1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:03,840 This week Instructure paid Shiny Hunters and says the student 2 00:00:03,840 --> 00:00:06,120 data is gone, but nobody believes them. 3 00:00:06,520 --> 00:00:09,320 Twin brothers got fired on a Teams call, forgot it was 4 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:14,360 recording and deleted 96 government databases live on the 5 00:00:14,360 --> 00:00:17,840 mic. Kids are beating age 6 00:00:17,840 --> 00:00:20,040 verification with a drawn on moustache. 7 00:00:20,520 --> 00:00:22,400 This isn't a joke, it is a news podcast. 8 00:00:22,760 --> 00:00:25,880 Google says hackers used AI to find a zero day for the first 9 00:00:25,880 --> 00:00:31,880 time and a Stoner just recovered $400,000 in Bitcoin after losing 10 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:37,360 his password whilst high in 2015 using AI. 11 00:00:37,520 --> 00:00:41,280 All of that and more in this week's The Awareness Angle. 12 00:00:53,480 --> 00:00:57,720 With me, as always is I'm sorry I've done it again. 13 00:00:57,720 --> 00:01:02,960 I'm Matt Davis, obviously, and with me, as always, is my 14 00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:05,440 partner in cybercrime prevention, Mr Luke Pettigrew. 15 00:01:05,680 --> 00:01:08,520 How you doing, Luke? Hey, I'm good to you. 16 00:01:08,800 --> 00:01:10,200 I'm good. What was the last thing you said 17 00:01:10,200 --> 00:01:13,440 to me before I pressed record? Don't forget to introduce 18 00:01:13,440 --> 00:01:15,720 yourself. And I did it again. 19 00:01:15,720 --> 00:01:17,920 So there we go. Yeah, that's all right. 20 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:22,000 Another week of crazy news stories that sounds just as 21 00:01:22,000 --> 00:01:25,280 made-up as last week. I like, it's unbelievable isn't 22 00:01:25,280 --> 00:01:28,160 it? Drawn on moustaches, deleting 23 00:01:28,160 --> 00:01:31,760 whilst live on a team's recording and AI recovering a 24 00:01:31,760 --> 00:01:34,480 stone as Bitcoin. That's just the tip of the 25 00:01:34,480 --> 00:01:36,320 iceberg. There's a few more we've got to 26 00:01:36,320 --> 00:01:39,080 talk about this week, so let's get straight into it, shall we? 27 00:01:39,080 --> 00:01:48,000 With this week's breech watch, right, first up, nobody believes 28 00:01:48,000 --> 00:01:51,680 the hackers who breached Canvas actually deleted the student 29 00:01:51,680 --> 00:01:53,120 data. So a couple of weeks ago, we 30 00:01:53,120 --> 00:01:56,240 spoke about Instructure and Canvas. 31 00:01:56,760 --> 00:01:59,880 This was all of the universities, not just in the US 32 00:01:59,880 --> 00:02:03,160 as someone on Tiktok pointed out, but it's in the UK as well 33 00:02:04,080 --> 00:02:07,400 that they were looking in to do finals and there was a lovely 34 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:11,600 ransomware message displayed. So shiny hunters claim 3.65 35 00:02:11,680 --> 00:02:16,080 terabytes of stolen data from Canvas Stroke Instructure. 36 00:02:16,080 --> 00:02:20,080 Canvas LMS is the product. Instructure is the company that 37 00:02:20,080 --> 00:02:26,920 develops it. 275,000,000 users across 9000 schools worldwide. 38 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:29,720 It's huge. And the data included names, 39 00:02:29,720 --> 00:02:32,720 emails, student IDs, and billions of private messages 40 00:02:32,720 --> 00:02:35,040 between students and their teachers. 41 00:02:36,200 --> 00:02:40,200 So it was reported this week that Instructure paid up. 42 00:02:40,480 --> 00:02:43,640 They paid the ransom. They're all a ransom. 43 00:02:43,680 --> 00:02:45,440 It's not been disclosed, I don't think. 44 00:02:46,360 --> 00:02:50,800 And they've claimed to have received shred logs as proof of 45 00:02:50,800 --> 00:02:52,800 data destruction. So they've paid to make the 46 00:02:52,800 --> 00:02:58,400 problem go away. According to the Register, every 47 00:02:58,400 --> 00:03:01,200 single security expert that they've spoken to doesn't 48 00:03:01,200 --> 00:03:04,640 believe that the data is gone. And why? 49 00:03:05,160 --> 00:03:09,080 Because back in 2024, Power School did exactly the same 50 00:03:09,080 --> 00:03:11,640 thing. They paid $2.85 million in 51 00:03:11,640 --> 00:03:16,000 Bitcoin, watched a video of the documents being deleted, and 52 00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:19,120 then five months later, that very same data was used to 53 00:03:19,120 --> 00:03:21,360 extort individual school districts. 54 00:03:21,520 --> 00:03:24,360 It just moved down the pipe, moved down the line, went to the 55 00:03:24,360 --> 00:03:27,040 supply chain. So it's it's almost a supply 56 00:03:27,040 --> 00:03:31,720 chain attack at that point. So yeah, I think this is this is 57 00:03:31,720 --> 00:03:35,200 an example of, and we've spoken about this before, many 58 00:03:35,200 --> 00:03:38,720 businesses attitude to a ransomware attack will be pay 59 00:03:38,760 --> 00:03:42,040 the ransom, get the problem, make it go away, make it go. 60 00:03:42,040 --> 00:03:44,360 Away. Yeah, some. 61 00:03:44,760 --> 00:03:48,160 It's also something that I mean, a lot of, I don't know, maybe 62 00:03:48,160 --> 00:03:50,840 not a lot, but some governments recommend not to pay it, right. 63 00:03:51,640 --> 00:03:54,680 Yeah. Maybe even some cyber insurance 64 00:03:54,680 --> 00:03:57,920 might have some sort of stuff around that sort of stuff. 65 00:03:57,920 --> 00:04:03,080 But no, it's you don't usually hear of companies doing that and 66 00:04:03,080 --> 00:04:06,600 not so more recently. Not so openly as well. 67 00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:10,760 Yeah. But yeah, I guess it makes you 68 00:04:10,760 --> 00:04:14,600 wonder how many copies of it exists and is it backed up 69 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:16,640 somewhere? Someone copied it to the yeah 70 00:04:16,959 --> 00:04:20,839 hard drive or something. The Register says that whilst 71 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:24,680 data suggests that fewer organisations are paying 72 00:04:24,680 --> 00:04:28,560 criminal ransomware demands, Chain analysis found percentage 73 00:04:28,560 --> 00:04:32,520 of paying victims in 25 dropped to a new all time low of 28%. 74 00:04:33,080 --> 00:04:35,200 Despite previously hitting record highs. 75 00:04:36,400 --> 00:04:41,000 The pay not paid debate still becomes much more complicated. 76 00:04:41,440 --> 00:04:42,880 And we spoke about this actually. 77 00:04:43,160 --> 00:04:46,760 I think organisations say publicly they won't pay and many 78 00:04:46,760 --> 00:04:51,480 genuine don't. But when in that situation, your 79 00:04:51,480 --> 00:04:54,520 playbook goes out the window and you just like, you know, you 80 00:04:54,520 --> 00:04:57,800 start making those decisions in the heat of the moment and you 81 00:04:57,800 --> 00:05:02,840 just want to get it solved. So yes, it's one to look out 82 00:05:02,840 --> 00:05:05,080 for. If, if, if you've been affected 83 00:05:05,080 --> 00:05:09,800 by the Canvas breach, keep your eyes peeled over the coming 84 00:05:09,800 --> 00:05:13,480 months because and, or if you're a customer of if you're an 85 00:05:13,480 --> 00:05:17,440 organisation or an Academy or an educational institution that 86 00:05:17,440 --> 00:05:20,320 uses Canvas, this might not have gone away. 87 00:05:20,320 --> 00:05:22,680 This just might have been gone. This just might have gone away 88 00:05:22,680 --> 00:05:25,960 for now, I think is the message here. 89 00:05:26,920 --> 00:05:30,520 It might, might not be Canvas's problem anymore in structure, 90 00:05:31,040 --> 00:05:33,840 you know, we've dealt with it. Anything that comes down the 91 00:05:33,840 --> 00:05:35,720 pipe's probably someone else's problem now. 92 00:05:35,880 --> 00:05:41,240 So yeah, just remember as well, any views and opinions expressed 93 00:05:41,240 --> 00:05:43,400 in this show are ours and do not represent those of you. 94 00:05:43,400 --> 00:05:45,680 Our employers probably should have said that from the off, but 95 00:05:45,680 --> 00:05:48,600 there we go. That's right, it had 96 00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:51,600 prerecorded, Yeah, little piece drop as. 97 00:05:51,600 --> 00:05:55,680 The disclaimer in the titles, right, Move on to the next one. 98 00:05:56,720 --> 00:06:00,680 Cool. Next one, we got 716,000 99 00:06:01,200 --> 00:06:04,280 impacted by Open Loop Health data breach. 100 00:06:05,520 --> 00:06:09,680 So hackers have stolen personal data of individuals during 101 00:06:09,680 --> 00:06:14,440 January 2026. It's a telehealth platform, Open 102 00:06:14,440 --> 00:06:20,160 Loop Health, which is like a remote care consultation and 103 00:06:20,160 --> 00:06:24,920 monitoring platform. Yeah, they've had they had 104 00:06:24,920 --> 00:06:28,760 access for roughly 24 hours before being discovered and a 105 00:06:28,760 --> 00:06:31,560 16,000 individuals have been affected. 106 00:06:32,400 --> 00:06:36,080 Names, addresses, emails, dates of birth, medical information, 107 00:06:37,480 --> 00:06:41,800 Social Security numbers for natural data was not accessed. 