1 00:00:01,240 --> 00:00:03,600 You're listening to The Awareness Angle, the podcast 2 00:00:03,600 --> 00:00:06,720 that cuts through the cyber security noise to bring you the 3 00:00:06,720 --> 00:00:11,040 stuff that really mattered, from shady scams to boardroom 4 00:00:11,040 --> 00:00:14,120 blunders. We break it down so you don't 5 00:00:14,120 --> 00:00:16,720 have to. Everything you hear is just our 6 00:00:16,720 --> 00:00:21,600 take, Not our employers, not our legal teams and definitely not 7 00:00:21,600 --> 00:00:26,080 the PR approved version. I'm Matt Davis here with Luke 8 00:00:26,080 --> 00:00:29,080 Pettigrew, the master of the mix, Wrangler of the road 9 00:00:29,160 --> 00:00:32,680 headlines and always ready with a timely Fact Check. 10 00:00:32,680 --> 00:00:34,520 Hello, Luke. Hey, Ann, Hey everyone. 11 00:00:34,520 --> 00:00:37,360 How are we doing? I'm doing good. 12 00:00:37,360 --> 00:00:38,960 How are you? Yeah, not too bad. 13 00:00:38,960 --> 00:00:40,000 Thanks. Yeah. 14 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:43,080 I could be better. I'm deaf in one ear currently. 15 00:00:43,080 --> 00:00:46,920 This is serving no purpose. I have I was on last week's 16 00:00:46,920 --> 00:00:48,880 episode. So if I'm shouting, I'm sorry, 17 00:00:49,440 --> 00:00:54,000 but I had a nasty incident with cotton bud and a five year old 18 00:00:54,000 --> 00:00:57,760 that made me jump and it kind you don't need to go into it and 19 00:00:57,800 --> 00:01:01,200 say yeah, it's I've got some ear drops and hopefully it'll all be 20 00:01:01,200 --> 00:01:02,960 fine because I quite like my earring. 21 00:01:03,120 --> 00:01:06,880 But there we go. So I'll do this one eared. 22 00:01:07,080 --> 00:01:08,400 There we go. The other one will fall out. 23 00:01:08,400 --> 00:01:12,240 Now, getting on with getting on with this. 24 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:15,160 Subscribe to the newsletter. If you don't, why not? 25 00:01:15,160 --> 00:01:18,000 We've got nearly 750 subscribers. 26 00:01:18,200 --> 00:01:21,680 Come on, get subscribing. You can get it at 27 00:01:21,680 --> 00:01:25,040 riskycreative.com. There you can subscribe. 28 00:01:25,040 --> 00:01:28,000 It lands in your inbox every Monday morning. 29 00:01:28,560 --> 00:01:31,560 Or you can get it on LinkedIn. Just search for the awareness 30 00:01:31,560 --> 00:01:35,920 angle and it will come up. It's free every Monday and tells 31 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:39,400 you everything you need to know about the week's episode. 32 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:43,560 Please subscribe to us on YouTube and the podcast 33 00:01:43,560 --> 00:01:44,960 platforms. We need to get the YouTube 34 00:01:44,960 --> 00:01:47,880 subscribers up, people. You get to see our wonderful 35 00:01:47,880 --> 00:01:50,720 faces every week if you get it on YouTube. 36 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:54,920 And we're going to start posting more clips and parts of the 37 00:01:55,080 --> 00:01:58,240 episodes as well. So please subscribe to us on 38 00:01:58,240 --> 00:02:02,360 YouTube at Risky Creative. The links to everything are in 39 00:02:02,360 --> 00:02:06,760 the notes of the episode or the show or at riskycreative.com. 40 00:02:07,720 --> 00:02:11,280 Last bit of business before we get started, the awareness angle 41 00:02:11,280 --> 00:02:13,160 interviews. This is where I sit down with 42 00:02:13,160 --> 00:02:18,040 people from across the business spectrum who can offer something 43 00:02:18,040 --> 00:02:20,440 to cybersecurity and cybersecurity awareness. 44 00:02:20,920 --> 00:02:24,720 Last Thursday, we released an episode where I sat down with 45 00:02:24,800 --> 00:02:28,080 Lori Stewart. Lori is from Canada, she's a 46 00:02:28,080 --> 00:02:31,600 content marketing pro and she's worked with some massive 47 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:36,160 cybersecurity brands and had helped to make their messages 48 00:02:36,200 --> 00:02:38,280 stand out. Essentially, we get into what 49 00:02:38,280 --> 00:02:42,200 security teams can learn from B to B marketing, why security 50 00:02:42,200 --> 00:02:46,000 awareness is a bit like a start up, why storytelling still works 51 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:49,200 and how to shift behaviours without boring them to death. 52 00:02:49,640 --> 00:02:52,800 So if you've struggled with security, comms or engagement, 53 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:57,280 it's a worthwhile episode. Laurie's also a massive lover of 54 00:02:57,280 --> 00:03:00,200 whiskey and we filmed it. She filmed it. 55 00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:05,680 She was sat in the synthesiser repair place that she runs with 56 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:08,880 her husband. And it's got to be as far as 57 00:03:08,880 --> 00:03:11,840 backgrounds go. I get mentions about this, but 58 00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:14,960 hers looked awesome, sort of like steel and corrugated iron 59 00:03:14,960 --> 00:03:17,120 and stuff like that. So it looks awesome. 60 00:03:17,360 --> 00:03:20,720 So yes, that is the episode before this one. 61 00:03:21,440 --> 00:03:22,040 Yeah. There we go. 62 00:03:23,400 --> 00:03:25,600 Right. Should we get on with the news? 63 00:03:25,600 --> 00:03:28,000 Yeah, let's get to it. Awesome. 64 00:03:28,440 --> 00:03:31,600 OK so kicking off the news tonight and this is 1 I I saw 65 00:03:31,640 --> 00:03:36,960 just before I saw this today and I was like Oh my Lord. 66 00:03:37,280 --> 00:03:40,880 OK so fittify. Have you heard of Fittify? 67 00:03:41,520 --> 00:03:44,160 I haven't, to be honest. I haven't heard of Fittify. 68 00:03:44,160 --> 00:03:47,680 It's like maybe we need awareify. 69 00:03:47,760 --> 00:03:50,360 Like thank you Spotify. Was Spotify the first? 70 00:03:50,360 --> 00:03:53,760 I don't know. Anyway, Fittify's pub. 71 00:03:54,320 --> 00:03:58,560 They are a fitness app and they're publicly accessible 72 00:03:58,920 --> 00:04:02,480 Google Cloud storage bucket. Those are words that should not 73 00:04:02,480 --> 00:04:06,480 go together has exposed hundreds of thousands of files. 74 00:04:07,480 --> 00:04:10,240 Some of the files, you can guess where this is going. 75 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:15,200 We'll use the uploaded progress pictures that individuals 76 00:04:15,200 --> 00:04:17,880 uploaded to track their body changes over time. 77 00:04:19,880 --> 00:04:23,480 We got this story from Cybernews and after Cybernews contacted 78 00:04:23,480 --> 00:04:27,120 the company, the unprotected instance was closed, so it is 79 00:04:27,120 --> 00:04:31,240 now protected. But Fittify is a popular fitness 80 00:04:31,240 --> 00:04:33,160 app. It has over 10 million downloads 81 00:04:33,560 --> 00:04:38,480 from the Google Play Store and an estimated 25,000,000 total 82 00:04:38,480 --> 00:04:44,440 installs across all platforms. In early May, the Cyber News 83 00:04:44,440 --> 00:04:49,040 team reached out to Fittify owned. 84 00:04:49,440 --> 00:04:50,960 Sorry. In early May, the Cyber News 85 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:54,200 research team discovered a Fittify Owned an accessible 86 00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:58,240 Google Cloud Storage bucket. Most of the files exposed in the 87 00:04:58,240 --> 00:05:00,720 unprotected instant will work out plans and instruction 88 00:05:00,720 --> 00:05:03,040 videos. You know, nothing too sensitive, 89 00:05:03,480 --> 00:05:08,160 but the photos that users are shared with the apps AI coach 90 00:05:08,600 --> 00:05:13,960 and their body scans. So one of the comments here says 91 00:05:13,960 --> 00:05:18,040 it's also worthwhile to note that progress pictures and body 92 00:05:18,040 --> 00:05:21,920 scans are often captured with minimal clothing to better 93 00:05:21,920 --> 00:05:24,520 showcase the progress of weight loss and muscle growth. 94 00:05:25,160 --> 00:05:28,120 Therefore, most of the leaked images might be the types of 95 00:05:28,520 --> 00:05:32,080 image that users normally wouldn't like to share and would 96 00:05:32,080 --> 00:05:36,440 like to keep private and not get out to anyone on the Internet. 97 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:40,120 Yeah. So in total, there was 373,000 98 00:05:40,120 --> 00:05:47,920 files shared 200 and six, 206,000 of these were the user 99 00:05:47,920 --> 00:05:52,880 profile photos and 138,000 were labelled as progress pics. 100 00:05:54,080 --> 00:05:58,800 So look, it's yeah, private photos on public servers. 101 00:05:58,880 --> 00:06:01,880 Like that's definitely a no. Surely. 102 00:06:02,320 --> 00:06:08,800 Yeah, yeah. The they should be kept secure. 103 00:06:08,800 --> 00:06:12,560 It's as simple as that. If you work for a business that 104 00:06:12,560 --> 00:06:17,600 has this kind of information about people, keep it safe, keep 105 00:06:17,600 --> 00:06:19,000 it secret. You think? 106 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:21,200 It's. You'll be the priority and 107 00:06:21,320 --> 00:06:26,520 building that sort of thing. It's clearly a mistake, isn't 108 00:06:26,520 --> 00:06:27,360 it? It has to be. 109 00:06:27,360 --> 00:06:30,000 It's clearly a faux pas. You know, it's, they haven't 110 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:36,800 done this on purpose, but it's, it's yeah, this is, it's, it's a 111 00:06:36,800 --> 00:06:39,080 big one. So you kind of trust as well 112 00:06:39,080 --> 00:06:42,040 that with a fitness app, your data is going to be kept safe. 113 00:06:42,160 --> 00:06:47,200 You know, I wouldn't want to share progress apps on Facebook 114 00:06:47,200 --> 00:06:50,720 or Instagram or Reddit, you know, where, where everyone can 115 00:06:50,720 --> 00:06:53,440 see. No, especially as it's got a lot 116 00:06:53,440 --> 00:06:57,920 of downloads, right, 25,000,000 installs across all platforms 117 00:06:58,640 --> 00:07:02,720 and it says about how these were accessible without passwords or 118 00:07:03,360 --> 00:07:07,520 any authentication. And it also says that there were 119 00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:10,920 hard coded secrets that could enable attacks to access more 120 00:07:11,000 --> 00:07:19,040 user data, so not ideal. No, no, yes. 121 00:07:19,040 --> 00:07:21,960 So please be really careful. I mean, you can't really do 122 00:07:21,960 --> 00:07:24,160 much. I mean, there's there's a sample 123 00:07:24,160 --> 00:07:26,920 image here. It's not even worth sharing the 124 00:07:26,920 --> 00:07:30,240 sample image because it's a pair of ankles and the rest of it's 125 00:07:30,240 --> 00:07:32,640 just blacked out. But I'm guessing that's because 126 00:07:32,640 --> 00:07:35,840 the rest of it was virtually nude and probably someone's 127 00:07:35,840 --> 00:07:39,080 standing in their underwear, which is how most progress 128 00:07:39,080 --> 00:07:41,440 picks. There's a Reddit again, there's 129 00:07:41,440 --> 00:07:45,480 a Reddit called slash R slash lose it, which is where people 130 00:07:45,680 --> 00:07:47,640 show how much weight they've lost. 131 00:07:48,240 --> 00:07:50,920 And quite often the progress picks on there and it are not 132 00:07:50,920 --> 00:07:54,080 safe for work. You have to Click to like, see 133 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:55,720 the picture. Something we'll come onto in a 134 00:07:55,720 --> 00:07:59,560 minute because, you know, there's a lot of flesh on the 135 00:07:59,560 --> 00:08:06,480 show. So, yeah, just if this was in 136 00:08:06,480 --> 00:08:08,600 the UK and they were M&S, there'd be a class action 137 00:08:08,600 --> 00:08:11,560 lawsuit against them now by some ambulance chasers like we spoke 138 00:08:11,560 --> 00:08:14,840 about previously that yeah, just really think about the data that 139 00:08:14,840 --> 00:08:17,120 you share and where you're sharing it. 140 00:08:17,320 --> 00:08:21,440 Maybe you want to keep those on your own phone and not in an app 141 00:08:21,440 --> 00:08:23,960 because you don't know who's built it, you don't know how 142 00:08:23,960 --> 00:08:27,560 good it is, you don't know where the data is sitting. 143 00:08:27,880 --> 00:08:32,480 You can't do. Most companies would do a like 144 00:08:32,480 --> 00:08:36,000 if that was a company sharing data with Fidify, they would 145 00:08:36,000 --> 00:08:39,000 probably get them to do a privacy screening assessment, 146 00:08:39,520 --> 00:08:42,159 which would ask them how their data is stored, who has access 147 00:08:42,159 --> 00:08:44,480 to it, where are the controls, all of that. 148 00:08:44,480 --> 00:08:47,120 And to meet certain compliance standards, you have to have all 149 00:08:47,120 --> 00:08:50,320 that. But as an end user, you just 150 00:08:50,320 --> 00:08:53,960 download an app and take a picture and it's don't just 151 00:08:53,960 --> 00:08:58,120 implicitly trust these apps. Yeah, cool. 152 00:08:58,520 --> 00:09:02,520 Right, on to the next one. Yeah, so this one was quite a 153 00:09:02,520 --> 00:09:05,680 big one this week. I'm sure everyone's heard about 154 00:09:05,680 --> 00:09:07,960 it. It was all over social media and 155 00:09:07,960 --> 00:09:09,280 probably all over LinkedIn as well. 156 00:09:10,760 --> 00:09:15,000 So yeah, we we transfer have come out now and said that 157 00:09:15,000 --> 00:09:19,840 they're not going to be training AI with with people's files 158 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:24,840 after this massive backlash. So obviously they came out with, 159 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:31,080 I believe, new terms of service and had some wording in there 160 00:09:31,080 --> 00:09:33,840 that people took in a certain way. 161 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:38,400 Let's have a quick quote. What did it say? 162 00:09:39,000 --> 00:09:41,120 So just to give people a bit of background, if you don't know, 163 00:09:41,120 --> 00:09:43,800 We Transfer is a file transfer service. 