1 00:00:01,040 --> 00:00:04,360 This week we've got a hack that lets strangers steal your season 2 00:00:04,360 --> 00:00:08,200 tickets and quietly erase stadium bands at one of Europe's 3 00:00:08,440 --> 00:00:11,200 biggest football clubs. A security tool that got 4 00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:14,240 poisoned and turned into a weapon against the very 5 00:00:14,400 --> 00:00:18,320 developers who trusted it. The AI app with a billion dollar 6 00:00:18,320 --> 00:00:21,240 Disney deal that vanished in just six months. 7 00:00:21,240 --> 00:00:25,040 Mehta's fighting back against scammers with AI, and Lloyds is 8 00:00:25,040 --> 00:00:28,640 back in the news after nearly half a million customers briefly 9 00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:31,120 got a window into someone else's bank account. 10 00:00:31,640 --> 00:00:35,520 All of that and a lot more on this week's The Awareness Angle. 11 00:00:47,360 --> 00:00:50,160 And with me, as always, is my partner in cybercrime 12 00:00:50,160 --> 00:00:53,960 prevention, Mr Luke Pettergrove. Hello, Luke, How are you doing? 13 00:00:54,360 --> 00:00:55,600 Yeah, well, thank you. How are you? 14 00:00:55,600 --> 00:00:56,720 I'm. Good, I'm good. 15 00:00:56,720 --> 00:00:58,000 How's your week been? Usual. 16 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:00,160 Yeah, not too bad. Yeah, pretty standard. 17 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:03,400 How are you? Yeah, not bad, not bad. 18 00:01:03,400 --> 00:01:08,120 Been doing some filming and just going down on like the final 19 00:01:08,120 --> 00:01:10,480 parts, preparing stuff. It's like scripts are written 20 00:01:10,480 --> 00:01:13,280 and blogs are written and just prepping stuff before it all 21 00:01:13,280 --> 00:01:16,200 gets published. So it's exciting times. 22 00:01:16,200 --> 00:01:18,680 More on that at another point though. 23 00:01:19,800 --> 00:01:20,360 Yeah. Awesome. 24 00:01:20,640 --> 00:01:23,240 OK, Should we get into it? Should we just get cracking? 25 00:01:23,760 --> 00:01:25,400 Yeah, let's go for it. Brilliant. 26 00:01:25,440 --> 00:01:28,840 OK then first up, it's this week's Breach of the Week. 27 00:01:31,400 --> 00:01:35,880 So this week's breach of the week is IAX Amsterdam Hack 28 00:01:35,880 --> 00:01:39,960 exposed fan data and allowed attackers to steal season 29 00:01:39,960 --> 00:01:43,760 tickets and lift stadium bands. So this comes from Bleeping 30 00:01:43,760 --> 00:01:47,520 Computer. Dutch football club AFC IAX has 31 00:01:47,600 --> 00:01:51,520 disclosed that hacker exploited vulnerabilities in its IT 32 00:01:51,520 --> 00:01:55,320 systems and access data belonging to just a few 100 33 00:01:55,560 --> 00:01:58,400 people. The security issues also allow 34 00:01:58,400 --> 00:02:03,040 transferring purchase tickets to others and enabled modifications 35 00:02:03,040 --> 00:02:06,760 to stadium bands the club. Found out about it not from its 36 00:02:06,760 --> 00:02:09,440 own security monitoring, but from journalists. 37 00:02:09,440 --> 00:02:13,400 RTL's investigation found that by poking exposed APIs and 38 00:02:13,400 --> 00:02:17,200 reusing shared keys, it was possible to act as other users, 39 00:02:17,200 --> 00:02:21,120 entirely transferring season tickets, alternate account 40 00:02:21,120 --> 00:02:24,240 details and even lifting stadium bans. 41 00:02:24,240 --> 00:02:27,400 Season ticket holders cannot prevent this, as the ticket can 42 00:02:27,400 --> 00:02:29,760 simply disappear from their account and can no longer be 43 00:02:29,760 --> 00:02:32,320 used. IAX have said that the 44 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:35,560 vulnerabilities have now been patched and the Dutch Data 45 00:02:35,560 --> 00:02:38,560 Protection Authority and police have been notified. 46 00:02:38,720 --> 00:02:42,120 I mean, that's there. Like the season tickets you can 47 00:02:42,120 --> 00:02:43,440 sort? All that out, but the lifting of 48 00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:46,800 stadium bans could have had potentially quite significant. 49 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:48,760 Impact, it could be quite bad, yeah. 50 00:02:49,040 --> 00:02:52,800 Yeah, I just have visions of like, you know, like football 51 00:02:52,800 --> 00:02:55,760 firms, like our Football Factory and a bunch of hooligans that 52 00:02:55,760 --> 00:02:58,520 have been banned from matches get allowed back in for like 1 53 00:02:58,520 --> 00:03:00,720 match and then like it's it's, it's got. 54 00:03:00,720 --> 00:03:03,960 Hollywood movie or Channel 4 movie written all over it in 55 00:03:03,960 --> 00:03:05,960 some ways. Oh, we're back in for one game. 56 00:03:05,960 --> 00:03:10,040 Let's make the most of it so. Yeah, yeah, it's quite an 57 00:03:10,040 --> 00:03:12,400 interesting one as well that they didn't find out themselves, 58 00:03:12,400 --> 00:03:15,480 but they found out from a journalist who were tipped off 59 00:03:16,120 --> 00:03:19,240 by the hackers. Yeah, that's quite an 60 00:03:19,240 --> 00:03:20,280 interesting one. Yeah. 61 00:03:20,640 --> 00:03:23,640 So I mean, that's IAX in Amsterdam, could have been any 62 00:03:23,640 --> 00:03:25,520 football club. And it's just another place 63 00:03:25,520 --> 00:03:27,720 where your data lives, your data resides. 64 00:03:28,520 --> 00:03:30,400 You know, it's just another place where you wouldn't 65 00:03:30,400 --> 00:03:33,640 necessarily think your data is going to get exposed, but there 66 00:03:33,640 --> 00:03:36,240 it has could be any football club in the world. 67 00:03:36,360 --> 00:03:38,080 You know it's. Big or small? 68 00:03:38,560 --> 00:03:42,400 So yeah, I guess we're not those footballs are any events kind of 69 00:03:42,600 --> 00:03:44,640 sports or other? It's interesting. 70 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:48,240 Yeah, yeah. And it's it says here that every 71 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:52,600 IAX app user had the same digital key to make adjustments 72 00:03:52,600 --> 00:03:56,840 to their account, So purely by manipulating a sent data packet. 73 00:03:57,160 --> 00:03:59,760 It was possible to perform actions on someone else's 74 00:03:59,760 --> 00:04:01,880 behalf, such as transferring a ticket. 75 00:04:03,520 --> 00:04:06,480 So that was a design flaw, not a sophisticated hack. 76 00:04:06,720 --> 00:04:09,880 So some of the breaches don't require advanced tools. 77 00:04:10,200 --> 00:04:14,560 They just find a little problem and it's a wide open door. 78 00:04:14,680 --> 00:04:17,079 Like we spoke about last week with Companies House, it's a 79 00:04:17,079 --> 00:04:18,200 similar thing, isn't it? Like. 80 00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:23,000 Leaving the door open so. Yeah, yeah, right. 81 00:04:23,400 --> 00:04:24,840 That's this week's breach of the week. 82 00:04:25,240 --> 00:04:26,640 Just an interesting one. Different one. 83 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:28,680 The Sports Club. Yeah, something different. 84 00:04:29,120 --> 00:04:35,440 So let's get on with this week's news, right? 85 00:04:35,560 --> 00:04:37,240 And you're going to kick us off this week. 86 00:04:37,880 --> 00:04:41,360 Yes, the first one we've. Got kick off this week, sorry. 87 00:04:41,480 --> 00:04:43,720 I just realised. It was completely accidental. 88 00:04:43,720 --> 00:04:45,320 I just realised what I did. Sorry, go on. 89 00:04:46,120 --> 00:04:49,840 Yeah, so this one is Meta launches a new anti scam tool 90 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:52,880 across WhatsApp, Facebook and Messenger using AI. 91 00:04:52,960 --> 00:04:54,760 So something we sort of spoke about before. 92 00:04:54,760 --> 00:04:57,760 It feels like at last, but I wonder if it actually works. 93 00:04:57,760 --> 00:04:59,320 OK, go on. Yeah. 94 00:04:59,320 --> 00:05:02,400 So, yeah, obviously designed to fight scammers and to protect 95 00:05:02,400 --> 00:05:04,680 people. It was launched a couple of 96 00:05:04,680 --> 00:05:06,760 weeks ago, I think, by the looks of this. 97 00:05:06,760 --> 00:05:09,760 But yeah, essentially it's a bunch of features across those 98 00:05:09,760 --> 00:05:12,120 apps. On WhatsApp, there's a new 99 00:05:12,120 --> 00:05:15,560 device linking warning that flags up any suspicious requests 100 00:05:15,600 --> 00:05:18,920 before you accidentally sort of link your account to sub 101 00:05:18,920 --> 00:05:21,560 criminal. Facebook has some alerts when 102 00:05:21,560 --> 00:05:25,240 you send or receive send requests from accounts that have 103 00:05:25,240 --> 00:05:30,880 suspicious, Yeah, suspicious activity Messenger is getting 104 00:05:30,880 --> 00:05:34,000 expanded AI powers scam detection that watches for 105 00:05:35,080 --> 00:05:39,720 patterns like dodgy job offers and ones before you communicate 106 00:05:40,120 --> 00:05:42,760 any further. And they've also said that 107 00:05:42,760 --> 00:05:47,680 they've removed over 159 billion scam ads in 2025. 108 00:05:47,840 --> 00:05:51,680 Ninety 2% were taken down before anyone even reported them, 109 00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:52,760 apparently. Well, we know. 110 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:54,720 That's not true. Well, we know that's not really 111 00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:56,960 made a dent then, don't we? Because we'd see them near 112 00:05:56,960 --> 00:06:00,800 enough every week. Yeah and yet it down over 10 113 00:06:00,800 --> 00:06:03,800 million accounts linked to criminal scam centres. 114 00:06:03,880 --> 00:06:06,160 So it's quite a few good improvements there. 115 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:12,200 I've said it's about time I have and yeah, now they're using but 116 00:06:12,200 --> 00:06:15,840 yeah, AI told them that they have to fight back against 117 00:06:15,840 --> 00:06:21,720 scammers which also use AIA lot of their posts or fake adverts 118 00:06:21,720 --> 00:06:23,760 and videos. But we've seen a lot of them 119 00:06:24,840 --> 00:06:30,000 deep fake type adverts promising various things or cryptocurrency 120 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:33,200 sort of scams with many manipulated videos and all over 121 00:06:33,200 --> 00:06:37,360 Facebook for example, so. Do you remember weeks ago we 122 00:06:37,360 --> 00:06:39,160 spoke about Brad Pitt in a hospital bed? 123 00:06:39,160 --> 00:06:43,360 Do you remember that? And that was like WhatsApp and 124 00:06:43,520 --> 00:06:46,760 Facebook Messenger. So that I imagine would have 125 00:06:46,760 --> 00:06:48,360 been tackled by this as well, which is. 126 00:06:48,480 --> 00:06:49,120 Cool. Yeah. 127 00:06:49,120 --> 00:06:52,000 And then the interest is sort of ones here. 128 00:06:52,000 --> 00:06:56,040 I think it's like the WhatsApp device linking. 