108 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:48,920 Gotten to open loop and a frag to call in themselves stuck in 109 00:06:48,920 --> 00:06:51,960 2019 claimed responsibility on the hacking forum. 110 00:06:54,720 --> 00:06:58,760 I mean that they had 1.6 million patients, which is interesting, 111 00:06:58,760 --> 00:07:02,560 certainly a lot more than the affected individuals. 112 00:07:05,360 --> 00:07:10,200 And by posting some samples as proof that the forum listing was 113 00:07:10,200 --> 00:07:12,560 taken down, which is a bit of a weird one. 114 00:07:15,960 --> 00:07:19,160 And yeah, it this sort of effects multiple health care 115 00:07:19,160 --> 00:07:22,240 organisations, not just one thing. 116 00:07:22,240 --> 00:07:27,880 So they're AUS company, yes, not just not just limit to one 117 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:31,120 hospital or one on a clinic. So every organisation that uses 118 00:07:31,120 --> 00:07:35,880 their infrastructure to deliver virtual care may be affected 119 00:07:36,120 --> 00:07:40,800 with this? Yeah, it's discovered on January 120 00:07:40,800 --> 00:07:45,840 7th, engaged fed by cybersecurity specialists, 121 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:51,360 confirmed that they were terminated within 24 hours and 122 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:55,960 they notified various various places. 123 00:07:58,440 --> 00:08:02,560 And yeah, it's interesting that yeah, they've claimed 1.6 124 00:08:02,560 --> 00:08:06,800 million records, but there was a confirmed number of 716,000. 125 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:12,040 But maybe there's some something weird going on there, duplicates 126 00:08:12,040 --> 00:08:16,320 or some exaggeration there. But yeah. 127 00:08:16,440 --> 00:08:20,360 And not too unusual. Affected individuals being 128 00:08:20,360 --> 00:08:23,240 offered one year of free identity and credit monitoring. 129 00:08:25,920 --> 00:08:29,160 I find this, I mean, this is a great example, 24 hours, they 130 00:08:29,160 --> 00:08:34,960 had access for 24 hours and they've made off with, you know, 131 00:08:35,240 --> 00:08:39,000 over 700,000 records and yeah, the damage is done. 132 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:42,400 You know, that's all it takes. It doesn't need more than that. 133 00:08:42,919 --> 00:08:45,680 Yet the average time to discovery from your network 134 00:08:45,680 --> 00:08:47,640 being compromised is like 200 days. 135 00:08:47,840 --> 00:08:51,520 So it's imagine the damage they could do in 200 days, you know? 136 00:08:51,680 --> 00:08:53,960 Yeah, it's mad. No, it's go crazy. 137 00:08:54,840 --> 00:09:01,240 Yeah, so and the other thing here is they're a back end 138 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:04,040 platform. So they're not they're someone 139 00:09:04,040 --> 00:09:06,720 that you wouldn't realise had your data necessarily. 140 00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:08,320 And then she'd really done a deep dive. 141 00:09:08,680 --> 00:09:13,120 So it's, you know, you may be affected by this and not 142 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:17,280 realise. Yeah, but that's the other scary 143 00:09:17,280 --> 00:09:20,560 thing with this. So keep an eye out for fishing 144 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:22,240 obviously I think is the big one. 145 00:09:22,440 --> 00:09:26,200 It's it's. Yeah, definitely. 146 00:09:26,880 --> 00:09:29,520 Any data? Anything dodgy around your 147 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:32,320 medical because it's it's names, addresses, e-mail addresses, 148 00:09:32,320 --> 00:09:34,240 date of birth and medical information. 149 00:09:34,680 --> 00:09:39,320 So any how would they use that medical surveys, medication 150 00:09:39,320 --> 00:09:44,680 surveys, counselling, you know anything new that doesn't look 151 00:09:44,680 --> 00:09:48,320 normal that references anything medical related to you. 152 00:09:49,240 --> 00:09:51,480 That information is out there. It's not like, Oh, well, it must 153 00:09:51,480 --> 00:09:53,040 be true because only my doctor knows that. 154 00:09:53,040 --> 00:09:56,520 Not anymore. Many more people know that now 155 00:09:56,520 --> 00:09:58,120 or could know that. Yeah, so. 156 00:09:58,880 --> 00:10:04,400 Well, hopefully those affected now may know who they are, but 157 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:06,160 there's not a lot of information on this article. 158 00:10:06,160 --> 00:10:11,000 But yeah. Right, that's it for this week's 159 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:13,680 breaches. Let's move on to some news, 160 00:10:17,080 --> 00:10:18,960 right? Top story this week. 161 00:10:19,040 --> 00:10:20,720 I love this. I think this is brilliant. 162 00:10:21,360 --> 00:10:26,480 Twin brothers deleted 96 government databases while still 163 00:10:26,680 --> 00:10:34,400 on a recorded teams call. So the brothers, they worked for 164 00:10:34,400 --> 00:10:38,080 a company called Opexus, a Washington, DC firm that sold 165 00:10:38,080 --> 00:10:41,800 software and services to 45 different federal clients. 166 00:10:42,440 --> 00:10:45,920 And they were fired after the company discovered that one of 167 00:10:45,920 --> 00:10:49,480 them had a prior felony conviction during a background 168 00:10:49,480 --> 00:10:52,120 review. How did they even get recruited? 169 00:10:52,640 --> 00:10:55,960 It's only upon a further review that they've been fired. 170 00:10:56,640 --> 00:10:58,960 So HR terminated them during a team's call. 171 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:01,400 Could can we have a team's call? Yeah, We're terminating your, 172 00:11:01,560 --> 00:11:03,200 your contract because we've found this out. 173 00:11:05,240 --> 00:11:09,360 The access for one of the twins was cut immediately, the one 174 00:11:09,360 --> 00:11:14,080 that had the felony, but the other one had connected to the 175 00:11:14,080 --> 00:11:17,040 VPN 10 minutes before the meeting and still maintained 176 00:11:17,040 --> 00:11:21,520 full access. So that that twin Munib started 177 00:11:21,520 --> 00:11:24,000 restricting changes to production databases and then 178 00:11:24,000 --> 00:11:26,360 deleted them. And the entire conversation was 179 00:11:26,360 --> 00:11:30,880 recorded because the HR person had been recording the call and 180 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:35,080 the brothers didn't leave the HR call after HR had disconnected, 181 00:11:35,080 --> 00:11:39,080 they stayed on the team's call. So they had actual video 182 00:11:39,080 --> 00:11:44,120 evidence of this and the entire conversation was captured, 183 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:47,640 including lines like people are locked out for the day, this is 184 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:51,560 the perfect time, don't worry about it, you don't do nothing. 185 00:11:52,960 --> 00:11:57,360 It's like wow. Yeah exactly. 186 00:11:57,880 --> 00:12:01,360 Also stolen 5 1/2 thousand username and password 187 00:12:01,360 --> 00:12:05,360 combinations and built Python scripts to test them against 188 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:10,040 airlines and hotels and used stolen air miles to book himself 189 00:12:10,040 --> 00:12:14,520 a flight. This is they've been found as 190 00:12:14,520 --> 00:12:17,920 Sahib was found guilty by jury on May the 7th. 191 00:12:18,400 --> 00:12:22,080 Mooney pled guilty in April but has since filed handwritten 192 00:12:22,080 --> 00:12:24,320 letters from gaol trying to walk it back. 193 00:12:24,320 --> 00:12:27,440 So they've potentially faced decades in prison. 194 00:12:29,400 --> 00:12:32,840 This is where security needs to talk to HR to make sure that 195 00:12:32,840 --> 00:12:35,480 this happened instantly after someone's been dismissed. 196 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:40,160 Security awareness around the dismissal process and the 197 00:12:40,160 --> 00:12:44,000 leavers process needs to be nailed on somewhat. 198 00:12:44,120 --> 00:12:47,360 I think like there's a perfect reason. 199 00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:51,320 Send that to someone in your HR team and go, can we have a chat 200 00:12:51,320 --> 00:12:54,440 about this? Could, could a scenario where 201 00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:58,320 this happens occur here? And it's not necessarily the one 202 00:12:58,320 --> 00:13:01,840 that they were actually according to this, it's the 203 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:04,720 brother that they were dismissing and the other 204 00:13:04,720 --> 00:13:08,360 brothers done the actions. So, you know, you need to spread 205 00:13:08,360 --> 00:13:12,360 your net a little wider. Husbands, wives, brothers, 206 00:13:12,680 --> 00:13:17,680 relatives, that kind of thing. It's yes, the second someone's 207 00:13:17,680 --> 00:13:21,560 fired, you need to cut that access immediately. 208 00:13:22,440 --> 00:13:25,080 Yeah. And why background cheques not 209 00:13:25,080 --> 00:13:30,040 been done before? Yeah, quite, quite bizarre, that 210 00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:32,360 one. I, I, I love the fact it's all 211 00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:35,720 been caught on video. Like these aren't stupid people. 