164 00:09:43,800 --> 00:09:47,960 So if it's a bit like Google Drive or Dropbox, it's it's very 165 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:51,280 much like Dropbox. You can upload a file to We 166 00:09:51,280 --> 00:09:53,600 Transfer and send someone the link. 167 00:09:54,040 --> 00:09:58,000 And it's a way to transfer big files, files that are too big to 168 00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:00,600 e-mail. It's a way to share them with 169 00:10:00,600 --> 00:10:01,800 someone. So it's used a lot in the 170 00:10:01,800 --> 00:10:07,600 creative industry, video design, graphic, it's used a lot in the 171 00:10:07,600 --> 00:10:09,840 creative industry. And we transfer as kind of one 172 00:10:09,840 --> 00:10:14,160 of the industry leaders in this kind of drag and drop share 173 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:18,240 space. Yeah, So it was supposed to be 174 00:10:18,800 --> 00:10:22,160 something that was going to come into effect on the 8th of August 175 00:10:22,160 --> 00:10:26,960 and basically said that they'd use the uploaded files to 176 00:10:26,960 --> 00:10:29,800 improve performance of their machine learning models. 177 00:10:32,160 --> 00:10:35,080 And obviously that was met with a lot of backlash and people 178 00:10:35,080 --> 00:10:38,080 saying that they're going to jump ship from using that 179 00:10:38,080 --> 00:10:41,080 platform. And yeah, obviously they've now 180 00:10:41,080 --> 00:10:46,480 come out in this BBBC News story where a spokesperson, A 181 00:10:46,480 --> 00:10:49,840 spokeswoman from We Transfer has said that they don't use machine 182 00:10:49,840 --> 00:10:53,240 learning or any form of AI to process content shared on We 183 00:10:53,240 --> 00:10:58,360 Transfer, and nor do they sell it or that the content or data 184 00:10:58,360 --> 00:11:00,720 to third parties. And then they've updated the 185 00:11:01,200 --> 00:11:04,920 terms of service to now clarify, saying that they've made the 186 00:11:04,920 --> 00:11:10,520 language easier to understand. It's all been a big 187 00:11:10,520 --> 00:11:12,520 misunderstanding. We weren't really going to do 188 00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:15,200 that, so we've just reworded it to make it clearer. 189 00:11:15,280 --> 00:11:16,720 Yeah. OK. 190 00:11:18,400 --> 00:11:22,000 It's it's funny, we've spoken before Vevida. 191 00:11:22,960 --> 00:11:25,960 Vevida are obviously security awareness company, cyber 192 00:11:25,960 --> 00:11:29,480 security awareness company that do escape rooms and Vevida reels 193 00:11:29,480 --> 00:11:33,720 the TikTok style videos. Simeon their their CEO reached 194 00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:37,200 out to me about this. Actually, he shared this with me 195 00:11:37,200 --> 00:11:42,240 in shock before the backtrack or the clarity had happened when it 196 00:11:42,240 --> 00:11:46,480 was first when news broke and it was we transfer a training AI on 197 00:11:46,480 --> 00:11:49,240 your files. He was like in shock. 198 00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:53,480 He's been a content creator for many years and we transfer, he's 199 00:11:53,480 --> 00:11:58,040 like one of their go to tools and he's it's just not OK that 200 00:11:58,040 --> 00:12:01,800 you're accessing all of my data and you're training AI on it to 201 00:12:01,800 --> 00:12:04,440 like make other people's stuff better. 202 00:12:04,440 --> 00:12:10,080 It's it was massive. And he highlighted another tool 203 00:12:10,080 --> 00:12:14,600 that they use, Capcart, that they've used in some elements 204 00:12:14,760 --> 00:12:16,240 that I don't think they use anymore. 205 00:12:16,760 --> 00:12:20,520 He's highlighted that because Capcart have also said they've 206 00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:23,880 changed their terms to say that they're training their AI on the 207 00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:28,920 content you share with them. Yeah, I think as well as 208 00:12:28,920 --> 00:12:34,120 mentioned about Dropbox back in 2023 had a similar thing I think 209 00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:37,960 where they had to clarify their terms of service about AI 210 00:12:37,960 --> 00:12:45,200 models. It's it's a tricky old world, 211 00:12:45,200 --> 00:12:45,920 isn't it? It's funny. 212 00:12:45,920 --> 00:12:50,600 I've got a funny enough you mentioned Dropbox. 213 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:55,000 I haven't seen this for Dropbox, but I saw this for cap carts. 214 00:12:55,000 --> 00:12:59,480 Someone a post a month ago on on Reddit. 215 00:12:59,960 --> 00:13:05,480 Someone of them asked ChatGPT to break down Cap Cut's terms of 216 00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:09,360 service, it says. Here's a clear eyed breakdown of 217 00:13:09,360 --> 00:13:12,000 the Cap Cut terms of service based on your request for 218 00:13:14,480 --> 00:13:17,040 expletive that takes advantage of users. 219 00:13:17,600 --> 00:13:20,160 While not every clause is malicious, several stand outs as 220 00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:23,160 exploitative, overreaching or unfairly skewed in favour of the 221 00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:26,560 company. SO and ChatGPT flags on this, it 222 00:13:26,560 --> 00:13:29,040 says content owning and ownership and licencing. 223 00:13:29,200 --> 00:13:32,960 You give them everything forever, you give them a 224 00:13:32,960 --> 00:13:35,360 permanent licence to use anything you upload. 225 00:13:35,520 --> 00:13:39,160 They can modify it and let others use it too forever for 226 00:13:39,160 --> 00:13:42,280 free. They even say that if your 227 00:13:42,280 --> 00:13:45,480 content involves music, you as the user must deal with the 228 00:13:45,480 --> 00:13:48,560 music rights and performance rights organisations and if 229 00:13:48,560 --> 00:13:50,000 there's any comeback, it's your fault. 230 00:13:51,800 --> 00:13:54,640 There's numerous other things. We'll put a link to this Reddit 231 00:13:54,640 --> 00:13:57,800 post in in the show notes. I won't go through it now, but 232 00:13:58,520 --> 00:14:01,960 basically they just completely wash their hands of it. 233 00:14:01,960 --> 00:14:05,640 In summary, it says there are some protective clauses, but 234 00:14:05,640 --> 00:14:09,120 many terms strip users of rights, push liability onto the 235 00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:13,520 user, and give the company free reign to exploit, modify, and 236 00:14:13,520 --> 00:14:15,520 profit from user content. So. 237 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:21,040 That's crazy. That's Capcart we transfer. 238 00:14:21,440 --> 00:14:25,440 Apparently we misunderstood the phrasing and they were never 239 00:14:25,440 --> 00:14:27,600 going to do this, so we'll. See. 240 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:33,400 Cool next story. Yes, right. 241 00:14:33,400 --> 00:14:38,840 Let me get that up. The next story tonight, this 242 00:14:38,840 --> 00:14:45,120 comes from IT Pro. And apparently, the headline on 243 00:14:45,120 --> 00:14:50,440 this reads, all U.S. forces must now assume their networks are 244 00:14:50,440 --> 00:14:53,840 compromised after the SALT Typhoon breach. 245 00:14:54,200 --> 00:15:00,800 So cybersecurity experts have issued a stark warning after the 246 00:15:00,960 --> 00:15:05,080 US state's National Guard network was breached. 247 00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:11,160 According to the Department of Defence, SALT Typhoon espionage 248 00:15:11,160 --> 00:15:17,000 group breached and laid low in the network for almost a year, 249 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:20,560 potentially accessing sensitive military and law enforcement 250 00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:25,880 data. So yeah, it's pretty, pretty 251 00:15:25,880 --> 00:15:27,840 shocking really. There's been a long running 252 00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:30,400 campaign that extensively compromised the National Guard 253 00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:33,240 network from March 24 to December 24. 254 00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:42,160 This follows similar cyber espionage attacks, including 255 00:15:42,160 --> 00:15:44,920 attacks on telecoms firms AT&T and Verizon. 256 00:15:45,760 --> 00:15:49,280 Verizon, sorry. In December last year, White 257 00:15:49,280 --> 00:15:51,520 House officials warn this particular campaign saw the 258 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:55,640 group access and record private conversations of very senior US 259 00:15:55,640 --> 00:16:00,080 political figures. There's been numerous instances 260 00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:02,960 across public and private sectors where sensitive 261 00:16:02,960 --> 00:16:05,520 information has been compromised by lateral movement. 262 00:16:05,720 --> 00:16:12,480 So in in the US. So yeah, it's, it's frightening, 263 00:16:12,480 --> 00:16:16,200 really. But just kind of title, Yeah, 264 00:16:16,200 --> 00:16:19,240 they just now have to assume it's all been compromised. 265 00:16:19,960 --> 00:16:22,640 So what do you do if it's connected to a Wi-Fi, you'll get 266 00:16:22,800 --> 00:16:24,200 got an Ethernet cable plugged in. 267 00:16:24,200 --> 00:16:28,240 You just assume it's compromised and everybody can see might be 268 00:16:28,240 --> 00:16:34,520 able to see everything. Yeah, I'm yet no one can release 269 00:16:34,520 --> 00:16:36,520 the Epstein files yet, but there we go. 270 00:16:36,520 --> 00:16:38,080 I won't get into that. That's all I'll say. 271 00:16:38,520 --> 00:16:40,760 It's funny like it it it's I did. 272 00:16:41,240 --> 00:16:43,160 I'm not going to get into that because that's like just 273 00:16:43,160 --> 00:16:45,520 something different. But I did hear something say, 274 00:16:45,520 --> 00:16:47,600 why doesn't someone just leak them? 275 00:16:48,880 --> 00:16:51,760 People won't leak them. The person that leaks something 276 00:16:51,760 --> 00:16:56,240 like the Epstein files, if they exist, is going to be the most 277 00:16:56,240 --> 00:17:00,240 haunted man or woman on the planet by the richest people. 278 00:17:00,240 --> 00:17:03,840 If you've ever seen things like the game or you know, like there 279 00:17:03,840 --> 00:17:08,119 was a film Michael Douglas who was like a manhunt for him or 280 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:10,160 the running Man, like the running man. 281 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:12,400 The trailer for the new film looks awesome. 282 00:17:12,839 --> 00:17:15,480 Like the whole country is out to get this one man. 283 00:17:15,960 --> 00:17:18,720 That's the person that would leak the Epstein files. 284 00:17:18,720 --> 00:17:21,319 They'd be like billion billionaires after them. 285 00:17:21,319 --> 00:17:27,000 So yeah, it's, it's safe to assume like big, big targets 286 00:17:27,000 --> 00:17:31,120 like this compromise and they don't even know it. 287 00:17:31,400 --> 00:17:36,240 Well, yeah, that's they won't be the only ones that's scary. 288 00:17:36,440 --> 00:17:40,120 No they won't. Yeah, yeah, that's pretty much 289 00:17:40,120 --> 00:17:44,000 all to say on that. I think this one's yours. 290 00:17:45,200 --> 00:17:50,400 Oh yes, the next story we have is how Reddit now, well, they're 291 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:55,600 going to be introducing age verification in the UK ahead of 292 00:17:55,720 --> 00:18:00,760 the rules, which they are from the Online Safety Act, and that 293 00:18:00,760 --> 00:18:04,880 requires sites that show adult material to introduce robust age 294 00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:10,520 checking techniques. So yeah, obviously Reddit is an 295 00:18:10,720 --> 00:18:13,320 online community discussion forum. 296 00:18:13,320 --> 00:18:17,880 So yeah, a lot of people want to stay anonymous in there as much 297 00:18:17,880 --> 00:18:20,360 as they can unless they want to obviously expose who they are 298 00:18:21,480 --> 00:18:24,920 with with their posts and stuff. But I guess that, yeah, this is 299 00:18:24,920 --> 00:18:29,240 sort of more of a child safety thing, although it's probably 300 00:18:29,240 --> 00:18:32,400 like an age of requirement of what, what, what what spread 301 00:18:32,400 --> 00:18:34,120 it's age requirement for you? 13 years older. 