129 00:06:56,400 --> 00:06:59,400 It's not really something you typically talk about obviously 130 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:03,120 that you can link your phone to a web version of WhatsApp or 131 00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:06,840 just like app version on your computer through through like a 132 00:07:06,840 --> 00:07:09,880 QR code. I'm, I think we spoke about that 133 00:07:09,880 --> 00:07:13,440 just a few weeks ago about that being an issue. 134 00:07:13,480 --> 00:07:17,080 Yeah, there was a campaign going around that was targeting that. 135 00:07:17,520 --> 00:07:19,280 So yeah, like all, all the sort of takers. 136 00:07:19,720 --> 00:07:23,280 So I would give you the QR code to scan or or you'd go onto like 137 00:07:23,280 --> 00:07:26,920 a dodgy web version of WhatsApp I guess. 138 00:07:27,320 --> 00:07:31,360 OK, imitation website and you'd scan AQR code and so on and 139 00:07:31,360 --> 00:07:34,640 you'd link your account to to their device. 140 00:07:34,680 --> 00:07:38,600 But yeah, it basically asks you just sort of be careful with 141 00:07:38,600 --> 00:07:42,520 what you're scanning, just to sort of double check before you 142 00:07:42,520 --> 00:07:46,960 actually do scan code. And yeah, there's a lot of 143 00:07:46,960 --> 00:07:50,880 adverts. 159 million seems like a huge number. 144 00:07:50,880 --> 00:07:55,600 I wonder what, how many adverts they have in general across the 145 00:07:55,600 --> 00:07:57,600 platform. It's a really nice accident. 146 00:07:58,560 --> 00:08:01,040 There's some really nice screenshots in the article that 147 00:08:01,040 --> 00:08:02,320 they've. Shared Let me just share this 148 00:08:02,320 --> 00:08:04,360 here. So this one for example. 149 00:08:05,840 --> 00:08:08,960 This is a friend request. Check the details before you 150 00:08:08,960 --> 00:08:12,120 confirm. They joined Facebook 6 days ago. 151 00:08:12,120 --> 00:08:13,960 They appear to be in a different country. 152 00:08:14,360 --> 00:08:16,840 You don't have many mutual friends confirm anyway. 153 00:08:16,840 --> 00:08:20,160 So that's all that stops people creating that. 154 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:22,920 I mean, that's really good. That's it doesn't take it's not 155 00:08:22,920 --> 00:08:25,440 rocket science. That's a good use of AI, but 156 00:08:25,440 --> 00:08:29,040 like they didn't really need like a really advanced AI to 157 00:08:29,320 --> 00:08:31,040 display that kind of information. 158 00:08:31,760 --> 00:08:35,640 And then it safety tips, check profile details carefully. 159 00:08:35,640 --> 00:08:38,200 Look out for duplicate accounts. That safety tips is hidden 160 00:08:38,200 --> 00:08:41,360 behind a little blue text that says safety tips and no one's 161 00:08:41,360 --> 00:08:42,960 ever going to see that safety tips window. 162 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:46,480 But that half screen thing that comes up when the frame request 163 00:08:46,480 --> 00:08:49,920 is there, I think after you press confirm, please check the 164 00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:53,240 details before you confirm. That's a really nice touch. 165 00:08:53,240 --> 00:08:56,240 And there was one more screenshot here that is from 166 00:08:56,480 --> 00:09:00,360 Facebook Messenger and the messenger image. 167 00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:04,720 This chat could be suspicious. Scam detection found that this 168 00:09:04,720 --> 00:09:07,640 chat could be suspicious. You can request an AI. 169 00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:11,400 Review of messages in this chat against signs of a scam. 170 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:14,640 So again, that's quite good. And then you can send it off for 171 00:09:14,640 --> 00:09:18,000 review and it comes back and says common scam signs, job 172 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:21,840 offers, work from home offers, job in exchange for money, that 173 00:09:21,840 --> 00:09:22,960 kind of thing. So. 174 00:09:23,200 --> 00:09:26,880 Yeah, I think that's it's positive that meta are doing 175 00:09:26,880 --> 00:09:29,040 some with. I don't think this this won't. 176 00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:32,160 Scratch the surface probably, but it's positive that meta are 177 00:09:32,160 --> 00:09:36,640 actually doing something. It feels like a shift almost, 178 00:09:36,640 --> 00:09:40,880 doesn't it? Yeah, I think the next story 179 00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:45,400 kind of touches on AI and stuff, but I think, yeah, as we've 180 00:09:45,760 --> 00:09:49,040 discussed a few times, that AI is so accessible now, it's so 181 00:09:49,040 --> 00:09:52,680 easy to use for the wrong purposes and such. 182 00:09:52,680 --> 00:09:55,960 So hopefully this does do something. 183 00:09:56,760 --> 00:09:59,800 But yeah, like you said, it's probably going to be more that 184 00:09:59,800 --> 00:10:03,080 needs to be done and then there'll be new ways around all 185 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:06,840 of these scan detections. And it's like a never ending 186 00:10:06,840 --> 00:10:08,640 battle, isn't it? Yes. 187 00:10:08,800 --> 00:10:10,080 Yeah, it is. Yeah, it is. 188 00:10:11,600 --> 00:10:13,600 Well, I'll move on to the next one then. 189 00:10:13,640 --> 00:10:15,120 You kind of queued that up nicely. 190 00:10:15,120 --> 00:10:20,960 The next story is Open AI shuts down Sora video app and Disney 191 00:10:20,960 --> 00:10:24,160 pulls it's $1 billion investment deal. 192 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:27,320 So from Variety, this has been reported everywhere. 193 00:10:27,400 --> 00:10:32,240 Just six months after launch, Open AI has shut down Sora, it's 194 00:10:32,320 --> 00:10:35,440 AI video generation app, which had hit a million downloads in 195 00:10:35,440 --> 00:10:37,000 under 5. Days, I think it was the. 196 00:10:37,480 --> 00:10:41,680 Fastest growing app at it's time the most downloaded app in 197 00:10:41,800 --> 00:10:46,480 fastest most downloaded app after Open AI came out, so it's 198 00:10:46,480 --> 00:10:49,000 now gone. Open AI says it's exiting the 199 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:53,080 video generation business entirely to shift it's 200 00:10:53,080 --> 00:10:56,600 priorities elsewhere. So with the closure reported, 201 00:10:56,600 --> 00:11:01,080 part of a wider move to simplify it's product line up ahead of a 202 00:11:01,080 --> 00:11:05,440 potential IPO. So Disney had agreed to licence 203 00:11:05,440 --> 00:11:08,920 iconic characters including Mickey Mouse and Cinderella to 204 00:11:08,920 --> 00:11:12,760 open AI for use in Sora, and had planned to take a $1 billion 205 00:11:12,760 --> 00:11:15,560 stake in the company. But they're now winding down 206 00:11:15,560 --> 00:11:18,920 that partnership completely. Obviously everybody said that 207 00:11:18,920 --> 00:11:22,440 SORA contributed to misinformation and AI slop 208 00:11:22,440 --> 00:11:25,480 copyright holders. Had raised concerns about their 209 00:11:25,480 --> 00:11:28,120 IP, their intellectual property appearing in videos, which is 210 00:11:28,120 --> 00:11:30,880 one reason Disney did a deal I would imagine. 211 00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:34,360 You know, let's like if we can't beat it, let's get in there and 212 00:11:34,480 --> 00:11:39,040 own it. But I mean this I did read other 213 00:11:39,040 --> 00:11:42,360 things that said open AI pulling out of this because they can't 214 00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:45,480 compete with some of the tools that are coming out of China 215 00:11:45,480 --> 00:11:47,520 right now. Like they're actually saw as 216 00:11:47,520 --> 00:11:50,320 actually quite far behind the curve compared to some of the 217 00:11:50,320 --> 00:11:52,840 leading ones coming out from China and that they just haven't 218 00:11:52,840 --> 00:11:56,800 got the time, money or, you know, intelligence to artificial 219 00:11:56,800 --> 00:11:59,560 or real to kind of compete. They're like can't keep up. 220 00:12:00,280 --> 00:12:04,160 So in some ways it's good that Saura's gone or he's going 221 00:12:04,160 --> 00:12:07,280 That's good because it might result in less AI slop on my 222 00:12:07,440 --> 00:12:10,520 Instagram and TikTok feed, which is really annoying. 223 00:12:10,560 --> 00:12:13,160 But this does also. Kind of move, move. 224 00:12:13,160 --> 00:12:17,080 The problem? Many users are going to move to 225 00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:20,080 other options that aren't owned by American or European 226 00:12:20,080 --> 00:12:23,320 companies and aren't. Regulated or controlled? 227 00:12:23,320 --> 00:12:26,560 And yeah, so I think this doesn't solve the problem. 228 00:12:26,560 --> 00:12:29,560 It might just move it. But yeah, yeah, it's an 229 00:12:29,560 --> 00:12:31,920 interesting, it's not really a security story, but it does mean 230 00:12:31,920 --> 00:12:35,560 that we might see less AI slop on our feed. 231 00:12:35,560 --> 00:12:38,600 So we might it's It's not now, not as easily. 232 00:12:38,600 --> 00:12:42,600 Accessible in some ways. Yeah, that's interesting. 233 00:12:42,600 --> 00:12:45,560 I just said there with the whole sort of regulations and stuff 234 00:12:45,560 --> 00:12:51,160 behind AI and generated content, I think probably wrong, but I 235 00:12:51,160 --> 00:12:54,760 feel like it's not there yet and it's kind of no one kind of has 236 00:12:54,760 --> 00:13:00,440 come up with laws and whatnot. And now if, if, yeah, I guess if 237 00:13:00,680 --> 00:13:05,240 they said these platforms go away, then there's less reason 238 00:13:05,240 --> 00:13:10,160 for American companies or countries even to do anything 239 00:13:10,160 --> 00:13:13,080 about it. If it's like a Chinese made tall 240 00:13:13,080 --> 00:13:16,120 or something or any other country that's not not them. 241 00:13:16,160 --> 00:13:19,680 But yeah, they said, I'm sure there'd be many other tools now 242 00:13:19,680 --> 00:13:20,840 that people would just use instead. 