:18:38,341 --> 00:18:41,228 because my speakers still play music when I expect it to. 357 00:18:41,528 --> 00:18:44,154 Oh, it still works fine, but really it's probably already 358 00:18:44,154 --> 00:18:47,153 been hacked because it was from 10 years ago. 359 00:18:47,836 --> 00:18:50,366 Recently, actually two recent examples. 360 00:18:50,656 --> 00:18:54,242 D-Link, which are a very big brand for routers, just a few 361 00:18:54,242 --> 00:18:57,020 days ago, they reported, well, someone reported that there's 362 00:18:57,020 --> 00:19:00,766 vulnerability, they can be hacked for a device that was 363 00:19:00,766 --> 00:19:03,104 launched in 2017. So it's not that long ago, eight 364 00:19:03,104 --> 00:19:05,776 years ago. It was discontinued in 2021. 365 00:19:06,536 --> 00:19:10,646 It was a high-end router, but it's now very hackable. 366 00:19:10,886 --> 00:19:13,226 And they've also said, we're not gonna, they're not gonna fix it. 367 00:19:13,886 --> 00:19:18,577 So people who have those routers, they're not gonna be 368 00:19:18,577 --> 00:19:22,222 constantly thinking about, oh, I'm now exposed, I'm now, 369 00:19:22,222 --> 00:19:26,216 someone's got a master key to my house, right, from my router. 370 00:19:26,216 --> 00:19:29,731 And they can enter my network. Because it works. 371 00:19:29,761 --> 00:19:32,539 It, you know, if I'm a user and it's still working, I don't 372 00:19:32,539 --> 00:19:34,805 really think about and consciously go out to pay 373 00:19:34,805 --> 00:19:36,971 attention to it. The recent one. 374 00:19:36,971 --> 00:19:40,171 And the other thing I also learned recently was, the 375 00:19:40,171 --> 00:19:43,211 devices that we completely forget about. 376 00:19:43,781 --> 00:19:46,574 It's fun to set up, but if you don't find the value from it, 377 00:19:46,574 --> 00:19:48,701 you actually forget that it's connected to the internet. 378 00:19:48,701 --> 00:19:52,573 One of the unexpected devices that came up my radar recently 379 00:19:52,573 --> 00:19:55,986 was a Thermomix. Oh, Thermomix cooker. 380 00:19:55,986 --> 00:20:00,157 So it's wifi enabled. Someone's worked out how to hack 381 00:20:00,157 --> 00:20:02,287 it. You need physical access to the 382 00:20:02,287 --> 00:20:05,528 Thermomix to actually hack it. I never thought that there would 383 00:20:05,528 --> 00:20:08,222 be even a point of attack. Like first of all, I don't know 384 00:20:08,222 --> 00:20:11,426 how many people that use the device still use it with the 385 00:20:11,426 --> 00:20:13,898 wifi. But it's one of those things 386 00:20:13,898 --> 00:20:16,478 where it has the capability, it's got the parts for it. 387 00:20:17,198 --> 00:20:20,843 If you're not constantly thinking about keeping up to 388 00:20:20,843 --> 00:20:24,357 date, maintaining it, managing it, then it can be used against 389 00:20:24,357 --> 00:20:27,452 you. And we, just now when you 390 00:20:27,452 --> 00:20:29,756 mentioned it, it is used for DDoS attack, right? 391 00:20:29,756 --> 00:20:32,876 And DDoS attack is just like sending garbage traffic. 392 00:20:33,176 --> 00:20:34,896 Even it could be like ping or whatever, right? 393 00:20:34,896 --> 00:20:38,792 So it is very easy to just send from any device endpoints, 394 00:20:38,792 --> 00:20:39,866 right? So that's one thing. 395 00:20:40,346 --> 00:20:43,946 And I think this comes back to like, even including me, right? 396 00:20:44,006 --> 00:20:48,686 Sometimes we put a lot of focus on our laptops, our hand phones. 397 00:20:48,746 --> 00:20:51,830 I think those two are predominantly devices that we 398 00:20:51,830 --> 00:20:55,353 think is the most like, yeah, susceptible and our golden 399 00:20:55,353 --> 00:20:58,431 source, right? And we have so many other 400 00:20:58,431 --> 00:21:00,263 devices. I'm pretty sure many people 401 00:21:00,263 --> 00:21:03,061 don't even think of, you know, updating the firmware, because 402 00:21:03,061 --> 00:21:07,093 it would even took a lot of effort to just, you know, go to 403 00:21:07,093 --> 00:21:10,193 the settings, update the OS, because it doesn't do that 404 00:21:10,193 --> 00:21:12,523 automatically, right? Unlike maybe your laptop or your 405 00:21:12,523 --> 00:21:15,538 hand phone, it will just auto update and you just trigger yes, 406 00:21:15,538 --> 00:21:18,509 right? So I think this brings an 407 00:21:18,509 --> 00:21:23,388 awareness for us as a, you know, like, common people, I guess, to 408 00:21:23,388 --> 00:21:27,554 actually now think that we have so many devices at home that are 409 00:21:27,554 --> 00:21:30,382 probably prone, especially if we buy it a long time ago. 410 00:21:30,382 --> 00:21:35,092 The firmware is not updated. And even the provider has 411 00:21:35,092 --> 00:21:36,842 stopped providing the patches, right? 412 00:21:36,842 --> 00:21:39,101 So I think now we can kind of like map a little bit. 413 00:21:39,401 --> 00:21:41,684 So when we think about this now, right? 414 00:21:42,046 --> 00:21:45,760 What should we do? So I guess, this maybe come to 415 00:21:45,760 --> 00:21:48,084 your Otonata, right? The things that now you're 416 00:21:48,084 --> 00:21:49,308 doing, right? So, yeah. 417 00:21:49,308 --> 00:21:52,458 How do we know that we are being hacked or not hacked? 418 00:21:53,523 --> 00:21:55,893 I think in most cases it's hard to tell. 419 00:21:56,313 --> 00:22:00,910 So I think one of the challenges with network devices is that if 420 00:22:00,910 --> 00:22:03,823 someone broke into your network, it's different from someone 421 00:22:03,823 --> 00:22:06,991 breaking to your house. Even though there are a lot of 422 00:22:06,991 --> 00:22:09,081 parallels, right? If, and this is kind of where I 423 00:22:09,081 --> 00:22:11,691 started for myself as well. 'Cause I was concerned about 424 00:22:11,691 --> 00:22:14,969 home security. And I had, you know, security 425 00:22:14,969 --> 00:22:17,437 sys, alarm systems, I had sensor lights. 426 00:22:17,767 --> 00:22:20,527 I had enough indicators to tell me if my security is 427 00:22:20,527 --> 00:22:22,541 compromised. But then I realized that my 428 00:22:22,541 --> 00:22:25,115 network is a whole different ball game, because if someone 429 00:22:25,115 --> 00:22:28,349 broke into the home network, it's like they have access to 430 00:22:28,349 --> 00:22:30,157 your house but you don't know that they're there. 431 00:22:30,697 --> 00:22:32,987 It's a bit like, I dunno if you've watched the movie the 432 00:22:32,987 --> 00:22:35,397 Invisible Man. It's very freaky if someone is 433 00:22:35,397 --> 00:22:38,204 standing behind you, but you don't know them and they're 434 00:22:38,204 --> 00:22:40,857 there 24/7 watching everything that you do. 435 00:22:40,857 --> 00:22:42,507 They have access to everything that you have. 436 00:22:43,381 --> 00:22:46,755 It's a scary thought, but it's a good parallel compared to your 437 00:22:46,755 --> 00:22:48,405 physical security. This is your network security. 438 00:22:48,735 --> 00:22:51,234 How can you tell? There are a few indicators of 439 00:22:51,234 --> 00:22:53,843 compromise. One of the ones that I find kind 440 00:22:53,843 --> 00:22:57,958 of anyone can do is look at your router and see what the traffic 441 00:22:57,958 --> 00:22:59,883 is. Firstly, see what's connected on 442 00:22:59,883 --> 00:23:02,640 your network. You know, your most modern 443 00:23:02,640 --> 00:23:05,217 routers should show you everything is listed in the 444 00:23:05,217 --> 00:23:07,055 network. If something looks a bit 445 00:23:07,055 --> 00:23:09,701 suspicious, as in you don't really recognize or you can't 446 00:23:09,701 --> 00:23:11,115 find it, you go around everywhere. 447 00:23:11,235 --> 00:23:13,335 Maybe it's your washing machine, maybe it's the fridge, I dunno. 448 00:23:13,785 --> 00:23:17,301 But you can't find out what that one device is and it's sending 449 00:23:17,301 --> 00:23:20,363 data and it's connecting. That's the one you need to be 450 00:23:20,363 --> 00:23:23,405 concerned about. Second one, similar to the 451 00:23:23,405 --> 00:23:26,639 router is check your firmware, right, as what you pointed out. 452 00:23:27,519 --> 00:23:29,709 Age is a big factor, a risk factor. 453 00:23:29,739 --> 00:23:32,419 If you've got a really old router, chances are there's 454 00:23:32,419 --> 00:23:35,139 someone's already found a way to hack it and has published it. 455 00:23:35,439 --> 00:23:38,977 If you haven't updated the firmware, or in some cases you 456 00:23:38,977 --> 00:23:40,974 can't, you're not allowed to update the firmware. 457 00:23:41,394 --> 00:23:45,111 I've had quite a few routers in Singapore, unfortunately, where 458 00:23:45,111 --> 00:23:49,822 it's convenient to keep the router because you've set up 50 459 00:23:49,822 --> 00:23:54,279 devices on your wifi, and you've signed up to a new ISP, ISP is 460 00:23:54,279 --> 00:23:56,736 giving you a router, but, you know, ah, I don't wanna have to 461 00:23:56,736 --> 00:23:59,298 reset up all the wifi again. I'm just gonna use the old 462 00:23:59,298 --> 00:24:01,986 router. Unfortunately, in a lot of 463 00:24:01,986 --> 00:24:05,486 cases, the firmware is fixed to a much older version. 464 00:24:06,056 --> 00:24:09,536 I've now physically forced quite a few routers of clients to 465 00:24:10,196 --> 00:24:13,770 forget the ISP version and follow the manufacturer's 466 00:24:13,770 --> 00:24:15,983 version. But it's so much effort to try 467 00:24:15,983 --> 00:24:17,592 and do that. So firstly, you need to know 468 00:24:17,592 --> 00:24:19,650 about it. And secondly, you gotta put an 469 00:24:19,650 --> 00:24:22,851 effort to break out of that. So one, check what's on your 470 00:24:22,851 --> 00:24:25,549 network. Two, if you can, make sure the 471 00:24:25,549 --> 00:24:29,627 router is recently up to date. The third one goes back to the 472 00:24:29,627 --> 00:24:31,177 first point. If you've got anything 473 00:24:31,177 --> 00:24:33,945 suspicious. So you mentioned the, my 474 00:24:33,945 --> 00:24:36,661 business, Otonata. We've now got something called a 475 00:24:36,661 --> 00:24:38,169 hack check. It's a free service. 476 00:24:38,519 --> 00:24:42,036 Basically you take a photo of a device if it's something that 477 00:24:42,036 --> 00:24:45,055 you are a bit suspicious about, we've now got AI to help you 478 00:24:45,055 --> 00:24:48,535 recognize what the device is and then also run it through our 479 00:24:48,535 --> 00:24:51,659 vulnerability database. And what that means is it will 480 00:24:51,659 --> 00:24:55,209 look through for that device, any known publicly disclosed 481 00:24:55,209 --> 00:24:57,963 vulnerabilities. So unfortunately, the database 482 00:24:57,963 --> 00:25:01,589 is now over 300,000 lines of products. 483 00:25:02,238 --> 00:25:05,434 But basically we can tell you that, hey, this product is 484 00:25:05,434 --> 00:25:08,888 there's a risk of it having been hacked before for different 485 00:25:08,888 --> 00:25:12,059 reasons. The worst one is the, what's 486 00:25:12,059 --> 00:25:15,524 called RCE, Remote Code Execution, where it's not just 487 00:25:15,524 --> 00:25:18,544 the mobile phones and the laptops, right? 488 00:25:19,364 --> 00:25:22,234 Smart TVs, especially old smart TVs, they've got a lot of 489 00:25:22,234 --> 00:25:23,999 processing power. 'Cause if you think about 490 00:25:23,999 --> 00:25:26,504 something like what, running 4K and processing a 4K signal, it 491 00:25:26,504 --> 00:25:27,974 actually takes quite a bit of power. 492 00:25:28,394 --> 00:25:32,366 But if you got an older TV that hasn't yet been up to date, I 493 00:25:32,366 --> 00:25:34,564 think the biggest risk we find are one, age. 494 00:25:35,294 --> 00:25:37,694 Two, things which have good processing power. 495 00:25:38,054 --> 00:25:40,994 But three, if it's, how do I put this? 496 00:25:41,384 --> 00:25:43,874 It's a dubious brand, a no-name brand. 497 00:25:43,994 --> 00:25:48,229 So sometimes you get OEMs that have kind of cobbled together 498 00:25:48,229 --> 00:25:51,359 different parts and, you know, a screen from here, processing 499 00:25:51,359 --> 00:25:54,364 board from there. Those are typically the ones 500 00:25:54,364 --> 00:25:58,058 where we found that there has been, you know, more cause for 501 00:25:58,058 --> 00:26:00,127 concern. I'll tell you a funny story, but 502 00:26:00,127 --> 00:26:03,661 one of the, before I got into cybersecurity, one of my friends 503 00:26:03,661 --> 00:26:08,173 was very proud of the fact that he bought a media player from a 504 00:26:08,173 --> 00:26:13,021 very small shop that was $50, but you could access everything. 505 00:26:13,651 --> 00:26:18,481 So I was like, I understand business enough to go, you're 506 00:26:18,481 --> 00:26:22,602 not making money for $50. You have access to pirated 507 00:26:22,602 --> 00:26:27,428 movies, streaming from IP TV all over the world and it's $50 for 508 00:26:27,428 --> 00:26:30,565 a lifetime? It reminded me of a quote that 509 00:26:30,565 --> 00:26:33,727 if you can't work out what the product is, you are the product. 510 00:26:34,669 --> 00:26:39,216 So it occurred to me much later on that you paid them $50, their 511 00:26:39,216 --> 00:26:43,784 job is to feed you with dodgy content, but they've got access 512 00:26:43,784 --> 00:26:46,759 to your house. You are the proxy. 513 00:26:47,239 --> 00:26:50,508 You are the service. Doesn't matter, the $50 doesn't 514 00:26:50,508 --> 00:26:52,712 matter anymore. They're selling access to your 515 00:26:52,712 --> 00:26:56,530 network to be able to access the rest of your network in your 516 00:26:56,530 --> 00:27:00,549 devices, in your house. So yes, while, you know, your 517 00:27:00,549 --> 00:27:03,941 laptops and your mobile phones are the ones that you only think 518 00:27:03,941 --> 00:27:08,010 about. If you expand that to just go by 519 00:27:08,010 --> 00:27:12,304 the processor, your network connection, storage, power, your 520 00:27:12,304 --> 00:27:16,735 home could actually be a computer, right? 521 00:27:16,765 --> 00:27:19,621 Just different, just split out over different things, 522 00:27:19,621 --> 00:27:22,580 distributed computing. Your neighborhood could be a 523 00:27:22,580 --> 00:27:25,405 computer. And when you think about how 524 00:27:25,405 --> 00:27:29,054 connected everyone is from a wifi point of view, there's 525 00:27:29,054 --> 00:27:32,852 actually now they found another form of attack called nearest 526 00:27:32,852 --> 00:27:35,836 neighbor attack. Whereby rather than attacking a 527 00:27:35,836 --> 00:27:39,160 target directly, they attack the neighbor, compromise that 528 00:27:39,160 --> 00:27:44,035 network, and because it's wifi distance away, 24/7, they're 529 00:27:44,035 --> 00:27:47,568 just knocking on the, checking every single door they can until 530 00:27:47,568 --> 00:27:51,143 they find an entry point in. So I find that in Asian 531 00:27:51,143 --> 00:27:55,025 countries, and this goes back to one of the hypothesis for why 532 00:27:55,025 --> 00:28:00,339 Asia is a hotbed for sources. My hypothesis is because 533 00:28:00,339 --> 00:28:04,643 everyone's so dense within wifi points, it's gonna be quite easy 534 00:28:04,643 --> 00:28:09,463 for someone to work out how to attack one location, find wifi 535 00:28:09,463 --> 00:28:13,505 around the area, use that to attack someone else's house, use 536 00:28:13,505 --> 00:28:16,405 their resources to attack the neighbor and the neighbor and 537 00:28:16,405 --> 00:28:17,975 neighbor. So daisy chain the attack. 