302 00:18:34,120 --> 00:18:37,560 Is it 18? Yeah, 13, but this is for this 303 00:18:37,560 --> 00:18:41,120 is for like the not safe for work content, isn't it, or, or 304 00:18:41,120 --> 00:18:47,800 the more adult topics. So Reddit maybe, maybe 17 plus 305 00:18:47,800 --> 00:18:52,160 for Reddit but I don't know what's the latest on it but. 306 00:18:53,120 --> 00:18:55,040 It's pretty open and free. Yeah, it's. 307 00:18:55,280 --> 00:18:58,320 Yeah, there's no cheques at the moment, so that's what they want 308 00:18:58,320 --> 00:19:03,320 to add in. The UK's Online Safety Act seems 309 00:19:03,320 --> 00:19:08,560 to be leading the way on this. But it's not the only place, is 310 00:19:08,560 --> 00:19:12,440 it so? No, indeed, this news article, 311 00:19:12,840 --> 00:19:16,400 the, the one that has seen it mentioned was that I'd seen 312 00:19:16,400 --> 00:19:21,720 mentioned before in other news stories was things like adult 313 00:19:21,720 --> 00:19:25,560 websites. So yeah, they're all bringing it 314 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:28,560 in and it's the, the approach they're taking with this. 315 00:19:28,560 --> 00:19:31,240 I think it's quite interesting because they're offloading it to 316 00:19:31,240 --> 00:19:36,520 a third party. So and there's data privacy 317 00:19:36,640 --> 00:19:40,200 reasons for that. Like you have to, you have to 318 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:44,360 like take to provide government ID in like a photo or something 319 00:19:44,360 --> 00:19:49,840 like that. So obviously Reddit don't want 320 00:19:49,840 --> 00:19:52,280 this data. And then if you've got a company 321 00:19:52,280 --> 00:19:56,000 that is an ID or Reddit gets your age, like yes, we confirm 322 00:19:56,000 --> 00:20:00,440 that this user is 18. So which means maybe they don't 323 00:20:00,440 --> 00:20:04,320 even get your details. Maybe. 324 00:20:05,480 --> 00:20:07,120 Maybe they just get your username. 325 00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:13,360 It's interesting, don't quite know because it says that from 326 00:20:13,360 --> 00:20:19,560 the 14th of July, but I haven't seen anything on that, so I 327 00:20:19,920 --> 00:20:21,400 don't know if that's actually in place yet. 328 00:20:21,400 --> 00:20:24,800 But yeah, it says how? Yeah, they're using that third 329 00:20:24,800 --> 00:20:30,440 party persona. Yeah, who will need a selfie or 330 00:20:30,440 --> 00:20:35,200 a government ID and passport they've added as well. 331 00:20:35,200 --> 00:20:38,720 How percent of promises not to retain the picture for longer 332 00:20:38,720 --> 00:20:41,040 than 7 days? It does. 333 00:20:41,040 --> 00:20:44,400 It does make you wonder, Dave David on the article it says 334 00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:47,440 David Greene, civil liberties director at the Electronic 335 00:20:47,440 --> 00:20:51,240 Frontier Foundation, said that this whole UK Online Safety Act 336 00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:55,480 is tragedy because we can't use the Internet without having to 337 00:20:55,480 --> 00:20:57,960 provide their papers, as it were. 338 00:20:59,400 --> 00:21:02,680 And he's disappointed that Reddit aren't challenging the 339 00:21:02,680 --> 00:21:06,400 law now. Apple in some ways are because 340 00:21:06,400 --> 00:21:09,240 they're still fighting that encryption and was it Meta have 341 00:21:09,240 --> 00:21:13,560 gone in with them or WhatsApp have gone in Yeah, well, 342 00:21:13,680 --> 00:21:15,560 someone. Someone WhatsApp I think it was. 343 00:21:16,040 --> 00:21:18,840 I think it was met yeah, Meta because of WhatsApp. 344 00:21:19,560 --> 00:21:23,560 But yeah, I mean, I suppose Reddit are picking the fight and 345 00:21:23,560 --> 00:21:27,160 they're like, we don't want to fight the UK government, but it 346 00:21:27,680 --> 00:21:29,320 there will come a time where they'll go. 347 00:21:29,320 --> 00:21:31,280 It's in the interest of national security. 348 00:21:31,280 --> 00:21:34,160 The persona must hand over this data so we can track who's been 349 00:21:34,160 --> 00:21:37,840 looking at, you know, the wrong type of thing on the Internet. 350 00:21:38,560 --> 00:21:41,160 Yeah. Just one more thing to add I 351 00:21:41,160 --> 00:21:45,920 guess is how Ofcom, the UK regulators expect because 352 00:21:45,920 --> 00:21:50,320 they're expecting other companies to follow with this or 353 00:21:50,320 --> 00:21:52,120 face enforcement if they fail to act. 354 00:21:52,120 --> 00:21:59,840 So not quite sure what that and finds 4 to 18 million or 10% of 355 00:21:59,840 --> 00:22:04,480 worldwide revenue. That's a lot of money. 356 00:22:05,440 --> 00:22:07,960 That's that's why they want to probably just get on board 357 00:22:07,960 --> 00:22:08,720 that's. Bigger. 358 00:22:09,120 --> 00:22:15,480 That's bigger than a GDPR breach from the ICO, which is 17 and a 359 00:22:15,480 --> 00:22:19,800 half million or 4% of annual global turnover. 360 00:22:20,040 --> 00:22:25,520 Yeah, so the rules come into force on the 25th of July, but 361 00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:29,520 Reddit has started already. But I mean, I haven't heard much 362 00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:34,680 about it or seen anything. The last line of the article 363 00:22:34,680 --> 00:22:39,000 says in the most serious cases it can seek a core order for 364 00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:43,160 business disruption measures, such as requiring payment 365 00:22:43,160 --> 00:22:46,080 providers or advertisers to withdraw their services from a 366 00:22:46,080 --> 00:22:50,600 platform or requiring ISPs, Internet service providers, to 367 00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:52,520 block access to a site in the UK. 368 00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:56,640 Oh well. So they will literally if you 369 00:22:56,640 --> 00:22:59,960 don't conform to this, we can stop your website working in the 370 00:22:59,960 --> 00:23:01,240 UK. That's massive. 371 00:23:02,920 --> 00:23:06,000 That's mad, isn't it? That's insane. 372 00:23:07,120 --> 00:23:09,360 It's completely unrelated, but I am. 373 00:23:10,600 --> 00:23:13,680 I doubt I I got a link to AI. Can't remember what it was 374 00:23:13,680 --> 00:23:18,480 called now. I got a link to a radio service. 375 00:23:20,440 --> 00:23:24,600 It was like a, it wasn't he's an app, but it was a website and it 376 00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:27,760 was like, you can listen to lots of local radio stations all over 377 00:23:27,760 --> 00:23:29,240 the world. Social media. 378 00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:32,400 But then a disclaimer came up and it said in the UK you can 379 00:23:32,400 --> 00:23:35,280 only access UK radio stations due to copyright. 380 00:23:36,640 --> 00:23:39,800 So you can see all these lovely dots all over the globe, all 381 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:43,040 these amazing radio stations in all these weird and wonderful 382 00:23:43,040 --> 00:23:46,160 places, but in the UK you're not allowed to listen to them 383 00:23:46,160 --> 00:23:49,880 because of copyright. It's kind of VPN I guess that's 384 00:23:49,880 --> 00:23:53,000 what most people would do. So you turn on your VPN and 385 00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:55,760 access them anyway. Now you just. 386 00:23:55,760 --> 00:24:00,880 Yeah, yeah. Which I wonder, like I'm sorry, 387 00:24:00,880 --> 00:24:06,960 but is this just oh, if this is just in the UK, what is to stop 388 00:24:07,200 --> 00:24:12,040 a 15 year old lad downloading AVPN, turning it on and then 389 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:15,080 accessing a site he wants or looking at stuff on Reddit? 390 00:24:16,360 --> 00:24:20,040 Yeah, yeah, I. Mean the step in the right 391 00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:23,080 direction in the way, but it's going to be work around as with 392 00:24:23,080 --> 00:24:26,320 everything. As a as a parent, I'm really. 393 00:24:26,320 --> 00:24:31,520 As a parent, I'm really torn. Like I don't think it's enough 394 00:24:32,360 --> 00:24:37,040 because I don't think, like where where do you draw the line 395 00:24:37,040 --> 00:24:40,120 on the content as well? Because a Google search can show 396 00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:43,200 offensive stuff. So that is a Google search. 397 00:24:43,280 --> 00:24:46,200 Maybe to turn off safe search on Google, you're going to have to 398 00:24:46,800 --> 00:24:49,240 provide government. I I don't know. 399 00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:53,480 It's yeah, I'll tell you what, the ID business is probably a 400 00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:54,760 good business to be in right now. 401 00:24:55,800 --> 00:24:58,920 Yeah, people like persona, you know, they're going to get, 402 00:24:58,920 --> 00:25:01,640 they're like, come to us, everyone come to us. 403 00:25:02,440 --> 00:25:06,160 And then there'll be a right target if any exposed Google, 404 00:25:06,440 --> 00:25:10,560 Google storage there to. They're going to be like these. 405 00:25:10,560 --> 00:25:14,120 These handful of companies are going to have the identity data 406 00:25:14,800 --> 00:25:19,800 for lots of people interested. Yeah, well, they said they'll 407 00:25:19,800 --> 00:25:22,520 delete it after the days, so well, we'll see. 408 00:25:23,200 --> 00:25:25,760 This will be some records I'm sure we have to see. 409 00:25:25,760 --> 00:25:29,360 If that's true, there'll be a backup somewhere, someone, not 410 00:25:29,360 --> 00:25:32,920 the same persona, but there'll be other people somewhere. 411 00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:37,720 Yeah, test data or something. Right. 412 00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:41,760 Moving on to the next story. This is really timely actually 413 00:25:41,760 --> 00:25:45,880 because I've just covered this in a piece of, I've just, we've 414 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:49,960 just made some training and we use this as an example. 415 00:25:50,680 --> 00:25:53,680 So and then I saw this and I was like, wow, what a coincidence. 416 00:25:54,280 --> 00:26:00,160 UK pet owners have been targeted by fake microchip renewal scams. 417 00:26:00,960 --> 00:26:04,480 So thousands of pet owners have reported receiving emails 418 00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:08,280 claiming their pets micro microchip registration is about 419 00:26:08,280 --> 00:26:12,720 to expire, urging them to pay a renewal fee through sites like 420 00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:16,760 petchip.info. These messages look legitimate, 421 00:26:17,000 --> 00:26:21,560 they include the pets name, breed, age and even microchip 422 00:26:21,560 --> 00:26:24,440 number. But the key thing here, as a pet 423 00:26:24,440 --> 00:26:27,920 owner, I know microchips don't expire. 424 00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:31,560 There's no registration, there's no subscription and the 425 00:26:31,560 --> 00:26:34,080 government doesn't charge annual fees. 426 00:26:34,080 --> 00:26:35,720 It's there's. No. 427 00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:39,640 Pay to get Yeah, yeah. Yeah. 428 00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:43,040 You pay the vet for the insertion and that's it. 429 00:26:44,160 --> 00:26:46,400 These messages are scams designed to collect payment and 430 00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:50,240 personal details. But the level of personalisation 431 00:26:50,240 --> 00:26:54,280 has raised questions around where the data's coming from. 432 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:59,480 So Pentest partners have issued a report and they say the issue 433 00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:04,520 isn't just phishing, it's about how the microchip databases 434 00:27:04,520 --> 00:27:09,320 manage access to sensitive data. They found that several 435 00:27:09,320 --> 00:27:12,880 platforms allow users to enter a microchip ID to receive pet 436 00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:17,280 details without any real limits. So these chip numbers are 437 00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:20,280 predictable. So attackers can guess large 438 00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:23,000 batches of ID. So you could literally go paste 439 00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:25,600 in an ID, it give you the details, paste in an ID, give 440 00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:28,320 you the paste in an ID paste, and you could do that all day 441 00:27:28,320 --> 00:27:31,960 and at no point it'd go hang on a minute why you've got asking 442 00:27:31,960 --> 00:27:37,600 for so many IDs. So the PET chip, whoever manages 443 00:27:37,600 --> 00:27:40,200 the pet chip databases and looks after those, they need to up 444 00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:44,040 their game and increase the security on those like pronto 445 00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:47,880 because you've got names, addresses, pet names. 