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Hi, this is Mark Raven. 
Welcome to episode 71 of lean 

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blog audio. 
Its July 23rd 2015, today's post

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is titled throwback Thursday. 
This American Life on new me, 

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lessons and labor notes, still 
hates lean. 

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So episode number 403 of the 
public radio program. 

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This American Life originally 
aired in 2010 and since you're 

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listening to this podcast, I 
assume you like listening to 

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stuff. 
And you may want to may be 

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postponed listening to this 
episode until your next commutes

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or your next trip and maybe go 
and you know download Episode 43

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of This American Life about the 
new me car plant. 

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And if you want to listen to 
that, and then listen Maybe here

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to my commentary on that story. 
You know, the nummi plant, if 

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you don't know, it was a joint 
venture between GM and Toyota in

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Fremont, California. 
It's now Now actually we're 

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Tesla builds its Vehicles as a 
joint venture, the nummi plant 

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that meant the closed down GM 
Fremont plant was reopened to be

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managed under the Toyota 
production system. 

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It was an opportunity for GM to 
learn from Toyota. 

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Now, This American Life. 
You know, asks why GM didn't 

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learn more the lessons from knew
me? 

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Well, GM did learn many lessons,
it wasn't enough to save the 

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company. 
From bankruptcy and I think GM 

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going from 50% market share to 
just over twenty percent market.

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Share would bankrupt you in any 
circumstance regardless of how 

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lean your factories became when 
you have more retirees and 

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active employees, that that loss
of market share was the biggest 

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problem, not the lack of lessons
learned from Toyota now that 

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episode re-aired on NPR stations
last weekend. 

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Which I learned about when many 
of you mailed me or you tweeted 

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at me about the program, even 
some of my personal Facebook 

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friends, who don't share my 
passion for lean. 

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Share, the link with me. 
I think a lot of people didn't 

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realize it was a repeat. 
Now, you know what makes it a 

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throwback in a way is not only 
the art of the the episode that 

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came out in 2010, by also 
blogged about it back. 

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Then in a post titled NPR on the
end of the line at new me and my

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story about an interviewee so 
you can A link to that original 

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blog post. 
If you go to lean blog dot org 

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slash audio 71 and there's also 
a link to the This American Life

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episode. 
You can read a transcript even 

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though again I'm going to assume
you like listening to things at 

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least as much as you do reading 
or that's more convenient for 

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you to do so. 
So you can listen, you can read.

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I really do think it's an hour. 
Well, spent now Beyond this. 

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This American Life and what they
talked about when I blogged 

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about five years ago, also 
floating around the twitterverse

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this week was a link to a blog 
post from the website labor 

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notes and labor notes from the 
labor unions. 

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Generally very critical of lean.
It was also critical of This 

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American Life and I had tried 
unsuccessfully to create an 

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account that would allow me to 
comment on the labor. 

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Notes website, that some 
technical glitches, it seems. 

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So I'm To share my thoughts in a
bit. 

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And I thought well let me just 
write a new blog post about it. 

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I've got my own website. 
I don't need to comment on there

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isn't I know labor notes in the 
past has read some of my posts 

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and we've had some back and 
forth but you know it's funny in

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a way, a labor notes is 
complaining about This American 

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Life. 
Usually conservatives complain 

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that mpr's part of you know the 
liberal media, but labor notes 

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views, this episode, it seems as
being part of You know, the vast

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corporate right-wing conspiracy.
So I do labor notes, doesn't 

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like lean. 
Let me know. 

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It's Doesn't Like This American 
Life there grouchier than I am. 

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So, you know, labor notes has 
lashed out before about lean 

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and, you know. 
They're, they're usually either 

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just complaining about 
management. 

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You know, if, if lean is an idea
from those management types, 

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therefore, lean must be evil or 
they're complaining, you know, 

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about bad practices that aren't 
really lean. 

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And, you know, I would line, 
With the labor notes Riders to 

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complain about what I call Les 
more. 

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You lean as misguidedly 
executed, when lame stuff 

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happens, I criticize that as 
well, even though I'll give 

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credit labor notes in one of 
their retorts once said, lame 

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should really mean lean as 
mainly experienced. 

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So, yeah, touche labor notes. 
But, you know, from their most 

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recent post here, they they're 
writing about new me. 

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Trouble is the quote team 
concept, unquote program of 

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standardization D Skilling and 
continuous speed up wasn't such 

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a boon for workers as the show 
portrays neither be imported 

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version nor even the original in
Japan. 

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So they put those scare quotes 
around the phrase, team concept,

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you know, asking people to work 
in teams or the idea of 

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management being part of Team 
with workers, you know, I must 

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be some sort of trap. 
That's, I guess, you know, 

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that's how labor notes Visa 
labor notes, complains about 

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what they call the descaling of 
work. 