243 00:13:21,440 --> 00:13:24,120 I do wonder if this is a pause rather than a permanent 244 00:13:24,120 --> 00:13:26,200 retirement though. I read I read something this 245 00:13:26,200 --> 00:13:30,320 week that said because obviously the use of AI and all the data 246 00:13:30,320 --> 00:13:33,240 centres that tell me if I'm wrong, but isn't that partly to 247 00:13:33,240 --> 00:13:35,640 blame for like? High RAM prices and RAM 248 00:13:35,640 --> 00:13:37,800 shortages and stuff like that because everyone needs it. 249 00:13:38,360 --> 00:13:42,000 This kind of thing used to be graphic cards, but now it's RAM. 250 00:13:42,560 --> 00:13:46,120 I saw saw something this week that said Google using AI had 251 00:13:46,720 --> 00:13:50,040 found a way to like use six times less memory. 252 00:13:51,000 --> 00:13:54,280 And that share prices in like some RAM manufacturers had gone 253 00:13:54,280 --> 00:13:57,080 up because they reckoned that there was about to be like a all 254 00:13:57,080 --> 00:13:59,400 of a sudden they'd been like a revolutionary breakthrough that 255 00:13:59,400 --> 00:14:02,440 you don't need as much memory to do certain things now. 256 00:14:03,240 --> 00:14:06,480 And if that's the case, we might see tools like that come back 257 00:14:06,480 --> 00:14:09,440 reborn with new investment. Under a new skin, who knows? 258 00:14:10,320 --> 00:14:12,440 Yeah, the techs, they've still got the tech. 259 00:14:12,920 --> 00:14:15,320 Maybe they'll just shadow it. For a little while and then 260 00:14:15,320 --> 00:14:16,800 relaunch it later. Who knows? 261 00:14:18,160 --> 00:14:22,000 Yeah, right. Take the next one. 262 00:14:22,000 --> 00:14:24,160 I think we're done on that one. Cool. 263 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:28,760 Yeah, so the next one we've got screen is quite a big one 264 00:14:28,760 --> 00:14:32,360 recently. So how a poisoned security 265 00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:35,680 scanner became the key to backdooring like LLM. 266 00:14:36,520 --> 00:14:43,160 So it's quite technical one on this one, but try my best to get 267 00:14:43,160 --> 00:14:45,840 it across. I think it's happened the week 268 00:14:45,840 --> 00:14:50,400 of of a city last recording. So basically from what I've 269 00:14:50,400 --> 00:14:55,920 seen, like LLM is a tool that provides access to various 270 00:14:55,920 --> 00:15:01,480 models and allows businesses to monitor and track various things 271 00:15:01,480 --> 00:15:06,000 and sort of, yeah, give access to employees as well with 272 00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:10,480 various sort of guardrails and all sorts of things. 273 00:15:11,680 --> 00:15:16,000 And it's also open source for, for use there. 274 00:15:16,000 --> 00:15:19,120 But I think there is like a maybe like a business version of 275 00:15:19,120 --> 00:15:22,080 something. But yeah, basically it makes it 276 00:15:22,080 --> 00:15:25,160 easy for teams to give developers access to various 277 00:15:25,160 --> 00:15:29,160 LLMS. And the story here is that 2 278 00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:33,960 versions of the light LLM Python package were found to contain 279 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:38,840 malicious code. And this, this toll is 280 00:15:38,840 --> 00:15:42,240 downloaded roughly 3.4 million * a day. 281 00:15:43,560 --> 00:15:47,480 So obviously it's quite a large amount of potential compromise 282 00:15:47,480 --> 00:15:51,640 there. But the story here is that the 283 00:15:51,640 --> 00:15:57,880 attack didn't start with by LLM. They've compromised Trivy, which 284 00:15:58,160 --> 00:16:02,240 is a open source security scanner that can sort of find 285 00:16:02,360 --> 00:16:07,000 vulnerabilities and misconfigurations across code 286 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:14,360 repositories and like let them use that in their build pipeline 287 00:16:14,560 --> 00:16:16,920 and it's trusted inside their their tool. 288 00:16:17,120 --> 00:16:18,960 Yeah, that's obviously it's a security scanner. 289 00:16:18,960 --> 00:16:24,480 So it scans all kind of aspects of the tool itself, which means 290 00:16:24,480 --> 00:16:28,440 it can potentially get access to the higher privileged areas, 291 00:16:29,040 --> 00:16:34,800 which could include sort of APIs and various keys, no other sort 292 00:16:34,800 --> 00:16:37,760 of permissions. But yes, so they've sort of 293 00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:42,400 supplied chain detects in that way of compromising one tool 294 00:16:43,160 --> 00:16:46,680 used within another, bit of like an inception thing there. 295 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:52,200 And yeah, they basically used, it stole credentials that were 296 00:16:52,200 --> 00:16:55,600 used to publish packages to the official Python package 297 00:16:55,600 --> 00:16:59,200 repository. And they published 2 poisoned 298 00:16:59,200 --> 00:17:03,440 versions of the application. And those malicious versions 299 00:17:03,440 --> 00:17:07,359 were available for about 3 hours before it was quarantined for 300 00:17:07,359 --> 00:17:13,599 anybody installing like LLM during that time, which have the 301 00:17:14,280 --> 00:17:21,720 version which has sort of harvesting capabilities for SSH 302 00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:27,119 keys, cloud credentials, API keys, crypto wallets, solidly 303 00:17:27,119 --> 00:17:32,200 harvested that back to an attack controlled server and also 304 00:17:32,200 --> 00:17:35,000 leaves the back door for ongoing access. 305 00:17:35,240 --> 00:17:38,800 So yeah, it's quite a big one of a lot of technical detail. 306 00:17:38,800 --> 00:17:40,560 And we can put all that in the newsletter. 307 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:44,800 And I assume anybody that's familiar with these tours would 308 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:49,120 be already on it. You would have, Yeah. 309 00:17:51,160 --> 00:17:55,280 And obviously it was sort of, I mean, a small and also a big 310 00:17:55,280 --> 00:17:59,360 window of, of time that that compromised package was out. 311 00:17:59,360 --> 00:18:02,320 But yeah, you'd heard people have already sort of been 312 00:18:02,320 --> 00:18:04,560 updating to the type of versions. 313 00:18:04,560 --> 00:18:09,360 But yeah, there's probably a lot to potentially go into on this. 314 00:18:09,360 --> 00:18:14,600 But I think it just shows like we spoke about a lot of like MPM 315 00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:19,680 packages getting compromised and everything else like Kodal, 316 00:18:19,680 --> 00:18:23,200 GitHub and for example, let you people typically trust it. 317 00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:28,800 And yeah, sometimes as well, you don't really realise that you 318 00:18:28,800 --> 00:18:32,520 could be using this package within another package, sort of 319 00:18:32,520 --> 00:18:36,760 things like Trivy, for example, being used inside the like LLM. 320 00:18:38,920 --> 00:18:46,600 But yeah, it seems to be as well a group of team PCP who have 321 00:18:46,600 --> 00:18:48,360 sort of done similar things before. 322 00:18:48,360 --> 00:18:54,120 And there's a whole post about it on Snick's blog, so we can 323 00:18:54,120 --> 00:18:57,800 link that there as well. Yeah, I'll put a link to that in 324 00:18:57,800 --> 00:19:02,280 the newsletter as well. But yeah, but I mean, for anyone 325 00:19:02,280 --> 00:19:05,520 listening that's not already been on the case and uses this 326 00:19:05,600 --> 00:19:09,080 tool potentially, I think there's ways to sort of, yeah, 327 00:19:09,080 --> 00:19:16,840 check your versions. It says here that 1.82.7 or 1.82 328 00:19:16,840 --> 00:19:19,160 dot 8 is compromised. And then to sort of, yeah, 329 00:19:19,160 --> 00:19:22,640 double check what double check versions you got update to a 330 00:19:23,560 --> 00:19:28,800 secure version and then rotate credentials on affected systems, 331 00:19:28,800 --> 00:19:32,320 which could be quite a big task. And there's also ways of looking 332 00:19:32,320 --> 00:19:36,080 to see what is going on, I guess with your platforms to make sure 333 00:19:36,080 --> 00:19:38,600 it's not compromised in any way this. 334 00:19:38,600 --> 00:19:41,360 Is this is one of those incidents where it's big enough 335 00:19:41,360 --> 00:19:45,120 that kind of the security world kind of stops, you know, lock 4J 336 00:19:45,120 --> 00:19:48,120 was a similar one. This is like 1 where like I've, 337 00:19:48,160 --> 00:19:51,840 I've seen so many people talking about this on TikTok and as a 338 00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:55,040 security awareness professional, a lot of this, we're not 339 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:56,680 expected to understand all of this. 340 00:19:56,680 --> 00:19:59,360 If you're a security awareness professional, you should, you're 341 00:19:59,360 --> 00:20:02,880 not expected to understand the insurance and outs of this, but 342 00:20:02,880 --> 00:20:05,760 what you can do is you can help translate it. 343 00:20:05,760 --> 00:20:09,320 This is a great opportunity to work with those tech teams and 344 00:20:09,320 --> 00:20:12,400 you can almost be the translator between the technical and your 345 00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:14,480 end users. You can help bring that if 346 00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:16,280 you've got established comms channels. 347 00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:19,760 With the business, you can help get this message out there. 348 00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:21,880 So it's this is a great opportunity to build some 349 00:20:21,880 --> 00:20:25,600 relationships. I saw Sans, Sans have done a, 350 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:28,800 they've got a blog post when security scanner became the 351 00:20:28,800 --> 00:20:32,480 weapon. They had an emergency webinar as 352 00:20:32,480 --> 00:20:35,200 well. They've got a report PDF that 353 00:20:35,200 --> 00:20:37,560 you can download threat Intelligence Report. 