446 00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:52,920 It's funny, the way, the way this came to relevance for me 447 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:58,200 was we were doing something on social media and be careful, be 448 00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:00,960 careful what you share, how much information you share on social 449 00:28:00,960 --> 00:28:03,400 media. And one of the examples we gave 450 00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:05,400 was like a Twitter feed, I think it was. 451 00:28:05,400 --> 00:28:08,040 And it was like, oh, look at my new puppies, blah, blah, blah. 452 00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:12,760 And you know, you think about when we put this together, I 453 00:28:12,760 --> 00:28:15,440 thought, oh, pet names for passwords, right? 454 00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:18,120 So maybe it's, it would help guess a pet name. 455 00:28:18,120 --> 00:28:21,760 Like for a period of time, someone close to me used their 456 00:28:21,760 --> 00:28:24,080 old dog's name as part of their password. 457 00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:28,640 It's quite common. But actually, when this training 458 00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:32,520 was all built, the guy that built it actually used it for 459 00:28:32,520 --> 00:28:35,960 this exact reason. He was like, no, I'm going to 460 00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:41,160 say that your pet needs. I think it was actually a chip 461 00:28:41,160 --> 00:28:43,200 registration. I was like, Oh my God, that's 462 00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:44,840 them. So when I saw this, it was 463 00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:47,320 brilliant. And it just goes to show they'll 464 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:51,360 do anything. Yeah, hackers or cyber criminals 465 00:28:51,400 --> 00:28:54,640 will, you know, if they can find something and if there's an 466 00:28:54,640 --> 00:28:58,400 angle, if there's a cyber criminal angle, maybe that 467 00:28:58,400 --> 00:29:00,400 should be the dark side podcast that we do. 468 00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:03,040 Maybe we should do one of these talking about the good and then 469 00:29:03,480 --> 00:29:05,760 put our hoods up and. Talk about the bad stuff. 470 00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:11,280 Yeah. So yes, it's be really, if it 471 00:29:11,280 --> 00:29:14,480 feels unusual or out of the ordinary, be really, really 472 00:29:14,480 --> 00:29:19,400 careful, you know, deal with it. If you've never done it before, 473 00:29:20,040 --> 00:29:21,760 just deal with it with suspicion. 474 00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:25,080 And I'll tell you what. Pet ship.info, the thing they 475 00:29:25,080 --> 00:29:30,880 mentioned, the website works. There's a website there and 476 00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:36,120 it's, oh, it's, it's ugly. It's really, it looks like it's 477 00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:39,960 25 years old, right? But there's a you can select the 478 00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:43,440 language, it's got today's date, and then it just asks you to 479 00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:45,880 insert a microchip number. Right. 480 00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:50,080 Yeah. Yeah. 481 00:29:50,320 --> 00:29:52,480 So I'm not going to put my I don't know what my pet's 482 00:29:52,480 --> 00:29:55,320 microchip number is because I don't need to know. 483 00:29:55,320 --> 00:29:57,840 Yeah, I. Mean there's most things with 484 00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:01,120 these these sorts of unexpected all slightly strange things. 485 00:30:01,120 --> 00:30:05,680 Just yeah, check with whoever like in this case you can ask 486 00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:10,840 your vet to double check or absolutely yeah, contact to your 487 00:30:11,040 --> 00:30:15,360 pet chip break a chip is with and ask them sort of thing. 488 00:30:17,760 --> 00:30:22,160 This brings us back as well to the whole have I been poned? 489 00:30:22,160 --> 00:30:25,560 We've spoken about before database of like breaches and 490 00:30:25,720 --> 00:30:27,720 where your data has been exposed. 491 00:30:28,480 --> 00:30:31,480 This is why I don't see much value in that anymore, right? 492 00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:35,400 Because we should all assume that our data is out there the 493 00:30:35,400 --> 00:30:39,160 size of some of these breaches. Now, when have I been I've 494 00:30:39,160 --> 00:30:41,800 worked in cyber, When have I been poned came out and it was 495 00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:43,920 like revolutionary. It was amazing. 496 00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:46,320 And every time a new one dropped, you were like, Oh my 497 00:30:46,320 --> 00:30:50,080 God, you know, I remember getting caught in one for some 498 00:30:50,680 --> 00:30:55,040 mixtape website and it was like, Oh my God, that's made it on to 499 00:30:55,040 --> 00:30:57,800 have I been poned. It's amazing that that Piff had 500 00:30:57,800 --> 00:31:01,600 like made it onto the list. And it's like, but now there's 501 00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:04,440 so much out there and it happens all the time and a lot of it 502 00:31:04,440 --> 00:31:07,560 doesn't make the news anymore because it's only the massive 503 00:31:07,560 --> 00:31:10,560 ones that do. So we should be suspicious of 504 00:31:10,560 --> 00:31:15,040 anything that comes in that's slightly unusual because this 505 00:31:15,040 --> 00:31:18,720 fishing can now be really personalised and really targeted 506 00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:21,480 people. It's not difficult to build a 507 00:31:21,480 --> 00:31:25,120 real accurate profile of some people, a lot of people. 508 00:31:25,120 --> 00:31:30,720 So yeah, just be sceptical. Right. 509 00:31:31,560 --> 00:31:33,480 Next story, Sir. Cool. 510 00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:37,760 Yeah. So next one we've got is a story 511 00:31:37,760 --> 00:31:42,680 around how Indian police have raided tech support scam call 512 00:31:42,680 --> 00:31:49,400 centres and then, yeah, busted local summer fraud gang who were 513 00:31:49,400 --> 00:31:53,200 accused of GP in UKUS and Australian victims with tech 514 00:31:53,200 --> 00:31:58,560 tech support scams. And yeah, it says here about how 515 00:31:58,560 --> 00:32:02,640 officers from the Central Bureau of Investigation have raided a 516 00:32:02,640 --> 00:32:08,880 call centre used by the group in Noida, Uttar Pradesh and of 517 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:11,720 France. I think it's Uttar Pradesh. 518 00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:13,880 Yeah. I I could also have that wrong, 519 00:32:13,880 --> 00:32:16,720 but I think it's Uttar Pradesh, yeah. 520 00:32:17,200 --> 00:32:23,160 So that was last week and there was an 18 month operation where 521 00:32:23,160 --> 00:32:30,080 they teamed up with the NCA and the FBI and Microsoft basically. 522 00:32:30,080 --> 00:32:33,840 I mean, what a team, what, what, what like that's like some 523 00:32:34,200 --> 00:32:37,760 international, you've got the one of the biggest computing 524 00:32:37,760 --> 00:32:42,320 companies in the world, National Crime Agency and the FBI just 525 00:32:42,320 --> 00:32:43,680 about to come through your front door. 526 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:49,600 Yeah, that's so, yeah, they basically identified the group 527 00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:55,000 who are part of the as part of the Operation Shakravi. 528 00:32:56,000 --> 00:32:58,120 So I guess it's probably not the first one they've done. 529 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:04,040 And yeah, basically carries on to say how UK victims at least 530 00:33:04,040 --> 00:33:08,840 have lost 309,000 lbs after receiving these. 531 00:33:09,920 --> 00:33:13,720 Yeah, pop ups on the computers. So the machine's been hacked and 532 00:33:13,720 --> 00:33:16,640 then obviously it says phone this number, people falling 533 00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:20,720 through to these scammers and a trick to pay to fix an issue 534 00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:29,560 that doesn't exist. Yeah, it's quite a interesting 535 00:33:29,560 --> 00:33:33,040 one. But I this is about over 100 536 00:33:33,040 --> 00:33:37,480 victims from the UK identified by a National Crime Agency and 537 00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:42,440 they obviously had liaised with US and India to coordinate this 538 00:33:42,440 --> 00:33:49,120 operation. Do you know I had I years ago, I 539 00:33:49,120 --> 00:33:54,600 remember what must it be? I remember where I was living. 540 00:33:54,600 --> 00:33:57,240 I must have been, it must have been about 9-8 or nine years 541 00:33:57,240 --> 00:34:01,640 ago, I got a scam call from someone pretending to be my 542 00:34:01,640 --> 00:34:04,520 Internet service provider that said my computer had been hacked 543 00:34:04,960 --> 00:34:07,000 and obviously working in ITI was like, here we go. 544 00:34:07,920 --> 00:34:10,320 And I was like, oh, OK, yeah, oh, thanks for telling me. 545 00:34:10,320 --> 00:34:11,960 Thanks. And then they were like, yeah, 546 00:34:11,960 --> 00:34:14,719 we, we've received, we've noticed activity from your 547 00:34:14,719 --> 00:34:17,520 computer that Microsoft, that's who they said they were calling 548 00:34:17,520 --> 00:34:18,560 from. They said, we're calling from 549 00:34:18,560 --> 00:34:20,679 Microsoft. We've noticed some issues with 550 00:34:20,679 --> 00:34:25,199 your Windows computer. Can we help fix them? 551 00:34:25,199 --> 00:34:26,560 And I was like, yeah, that's brilliant. 552 00:34:26,960 --> 00:34:29,320 So that basically they asked me to go somewhere and I can't 553 00:34:29,320 --> 00:34:32,120 remember where now, but they asked me to go somewhere on my 554 00:34:32,120 --> 00:34:33,760 computer. They were like, right, go here. 555 00:34:33,760 --> 00:34:37,440 And I'm like, Yep, and go here. And wherever it was, it was 556 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:40,639 somewhere that errors would normally appear like everyday 557 00:34:40,639 --> 00:34:44,840 like it, I can't remember. It was some it wasn't, it wasn't 558 00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:47,480 registry, but it was, it was somewhere where there would 559 00:34:47,679 --> 00:34:52,239 where you'd normally see errors because things in the background 560 00:34:52,239 --> 00:34:54,800 just fall over or don't work and it doesn't affect it. 561 00:34:55,280 --> 00:34:57,480 And they were like, all of this, your computer's broken. 562 00:34:57,480 --> 00:34:59,920 All of this is suspicious activity. 563 00:34:59,920 --> 00:35:03,120 You know, we need to get on your device, go to this website and 564 00:35:03,120 --> 00:35:04,880 download this remote access tool. 565 00:35:05,160 --> 00:35:08,320 And this is 9 years ago. And at that point I was like, 566 00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:10,080 no, I'm not doing that because I know you're a scam. 567 00:35:10,440 --> 00:35:12,200 They're like, no, we're not. And I'm like, I know you're a 568 00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:13,560 scam. I work in ITI know you're a 569 00:35:13,560 --> 00:35:14,400 scam. And hung up. 570 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:19,240 And then they called me back and laughed down the phone at me. 571 00:35:19,920 --> 00:35:23,440 So I hung up and then they called me back again and just 572 00:35:23,440 --> 00:35:26,520 there was like two or three of them just going ha ha ha ha ha 573 00:35:27,960 --> 00:35:29,240 ha. And I just left it on the side 574 00:35:29,240 --> 00:35:31,440 and eventually it cut off and they must have moved on to their 575 00:35:31,440 --> 00:35:35,400 next victim. Like it's when you're on the 576 00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:38,560 front end of these, it's they're quite convinced. 577 00:35:38,560 --> 00:35:41,040 If you didn't know, they are quite convincing. 578 00:35:41,160 --> 00:35:44,000 So they deserve everything they get because it's. 579 00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:47,520 Yeah, obviously. Yeah, these things, that's 580 00:35:47,560 --> 00:35:51,920 right. I mean it's obviously pretty 581 00:35:51,920 --> 00:35:58,400 common thing with fake virus letters and they could be like a 582 00:35:59,760 --> 00:36:02,920 you go to a website and it asks to show you notifications and 583 00:36:02,920 --> 00:36:07,520 you take yes backs then and then it pops up saying fake like a 584 00:36:07,520 --> 00:36:10,360 fake alert saying you've got a virus furnace number. 