538 00:28:18,625 --> 00:28:24,185 When I do a scan of where I am now in a 24 hour period the wifi 539 00:28:24,185 --> 00:28:26,385 around me, I get over 800 points. 540 00:28:27,105 --> 00:28:29,402 So if you think about it, it's almost like someone trying to 541 00:28:29,402 --> 00:28:33,104 break into your house, there's 800 doors to choose from, and 542 00:28:33,104 --> 00:28:37,287 you can do it 24/7 because it's distributed computing, right? 543 00:28:37,287 --> 00:28:40,283 Once you've broken into someone else's house, there's zero 544 00:28:40,283 --> 00:28:43,677 opportunity costs. All you need is a AI written bot 545 00:28:43,677 --> 00:28:47,451 to work out how to best maximize that location to attack 546 00:28:47,451 --> 00:28:50,412 everybody else. So I find it really interesting. 547 00:28:50,487 --> 00:28:54,427 There's a lot of vectors, it's whole new cowboy territory. 548 00:28:54,477 --> 00:28:58,433 There's a lot of vectors that are now gonna be AI augmented as 549 00:28:58,433 --> 00:29:01,932 well, because they're going to, they're finding... researchers 550 00:29:01,932 --> 00:29:07,117 are finding more and more new threats that kids, even kids are 551 00:29:07,117 --> 00:29:10,168 getting into it. It's kind of disturbing. 552 00:29:10,168 --> 00:29:13,798 But the barrier to entry for hacking now is super low. 553 00:29:14,128 --> 00:29:16,444 Woa. I think you just open up a lot 554 00:29:16,444 --> 00:29:18,058 of things, right? So obviously there are many 555 00:29:18,058 --> 00:29:19,633 interesting things that we can pick, right? 556 00:29:19,633 --> 00:29:23,443 So the first thing I think, just to summarize, right, for us at 557 00:29:23,443 --> 00:29:28,173 home, please try to first figure out what networks are being 558 00:29:28,173 --> 00:29:28,703 used. Yeah. 559 00:29:28,703 --> 00:29:31,597 What device are being connected to your network, right? 560 00:29:31,807 --> 00:29:33,847 See if there's any device that you don't know. 561 00:29:34,247 --> 00:29:36,057 The traffic is a bit suspicious, right? 562 00:29:36,417 --> 00:29:38,337 And first, identify that. Check the firmware. 563 00:29:38,967 --> 00:29:40,917 Use your tool, I think, I believe it's free, right? 564 00:29:40,917 --> 00:29:44,544 Available online and I think we can just take a snap and upload 565 00:29:44,544 --> 00:29:47,067 it and maybe it can tell whether there's a risk or not. 566 00:29:47,967 --> 00:29:50,709 When you mentioned about the media player, in fact, today, I 567 00:29:50,709 --> 00:29:55,032 read an article in Krebs that says Android Media Player, the 568 00:29:55,032 --> 00:29:58,227 typical thing for streaming, right, it's actually a 569 00:29:58,227 --> 00:30:00,147 vulnerable for such things, right? 570 00:30:00,267 --> 00:30:03,646 So if those of you listeners who actually has this kind of 571 00:30:03,646 --> 00:30:06,889 device, that will be also one thing that to be suspicious 572 00:30:06,889 --> 00:30:10,175 about, right? So think about the repercussions 573 00:30:10,175 --> 00:30:14,530 of continuing using the device. Okay, let's say we have mapped 574 00:30:14,530 --> 00:30:16,854 it out, right? So but one thing I would like to 575 00:30:16,854 --> 00:30:19,303 understand, this is also for layman people to understand, 576 00:30:19,303 --> 00:30:21,794 right? So where does the attacker 577 00:30:21,794 --> 00:30:24,259 actually come in the first place, right? 578 00:30:24,259 --> 00:30:26,869 Because we have so many devices. Router is one, right? 579 00:30:26,869 --> 00:30:29,779 We have smart TV, we have maybe fridge, whatever that is. 580 00:30:29,839 --> 00:30:34,482 How does it actually go inside? Which point of attack typically 581 00:30:34,482 --> 00:30:39,686 is the most vulnerable, yeah? So I think the two most likely 582 00:30:39,686 --> 00:30:43,463 sources are either one, your compromised IoT device, which 583 00:30:43,463 --> 00:30:46,363 is, you know, typically your media player, even your printer. 584 00:30:47,376 --> 00:30:48,696 And the other one's gonna be your router. 585 00:30:49,266 --> 00:30:54,364 And like I said, I think as long as there's a sufficient powerful 586 00:30:54,364 --> 00:30:59,122 processor in that device, and it is able to be compromised to get 587 00:30:59,122 --> 00:31:03,296 to RC, running code, that's when it's going to find everything. 588 00:31:03,444 --> 00:31:06,590 It's doing everything else that a hacker would wanna do, which 589 00:31:06,590 --> 00:31:09,596 is look around for your network, look at what combination of 590 00:31:09,596 --> 00:31:12,716 devices that you have, and then work out what's the next best 591 00:31:12,716 --> 00:31:14,940 spot to jump into. So that's called lateral 592 00:31:14,940 --> 00:31:18,124 movement. If you look at the diagnostics 593 00:31:18,124 --> 00:31:22,626 of some of the larger attacks by the more state sponsored, those 594 00:31:22,626 --> 00:31:25,350 really powerful APTs, that's really what they're looking for. 595 00:31:25,350 --> 00:31:26,880 Lateral movement and persistence. 596 00:31:27,120 --> 00:31:30,254 Because what they wanna do is be able to... they don't just break 597 00:31:30,254 --> 00:31:31,605 in and then they go steal everything. 598 00:31:31,605 --> 00:31:34,360 It's not like robbing a bank. They wanna hide there 'cause 599 00:31:34,360 --> 00:31:36,615 they wanna use it to leverage into something else. 600 00:31:37,425 --> 00:31:41,485 And there have been few big cases, quite well known cases 601 00:31:41,485 --> 00:31:44,695 where, for example, in Medibank Private, which is a private 602 00:31:44,695 --> 00:31:46,593 health insurance. The government took two years 603 00:31:46,593 --> 00:31:48,043 and they worked out what actually happened. 604 00:31:48,373 --> 00:31:52,465 The database administrator's home PC got hacked and they 605 00:31:52,465 --> 00:31:55,783 found the passwords that he had for the database. 606 00:31:56,413 --> 00:31:59,196 Over three months, they just slowly tested it and went, oh, 607 00:31:59,196 --> 00:32:01,153 we can get in, we can get in, we can get in. 608 00:32:01,213 --> 00:32:04,639 And they stayed inside the servers downloading 500 609 00:32:04,639 --> 00:32:07,633 gigabytes of data. This is personal medical 610 00:32:07,633 --> 00:32:10,653 information. So if you think about it, in the 611 00:32:10,653 --> 00:32:13,153 home network, what they're really targeting for is movement 612 00:32:13,153 --> 00:32:16,123 across the network to see how many devices they can compromise 613 00:32:16,123 --> 00:32:18,463 and then staying inside the network and using that. 614 00:32:18,823 --> 00:32:20,977 And that's what the persistence is. 615 00:32:22,067 --> 00:32:25,959 You kind of want to ex, you kind of expect that your laptop is 616 00:32:25,959 --> 00:32:28,262 safe. Especially Mac, like there's a, 617 00:32:28,262 --> 00:32:31,628 there's a reputation for Apple being very pedantic about 618 00:32:31,628 --> 00:32:34,379 security. But even now, you can see that 619 00:32:34,379 --> 00:32:37,651 if you just Google zero day, right, you'll see that even Macs 620 00:32:37,651 --> 00:32:41,537 get compromised as well. No one is completely protected. 621 00:32:41,717 --> 00:32:46,117 Like there's enough incentive for hackers to want to target 622 00:32:46,117 --> 00:32:49,461 Macs because of their reputation and because people expect it to 623 00:32:49,461 --> 00:32:51,769 be safe. But unfortunately, the reality 624 00:32:51,769 --> 00:32:54,051 is it's still software. It's still computer, it's still 625 00:32:54,051 --> 00:32:58,477 made by people. And now worse with one extra 626 00:32:58,477 --> 00:33:03,156 computing resources and AI, it's even easier now to customize a 627 00:33:03,156 --> 00:33:06,840 target and what's the best way to attack the target based on 628 00:33:06,840 --> 00:33:09,986 what they have. So that lateral movement is one 629 00:33:09,986 --> 00:33:12,642 of the things that they're typically going for. 630 00:33:13,212 --> 00:33:17,278 And DDoS is just the easy thing to do once you compromise a 631 00:33:17,278 --> 00:33:19,984 network. What they're finding now 632 00:33:19,984 --> 00:33:25,865 recently is that the hackers are using people's houses and 633 00:33:25,865 --> 00:33:29,585 monetizing them. So there's a term that really 634 00:33:29,585 --> 00:33:31,958 disturbs me now. It's called residential proxy. 635 00:33:32,780 --> 00:33:37,834 It's almost like giving someone, renting out someone else's 636 00:33:37,834 --> 00:33:42,325 network access to someone who wants to hide the information in 637 00:33:42,325 --> 00:33:45,467 the news. If you look at, in the Singapore 638 00:33:45,467 --> 00:33:47,963 context, there's very strong laws around loaning out your 639 00:33:47,963 --> 00:33:51,131 SIM, your SIM card, you get in a lot of trouble, right? 640 00:33:51,131 --> 00:33:55,835 And it's because your SIM card is then used to commit crime, 641 00:33:55,835 --> 00:33:58,883 scam other people. And going back to the whole 642 00:33:58,883 --> 00:34:01,976 reputation in Singapore being a law abiding, when you see a 643 00:34:01,976 --> 00:34:06,091 number that's a trustworthy number with a +65, you kind of 644 00:34:06,091 --> 00:34:08,138 expect, oh, you know, they should be protected. 645 00:34:09,398 --> 00:34:12,458 In that same context, the internet connection doesn't have 646 00:34:12,458 --> 00:34:14,068 any of that. Yeah. 647 00:34:14,217 --> 00:34:14,737 Yeah. Yeah. 648 00:34:14,737 --> 00:34:18,529 Unfortunately, if someone else is renting out your home network 649 00:34:18,529 --> 00:34:22,913 connection, the people that want to use that to hide whatever 650 00:34:22,913 --> 00:34:25,777 they're doing can have all sorts of different reasons. 651 00:34:25,853 --> 00:34:29,077 What are typical use case that people are doing with this 652 00:34:29,077 --> 00:34:32,543 residential proxy? So, at the moment, what the 653 00:34:32,543 --> 00:34:35,929 family friendly version is fraud, unfortunately, which is, 654 00:34:35,929 --> 00:34:38,549 you know, looking like it's coming from, the traffic is 655 00:34:38,549 --> 00:34:41,344 coming from somewhere else. There's much scarier things that 656 00:34:41,344 --> 00:34:43,909 people, 'cause they're renting it on the dark web. 657 00:34:43,938 --> 00:34:46,879 There are much scarier things that people can rent them out 658 00:34:46,879 --> 00:34:48,319 for that are not family friendly. 659 00:34:48,679 --> 00:34:51,889 When you think about pornography, the darkest things 660 00:34:51,889 --> 00:34:57,455 in the dark web that you don't want people to be seen that you 661 00:34:57,455 --> 00:35:00,667 are accessing, that's where residential proxies are becoming 662 00:35:00,667 --> 00:35:03,415 a service. So hackers are compromising it 663 00:35:03,415 --> 00:35:07,381 and they've gone from botnets, which are, you know, a bit more 664 00:35:07,381 --> 00:35:10,901 volatile to trying to come up with more stable, sustainable, 665 00:35:10,901 --> 00:35:14,945 they call it sustainable sources of income, which is to rent out 666 00:35:14,945 --> 00:35:18,540 other people's houses. That concept really disturbs me, 667 00:35:18,540 --> 00:35:21,815 because these people don't even realize that they are, they're 668 00:35:21,815 --> 00:35:23,515 being sold as a residential proxy. 669 00:35:23,845 --> 00:35:27,291 And it's the people that bought the $50 media player that went, 670 00:35:27,291 --> 00:35:30,790 oh, I'm getting all this great content, but they're actually 671 00:35:30,790 --> 00:35:34,585 now part of... Yeah, but it's, I don't think 672 00:35:34,585 --> 00:35:37,485 we've seen enough. I don't think there's enough 673 00:35:37,485 --> 00:35:40,961 cases yet where someone is, has been taken the court or arrested 674 00:35:40,961 --> 00:35:43,561 because their network has been compromised to the extent that 675 00:35:43,561 --> 00:35:46,561 they're being used to facilitate a really bad cyber crime. 676 00:35:46,561 --> 00:35:50,552 But it's not implausible. If your bandwidth is really 677 00:35:50,552 --> 00:35:53,717 great 'cause you're really like online gaming, for example, and 678 00:35:53,717 --> 00:35:57,111 there's a whole bunch of traffic that happens after you've gone 679 00:35:57,111 --> 00:36:01,434 to bed, I don't know what the liability, where the liability 680 00:36:01,434 --> 00:36:03,479 falls. But if it's a SIM card, it's 681 00:36:03,479 --> 00:36:05,835 very clear you're the one that let your access out. 682 00:36:05,865 --> 00:36:08,361 But home networks, I don't think we are quite, we're quite clear 683 00:36:08,361 --> 00:36:09,195 on that yet. Yeah. 684 00:36:09,870 --> 00:36:11,880 And even like it's very distributed, right? 685 00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:15,240 Again, like it's very hard to trace actually how the traffic 686 00:36:15,570 --> 00:36:19,062 goes in the internet in, in while connected internet 687 00:36:19,062 --> 00:36:21,404 devices. And, yeah, again, just to remind 688 00:36:21,404 --> 00:36:24,939 people, if you buy this kind of media player, be cautious. 689 00:36:25,299 --> 00:36:28,689 Try to check further. You mentioned something about 690 00:36:28,689 --> 00:36:30,907 password, right? Again, I wanna understand the 691 00:36:30,907 --> 00:36:33,706 root cause how these attackers can actually go into your 692 00:36:33,706 --> 00:36:37,484 internet router or your, I dunno, media player, printer and 693 00:36:37,484 --> 00:36:38,528 all that. Yeah. 694 00:36:38,993 --> 00:36:42,947 Is password like weak password the typical way they hack in or 695 00:36:42,947 --> 00:36:46,033 is like open ports or is there any other thing that they do? 696 00:36:46,063 --> 00:36:50,173 There's no, so in the... I'll come up with the, I'll go 697 00:36:50,173 --> 00:36:53,509 backwards a little bit in the context of what I do in terms of 698 00:36:53,509 --> 00:36:54,769 the service that I provide, right? 699 00:36:54,799 --> 00:36:58,849 What I try and do is, I look at how someone would compromise 700 00:36:58,849 --> 00:37:01,969 your network and use it against you and then protect from that. 701 00:37:02,299 --> 00:37:05,224 And what that means is the service that I do is it's almost 702 00:37:05,224 --> 00:37:07,794 like going to your house, looking at all your doors and 703 00:37:07,794 --> 00:37:10,057 windows and going, that one, you've got a rusty lock there, 704 00:37:10,057 --> 00:37:11,374 someone's gonna come in and break in. 705 00:37:11,644 --> 00:37:15,558 That one's big enough to, that one, I know this brand of door 706 00:37:15,558 --> 00:37:17,839 or door lock, it's been broken into. 707 00:37:17,854 --> 00:37:21,709 I like the analogy, yeah, okay. So the network version of that 708 00:37:21,709 --> 00:37:25,123 is going into your home network. So I've got devices to actually 709 00:37:25,123 --> 00:37:29,031 plug into your network. It'll do a initial scan to do an 710 00:37:29,031 --> 00:37:31,882 inventory, right? If I'm a corporate IT person and 711 00:37:31,882 --> 00:37:34,820 I take over the responsibility of the IT assets for a company, 712 00:37:34,820 --> 00:37:37,522 that's the first thing you do. Do inventory and look at all the 713 00:37:37,522 --> 00:37:42,012 things that you have. Then one by one, I will test the 714 00:37:42,012 --> 00:37:45,764 vulnerabilities on that device. So going back to what I said 715 00:37:45,764 --> 00:37:48,612 earlier, we've got over 300,000 lists of items. 