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When, you know, in reality a 
lien Auto Factory, really does, 

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you know a lot of cross training
so that employees have more 

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skills? 
You know, when I worked at 

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General Motors before, any 
semblance of a lean culture, 20 

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years ago, that was D skilled 
work. 

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That was a management system 
that GM system that didn't 

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respect workers and their 
abilities, and their brains. 

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Lean management is very 
different. 

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And, you know, when labor notes 
talks about speeding up the line

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and management by stress. 
Again, those sound like the 

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concepts of the old General 
Motors management system, and 

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that's what I experienced and 
suffered through a bit before 

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the plant. 
I worked for got a new plant 

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manager and that plant manager 
was Larry Spiegel, who gets to 

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say a few things in the this 
Life peace. 

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And I shared a story about him 
and my post five years ago. 

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So when Larry was asked about 
the difficulty he faced in 

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bringing, the new me approach to
another GM Factory. 

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He basically said there were too
many people convinced that they 

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didn't have to change. 
And Larry was asked by the the 

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correspondent Frank land fit 
hadn't, General Motors, 

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threatened to close down the 
Plant and Larry said, they 

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didn't believe them, Frank 
laying fit said, why? 

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Larry He said it's not logical, 
they just didn't Frank length. 

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It, then again, said this was 
one of the biggest differences 

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between Fremont and Van. 
Nuys, Van, Nuys, hadn't been 

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shut down. 
And I'll add is a comment here, 

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you know, as the GM plant had 
been at Fremont. 

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The one that became new me Frank
again said turns out, it's a lot

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easier to get Workers to change 
if they've lost their jobs and 

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then you offer them back. 
Without that many union members 

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just saw the Toyota system is, 
Threat and they had a point 

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under the Japanese system Van 
Nuys stood to lose a fourth of 

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its Workforce because the more 
efficient a plant becomes the 

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fewer workers. 
It needs and just as bad the 

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team concept hurt their 
seniority rights. 

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This have been a problem for 
union members back at nummi also

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that's the end of quote from the
story. 

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You know, my experience, lean 
Transformations, do not require 

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the threat of plant closure you 
know in healthcare organizations

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like Theta care and Virginia 
Mason have transformed Formed 

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themselves without having some 
sort of Crisis or threatening to

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shut down the hospital. 
Now, the threat of not eating 

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25% of your employees anymore. 
I totally understand why the UAW

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and the Van Nuys plant. 
Wouldn't like that. 

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Now let's not explored in This 
American Life is if GM would 

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have made any sort of no layoffs
due to no layoffs, due to lean 

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commitment, as many 
organizations do including 

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places like fate Are in 
Virginia. 

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Mason with GM have retrained or 
redeployed workers in a way that

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was more constructive than the 
infamous GM jobs, bank with GM. 

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Have tried to grow the plants 
business. 

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So they could avoid firing 
employees. 

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You doing more work with the 
same number of employees, which 

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is not quote unquote, speeding 
up the work week, of course, 

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when we reduce waste and improve
processes through Lane. 

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So it's hard to see the how you 
could blame employees for not 

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liking something in my eye. 
Cost them their jobs and labor 

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notes. 
Also criticized, This American 

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Life for blaming workers and, 
you know, I always thought that 

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so-called militant attitudes 
from employees or unions with a 

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result of bad management. 
You know, but Larry Spiegel, in 

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my experience with him, he was a
great leader when I worked under

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him at General Motors. 
He was a truly lean leader who 

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had the courage to do things, a 
new way, within General Motors. 

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And so here's what I tried to 
write on the labor notes, Larry 

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Spiegel was the GM plant manager
who is quoted in the story. 

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I worked at GM from 1995 to 1997
as an engineer at the Livonia 

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engine plant and Larry was 
brought in as our plant manager 

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in 1996 after a number of major 
quality problems under the old 

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plant manager and his regime, 
the workers were blamed and it 

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was extremely unfair bad 
managers literally got in the 

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way of UAW members putting 
quality first when Larry became 

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the plant manager, he Rest, an 
all-hands meeting of hourly and 

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salaried employees and he told 
them that the days of blaming 

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the workers were over. 
The problem wasn't the workers. 

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The problem was the old 
management style Larry made that

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quite clear and lived by his 
desire to manage in a new way 

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putting quality first and 
listening to the workers and the

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factory made a lot of progress 
under his leadership. 

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Now I work today in health care,
the problem. 

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There also is the management 
system, not the workers. 

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That's why the application. 
Lean in the Toyota production 

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system works so well. 
A new management style allows 

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people to put quality and 
patient. 