585 00:36:11,400 --> 00:36:15,280 Maybe think as well the PayPal scam you had quite a while ago, 586 00:36:15,280 --> 00:36:20,160 which you have a video on where they used the PayPal money 587 00:36:20,160 --> 00:36:22,800 request to get you to call up a fake PayPal scam. 588 00:36:22,800 --> 00:36:26,240 So it's all pretty simple stuff. Same we. 589 00:36:26,240 --> 00:36:29,280 Did a video back when we worked together, we did a video on 590 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:33,360 Chrome notifications, didn't we? Because when you visit websites 591 00:36:33,360 --> 00:36:35,880 on Chrome and it'll ask you if you want to allow or block 592 00:36:35,880 --> 00:36:38,240 notifications. This website wants to send you 593 00:36:38,240 --> 00:36:41,480 notifications. If you send, if you say allow on 594 00:36:41,480 --> 00:36:45,080 a lot of websites, you'll end up getting peppered with stuff down 595 00:36:45,080 --> 00:36:47,720 that like that look like a proper Chrome notification and 596 00:36:47,720 --> 00:36:51,520 say you've got a virus, your machine is infected and it's 597 00:36:51,520 --> 00:36:53,280 not, it's just a fake notification. 598 00:36:53,280 --> 00:36:57,200 It's one of these, it's a it's a fake scare wear pop up that 599 00:36:57,200 --> 00:36:59,560 would encourage you to call a number that would lead you 600 00:36:59,560 --> 00:37:03,680 through to a contact centre like this that the FBI is waiting at 601 00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:07,200 the front door. Yeah, I think one, one thing to 602 00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:12,080 decide I guess is I've wanted is to educate people, especially 603 00:37:12,080 --> 00:37:16,880 like family members and like older people using computers and 604 00:37:16,880 --> 00:37:20,800 stuff that might panic and see this and want to fix it. 605 00:37:21,560 --> 00:37:24,440 I guess just reminding, like, are Microsoft ever going to 606 00:37:24,440 --> 00:37:27,120 contact you to tell you something's wrong? 607 00:37:27,240 --> 00:37:31,280 Microsoft will never, ever contact you to tell you 608 00:37:31,280 --> 00:37:34,720 something's wrong. Neither I I don't think your ISP 609 00:37:34,720 --> 00:37:39,240 would buy the phone either. I don't think BT, Virgin, 610 00:37:39,240 --> 00:37:42,880 Verizon, you know who, whoever, wherever you are in the world, 611 00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:45,400 whoever you get your Internet from, I don't think they're ever 612 00:37:45,400 --> 00:37:47,600 going to pick up the phone and call you say there's a problem 613 00:37:47,600 --> 00:37:50,120 on your computer. I just don't think it happens. 614 00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:54,480 Yeah. They're more likely to just turn 615 00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,280 turn off your Internet connection and wait for you to 616 00:37:58,280 --> 00:38:02,120 call them. Yeah. 617 00:38:04,000 --> 00:38:07,040 Right, next one, on to the next one. 618 00:38:07,040 --> 00:38:08,760 I saw this. I'm not going to go into lots of 619 00:38:08,760 --> 00:38:13,080 details about this because it's a little political and a little 620 00:38:13,080 --> 00:38:16,280 sensitive, but I thought this was interesting because it just 621 00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:21,720 goes to show the human impact that some of these things can 622 00:38:21,720 --> 00:38:25,160 have a case. So this is a story that I saw on 623 00:38:25,160 --> 00:38:29,160 the BBC News. Thousands of Afghans were moved 624 00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:33,840 to the UK in a secret scheme after a data breach. 625 00:38:34,800 --> 00:38:38,160 So this has been spoken about in Parliament here in the UK, but 626 00:38:38,160 --> 00:38:44,440 basically the secret scheme was set up after a British official 627 00:38:44,960 --> 00:38:49,520 inadvertently leaked their data in February 2022. 628 00:38:49,840 --> 00:38:54,520 The personal details of nearly 19,000 people who had applied to 629 00:38:54,520 --> 00:38:58,760 move to the UK after the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan were 630 00:38:58,760 --> 00:39:02,400 leaked. So the previous government, not 631 00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:04,560 the one in power now, but the previous government here in the 632 00:39:04,560 --> 00:39:09,640 UK, left the breach in August 2023 when some of the details 633 00:39:09,640 --> 00:39:13,840 appeared on Facebook. A resettlement scheme for those 634 00:39:13,840 --> 00:39:17,880 on the leaked list was set up nine months later and has seen 4 635 00:39:17,880 --> 00:39:21,000 1/2 thousand Afghans arrive in the UK so far. 636 00:39:21,680 --> 00:39:25,600 But the existence of this is this is the existence of the 637 00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:28,760 leak and the relocations were kept secret because the 638 00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:33,360 government obtained a super injunction stopping it becoming 639 00:39:33,360 --> 00:39:40,160 public. So this only came to light on 640 00:39:40,160 --> 00:39:43,840 Tuesday this week after a High Court judge ruled that the 641 00:39:43,840 --> 00:39:48,080 gagging order should be lifted. So the leak contained the names, 642 00:39:48,360 --> 00:39:52,680 the contact details and some family information of people 643 00:39:52,680 --> 00:39:54,720 potentially at risk of harm from the Taliban. 644 00:39:56,440 --> 00:40:01,040 It's that there's the BBC's got a couple of different dives into 645 00:40:01,040 --> 00:40:06,040 this that talks about this story and then why this is important. 646 00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:13,000 But this a data breach. These are thousands of people 647 00:40:13,240 --> 00:40:15,440 have had to move thousands of miles. 648 00:40:15,840 --> 00:40:19,520 To a different country because of a daily breach because their 649 00:40:19,520 --> 00:40:23,520 lives were at risk if they stayed that's like that's the 650 00:40:23,680 --> 00:40:27,680 real world impact that some of these things can have yeah so 651 00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:31,960 it's. It's quite crazy so as well how 652 00:40:31,960 --> 00:40:36,640 it was because they the person sent a e-mail with the 653 00:40:36,640 --> 00:40:41,520 spreadsheet to the wrong people and it's so simple and was they 654 00:40:41,520 --> 00:40:45,160 said it is outside of the authorised sort of process for 655 00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:49,000 doing that. So it's it's just a human error 656 00:40:49,400 --> 00:40:52,360 that's caused this huge, huge issue. 657 00:40:53,200 --> 00:41:02,280 Now I some people would probably say that uses to blame these 658 00:41:02,280 --> 00:41:07,560 things happen right? We in every organisation people 659 00:41:07,800 --> 00:41:09,880 get a name. I emailed someone this week. 660 00:41:10,320 --> 00:41:14,600 I got relatively new in the business, was told a name, chose 661 00:41:14,600 --> 00:41:16,040 the name. It was the wrong person, right? 662 00:41:16,040 --> 00:41:19,680 This can happen. But what we need to ensure is 663 00:41:19,680 --> 00:41:23,760 that we have systems in place that if there's certain data 664 00:41:23,760 --> 00:41:26,800 involved, it doesn't allow you to make a mistake. 665 00:41:27,320 --> 00:41:31,720 I think that's, and these tools, like there's companies out there 666 00:41:31,920 --> 00:41:35,200 that do this and they've got good price, like they've got 667 00:41:35,200 --> 00:41:37,280 significant price tags associated with them. 668 00:41:38,120 --> 00:41:41,440 But then why don't Google, Why don't Outlook go and buy these 669 00:41:41,440 --> 00:41:42,840 companies? They've got the money. 670 00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:45,440 I don't think they'll buy these companies or make the technology 671 00:41:45,440 --> 00:41:47,840 themselves that stops this from happening. 672 00:41:47,840 --> 00:41:54,160 It's users poor, poor users having to deal with systems that 673 00:41:54,160 --> 00:42:00,360 don't fix this. I think that's, so this is I, I 674 00:42:00,360 --> 00:42:04,520 hadn't read that part, that it was a e-mail attachment to the 675 00:42:04,520 --> 00:42:10,160 wrong person. It's if that person knows that 676 00:42:10,160 --> 00:42:13,440 their actions led to this, I hope they've received the 677 00:42:13,440 --> 00:42:16,560 support that they deserve and they're not like, I hope they're 678 00:42:16,560 --> 00:42:20,080 not feeling guilty about it because it's not their fault. 679 00:42:20,640 --> 00:42:23,080 It's an honest mistake, probably. 680 00:42:23,560 --> 00:42:26,960 Yeah, far as I'm or I wasn't intentional. 681 00:42:29,160 --> 00:42:32,080 Yeah. It just goes to show, doesn't 682 00:42:32,080 --> 00:42:39,080 it, that, you know, inside a risk, it's accidental that we 683 00:42:39,080 --> 00:42:43,760 really need to worry about. It's not necessarily, it's not 684 00:42:43,760 --> 00:42:45,760 the malicious actors in our organisation. 685 00:42:45,840 --> 00:42:48,960 It's these things going to happen really, really easily, 686 00:42:49,640 --> 00:42:52,200 accidentally. And that's, yeah, it's 687 00:42:52,200 --> 00:42:53,320 terrifying. Yeah. 688 00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:57,080 It's, yeah, we need better systems. 689 00:42:57,080 --> 00:43:01,080 We need better that that don't. And companies shouldn't be held 690 00:43:01,080 --> 00:43:02,640 to ransom because they can't afford them. 691 00:43:03,040 --> 00:43:04,840 That's why that's kind of what I'm getting at. 692 00:43:06,000 --> 00:43:10,080 And I think these simple cheques should be in place for the when 693 00:43:10,080 --> 00:43:14,200 you send an e-mail, it should sort of, you'd think, have some 694 00:43:14,240 --> 00:43:16,200 it's. Not like you're sending 36 695 00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:18,520 names, 36,000 names and addresses. 696 00:43:18,520 --> 00:43:19,720 Are you sure you want to do that? 697 00:43:19,720 --> 00:43:21,920 Click Yes or No. Especially if you, if you've 698 00:43:21,920 --> 00:43:25,240 sent it to a bunch of people. Yeah. 699 00:43:25,240 --> 00:43:30,080 Not this one person. Yeah, yeah, yeah. 700 00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:35,240 So, yeah, it's it's a good story to use if if you're considering 701 00:43:35,240 --> 00:43:40,840 stuff about inside a risk that's like the you won't get a story 702 00:43:40,840 --> 00:43:48,280 with a bigger impact than that. How like war people, you know, 703 00:43:48,720 --> 00:43:53,880 struggling people having to relocate thousands of miles, but 704 00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:57,360 the cost, the whole cost associated with that one e-mail, 705 00:43:57,920 --> 00:44:01,800 the UK government having to lift and shift thousands of people. 706 00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:10,560 And that one person like I really hope they're OK, if they 707 00:44:10,560 --> 00:44:12,360 even if they even know it was them. 708 00:44:12,360 --> 00:44:15,440 Hopefully they don't. This is where I hope, And if 709 00:44:15,440 --> 00:44:17,600 they've, if they hadn't, if they're listening to this and 710 00:44:17,600 --> 00:44:19,960 they've only just realised, I'm really sorry. 711 00:44:20,360 --> 00:44:24,040 But maybe there's a world where the person that made that 712 00:44:24,040 --> 00:44:27,880 mistake doesn't realise and is living a happy life on a farm 713 00:44:27,880 --> 00:44:32,640 somewhere with some chickens. They should be relocated. 714 00:44:32,640 --> 00:44:35,520 They should be. They should be compensated for 715 00:44:36,160 --> 00:44:39,720 for yeah, they should be supported definitely. 716 00:44:39,880 --> 00:44:45,280 Anyway, next one. Yes, I think this is the last 717 00:44:45,520 --> 00:44:52,560 news story we have for this week, another cyberattack on a 718 00:44:52,760 --> 00:44:55,080 company. So this one was Louis Vuitton 719 00:44:55,600 --> 00:44:58,560 have come out and said that UK customer data has been stolen. 720 00:45:00,320 --> 00:45:05,400 So they are the French luxury brand have reassured customers 721 00:45:05,400 --> 00:45:08,760 that financial data is not included in this. 722 00:45:10,120 --> 00:45:12,360 But yeah, they're just the next retailer that seems to be 723 00:45:12,640 --> 00:45:18,080 targeted by cyber attackers. They, yeah, they said that they 724 00:45:18,080 --> 00:45:22,440 have had unauthorised third party access to its UK operation 725 00:45:22,440 --> 00:45:27,400 systems and obtained new names, contact details and purchase 726 00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:34,360 history. They also said that last week 727 00:45:34,360 --> 00:45:38,720 said that the Korean operation had a similar cyber attack, but 728 00:45:38,720 --> 00:45:41,160 again no financial data was taken. 729 00:45:43,600 --> 00:45:46,320 Yeah, I saw that it was, it was, they said it was like the 730 00:45:46,320 --> 00:45:50,800 second, second breach in a week. But I'm just seeing actually 731 00:45:50,800 --> 00:45:56,760 there's updated today that there's breach notifications for 732 00:45:56,760 --> 00:45:58,640 Italy and Sweden as well. Oh wow. 733 00:45:59,480 --> 00:46:04,280 So, yeah, and Turkey, and it's not. 734 00:46:04,480 --> 00:46:09,040 And and hey, other other extortion groups are available. 