716 00:37:49,129 --> 00:37:51,169 They are known, they're published. 717 00:37:51,679 --> 00:37:54,205 One of the, it's a double-edged sword. 718 00:37:54,235 --> 00:37:58,462 One of the ethos for hack-for-vulnerability and 719 00:37:58,462 --> 00:38:03,165 security research is that when you find a way to hack 720 00:38:03,165 --> 00:38:06,191 something, you tell the manufacturer and you give them a 721 00:38:06,191 --> 00:38:09,260 chance to fix it. Unfortunately, not every 722 00:38:09,260 --> 00:38:13,283 manufacturer will fix it. Not every manufacturer cares. 723 00:38:14,093 --> 00:38:18,439 And in the meantime, until it's resolved, this information is 724 00:38:18,439 --> 00:38:20,233 public. It's known. 725 00:38:20,383 --> 00:38:23,783 So like I said with the D-Link example, they're afraid they 726 00:38:23,783 --> 00:38:26,909 said they're not gonna fix it. But what that means is the 727 00:38:26,909 --> 00:38:29,393 instructions for how to hack it are on Google. 728 00:38:30,208 --> 00:38:32,973 Oh no! So that's how, that's, and like 729 00:38:32,973 --> 00:38:36,293 I said, the list of the database that I have, it's just, it's 730 00:38:36,293 --> 00:38:39,587 growing exponentially. But the services basically to 731 00:38:39,587 --> 00:38:44,222 look at the devices that you have, and then based on the 732 00:38:44,222 --> 00:38:46,943 vulnerabilities that we can test, we'll test them and tell 733 00:38:46,943 --> 00:38:49,271 you this is how someone will hack into your network and this 734 00:38:49,271 --> 00:38:52,073 is what you need to do in order to prevent that. 735 00:38:52,265 --> 00:38:56,037 In the context of the, what you are asking around what's the 736 00:38:56,037 --> 00:38:59,811 most common way. The most common way that I, if 737 00:38:59,811 --> 00:39:03,951 I'm a hacker and I'm hacking a house, is to actually look at 738 00:39:03,951 --> 00:39:07,308 what devices you have and check the internet because it's been 739 00:39:07,308 --> 00:39:10,025 published. 'Cause that actual device has 740 00:39:10,025 --> 00:39:13,771 already had a publicly acknowledged way of accessing 741 00:39:13,771 --> 00:39:15,921 that and it's got instructions. Oh wow! 742 00:39:16,121 --> 00:39:20,445 Right, so unfortunately, based on that approach and that ethos, 743 00:39:20,445 --> 00:39:25,021 once you break into a network, it's not hard to work out how to 744 00:39:25,021 --> 00:39:30,028 then take advantage of that. Easy passwords are, it's a no 745 00:39:30,028 --> 00:39:31,954 brainer. It's almost, there are tools 746 00:39:31,954 --> 00:39:34,918 that you can go online to actually see how challenging 747 00:39:34,918 --> 00:39:37,164 your password is. And that's one of the things I 748 00:39:37,164 --> 00:39:40,804 recommend people do as well. Try password strength tester. 749 00:39:42,026 --> 00:39:45,146 Being a child from growing up with technology in the eighties, 750 00:39:45,566 --> 00:39:47,786 you used to come with a password that was easy to remember. 751 00:39:47,816 --> 00:39:52,286 Unfortunately, those are, it's like closing, trying to cover a 752 00:39:52,286 --> 00:39:53,576 piece of paper as your front door. 753 00:39:53,756 --> 00:39:56,531 It's completely useless. People just charge through cause 754 00:39:56,531 --> 00:39:58,916 brute force and distributed computing makes it so easy. 755 00:39:58,916 --> 00:40:03,572 So it's almost like you don't even want to talk about the 756 00:40:03,572 --> 00:40:06,296 simple passwords. The weak passwords being a 757 00:40:06,296 --> 00:40:08,276 factor because that's already a given. 758 00:40:08,306 --> 00:40:11,854 You need to not have default passwords and simple to guess 759 00:40:11,854 --> 00:40:14,668 passwords. Unfortunately, in the clients 760 00:40:14,668 --> 00:40:18,086 that I've seen, it's still happening a lot. 761 00:40:19,406 --> 00:40:22,850 "adminadmin". I dunno how many devices I've 762 00:40:22,850 --> 00:40:25,356 seen with the username and passwords "adminadmin". 763 00:40:26,126 --> 00:40:29,282 What we're finding now as well is even with what looks like 764 00:40:29,282 --> 00:40:33,373 random passwords, security researchers have now found a lot 765 00:40:33,373 --> 00:40:36,227 of hardware. Even though it looks like a 766 00:40:36,227 --> 00:40:38,451 random password, there's actually algorithm to how they 767 00:40:38,451 --> 00:40:41,953 create the random password. So unfortunately, even with a 768 00:40:41,953 --> 00:40:45,297 modern router, it looks like it's really weird and 769 00:40:45,297 --> 00:40:47,841 randomized. One of the cases was a 770 00:40:47,841 --> 00:40:50,463 researcher found that it is based on the MAC address. 771 00:40:51,273 --> 00:40:53,643 Because again, it's designed by a person. 772 00:40:53,793 --> 00:40:56,673 It's not, they had to come up with a way for them to scale it 773 00:40:56,673 --> 00:40:59,879 up and to make it within a scalable process and therefore 774 00:40:59,879 --> 00:41:02,883 that's the algorithm they use. And someone worked out, I can 775 00:41:02,883 --> 00:41:04,699 reverse it and I can find everyone's password. 776 00:41:05,149 --> 00:41:10,447 So there's no one way, unfortunately, there's no one 777 00:41:10,447 --> 00:41:14,711 way to protect. You gotta think about the 778 00:41:14,711 --> 00:41:17,951 flexible approach, right? So one cybersecurity terminology 779 00:41:17,951 --> 00:41:22,748 is called living off the land, whereby if I am, if I can't 780 00:41:22,748 --> 00:41:25,688 bring anything to the party and I can only attack this way, what 781 00:41:25,688 --> 00:41:30,098 can I use, what resources do I use within that space to be able 782 00:41:30,098 --> 00:41:32,528 to... You have to be creative, right? 783 00:41:32,528 --> 00:41:35,305 If you're a hacker to just, you know, it's like breaking into a 784 00:41:35,305 --> 00:41:38,518 bank with only a backpack or your watch. 785 00:41:39,078 --> 00:41:40,298 It's almost like a MacGyver thing. 786 00:41:40,388 --> 00:41:44,251 Yeah, exactly. But the problem is now you have 787 00:41:44,251 --> 00:41:46,288 AI. AI can scrape everything, can 788 00:41:46,288 --> 00:41:48,428 search all this other stuff to help you. 789 00:41:48,758 --> 00:41:51,832 So yeah, passwords is like a, you don't even wanna talk about 790 00:41:51,832 --> 00:41:55,655 it anymore 'cause you need, it's like minimum a very, very 791 00:41:55,655 --> 00:41:58,377 minimal standard. Don't use default passwords. 792 00:41:58,407 --> 00:42:02,775 Change your default passwords. And even on things like security 793 00:42:02,775 --> 00:42:06,859 cameras, it's very common for security cameras to, because you 794 00:42:06,859 --> 00:42:10,301 feel like it's a physical device plugged in, but you forget that 795 00:42:10,301 --> 00:42:12,972 actually it's probably streaming video somewhere else. 796 00:42:13,512 --> 00:42:17,052 So a lot of times, some of the passwords are actually baked 797 00:42:17,052 --> 00:42:20,707 into the hardware as well. Brother printers, there were the 798 00:42:20,707 --> 00:42:23,742 mother-, I think it was the motherboard manufacturers, 799 00:42:23,742 --> 00:42:28,302 unfortunately, had a hardware password baked into it. 800 00:42:28,782 --> 00:42:31,769 There's something like 6,000 different models of various 801 00:42:31,769 --> 00:42:35,520 printers that all have the same flaw and you can't fix it from 802 00:42:35,520 --> 00:42:37,302 firmware update 'cause it's built into the hardware. 803 00:42:38,042 --> 00:42:41,382 So it's cases like that where you have to do what you can with 804 00:42:41,382 --> 00:42:44,330 the password, but it's not gonna be bulletproof either. 805 00:42:44,360 --> 00:42:47,165 There's no one tried and tested way where hackers will keep 806 00:42:47,165 --> 00:42:49,190 going. They're gonna be creative based 807 00:42:49,190 --> 00:42:51,575 on what you have and unfortunately they're gonna use 808 00:42:51,575 --> 00:42:55,783 that against you. So on that, what I try to 809 00:42:55,783 --> 00:43:00,210 espouse is something called the be the path of greater 810 00:43:00,210 --> 00:43:03,429 resistance. So in the cybersecurity world, 811 00:43:03,429 --> 00:43:07,630 there's something called defense in depth where you want to not 812 00:43:07,630 --> 00:43:09,520 just have, that's where your multi-factor authentication 813 00:43:09,520 --> 00:43:11,807 comes in. You don't want to just have one 814 00:43:11,807 --> 00:43:13,725 level of protection. You want multiple ways of 815 00:43:13,725 --> 00:43:16,230 protecting. And even in home security, 816 00:43:16,230 --> 00:43:19,390 that's a common parallel. There's a story around a bear 817 00:43:19,390 --> 00:43:21,970 and chasing people in the woods. I won't go into that one. 818 00:43:21,970 --> 00:43:25,454 But basically the idea is as long as you are a bit more 819 00:43:25,454 --> 00:43:29,460 difficult than someone else, you create a bit more resistance to 820 00:43:29,460 --> 00:43:32,686 being the easy target. You're already better off, 821 00:43:32,686 --> 00:43:35,642 right? So I don't know if anyone is 822 00:43:35,642 --> 00:43:39,400 unhackable, I don't know if anyone is, even Fort Knox. 823 00:43:39,400 --> 00:43:41,897 I mean, if you got enough resources, you can break into 824 00:43:41,897 --> 00:43:43,810 anything, right? It's just a matter of whether 825 00:43:43,810 --> 00:43:45,635 it's worth it. So it's a question of not 826 00:43:45,635 --> 00:43:48,730 necessarily trying to go crazy to protect a lump of coal. 827 00:43:49,030 --> 00:43:53,042 You wanna find the right balance between what you have at risk, 828 00:43:53,042 --> 00:43:55,334 and how much effort you put into protecting it. 829 00:43:55,844 --> 00:43:58,536 Yeah. So first of all, it's like 830 00:43:58,536 --> 00:44:00,114 thanks for all sharing all these. 831 00:44:00,134 --> 00:44:03,914 I think it opened up a lot of our minds, our eyes, right? 832 00:44:04,244 --> 00:44:07,611 The first is like the scariest part is like so many devices 833 00:44:07,611 --> 00:44:11,270 with outdated firmware that are publicly disclosed, you know, in 834 00:44:11,270 --> 00:44:14,771 terms of vulnerabilities. And if the vendor, the provider 835 00:44:14,771 --> 00:44:18,161 doesn't patch it, you know, it stays open, people can try it. 836 00:44:18,161 --> 00:44:20,131 Even like you mentioned the instructions are out there. 837 00:44:20,131 --> 00:44:23,801 And we all know now with like AI capability, you can just search 838 00:44:24,221 --> 00:44:26,561 and even try yourself, right? Hacking into others. 839 00:44:26,771 --> 00:44:28,451 Okay, that is... Don't try this at home. 840 00:44:29,261 --> 00:44:31,921 That itself is pretty scary. Second thing is you mentioned 841 00:44:31,921 --> 00:44:34,451 about password, right? So I also realized, or just 842 00:44:34,451 --> 00:44:38,191 realized when we, when you talk about brute force, I think all 843 00:44:38,191 --> 00:44:40,931 these devices don't have something like a rate limiter 844 00:44:41,291 --> 00:44:44,635 or, you know, the ability to actually, you know, kind of like 845 00:44:44,635 --> 00:44:46,871 back pressure, you know, like where people are attacking you 846 00:44:46,871 --> 00:44:47,921 with so many traffic. That's right. 847 00:44:47,921 --> 00:44:50,453 So many attempts, so many times. It will just let it, right, 848 00:44:50,453 --> 00:44:53,393 until it breaks. And if you use easy password, 849 00:44:53,393 --> 00:44:56,805 even default password, it's so much easy to just hack within 850 00:44:56,805 --> 00:44:58,136 minutes, I guess. Yeah. 851 00:44:59,396 --> 00:45:03,730 The worst wifi password I found took three seconds. 852 00:45:05,320 --> 00:45:07,900 And this client was living on a very busy street. 853 00:45:08,260 --> 00:45:10,750 So I told him, you know, if I drove by your house slowly, I 854 00:45:10,750 --> 00:45:12,670 would've broken into your wifi. That's how. 855 00:45:12,730 --> 00:45:15,965 It's three seconds. Unfortunately, like I said, if 856 00:45:15,965 --> 00:45:19,972 you grew up in a time where brute force wasn't a thing, rate 857 00:45:19,972 --> 00:45:23,520 limiting wasn't a thing. We are in a whole different 858 00:45:23,520 --> 00:45:26,340 world now where it's so easy. It's almost like, you know. 859 00:45:27,453 --> 00:45:31,929 Our phones are so much more powerful now than a full size 860 00:45:31,929 --> 00:45:34,923 room computer was, you know, 30, 40 years ago. 861 00:45:35,883 --> 00:45:39,393 We, but our culture and our expectations technology are 862 00:45:39,393 --> 00:45:43,063 still kind of very backward. So absolutely right. 863 00:45:43,083 --> 00:45:46,177 Like if you think about what I said earlier with age being a 864 00:45:46,177 --> 00:45:48,855 risk factor. With the smart TVs, I don't know 865 00:45:48,855 --> 00:45:50,991 about modern ones. I would hope that there's some 866 00:45:50,991 --> 00:45:53,973 kind of cool off mechanism, rate limits where, or too many, 867 00:45:53,973 --> 00:45:56,193 you've got the password wrong five times. 868 00:45:56,223 --> 00:45:57,603 Like you have it with your phone, right? 869 00:45:57,603 --> 00:46:00,120 Yes. The more you try, the longer it 870 00:46:00,120 --> 00:46:03,324 takes before you can try again. I've never found one with any of 871 00:46:03,324 --> 00:46:05,163 these devices actually. Exactly. 872 00:46:05,163 --> 00:46:06,862 So I don't know. I don't know if they they built 873 00:46:06,862 --> 00:46:09,165 that. But again, going back to age, I 874 00:46:09,165 --> 00:46:12,449 almost guarantee you 10 years ago, a smart device would not 875 00:46:12,449 --> 00:46:15,991 have any of those because you go, no one's gonna try and brute 876 00:46:15,991 --> 00:46:19,004 force my TV. Because I just wanna put it on 877 00:46:19,004 --> 00:46:21,068 the internet. I wanna make it smart and make 878 00:46:21,068 --> 00:46:23,527 it accessible. Does it mean, is it possible now 879 00:46:23,527 --> 00:46:26,687 for you, because you mentioned like at one point in time you 880 00:46:26,687 --> 00:46:29,098 scan there could be like hundreds of wifi networks 881 00:46:29,098 --> 00:46:30,715 available. Like I just bring a device. 