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Safety first managers actually 
listen to their employees and 

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it's nothing to complain about. 
But then again, labor notes 

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complains about lean Healthcare 
is if it's as evil, as they 

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think lean manufacturing is now,
you know, GM's history is 

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complicated. 
I was never one to blame the 

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union for the company's 
problems. 

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I blamed leadership or a lack 
thereof. 

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Is I wrote about Out in a number
of posts that I linked to here, 

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I don't demonize the union, I 
wish the union folks wouldn't 

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demonize lean. 
Now if you've listened this long

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eleven and a half minutes, thank
you for doing. 

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So I'm going to go ahead and 
read the post that I wrote five 

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years ago about this American 
life and the NPR story. 

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Here's why I wrote the story 
highlights. 

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Some of the problems you'll the 
Fremont, California plant had 

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before GM closed. 
For the first time in 1982, this

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included workers, drinking on 
the job workers, having sex in 

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the plant, bad absenteeism 
rates, compounded by management,

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finding random drunks at the bar
across the street to then. 

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Come on the line to fill in 
workers, hitting management, so 

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much that they sabotage 
Vehicles. 

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Now the root cause isn't only 
bad workers, quote unquote. 

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A lot of that is due to bad 
management system. 

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Something that changed 
dramatically when new me was 

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Formed with Toyota management 
principles and practices. 

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Now, as with many things in 
life, it was complicated in this

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post, I'm going to share my 
personal experiences with one of

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the leaders featured in the 
story. 

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Now, new me, of course, quickly 
became a huge success after 

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reopened with mainly the same 
workers, but with a new 

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management system and new 
managers. 

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So why didn't GM the rest of GM 
learned? 

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More of these lessons? 
Well, there were certainly 

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attempts you in my second year 
working at the GM. 

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Lavanya engine plant. 
A new plant manager was brought 

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in with new me experience, a man
named Larry Spiegel and one of 

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the early efforts to spread lean
and TPS was at the GM Van Nuys 

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Factory in California, but the 
efforts failed as Spiegel 

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explained and he was called a 
quote-unquote Commando, new me, 

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Commando it was a term given to 
the GM people who were brought 

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in to learn from knew me, and 
Larry was one of the first. 

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It says quote. 
Note, the lack of receptive to 

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change was. 
So deep said Larry Spiegel, one 

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of the Commandos who struggled 
to transform the Van Nuys plan. 

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There were too many people 
convinced they didn't need to 

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change Spiegel said that even 
though GM had threatened to 

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close the plant workers believe 
that would never happen and they

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stuck with their own ways. 
So at the Livonia engine plant 

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our quality and productivity not
to mention morale. 

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We're at the bottom of the 
barrel even by GM standards. 

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Now Larry spent months, walking 
the plant floor or the gemba is 

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we would call it, he listens to 
people, he talked to them. 

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He this is a very different 
leadership style than before, I 

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mean you know he was the plant 
manager with about 800 people 

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reporting to him but he took the
time to go and see that's a key 

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lesson from NuMe. 
So being a young Patient 

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engineer. 
I was ready for change. 

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I knew the old management 
mindsets weren't working. 

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I believed in the promise of 
lean and TPS even though we 

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couldn't call it lean and we 
didn't make much mention of 

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Toyota. 
So I asked Larry at one point, 

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you know, when were we really 
going to start fixing things? 

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Let's go and I recall his 
answer, he said something like, 

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I know what we have to do here 
based on his experiences at 

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nummi and previously at the 
Warren transmission, plant with 

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the The people here. 
Don't know that. 

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I know, I have to take time to 
build respect to let them know. 

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I've heard them and I've seen 
the problems firsthand. 

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So that encounter in Larry's, 
leadership, made a huge impact 

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on me and my young career, even 
though I left GM to go to MIT in

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1997, I kept in touch with 
people from the plant and I was 

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happy to hear that they made 
great strides in the first few 

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years. 
Moving up to the top quartile in

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performance. 
From the bottom of the barrel, 

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they were improving quality and 
productivity. 

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They even had a new engine 
program assigned to them which, 

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you know, helped the plant stay 
open, but the plant later became

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the Victim of GM's, bankruptcy 
and was closed. 

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I think, probably by 2011. 
So that's, that's my story of 

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working with Larry. 
Spiegel, a great lean leader, 

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he's retired, couple years back,
he was teaching lean at the 

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University of Michigan, you 
know, I think he was one of the 

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people that was really trying to
push GM in the right direction. 

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So that was my blog post from 
five years ago. so again, if you

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want to find links to any of 
those go to lean blog dot org 

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slash audio 71, thanks for 
listening