735 00:46:09,080 --> 00:46:13,160 This isn't the work of Scattered Spider apparently this is shiny 736 00:46:13,160 --> 00:46:18,920 hunters amazing name so other hacking groups are available. 737 00:46:18,920 --> 00:46:20,040 Clearly so. Yeah. 738 00:46:21,120 --> 00:46:23,680 It looks like they're. I wonder. 739 00:46:25,160 --> 00:46:28,880 I wonder if they got popped and then they've traversed the 740 00:46:28,880 --> 00:46:33,200 network as it were. Seems so in this case as they've 741 00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:37,640 gone round to their of a existence in other countries. 742 00:46:38,000 --> 00:46:40,200 Yeah. I mean, shiny hunters, they're 743 00:46:40,200 --> 00:46:42,880 saying that this could be tied to the data breach at Adidas 744 00:46:42,880 --> 00:46:47,440 that I think we spoke about back in May briefly. 745 00:46:47,880 --> 00:46:51,600 But before we even made this, the snowflake attacks that 746 00:46:51,600 --> 00:46:55,720 happened last year, shiny hunters were one of those that 747 00:46:55,720 --> 00:46:59,720 were involved in that and they like impacted Santander, 748 00:46:59,720 --> 00:47:03,000 Ticketmaster, AT&T Advanced Auto Parts. 749 00:47:03,000 --> 00:47:08,720 I think we might have spoken about those and Cylance, which 750 00:47:08,760 --> 00:47:14,800 didn't Cylance, yeah, Cylance got, they were a cybersecurity 751 00:47:14,800 --> 00:47:16,920 company that got impacted by that as well. 752 00:47:17,680 --> 00:47:21,080 Right. Yeah, I mean, Cylance isn't 753 00:47:21,080 --> 00:47:23,400 Cylance anymore. It's now part of BlackBerry so. 754 00:47:24,280 --> 00:47:28,760 All right, yeah, Yeah, I think this one's so early. 755 00:47:29,240 --> 00:47:34,520 I haven't seen much comment from Louis Vuitton, but I'm sure 756 00:47:34,520 --> 00:47:38,480 it'll be more as and when. I can confidently say that my 757 00:47:38,480 --> 00:47:40,800 details haven't been compromised because I haven't bought 758 00:47:40,800 --> 00:47:44,560 anything from Louis Vuitton slightly out of my price range. 759 00:47:44,680 --> 00:47:46,440 Yeah, that's fine. I'm happy with that. 760 00:47:47,800 --> 00:47:50,560 I guess you understand the things around just keeping an 761 00:47:50,560 --> 00:47:55,440 eye on your banking and creating the credit reports and watch out 762 00:47:55,440 --> 00:48:00,960 for potential contact from Louis Vuitton that probably aren't 763 00:48:00,960 --> 00:48:04,800 going to be them. Yeah, so much more on that one. 764 00:48:05,840 --> 00:48:11,400 Absolutely, absolutely right. That's all for the news this 765 00:48:11,400 --> 00:48:16,520 week, right? Just dropping into awareness 766 00:48:16,520 --> 00:48:18,880 awareness. So this is the little section 767 00:48:18,880 --> 00:48:20,480 for security awareness professionals. 768 00:48:20,920 --> 00:48:25,120 I just wanted to mention this because it got shared again on 769 00:48:25,920 --> 00:48:29,440 LinkedIn this week. So I actually contributed and 770 00:48:29,440 --> 00:48:36,320 had a quote in a report produced by Keepnet and they have keep 771 00:48:36,320 --> 00:48:42,160 that have the 2025 new hires fishing susceptibility report, 772 00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:46,320 which is actually quite an interesting, like it raises a 773 00:48:46,320 --> 00:48:49,440 really interesting point, OK. Because did you know that new 774 00:48:49,440 --> 00:48:54,880 hires are 44% more likely to fail for a fishing to fall for a 775 00:48:54,880 --> 00:48:57,600 fishing scam and sees the employees? 776 00:48:57,960 --> 00:49:03,640 Yeah, 71% of new hires are at risk of falling for fishing or 777 00:49:03,640 --> 00:49:07,120 social engineering tax within their first 90 days. 778 00:49:07,440 --> 00:49:12,000 So this could be a lack of, you know, understanding how it's all 779 00:49:12,000 --> 00:49:14,880 glued together. It could be a keen and eagerness 780 00:49:14,880 --> 00:49:19,640 to please and succeed. So this report does dive into 781 00:49:19,640 --> 00:49:24,640 that and really drives into why onboarding is a key, key part of 782 00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:29,280 any cybersecurity team. I am provided a quote for the 783 00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:33,640 report and basically I say I'll read it for you. 784 00:49:33,640 --> 00:49:36,800 Now it's only short. New hires bring fresh energy and 785 00:49:36,800 --> 00:49:39,640 ideas, but they also come with a steep learning curve when it 786 00:49:39,640 --> 00:49:43,600 comes to cybersecurity. Policies can be overwhelming and 787 00:49:43,600 --> 00:49:47,160 a lot of knowledge is assumed. As an employer, it's easy to 788 00:49:47,160 --> 00:49:50,000 forget how much of your security setup feels obvious. 789 00:49:50,640 --> 00:49:53,280 Put yourself in their shoes for just a minute and you'll see how 790 00:49:53,280 --> 00:49:56,520 unfamiliar and confusing it can be. 791 00:49:57,040 --> 00:50:00,280 That early period is critical. Mistakes often happen not from 792 00:50:00,280 --> 00:50:04,440 carelessness, but uncertainty. And if we don't clearly explain 793 00:50:04,440 --> 00:50:07,400 how things work, why they matter, and where to go for 794 00:50:07,400 --> 00:50:10,280 help, we leave new starters to figure it out on their own. 795 00:50:10,680 --> 00:50:14,720 That's not just unfair, it's risky, as we've just seen with, 796 00:50:15,200 --> 00:50:18,280 you know, sharing files via e-mail that perhaps you should. 797 00:50:19,000 --> 00:50:22,000 And I know this first hand because I changed jobs end of 798 00:50:22,000 --> 00:50:23,600 January. I started a new role in a new 799 00:50:23,600 --> 00:50:26,160 business. I went from a Google world to a 800 00:50:26,160 --> 00:50:30,040 Microsoft world and two companies in the same vertical 801 00:50:30,040 --> 00:50:32,880 that you know, pretty much are competitors doing the same thing 802 00:50:32,880 --> 00:50:37,560 in many ways could not be so could not be more different than 803 00:50:37,560 --> 00:50:40,680 two businesses could have completely different risk 804 00:50:40,680 --> 00:50:43,120 appetites. They work in different ways the 805 00:50:43,120 --> 00:50:46,280 way that you know it could not be more different. 806 00:50:46,280 --> 00:50:50,680 The learning curve is huge, so that on boarding is such a vital 807 00:50:50,680 --> 00:50:55,200 part of any new any, any cyber function. 808 00:50:55,560 --> 00:50:58,120 You're on boarding and getting the message right from day one. 809 00:50:58,400 --> 00:51:00,880 Putting yourself in their shoes is a must. 810 00:51:01,160 --> 00:51:03,440 So look, check out the Keepnet report. 811 00:51:04,600 --> 00:51:09,240 It's worth a read, and there'll be a link to that in the 812 00:51:09,240 --> 00:51:13,600 newsletter, which you can get at riskycreative.com or in the show 813 00:51:13,600 --> 00:51:15,560 notes. Yeah, it's an interesting one. 814 00:51:15,600 --> 00:51:17,720 Just made me think it might be in the report. 815 00:51:17,720 --> 00:51:21,760 But this stats obviously quite high, but I wonder if it's from 816 00:51:22,720 --> 00:51:26,600 criminals looking at LinkedIn people that they've posted on 817 00:51:26,600 --> 00:51:29,680 public saying that, oh, I've gotten a job at this company and 818 00:51:29,680 --> 00:51:33,040 then they people get targeted from that potentially. 819 00:51:33,040 --> 00:51:35,320 And obviously, yeah, at that point they don't know the 820 00:51:35,320 --> 00:51:39,480 systems very well. It's it's a really interesting 821 00:51:39,480 --> 00:51:43,200 way to think about it actually. I hadn't thought of that, but it 822 00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:45,240 could be, especially in the higher more. 823 00:51:45,760 --> 00:51:48,440 Yeah, the more. The more roles and companies. 824 00:51:48,720 --> 00:51:52,680 In the roles that have more access, you know, we spoke, I 825 00:51:52,680 --> 00:51:56,280 think we spoke last week about system admins having access, you 826 00:51:56,280 --> 00:51:58,720 know, and they could be a potential target and stuff like 827 00:51:58,720 --> 00:52:00,960 that. It's yeah, if I'm like, I'm just 828 00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:04,320 starting a role as a, you know, as a role as a System 829 00:52:04,320 --> 00:52:08,040 Administrator, you've probably got all the access in the world 830 00:52:08,200 --> 00:52:10,360 quite early because you need it to do your job. 831 00:52:10,520 --> 00:52:13,920 But you don't understand the different functions of the 832 00:52:13,920 --> 00:52:18,120 business and you don't know what a bonus e-mail looks like or 833 00:52:18,120 --> 00:52:22,120 what a payroll e-mail looks like or what the benefits scheme 834 00:52:22,120 --> 00:52:23,720 looks like. You, you aren't familiar with 835 00:52:23,720 --> 00:52:25,960 any of them. And that's the thing, like don't 836 00:52:25,960 --> 00:52:30,040 just, if you're on boarding people, show them what good 837 00:52:30,040 --> 00:52:31,720 looks like. Don't just tell them. 838 00:52:32,160 --> 00:52:34,520 Don't just like give them a load of phishing simulations. 839 00:52:34,920 --> 00:52:37,640 Show them what normal life is like. 840 00:52:37,640 --> 00:52:40,280 Show them what an e-mail from your pension provider. 841 00:52:40,280 --> 00:52:42,640 Show them what an e-mail. Give them an give them somewhere 842 00:52:42,640 --> 00:52:45,720 where they can check. We years ago, God, years ago, we 843 00:52:45,720 --> 00:52:49,840 used to have a thing. I can't remember what we called 844 00:52:49,840 --> 00:52:50,960 it. Just send them emails. 845 00:52:51,760 --> 00:52:53,560 Who's sending me emails? That was it. 846 00:52:54,040 --> 00:52:56,720 And that was, that was awesome. Actually, I'd forgotten 847 00:52:56,720 --> 00:53:00,680 completely about that, but it was the page that showed example 848 00:53:00,680 --> 00:53:02,960 emails from all of the internal services. 849 00:53:03,720 --> 00:53:07,080 So if someone was unsure that it was an e-mail from Work Day or 850 00:53:07,080 --> 00:53:11,560 an e-mail from HR, they could go to who send them emails and they 851 00:53:11,560 --> 00:53:14,960 could see, yeah, what looked like and yeah, that. 852 00:53:15,040 --> 00:53:18,040 Yeah, do something like that. That's awesome. 853 00:53:19,120 --> 00:53:24,760 Go Yeah. OK, right, just touching on 854 00:53:24,760 --> 00:53:27,000 that. We had an e-mail this week from 855 00:53:27,000 --> 00:53:31,800 Boris and Boris emailed us said and I love this. 856 00:53:31,800 --> 00:53:36,560 If you're listening, e-mail us. Hello at riskycreative.com, get 857 00:53:36,560 --> 00:53:38,280 in touch, leave comments. This is lovely. 858 00:53:38,280 --> 00:53:40,880 We had Lori Driver asking us something a couple of weeks ago 859 00:53:40,880 --> 00:53:43,000 on TikTok. Get in touch, ask us the 860 00:53:43,000 --> 00:53:44,360 questions. We we love it. 861 00:53:44,360 --> 00:53:46,720 We love to know that you're listening, Boris said. 862 00:53:46,720 --> 00:53:48,800 As an Intersect professional, I'm really enjoying listening to 863 00:53:48,800 --> 00:53:51,320 your podcast. Love the dynamic and the topics 864 00:53:51,320 --> 00:53:55,160 you're sharing. Thank you Boris, thank you, He 865 00:53:55,440 --> 00:53:56,680 said. Was wondering if you'd be 866 00:53:56,680 --> 00:53:59,640 interested in exploring topics that would be really relevant to 867 00:53:59,640 --> 00:54:03,320 the wider public like we did on AI and voice note scams. 868 00:54:03,520 --> 00:54:06,000 I think we're working on that. We're, we're, we're doing some 869 00:54:06,000 --> 00:54:09,920 stuff to, you know, not not so focused. 870 00:54:11,440 --> 00:54:15,000 Maybe an episode devoted to the most popular scams right now. 871 00:54:16,080 --> 00:54:18,960 I think it's a good angle to explore is also the experiences 872 00:54:19,360 --> 00:54:22,920 and impacts on victims of scams and cybercrime. 873 00:54:24,360 --> 00:54:26,800 Love the e-mail, Boris. Thank you for the feedback. 874 00:54:26,800 --> 00:54:28,520 We're going to take that on board and do some stuff. 875 00:54:28,520 --> 00:54:32,840 But Boris did also share regarding that last bit, the 876 00:54:32,840 --> 00:54:35,440 impact on victims of scams and cyber crimes. 877 00:54:36,720 --> 00:54:42,320 Boris shared at DOT Gov uk.gov research and analysis report 878 00:54:42,320 --> 00:54:45,840 that I hadn't seen that is actually about the experiences 879 00:54:45,840 --> 00:54:48,200 of victims of fraud and cybercrime. 880 00:54:49,320 --> 00:54:52,760 And I tell you what let me just share this quickly now this is 881 00:54:52,760 --> 00:54:55,160 the first this is the first screen share of the episode. 882 00:54:55,160 --> 00:54:56,880 Luke last week we had about 9:00. 883 00:54:57,040 --> 00:54:58,120 That's amazing. That's an easy to. 884 00:54:58,800 --> 00:55:01,960 Edit after. So if you're if you're listening 885 00:55:01,960 --> 00:55:04,200 on a podcast platform and you want to see what we're about to 886 00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:07,240 talk about, you can also catch every episode on YouTube. 