882 00:46:30,715 --> 00:46:34,230 It could be just mobile device. You just walk around and just 883 00:46:34,230 --> 00:46:37,269 stay for, I dunno how many minutes and see if you can... 884 00:46:37,269 --> 00:46:38,080 I, wow. Yeah. 885 00:46:38,080 --> 00:46:40,047 I don't really want to talk about it 'cause I feel like 886 00:46:40,047 --> 00:46:41,680 people will get the idea to try it. 887 00:46:42,100 --> 00:46:44,713 Okay. Unfortunately, the tools are 888 00:46:44,713 --> 00:46:46,603 there. That it's not hard. 889 00:46:46,933 --> 00:46:48,673 And that's kind of what concerns me. 890 00:46:49,463 --> 00:46:52,639 We are in an environment where the technology and the 891 00:46:52,639 --> 00:46:56,756 capability is very, very far advanced for misuse. 892 00:46:57,286 --> 00:47:00,523 And the expectation and understanding of security is 893 00:47:00,523 --> 00:47:04,305 very, very, very far behind. It's just, the gap is just 894 00:47:04,305 --> 00:47:06,468 growing. It's already big enough for 895 00:47:06,468 --> 00:47:08,478 corporates. You read about how many 896 00:47:08,478 --> 00:47:11,203 enterprises are being compromised and hacked on a 897 00:47:11,203 --> 00:47:14,295 daily basis. There's nothing paying attention 898 00:47:14,295 --> 00:47:17,983 to the homes. And yet we know that from a DDoS 899 00:47:17,983 --> 00:47:20,738 point of view, they've already been significantly compromised. 900 00:47:20,798 --> 00:47:23,698 So that's the way I find it interesting personally because 901 00:47:23,698 --> 00:47:26,380 I'm going. How do I help people at least 902 00:47:26,380 --> 00:47:29,569 catch up a bit to the corporate? I'm not saying be a corporate, 903 00:47:29,569 --> 00:47:32,315 you know, to that extent. Because even then, quite 904 00:47:32,315 --> 00:47:34,465 frankly, they're not keeping up to the level of threat. 905 00:47:34,495 --> 00:47:38,572 But take some steps, right? Be the path of greater 906 00:47:38,572 --> 00:47:40,262 resistance. Take some steps so it's 907 00:47:40,262 --> 00:47:43,408 protecting yourself. And don't make it so easy 908 00:47:43,408 --> 00:47:46,558 because it's bad enough. The gap is huge enough as it is. 909 00:47:47,573 --> 00:47:50,033 Coming back to that, right? Like the path of greater 910 00:47:50,033 --> 00:47:53,170 resistance and also like the number of point of attacks that 911 00:47:53,170 --> 00:47:55,259 hackers could leverage, so to speak, right? 912 00:47:55,409 --> 00:47:57,799 But interesting enough for your service, right? 913 00:47:58,399 --> 00:48:03,365 You kind of like target a lot for C-suites, executives, right? 914 00:48:03,575 --> 00:48:07,056 High-net-worth, lawyer. You also mentioned in the very 915 00:48:07,056 --> 00:48:09,932 beginning just now that personal medical, you know, information 916 00:48:09,932 --> 00:48:13,260 could easily be hacked simply because they went in from your 917 00:48:13,260 --> 00:48:14,180 home network. Yeah. 918 00:48:14,720 --> 00:48:19,400 So tell us this, like if you're part of this demographics or 919 00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:22,906 personas, so to speak, right? Are you, should you be more 920 00:48:22,906 --> 00:48:25,889 concerned? And why attackers love, you 921 00:48:25,889 --> 00:48:28,265 know, chasing them? Yeah, absolutely. 922 00:48:28,505 --> 00:48:31,805 So if you think about from an economics perspective, what's 923 00:48:31,805 --> 00:48:33,995 the incentive for someone to attack you? 924 00:48:34,959 --> 00:48:37,509 Quite a few times when I've had the conversation with people to 925 00:48:37,509 --> 00:48:40,545 tell them, hey, you're at risk, sometimes the response I get is, 926 00:48:40,545 --> 00:48:43,378 so what they gonna do to me? Like, what are you gonna do? 927 00:48:43,378 --> 00:48:46,976 They go, they, you know, I don't have money in my bank, for 928 00:48:46,976 --> 00:48:49,872 example, right? And what I found is there's 929 00:48:49,872 --> 00:48:53,568 three threats that are quite common and more prominent in 930 00:48:53,568 --> 00:48:56,329 high-net-worth individuals. The first thing is they're 931 00:48:56,329 --> 00:48:59,548 attacking you directly, right? So they're going after your, you 932 00:48:59,548 --> 00:49:02,536 specifically, your assets, your financial assets, your digital 933 00:49:02,536 --> 00:49:05,218 assets. For example, bank accounts, 934 00:49:05,218 --> 00:49:06,949 right? If they can... 935 00:49:06,949 --> 00:49:11,596 I've known of cases where they've been able to spoof 936 00:49:11,596 --> 00:49:15,278 someone's bank account and show them a screen that's not theirs 937 00:49:15,278 --> 00:49:17,176 and actually transferred the money somewhere else. 938 00:49:17,646 --> 00:49:20,971 Stealing passwords, stealing your family photos and holding 939 00:49:20,971 --> 00:49:25,796 that as ransom. I've heard of cases just this 940 00:49:25,796 --> 00:49:29,746 year where someone's C-suite person has had their entire 941 00:49:29,746 --> 00:49:33,964 digital identity stolen. So social media accounts, family 942 00:49:33,964 --> 00:49:37,226 photos, bank transactions, financial records, travel plans 943 00:49:37,226 --> 00:49:40,774 all stolen and then sold on the dark web for identity theft. 944 00:49:41,104 --> 00:49:42,454 And the person didn't even know about it. 945 00:49:42,484 --> 00:49:46,744 So he wasn't even given a chance to pay a ransom to get it back. 946 00:49:46,744 --> 00:49:49,768 He was just, immediately his information was all sold and 947 00:49:49,768 --> 00:49:54,992 utilized against it. So you might be a target just by 948 00:49:54,992 --> 00:49:58,873 targeting you directly. The second other source that 949 00:49:58,873 --> 00:50:03,597 I've seen is, it's happened more in, I've seen in Australia where 950 00:50:03,597 --> 00:50:07,236 it's tax fraud. So they file on your behalf. 951 00:50:07,566 --> 00:50:11,190 So they have enough information about you to file your taxes for 952 00:50:11,190 --> 00:50:13,441 you. It sounds convenient. 953 00:50:13,711 --> 00:50:16,219 But what they're doing is they're actually claiming a 954 00:50:16,219 --> 00:50:19,252 refund under your name. So they're getting very big 955 00:50:19,252 --> 00:50:21,196 chunks of the money out from the tax office. 956 00:50:22,102 --> 00:50:24,802 The last one I heard was $24,000 as a refund. 957 00:50:25,192 --> 00:50:27,415 And they get the money transferred to their own account 958 00:50:27,415 --> 00:50:30,795 and then they disappear. But when you go to do your own 959 00:50:30,795 --> 00:50:33,652 tax claim, suddenly, oh no, I haven't filed my taxes, I 960 00:50:33,652 --> 00:50:37,431 haven't done any of that. It's so much effort to undo that 961 00:50:37,431 --> 00:50:39,493 damage. I've got friends that couldn't, 962 00:50:39,493 --> 00:50:42,283 that lost sleep because they felt personally violated. 963 00:50:42,613 --> 00:50:45,763 But on top of that, just the admin to be able to undo that 964 00:50:45,763 --> 00:50:48,866 and the loss to the, you know, the tax office is quite 965 00:50:48,866 --> 00:50:49,993 significant. It's a very big deal. 966 00:50:51,103 --> 00:50:53,881 The third one is what I talked about earlier which is access 967 00:50:53,881 --> 00:50:56,681 through you. So depending on what you have 968 00:50:56,681 --> 00:51:00,095 access to, C-suites are a very popular target because of the 969 00:51:00,095 --> 00:51:04,122 access to the organization. There's a lot more efforts at 970 00:51:04,122 --> 00:51:07,894 trying to protect them through, you know, VPN, through, I've got 971 00:51:07,894 --> 00:51:10,898 friends who. They do the internet banking on 972 00:51:10,898 --> 00:51:13,730 the work computer and they do everything else on their home 973 00:51:13,730 --> 00:51:15,214 computer. Like keep, you know, keep all 974 00:51:15,214 --> 00:51:18,044 that separate. But it's because they're very 975 00:51:18,044 --> 00:51:20,366 big targets for leveraging their access. 976 00:51:20,426 --> 00:51:24,074 I already know of two people that have had their title, the 977 00:51:24,074 --> 00:51:27,836 office holder title used against them, against the organization. 978 00:51:27,866 --> 00:51:32,276 So what that means is one of them was saying he was the 979 00:51:32,276 --> 00:51:36,807 president of a sports club. His email got spoofed to ask the 980 00:51:36,807 --> 00:51:42,674 treasurer to send money. The easy way to do that was to 981 00:51:42,674 --> 00:51:46,531 go online and look at all the office holders 'cause it's 982 00:51:46,531 --> 00:51:48,133 public. It's public information. 983 00:51:48,133 --> 00:51:50,533 It's called open source intelligence, right? 984 00:51:50,533 --> 00:51:54,193 So C-Suites are very, it's easy to see what they look like. 985 00:51:54,223 --> 00:51:57,673 It's easy to find out who they are, where, what organization 986 00:51:57,673 --> 00:52:01,288 they are, what their role is. And in more recent cases, and 987 00:52:01,288 --> 00:52:05,694 I'll show you some links, but CFOs, CEOs have been spoofed 988 00:52:05,694 --> 00:52:10,348 with deep fakes, with AI technology, to mimic them and 989 00:52:10,348 --> 00:52:13,288 provide instructions to, hey, transfer $25 million. 990 00:52:14,248 --> 00:52:16,402 It's me. I'm giving you the authority now 991 00:52:16,402 --> 00:52:21,480 on the video call in front of other deep fake members of the 992 00:52:21,480 --> 00:52:23,956 executive. And it's, there's more reasons 993 00:52:23,956 --> 00:52:27,134 to be targeting a high-net-worth individual from an economic 994 00:52:27,134 --> 00:52:30,953 incentive point of view. Now, if you are a hacker just 995 00:52:30,953 --> 00:52:35,092 after a bot net, you don't need to put in all the extra effort. 996 00:52:35,452 --> 00:52:37,042 But you have a whole different model there. 997 00:52:37,372 --> 00:52:40,732 And quite frankly, that's why a lot of people have, that's why 998 00:52:40,732 --> 00:52:42,878 they've been so successful. 'Cause these people aren't 999 00:52:42,878 --> 00:52:46,546 really looking after themselves. So I'm focusing on the people 1000 00:52:46,546 --> 00:52:50,581 that have, one, more a bigger target, but are also more 1001 00:52:50,581 --> 00:52:54,626 willing to get help to protect themselves because they know 1002 00:52:54,626 --> 00:52:58,721 that they've got more risk. If I had a magic wand and 1003 00:52:58,721 --> 00:53:01,111 unlimited resources, I would want to try and protect 1004 00:53:01,111 --> 00:53:03,535 everybody. But the reality is, you know, 1005 00:53:03,535 --> 00:53:07,273 you got a 80-20 rule, you gotta work with the target that are 1006 00:53:07,273 --> 00:53:10,357 more responsive, but also higher targets until I can work out how 1007 00:53:10,357 --> 00:53:13,389 I can scale this and make the umbrella bigger. 1008 00:53:13,938 --> 00:53:17,160 And try and get, I guess, more people involved in looking after 1009 00:53:17,160 --> 00:53:19,440 that. There's a similar parallel in 1010 00:53:19,440 --> 00:53:23,550 what's happening in the US. A lot of infrastructure, city 1011 00:53:23,550 --> 00:53:26,466 infrastructure, so water systems, for example, they run 1012 00:53:26,466 --> 00:53:28,995 with operational technology that was really, really old. 1013 00:53:29,852 --> 00:53:33,702 And what's happened is they've been hacked on a regular basis, 1014 00:53:33,702 --> 00:53:37,011 but because they are, It's such a fundamental service, I mean, 1015 00:53:37,011 --> 00:53:39,357 imagine if you wanna turn on the tap and there's no water. 1016 00:53:39,357 --> 00:53:43,069 But at the same time, because it's so old and outdated, it's 1017 00:53:43,069 --> 00:53:46,649 not fun, sexy to get into the industry of cybersecurity for 1018 00:53:46,649 --> 00:53:48,757 water service. So they become really big 1019 00:53:48,757 --> 00:53:50,929 targets. So there's a big community now 1020 00:53:50,929 --> 00:53:55,069 in the US for white hat hackers to volunteer their time to go 1021 00:53:55,069 --> 00:53:56,917 help protect their local water utility. 1022 00:53:57,277 --> 00:54:01,279 Because without that community, that kind of community approach, 1023 00:54:01,279 --> 00:54:03,847 there's no way to scale it up to be able to fit. 1024 00:54:04,607 --> 00:54:06,907 And even then they're only covering a small portion of it. 1025 00:54:06,907 --> 00:54:11,077 They're not covering everybody. So very, very big target base. 1026 00:54:11,561 --> 00:54:13,702 Very hard to reach everybody at once. 1027 00:54:14,062 --> 00:54:17,490 I'm focusing on the people that are more susceptible, but also 1028 00:54:17,490 --> 00:54:21,206 are gonna be more willing to listen to, hey, this is how 1029 00:54:21,206 --> 00:54:23,402 you're gonna get attacked. This is how it can help you. 1030 00:54:24,162 --> 00:54:26,272 And that's why I've targeted the, yeah, executives. 1031 00:54:26,302 --> 00:54:29,488 Ideally it'd be everybody. But, yeah, it's not a, it's a 1032 00:54:29,488 --> 00:54:31,240 very big landscape at the moment. 1033 00:54:31,256 --> 00:54:34,561 Yeah. I think that's also very good 1034 00:54:34,561 --> 00:54:37,897 awareness building, right? Because again, like we all like 1035 00:54:37,897 --> 00:54:41,896 our gadgets, our devices, we just buy them, put it at home, 1036 00:54:41,896 --> 00:54:43,792 you know. We forgot about it, especially 1037 00:54:43,792 --> 00:54:47,347 if you're these type of persona where you hold a lot of 1038 00:54:47,347 --> 00:54:49,731 information. You know, could be medical, 1039 00:54:49,731 --> 00:54:52,118 private, it could be your digital assets. 1040 00:54:52,118 --> 00:54:55,346 I think these days a lot of people, hack into, I dunno, 1041 00:54:55,346 --> 00:54:58,423 either your browsers and they just took your crypto for 1042 00:54:58,423 --> 00:55:01,944 whatever reasons, right? In this world these days, I 1043 00:55:01,944 --> 00:55:05,398 think if you simply have a lot of these assets, right? 1044 00:55:05,398 --> 00:55:09,493 I would say just be mindful as well and yeah, probably do take 1045 00:55:09,493 --> 00:55:11,933 care about the security of your network, right? 1046 00:55:12,973 --> 00:55:16,573 So with all these, right, how come in the news, there's no, 1047 00:55:16,573 --> 00:55:19,505 nothing, nothing at all mentioning about this, because 1048 00:55:19,505 --> 00:55:21,774 this is happening, and it's widespread. 1049 00:55:22,224 --> 00:55:26,312 And if you're saying that Singapore now is the top source 1050 00:55:26,312 --> 00:55:28,144 country, why I've never heard anything about it? 1051 00:55:29,340 --> 00:55:32,520 That's an interesting question. I have actually had a chance to 1052 00:55:32,520 --> 00:55:34,320 ask someone in the government before. 