354 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:40,000 That's just Sans. Anyone and everyone we've 355 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:42,560 already mentioned SNIC, you know anyone and everyone has probably 356 00:20:42,920 --> 00:20:44,320 got a write up and a report on this. 357 00:20:44,320 --> 00:20:47,040 So touch base with your tech teams, offer them. 358 00:20:47,040 --> 00:20:48,760 If you're an awareness professional, just offer them 359 00:20:48,760 --> 00:20:50,640 some assistance. Anything I can help with? 360 00:20:50,640 --> 00:20:54,600 Can I help you get the message out to support this ongoing in 361 00:20:54,640 --> 00:20:55,880 over the next? Couple of weeks. 362 00:20:56,280 --> 00:20:58,440 I think this is a really good opportunity to build some 363 00:20:58,440 --> 00:21:00,720 bridges. Yeah, definitely. 364 00:21:02,120 --> 00:21:04,640 You said, have you done some messaging on this where you are? 365 00:21:05,960 --> 00:21:08,520 Yeah, there has been, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. 366 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:10,040 I think obviously it's quite a recent thing, right. 367 00:21:10,040 --> 00:21:13,160 So not, not everybody would be on it potentially and. 368 00:21:14,000 --> 00:21:17,040 Yeah. And if small organisation that 369 00:21:17,040 --> 00:21:20,640 has just a handful of developers, you know, there 370 00:21:20,640 --> 00:21:23,080 might not be the maturity that they're aware of what everyone's 371 00:21:23,080 --> 00:21:26,360 using and these developers might live in a bit of a black hole or 372 00:21:26,360 --> 00:21:29,560 a cave and not check out on socials regularly. 373 00:21:29,560 --> 00:21:34,000 So just have the word introduce this to your people. 374 00:21:34,040 --> 00:21:36,960 Like do we use this? Do you think is this something 375 00:21:36,960 --> 00:21:38,680 we should care about? With. 376 00:21:39,120 --> 00:21:41,080 Yeah, right. Should I move on to the next 377 00:21:41,080 --> 00:21:42,080 one? Yeah. 378 00:21:43,240 --> 00:21:45,440 OK, this is a, this is an interesting one. 379 00:21:45,440 --> 00:21:50,120 This has got, Yeah, Apple, Apple have rolled out or is rolling 380 00:21:50,120 --> 00:21:54,520 out age verification to UK iPhone users. 381 00:21:54,520 --> 00:21:58,080 It's new age verification programme for UK users is going 382 00:21:58,080 --> 00:22:01,640 to require customers to prove they're at least 18 to use some 383 00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:04,400 features. And these features are going to 384 00:22:04,400 --> 00:22:09,960 be turned on by default, which means that all users, including 385 00:22:09,960 --> 00:22:15,120 adults, will have to prove their age via a credit card and other 386 00:22:15,120 --> 00:22:20,200 payment methods on file or by submitting ID to be scanned. 387 00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:24,480 So this new policy will reportedly be implemented when 388 00:22:24,480 --> 00:22:30,440 UK users complete the latest iOS 26.4 software. 389 00:22:30,440 --> 00:22:34,480 Update I've already done that. That's why it's quite a quite a 390 00:22:34,480 --> 00:22:36,760 big bomb. I imagine there'd be people that 391 00:22:36,760 --> 00:22:39,560 won't update if they can. Let me just see what number. 392 00:22:39,560 --> 00:22:44,320 I'm Jim Raw. I'm pretty sure I'm on 26.4. 393 00:22:44,560 --> 00:22:46,560 This is strange. I haven't been asked to verify 394 00:22:46,560 --> 00:22:51,400 yet. So on March the 12th, the UK's 395 00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:54,640 Information Commissioner's Office, ICO and Ofcom. 396 00:22:55,080 --> 00:22:57,840 Both of which Regulate Child Online Safety, announced that 397 00:22:57,840 --> 00:23:00,480 they're giving social media platforms several weeks to 398 00:23:00,480 --> 00:23:03,400 report back on their plans to bolster child safety. 399 00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:07,120 And the ICO, of course, said it was mulling further regulatory 400 00:23:07,120 --> 00:23:11,400 action if they don't keep children under the age of 13 off 401 00:23:11,400 --> 00:23:13,240 platforms. Yeah, this is. 402 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:16,760 Apple told users it's new policy comes in response to laws 403 00:23:17,200 --> 00:23:22,080 requiring stringent mechanisms. This is required by law in some 404 00:23:22,080 --> 00:23:24,360 countries and regions, the tech giant said. 405 00:23:24,840 --> 00:23:28,240 In a blog post in certain countries, you might be required 406 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:30,600 to confirm you're an adult before downloading apps, 407 00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:34,360 changing certain settings, or taking other actions with your 408 00:23:34,360 --> 00:23:36,960 Apple account. I read somewhere that it was 409 00:23:36,960 --> 00:23:39,440 also going to be just to perform a Google search. 410 00:23:40,440 --> 00:23:42,680 You won't be. At like, unless you verify how 411 00:23:42,680 --> 00:23:46,160 old you are, you won't be able to search Google on a iPhone or 412 00:23:46,160 --> 00:23:48,400 iPad, which is an interesting one. 413 00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:51,560 Yes. Do you wonder because it talks 414 00:23:51,560 --> 00:23:56,040 about, yeah, if you don't do it or you are under age, you get 415 00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:58,160 web content philtres turned on automatically. 416 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:02,680 But that's what just for the operating system and Safari or 417 00:24:02,680 --> 00:24:06,640 does it go across because you can install that Chrome on a on 418 00:24:06,680 --> 00:24:09,760 a iPhone, right? So I'm pretty sure that when you 419 00:24:09,760 --> 00:24:15,120 install Chrome on and I might be wrong, someone please comment or 420 00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:16,720 e-mail and let me know if I'm wrong. 421 00:24:17,120 --> 00:24:19,840 I'm pretty sure that all third party browsers on Apple still 422 00:24:19,840 --> 00:24:22,600 use Apple Webkit, so fundamentally they're all just 423 00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:26,000 kind of still using Safari in a way. 424 00:24:26,120 --> 00:24:31,000 I could be wrong, but I'm pretty sure they're all using the same 425 00:24:31,000 --> 00:24:35,880 kind of bones as it were in a way that I not Internet Explorer 426 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:37,560 anymore. Is it in a way that edges 427 00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:40,680 Chromium based? I think that on iOS they're all 428 00:24:40,880 --> 00:24:42,760 Safari based. I could be wrong. 429 00:24:42,880 --> 00:24:45,000 But sounds like a thing that Apple would do. 430 00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:49,480 Yeah, in their kind of closed off ecosystem, absolutely. 431 00:24:49,480 --> 00:24:51,800 I would love to know what happens. 432 00:24:51,800 --> 00:24:55,120 We've often, we've criticised, you know, age verification 433 00:24:55,120 --> 00:24:57,600 cheques for sending. Off data to third parties. 434 00:24:57,920 --> 00:25:00,760 We kind of have to trust Apple. If you've got an Apple device, 435 00:25:01,120 --> 00:25:02,960 you kind of trust them with everything anyway. 436 00:25:04,800 --> 00:25:07,040 It would be interesting to know if that information is going 437 00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:09,960 back to Apple or whether or not it stays on the device. 438 00:25:09,960 --> 00:25:15,000 I'm sure we spoke before about it staying on the device in like 439 00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:17,480 their, I can't remember what they call it. 440 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:20,320 They're like the name is, is there. 441 00:25:20,320 --> 00:25:22,040 It's like an entrenched something. 442 00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:24,680 They've got like a a secure enclave. 443 00:25:25,120 --> 00:25:27,040 Secure enclave. That's the one. 444 00:25:27,520 --> 00:25:29,240 Yeah, yeah. Who knows? 445 00:25:29,600 --> 00:25:32,880 Isolate hardware area, isn't it? But yeah, I'd be interested in 446 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:36,880 this and know if it's a local processed sort of check that you 447 00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:38,720 said. Yeah, Yeah. 448 00:25:39,560 --> 00:25:41,360 It kind of normalises this as well. 449 00:25:41,400 --> 00:25:43,760 And this is something, if you're in the business of security 450 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:46,240 awareness, this is something. You can communicate to your 451 00:25:46,240 --> 00:25:48,760 customers, users, people, colleagues. 452 00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:51,200 Let them know. What this looks like because 453 00:25:51,200 --> 00:25:55,160 there may be phishing campaigns that try and imitate it or try 454 00:25:55,160 --> 00:25:58,400 and leverage off it. This is such a big change, but 455 00:25:58,400 --> 00:26:01,000 this is exactly the type of thing you can expect malicious 456 00:26:01,000 --> 00:26:03,240 actors to take advantage of, like. 457 00:26:03,520 --> 00:26:05,600 Your age verification has expired. 458 00:26:05,800 --> 00:26:09,280 Click here to reverify and you'll take some bogus. 459 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:11,760 Apple with your details right? Exactly. 460 00:26:11,960 --> 00:26:14,640 Exactly. It's this is this is great fuel 461 00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:16,600 for fishing men and women's. Yeah. 462 00:26:16,640 --> 00:26:19,080 Just show your people what good looks like. 463 00:26:19,160 --> 00:26:20,640 There'll be screenshots out there. 464 00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:23,240 Get on the beta release. I'm on the beta release as well. 465 00:26:23,240 --> 00:26:25,240 I haven't got it. Like, try and find out. 466 00:26:25,520 --> 00:26:27,480 If I can find out more, I'll put it in the newsletter. 