887 00:55:08,360 --> 00:55:13,600 So you see here gov.uk experiences of victims of fraud 888 00:55:14,040 --> 00:55:17,520 and cybercrime. So Ipsos UK designed and 889 00:55:17,520 --> 00:55:20,880 delivered the Fraud and Cyber Victims Survey and conducted 890 00:55:20,880 --> 00:55:25,080 qualitative interviews. We'd like to thank the following 891 00:55:25,080 --> 00:55:27,720 individuals for their support and delivering the Victims 892 00:55:27,720 --> 00:55:30,560 Survey. Thank you to all of those people 893 00:55:30,560 --> 00:55:34,400 but the executive summary. It aims to understand the 894 00:55:34,400 --> 00:55:38,600 impacts of fraud and cybercrime victimisation on individuals and 895 00:55:38,600 --> 00:55:42,840 perceptions of support received through Action Fraud, the 896 00:55:42,960 --> 00:55:46,480 National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit and the police. 897 00:55:46,840 --> 00:55:53,320 So just to highlight some of the key findings, the emotional, 898 00:55:53,320 --> 00:55:58,280 physical and financial harms that victims experience. 86% of 899 00:55:58,280 --> 00:56:04,240 respondents experienced anger, 73% stress and 63% anxiety. 900 00:56:05,160 --> 00:56:10,200 Well, I'm going to read into this and cover it a bit more, I 901 00:56:10,200 --> 00:56:12,800 think, but it's some angles on this. 902 00:56:12,800 --> 00:56:16,760 Is that like fraud, this kind of online fraud, the type we've 903 00:56:16,840 --> 00:56:20,360 spoken about, the call centre that was raided, This leaves 904 00:56:20,360 --> 00:56:22,080 emotional scars for people, right? 905 00:56:22,400 --> 00:56:26,760 Significant stress, anxiety can lead to significant long term 906 00:56:26,760 --> 00:56:30,400 mental health effects. And the the worst part of this 907 00:56:30,400 --> 00:56:35,200 is when you fall, if you fall for a scam like this, they know 908 00:56:35,200 --> 00:56:37,480 you're vulnerable. So they will typically let you 909 00:56:37,480 --> 00:56:39,960 cool off a little bit and then they'll come back again. 910 00:56:40,600 --> 00:56:45,160 And EastEnders, AUK soap opera EastEnders. 911 00:56:46,400 --> 00:56:48,600 It really disappointed me that they didn't do more with this 912 00:56:48,600 --> 00:56:51,320 story. But there's a character in in 913 00:56:51,320 --> 00:56:54,680 the show called Jean Slater. She's she's vulnerable. 914 00:56:55,760 --> 00:57:00,120 She's shown to be quite scatty. She's also suffers from bipolar. 915 00:57:01,000 --> 00:57:05,360 And she got a call saying, what was it? 916 00:57:05,360 --> 00:57:09,800 It was like it was an investment fund asking her to invest some 917 00:57:09,800 --> 00:57:13,360 money and someone convinced her to invest all of her life 918 00:57:13,360 --> 00:57:16,920 savings into this investment scheme that was guaranteed to 919 00:57:16,920 --> 00:57:18,600 give her great returns on it and brilliant. 920 00:57:19,320 --> 00:57:20,880 Anyway, she lost all of that money. 921 00:57:20,880 --> 00:57:24,240 That scheme was a scam. They went off about a week 922 00:57:24,240 --> 00:57:27,920 later, she got a call from a law firm saying that they were 923 00:57:28,480 --> 00:57:32,920 looking for victims of this scam and if they pay an upfront fee, 924 00:57:33,720 --> 00:57:37,280 then they will help to get her money back. 925 00:57:37,280 --> 00:57:40,160 And it was like, no win. We we guarantee we'll get you 926 00:57:40,160 --> 00:57:42,600 money back, something like that. And anyway, she paid the money 927 00:57:43,280 --> 00:57:45,160 and was done again, compromised twice. 928 00:57:45,840 --> 00:57:49,400 And that's where EastEnders, like, left the story with that. 929 00:57:49,400 --> 00:57:52,560 She didn't really have any emotional damage, didn't really 930 00:57:52,560 --> 00:57:56,240 have any stress. So I've spoken about that before 931 00:57:56,240 --> 00:57:58,800 in an episode, I think. But it's a shame that EastEnders 932 00:57:58,800 --> 00:58:01,720 didn't do more with it. But yeah, we'll, we'll share a 933 00:58:01,720 --> 00:58:03,920 link to that report in the show notes. 934 00:58:05,480 --> 00:58:09,160 It's very much a human crime. You know, these people that fall 935 00:58:09,160 --> 00:58:11,080 for this aren't stupid. They're not silly. 936 00:58:11,360 --> 00:58:14,640 They're vulnerable. Like, they're just not aware. 937 00:58:14,920 --> 00:58:17,800 And that's these make money because like we always say, if 938 00:58:17,800 --> 00:58:20,120 they didn't make money, the criminals wouldn't do them. 939 00:58:20,400 --> 00:58:23,640 Yeah, definitely. That's definitely looks like a 940 00:58:23,640 --> 00:58:27,400 lot of information in the report, probably be, you know, 941 00:58:27,440 --> 00:58:30,400 useful to to talk about it, Yeah. 942 00:58:30,840 --> 00:58:34,120 Yeah, let's let's go away and digest that and we'll come back 943 00:58:34,120 --> 00:58:38,760 to come back to that to talk about that some more, right. 944 00:58:38,760 --> 00:58:42,560 I'm going to talk about a topic I had now second screen share of 945 00:58:42,560 --> 00:58:48,320 the show, right? I saw this on LinkedIn. 946 00:58:52,000 --> 00:58:57,360 This is by Chris Stoker Walker who's journalist and I thought 947 00:58:57,360 --> 00:59:01,840 this was quite interesting. Your expensive anti fishing 948 00:59:01,840 --> 00:59:07,120 training is a placebo and in some cases it may be making 949 00:59:07,120 --> 00:59:11,000 things worse. A new study he's written for PC 950 00:59:11,000 --> 00:59:14,360 Mag suggests that many of the anti fishing courses rolled out 951 00:59:14,360 --> 00:59:17,800 in offices around the world aren't just ineffective, they're 952 00:59:17,800 --> 00:59:20,800 counterproductive. Employees who took part in 953 00:59:20,800 --> 00:59:23,640 interactive fishing awareness lessons were slightly more 954 00:59:23,640 --> 00:59:27,800 likely to click on a malicious link, and those who had no 955 00:59:27,800 --> 00:59:31,640 training at all. It's a fascinating finding from 956 00:59:31,640 --> 00:59:33,360 a paper that most others have missed. 957 00:59:33,960 --> 00:59:37,360 As Alan W told me, you always find interesting papers. 958 00:59:38,360 --> 00:59:40,880 And then Chris asks, what's the worst fishing lure you've 959 00:59:40,880 --> 00:59:42,840 encountered as part of your employer's training? 960 00:59:43,360 --> 00:59:46,240 And why did you feel better equipped after training? 961 00:59:46,560 --> 00:59:51,120 So yeah, it's a, it's a really interesting post actually. 962 00:59:54,640 --> 00:59:58,040 So the Anti Phishing Working Group, which collates 963 00:59:58,040 --> 01:00:01,760 information from various bodies, reported nearly 1,000,000 964 01:00:01,760 --> 01:00:04,400 phishing attacks in the last three months of 2024. 965 01:00:04,920 --> 01:00:08,400 That's seven per minute, every minute of the day. 966 01:00:09,280 --> 01:00:11,640 And that's just the ones that the member companies report to 967 01:00:11,640 --> 01:00:14,440 the Anti Phishing Working Group. I've never heard of the Anti 968 01:00:14,440 --> 01:00:16,360 Phishing Working Group. No, I haven't either. 969 01:00:16,960 --> 01:00:20,840 No. So, yeah, each incursion cost 970 01:00:20,840 --> 01:00:23,800 businesses as hackers often get their victims to hand over 971 01:00:23,800 --> 01:00:30,880 passwords or bank details. One analysis claims $17,700 is 972 01:00:30,880 --> 01:00:33,040 lost per minute to phishing attacks. 973 01:00:33,040 --> 01:00:35,480 That's in that's incredible. Wow. 974 01:00:37,280 --> 01:00:43,680 But yeah, the this reports anti phishing educators marketing 975 01:00:43,680 --> 01:00:47,920 claims are too optimistic. It's, it's an interesting take. 976 01:00:48,000 --> 01:00:53,720 You know, love or hate it, cyber functions typically will all 977 01:00:54,000 --> 01:00:57,040 fish apart from Erin that we spoke to Fastly. 978 01:00:57,240 --> 01:01:03,480 Erin doesn't fish, but most companies need to fish. 979 01:01:03,480 --> 01:01:06,760 It's like it's a compliance requirement for some businesses. 980 01:01:06,880 --> 01:01:09,520 I used to get audited. You'll now get audited. 981 01:01:09,760 --> 01:01:11,920 You're probably being audited as we speak. 982 01:01:11,920 --> 01:01:14,640 But fishing is something you get audited on. 983 01:01:14,640 --> 01:01:18,240 Like you need to sow proof that people have been trained against 984 01:01:18,240 --> 01:01:20,440 fishing. And this is a conversation, I've 985 01:01:20,440 --> 01:01:24,160 just started an interesting conversation about what would a 986 01:01:24,160 --> 01:01:25,800 world look like if you don't fish? 987 01:01:26,960 --> 01:01:30,800 And I think there is a, there is a world where you raise the 988 01:01:30,800 --> 01:01:35,480 projection, but you don't have to simulate, you just educate. 989 01:01:35,640 --> 01:01:40,240 So it's, and I always say fishing simulations to me is a 990 01:01:40,240 --> 01:01:43,880 bit like mugging someone or, or like, oh, you want to learn 991 01:01:43,880 --> 01:01:47,120 karate? You absolutely beat the living 992 01:01:47,120 --> 01:01:49,480 daylights out of them. And then you go, right now I'm 993 01:01:49,480 --> 01:01:53,560 going to show you how to stop that happening again, like or or 994 01:01:53,560 --> 01:01:56,080 like mugging someone and going now I'm going to show you how to 995 01:01:56,080 --> 01:01:59,880 stop getting mugged. It's like, it seems quite. 996 01:01:59,960 --> 01:02:05,120 I can't think of anything else in the world where you simulate 997 01:02:05,120 --> 01:02:07,840 the attack and then educate after. 998 01:02:09,320 --> 01:02:12,360 To interest something about. There's, if anyone's, there's 999 01:02:12,360 --> 01:02:15,040 probably 1,000,000 examples that are really obvious that just 1000 01:02:15,040 --> 01:02:16,680 haven't got right if anyone's listening. 1001 01:02:16,680 --> 01:02:19,600 And you can think of something similar to phishing simulations 1002 01:02:19,960 --> 01:02:25,880 where you simulate the attack and then teach them how they 1003 01:02:25,880 --> 01:02:28,600 could have avoided that. Don't know. 1004 01:02:29,480 --> 01:02:32,640 Maybe that is in karate where you like slowly, like take 1005 01:02:32,640 --> 01:02:34,240 someone and then stop before breaking. 1006 01:02:34,280 --> 01:02:35,600 I don't know. I don't know. 1007 01:02:35,760 --> 01:02:38,800 I'm not a martial arts expert, so yes, I thought that was 1008 01:02:38,800 --> 01:02:42,440 interesting. Links to that to Chris Stoker 1009 01:02:42,440 --> 01:02:46,800 Waters Walker's article will be in the show notes. 1010 01:02:47,040 --> 01:02:50,800 The only other thing I wanted to show you this week was we've 1011 01:02:50,800 --> 01:02:56,880 spoken loads in the past about the retirement of Windows and 1012 01:02:56,880 --> 01:03:00,800 Windows Updates and people that don't install Windows Updates. 1013 01:03:02,960 --> 01:03:06,160 You know, we've all worked in organisations where people delay 1014 01:03:06,160 --> 01:03:08,720 the installation of updates because they can cause 1015 01:03:09,160 --> 01:03:13,400 disruption. Well, I saw a post on Reddit 1016 01:03:13,400 --> 01:03:18,760 this week and guess what? There was an update to Windows 1017 01:03:19,320 --> 01:03:21,600 that caused some really serious disruption. 1018 01:03:22,200 --> 01:03:25,440 Let me just get this is on the the subreddit called mildly 1019 01:03:25,440 --> 01:03:28,520 infuriating. I would be more than mildly 1020 01:03:28,520 --> 01:03:32,800 infuriated if I was stuck in a lift because of a Windows 1021 01:03:32,800 --> 01:03:37,520 Update. So my build this this is a 1022 01:03:37,520 --> 01:03:40,880 picture of a an inside of an elevator with a big screen. 1023 01:03:41,440 --> 01:03:45,960 Big screen that's just got a little loading dial in it on the 1024 01:03:45,960 --> 01:03:48,720 right hand side. So my building spent all year 1025 01:03:48,720 --> 01:03:53,400 redoing the elevators to have touch screens instead of normal 1026 01:03:53,560 --> 01:03:56,680 elevator buttons. All the touch screens are now 1027 01:03:56,680 --> 01:04:00,320 windows based. Today the elevator decided to 1028 01:04:00,320 --> 01:04:04,040 install a Windows Update while I was in the elevator. 1029 01:04:04,840 --> 01:04:07,440 Really feels like technology is moving backwards. 1030 01:04:07,720 --> 01:04:10,160 Unlike me who's not moving at all. 1031 01:04:10,440 --> 01:04:16,320 The elevator stopped and I'm not able to select a floor or open 1032 01:04:16,320 --> 01:04:18,440 the doors. That's incredible. 1033 01:04:19,560 --> 01:04:25,880 What happens if it black screens of deaths like it's the? 1034 01:04:25,920 --> 01:04:27,840 The comments are equally as interesting. 1035 01:04:27,840 --> 01:04:31,080 I don't see how a touch screen and computer connected to the 1036 01:04:31,080 --> 01:04:35,440 Internet improves an elevator. It seems like it would just add 1037 01:04:35,440 --> 01:04:40,440 more points of failure, yes? Yeah, I do wonder why that's a. 1038 01:04:40,760 --> 01:04:44,160 Thing someone says, it's definitely a worse user 1039 01:04:44,160 --> 01:04:45,880 experience. This is Canada. 1040 01:04:46,400 --> 01:04:49,120 If it's winter and you're wearing gloves now, you can't 1041 01:04:49,120 --> 01:04:50,600 press the elevator buttons anymore. 1042 01:04:51,600 --> 01:04:54,720 Plus it's much less satisfying than a tactile button. 