212 00:13:35,880 --> 00:13:39,800 These are intelligent people that can, you know, maintain 213 00:13:39,800 --> 00:13:43,800 databases and steal passwords and write Python scripts. 214 00:13:44,240 --> 00:13:46,040 But they forgot to press stop on the recording. 215 00:13:48,400 --> 00:13:51,720 Yeah. Yeah, or even the call go to a 216 00:13:51,760 --> 00:13:52,920 private one. Yeah, yeah, we're. 217 00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:55,240 Just hanging up. All I had to do was hang up. 218 00:13:57,480 --> 00:13:58,120 That's right. That's great. 219 00:13:58,560 --> 00:14:02,080 That's great, yeah. I'll let move on to the next one 220 00:14:02,080 --> 00:14:03,640 is brilliant. Go and you can have this one. 221 00:14:04,720 --> 00:14:09,480 Go on next one, we've got some kids bypassing age verification 222 00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:15,920 cheques with a fake moustache. So yeah, as we know, the age 223 00:14:15,920 --> 00:14:21,560 verification systems, I guess, particularly the ones in the UK 224 00:14:21,560 --> 00:14:27,400 with the Online Safety Act, are not very good as yeah, children 225 00:14:27,400 --> 00:14:32,120 have been found to draw a fake moustache with makeup pencil and 226 00:14:32,120 --> 00:14:35,880 they were able to bypass these cheques and be verified as being 227 00:14:35,880 --> 00:14:38,240 old enough. So apparently if you have a 228 00:14:38,240 --> 00:14:42,120 moustache, you're over 16. According to this, it's as. 229 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:49,400 Simple as that. So it's AUK based non profit. 230 00:14:49,400 --> 00:14:54,520 Internet mass surveyed 1300 children aged between 9 and 16. 231 00:14:56,400 --> 00:15:00,960 Half of them said the age cheques were easy to bypass. 1/3 232 00:15:00,960 --> 00:15:02,400 said they've they've bypassed it. 233 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:08,440 So there were some methods, various methods drawing on a 234 00:15:08,440 --> 00:15:12,520 moustache point in the camera, a video game character which we 235 00:15:12,520 --> 00:15:18,320 covered before, totally funny faces, simple things that you 236 00:15:18,320 --> 00:15:21,080 seem fake birthdays or boring parents ID. 237 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:25,960 I'm sure that's not borrowed or or like temporarily stolen. 238 00:15:26,560 --> 00:15:28,200 Can I borrow your driver's licence? 239 00:15:28,200 --> 00:15:30,040 No, it's going to be where's Mom's purse? 240 00:15:33,600 --> 00:15:37,560 And yeah, the fake moustache trick works across multiple 241 00:15:38,040 --> 00:15:43,720 different platforms, yeah. I wish I'd have, I wish I'd have 242 00:15:43,720 --> 00:15:45,640 read this a few weeks ago because it was two or three 243 00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:47,800 weeks ago. My son had to do the age 244 00:15:47,800 --> 00:15:52,640 verification on Roblox and if it comes up for any of my other 245 00:15:52,640 --> 00:15:57,800 kids I'm going to test this. We've got a fake moustache 246 00:15:57,800 --> 00:15:59,680 somewhere. I was looking for it for this 247 00:15:59,680 --> 00:16:01,640 episode because I was going to put it on but then I realised 248 00:16:01,640 --> 00:16:03,400 I've already got 1 so it wouldn't really work. 249 00:16:06,440 --> 00:16:09,400 Yeah. So obviously it's not just the 250 00:16:09,400 --> 00:16:16,120 UK in this Australia, 25 U.S. states also have some form of 251 00:16:16,120 --> 00:16:19,840 age ratification in place. And if it's some other, some of 252 00:16:19,840 --> 00:16:23,240 countries isn't there, not just not just those, but yeah, many 253 00:16:23,240 --> 00:16:27,240 governments are rolling this out as a requirement for social 254 00:16:27,240 --> 00:16:31,560 media or adult content websites. And yeah, then you sort of, they 255 00:16:31,560 --> 00:16:37,760 use these AI age estimating scans, which obviously aren't 256 00:16:37,760 --> 00:16:41,960 very good or you upload your ID, but a lot of people obviously 257 00:16:41,960 --> 00:16:44,360 don't want to upload their their ID to it. 258 00:16:46,760 --> 00:16:50,120 And yeah, the idea is obviously to protect children from harmful 259 00:16:50,120 --> 00:16:54,040 content, but in the the reality is that they're bypassing these 260 00:16:54,400 --> 00:17:00,000 fairly easily. So yeah, there's not much of a 261 00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:02,600 surprise that we're talking about this again. 262 00:17:03,160 --> 00:17:06,240 I remember saying it was really good that Roblox had done it. 263 00:17:06,280 --> 00:17:09,000 When we spoke about Roblox two or three episodes ago, I 264 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:11,280 remember saying, oh, it's really good that Roblox had done that. 265 00:17:11,280 --> 00:17:15,440 So he gets age-related content. Completely naively, even me 266 00:17:15,440 --> 00:17:19,520 having covered this before and I was doing this every week, 267 00:17:20,160 --> 00:17:23,800 naively, I remember thinking, oh, that's all right, Yeah, it's 268 00:17:23,800 --> 00:17:25,400 performative, isn't it? It's. 269 00:17:25,880 --> 00:17:27,839 It's security theatre. It's. 270 00:17:28,160 --> 00:17:31,000 Yeah, I and I felt they. Get fined but. 271 00:17:31,560 --> 00:17:34,640 I felt victim to that as well. I was there thinking it'd be all 272 00:17:34,640 --> 00:17:39,160 right because they're checking his age, but actually he could 273 00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:41,560 have been doing anything. I think previously before it was 274 00:17:42,480 --> 00:17:44,560 the game with Norman Reedus wasn't it? 275 00:17:44,600 --> 00:17:46,800 Where they had his icon put in places. 276 00:17:47,120 --> 00:17:49,240 Yeah, Death Stranding game. Yeah, Death Stranding. 277 00:17:49,240 --> 00:17:53,080 It's so realistic, wasn't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah. 278 00:17:53,280 --> 00:17:55,600 I guess after this check where your where your ideas. 279 00:17:57,520 --> 00:17:59,200 Yeah, it should be right here, actually. 280 00:17:59,320 --> 00:18:01,680 And just. No, it's here. 281 00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:02,640 It's all right. I've got it. 282 00:18:03,200 --> 00:18:04,040 Yeah. Yeah. 283 00:18:04,840 --> 00:18:07,400 But yeah, that's. The amazing thing? 284 00:18:07,400 --> 00:18:09,160 Let's just go back to the beginning of what you said 285 00:18:09,160 --> 00:18:11,920 there. You said they surveyed around 286 00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:20,000 1300 children aged 9 to 16. And basically the kids said 287 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:21,880 themselves that these are easy to beat. 288 00:18:21,960 --> 00:18:25,440 Like it's a known these, these kids aren't stupid. 289 00:18:25,440 --> 00:18:28,600 They've found a way round this. They're finding a way round 290 00:18:28,680 --> 00:18:30,080 this. I mean, they're, they're the 291 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:33,400 share of their friends, right? They're not not going to keep it 292 00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:35,760 secret. And they're not, it'll be at 293 00:18:35,760 --> 00:18:37,960 school going, I can't play that game on Roblox anymore. 294 00:18:37,960 --> 00:18:39,560 I'm not old enough. And one of them will be like, 295 00:18:39,560 --> 00:18:42,200 yeah, yeah, all you need to do is open up this game, you know, 296 00:18:42,200 --> 00:18:44,440 go to open up FIFA. Draw a moustache. 297 00:18:44,720 --> 00:18:48,360 Draw a moustache on or open up FIFA and get they'll all be 298 00:18:48,360 --> 00:18:50,600 coming into school with their sister's eyeliner. 299 00:18:50,840 --> 00:18:53,040 Like I'll bring my sister's eyeliner in tomorrow and then 300 00:18:53,040 --> 00:18:55,560 they'll all be after school with teach be like, why have you all 301 00:18:55,560 --> 00:19:00,720 got moustache? Yeah, yeah, this is brilliant. 302 00:19:00,840 --> 00:19:02,280 It's brilliant. Well, it's, it's brilliant. 303 00:19:02,280 --> 00:19:06,640 And it's also it, it doesn't work like this is not the way. 304 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:08,880 Yeah. That's yeah. 305 00:19:09,600 --> 00:19:12,880 It's really not great, No. And I wonder if it's ever going 306 00:19:12,880 --> 00:19:14,880 to be improved. How? 307 00:19:15,240 --> 00:19:18,440 How? Yeah, yeah, yeah. 308 00:19:19,000 --> 00:19:20,800 Right, I'll move on to the next one. 309 00:19:23,240 --> 00:19:27,880 Fake clawed code installer is stealing developer credentials. 310 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:32,800 So this is from Ontinue and it's a blog that they've posted 311 00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:36,160 attackers and we've covered this before, but not for Claude 312 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:43,040 attackers set up fake Claude attackers set up fake Claude 313 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:47,680 code installation pages promoted through sponsored Google search 314 00:19:47,680 --> 00:19:52,280 results. The fake page looks identical to 315 00:19:52,280 --> 00:19:55,320 a legitimate Claude code documentation, but swaps the 316 00:19:55,320 --> 00:19:59,960 install commands destination to an attacker controlled domain. 