1053 00:55:35,128 --> 00:55:37,678 The response wasn't what I was hoping for. 1054 00:55:38,296 --> 00:55:41,506 But you're absolutely right. I think at the moment there's 1055 00:55:41,506 --> 00:55:44,920 probably a level of concern but not necessarily clear 1056 00:55:44,920 --> 00:55:46,180 understanding of what to do about it. 1057 00:55:46,240 --> 00:55:49,632 So just a few months ago, I think the Minister of Law called 1058 00:55:49,632 --> 00:55:53,949 out for the first time threats from APT that, and calling out 1059 00:55:53,949 --> 00:55:58,844 the country, the source, is typically not in the culture for 1060 00:55:58,844 --> 00:56:01,375 Singapore to be acknowledging. I was curious about that. 1061 00:56:01,400 --> 00:56:02,360 Why? Yeah. 1062 00:56:02,360 --> 00:56:05,605 Calling it out unless it's really, unless it's like a real, 1063 00:56:05,605 --> 00:56:10,010 really serious problem. What I think at the moment, 1064 00:56:10,010 --> 00:56:13,874 unless there's a clear line between the damage that's being 1065 00:56:13,874 --> 00:56:15,861 caused. Like I said with the SIM cards, 1066 00:56:15,861 --> 00:56:19,710 it's probably my best example. At the moment, it's very, it's a 1067 00:56:19,710 --> 00:56:23,702 lot easier to see that, hey, if I don't control the SIM cards 1068 00:56:23,702 --> 00:56:26,672 and allow people to take advantage of that and use that 1069 00:56:26,672 --> 00:56:31,574 for legal purposes, then that's when the response, the societal 1070 00:56:31,574 --> 00:56:33,474 response is, okay, we need to clamp down on it. 1071 00:56:33,474 --> 00:56:37,359 We need to deal with it. I don't think that's as clear 1072 00:56:37,359 --> 00:56:41,532 cut yet with the internet technology and with, so I think, 1073 00:56:41,532 --> 00:56:44,421 one, the attack is not so clear and two, therefore the response 1074 00:56:44,421 --> 00:56:47,741 isn't as harsh or as firm or as immediate and urgent. 1075 00:56:48,341 --> 00:56:51,431 But when you can see the efforts that Singapore is working on at 1076 00:56:51,431 --> 00:56:55,011 the moment, I think it's clear that they are very concerned 1077 00:56:55,011 --> 00:56:57,521 about the effect on corporates and businesses. 1078 00:56:57,581 --> 00:57:00,977 'Cause that does link to the reputation of the country as 1079 00:57:00,977 --> 00:57:03,981 well as being attractive place for businesses. 1080 00:57:04,331 --> 00:57:08,153 So I think it's a matter of time before, one, the attack scale 1081 00:57:08,153 --> 00:57:12,727 up, before there's more and more things that you can do with a 1082 00:57:12,727 --> 00:57:15,462 compromised network. And then two, finding a strategy 1083 00:57:15,462 --> 00:57:19,567 to be able to respond to that. I use vaping as a parallel. 1084 00:57:19,837 --> 00:57:22,680 So when vaping started happening, you know, there was a 1085 00:57:22,680 --> 00:57:24,254 growing trend, growing popularity. 1086 00:57:25,176 --> 00:57:28,558 It didn't seem like it was that big a deal until they started 1087 00:57:28,558 --> 00:57:29,928 putting more and more things into it. 1088 00:57:30,058 --> 00:57:33,550 They started getting more visibility around the problem 1089 00:57:33,550 --> 00:57:37,450 and it became very, very clear that, okay, we need a stronger 1090 00:57:37,450 --> 00:57:39,196 response. And the government has then 1091 00:57:39,196 --> 00:57:40,318 gone, right? That's it. 1092 00:57:40,378 --> 00:57:41,788 Zero tolerance. Clamp down on it. 1093 00:57:42,604 --> 00:57:45,814 I see a similar parallel to that with home cybersecurity. 1094 00:57:46,444 --> 00:57:50,852 Unfortunately, the way the networks are working, it's 1095 00:57:50,852 --> 00:57:53,794 harder to... unless you're China with a firewall. 1096 00:57:53,794 --> 00:57:55,624 And even then people get around firewall. 1097 00:57:56,014 --> 00:57:58,719 It's harder to control things that flow in and out from the 1098 00:57:58,719 --> 00:58:01,879 internet. It's not like it's a physical 1099 00:58:01,879 --> 00:58:04,330 border. I think that's where, again, if 1100 00:58:04,330 --> 00:58:07,856 the threat is not clear and therefore the strategy for 1101 00:58:07,856 --> 00:58:11,599 responding is not that clear, you have to quite frankly let 1102 00:58:11,599 --> 00:58:14,641 things develop further and then see, okay, so how do they 1103 00:58:14,641 --> 00:58:17,701 respond from that? But from my perspective, by that 1104 00:58:17,701 --> 00:58:20,887 time, where we are, it's already kind of we're already late to 1105 00:58:20,887 --> 00:58:23,648 the party. So it's almost up to the people 1106 00:58:23,648 --> 00:58:26,907 to try and take the personal responsibility to protect 1107 00:58:26,907 --> 00:58:29,760 themselves. And quite frankly, it's almost a 1108 00:58:29,760 --> 00:58:35,214 going back to defense in depth. Even if you have a police post 1109 00:58:35,214 --> 00:58:38,610 station near you, if you're surrounded by police stations. 1110 00:58:38,940 --> 00:58:41,294 And if there's security guard in your state, it doesn't mean that 1111 00:58:41,294 --> 00:58:42,600 you should leave your front door open. 1112 00:58:43,110 --> 00:58:48,216 But when I say we collectively, you're so used to a protected 1113 00:58:48,216 --> 00:58:51,595 safe space that you don't really think about what people could be 1114 00:58:51,595 --> 00:58:53,241 doing and how they could be leveraging you. 1115 00:58:53,631 --> 00:58:56,712 It's to the benefit of the, you know, the people using the 1116 00:58:56,712 --> 00:59:00,329 networks and access and hacking. So it's almost like, I just 1117 00:59:00,329 --> 00:59:04,398 think that we are not yet there in the point where there's a 1118 00:59:04,398 --> 00:59:08,595 very big, clear problem, but it's got enough fires and smoke 1119 00:59:08,595 --> 00:59:11,895 to indicate to me that this is gonna get worse. 1120 00:59:12,135 --> 00:59:13,815 Yeah. It's just gonna get worse. 1121 00:59:13,815 --> 00:59:17,015 So in the meantime, I'm gonna try and help people be educated 1122 00:59:17,015 --> 00:59:20,235 to be able to catch up and try and close a bit of their gap. 1123 00:59:20,794 --> 00:59:24,054 But quite frankly, I expect the gap will still get bigger, 1124 00:59:24,054 --> 00:59:26,552 especially with AI growing at the pace that it's growing. 1125 00:59:26,997 --> 00:59:29,122 How about the telco, you know, the internet provider? 1126 00:59:29,122 --> 00:59:31,442 They would have seen these traffic, right? 1127 00:59:31,442 --> 00:59:33,342 Especially if it's being used for DDoS attack. 1128 00:59:33,362 --> 00:59:36,273 I'm sure like you will see the kind of like the targets, right? 1129 00:59:36,273 --> 00:59:38,863 The target endpoints goes to somewhere and in one go. 1130 00:59:38,863 --> 00:59:42,263 Like how about them? Like can they actually try to 1131 00:59:42,263 --> 00:59:45,113 mitigate a little bit? It's hard. 1132 00:59:45,113 --> 00:59:48,912 So at the moment when you look at the scale that they're 1133 00:59:48,912 --> 00:59:52,410 attacking it's, you know, it's within 14 seconds, for example. 1134 00:59:52,770 --> 00:59:55,506 By the time the AI recognizes, oh, there's something going on, 1135 00:59:55,506 --> 00:59:58,255 it's already over. But one of the interesting 1136 00:59:58,255 --> 01:00:01,590 trends that I'm, that you're seeing with DDoS attacks, 1137 01:00:01,590 --> 01:00:03,540 they're actually attacking ISPs as well. 1138 01:00:03,960 --> 01:00:09,823 So it's almost like if you... there's a level of mischief in 1139 01:00:09,823 --> 01:00:12,783 what they're doing as well. It's not always, you know, for 1140 01:00:12,783 --> 01:00:14,303 commercial gain or economic gain. 1141 01:00:14,333 --> 01:00:16,873 It's also sometimes they just wanna piss someone off. 1142 01:00:17,573 --> 01:00:21,912 So ISPs actually, if you look at Cloudflare and the setup they've 1143 01:00:21,912 --> 01:00:24,567 got, because they can, they're tracking where all the IP 1144 01:00:24,567 --> 01:00:28,057 addresses are, they can actually tell the ISPs, this is where 1145 01:00:28,057 --> 01:00:30,533 your, yeah, this is where the attacks are coming from. 1146 01:00:31,224 --> 01:00:35,544 I actually want to talk to the ISP to go give me a list of all 1147 01:00:35,544 --> 01:00:38,070 the IP addresses. Every time I go to a house that 1148 01:00:38,070 --> 01:00:42,081 I check, I can marry it out. I can tell you there's already a 1149 01:00:42,081 --> 01:00:46,338 compromised device there. I just don't think at the moment 1150 01:00:46,338 --> 01:00:49,320 the concern, the level of concern is warranting that for 1151 01:00:49,320 --> 01:00:51,340 the ISPs to actually take that kind of action. 1152 01:00:52,260 --> 01:00:55,356 But I feel like if, you know, magic wand, that's what we need 1153 01:00:55,356 --> 01:00:58,166 to be doing. We need to be going tell me all 1154 01:00:58,166 --> 01:01:00,674 the ones that are, have been compromised 'cause attacks 1155 01:01:00,674 --> 01:01:04,170 coming from there, I'll go send someone there and actually work 1156 01:01:04,170 --> 01:01:08,106 out with what devices. One or many devices is actually 1157 01:01:08,106 --> 01:01:10,578 contributing to this, right? Because the footprints are 1158 01:01:10,578 --> 01:01:12,396 there. That's the good thing in a way 1159 01:01:12,396 --> 01:01:14,932 about the internet, right? Even though it's all connected, 1160 01:01:14,932 --> 01:01:18,612 interconnected and all digital, you should be able to see if you 1161 01:01:18,612 --> 01:01:20,828 can see it's coming to attack you, you can see where it's 1162 01:01:20,828 --> 01:01:22,118 coming from. Yeah, with the packets. 1163 01:01:22,118 --> 01:01:24,048 Yeah. So it's really around be able to 1164 01:01:24,048 --> 01:01:27,368 trace and follow that. But yeah, we're just not in a 1165 01:01:27,368 --> 01:01:30,878 position where, one, they've got the resource and the, I guess 1166 01:01:30,878 --> 01:01:33,398 the social urgency to deal with that. 1167 01:01:33,747 --> 01:01:36,435 Like I said, if it becomes a bigger, which I expect it'll 1168 01:01:36,435 --> 01:01:38,961 become a bigger problem, like with the SIM cards, then yeah, 1169 01:01:38,961 --> 01:01:41,424 you're gonna put in more and more steps to try and deal with 1170 01:01:41,424 --> 01:01:44,454 it. But also if you look at the rate 1171 01:01:44,454 --> 01:01:48,906 of growth of DDoS as a proxy, I don't think any country in the 1172 01:01:48,906 --> 01:01:52,294 world is prepared to deal with the level that they're growing. 1173 01:01:52,364 --> 01:01:56,810 And the Aisuru report that Brian Krebs was just discovering is 1174 01:01:56,810 --> 01:01:59,942 hitting new records at.... Like this year they've gone 1175 01:01:59,942 --> 01:02:05,547 from, I think it was 3.5 to now 30, 30 terabits per second. 1176 01:02:06,137 --> 01:02:09,625 Like the pace at which they're collecting devices and break and 1177 01:02:09,625 --> 01:02:12,946 compromising networks is I don't think any single government by 1178 01:02:12,946 --> 01:02:15,228 itself can deal with that level of growth. 1179 01:02:16,143 --> 01:02:20,489 So if government, maybe now not the right time for them to act 1180 01:02:20,489 --> 01:02:22,605 in. The ISP is probably also not the 1181 01:02:22,605 --> 01:02:25,291 right time. So it's coming back to us now to 1182 01:02:25,291 --> 01:02:28,165 protect ourselves, right? So thinking my head, typically 1183 01:02:28,165 --> 01:02:32,357 in a corporate or maybe like we read in the news or some blogs, 1184 01:02:32,357 --> 01:02:34,475 right? You would typically install 1185 01:02:34,475 --> 01:02:36,775 anti-virus, anti-malware on your laptop. 1186 01:02:37,195 --> 01:02:39,937 In corporate you will have like a firewall, you know, put in 1187 01:02:39,937 --> 01:02:41,935 place. Is there such thing that we can 1188 01:02:41,935 --> 01:02:45,658 do to our home network as well? I think the short answer is 1189 01:02:45,658 --> 01:02:48,318 there's no one size fits all. Like I said, there's no one path 1190 01:02:48,318 --> 01:02:51,497 that people are following. In the early days with viruses, 1191 01:02:51,497 --> 01:02:54,412 it was a lot clearer, right? You would get infected through 1192 01:02:54,412 --> 01:02:57,034 an email or you would get infected through pirated 1193 01:02:57,034 --> 01:02:59,137 software. Like there was clearer vectors 1194 01:02:59,137 --> 01:03:01,852 for attacks. Now with the level of technology 1195 01:03:01,852 --> 01:03:04,972 and how everything is a lot more interconnected now. 1196 01:03:05,872 --> 01:03:10,747 And again, with AI giving you a very, very large range of access 1197 01:03:10,747 --> 01:03:13,072 tools is not as straightforward as that. 1198 01:03:13,770 --> 01:03:16,401 I think that's where one of the philosophies that I push is 1199 01:03:16,401 --> 01:03:18,193 to... "can doesn't mean you should. 1200 01:03:18,343 --> 01:03:20,623 So you shouldn't just connect things. 1201 01:03:20,623 --> 01:03:22,243 You shouldn't just buy it 'cause it's got wifi. 1202 01:03:22,243 --> 01:03:25,413 You shouldn't just plug it in and not as, as any value. 1203 01:03:25,963 --> 01:03:30,262 I have a robot vacuum cleaner. It sends a crazy amount of data 1204 01:03:30,262 --> 01:03:33,163 to the internet. It's very frustrating that I 1205 01:03:33,163 --> 01:03:36,578 know what it's probably doing. It's scanning on my neighbor's 1206 01:03:36,578 --> 01:03:38,268 wifi. It's logging everything in my 1207 01:03:38,268 --> 01:03:41,398 house and sending it to them, but I've kept it separate from 1208 01:03:41,398 --> 01:03:43,243 my, the rest of my, all my devices. 1209 01:03:43,873 --> 01:03:46,953 I get a lot of value out of having my robot vacuum cleaner 1210 01:03:46,953 --> 01:03:50,173 run once a day, twice a day because it keeps my house clean. 1211 01:03:50,203 --> 01:03:54,817 So I get benefit of doing that. My washing machine, on the other 1212 01:03:54,817 --> 01:03:57,583 hand is wifi connected, but I get zero value out of that. 1213 01:03:57,613 --> 01:04:01,493 In fact, I'm probably the service of how, the product. 1214 01:04:01,493 --> 01:04:03,103 I'm giving them my product information. 1215 01:04:03,955 --> 01:04:07,711 I've connected it as well because I wanted to not leave it 1216 01:04:07,711 --> 01:04:11,345 open for someone else to try and connect to it, but I'm a lot 1217 01:04:11,345 --> 01:04:13,615 more conscious around why I've connected it that way. 1218 01:04:13,855 --> 01:04:17,686 So going back to what you were saying with the anti-virus and 1219 01:04:17,686 --> 01:04:21,298 anti-malware, there's no clear one size fits all approach, what 1220 01:04:21,298 --> 01:04:25,093 I try and challenge people to do is think about spring cleaning. 1221 01:04:25,453 --> 01:04:27,351 Spring cleaning your network. Like look at all the things that 1222 01:04:27,351 --> 01:04:30,163 you have at your network and go, do I actually get value? 1223 01:04:30,703 --> 01:04:33,591 Does it improve my life to have wifi connectivity for this 1224 01:04:33,591 --> 01:04:35,940 thing? If not, then either get rid of 1225 01:04:35,940 --> 01:04:38,443 the thing or at least try and disable the wifi. 1226 01:04:39,123 --> 01:04:42,561 Unfortunately, I've seen so many cases where people have 1227 01:04:42,561 --> 01:04:45,113 connected things and forgotten about them to a point that even 1228 01:04:45,113 --> 01:04:46,993 though they've been hacked, they don't even realize it. 1229 01:04:47,675 --> 01:04:50,195 And because they haven't used it on a regular basis, it doesn't 1230 01:04:50,195 --> 01:04:53,714 add the value. You forget that you are taking 1231 01:04:53,714 --> 01:04:58,990 on the risk without the benefit. So it's all bad news having that 1232 01:04:58,990 --> 01:05:01,590 some kind of connectivity. So yeah, unfortunately there's 1233 01:05:01,590 --> 01:05:05,140 no one size fits all approach. You know, back in the day, it 1234 01:05:05,140 --> 01:05:09,048 was just running antivirus. But now, the amount of different 1235 01:05:09,048 --> 01:05:13,322 threat vectors are significant, the best thing to do is try and 1236 01:05:13,322 --> 01:05:16,288 reduce your attack surface and try and keep as little entry 1237 01:05:16,288 --> 01:05:19,056 points for, you know, someone to access your house. 