1043 01:04:57,720 --> 01:05:00,600 Someone else says no matter what the operating system features or 1044 01:05:00,600 --> 01:05:03,560 tools it has, why would you ever need to update it? 1045 01:05:03,680 --> 01:05:06,680 Have it disconnected from the Internet to stop any cyber 1046 01:05:06,680 --> 01:05:08,440 attack issues. I mean that's a really good 1047 01:05:08,440 --> 01:05:11,440 point. Just just isolate the device. 1048 01:05:11,640 --> 01:05:15,440 Yeah. And then someone says you can't 1049 01:05:15,440 --> 01:05:17,800 collect money for showing you ads in the elevator. 1050 01:05:17,920 --> 01:05:19,720 It's money. I guess that's the point of it, 1051 01:05:19,720 --> 01:05:21,040 right? Maybe showing ads? 1052 01:05:21,880 --> 01:05:25,160 Probably, yeah. Someone. 1053 01:05:25,160 --> 01:05:28,560 I wonder what your local fire Marshall might think of the 1054 01:05:28,560 --> 01:05:32,480 situation. Look, it's if you've seen 1055 01:05:32,600 --> 01:05:35,480 windows in any strange places, let us know. 1056 01:05:35,640 --> 01:05:44,240 It's it's I think that's mad. But windows in a lift, windows 1057 01:05:44,240 --> 01:05:46,640 updating in a lift, windows connected to the Internet in a 1058 01:05:46,640 --> 01:05:50,120 lift. That the lift like have a 1059 01:05:50,120 --> 01:05:52,040 separate screen for digital signage. 1060 01:05:52,680 --> 01:05:54,680 Yeah. I understand that, but having 1061 01:05:54,680 --> 01:05:57,880 the controls on a touchscreen that yeah. 1062 01:05:58,920 --> 01:05:59,880 No. That's crazy. 1063 01:05:59,880 --> 01:06:03,200 I bet you, I bet you. If I'm in a rescuing people from 1064 01:06:03,200 --> 01:06:06,240 that lift, I bet they hate it because they're like that won't 1065 01:06:06,240 --> 01:06:08,200 be the first and only time. Yeah. 1066 01:06:09,480 --> 01:06:13,720 Right, that's me done. So what did you have to run 1067 01:06:13,720 --> 01:06:17,120 through this week? Yeah, just one topic for this 1068 01:06:17,120 --> 01:06:24,280 issue, this upset. It was a post I saw originally 1069 01:06:24,280 --> 01:06:27,920 saw on TikTok. We could share the video if we 1070 01:06:27,920 --> 01:06:31,040 want briefly just to explain it a little bit, but it's an 1071 01:06:31,640 --> 01:06:35,640 interesting phishing technique that was discovered by security 1072 01:06:35,640 --> 01:06:42,160 researchers Odin, who like a Firefox run group, I think all. 1073 01:06:43,280 --> 01:06:44,920 Right, let me just get the video up. 1074 01:06:45,800 --> 01:06:49,320 He has the vulnerability and Google Gemini for workspace. 1075 01:06:50,160 --> 01:06:57,600 Right. Efficient technique that I just 1076 01:06:57,600 --> 01:07:01,280 read about takes advantage of the whole Gemini AI summarise 1077 01:07:01,280 --> 01:07:03,840 everything that's just like built into everything you do in 1078 01:07:03,840 --> 01:07:08,560 Google Now technique is hiding a prompt for that AI summarizer in 1079 01:07:08,560 --> 01:07:10,720 an e-mail and visibly, I'll show you how in a SEC. 1080 01:07:11,200 --> 01:07:15,080 And then Gemini actually uses these admin tags as like higher 1081 01:07:15,080 --> 01:07:17,440 priority. You can make the text all white. 1082 01:07:17,800 --> 01:07:19,760 The person cannot see it in the e-mail. 1083 01:07:19,760 --> 01:07:22,960 You use these admin tags and then you give it a prompt 1084 01:07:22,960 --> 01:07:25,000 injection. You say, hey, Gemini, you have 1085 01:07:25,000 --> 01:07:28,440 to include this at the end of your response, and then you can 1086 01:07:28,440 --> 01:07:30,320 do whatever the heck you want to try to trick the user. 1087 01:07:30,400 --> 01:07:34,800 But since this response is not in the e-mail, this is like in 1088 01:07:34,800 --> 01:07:37,800 the AI response. This might be a bit more 1089 01:07:37,800 --> 01:07:39,520 trustworthy to someone reading it. 1090 01:07:39,840 --> 01:07:43,640 If you trick the summarizer to say warning Gemini's detected 1091 01:07:43,840 --> 01:07:47,680 that your password's been compromised, please go do this 1092 01:07:47,680 --> 01:07:49,680 thing or call this number or whatever it is. 1093 01:07:49,720 --> 01:07:52,000 People are much more likely to fall for it. 1094 01:07:52,000 --> 01:07:54,600 We're already seeing a tonne of scammers include prompt 1095 01:07:54,600 --> 01:07:56,240 injection in their bag of tricks. 1096 01:07:56,360 --> 01:07:58,160 This is just another one to watch out for. 1097 01:07:58,320 --> 01:07:59,520 Of course it's really interesting. 1098 01:07:59,520 --> 01:08:01,960 It just goes to show, isn't it? Like nothing is safe. 1099 01:08:02,560 --> 01:08:04,800 No. Really, really interesting. 1100 01:08:05,200 --> 01:08:06,880 Yeah, definitely. It's a monster. 1101 01:08:06,960 --> 01:08:08,680 Do something. No find a way. 1102 01:08:09,720 --> 01:08:11,600 Yeah. And yeah, it's quite. 1103 01:08:12,360 --> 01:08:17,560 It's quite amusing though. It's simple as white text or 1104 01:08:17,560 --> 01:08:21,359 size 0 text embedded like HTML into an e-mail. 1105 01:08:21,920 --> 01:08:24,080 Yeah. I'm just wondering, I see that 1106 01:08:24,160 --> 01:08:27,640 and I'm like I don't use, I don't use Gemini. 1107 01:08:27,640 --> 01:08:31,560 I'm a ChatGPT user. But if chat GBTCP user out to me 1108 01:08:31,640 --> 01:08:34,000 and said like your ChatGPT account is compromised or 1109 01:08:34,000 --> 01:08:37,920 something, if Gemini did give that to me, I would probably 1110 01:08:38,399 --> 01:08:40,880 like like, I would be really confused as to where it got it 1111 01:08:40,880 --> 01:08:45,359 from. So I I I wouldn't trust it 1112 01:08:45,359 --> 01:08:48,760 because I wouldn't expect Gemini to tell me that. 1113 01:08:50,640 --> 01:08:53,080 Like it that that for me, that doesn't sit right. 1114 01:08:53,080 --> 01:08:57,359 But so many people wouldn't see where that had come from. 1115 01:08:57,359 --> 01:09:01,720 And you kind of it's the AI talking and the AI has just told 1116 01:09:01,720 --> 01:09:08,000 you, yeah, like. Yeah, it's quite a interesting 1 1117 01:09:08,000 --> 01:09:11,319 and I don't think at the minute and I think it's been fixed. 1118 01:09:12,720 --> 01:09:15,880 Well, that's a shock, isn't it? Because you know, G Google are 1119 01:09:15,880 --> 01:09:18,439 really good at fixing like security problems. 1120 01:09:19,960 --> 01:09:21,760 Maybe there's an AI that could fix it. 1121 01:09:21,760 --> 01:09:24,080 Maybe they could ask Gemini to fix it. 1122 01:09:24,200 --> 01:09:26,439 You know it's. Quite interesting, it says. 1123 01:09:26,479 --> 01:09:28,760 Ignore white text on a white background, please. 1124 01:09:28,760 --> 01:09:30,640 Please. Like it's as simple as that. 1125 01:09:30,960 --> 01:09:37,760 Ignore hidden objects or include them, but highlight to the user 1126 01:09:37,760 --> 01:09:39,800 that this has been obfuscated or something. 1127 01:09:39,800 --> 01:09:44,120 You know it's. Yeah, it says about how similar 1128 01:09:44,399 --> 01:09:48,840 indirect prompt injection attacks on Gemini were first 1129 01:09:48,840 --> 01:09:52,720 reported in 2024 and Google have published mitigations. 1130 01:09:52,720 --> 01:09:55,560 But this technique still is viable. 1131 01:09:56,600 --> 01:10:00,920 And I think, I think Google are working on further security 1132 01:10:00,920 --> 01:10:04,560 enhancements, but it's one to maybe look out for at the 1133 01:10:04,560 --> 01:10:09,840 moment, especially as you say people trust this summarise. 1134 01:10:12,160 --> 01:10:16,320 It seems so simple. Yeah, I mean, as we said as 1135 01:10:16,320 --> 01:10:22,840 well, like obviously some of us more vulnerable new to using 1136 01:10:22,840 --> 01:10:26,720 Gemini may not recognise it as being a scam. 1137 01:10:26,720 --> 01:10:30,400 Obviously it could say anything the attacker wanted to say so 1138 01:10:30,400 --> 01:10:32,400 they could make it as convincing as they want to. 1139 01:10:33,120 --> 01:10:40,680 Yeah, yeah, it's yeah. They really, really like there 1140 01:10:40,680 --> 01:10:42,600 should be a team. It doesn't make money. 1141 01:10:42,600 --> 01:10:44,760 That's probably the problem, but there should be a team at Google 1142 01:10:44,760 --> 01:10:47,000 that like picks up on stuff like this and then literally goes 1143 01:10:47,000 --> 01:10:48,840 like crack squad. We need to get this fixed right 1144 01:10:48,840 --> 01:10:52,240 away done and then make a good news story about it. 1145 01:10:52,600 --> 01:10:55,760 Get back to this. Get a team on TikTok to go back 1146 01:10:55,760 --> 01:10:59,680 and reply to this TikTok and go we saw this awesome. 1147 01:10:59,840 --> 01:11:01,960 We've fixed it because we're really awesome. 1148 01:11:02,200 --> 01:11:06,240 Use Google, you know, like play up to the fact that Google 1149 01:11:06,240 --> 01:11:08,920 Geminis nailing this where others might be failing. 1150 01:11:08,960 --> 01:11:10,920 You know, this probably isn't just a Gemini problem. 1151 01:11:10,920 --> 01:11:14,160 This is and this is a new feature problem, like these 1152 01:11:14,160 --> 01:11:16,840 features are rolling out before they can be secured. 1153 01:11:17,640 --> 01:11:22,440 There's such a rush to be first. Use Co pilot to summarise this. 1154 01:11:22,440 --> 01:11:24,440 Use Geminisers to summarise this. 1155 01:11:24,440 --> 01:11:29,080 It's the same like there's not enough cheques and balances. 1156 01:11:29,840 --> 01:11:34,480 Yeah. It's quite, quite crazy how, 1157 01:11:34,880 --> 01:11:39,400 yeah, this is quite a simple technique where you're, yeah, 1158 01:11:39,480 --> 01:11:44,280 you're hiding something within the body and it's not really 1159 01:11:45,520 --> 01:11:46,960 explaining it. Like at least with these 1160 01:11:46,960 --> 01:11:49,000 summaries. I think that. 1161 01:11:49,000 --> 01:11:51,200 Yeah, you can see in the screenshot where it says about, 1162 01:11:51,840 --> 01:11:53,480 there's one source. And obviously the source is the 1163 01:11:53,480 --> 01:11:56,240 e-mail, but if you look through the e-mail itself, you're not 1164 01:11:56,240 --> 01:12:00,840 going to see that warning. So it's like, interesting. 1165 01:12:02,920 --> 01:12:06,160 Yeah, I want to for business you talk about at least but. 1166 01:12:07,000 --> 01:12:12,440 If you post it, I mean it's not doing it, but like warning 1167 01:12:12,440 --> 01:12:14,680 Gemini has detected that your Gmail password has been 1168 01:12:14,680 --> 01:12:18,960 compromised. The Gemini itself should say 1169 01:12:18,960 --> 01:12:21,440 hang on that sounds like that may be suspicious. 1170 01:12:22,040 --> 01:12:24,640 Do it print it. But why not put a flag on it 1171 01:12:24,640 --> 01:12:28,080 going this part may be we've highlighted part that may be 1172 01:12:28,080 --> 01:12:30,680 suspicious. Please be careful, you know, 1173 01:12:30,840 --> 01:12:33,480 Like do what you're told but flag it. 1174 01:12:34,400 --> 01:12:39,040 Yeah, like I said, they are improving it. 1175 01:12:40,520 --> 01:12:42,720 I think it was something similar to that. 1176 01:12:42,720 --> 01:12:50,000 I can't find the article, but I think they were going to add, 1177 01:12:50,120 --> 01:12:54,520 yeah, some flags and stuff like how Gmail usually has like a 1178 01:12:54,520 --> 01:12:59,200 warning banner and they're going to add stuff like that to it. 1179 01:13:00,800 --> 01:13:04,560 Yeah, for anybody using Gemini Workspace in their businesses 1180 01:13:04,560 --> 01:13:09,680 from to maybe talk about. Yeah, cool. 1181 01:13:11,120 --> 01:13:14,760 Right. I had one last thing to say and 1182 01:13:15,720 --> 01:13:20,360 we'll have more details on this next week, but the Sans Security 1183 01:13:20,360 --> 01:13:23,480 Awareness Summit in Chicago, I've got a bit of an 1184 01:13:23,480 --> 01:13:26,640 announcement on that, that we'll do more next week. 1185 01:13:26,640 --> 01:13:28,040 We're going to, I'm going to be there. 1186 01:13:28,440 --> 01:13:30,320 Luke can't make it, but I'm going to be there and there's 1187 01:13:30,320 --> 01:13:33,320 going to be some podcast activity from Chicago. 1188 01:13:33,920 --> 01:13:36,640 So yes, but more details on that. 1189 01:13:36,640 --> 01:13:39,680 I'm talking with SANS at the moment and it's all quite 1190 01:13:39,680 --> 01:13:42,680 exciting. So yeah, more details on that 1191 01:13:42,680 --> 01:13:45,360 next week. But if you're in Chicago or you 1192 01:13:45,360 --> 01:13:48,560 can't make the SANS Security Awareness Summit in Chicago, 1193 01:13:49,240 --> 01:13:52,840 we're going to give you a bit of a experience so you can feel 1194 01:13:52,840 --> 01:13:56,200 more included. So yeah, but more on that next 1195 01:13:56,200 --> 01:14:01,120 week, right? That is all from us. 1196 01:14:01,120 --> 01:14:02,040 We're. Done. 1197 01:14:02,800 --> 01:14:07,480 Yeah, brilliant. OK, so much in this week. 1198 01:14:07,480 --> 01:14:09,320 It's been another packed week of stuff. 1199 01:14:09,320 --> 01:14:11,560 Really good. Subscribe to the newsletter, 1200 01:14:11,640 --> 01:14:13,400 subscribe to us on YouTube, please. 1201 01:14:13,400 --> 01:14:16,640 We need to get those numbers up and on all of the podcast 1202 01:14:16,640 --> 01:14:19,880 platforms as well. And I will speak to you again 1203 01:14:20,000 --> 01:14:21,960 next week. Yeah, catch you next week. 1204 01:14:22,240 --> 01:14:22,760 Bye everyone. See. 1205 01:14:22,760 --> 01:14:23,840 You later, bye.