317 00:19:59,960 --> 00:20:02,640 So we've spoken about Google Ads before. 318 00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:07,760 Google decided in their infinite wisdom that ad blockers were bad 319 00:20:07,960 --> 00:20:11,120 because they were costing the one of the richest companies in 320 00:20:11,120 --> 00:20:16,400 the world lots of money. So they blocked the ability for 321 00:20:16,400 --> 00:20:20,960 you block origin and ad blockers to stop working in Chrome, which 322 00:20:20,960 --> 00:20:25,560 is the most widely used browser. And of course, now Google Ads 323 00:20:25,560 --> 00:20:27,480 appear at the top of every Google search. 324 00:20:27,800 --> 00:20:32,640 And this operation targets developers who search on Google 325 00:20:32,640 --> 00:20:36,520 for install clawed code. And then the top results would 326 00:20:36,520 --> 00:20:41,360 be a sponsored result. And it looks like a legitimate 327 00:20:41,360 --> 00:20:43,440 clawed code page. We've covered this numerous 328 00:20:43,440 --> 00:20:46,640 times. You found one that was a 329 00:20:46,640 --> 00:20:49,720 compromised Google Ads account for Sydney Zoo. 330 00:20:50,320 --> 00:20:52,960 You found another one for, AH Refs. 331 00:20:53,240 --> 00:20:56,080 You know this, this happens so frequently. 332 00:20:56,240 --> 00:20:59,720 We found them live on air whilst recording this. 333 00:20:59,880 --> 00:21:02,480 That's how easy they are to come across. 334 00:21:03,960 --> 00:21:06,800 And you can't unless you look at the domain or you look at the 335 00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:09,560 download domain. You can't tell that easily, 336 00:21:09,560 --> 00:21:12,280 especially when you kind of trust Google. 337 00:21:12,600 --> 00:21:16,400 So this, this one's quite interesting. 338 00:21:17,920 --> 00:21:21,600 It renders an altered one line installation command in HTML 339 00:21:21,600 --> 00:21:26,600 that looks identical to the one from Anthropic, but sends you to 340 00:21:26,600 --> 00:21:33,640 events.msft.msft23.com instead. The payload doesn't match any 341 00:21:33,640 --> 00:21:37,200 known malware family, it's been compared to a number of 342 00:21:37,200 --> 00:21:39,400 different ones, and there's no technical match, which means 343 00:21:39,400 --> 00:21:42,440 this is either new or privately maintained. 344 00:21:44,440 --> 00:21:47,680 And the malware cheques your Windows region settings and a 345 00:21:47,680 --> 00:21:49,320 ports installation if you're in Russia. 346 00:21:50,240 --> 00:21:53,160 Should we just all get AVPN to say we're in Russia? 347 00:21:54,040 --> 00:21:56,360 Would that solve? Should we all just tell our 348 00:21:56,360 --> 00:21:58,280 systems? Yeah, we're sat in Moscow? 349 00:21:58,680 --> 00:22:02,120 This isn't, again, I would not just Russia, Russia, Iran or CIS 350 00:22:02,120 --> 00:22:04,080 countries. This isn't the first time again, 351 00:22:04,080 --> 00:22:08,720 that malware won't run if you're based in one of those countries. 352 00:22:11,120 --> 00:22:17,120 And this is fresh this year. The date the the compiled date 353 00:22:17,120 --> 00:22:23,160 on the helper places it within 60 days of Chrome 144, meaning 354 00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:28,360 whoever built this is tracking upstream Chromium changes and 355 00:22:28,360 --> 00:22:31,360 updating the tooling to match. So this is just this is being 356 00:22:31,360 --> 00:22:34,920 maintained and being updated. So updating Google Chrome 357 00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:36,800 doesn't fix this issue. It's still coming. 358 00:22:37,720 --> 00:22:41,240 You cannot trust sponsored links on Google. 359 00:22:41,640 --> 00:22:45,160 Full stop Google. Like we've said about Meta 360 00:22:45,160 --> 00:22:48,520 selling advertising to anyone, Google should do better. 361 00:22:48,520 --> 00:22:53,360 They could do better. How difficult is it to like it 362 00:22:53,400 --> 00:22:56,640 it there's ways they could do this, but they generate too much 363 00:22:56,640 --> 00:22:59,680 money. So and if you're a developer, 364 00:22:59,680 --> 00:23:03,160 think about the access that a dodgy cloud code. 365 00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:06,680 It's got the keys to your Kingdom, literally the keys to 366 00:23:06,680 --> 00:23:08,560 your Kingdom that you're going to put in it. 367 00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:13,320 It's be really, really careful. Go straight to the domain. 368 00:23:13,400 --> 00:23:15,320 Don't Google it. Cloud dot AI, 369 00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:18,960 claude.aianthropic.com something like that. 370 00:23:18,960 --> 00:23:21,040 Just go there. Yeah. 371 00:23:22,280 --> 00:23:25,760 Yeah. Anyway, that's, that's yeah, 372 00:23:25,760 --> 00:23:29,120 that's my rant over on that one. If you're in a business, have a 373 00:23:29,120 --> 00:23:32,880 safe, why not have we used to have I built, when I worked on 374 00:23:32,880 --> 00:23:38,120 help desk 1215 years ago, a shortcuts page in a Google site 375 00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:41,120 that all the frequently visited links. 376 00:23:41,120 --> 00:23:43,720 And this was before I really had a security hat on. 377 00:23:43,720 --> 00:23:46,680 This was just convenience. All the regular links that we 378 00:23:46,680 --> 00:23:49,920 had to visit as a team on help desk, I put them all on a single 379 00:23:49,920 --> 00:23:51,920 page. So rather than searching through 380 00:23:51,920 --> 00:23:54,880 your bookmarks, I mean bookmarks we spoke about a couple of weeks 381 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:58,160 ago, but I had a shortcut page. Businesses should have sites 382 00:23:58,440 --> 00:24:00,680 that link to trusted download destinations. 383 00:24:02,080 --> 00:24:04,680 And as an individual, bookmarks use bookmarks. 384 00:24:05,120 --> 00:24:07,040 We're bringing bookmarks back. Come on. 385 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:11,320 Yeah, yes. Let me know how I am. 386 00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:15,680 Maybe like a software repository that's maintained by all that 387 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:17,640 someone as well is the another option. 388 00:24:18,160 --> 00:24:20,280 That would be the more mature option than a, than a 389 00:24:20,280 --> 00:24:22,440 destination for the download page of bookmarks. 390 00:24:24,520 --> 00:24:26,480 Yeah, I think that's it on that one. 391 00:24:26,760 --> 00:24:30,600 It's yeah, Google ads, man. Just stay away from the 392 00:24:30,600 --> 00:24:33,360 sponsored links. Yeah, yeah, it's a good one 393 00:24:33,800 --> 00:24:35,480 maybe. What's the next one? 394 00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:42,920 Yeah, so this one, Google have confirmed that hackers have used 395 00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:45,960 AI to find a zero day for the first time. 396 00:24:48,320 --> 00:24:52,920 So this is a it's a blog post on their Google threat Intelligence 397 00:24:53,120 --> 00:24:55,800 group. But they still sort of said that 398 00:24:56,760 --> 00:25:02,880 a cybercrime group has used AI to discover a previously unknown 399 00:25:02,880 --> 00:25:06,120 vulnerability in an open source system administration tool and 400 00:25:06,120 --> 00:25:10,960 built an exploit for it to deserve. 401 00:25:11,480 --> 00:25:15,120 There's a report the details how this has sort of been done. 402 00:25:18,040 --> 00:25:22,920 And yeah, they're basically found some some stuff in this 403 00:25:24,360 --> 00:25:28,040 zero days sort of exploits code that proves that AI was heavily 404 00:25:28,040 --> 00:25:33,200 involved in it. And they plan to to to use the 405 00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:40,040 exploit for financial gain. So you had this Google threat 406 00:25:40,040 --> 00:25:45,320 intelligence group alerted the offender to imminent threat and 407 00:25:45,320 --> 00:25:48,680 they, and I think that's before, yeah, before the cyber crime 408 00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:53,240 crime group initiated a mass, mass exploitation campaign. 409 00:25:56,040 --> 00:26:00,280 But obviously some probably not the first time that attackers 410 00:26:00,280 --> 00:26:03,640 have used AI, but it's the first time that Google have found 411 00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:07,800 evidence that it's been used in the sort of in the world. 412 00:26:08,560 --> 00:26:12,560 I was going to add a that we know of caveat to that because I 413 00:26:12,600 --> 00:26:15,640 feel very much like really are we sure? 414 00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:18,600 So this is probably that we know of that we can identify. 