1238 01:05:19,596 --> 01:05:22,722 Speaking about value, it reminds me one typical device that 1239 01:05:22,722 --> 01:05:25,854 people have that is always connected and it's kind of like 1240 01:05:25,854 --> 01:05:28,446 valuable for them, which is the network attached storage. 1241 01:05:29,196 --> 01:05:31,836 This could be your harddisk that you can access from anywhere, 1242 01:05:31,836 --> 01:05:33,938 right? What should we do about it? 1243 01:05:33,938 --> 01:05:36,893 We love it. We want it to be connected, but 1244 01:05:36,893 --> 01:05:39,308 it also opens itself up for attacks. 1245 01:05:39,938 --> 01:05:43,348 And I think the challenge with network access storage is it's 1246 01:05:43,348 --> 01:05:45,158 very attractive for multiple reasons. 1247 01:05:45,318 --> 01:05:47,502 Yeah. And typically we store like 1248 01:05:47,502 --> 01:05:49,088 personal. Yeah, yeah. 1249 01:05:49,178 --> 01:05:54,703 One I've got, in Australia, ASX20, top 20 listed companies 1250 01:05:54,703 --> 01:05:57,970 in Australia. I know one of them has been 1251 01:05:57,970 --> 01:05:59,797 hacked before with ransomware on the NAS. 1252 01:06:00,254 --> 01:06:04,136 I've several NASes as well. And one of the best targets, 1253 01:06:04,136 --> 01:06:06,543 most attractive targets for ransomware because it's your 1254 01:06:06,543 --> 01:06:09,643 digital assets. I constantly tell people that if 1255 01:06:09,643 --> 01:06:12,756 my whole house burned down, the only thing I need protected is 1256 01:06:12,756 --> 01:06:14,661 the photos. Because you can't replace that. 1257 01:06:14,661 --> 01:06:18,446 You can replace everything else. Your passport, your ID cards, 1258 01:06:18,446 --> 01:06:20,601 what certificates, whatever. You can get reprints. 1259 01:06:20,871 --> 01:06:22,131 But you can't get the photos back. 1260 01:06:22,671 --> 01:06:24,531 So it's a very, very attractive source. 1261 01:06:25,191 --> 01:06:27,756 Unfortunately, going back to what I said about distributed 1262 01:06:27,756 --> 01:06:31,238 computing, it's got a processor, it's got storage, and it's got 1263 01:06:31,238 --> 01:06:32,031 network. It's... 1264 01:06:32,616 --> 01:06:36,456 It's got your asset as well. Yeah, so it is a great target. 1265 01:06:36,526 --> 01:06:41,361 And quite sadly, I've seen quite a few NASes now that when I run 1266 01:06:41,361 --> 01:06:43,876 this vulnerability scan thing, because it's so attractive, 1267 01:06:43,876 --> 01:06:48,692 going back to what I said about the ethos, it's constantly being 1268 01:06:48,692 --> 01:06:51,666 hacked and new vulnerabilities are being found all the time. 1269 01:06:52,357 --> 01:06:54,697 One of the key things that people have to be doing is 1270 01:06:54,697 --> 01:06:56,827 checking whether the firm has been updated for NAS. 1271 01:06:57,067 --> 01:07:00,061 Right, you, that's one of the, keep in mind that that's one, 1272 01:07:00,061 --> 01:07:03,065 it's a gold mine. Like NASes have been found to be 1273 01:07:03,065 --> 01:07:05,867 mining crypto. Because they're on there 24/7. 1274 01:07:05,887 --> 01:07:08,560 They're constantly worrying and you just don't know what's 1275 01:07:08,560 --> 01:07:10,611 happening. They've been very popular. 1276 01:07:11,091 --> 01:07:15,521 Trend Micro have something called Zero Day Initiative where 1277 01:07:15,521 --> 01:07:18,973 they reward hackers, competitions for hacking the 1278 01:07:18,973 --> 01:07:23,012 NASes, QNAP and Synology have been very, very popular. 1279 01:07:23,522 --> 01:07:26,538 And there's a Singapore company. Actually I'll call them out on 1280 01:07:26,538 --> 01:07:27,762 this podcast. STAR Labs. 1281 01:07:28,142 --> 01:07:32,880 They've won what they call Master of Pwn which is there are 1282 01:07:32,880 --> 01:07:37,825 a few competitions every year. They won the one in, I think it 1283 01:07:37,825 --> 01:07:40,948 was Ireland, no, Berlin, I think, earlier this year where 1284 01:07:40,948 --> 01:07:43,282 they've successfully shown how to hack into things. 1285 01:07:43,552 --> 01:07:47,193 So going back to what I said before, the workflow for 1286 01:07:47,193 --> 01:07:51,463 security researchers to hack into something is to share the 1287 01:07:51,463 --> 01:07:54,099 information with the manufacturer and then make it 1288 01:07:54,099 --> 01:07:55,466 public. But ideally giving the 1289 01:07:55,466 --> 01:07:58,844 manufacturer time to patch it. This happens a lot with NAS. 1290 01:07:58,864 --> 01:08:02,246 It's very... 2, 3 times a year, this happens. 1291 01:08:02,996 --> 01:08:07,296 So if you have a NAS, absolutely take extra precaution with it. 1292 01:08:07,296 --> 01:08:09,986 Check if the firmware is updating, up to date. 1293 01:08:10,632 --> 01:08:15,290 If it's old and it doesn't update anymore, get a new one, 1294 01:08:15,290 --> 01:08:17,548 unfortunately. Christmas, go shopping. 1295 01:08:17,548 --> 01:08:21,010 But at the same time, be aware that it's a very attractive 1296 01:08:21,010 --> 01:08:23,930 target and just do the hygiene, like the digital hygiene that 1297 01:08:23,930 --> 01:08:26,712 you need to. Don't hold things that longer 1298 01:08:26,712 --> 01:08:29,640 than you need to, right? Cause it can be used against 1299 01:08:29,640 --> 01:08:32,747 you. It's typically harder with NAS, 1300 01:08:32,747 --> 01:08:36,255 because as you accumulate your data, your files, right, and to 1301 01:08:36,255 --> 01:08:38,343 migrate it to something else. Yeah. 1302 01:08:38,627 --> 01:08:41,465 When you have terabytes, for example, you have terabytes of 1303 01:08:41,465 --> 01:08:44,046 data. I literally in my bag right now, 1304 01:08:44,046 --> 01:08:47,423 I have a harddisk to put in the NAS that I just bought an hour 1305 01:08:47,423 --> 01:08:49,410 ago. 'Cause I want to, because I'm 1306 01:08:49,410 --> 01:08:52,841 actually doing that. I'm, it's outgrowing the 1307 01:08:52,841 --> 01:08:54,850 capacity. So I just bought 16 terabyte 1308 01:08:54,850 --> 01:08:56,448 harddisk. But yeah, absolutely. 1309 01:08:56,448 --> 01:09:01,301 So once I do the migration, it's part the Lean methodology that I 1310 01:09:01,301 --> 01:09:04,988 applied to my process as well. Along the way, if you don't need 1311 01:09:04,988 --> 01:09:07,712 to hold, if it doesn't add any value, get rid of it. 1312 01:09:07,773 --> 01:09:11,046 It makes the migration easier, but it also reduces your attack 1313 01:09:11,046 --> 01:09:13,371 surface. If you don't have too much 1314 01:09:13,371 --> 01:09:16,173 clutter and complexity, going back to some of the learnings 1315 01:09:16,173 --> 01:09:17,733 that I took away from the corporate world. 1316 01:09:18,662 --> 01:09:21,423 It just makes your life simpler, having less things to manage. 1317 01:09:22,023 --> 01:09:26,363 Because it's really fun to buy the new thing, plug it in, and 1318 01:09:26,582 --> 01:09:28,832 get that 30 seconds of enjoyment. 1319 01:09:29,372 --> 01:09:33,582 But the risk that you put on, take on for leaving it then and 1320 01:09:33,582 --> 01:09:36,292 not tidying it up, it just grows over time. 1321 01:09:37,143 --> 01:09:42,703 And I've already found NASes in my circles scanning that have 1322 01:09:42,703 --> 01:09:46,661 been compromised. And the disappointing ones are 1323 01:09:46,661 --> 01:09:50,093 finding where people know that they should have updated the 1324 01:09:50,093 --> 01:09:52,292 password or changed the password and they haven't. 1325 01:09:52,843 --> 01:09:56,103 And I'd show them this took 30 seconds. 1326 01:09:56,133 --> 01:09:56,598 Like... Yeah. 1327 01:09:57,561 --> 01:09:59,871 You are so close to, if you haven't been hacked already, 1328 01:09:59,871 --> 01:10:01,326 you're so close to being hacked. Yeah. 1329 01:10:01,731 --> 01:10:04,701 It's disappointing because when you, like I said, the value that 1330 01:10:04,701 --> 01:10:08,271 I place on my digital assets is significantly high, so I want to 1331 01:10:08,271 --> 01:10:12,706 take effort to protect it. But people don't realize how 1332 01:10:12,706 --> 01:10:16,491 easy it is for NASes and how attractive it is to be hacked. 1333 01:10:16,656 --> 01:10:18,953 Yeah. I guess one of the main reasons 1334 01:10:18,953 --> 01:10:21,384 why people don't want to change password is like they might 1335 01:10:21,384 --> 01:10:23,534 forget the password. They don't know how to create 1336 01:10:23,534 --> 01:10:25,511 strong password. And that's why I think using 1337 01:10:25,511 --> 01:10:28,386 password manager is like, maybe it's like a must these days. 1338 01:10:28,386 --> 01:10:31,446 Like if you have password manager, it can help you to kind 1339 01:10:31,446 --> 01:10:33,936 of like, first, create a strong password. 1340 01:10:33,966 --> 01:10:35,326 Second is kind of like save it, right? 1341 01:10:35,326 --> 01:10:37,986 So that you can get access to it from time to time. 1342 01:10:38,046 --> 01:10:39,464 Absolutely. That's one of the things I 1343 01:10:39,464 --> 01:10:40,806 strongly recommend. Install password managers. 1344 01:10:41,346 --> 01:10:43,106 So I wanna touch on a bit about AI, right? 1345 01:10:43,106 --> 01:10:46,634 So now we know about all these possibilities, the attack 1346 01:10:46,634 --> 01:10:49,026 vectors, the potentials that you can do, right? 1347 01:10:49,056 --> 01:10:52,461 Because I think it can be lucrative for someone who start 1348 01:10:52,461 --> 01:10:55,686 going to the dark side and knowing about potential of this. 1349 01:10:55,836 --> 01:10:59,784 And now with AI, kind of like, I would say superpower for them to 1350 01:10:59,784 --> 01:11:02,256 kickstart doing this, I wanna understand the scale. 1351 01:11:02,316 --> 01:11:06,960 How much has it really been in terms of increasingly hackers 1352 01:11:06,960 --> 01:11:11,310 learning from AI and using its capability, to actually starting 1353 01:11:11,310 --> 01:11:13,746 becoming like a, you know hacker? 1354 01:11:14,781 --> 01:11:17,031 So I don't think it's that obvious yet. 1355 01:11:17,601 --> 01:11:23,416 But from just tools that I build as well, I use AI for coding, 1356 01:11:23,416 --> 01:11:25,919 for understanding. Like I said, if I'm trying to 1357 01:11:25,919 --> 01:11:28,788 think like a hacker, if I'm trying to replicate what they're 1358 01:11:28,788 --> 01:11:34,323 doing, I'm gonna be trying to use the tool to protect as much 1359 01:11:34,323 --> 01:11:38,485 as I can for good. But it's also very easy to go 1360 01:11:38,485 --> 01:11:42,791 the other way, cause, you know. In a way, as far as AI is 1361 01:11:42,791 --> 01:11:45,891 concerned, I could just as easily be a hacker, someone 1362 01:11:45,891 --> 01:11:48,817 trying to break into someone's network, because I'm asking it 1363 01:11:48,817 --> 01:11:52,271 questions that a hacker would be asking it, which is you look at 1364 01:11:52,271 --> 01:11:54,591 the, firstly, what is this? What device is this? 1365 01:11:55,011 --> 01:11:57,511 Is there known vulnerability that I can use to attack it? 1366 01:11:57,951 --> 01:12:01,793 And if not, for this type of device, what are the most common 1367 01:12:01,793 --> 01:12:04,189 ways for, you know, it doesn't have to be this brand, doesn't 1368 01:12:04,189 --> 01:12:06,283 have to be. But if there's a common 1369 01:12:06,283 --> 01:12:09,133 component, if there's a common combination of components. 1370 01:12:09,463 --> 01:12:12,709 If you think about the range of things you can ask an AI, you 1371 01:12:12,709 --> 01:12:15,559 can ask it many, many different ways of how to, what's the best 1372 01:12:15,559 --> 01:12:19,178 way to attack this device. It's not clear yet, like I said. 1373 01:12:19,178 --> 01:12:22,148 And as I mentioned earlier, Anthropic recently reported that 1374 01:12:22,761 --> 01:12:27,577 they believe that it's the resources are being put towards 1375 01:12:27,577 --> 01:12:31,484 nefarious users for hacking and by creating a hacking, 1376 01:12:31,484 --> 01:12:35,532 autonomous hacking agent. It's not even someone querying 1377 01:12:35,532 --> 01:12:37,948 anymore. It's someone using AI to work 1378 01:12:37,948 --> 01:12:41,228 out how to hack everything else, setting up an agent. 1379 01:12:41,648 --> 01:12:47,006 So it's a double-edged sword. What I'm trying to do is use the 1380 01:12:47,006 --> 01:12:50,146 positive side of that sword and the AI to go, how do I help? 1381 01:12:50,776 --> 01:12:53,914 How do I help rather than hurt? But as far as AI is concerned, 1382 01:12:53,914 --> 01:12:56,347 it's the same. It's the same query, it's the 1383 01:12:56,347 --> 01:12:59,608 same skillset, right? You are asking it how to, I'm 1384 01:12:59,608 --> 01:13:03,256 asking how to, how would someone hack it in order to protect it? 1385 01:13:03,586 --> 01:13:04,966 They're asking how would someone hack it? 1386 01:13:04,966 --> 01:13:06,796 Full stop, right? To be able to get in. 1387 01:13:06,916 --> 01:13:09,016 But it's the same. It's the same skillset. 1388 01:13:09,625 --> 01:13:13,374 And I think, weirdly, one of the things that was being reported 1389 01:13:13,374 --> 01:13:16,050 as well was going back to the residential proxies. 1390 01:13:16,920 --> 01:13:21,465 Apparently, there are LLMs being who are using the residential 1391 01:13:21,465 --> 01:13:24,955 proxy to get around scraping rules. 1392 01:13:26,165 --> 01:13:27,825 So it doesn't look like they're the ones scraping. 1393 01:13:27,885 --> 01:13:32,535 So I don't know how much of that is, you know, traceable back to 1394 01:13:32,535 --> 01:13:36,157 the LLM, but it kind of makes sense when you think about it, 1395 01:13:36,157 --> 01:13:37,587 right? Because they, they're going, 1396 01:13:37,587 --> 01:13:41,281 they wanna hide the activity and get as much data as they can, 1397 01:13:41,281 --> 01:13:44,460 but not showing that it's them. So they're going to people's 1398 01:13:44,460 --> 01:13:47,685 houses and using the houses. It's a bit like Black Mirror, 1399 01:13:47,685 --> 01:13:49,233 you know, it's like Black Mirror kind of stuff. 1400 01:13:49,233 --> 01:13:52,242 It feels very warped to be talking about or thinking that's 1401 01:13:52,242 --> 01:13:55,790 what they're doing. But the reality is if it's on 1402 01:13:55,790 --> 01:13:59,071 the network and you can't tell, they can get away with it. 1403 01:13:59,251 --> 01:14:02,037 They, it's hard for them to, I mean, they don't, as long as 1404 01:14:02,037 --> 01:14:04,385 they keep quiet about it, you know, you can't tell it's them 1405 01:14:04,385 --> 01:14:07,703 doing it. So AI is introducing new 1406 01:14:07,703 --> 01:14:11,627 complexity, new challenges to cybersecurity, but it can also 1407 01:14:11,627 --> 01:14:15,419 be like, I believe that AI for everything in the sense that, 1408 01:14:16,064 --> 01:14:17,624 it's a double edged sword, right? 