467 00:26:27,480 --> 00:26:29,160 But maybe we'll come back to this next week. 468 00:26:29,160 --> 00:26:30,960 If I actually get the prompt or not. 469 00:26:31,120 --> 00:26:32,520 Right. Roll on to the next one. 470 00:26:33,120 --> 00:26:37,320 Yeah, So next one, we've got Tiktok for business accounts is 471 00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:39,640 being targeted in a new phishing campaign. 472 00:26:41,400 --> 00:26:47,080 So this is impersonating login and schedule a call pages. 473 00:26:47,080 --> 00:26:49,760 So this is a story from Blinking Computer. 474 00:26:51,040 --> 00:26:56,240 It says here that it's a phishing campaign that prevents 475 00:26:56,240 --> 00:26:59,440 security bots from analysing malicious pages when obviously 476 00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:02,400 business accounts are being targeted because they could be 477 00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:05,400 used from advertising campaigns and AD fraud. 478 00:27:05,440 --> 00:27:09,840 And yeah, you sort of have a potential audience to share 479 00:27:10,040 --> 00:27:14,040 malicious contact with. And it talks about how Tik Tok's 480 00:27:14,040 --> 00:27:17,880 been used to spread information, silly malware through malicious 481 00:27:17,880 --> 00:27:21,600 videos, the cryptocurrency scams for Pig, fake promotions. 482 00:27:21,600 --> 00:27:25,840 And yeah, victims are being loaded with TikTok business 483 00:27:25,840 --> 00:27:28,840 compromised accounts which take them to a cloud flare hosted 484 00:27:28,840 --> 00:27:33,560 phishing page, which I would hope has been probably taken 485 00:27:33,560 --> 00:27:36,200 down by now, but at least by the time this goes out. 486 00:27:38,120 --> 00:27:45,160 It talks about a few details here because it the initial link 487 00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:48,440 redirects viral legitimate Google storage URL in which 488 00:27:48,680 --> 00:27:53,760 blocks spots using Cloudflare turnstile check and redirects to 489 00:27:54,160 --> 00:27:57,720 the malicious page. The domains are all like 490 00:27:57,720 --> 00:28:02,360 welcome.careers.com with some sort, there's a few different 491 00:28:02,360 --> 00:28:07,240 wordings and essentially it's a malicious page that is 492 00:28:07,240 --> 00:28:11,320 impersonating TikTok for business and Google careers 493 00:28:11,560 --> 00:28:14,600 pages. So yeah, it seems like the not 494 00:28:15,040 --> 00:28:19,880 quite sure exactly how you get these, how you get to these 495 00:28:19,880 --> 00:28:23,360 pages, but they look like these. So it's kind of maybe it's 496 00:28:23,360 --> 00:28:28,760 similar to probably spoke about the Google ads fake page before 497 00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:32,440 and another one recently, but they're too. 498 00:28:33,280 --> 00:28:39,120 Yeah, imitating invitation pages on the Tiktok for business. 499 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:44,560 I'll see so that but. That top page you've got there 500 00:28:45,800 --> 00:28:49,080 that log into your Tiktok for Business account is almost 501 00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:52,240 identical to the proper one. I've got the proper one up on 502 00:28:52,240 --> 00:28:55,640 the screen next to me. The only difference is that 503 00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:59,040 login with Google button isn't there on the legit one. 504 00:28:59,440 --> 00:29:03,800 Login with Tiktok is there on the legit one, right? 505 00:29:04,480 --> 00:29:06,880 And the only other differences is where it says you see, 506 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:10,120 they're steering you away from signing in with TikTok because 507 00:29:10,120 --> 00:29:13,640 e-mail or phone and password. There's a used phone. 508 00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:15,800 It it just says e-mail on the top one. 509 00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:18,040 And then it's there's a button to use phone, which will change 510 00:29:18,040 --> 00:29:19,680 you to a different login process. 511 00:29:20,680 --> 00:29:22,840 And there's no forget password function as well, which is a 512 00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:26,200 huge red flag actually that there's no, I haven't put a 513 00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:30,160 forgot password function. But yeah, login with Tiktok will 514 00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:33,440 be there when you try to log into a Tiktok page. 515 00:29:34,320 --> 00:29:36,080 And it's not there. So they're obviously trying to 516 00:29:36,080 --> 00:29:39,160 skim some Google credentials there as well, which is 517 00:29:39,160 --> 00:29:40,640 interesting. Yeah. 518 00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:42,560 Yeah. And as you can see that the euro 519 00:29:42,560 --> 00:29:46,800 is welcome.careersengage.com/TKlogin. 520 00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:50,800 It's obviously another thing to look out for. 521 00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:55,600 Yeah. And yeah, the Google careers 522 00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:59,120 page as well. It's like harvesting some data 523 00:29:59,120 --> 00:30:02,760 there. And I wonder then if they've if 524 00:30:02,760 --> 00:30:05,840 someone would contact you. I guess to socially engineer you 525 00:30:05,880 --> 00:30:08,320 don't seem to show anything more about. 526 00:30:08,440 --> 00:30:10,080 Possibilities are endless though, aren't they? 527 00:30:10,080 --> 00:30:13,760 I mean, that's, yeah. Career scams and you know, 528 00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:15,920 resume scams and all stuff like that. 529 00:30:16,040 --> 00:30:18,720 It this is the problem. You don't know how it's going to 530 00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:22,000 be around that corner. And yeah, so it says about on 531 00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:25,160 this one. Obviously they served that fake 532 00:30:25,160 --> 00:30:29,760 login page which sells credentials and says here that 533 00:30:29,760 --> 00:30:32,320 it can even take session cookies and exfiltrate them. 534 00:30:34,680 --> 00:30:40,600 And it can also hijack your account if you have two FA 535 00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:46,920 enabled, which I I presume it's sort of sits in between like the 536 00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:49,880 the GMs service in a way that it would sort of push you a 537 00:30:50,960 --> 00:30:54,600 notification and stuff to be like here's the multi factor 538 00:30:54,600 --> 00:30:58,560 code to to log in. But I guess if you have, if 539 00:30:58,560 --> 00:31:00,920 you're using like SMS or sometimes they just have built 540 00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:04,640 in sort of, they'll e-mail you a 6 digit code sort of thing, 541 00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:06,280 right? But if you had like a actual 542 00:31:06,280 --> 00:31:09,560 authenticator app, you'd probably be in a safer position. 543 00:31:11,160 --> 00:31:15,080 Or to use passkeys for example, you wouldn't necessarily get 544 00:31:15,160 --> 00:31:18,760 compromised this way. Tick tock by default does. 545 00:31:19,320 --> 00:31:21,840 I know this because I set up a new account just this morning. 546 00:31:21,840 --> 00:31:24,080 Tick. Tock by default does send you a 547 00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:26,600 verification code to your e-mail when you set up an account. 548 00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:30,400 That's like it's default status. It doesn't do. 549 00:31:30,520 --> 00:31:34,280 At no point during that sign up process to TikTok has it asked 550 00:31:34,280 --> 00:31:36,600 me if I want to use an authenticator app or set up a 551 00:31:36,600 --> 00:31:42,680 passkey, which is interesting. So maybe there is a maybe there 552 00:31:42,680 --> 00:31:45,800 is a evolution there to happen on Tik Tok's side. 553 00:31:45,880 --> 00:31:49,480 Who knows? Yeah, I said, yeah, just to sort 554 00:31:49,480 --> 00:31:52,880 of clarify, I mentioned Google Storage and Cloudflare turnstile 555 00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:57,040 gets used and that's like the legit services which obviously 556 00:31:57,040 --> 00:32:02,080 allow it to appear more trusted and especially to like security 557 00:32:02,080 --> 00:32:05,800 tools and stuff. Obviously this seems like a 558 00:32:05,800 --> 00:32:10,480 Google storage link or a cloud flare token of some sort. 559 00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:14,680 So sort of Belize is real. And yeah, they're sort of going 560 00:32:14,680 --> 00:32:17,360 after TikTok for business accounts with this. 561 00:32:17,360 --> 00:32:21,160 So I guess you have to be careful of any TikTok, as you 562 00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:23,760 see. Yeah, it might be one that's not 563 00:32:23,760 --> 00:32:25,080 real. Yeah, that's that one. 564 00:32:25,800 --> 00:32:29,960 Cool, cool TikTok phishing. Right. 565 00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:34,160 I'll move on to the next one. Lloyds app glitch turned 566 00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:39,240 transactions into shared experience 447,000 users. 567 00:32:39,240 --> 00:32:43,120 It's like a banking orgy. It's a faulty overnight update 568 00:32:43,120 --> 00:32:46,680 at Lloyds Banking Group that we spoke about 3-4 episodes 234 569 00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:50,520 episodes ago that caused a mobile app glitch on March the 570 00:32:50,520 --> 00:32:51,880 12th. So it would have been two or 571 00:32:51,880 --> 00:32:57,080 three episodes ago up to 447,000 users. 572 00:32:57,200 --> 00:33:01,440 Nearly half a million users saw other customers transactions. 