415 00:26:20,760 --> 00:26:26,080 Yeah, been no surprise that they declined to identify what the 416 00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:31,200 vulnerability was, I guess whether or not I had been 417 00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:35,720 patched or name it. But it's a popular open source 418 00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:40,160 web-based administration tool. I'm not too sure that what, what 419 00:26:40,160 --> 00:26:42,080 it could be, but we've been sure you could Google it and find 420 00:26:42,080 --> 00:26:46,400 out. But yeah, basically there was a, 421 00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:52,560 a Python script that allowed attackers to bypass 2 factor 422 00:26:52,560 --> 00:26:58,160 authentication for the service. And yeah, it says that the, 423 00:27:00,200 --> 00:27:04,280 yeah, they've, they've sort of confirmed that AI was used 424 00:27:05,560 --> 00:27:09,480 within it. Ham it doesn't say much more. 425 00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:12,440 I mean, they they said that Google are confident it wasn't 426 00:27:12,440 --> 00:27:15,720 Gemini or or Anthropic Smithos, which I guess was big one 427 00:27:16,440 --> 00:27:19,600 potential thing we spoke about last episode of Mythos being 428 00:27:19,600 --> 00:27:23,520 used in that way. But obviously, as we mentioned 429 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:26,760 as well, there's something AI tools out there and various 430 00:27:26,760 --> 00:27:31,600 other companies or or countries are developing similar things. 431 00:27:31,680 --> 00:27:35,520 Just the last episode, Mythos CEO basically said we've got 6 432 00:27:35,520 --> 00:27:38,880 to 12 months till China and other people catch up. 433 00:27:39,160 --> 00:27:43,640 So it's, yeah, maybe that was overly optimistic. 434 00:27:45,320 --> 00:27:47,640 Yeah. So basically he says within 435 00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:53,880 within this article that there were various artefacts in the 436 00:27:53,880 --> 00:27:56,280 explicit code that were inconsistent with human 437 00:27:56,280 --> 00:28:01,040 developers. So it included documentation 438 00:28:01,040 --> 00:28:05,760 strings in Python, highly annotated code and hallucinated 439 00:28:06,360 --> 00:28:11,880 a non existent CVSS score. So yeah, maybe they potentially 440 00:28:11,880 --> 00:28:14,840 could have cleaned up the code a bit to disguise that, but maybe 441 00:28:14,840 --> 00:28:18,400 they weren't sort of had the knowledge to to do that, right. 442 00:28:18,400 --> 00:28:20,480 So they use AI to to create that. 443 00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:24,480 Yeah. But yeah, obviously this is 444 00:28:24,800 --> 00:28:27,920 probably not the probably not the first time, and it 445 00:28:27,920 --> 00:28:29,240 definitely won't be the last time. 446 00:28:29,840 --> 00:28:33,680 I love the fact that even that it worked even though it had 447 00:28:33,680 --> 00:28:38,280 like hallucinogenic contents. Yeah. 448 00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:41,960 Like why clean it up if it just works like? 449 00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:49,840 There's no need to, that's true. Yeah, there's there's much more 450 00:28:49,840 --> 00:28:52,480 on this one. I mean, obviously something to 451 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:56,040 be thinking about. I guess with AII mean obviously 452 00:28:56,560 --> 00:28:59,960 cyber criminals using AIA lot whether it's in phishing emails 453 00:28:59,960 --> 00:29:08,240 or obviously creating 0 days. But yeah, I guess I guess the 454 00:29:08,240 --> 00:29:13,000 cow to these sort of things are potentially obviously depends on 455 00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:18,600 the companies providing updates for software or you'd hope 456 00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:22,640 there'd be a bit more information on what's what to 457 00:29:22,640 --> 00:29:26,160 look out for. But I think this, there's a, 458 00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:28,760 there's a blog post about it all, but I don't think it really 459 00:29:30,120 --> 00:29:32,760 covers much. They're quite secretary, it 460 00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:36,800 seems a lot what it was. It's they're probably trying to 461 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:42,960 be extra protective, which at the same time is frustrating. 462 00:29:44,280 --> 00:29:48,160 But yeah, I mean, we can, we can drop this blog post to the news 463 00:29:48,160 --> 00:29:49,000 now. Yeah. 464 00:29:49,400 --> 00:29:52,840 Funeral wants to read. And of course, the newsletter is 465 00:29:52,880 --> 00:29:57,080 available at riskycreative.com or you can find it on LinkedIn 466 00:29:57,080 --> 00:29:59,560 at the Awareness Angle newsletter. 467 00:29:59,760 --> 00:30:01,120 You can search LinkedIn for that. 468 00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:05,040 It comes out every Monday and contains links and details of 469 00:30:05,040 --> 00:30:06,960 everything we discuss on every episode. 470 00:30:07,680 --> 00:30:11,640 So yeah, link to that and all the other stories will be in the 471 00:30:11,640 --> 00:30:14,480 newsletter, which is out every Monday morning along with every 472 00:30:14,480 --> 00:30:17,000 episode. Cool. 473 00:30:17,560 --> 00:30:19,920 Shall move on to the next one. Yeah, go for the next one. 474 00:30:20,560 --> 00:30:25,320 So we're back on Claude. Claude AI recovers Stoner's 475 00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:29,680 $400,000 Bitcoin after an 11 year search. 476 00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:34,840 I love this this is this is again like a script for a movie. 477 00:30:35,320 --> 00:30:40,560 Dude, where's my Bitcoin? A man bought 5 Bitcoin in 2015 478 00:30:41,040 --> 00:30:45,240 at a Starbucks for around $12150. 479 00:30:46,240 --> 00:30:50,040 Change the password while high and then completely forgot about 480 00:30:50,040 --> 00:30:51,880 it. And just to be clear, Claude 481 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:57,640 didn't crack Bitcoin encryption. OK, let's just calm down in if I 482 00:30:57,640 --> 00:31:00,240 share this on the socials, just clarify that in the comments. 483 00:31:00,240 --> 00:31:03,240 Claude didn't crack Bitcoin encryption. 484 00:31:03,240 --> 00:31:04,840 It didn't break any cryptography. 485 00:31:05,200 --> 00:31:09,480 What it did was sort through his messy archive of old files. 486 00:31:09,760 --> 00:31:13,520 Find a forgotten backup wallet that still worked with the old 487 00:31:13,520 --> 00:31:16,800 credentials and spotted a configuration error in the 488 00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:20,040 recovery tool that had been blocking his progress for years. 489 00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:24,600 This is like more digital forensic assistant than master 490 00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:28,720 hacker. But this is brilliant because 491 00:31:28,720 --> 00:31:32,720 it's, I mean, it just shows you what AI is really, really good 492 00:31:32,720 --> 00:31:37,040 at, pattern matching and disorganised data sets that you 493 00:31:37,040 --> 00:31:39,640 know would have taken him months to sift through. 494 00:31:41,760 --> 00:31:45,560 To the other extreme, people uploading sensitive files, 495 00:31:45,560 --> 00:31:47,880 private keys in the wallet to AI models. 496 00:31:48,920 --> 00:31:53,800 You don't want to be uploading your Bitcoin stuff to AI in case 497 00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:57,520 it spits it out to someone else. Yeah, especially if you haven't 498 00:31:58,160 --> 00:32:02,160 configured any security sort of settings of that was called a 499 00:32:02,160 --> 00:32:05,760 cloud bot being misconfigured or not protected in certain ways, 500 00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:09,240 but. He spent eleven years trying to 501 00:32:09,240 --> 00:32:14,920 recover this, including brute forcing it with 3.5 trillion 502 00:32:15,400 --> 00:32:22,880 password combinations on rented GPU time, and then he found an 503 00:32:22,880 --> 00:32:27,960 old mnemonic seed phrase in a college notebook and he dumped 504 00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:31,600 the whole of his old college computer into Claude as a last 505 00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:34,640 resort. Then that found the old backup 506 00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:38,120 file from 2019 that predated the password change when he was 507 00:32:38,120 --> 00:32:41,440 stoned and the mnemonic phrase was able to decrypt it. 508 00:32:42,640 --> 00:32:47,040 I sent the password. Turned out to be LOL 420. 509 00:32:47,480 --> 00:32:52,040 The police. That's the most stoned. 510 00:32:52,240 --> 00:32:54,720 The most stoned password ever, I think. 511 00:32:55,760 --> 00:32:57,360 Yeah. So were you stoned when you set 512 00:32:57,360 --> 00:33:01,400 that password? So yeah, he's now worth what was 513 00:33:01,400 --> 00:33:06,720 $12150 is now 400,000 lbs. So thanks to Claude, he's 514 00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:08,640 probably bought a house. So that's amazing. 