1409 01:14:17,624 --> 01:14:20,109 You can use it, you can use it for good, you can use it for 1410 01:14:20,109 --> 01:14:23,150 harm. So I'm focusing on trying to 1411 01:14:23,150 --> 01:14:27,825 leverage that for good. But there's a lot of options for 1412 01:14:27,825 --> 01:14:29,964 attacking. I mean, some of the recent 1413 01:14:29,964 --> 01:14:33,668 cases, they're just teenagers. Teenagers who are bored, they 1414 01:14:33,668 --> 01:14:37,273 just miss, they're just being teenagers, but they have access 1415 01:14:37,273 --> 01:14:41,436 to crazy resources now with AI. Some of the best known 1416 01:14:41,436 --> 01:14:43,136 ransomware gangs are run by teenagers. 1417 01:14:43,166 --> 01:14:45,607 It's, Scattered Spider is one of them. 1418 01:14:45,637 --> 01:14:48,112 The other one was, yeah, that, like I think I mentioned 1419 01:14:48,112 --> 01:14:51,415 17-year-old kid that was arrested in the UK for hacking 1420 01:14:51,415 --> 01:14:55,300 into a childcare network. They just, yeah, it's crazy. 1421 01:14:55,300 --> 01:14:59,524 I mean, if you think about 40 years ago, teenagers wouldn't 1422 01:14:59,524 --> 01:15:02,980 even have access to, you know, a fraction of these resources. 1423 01:15:02,980 --> 01:15:06,156 But now you can ask ChatGPT, you can ask Gemini, you can ask 1424 01:15:06,156 --> 01:15:07,615 Claude. It's crazy. 1425 01:15:07,615 --> 01:15:11,406 And again, I would imagine the lucrativity of this activity, 1426 01:15:11,406 --> 01:15:13,192 right? Because like increasingly we 1427 01:15:13,192 --> 01:15:15,661 have digital assets. Increasingly, we are well 1428 01:15:15,661 --> 01:15:17,710 connected. Increasingly, there are so many 1429 01:15:17,710 --> 01:15:20,481 devices that potentially kind of like lure you into, hey, please 1430 01:15:20,481 --> 01:15:21,475 attack me. Please attack me. 1431 01:15:21,475 --> 01:15:25,705 I think that might be one of the reasons why, you know, a lot of 1432 01:15:25,705 --> 01:15:28,295 people trying out, right? And if they didn't get caught. 1433 01:15:29,445 --> 01:15:32,707 Yeah. I again, I haven't really met a 1434 01:15:32,707 --> 01:15:36,295 hacker to ask to, but I've heard stories, enough stories, and 1435 01:15:36,295 --> 01:15:37,875 you're right. It's very lucrative. 1436 01:15:37,875 --> 01:15:41,965 One of the most disturbing ones I heard was, an interview with a 1437 01:15:41,965 --> 01:15:45,621 ransomware negotiator. This is a corporate one but he 1438 01:15:45,621 --> 01:15:50,027 was negotiating with a guy who attacked a children's ICU unit. 1439 01:15:51,047 --> 01:15:54,211 The guy, the hacker knew what he was doing 'cause it was a, he 1440 01:15:54,211 --> 01:15:58,145 was threatening to disconnect the life support for the child 1441 01:15:58,145 --> 01:16:01,738 and kill the child. And he wanted to do it for 1442 01:16:01,738 --> 01:16:02,908 money. He just wanted the money. 1443 01:16:04,078 --> 01:16:07,428 When you think about how much technology now has operational 1444 01:16:07,428 --> 01:16:09,429 technology, right? So outside of the home 1445 01:16:09,429 --> 01:16:12,642 environment at the moment, but on the way here, I was just 1446 01:16:12,642 --> 01:16:15,093 looking at LinkedIn where Singapore is now talking about 1447 01:16:15,093 --> 01:16:17,103 cybersecurity standards for lifts. 1448 01:16:17,878 --> 01:16:18,968 Smart lifts. Wow. 1449 01:16:19,203 --> 01:16:21,989 And it just opened my, it just suddenly blew my mind like, oh 1450 01:16:21,989 --> 01:16:23,263 my God, I never thought about that. 1451 01:16:23,263 --> 01:16:28,195 Can you imagine if you are being held hostage in an elevator, in 1452 01:16:28,195 --> 01:16:30,603 the hospital when you're trying to get to someone? 1453 01:16:31,346 --> 01:16:35,743 That's crazy. So we don't recognize how many 1454 01:16:35,743 --> 01:16:41,135 different things are now at risk, let alone in the home 1455 01:16:41,135 --> 01:16:44,125 environment where, you know, you wanna feel safe in your home, 1456 01:16:44,125 --> 01:16:46,341 own home. You wanna feel that your things 1457 01:16:46,341 --> 01:16:48,795 are protected. But like I said, you know, it's 1458 01:16:48,795 --> 01:16:51,327 like Invisible Man. It could be someone watching you 1459 01:16:51,327 --> 01:16:53,577 all the time, 24/7. And they're not even watching 1460 01:16:53,577 --> 01:16:55,532 you. They're hiring an AI agent to 1461 01:16:55,532 --> 01:16:58,429 watch you until you do something that they're interested in and 1462 01:16:58,429 --> 01:16:59,677 then they'll come and pay attention. 1463 01:17:00,699 --> 01:17:05,222 It's not great, but it is the state of the, you know, the 1464 01:17:05,222 --> 01:17:06,819 maturity of the society at the moment. 1465 01:17:07,179 --> 01:17:10,303 We are very immature in the sense of cybersecurity, but we 1466 01:17:10,303 --> 01:17:14,167 are also on the other side of the scale, very, very connected, 1467 01:17:14,167 --> 01:17:16,942 right? So I feel like that's an area of 1468 01:17:16,942 --> 01:17:19,906 vulnerability. Well, again, this conversation 1469 01:17:19,906 --> 01:17:23,116 itself is really I would say insightful, at least for me, 1470 01:17:23,116 --> 01:17:26,362 right, to open up my eyes. And I'm sure many people here, 1471 01:17:26,362 --> 01:17:29,814 if they listen, they understand the level of... how should I 1472 01:17:29,814 --> 01:17:32,764 say, the level of risk that they're exposed to. 1473 01:17:32,794 --> 01:17:35,334 I think, hopefully, you know, they can do something, right? 1474 01:17:35,334 --> 01:17:39,281 So maybe that's also the time for you to say a little bit of 1475 01:17:39,281 --> 01:17:41,938 words of Otonata. What can you provide to people 1476 01:17:41,938 --> 01:17:44,624 if people wanna find how to get help, right? 1477 01:17:44,644 --> 01:17:47,422 Because I'm sure many people are kinda like clueless, okay, now 1478 01:17:47,422 --> 01:17:49,234 what? I need to do so many things. 1479 01:17:49,454 --> 01:17:52,458 Yeah. Yeah, so the web, I've got a 1480 01:17:52,458 --> 01:17:55,214 website, Otonata. O-T-O-N-A-T-A.com. 1481 01:17:55,743 --> 01:17:59,703 It's inspired by odonata which is a dragonfly, and you know, 1482 01:17:59,703 --> 01:18:02,763 it's a silent bug hunter, which I like the imagery. 1483 01:18:03,883 --> 01:18:06,862 But basically there's a service on the, from the website, I call 1484 01:18:06,862 --> 01:18:09,878 it Hack Check, which is, like I said, you could take a photo of 1485 01:18:09,878 --> 01:18:12,735 your device. And it might not all necessarily 1486 01:18:12,735 --> 01:18:15,501 recognize what the device is 'cause there's millions of them. 1487 01:18:15,621 --> 01:18:18,557 But it gives you a chance to put in the brand and the model 1488 01:18:18,557 --> 01:18:20,670 number. And what we'll do is we'll scan 1489 01:18:20,670 --> 01:18:22,896 the database and give you a very quick response. 1490 01:18:23,256 --> 01:18:25,986 So that's kind of the, the one of the easiest things you can do 1491 01:18:25,986 --> 01:18:30,111 in terms of understanding, or at least even if you're mildly 1492 01:18:30,111 --> 01:18:33,076 curious about your device and whether or not there's a known 1493 01:18:33,076 --> 01:18:35,825 vulnerability, try it out. 'Cause it's pretty easy, it's 1494 01:18:35,825 --> 01:18:39,120 free. But if you are more serious 1495 01:18:39,120 --> 01:18:42,945 about wanting to, I guess get your risk profile clearer and 1496 01:18:42,945 --> 01:18:46,830 understand what your actual risk is, we have a service that will 1497 01:18:46,830 --> 01:18:49,724 send a device to your house. You just plug it in and we'll do 1498 01:18:49,724 --> 01:18:52,356 a full scan for you. There's a much more premium 1499 01:18:52,356 --> 01:18:55,661 version, which is someone, I will go to your house and plug 1500 01:18:55,661 --> 01:18:58,964 it in for you and tell you how to protect your house and 1501 01:18:58,964 --> 01:19:01,994 actually help you configure your house to manage your risk. 1502 01:19:02,054 --> 01:19:04,838 And I think that's one of the key things I took away from a 1503 01:19:04,838 --> 01:19:07,471 corporate environment, which is it's all about balancing the 1504 01:19:07,471 --> 01:19:10,970 risk but we forget that the same principles apply everywhere even 1505 01:19:10,970 --> 01:19:14,503 at home. So it's a conversation about 1506 01:19:14,503 --> 01:19:18,856 finding what you have at risk and then taking the right 1507 01:19:18,856 --> 01:19:22,156 efforts to protect it. 'Cause in some cases, some of 1508 01:19:22,156 --> 01:19:23,386 the stuff is not worth protecting. 1509 01:19:23,774 --> 01:19:27,372 If it's a D-Link router and you have a NAS that you really want 1510 01:19:27,372 --> 01:19:30,398 to protect and secure, if it's all outdated D-Link router, just 1511 01:19:30,398 --> 01:19:33,614 get rid of it. Like it's not, it's not worth 1512 01:19:33,614 --> 01:19:37,314 taking extra steps to protect against that, if the solution is 1513 01:19:37,314 --> 01:19:41,748 just to entirely replace it. What I find is that there's no 1514 01:19:41,748 --> 01:19:46,146 one size fits all formula, which is why the service has different 1515 01:19:46,146 --> 01:19:48,946 scales. It can be as simple as telling 1516 01:19:48,946 --> 01:19:52,812 you this is at risk, to telling you, giving you better 1517 01:19:52,812 --> 01:19:55,674 visibility of your network to actually helping you change and 1518 01:19:55,674 --> 01:19:58,512 take all the steps that you need to protect yourself. 1519 01:19:58,512 --> 01:20:00,822 Because no one network is the same. 1520 01:20:00,972 --> 01:20:03,667 I've never seen a house that has exactly the same configuration 1521 01:20:03,667 --> 01:20:05,092 as another one that I've seen before. 1522 01:20:05,147 --> 01:20:07,818 Yeah. Yeah, so the website gives you 1523 01:20:07,818 --> 01:20:10,826 that, one, that simple hack check, but also more about the 1524 01:20:10,826 --> 01:20:14,492 service and what you can do. Typically, a scan takes about 1525 01:20:14,492 --> 01:20:16,992 two, three days, because it tries to look for all the 1526 01:20:16,992 --> 01:20:19,354 devices and network. And then it tries to, like I 1527 01:20:19,354 --> 01:20:21,727 said, knock on every door, check every window to see whether 1528 01:20:21,727 --> 01:20:26,010 something can be broken into. But the mitigation might take a 1529 01:20:26,010 --> 01:20:28,692 bit longer depending on what the issue actually is. 1530 01:20:29,396 --> 01:20:32,229 It might mean having to redesign your network. 1531 01:20:32,319 --> 01:20:35,720 'Cause it's, like I said, in some cases I've seen over 50 1532 01:20:35,720 --> 01:20:38,190 devices on the network. I've got more than 50 devices on 1533 01:20:38,190 --> 01:20:40,710 my network. And my network is segmented to 1534 01:20:40,710 --> 01:20:44,957 manage my risk profile. So it's not always gonna be the 1535 01:20:44,957 --> 01:20:46,632 exact same solution for everybody. 1536 01:20:46,902 --> 01:20:49,801 It's gonna be what do you, how do you wanna live your life with 1537 01:20:49,801 --> 01:20:51,907 your devices, right? How do you wanna be comfortable 1538 01:20:51,907 --> 01:20:55,015 with what you use? And this is the solution that 1539 01:20:55,015 --> 01:20:58,099 would give you the best protection while still keeping 1540 01:20:58,099 --> 01:21:00,507 it convenient. Because you don't wanna, like I 1541 01:21:00,507 --> 01:21:03,413 said, you don't wanna go crazy having three locks on your front 1542 01:21:03,413 --> 01:21:06,217 door, two locks on your window. Every time you wanna open a 1543 01:21:06,217 --> 01:21:08,172 window you gotta do magic tricks, you know, to do that, 1544 01:21:08,172 --> 01:21:09,625 right? It's finding the right balance 1545 01:21:09,625 --> 01:21:11,984 of risk. So yeah, that's what Otonata 1546 01:21:11,984 --> 01:21:13,812 does. It gives you very tailored 1547 01:21:13,812 --> 01:21:17,323 advice around what are you trying to achieve with what you 1548 01:21:17,323 --> 01:21:20,407 have, so that you don't have to worry about it. 1549 01:21:20,467 --> 01:21:22,397 Like going back to what I said at the start. 1550 01:21:23,278 --> 01:21:26,838 Having a lot of small decisions to make can be very fatiguing. 1551 01:21:27,378 --> 01:21:30,253 Unfortunately, when we accumulate devices, we sign 1552 01:21:30,253 --> 01:21:33,628 ourselves up to the obligation of looking after all these 1553 01:21:33,628 --> 01:21:35,543 things. But we don't do any of that. 1554 01:21:35,993 --> 01:21:38,813 'Cause it's boring. It's so tedious. 1555 01:21:38,933 --> 01:21:42,517 So I've taken my operational background expertise, applied a 1556 01:21:42,517 --> 01:21:44,873 more scalable process to managing it for you. 1557 01:21:45,357 --> 01:21:48,020 The last part of the service is actually offline monitoring. 1558 01:21:48,620 --> 01:21:51,886 So the starting point of the Otonata service is do a 1559 01:21:51,886 --> 01:21:55,545 inventory of what you have, do a vulnerability scan of all the 1560 01:21:55,545 --> 01:21:58,874 ways someone could attack you. Mitigate what your profile 1561 01:21:58,874 --> 01:22:01,530 should look like based on what risk you want. 1562 01:22:02,040 --> 01:22:05,668 But after that, we've exited your premises, but I know 1563 01:22:05,668 --> 01:22:07,200 exactly all the devices that you have. 1564 01:22:07,920 --> 01:22:11,250 And what we can do is, as new information comes about from a 1565 01:22:11,250 --> 01:22:14,660 vulnerability point of view, we can go, hey, you've got this 1566 01:22:14,660 --> 01:22:16,815 device. Last week, it was established 1567 01:22:16,815 --> 01:22:18,915 that this is how you would hack into it. 1568 01:22:19,455 --> 01:22:21,970 We can tell you. So it's almost like I don't 1569 01:22:21,970 --> 01:22:24,730 actually have to be at your house anymore, but I know all 1570 01:22:24,730 --> 01:22:27,502 the stuff you have and I can, I'm proactively looking out for 1571 01:22:27,502 --> 01:22:31,114 all your things. In supermarkets, there's recalls 1572 01:22:31,114 --> 01:22:35,958 where if you bought a dodgy food item, right? 1573 01:22:35,958 --> 01:22:37,868 They go, oh, you gotta bring this one back. 1574 01:22:37,868 --> 01:22:40,148 It's not safe for you to eat, et cetera, et cetera. 1575 01:22:40,718 --> 01:22:43,928 No one pays attention to recalls for your devices, unfortunately. 1576 01:22:44,648 --> 01:22:47,816 Firstly, no one even has recalls for devices 'cause they want to 1577 01:22:47,816 --> 01:22:50,030 keep it quiet. They don't want you to think 1578 01:22:50,030 --> 01:22:52,628 about the brand being affected. But we'll do that for you. 1579 01:22:52,628 --> 01:22:55,689 'Cause it's, I've got the processes automated, it's 1580 01:22:55,689 --> 01:22:58,296 scalable. I have hundreds and thousands of 1581 01:22:58,296 --> 01:23:00,879 devices. I can check them on a daily 1582 01:23:00,879 --> 01:23:03,253 basis. It's not something that I would 1583 01:23:03,253 --> 01:23:07,119 expect anyone to be, oh, today I gotta check everything on my 1584 01:23:07,119 --> 01:23:09,896 list, right? So that's why I've automated and 1585 01:23:09,896 --> 01:23:12,991 taken away the fatigue of having those micro decisions. 