573 00:33:01,960 --> 00:33:05,200 So that we know now the issue stemmed from an API defect 574 00:33:05,200 --> 00:33:10,040 triggered by near simultaneous logins which broke account data 575 00:33:10,160 --> 00:33:13,040 separation. So no money was accessed or 576 00:33:13,040 --> 00:33:16,640 stolen, but sensitive details, including account numbers and 577 00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:22,720 payment references were exposed. Lloyds has paid a goodwill 578 00:33:22,720 --> 00:33:27,880 compensation, reported the incident to regulators, and he's 579 00:33:27,880 --> 00:33:31,240 now reviewing how the bug passed testing. 580 00:33:31,720 --> 00:33:36,640 So that all sounds like, please don't sue us. 581 00:33:36,640 --> 00:33:41,160 Please don't find us. We're yeah, it's, yeah. 582 00:33:41,160 --> 00:33:43,160 There's a whole article here on the register. 583 00:33:43,160 --> 00:33:46,800 This has been reported in a few places, but so far Lloyds has 584 00:33:46,800 --> 00:33:54,200 paid out £100 3625 customers for goodwill, distress and 585 00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:58,480 inconvenience and it's going to consider further claims if any 586 00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:05,240 financial harm emerges. So there's 443,000 people that 587 00:34:05,640 --> 00:34:09,679 haven't been paid anything. Yeah, based on how you what, how 588 00:34:09,679 --> 00:34:11,800 you get paid, not a Lloyds Banking customers. 589 00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:15,639 I'm not, my mum is, but like I said she had about £8 in the 590 00:34:15,639 --> 00:34:20,760 account. If I go 139000, divide that by. 591 00:34:20,760 --> 00:34:29,800 362. £538.34 per person, yeah. So that's not a lot is it, 592 00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:32,840 £38.34? Yeah, so. 593 00:34:33,280 --> 00:34:36,719 I mean, get your takeaway, I suppose. 594 00:34:38,000 --> 00:34:40,560 What's that going to cost? If they paid that to everybody 595 00:34:40,560 --> 00:34:43,159 impacted, that would cost them 16.9 million. 596 00:34:43,199 --> 00:34:46,440 That'd be why they haven't. Which is probably less than the 597 00:34:46,440 --> 00:34:49,960 fine. Which is like 4% annual 598 00:34:49,960 --> 00:34:53,320 turnover. Yeah, that's the cheaper option. 599 00:34:54,040 --> 00:34:57,280 But yeah, I'm not sure. I don't know what. 600 00:34:58,760 --> 00:35:02,560 Stop the fine. 33 lbs. I mean at least the customers 601 00:35:02,560 --> 00:35:05,280 are getting something from that. They get fined by the ICO. 602 00:35:05,720 --> 00:35:08,320 What happens with the money when people? 603 00:35:08,840 --> 00:35:15,440 What happens with the money the ICO gets when the ICO finds a 604 00:35:15,640 --> 00:35:18,520 company? What happens with the? 605 00:35:18,880 --> 00:35:21,560 That's a really interesting. I just asked Claude, Claude 606 00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:23,160 says. The short answer is it doesn't 607 00:35:23,160 --> 00:35:25,320 go to the victims, it goes to the government. 608 00:35:25,720 --> 00:35:31,200 So yeah, awesome. Let's let's let them give 33 lbs 609 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:34,160 to each victim rather than the government getting 20 million 610 00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:35,240 or. Whatever they will get. 611 00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:38,960 So yeah, that's interesting. I'll, I'll dig, dig deeper on 612 00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:41,000 that because. Yeah. 613 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:44,760 Anyway, so yeah, not really much more on that, just an update on 614 00:35:44,760 --> 00:35:49,240 that story. 447,000 users. No financial harm has been 615 00:35:49,240 --> 00:35:54,560 claimed and they're paying £33 roughly to each affected. 616 00:35:54,560 --> 00:35:57,520 Customer, but they've only done it to three and a bit 1000. 617 00:35:57,520 --> 00:36:01,120 Customers so far. So it's interesting like, yeah, 618 00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:05,720 how they said this happened from a bug in the code and it got 619 00:36:06,080 --> 00:36:11,240 pushed out overnight as well. That seems like a bad time to do 620 00:36:11,240 --> 00:36:13,000 it. But I get they probably do it at 621 00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:16,600 that time because less people are using the the app and stuff 622 00:36:16,760 --> 00:36:18,080 looking more like a maintenance time. 623 00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:19,440 Isn't that you typically do that? 624 00:36:19,440 --> 00:36:23,360 But yeah, yeah, there's a quite, quite a bad one. 625 00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:27,160 There's a lovely comment here at the bottom of the article from 626 00:36:27,160 --> 00:36:30,000 the Register. In response to Lloyd's update, 627 00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:35,400 Chair of the Treasury Committee Dame Meg Hillier said modern 628 00:36:35,400 --> 00:36:39,040 banking methods mean we can now perform a variety of tasks on 629 00:36:39,040 --> 00:36:42,840 our phones in a matter of seconds and almost anywhere. 630 00:36:43,160 --> 00:36:47,320 What this incident brings into focus is the fact that there is 631 00:36:47,320 --> 00:36:50,200 a trade off. By moving more interactions with 632 00:36:50,200 --> 00:36:54,160 our bank online, we place our faith in technology which can 633 00:36:54,160 --> 00:36:58,080 suffer unpredictable errors. It's critical that consumers 634 00:36:58,080 --> 00:37:01,600 understand this, and that's why my committee continues to push 635 00:37:01,600 --> 00:37:05,640 banks to be transparent when things go wrong. 636 00:37:05,720 --> 00:37:07,240 And then it says it finishes off. 637 00:37:07,240 --> 00:37:09,120 Banking apps are built on one basic rule. 638 00:37:09,200 --> 00:37:11,920 Your account is yours. For a few hours. 639 00:37:11,920 --> 00:37:14,760 On March the 12th, that rule didn't hold. 640 00:37:14,960 --> 00:37:18,760 So yeah, interesting. Yeah, I'm sure there'll be more 641 00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:21,040 on that. We'll see what happens with the 642 00:37:21,040 --> 00:37:25,800 ICO and if there's any more information in future episodes. 643 00:37:28,960 --> 00:37:31,760 This week's fish of the week, of course, comes from the threat 644 00:37:31,760 --> 00:37:35,040 hunting threat intelligence team at Hawks Hunt. 645 00:37:35,720 --> 00:37:38,880 Big shout out to that team for the awesome work and for sharing 646 00:37:38,880 --> 00:37:46,040 this with us right here it is. It is ChatGPT impersonation fake 647 00:37:46,040 --> 00:37:51,000 subscription invoice. So you can see here subject 648 00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:56,080 ChatGPT plus from a compromised e-mail account. 649 00:37:57,360 --> 00:38:02,360 We have your ChatGPT plus invoice for the current billing 650 00:38:02,360 --> 00:38:04,440 period is now available for review. 651 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:08,680 Please check the details to ensure uninterrupted access to 652 00:38:08,680 --> 00:38:12,880 your plus features. To maintain your ChatGPT plus 653 00:38:12,880 --> 00:38:16,840 subscription benefits, please review this invoice promptly. 654 00:38:17,280 --> 00:38:20,960 Thank you for being a ChatGPT Plus subscriber, the ChatGPT 655 00:38:21,160 --> 00:38:25,480 Plus team. So yes, this e-mail mimics a 656 00:38:25,480 --> 00:38:27,200 subscription invoice notification. 657 00:38:27,200 --> 00:38:31,120 It uses ChatGPT branding and a generic e-mail layout. 658 00:38:31,120 --> 00:38:33,360 Now to me, this looks like a very much a vibe. 659 00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:38,040 Coded, you know, AI generated. Layout If if you're listening 660 00:38:38,040 --> 00:38:40,800 and you're not actually watching, you can see it on the 661 00:38:41,480 --> 00:38:44,520 see it on YouTube or check out the newsletter, which you can 662 00:38:44,520 --> 00:38:47,840 get by searching for the awareness angle on LinkedIn or 663 00:38:47,840 --> 00:38:50,480 subscribe at Risky Creative. Dot com. 664 00:38:51,880 --> 00:38:55,200 See, Yeah, obviously this is asking you to verify invoice 665 00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:57,880 details, and it's creating urgency by suggesting. 666 00:38:58,160 --> 00:39:00,320 You're going to lose access or you've been charged. 667 00:39:00,320 --> 00:39:03,160 For something that you don't think you. 668 00:39:03,200 --> 00:39:12,640 Have subscribed to so yeah, it's, it doesn't scream like it, 669 00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:14,680 it doesn't scream compromise, does it? 670 00:39:14,680 --> 00:39:20,080 In some ways, but it's there, you know, it's Yeah. 671 00:39:20,080 --> 00:39:23,880 See here. The verify, verify invoice 672 00:39:23,880 --> 00:39:26,000 details button these to a malicious website. 673 00:39:26,680 --> 00:39:31,200 So obviously pressuring the recipients to act quickly and 674 00:39:31,200 --> 00:39:34,280 these we've seen it time and time again unexpected 675 00:39:34,280 --> 00:39:36,920 subscription. Problems such a. 676 00:39:36,920 --> 00:39:40,000 Common phishing law, they're always used. 677 00:39:40,000 --> 00:39:42,680 It says this always confirm billing or subscription issues. 678 00:39:43,560 --> 00:39:48,280 So even if you're a ChatGPT subscriber like I'm I was, I've 679 00:39:48,280 --> 00:39:50,200 just ended my ChatGPT subscription. 680 00:39:50,840 --> 00:39:54,280 If I was a chat TBT subscriber, I wouldn't click that. 681 00:39:55,320 --> 00:39:58,200 I would go directly to the site and check it from there. 682 00:39:58,240 --> 00:40:02,000 And that's kind of what you need to do, really, because it's so 683 00:40:02,000 --> 00:40:04,440 common that these types of scams take place, isn't it? 684 00:40:05,040 --> 00:40:09,600 Yeah, now you see it quite often, not just obviously chat 685 00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:13,800 to Petite, but right, it could be anywhere. 686 00:40:14,560 --> 00:40:18,080 Anything. Yeah, yeah, literally, they'll 687 00:40:18,080 --> 00:40:20,240 choose. It could be it used to be 688 00:40:20,240 --> 00:40:22,640 WhatsApp Gold. Do you remember WhatsApp Gold? 689 00:40:23,160 --> 00:40:25,200 They used to be like your WhatsApp Gold subscription. 690 00:40:25,200 --> 00:40:26,800 There is no such thing as WhatsApp Gold. 691 00:40:26,800 --> 00:40:31,440 So it could even be made-up. But if not an existing service 692 00:40:31,440 --> 00:40:34,440 like this may have been, I don't know if there's been a ChatGPT 693 00:40:34,440 --> 00:40:36,000 breach. I don't know if they've got a 694 00:40:36,000 --> 00:40:39,640 list of ChatGPT subscribers. I don't recall anything. 