515 00:33:09,720 --> 00:33:11,400 Like I'd be very happy with that. 516 00:33:11,400 --> 00:33:13,520 It's not a bad return on investment. 517 00:33:13,880 --> 00:33:20,200 Yeah, I think there's a key. Let's lol. 420 F the police, 518 00:33:20,200 --> 00:33:24,600 whilst a very strong password and does meet many a password 519 00:33:24,600 --> 00:33:27,040 criteria because it did have an exclamation mark on the end of 520 00:33:27,040 --> 00:33:32,280 it and quite memorable. Clearly not memorable enough for 521 00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:35,960 this individual. So password management is 522 00:33:35,960 --> 00:33:40,200 something to be thought about. And don't go uploading all your 523 00:33:40,480 --> 00:33:44,600 contents of your whole computer to Claude just in case. 524 00:33:45,240 --> 00:33:46,720 It's probably worth a gamble at this. 525 00:33:46,840 --> 00:33:51,000 I probably I might have done the same, I don't know, but just be 526 00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:52,600 prepared for it to be shared widely. 527 00:33:54,080 --> 00:33:57,440 Yeah. Right. 528 00:33:57,520 --> 00:34:00,320 I think that's that on that one. So do you want to move on to the 529 00:34:00,320 --> 00:34:04,640 next one? Yeah, so next one you've got. 530 00:34:06,640 --> 00:34:12,280 So anyone who who knows your Audi's VIN number can add your 531 00:34:12,280 --> 00:34:16,679 car to their account. According to this to a security 532 00:34:16,679 --> 00:34:21,560 researcher has found that anyone can add any Audi to their My 533 00:34:21,560 --> 00:34:23,880 Audi account just by knowing the vehicle's VIN number. 534 00:34:26,600 --> 00:34:29,719 And yeah, obviously a a VIN number can be visible through 535 00:34:29,719 --> 00:34:33,480 the windshield of revved car. Yeah, it's printed on various 536 00:34:33,480 --> 00:34:37,520 documentations, service and records. 537 00:34:37,719 --> 00:34:41,760 Screen on the windscreen, it's that little like it's in that if 538 00:34:41,760 --> 00:34:43,760 you look on the edge of your windscreen where it's all black, 539 00:34:43,760 --> 00:34:46,400 it tends to be like shallowed out because it needs to be 540 00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:48,520 visible. On both my cars it's visible. 541 00:34:50,080 --> 00:34:55,960 Yeah, but basically they were able to add any vehicle as a as 542 00:34:55,960 --> 00:34:58,880 a guest user providing limited access. 543 00:35:01,400 --> 00:35:05,000 But the the researcher found API issues worth reporting. 544 00:35:05,120 --> 00:35:07,240 Yeah, doesn't say that they responsibly disclosed the 545 00:35:07,240 --> 00:35:13,800 findings to VW Group and car IAD which is VW software subsidiary. 546 00:35:16,160 --> 00:35:17,960 This is after initial engagement. 547 00:35:17,960 --> 00:35:22,400 VW Group stopped responding entirely, including two requests 548 00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:24,680 of for any form of recognition for the research. 549 00:35:26,080 --> 00:35:29,240 The researcher is an Audi owner himself and says he's genuinely, 550 00:35:29,280 --> 00:35:33,320 genuinely concerned about the vehicles association logic. 551 00:35:34,920 --> 00:35:38,600 But basically, yeah, they started digging into the My Audi 552 00:35:38,600 --> 00:35:42,720 app after his app started cutting out for days at a time 553 00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:45,080 and the Audi support went nowhere. 554 00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:52,320 They used community projects as a sign point to understand the 555 00:35:52,320 --> 00:35:56,000 authentication flow. He went sort of deeper into 556 00:35:56,000 --> 00:35:59,560 looking into the API structure and found that the vehicle 557 00:36:00,200 --> 00:36:02,840 association model treats Vins as if they're a secret. 558 00:36:04,680 --> 00:36:07,560 But basically I was able to you, you're able to create an account 559 00:36:08,280 --> 00:36:12,480 on my Audi portal or or other VW brand portals and add a vehicle 560 00:36:12,480 --> 00:36:22,280 just by entering the VIN number. Yeah, it's doesn't say much 561 00:36:22,280 --> 00:36:23,440 more. We obviously had tried to 562 00:36:23,440 --> 00:36:26,920 communicate, the issue didn't and this the conversation just 563 00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:31,480 stopped with VW group. Do you know, this isn't the 564 00:36:31,480 --> 00:36:34,800 first? I thought this sounded familiar. 565 00:36:35,240 --> 00:36:38,960 We're on episode 88 now. We spoke about vulnerabilities 566 00:36:38,960 --> 00:36:43,120 in Volkswagen's In Car Entertainment on episode 5, 567 00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:46,400 right? So go back to like over 12 568 00:36:46,400 --> 00:36:52,960 months ago, Episode 5 would have been what, December 2024, 569 00:36:52,960 --> 00:36:57,560 something like that. Yeah, this isn't And it, there's 570 00:36:57,560 --> 00:37:00,200 probably, it's just like any software, right? 571 00:37:00,200 --> 00:37:01,520 There's going to be vulnerabilities. 572 00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:05,360 But I, I can't remember exactly. I can't find. 573 00:37:05,360 --> 00:37:09,000 We didn't keep very good episode notes back then. 574 00:37:09,920 --> 00:37:13,880 So I was searching for our topics doc, but we didn't create 575 00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:18,720 one back then so I can't find it, but I don't think we thought 576 00:37:18,720 --> 00:37:20,080 we'd still be going at this point. 577 00:37:20,200 --> 00:37:26,400 So yeah, all I can find is a thumbnail and the thumbnail for 578 00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:29,960 that episode said voice cloning risks, AI scams, Volkswagen 579 00:37:29,960 --> 00:37:32,040 vulnerabilities, and meta breach. 580 00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:36,000 So. Yeah, there's a few things I 581 00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:40,480 guess from this sort of his, his research, right. 582 00:37:40,480 --> 00:37:44,040 So obviously our VIN numbers aren't secrets and they're 583 00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:47,920 pretty much public information. As we all mentioned, you can 584 00:37:47,960 --> 00:37:51,360 actually go up to any car and just get the VIN number for the 585 00:37:51,360 --> 00:37:57,400 windshield and potentially associate with your accountant 586 00:37:58,640 --> 00:38:02,880 potentially do certain things or or at least view some data and 587 00:38:02,880 --> 00:38:05,720 you might be able to view some information on the vehicle. 588 00:38:07,640 --> 00:38:11,200 Doesn't doesn't seem to same. I haven't properly looked to the 589 00:38:11,200 --> 00:38:13,800 article itself, but I'm not sure exactly what the limited access 590 00:38:13,800 --> 00:38:18,440 was, but I guess it's the fact that you can connect or sign 591 00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:21,280 into your account is it's not great in the first place. 592 00:38:24,040 --> 00:38:28,120 And yeah, it's like we spoke about if like Internet of Things 593 00:38:28,120 --> 00:38:31,640 and vulnerabilities there. We've spoken about car 594 00:38:31,640 --> 00:38:34,080 vulnerabilities, like you said of quite a while ago. 595 00:38:34,080 --> 00:38:39,120 And there was one of those events, wasn't one of the big 596 00:38:39,320 --> 00:38:42,560 hacking events that they found like a vulnerability in a car or 597 00:38:42,560 --> 00:38:44,080 it was in this this sun leaf or something? 598 00:38:44,360 --> 00:38:48,960 Yeah, years ago, I remember years ago, yeah, years and years 599 00:38:48,960 --> 00:38:53,800 ago they were able to take control of a Mitsubishi FEV PHEV 600 00:38:55,400 --> 00:38:58,320 that was again at DEFCON or something. 601 00:38:58,880 --> 00:39:01,520 Yeah, I remember an old colleague of ours, Piotr, 602 00:39:01,520 --> 00:39:04,400 telling us about one of the vulnerabilities they did at 603 00:39:04,920 --> 00:39:06,240 DEFCON. So yeah. 604 00:39:07,200 --> 00:39:11,160 But yeah, obviously again, again, I don't know what access 605 00:39:11,160 --> 00:39:16,400 was available, but with a smartphone connected car and 606 00:39:16,800 --> 00:39:19,280 app, you can sort of you can see the car's location if you're 607 00:39:19,520 --> 00:39:22,640 like properly authenticated, you can see the the range, it has 608 00:39:22,640 --> 00:39:25,120 the mileage and various other things. 609 00:39:25,120 --> 00:39:28,360 You can even unlock some some vehicles for the app and stuff. 610 00:39:28,680 --> 00:39:32,880 That's there's privacy issues with this, like if, if you, if 611 00:39:32,880 --> 00:39:38,160 you husband and wife have split up, you know, stalker, whatever. 612 00:39:38,240 --> 00:39:41,320 You know, if, if, if it's possible to find out the 613 00:39:41,320 --> 00:39:44,360 location of someone's vehicle and track that location. 614 00:39:44,840 --> 00:39:46,480 That's got all kinds of consequences. 