1586 01:23:13,251 --> 01:23:16,680 So it's really that step process: having your inventory 1587 01:23:16,680 --> 01:23:19,273 list built, doing a vulnerability scan, mitigating 1588 01:23:19,273 --> 01:23:21,811 the risks and then doing offline monitoring. 1589 01:23:22,171 --> 01:23:27,411 And for me, like I said, that gives you enough protection to 1590 01:23:27,411 --> 01:23:30,021 be more resistant. It's not gonna be, I can't 1591 01:23:30,021 --> 01:23:31,202 guarantee that you won't get hacked. 1592 01:23:31,562 --> 01:23:36,692 But I can tell you that compared to 99.9% of the population, you 1593 01:23:36,692 --> 01:23:38,792 are in a much better spot already just by doing these 1594 01:23:38,792 --> 01:23:39,977 things. Right, right. 1595 01:23:40,907 --> 01:23:42,467 Wow. So very comprehensive. 1596 01:23:42,467 --> 01:23:45,977 I'm sure if people would want to protect themselves better, they 1597 01:23:45,977 --> 01:23:47,297 can check out your website, right? 1598 01:23:47,297 --> 01:23:50,997 And maybe engage you. Is there any kind of like, I 1599 01:23:50,997 --> 01:23:53,987 dunno, like good stories? Good, you know, like service 1600 01:23:53,987 --> 01:23:58,023 that you did for us just to learn, be curious, like what 1601 01:23:58,023 --> 01:24:02,363 kind of service that you have saved, for example, in terms of, 1602 01:24:02,363 --> 01:24:06,228 you know, big profiles or maybe those kind of stuff, if you can 1603 01:24:06,228 --> 01:24:10,111 share? At the moment, so because of my 1604 01:24:10,111 --> 01:24:12,189 target audience, it's more discreet. 1605 01:24:12,359 --> 01:24:15,740 That's part of what I, what I bring to the table as well. 1606 01:24:16,140 --> 01:24:21,510 I have worked with people who were embarrassed to have had 1607 01:24:21,510 --> 01:24:23,580 vulnerabilities that were fairly basic. 1608 01:24:24,261 --> 01:24:28,401 IT leaders who had "adminadmin", thought leaders. 1609 01:24:28,491 --> 01:24:33,715 Like I said, ASX 20 CEOs that have had devices that have been 1610 01:24:33,715 --> 01:24:36,936 ransom hacked that they didn't know about. 1611 01:24:37,601 --> 01:24:39,191 I wouldn't share any direct stories. 1612 01:24:39,191 --> 01:24:44,757 I think what for me, it's more the amount of creative 1613 01:24:44,757 --> 01:24:48,591 situations that have been, I guess publicly disclosed in, 1614 01:24:48,591 --> 01:24:53,924 even in the last three years. One, I was just talking to 1615 01:24:53,924 --> 01:24:56,768 someone about today was politicians being caught in 1616 01:24:56,768 --> 01:24:59,744 compromising positions through cameras. 1617 01:25:00,538 --> 01:25:05,148 IP cameras. So it's a bit scandalous, right? 1618 01:25:05,508 --> 01:25:08,448 When you think about the, you know, people in high positions 1619 01:25:08,448 --> 01:25:14,023 and being caught, found dirty. But if you zoom out a bit 1620 01:25:14,023 --> 01:25:17,072 further and you go, how did someone get access to that 1621 01:25:17,072 --> 01:25:20,700 material in the first place? And does it mean that everyone 1622 01:25:20,700 --> 01:25:23,316 has access to everything? It's quite concerning. 1623 01:25:23,846 --> 01:25:28,586 So it's a bit juicy. Yeah, it's a bit, it's a good 1624 01:25:28,586 --> 01:25:32,910 source of gossip. But it risks missing the point 1625 01:25:32,910 --> 01:25:37,054 of how vulnerable we are as a society. 1626 01:25:37,589 --> 01:25:38,704 Wow. Right. 1627 01:25:38,704 --> 01:25:42,336 So like I said when you hear the more serious cases around 1628 01:25:42,786 --> 01:25:47,924 critical operational technology being compromised, it's very 1629 01:25:47,924 --> 01:25:49,966 raw. Like, you know, people's actual 1630 01:25:49,966 --> 01:25:52,419 lives are being affected. But at the same time, you gotta 1631 01:25:52,419 --> 01:25:55,306 zoom out and go how do we stop this from happening to, you 1632 01:25:55,306 --> 01:25:59,322 know, people we care about? It is a bit distance when you 1633 01:25:59,322 --> 01:26:01,205 see someone else, being attacked and affected. 1634 01:26:01,860 --> 01:26:05,340 But when it actually hits you, it's a, you know, it's, yeah, 1635 01:26:05,340 --> 01:26:07,228 it's very concerning. So, yeah, sorry, I don't have a 1636 01:26:07,228 --> 01:26:08,505 juicy story to share. It's okay. 1637 01:26:08,655 --> 01:26:11,195 I think that's quite revealing enough for us to understand the 1638 01:26:11,195 --> 01:26:15,048 kind of impact that, you know, we might get affected, I guess 1639 01:26:15,048 --> 01:26:19,100 one day, right? When this becomes like a more 1640 01:26:19,100 --> 01:26:22,119 riskier attack vectors. Possibilities are more endless, 1641 01:26:22,119 --> 01:26:23,895 right? So I think thanks for sharing 1642 01:26:23,895 --> 01:26:26,629 that. I was gonna say, I think with 1643 01:26:26,629 --> 01:26:30,027 the automation and if you project a bit further to what 1644 01:26:30,027 --> 01:26:33,114 the trends are with the Tesla robots, with the humanized 1645 01:26:33,114 --> 01:26:36,577 robots, with self-driving cars, I think once there's a much 1646 01:26:36,577 --> 01:26:39,867 bigger overlap between physical, the physical world and the 1647 01:26:39,867 --> 01:26:42,895 digital world. And you can extend it to 1648 01:26:42,895 --> 01:26:45,562 Neuralink like how people's brains are gonna be connected 1649 01:26:45,562 --> 01:26:48,912 and wired up. That's why I'm trying to get the 1650 01:26:48,912 --> 01:26:52,028 message out now earlier, because by the time we get there, it's 1651 01:26:52,028 --> 01:26:55,215 not just gonna be your digital assets that are risk, it's gonna 1652 01:26:55,215 --> 01:26:58,432 be your physical wellbeing. I mean, they've already shown 1653 01:26:58,432 --> 01:27:00,197 cars to be hacked while being driven. 1654 01:27:00,389 --> 01:27:01,187 Wow. Right. 1655 01:27:01,307 --> 01:27:05,803 So you extend that further. If you are not taking steps now 1656 01:27:05,803 --> 01:27:10,151 to protect some of the basics hygienes, when you get to a 1657 01:27:10,151 --> 01:27:13,637 point of having a humanoid robot helper in your kitchen or your 1658 01:27:13,637 --> 01:27:16,747 self-driving car is driving you to work, you're gonna set 1659 01:27:16,747 --> 01:27:21,047 yourself up for a world of pain because some of these basics 1660 01:27:21,047 --> 01:27:23,387 haven't been embedded into your normal. 1661 01:27:23,687 --> 01:27:27,015 You can't expect them to be covering every possible threat, 1662 01:27:27,015 --> 01:27:30,179 right? So that's why I think we are not 1663 01:27:30,179 --> 01:27:34,463 there yet, but given the trends of how things are converging 1664 01:27:34,463 --> 01:27:38,345 with networked physical devices, it's gonna get scary. 1665 01:27:38,705 --> 01:27:42,647 So, you know, as much as possible start learning the 1666 01:27:42,647 --> 01:27:46,365 basics to prepare yourself for when, yeah, you've got a robot 1667 01:27:46,365 --> 01:27:50,093 driving a car and your child to, I don't know, whatever activity 1668 01:27:50,093 --> 01:27:51,962 they've got, right? All of that is kind of 1669 01:27:51,962 --> 01:27:52,628 susceptible. Yeah. 1670 01:27:53,208 --> 01:27:55,989 So yeah, probably now it's not enough to just understand 1671 01:27:55,989 --> 01:27:58,677 physical safety anymore. Digital safety, definitely very 1672 01:27:58,677 --> 01:28:01,222 important. And we should not just focus a 1673 01:28:01,222 --> 01:28:03,553 lot on, you know, identifying scams, you know, these deep 1674 01:28:03,553 --> 01:28:05,673 fakes, which is kind of like now the trends, right? 1675 01:28:06,093 --> 01:28:08,677 But obviously these kind of attacks is also one thing that 1676 01:28:08,677 --> 01:28:10,171 throughout this conversation I learn a lot. 1677 01:28:10,471 --> 01:28:12,871 And hopefully people start having that awareness. 1678 01:28:13,081 --> 01:28:16,187 You know, try to do something. Or even understand why all these 1679 01:28:16,187 --> 01:28:18,301 becomes risky over the time as well. 1680 01:28:18,631 --> 01:28:19,921 So I think thanks for sharing that. 1681 01:28:20,434 --> 01:28:23,404 I know we've talked a lot. We've got only one question that 1682 01:28:23,404 --> 01:28:26,115 I would like to ask you to wrap up our conversation. 1683 01:28:26,475 --> 01:28:28,815 I call this the three technical leadership wisdom. 1684 01:28:28,845 --> 01:28:31,993 So just think of it like advice that you wanna give, maybe, you 1685 01:28:31,993 --> 01:28:35,491 know, pieces of wisdom that you wanna share to the listeners 1686 01:28:35,491 --> 01:28:37,820 here today. Yeah, what would that be? 1687 01:28:38,665 --> 01:28:42,738 So sourcing from Lean. Like I said, first one, I would 1688 01:28:42,738 --> 01:28:44,070 reiterate is "can doesn't mean should". 1689 01:28:44,980 --> 01:28:48,083 Like a lot of times we're not deliberate enough or we get 1690 01:28:48,083 --> 01:28:51,025 caught up with a shiny new thing that we don't really think about 1691 01:28:51,025 --> 01:28:54,215 the value that it adds. Go back to Lean principles, 5S. 1692 01:28:54,395 --> 01:28:57,406 Clear out the things that you actually don't need to reduce 1693 01:28:57,406 --> 01:28:59,610 your footprint. Reducing your footprint also 1694 01:28:59,610 --> 01:29:01,042 means reducing your attack surface. 1695 01:29:01,612 --> 01:29:04,308 A lot of times I, quite frankly, I've still got devices that I 1696 01:29:04,308 --> 01:29:06,180 know I need to clean up. I just haven't got around to do 1697 01:29:06,180 --> 01:29:08,350 it. But if you're not even thinking 1698 01:29:08,350 --> 01:29:10,672 about it, then you are constantly gonna be leaving 1699 01:29:10,672 --> 01:29:12,967 yourself open for no benefit, right? 1700 01:29:13,297 --> 01:29:17,030 So can doesn't mean should. Like I almost, if that's the one 1701 01:29:17,030 --> 01:29:19,942 thing like for people to take away from. 1702 01:29:20,512 --> 01:29:23,602 But if you can also be more aware of your digital hygiene. 1703 01:29:24,442 --> 01:29:28,966 So things that we access, things that we put up on the cloud, 1704 01:29:28,966 --> 01:29:31,942 they're all our digital assets, our footprints. 1705 01:29:32,842 --> 01:29:36,512 It's almost like having, you know, basic dental checkups. 1706 01:29:36,932 --> 01:29:40,538 There are things that we take for granted as minimum standards 1707 01:29:40,538 --> 01:29:42,722 of hygiene for ourselves, for our self-care. 1708 01:29:43,472 --> 01:29:46,682 Think about that being applied to your digital life, right? 1709 01:29:46,682 --> 01:29:52,437 So in terms of your data, in terms of your passwords, your 1710 01:29:52,437 --> 01:29:55,808 admin, your router firmware. There should be a list of things 1711 01:29:55,808 --> 01:29:57,982 that you need to be doing on a yearly basis. 1712 01:29:57,982 --> 01:29:59,892 Like you go to a dentist once or twice a year. 1713 01:30:00,222 --> 01:30:04,182 There needs to be that level of self-care for your digital 1714 01:30:04,182 --> 01:30:05,976 footprint, right? There has to be a level of 1715 01:30:05,976 --> 01:30:08,636 digital hygiene. If you don't do, if you're not 1716 01:30:08,636 --> 01:30:10,932 even thinking about it all, you won't do any of it. 1717 01:30:11,352 --> 01:30:16,692 Just put some thought and time into what should you do and then 1718 01:30:16,842 --> 01:30:20,472 create a process that gives you a reminder once a year, 1719 01:30:20,472 --> 01:30:23,865 something. In Australia, they remind you to 1720 01:30:23,865 --> 01:30:26,830 change your smoke alarm batteries when there's daylight 1721 01:30:26,830 --> 01:30:29,560 savings. So there's a kind of a mnemonic 1722 01:30:29,560 --> 01:30:32,420 around the relationship between time and having to do something, 1723 01:30:32,420 --> 01:30:34,299 right? Create something like that for 1724 01:30:34,299 --> 01:30:37,539 your own digital hygiene. Whether it's deleting your 1725 01:30:37,539 --> 01:30:41,673 photos that you... screenshots for example of information. 1726 01:30:41,673 --> 01:30:45,201 Like stuff like that where you actually consciously go through 1727 01:30:45,231 --> 01:30:47,301 cleaning up house every now and then. 1728 01:30:47,958 --> 01:30:51,351 And like I said, thinking in mind around your cybersecurity 1729 01:30:51,351 --> 01:30:53,949 posture is be the path of greater resistance. 1730 01:30:55,119 --> 01:30:58,236 Even if you're not doing everything I talked about, even 1731 01:30:58,236 --> 01:31:03,663 if you're not taking crazy steps to protect your house and your 1732 01:31:03,663 --> 01:31:08,768 assets, do something that makes it, that pushes you along in the 1733 01:31:08,768 --> 01:31:12,185 distribution curve, right? Makes it a little bit harder 1734 01:31:12,185 --> 01:31:16,031 than the next guy, because 700,000 devices right now on the 1735 01:31:16,031 --> 01:31:19,010 botnet. Those are already at the, this 1736 01:31:19,010 --> 01:31:20,810 is, that's the easy stuff, right? 1737 01:31:20,810 --> 01:31:23,502 There was people not doing anything about it and going, you 1738 01:31:23,502 --> 01:31:24,920 know what? Hack me, I don't care. 1739 01:31:24,980 --> 01:31:27,050 Those are the people, you don't wanna be in that group. 1740 01:31:27,350 --> 01:31:29,750 You wanna be in the ones that have a stronger password. 1741 01:31:30,110 --> 01:31:33,762 You wanna be in the ones that have paid attention to the 1742 01:31:33,762 --> 01:31:37,520 firmware and made it a little bit harder because then at least 1743 01:31:37,520 --> 01:31:40,165 you're not as exposed. Especially if you're high, if 1744 01:31:40,165 --> 01:31:42,762 you've got stuff to lose, if you are a higher net worth 1745 01:31:42,762 --> 01:31:46,437 individual. Like I said, you don't want to 1746 01:31:46,437 --> 01:31:50,082 lose your digital assets, your bank accounts, your financial. 1747 01:31:50,112 --> 01:31:54,062 You don't have financial losses, you don't have emotional turmoil 1748 01:31:54,062 --> 01:31:56,742 and losses because someone's compromised you. 1749 01:31:57,042 --> 01:32:00,712 So path of greater resistance, whatever steps you can take 1750 01:32:00,712 --> 01:32:04,242 towards being that. By all means, take a first step 1751 01:32:04,242 --> 01:32:07,337 and see how far you can go. If you need help, give me a 1752 01:32:07,337 --> 01:32:10,365 call. I really love that. 1753 01:32:10,365 --> 01:32:14,252 Very, how should I say, fit into the theme as well, what we 1754 01:32:14,252 --> 01:32:16,505 discussed, right? So, again, thank you so much, 1755 01:32:16,505 --> 01:32:19,728 Joseph, for sharing all this. I think again this is a very 1756 01:32:19,728 --> 01:32:21,570 good awareness session for all of us. 1757 01:32:21,660 --> 01:32:24,164 If people love this conversation, they would like to 1758 01:32:24,164 --> 01:32:26,920 connect with you, ask you more questions, is there a place to 1759 01:32:26,920 --> 01:32:28,410 reach out? Yeah, my website. 1760 01:32:28,590 --> 01:32:30,960 So Otonata. O-T-O-N-A-T-A.com. 1761 01:32:31,230 --> 01:32:33,540 Alright. Alright, so that's a wrap. 1762 01:32:33,540 --> 01:32:35,310 So again, thank you so much for coming here. 1763 01:32:35,700 --> 01:32:36,610 Thank you. Thanks for having me. 1764 01:32:36,610 --> 01:32:37,600 That was fun.