695 00:40:40,040 --> 00:40:42,600 So the chances are this has gone out to anyone and everyone. 696 00:40:43,360 --> 00:40:47,240 And the point being that, you know, it just I'm not paying for 697 00:40:47,240 --> 00:40:48,640 that. What am I paying for? 698 00:40:48,640 --> 00:40:50,440 Oh my God. Quick, I better check. 699 00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:55,040 I want to cancel. So yeah, you don't have to be a. 700 00:40:55,040 --> 00:40:58,200 Subscriber to be a victim. I think that's the key point 701 00:40:58,200 --> 00:41:00,800 there I. Think as well like you said, if 702 00:41:00,800 --> 00:41:03,720 you want a subscriber you you're probably more likely likely to 703 00:41:03,720 --> 00:41:06,960 click the link in the e-mail as well. 704 00:41:07,000 --> 00:41:10,080 Not necessarily going to be like oh I need to go to chat GBTS 705 00:41:10,080 --> 00:41:12,080 website and log in and stuff like that. 706 00:41:12,080 --> 00:41:16,760 So again, if it's unexpected and you've never subscribe to it, 707 00:41:16,760 --> 00:41:19,240 probably to ignore it, report it. 708 00:41:20,560 --> 00:41:25,360 I never get emails from ChatGPT either so as far like I don't 709 00:41:25,360 --> 00:41:28,760 remember receiving one. I might of when I signed up. 710 00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:32,040 Maybe I get a monthly invoice from them, I don't remember. 711 00:41:32,040 --> 00:41:35,080 It I think there is, yeah. You do OK. 712 00:41:35,160 --> 00:41:39,600 Yeah, I don't know if you get a try, sorry. 713 00:41:40,800 --> 00:41:44,400 Similar. Yeah, I get details, the plan 714 00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:46,120 and stuff, though. Where is that right? 715 00:41:46,440 --> 00:41:49,280 Didn't, no, didn't have any details. 716 00:41:49,280 --> 00:41:51,000 It's very generic, isn't, It's just. 717 00:41:51,000 --> 00:41:54,080 A very simple message, no context. 718 00:41:54,280 --> 00:41:56,240 I mean, it could have had context. 719 00:41:56,240 --> 00:41:58,920 Just because it had more details doesn't mean you should trust 720 00:41:58,920 --> 00:42:02,440 it. But yeah, go to chat CBT. 721 00:42:03,320 --> 00:42:08,840 With, at least in Gmail and with open AI, they have like the 722 00:42:08,840 --> 00:42:13,440 verification, the check mark in the e-mail which you can hover 723 00:42:13,440 --> 00:42:16,960 over and it says that it's verified that they own the 724 00:42:16,960 --> 00:42:19,880 domain perhaps. Yeah, some of the things to look 725 00:42:19,880 --> 00:42:21,080 out for, I guess they're obviously. 726 00:42:21,080 --> 00:42:23,720 Yeah, that's. That's a bit more of a 727 00:42:23,720 --> 00:42:25,920 complicated technical thing. I think. 728 00:42:25,920 --> 00:42:28,280 Like we said, if you don't, I'm not expecting it. 729 00:42:28,400 --> 00:42:32,600 That's the safest bet, right? Yeah, let me just see. 730 00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:36,680 It's just going to be a bunch of news articles talking about 731 00:42:36,680 --> 00:42:40,840 ChatGPT anyway. Yeah, that's the fish of the 732 00:42:40,840 --> 00:42:44,160 week from Hawks Hunt. Big thanks to the Hawks Hunt 733 00:42:44,160 --> 00:42:47,920 team for sharing it with us. I can't find any ChatGPT emails, 734 00:42:47,920 --> 00:42:52,600 but I'm sure they exist. Yeah, right. 735 00:42:52,840 --> 00:42:59,280 OK, that's the fish of the week. So let's move on to some 736 00:42:59,280 --> 00:43:02,600 security socials. Social Security, that's what I 737 00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:09,440 called it, Social Security. OK, I've got got a number of 738 00:43:09,440 --> 00:43:13,080 things to share this week and they kind of go here, there and 739 00:43:13,080 --> 00:43:16,400 everywhere. So let me just share this with 740 00:43:16,400 --> 00:43:18,880 you. The first one was something I 741 00:43:18,880 --> 00:43:20,720 saw on Reddit. I'm going to share this with you 742 00:43:20,720 --> 00:43:24,560 quickly. Now, how do you deal with users 743 00:43:24,880 --> 00:43:28,240 who refuse to lock their laptop when walking away? 744 00:43:28,880 --> 00:43:31,480 Now you tell me an organisation where this isn't a problem. 745 00:43:31,680 --> 00:43:36,440 This is a problem absolutely in every organisation when you've 746 00:43:36,440 --> 00:43:39,840 got smart people that think they know the best. 747 00:43:40,640 --> 00:43:43,120 One of the recurring issues I run into is users leaving their 748 00:43:43,120 --> 00:43:45,440 laptop unlocked when they walk away. 749 00:43:45,960 --> 00:43:48,960 Recently I told someone to lock their laptop when leaving it 750 00:43:48,960 --> 00:43:52,480 unattended and instead of just taking it on board they looked 751 00:43:52,480 --> 00:43:54,640 me straight in the eye and said. So what? 752 00:43:54,800 --> 00:43:58,120 What are you going to do? That kind of response irritated 753 00:43:58,120 --> 00:44:01,880 me more than the unlocked device itself because it shows they 754 00:44:01,880 --> 00:44:04,920 either don't understand the risk or just don't care. 755 00:44:04,960 --> 00:44:08,560 Summed it up brilliantly. I'm interested in how others 756 00:44:08,960 --> 00:44:11,920 approach this. We do have a policy for it. 15 757 00:44:11,920 --> 00:44:13,760 minutes. So policy exists. 758 00:44:15,080 --> 00:44:17,000 And then I thought the response is to this. 759 00:44:17,000 --> 00:44:18,840 I've worked. There's been different 760 00:44:18,840 --> 00:44:22,440 mentalities where I've worked at different places, and my old job 761 00:44:22,560 --> 00:44:25,320 users who didn't lock their computers were fair game for 762 00:44:25,320 --> 00:44:28,360 shenanigans. Changing wallpaper, changing the 763 00:44:28,360 --> 00:44:31,360 keyboard layout, cranking the speakers and stuff like that. 764 00:44:32,440 --> 00:44:36,000 One place I worked they would always have a love poem sent to 765 00:44:36,000 --> 00:44:38,040 the boss for them or something like that. 766 00:44:38,480 --> 00:44:42,840 Saying posting on slack, hacked by or something like that is 767 00:44:42,840 --> 00:44:45,920 really common. Why would I discuss with users? 768 00:44:45,920 --> 00:44:48,640 Never argue with users. Escalate to managers. 769 00:44:49,320 --> 00:44:52,480 But what do you do if the manager doesn't care if they're 770 00:44:52,480 --> 00:44:53,240 caught? Not locking. 771 00:44:53,240 --> 00:44:55,360 That's against policy so they will be written up. 772 00:44:55,720 --> 00:44:57,760 If it happens again, they will be terminated. 773 00:44:58,240 --> 00:45:00,400 I'd love to know what organisations do that because 774 00:45:00,400 --> 00:45:03,240 none of the organisations I've ever worked in would do that. 775 00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:06,720 Like, yeah, policy says that, but have you ever fired someone 776 00:45:06,720 --> 00:45:09,200 because of a acceptable use IT policy? 777 00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:15,080 It's in a in a, that person's tagged governance, risk and 778 00:45:15,080 --> 00:45:17,080 compliance. So yeah, I get that, but it's 779 00:45:17,080 --> 00:45:18,960 just not. It's the professional. 780 00:45:19,320 --> 00:45:22,240 Answer, it really depends on the the business, yeah. 781 00:45:22,920 --> 00:45:25,600 Cultural change starts with an e-mail to the rest of the team 782 00:45:25,600 --> 00:45:27,800 saying I left my computer unlocked so I'm buying 783 00:45:27,800 --> 00:45:30,720 everyone's snacks today. After a penis two to three 784 00:45:30,720 --> 00:45:33,200 times, you'll soon get the rest of the team joining in. 785 00:45:34,520 --> 00:45:40,840 Yeah, it's really, really we, we trialled ages ago at the 786 00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:43,240 organisation we worked together at. 787 00:45:43,440 --> 00:45:47,760 We trialled like RFID sensors or Bluetooth tooth things. 788 00:45:47,760 --> 00:45:49,960 So when you they unlock the device, when you approach the 789 00:45:49,960 --> 00:45:54,320 device and a kind of like, you know, keyless entry, but it's 790 00:45:54,560 --> 00:45:57,640 it's keyboardless locking almost, you know what I mean? 791 00:45:59,480 --> 00:46:02,120 So yeah. And I know I've seen red team 792 00:46:02,120 --> 00:46:05,640 exercises where this has been flagged and unlocked computers 793 00:46:05,640 --> 00:46:08,280 and unlocked Linux. Linux terminal has been the 794 00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:11,320 point of entry on more than one red team, so. 795 00:46:12,000 --> 00:46:14,800 Yeah, it's tough. I've also seen computers left 796 00:46:14,800 --> 00:46:19,320 unlocked just on a command prompt, just like with a post it 797 00:46:19,320 --> 00:46:21,560 note saying don't switch off and it's like what the hell, Is it 798 00:46:21,560 --> 00:46:24,800 useful then you know it's so yeah. 799 00:46:25,280 --> 00:46:28,480 Yeah, it reminds me, I think it's yours. 800 00:46:29,040 --> 00:46:33,160 Somebody you saw, they have a month or so someone on the train 801 00:46:33,160 --> 00:46:34,840 didn't they leave her laptop unlocked? 802 00:46:35,480 --> 00:46:37,840 And it's like, yeah, if they're if they're not locking their 803 00:46:37,840 --> 00:46:40,880 computer in the office and they're doing it in public, 804 00:46:40,880 --> 00:46:43,520 that's even worse. Do you know that was someone 805 00:46:43,520 --> 00:46:47,880 with architectural drawings on a train to Leeds, from Stevenage 806 00:46:47,880 --> 00:46:50,880 to Leeds? So it's like a two hour, 3 hour 807 00:46:50,880 --> 00:46:53,720 train journey. It's a long train journey and I 808 00:46:53,720 --> 00:46:56,040 think it was 9 minutes. They left their laptop 809 00:46:56,120 --> 00:47:01,200 unattended, open, unlocked on a table in a train that wasn't 810 00:47:01,200 --> 00:47:03,280 that busy. And there was architectural 811 00:47:03,280 --> 00:47:05,400 drawings like schematics on the screen. 