615 00:39:48,240 --> 00:39:51,680 Yeah, it's the fact that Volkswagen Group have gone quiet 616 00:39:51,920 --> 00:39:54,360 on that is a bit worrying. Yeah. 617 00:39:54,360 --> 00:39:57,800 I mean, obviously with this one with not, not saying that that 618 00:39:57,880 --> 00:40:00,320 is possible, but I guess it no, it could be possible, right, 619 00:40:01,520 --> 00:40:04,400 Maybe not with this vulnerability, but other, other 620 00:40:04,400 --> 00:40:07,360 vehicles over time. But yeah. 621 00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:10,480 It's obviously I'm not great that they've not responded 622 00:40:11,000 --> 00:40:14,560 either, so they don't want to. They don't want to pay a bug 623 00:40:14,560 --> 00:40:18,200 bounty, so they're just quietly. Yeah, I guess until, yeah, until 624 00:40:18,200 --> 00:40:23,960 someone breaks, breaks even more and becomes a big problem for 625 00:40:23,960 --> 00:40:24,880 them. They maybe they will. 626 00:40:24,880 --> 00:40:27,840 But yeah, yeah, I think that's it. 627 00:40:28,640 --> 00:40:30,560 OK. In which case, I think that's it 628 00:40:30,560 --> 00:40:33,480 for this week's news. Oh yeah. 629 00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:40,560 Let's do security socials. So this one this week is 630 00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:45,040 something I saw on LinkedIn from Amy Stokes Waters. 631 00:40:45,200 --> 00:40:50,400 Amy is of course CEO at the Cyber Escape Room Co and she 632 00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:54,520 posted just a day ago. Unbelievable. 633 00:40:54,560 --> 00:40:57,000 Scammers have gone back to writing letters now apparently 634 00:40:57,000 --> 00:41:00,360 because my dad got through this. Got this through the post today. 635 00:41:00,760 --> 00:41:06,800 WTF and we spoke about this. We had this before. 636 00:41:06,920 --> 00:41:09,840 I can't remember who shared it, but we've definitely shared a 637 00:41:09,840 --> 00:41:14,200 letter on here before. Hello Waters surname. 638 00:41:14,200 --> 00:41:17,280 I respectfully request your kind indulgence in reading this 639 00:41:17,280 --> 00:41:20,760 letter in its entirety. While I understand this may not 640 00:41:20,760 --> 00:41:23,920 be the conventional approach to establishing trust, I hope you 641 00:41:23,920 --> 00:41:26,800 will appreciate the urgency and sincerity of my reaching out. 642 00:41:27,360 --> 00:41:31,280 My name is Mr Kenji Tahara and I'm an official with the Hatchi 643 00:41:31,280 --> 00:41:34,240 Juni Nagano Bank. I've made several attempts to 644 00:41:34,240 --> 00:41:37,400 contact you without success. I obtained your contact 645 00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:40,280 information through public records in the UK. 646 00:41:41,560 --> 00:41:44,920 I'm writing regarding my deceased client, Engineer Smith 647 00:41:44,920 --> 00:41:47,520 Waters, an oil industry entrepreneur who resided in Hong 648 00:41:47,520 --> 00:41:50,680 Kong for 21 years. He and his immediate family 649 00:41:50,680 --> 00:41:54,160 passed away in the onset of the Russia Ukraine conflict. 650 00:41:54,680 --> 00:41:59,640 Before his passing, Mr Waters deposited the sum of 606. 651 00:41:59,640 --> 00:42:05,000 So hang on $60,500,000. Wow. 652 00:42:06,040 --> 00:42:07,360 Under the management of our bank. 653 00:42:08,240 --> 00:42:12,000 So yeah, here we go. This is very, very similar to 654 00:42:12,000 --> 00:42:15,040 the one we had before. Different region obviously 655 00:42:15,040 --> 00:42:20,280 mentions the Ukraine, Russia, which the other one didn't. 656 00:42:20,280 --> 00:42:23,560 The other one was more E, more, more W than that. 657 00:42:25,440 --> 00:42:28,520 And then yeah, I have worked out all modalities to complete the 658 00:42:28,520 --> 00:42:30,560 transaction without mincing words. 659 00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:35,160 I assure you that the operation is 100% legal and risk risk free 660 00:42:35,240 --> 00:42:39,560 if and only if you adhere strictly to my instructions. 661 00:42:40,200 --> 00:42:42,880 As soon as the estate is released to you, we shall share 662 00:42:42,880 --> 00:42:46,800 the ratio of 50% for me, which will go towards helping refugees 663 00:42:46,800 --> 00:42:51,800 from Ukraine war through various NGOs around Europe, 45% for you, 664 00:42:52,200 --> 00:42:56,200 while the remaining 5% will set aside for expenses incurred, 665 00:42:56,320 --> 00:42:59,840 incurred during and cause of securing this deposit. 666 00:42:59,840 --> 00:43:02,920 The expenses. That's a lot of money for 667 00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:05,400 expenses. What's 5% of 60 million? 668 00:43:05,920 --> 00:43:08,760 Wow. If my proposal is acceptable, 669 00:43:08,840 --> 00:43:11,600 kindly reply to my private e-mail address. 670 00:43:12,080 --> 00:43:15,360 Mr Kenji Tahara. That's incredible. 671 00:43:16,080 --> 00:43:19,240 I think that's brilliant. I mean, obviously it's so fake, 672 00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:22,920 but Oh my God, it's $60 million and that all the. 673 00:43:23,120 --> 00:43:27,000 There's more to that letter. I'll put a picture of that in 674 00:43:27,000 --> 00:43:28,240 the newsletter. It's brilliant. 675 00:43:29,520 --> 00:43:32,680 Yeah. And that's just arrived. 676 00:43:33,400 --> 00:43:41,040 Just boom 3 letterbox. Yeah, it's the new lots of the 677 00:43:41,040 --> 00:43:46,120 Nigerian Prince scam type thing. Yeah, but it's very bizarre. 678 00:43:46,120 --> 00:43:49,960 Perfect. I presume AI Brian potentially? 679 00:43:50,280 --> 00:43:54,880 I love though, like I assure you that the operation is 100% legal 680 00:43:54,880 --> 00:43:59,480 and risk free if and only if you would hear strictly to my 681 00:43:59,480 --> 00:44:02,640 instructions. So cool, so cool. 682 00:44:03,720 --> 00:44:06,760 Yeah, that was the first one which I thought was brilliant. 683 00:44:06,760 --> 00:44:10,120 You know, that's what a great story to tell the people in your 684 00:44:10,120 --> 00:44:14,320 organisation though, because it's different. 685 00:44:14,520 --> 00:44:18,960 It's it it kind of the old ways still work in the age of AI. 686 00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:23,080 People are still doing stuff in the more traditional, old tried 687 00:44:23,080 --> 00:44:27,640 and trusted way. So the next one I wanted to 688 00:44:27,640 --> 00:44:32,080 share to you came from a friend of mine, Liam Stock Rabat in 689 00:44:32,080 --> 00:44:33,320 Canada. Hello, Liam. 690 00:44:34,360 --> 00:44:37,640 He sent me this video last week. I forgot to include this last 691 00:44:37,640 --> 00:44:43,080 week, so I'll include it this week and it's called annual 692 00:44:43,080 --> 00:44:46,120 corporate training. Be like this is from TikTok. 693 00:44:46,520 --> 00:44:49,560 OK, I think it's fairly I if you're listening on the podcast 694 00:44:49,560 --> 00:44:52,880 platforms, I think you probably get the picture. 695 00:44:53,120 --> 00:44:56,480 It's a man sat in front of a computer and we're looking at 696 00:44:56,480 --> 00:44:58,040 the man from the bottom of his keyboard. 697 00:44:58,920 --> 00:45:03,120 This module will take 45 minutes to complete that one and we will 698 00:45:03,120 --> 00:45:04,760 test you on your knowledge at the end. 699 00:45:04,960 --> 00:45:07,640 Harassment. Click, click, click. 700 00:45:08,040 --> 00:45:11,040 Let's click so let's So what would let's take a look have a 701 00:45:11,040 --> 00:45:13,080 thing about don't forget it is the response. 702 00:45:13,120 --> 00:45:16,840 Here's a list so to some harass you might be in the workplace. 703 00:45:16,840 --> 00:45:19,040 There are always these are the key. 704 00:45:19,040 --> 00:45:23,720 Well, I he he your employee breaks punch dinner bullying 705 00:45:23,720 --> 00:45:25,520 harass. You've reached the end of the 706 00:45:25,520 --> 00:45:27,200 module. We will now do a test. 707 00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:30,160 Samantha walks in on Billy in the lunchroom. 708 00:45:30,160 --> 00:45:34,000 Samantha says to Billy, get out of my way, you fat, disgusting 709 00:45:34,000 --> 00:45:36,600 idiot. Is this acceptable workplace 710 00:45:36,600 --> 00:45:40,840 behaviour? Congratulations, you scored 100% 711 00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:42,600 on the test. The module is now. 712 00:45:43,200 --> 00:45:46,480 Complete and and if ever you needed an argument against like 713 00:45:46,640 --> 00:45:49,920 click and next training, that's it. 714 00:45:49,920 --> 00:45:51,840 I mean he's click, click, click, click, click, click, click, 715 00:45:51,840 --> 00:45:52,880 click, click, click, click, click. 716 00:45:53,520 --> 00:45:55,920 I used to find it really interesting when we did livid 717 00:45:55,920 --> 00:45:58,400 training. If you look at the time to 718 00:45:58,400 --> 00:46:01,760 complete training and you can, when you look at the time it's 719 00:46:01,760 --> 00:46:04,040 taken someone to complete training, you can tell who's 720 00:46:04,040 --> 00:46:07,520 done that. But also the question at the 721 00:46:07,520 --> 00:46:09,440 end, Oh, we've got to have a question at the end. 722 00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:12,560 You've got, you've got to check that they've watched the video. 723 00:46:12,560 --> 00:46:16,080 Quick put question at the end, but the question's so simple 724 00:46:16,080 --> 00:46:18,520 that you don't have to have watched the video or the to the 725 00:46:18,520 --> 00:46:24,360 other extreme like compliance teams go in the video, it stated 726 00:46:24,360 --> 00:46:27,680 how much the fine was for the ICO, blah, blah, blah. 727 00:46:28,040 --> 00:46:30,880 How much was that fine? It's I don't remember out of 728 00:46:30,880 --> 00:46:33,800 that video. You expect me to remember a A6 729 00:46:33,800 --> 00:46:38,760 figure number or A7 figure number like Yeah, everything 730 00:46:38,760 --> 00:46:43,440 that's wrong with. Me send with that, Yeah, no, 731 00:46:43,440 --> 00:46:45,720 that's good at all. The link to that as well will be 732 00:46:45,720 --> 00:46:47,120 in the newsletter. If you're listening and you 733 00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:50,080 really want to see it to get the full picture, then get the 734 00:46:50,080 --> 00:46:53,480 newsletter, Risky creative.com or the Awareness Ankle 735 00:46:53,640 --> 00:46:58,840 newsletter on LinkedIn, right? Have you? 736 00:46:58,840 --> 00:47:04,360 Did you have anything this week? Yeah, I have on video to share. 737 00:47:06,240 --> 00:47:12,200 So this is a videos on TikTok. Jamie's finance is the is the 738 00:47:12,200 --> 00:47:17,200 guy. I haven't fully researched to 739 00:47:17,200 --> 00:47:21,680 see if this is 100 and true, but I think it overall is in a way. 740 00:47:21,680 --> 00:47:25,400 But I thought it was interesting to sort of bring it to others 741 00:47:25,400 --> 00:47:26,960 play. It's not too long, I don't 742 00:47:26,960 --> 00:47:30,960 think. With NatWest RBS or Ulster Bank, 743 00:47:31,280 --> 00:47:34,880 there is a significant data risk that you should be aware of. 744 00:47:35,560 --> 00:47:37,880 So let's talk about biometric data. 745 00:47:38,200 --> 00:47:42,240 So for instance, the Face ID on your Apple iPhone or your 746 00:47:42,240 --> 00:47:44,880 biometric fingerprint on any other phone. 747 00:47:45,440 --> 00:47:48,640 So typically that is secure. So what that means is, for 748 00:47:48,640 --> 00:47:52,240 instance, Apple's Face ID that will only ever be stored on that 749 00:47:52,240 --> 00:47:55,680 device, never uploaded to the cloud, which is why if you ever 750 00:47:55,680 --> 00:47:57,920 get a new phone, you'll notice you'll have to set up that 751 00:47:57,920 --> 00:47:59,760 again. Even if you transfer all your 752 00:47:59,760 --> 00:48:03,160 data across because it's never even transferred from device to 753 00:48:03,160 --> 00:48:05,680 device because that's your biometric secure data. 754 00:48:05,680 --> 00:48:07,520 And that's back onto the wrong hands. 755 00:48:07,720 --> 00:48:09,280 That would be seriously detrimental. 756 00:48:09,560 --> 00:48:12,240 If you lose your password, well, you can just make a new 757 00:48:12,240 --> 00:48:15,040 password. But if somebody gets access to 758 00:48:15,040 --> 00:48:18,000 your face, well, you can't really change your face. 759 00:48:18,120 --> 00:48:21,240 And that's the same with your fingerprint or your voice. 760 00:48:21,760 --> 00:48:24,200 So let's approach. How has NatWest done it? 761 00:48:24,520 --> 00:48:28,440 So many banks in the UK will integrate Apple's Face ID or any 762 00:48:28,440 --> 00:48:31,640 other biometric system that any other phone has, but NatWest 763 00:48:31,640 --> 00:48:34,960 decided to do it themselves and they use it on the cloud. 764 00:48:35,240 --> 00:48:39,520 So your biometric data is stored on the cloud with Amazon Web 765 00:48:39,520 --> 00:48:41,760 Services. This is not a good look. 766 00:48:42,160 --> 00:48:45,240 Let's say they got hacked and your biometric data was leaked. 767 00:48:45,440 --> 00:48:47,880 Well that would be seriously detrimental for you. 768 00:48:48,440 --> 00:48:52,360 Well, at least for now you can consent to this after the 20th 769 00:48:52,360 --> 00:48:54,600 of May. They are changing it in a very 770 00:48:54,600 --> 00:48:59,960 small and very interestingly hidden positive change. 771 00:49:00,360 --> 00:49:04,280 They are changing the way that they process that data from 772 00:49:04,360 --> 00:49:08,400 consent to legitimate interest. They no longer need to ask you 773 00:49:08,400 --> 00:49:12,440 for consent to use that data. That is highly alarming and I 774 00:49:12,440 --> 00:49:15,840 would remove your biometric data from that W RBS or Ulster Bank 775 00:49:16,040 --> 00:49:23,680 immediately. It's interesting because I'm 776 00:49:23,680 --> 00:49:25,520 just looking at some of the comments there as well. 777 00:49:26,360 --> 00:49:28,120 The top comment that sounds like BS. 778 00:49:28,120 --> 00:49:30,640 The biometric data doesn't leave my phone if I log into the app 779 00:49:30,640 --> 00:49:34,600 using face Idi think that's true, but then there's another 780 00:49:34,600 --> 00:49:38,000 comment further down that says you can log into the app using 781 00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:40,760 Face ID, which is fine. That's not what this is about. 782 00:49:40,760 --> 00:49:44,600 There's a separate process for asking for biometric data for 783 00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:49,440 large payments, which is data they store, and it's what this 784 00:49:49,440 --> 00:49:52,400 video is. Now I know I've got a NatWest 785 00:49:52,400 --> 00:49:55,480 account. I'm pretty sure it's the NatWest 786 00:49:55,480 --> 00:49:58,640 accounts currently. Actually, I don't use Face ID to 787 00:49:58,640 --> 00:50:01,640 sign into my NatWest account. I use a six digit PIN, which 788 00:50:01,920 --> 00:50:05,120 which is quite interesting. The Face ID fell off the app. 789 00:50:05,120 --> 00:50:07,640 The app updated and I needed to set it up again or something and 790 00:50:07,640 --> 00:50:12,000 I didn't. I'm sure it's NatWest that you 791 00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:17,240 have to put your face in a picture, like you have to show 792 00:50:17,240 --> 00:50:18,640 it. There's a ring that appears on 793 00:50:18,640 --> 00:50:21,560 the screen and you have to get your phone just right and then 794 00:50:21,560 --> 00:50:24,160 it scans your face that way. I wonder if it's this that 795 00:50:24,160 --> 00:50:28,920 they're talking about. Yeah, sounds like it. 796 00:50:30,920 --> 00:50:32,400 There's a few old comments as well. 797 00:50:34,920 --> 00:50:38,680 There's one here I think of someone saying oh you don't 798 00:50:38,680 --> 00:50:42,160 understand how it's stored the and then someone believe it. 799 00:50:42,160 --> 00:50:44,880 He replied saying obviously a cloud based data will never be 800 00:50:44,920 --> 00:50:47,960 as private or protected as locally stored and there's no 801 00:50:47,960 --> 00:50:52,000 reason to hold this data online. And then someone says I'm a 802 00:50:52,480 --> 00:50:54,680 cyber engineer here at a large UK bank. 803 00:50:54,720 --> 00:50:57,280 This data is stored on Prem so nothing leaves the bank's 804 00:50:57,280 --> 00:51:01,080 infrastructure. And I mean maybe, but that 805 00:51:01,080 --> 00:51:03,800 doesn't particularly mean it's 100% secure. 806 00:51:03,920 --> 00:51:06,400 It doesn't. But also Crip Zones talking from 807 00:51:06,400 --> 00:51:08,480 their own experience. Well, yeah. 808 00:51:09,320 --> 00:51:13,320 Not having worked at three large retailers over the past three or 809 00:51:13,320 --> 00:51:15,000 four years, every single one's different. 810 00:51:15,320 --> 00:51:18,640 Every infrastructure, the way every business does it, is 811 00:51:18,640 --> 00:51:20,720 unique. Yeah. 812 00:51:22,440 --> 00:51:26,080 But I want to have a have a look at if you're a customer of one 813 00:51:26,080 --> 00:51:30,240 of these banks. Yeah, yeah, interesting. 814 00:51:30,760 --> 00:51:35,240 I just just lastly something I forgot to add, but I thought 815 00:51:35,240 --> 00:51:40,080 just as a little fun closer this week, I saw an article on the 816 00:51:40,080 --> 00:51:44,600 BBC Waymo, the self driving cars, right? 817 00:51:44,680 --> 00:51:48,000 They're recalling thousands of their self driving cars in the 818 00:51:48,320 --> 00:51:54,200 US because software issues could allow them to drive into flooded 819 00:51:54,400 --> 00:51:57,480 roads. And I, I haven't got the video 820 00:51:57,480 --> 00:52:00,640 here, but I'd seen a video of a Waymo car that's tried to drive 821 00:52:00,640 --> 00:52:04,480 into a flood and then kind of kind of avoided it. 822 00:52:04,720 --> 00:52:10,680 So yeah, the voluntary recall effects 3800 robo taxis using 823 00:52:10,680 --> 00:52:13,480 the company's 5th and 6th generation driving systems. 824 00:52:14,240 --> 00:52:18,760 And on the 20th of April in Texas, an empty Waymo vehicle 825 00:52:19,320 --> 00:52:23,080 emptied, entered a flooded road and was swept into a Creek. 826 00:52:24,040 --> 00:52:26,960 Oh well. Self driving cars might not be 827 00:52:26,960 --> 00:52:31,720 quite there yet, but yeah, yeah, right. 828 00:52:31,920 --> 00:52:33,240 I think that's it for this week then. 829 00:52:33,720 --> 00:52:36,200 That's a snappier episode than normal, but that's all good, 830 00:52:38,000 --> 00:52:42,040 right? Yeah, thank you very much. 831 00:52:42,200 --> 00:52:44,320 And let's do it all again next week. 832 00:52:45,400 --> 00:52:48,080 Cool, awesome, right? See you later. 833 00:52:48,440 --> 00:52:49,280 See you. Bye.