812 00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:09,240 I mean, just imagine if I kind of understood that and changed 813 00:47:09,240 --> 00:47:12,440 the density of some steel or the thickness of something, you 814 00:47:12,440 --> 00:47:14,920 know, like a whole building could have been built and fallen 815 00:47:14,920 --> 00:47:18,440 down because I tweaked with it on a train and you'd like trace, 816 00:47:18,440 --> 00:47:21,160 trace that back to me. It's just, it's madness. 817 00:47:21,160 --> 00:47:23,960 And you see it on LinkedIn all the time, people sharing stuff 818 00:47:23,960 --> 00:47:25,840 from coffee shops. And from trains where? 819 00:47:26,120 --> 00:47:28,000 People have just walked away and left it unlocked. 820 00:47:28,080 --> 00:47:30,360 I just. Yeah, it's so easy. 821 00:47:30,920 --> 00:47:34,560 To unlock it, and if you've got a MacBook and you set it up to 822 00:47:34,560 --> 00:47:37,320 unlock with your watch or just to pass like it's. 823 00:47:37,320 --> 00:47:41,400 Touch ID. Touch ID. £100 more on the new 824 00:47:41,400 --> 00:47:45,760 MacBook Neo. But it's so it's just easy, like 825 00:47:45,760 --> 00:47:48,280 come on now, lock your screens. It's really simple. 826 00:47:48,600 --> 00:47:51,200 But there's clearly a communication issue with that 827 00:47:51,200 --> 00:47:53,600 individual. They clearly don't understand 828 00:47:53,600 --> 00:47:57,160 the risks and they think that they're in a safe space in their 829 00:47:57,160 --> 00:48:00,400 office bubble. So then talk about tailgating, 830 00:48:00,400 --> 00:48:04,000 talk about how easy it is to get in, run a red team, get people 831 00:48:04,000 --> 00:48:07,040 to actually sneak in, you know, and do some stuff. 832 00:48:07,040 --> 00:48:10,760 Film it, tell the story, like bring them along on the journey. 833 00:48:10,760 --> 00:48:13,240 See if you can make them your North Star. 834 00:48:13,520 --> 00:48:16,600 You can change that stubborn individual's behaviour. 835 00:48:16,840 --> 00:48:20,840 You've that's a success metric to report to your board. 836 00:48:21,000 --> 00:48:23,600 Like this individual was a right a hole. 837 00:48:23,600 --> 00:48:25,400 We've made them change their behaviour. 838 00:48:25,480 --> 00:48:28,280 Yeah, anyway, that was the first topic. 839 00:48:28,280 --> 00:48:31,080 Let me move on to the next one. Some of these are are these are 840 00:48:31,120 --> 00:48:33,920 some of these are quite quick. I have more than two this week. 841 00:48:34,880 --> 00:48:39,960 I was sat in the reception area at my kids school this week and 842 00:48:40,520 --> 00:48:46,280 a poster caught my eye and we've we've spoken about child online 843 00:48:46,280 --> 00:48:49,120 safety on on here before, you know, lots of times. 844 00:48:49,120 --> 00:48:51,160 I've got a couple of things that touch on that this week. 845 00:48:51,680 --> 00:48:56,120 I loved this poster and this is again not all cyber security but 846 00:48:56,120 --> 00:48:59,600 it is in a way, and I love this most parents and carers. 847 00:48:59,600 --> 00:49:04,400 This is LGFL Safeguard Ed Put a link to it in the newsletter. 6 848 00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:08,200 top tips for parents to keep your children safe online. 849 00:49:09,480 --> 00:49:13,200 Top one, don't. Worry about screen time, Aim for 850 00:49:13,200 --> 00:49:15,280 screen quality. Oh my God. 851 00:49:15,760 --> 00:49:18,960 Scrolling through social media isn't the same as making a film 852 00:49:19,280 --> 00:49:21,920 or story or video calling grandma. 853 00:49:22,680 --> 00:49:26,520 Use the children commissioners digital 5A day to plan or review 854 00:49:26,800 --> 00:49:30,400 each day together and that includes be mindful, connect, be 855 00:49:30,400 --> 00:49:32,760 active, get creative, give to others. 856 00:49:33,000 --> 00:49:36,680 I love that my my 6 year old is using her iPad. 857 00:49:36,680 --> 00:49:39,880 She's watching like craft videos on YouTube, loads of YouTube, 858 00:49:40,240 --> 00:49:41,920 but she's crafting. While she's watching, she's 859 00:49:42,080 --> 00:49:45,200 using it as inspiration. So it's amazing, even though 860 00:49:45,200 --> 00:49:48,280 they've just, the government just released advice that I 861 00:49:48,280 --> 00:49:51,760 think under 5 shouldn't be on screens for more than an hour a 862 00:49:51,760 --> 00:49:55,840 day or something like that. So some important ones here are 863 00:49:55,840 --> 00:49:58,160 whizzed through these. Check the safety settings are 864 00:49:58,160 --> 00:50:00,760 turned on, whether it's your home Internet, mobile devices, 865 00:50:01,160 --> 00:50:04,120 consoles or apps, there's lots of settings to make them safe. 866 00:50:04,280 --> 00:50:06,800 We've talked about this before, parental controls. 867 00:50:07,280 --> 00:50:11,360 So many parents don't realise there are potential parental 868 00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:14,800 controls. Restricted mode on YouTube, safe 869 00:50:14,800 --> 00:50:16,920 search on YouTube. I'm going to do a bunch of 870 00:50:16,920 --> 00:50:20,440 videos on this stuff because no one talks about this and I think 871 00:50:20,440 --> 00:50:22,560 it's something that we can probably help with. 872 00:50:22,560 --> 00:50:26,400 So just that kind of simple. It's so simple to access. 873 00:50:26,400 --> 00:50:28,760 People just don't know it's there. 874 00:50:30,640 --> 00:50:33,360 Get your children to show you their apps and games. 875 00:50:33,440 --> 00:50:36,160 You don't need to know. About the latest game or app, 876 00:50:36,480 --> 00:50:38,280 but they can show you what they're doing and who they're 877 00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:41,240 doing it with and you can work out just don't be terrified by 878 00:50:41,240 --> 00:50:45,480 Italian brain rock because it's. Steal a brain rot and like 879 00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:46,520 there's some kids. What? 880 00:50:46,520 --> 00:50:48,160 Are you doing, oh, we're playing steal a brain rot? 881 00:50:48,160 --> 00:50:52,360 It's like, Oh my God. Don't try to hide news about 882 00:50:52,360 --> 00:50:54,880 scary things in the news. Talk to them about it, because 883 00:50:54,880 --> 00:50:57,000 that kind of dissolves the fake news. 884 00:50:57,000 --> 00:50:58,560 Quite often at dinner, one of my kids will. 885 00:50:58,560 --> 00:51:00,720 Come out with something they've seen about and it'll be 886 00:51:00,720 --> 00:51:01,960 something. And it's like, no. 887 00:51:02,360 --> 00:51:06,160 Iran aren't bombing London. Like read beyond the news like. 888 00:51:06,320 --> 00:51:08,920 You know, it's just. Read beyond that. 889 00:51:09,640 --> 00:51:11,960 And yeah, I, I, I won't go into that. 890 00:51:11,960 --> 00:51:13,440 I'll share a link to it on the newsletter. 891 00:51:13,880 --> 00:51:16,040 I'll leave that there, but I thought it was quite a 892 00:51:16,040 --> 00:51:19,280 refreshing approach compared to the don't. 893 00:51:19,280 --> 00:51:21,880 Let them see anything. Don't let them use anything like 894 00:51:22,000 --> 00:51:24,040 you can't escape it. Yeah. 895 00:51:25,680 --> 00:51:28,320 While we're on an educational angle, let me just give you this 896 00:51:28,320 --> 00:51:30,920 one really quickly. This is a website I stumbled 897 00:51:30,920 --> 00:51:33,760 across, stumbled across this completely randomly. 898 00:51:34,040 --> 00:51:37,600 My 11 year old said me and a friend when we're older are 899 00:51:37,600 --> 00:51:40,120 going to make a games company and we're going to call it 900 00:51:40,480 --> 00:51:43,200 Barefoot Games. I was like amazing. 901 00:51:43,200 --> 00:51:44,680 I thought that name probably exists. 902 00:51:44,760 --> 00:51:48,760 So I googled it and I came across this, The Fisherman, an 903 00:51:48,760 --> 00:51:54,120 underwater adventure barefoot from computing at school and BT. 904 00:51:54,800 --> 00:51:59,160 Hi, I'm Turtle, the new head of the cyber security team in our 905 00:51:59,280 --> 00:52:02,120 underwater village. Help me beat today. 906 00:52:02,120 --> 00:52:04,440 I am here to help you learn about fishing. 907 00:52:04,840 --> 00:52:08,200 Don't know what fishing is? Don't worry all will become 908 00:52:08,200 --> 00:52:11,400 clear soon. 1st I'm going to need your need. 909 00:52:11,480 --> 00:52:14,960 So obviously this is Turtle and there's lots of like undersea 910 00:52:14,960 --> 00:52:17,160 kind of stuff. It's BT colour theme. 911 00:52:17,160 --> 00:52:19,440 So clearly BT have sponsored this. 912 00:52:19,680 --> 00:52:22,200 You type in your nickname. I'm just going to go with Han. 913 00:52:23,040 --> 00:52:25,800 You choose your avatar. You can have a llama with a hat 914 00:52:25,800 --> 00:52:34,040 on, a Stingray, a a anglerfish, jellyfish, or a starfish with 915 00:52:34,040 --> 00:52:36,120 sunglasses or a diver. It's amazing. 916 00:52:37,000 --> 00:52:37,960 Hey. And if I you eat. 917 00:52:39,160 --> 00:52:41,720 As you you earn cyber points, so it's gamified. 918 00:52:41,720 --> 00:52:43,960 You'll learn cyber points. You can turn the music on. 919 00:52:43,960 --> 00:52:44,960 How Well? You're doing. 920 00:52:45,240 --> 00:52:48,680 As well. But for every mistake you make, 921 00:52:48,880 --> 00:52:52,520 you'll also lose a life. In a moment, you shall be able 922 00:52:52,520 --> 00:52:56,040 to see how many lives you have left at the top of your screen. 923 00:52:56,520 --> 00:52:59,160 Right, lives and points. Let's just go. 924 00:52:59,160 --> 00:53:04,000 I've got 5 lives, no points. I'm glad you found me, we have 925 00:53:04,000 --> 00:53:07,120 had some problems with our villagers personal information 926 00:53:07,120 --> 00:53:09,000 being stolen. Button says personal 927 00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:11,400 information. Transformation is data such as 928 00:53:11,400 --> 00:53:13,960 your name, date of birth or address. 929 00:53:14,480 --> 00:53:17,040 Let me show you what your information looks like. 930 00:53:18,840 --> 00:53:27,280 Personalinformationgeneratedetailsandthereitisann@fishmail.co.uk Password Home address, payment 931 00:53:27,280 --> 00:53:30,760 card number Yeah, it's. Were you paying? 932 00:53:30,960 --> 00:53:32,480 Attention. I'll stop this there because 933 00:53:32,480 --> 00:53:34,280 then it goes on to like quiz me for it. 934 00:53:34,400 --> 00:53:36,400 But I thought it was just really nice and accessible. 935 00:53:36,400 --> 00:53:38,320 I haven't shown my kids. That yet, but I can imagine 936 00:53:38,320 --> 00:53:40,560 them. Getting involved in that and I 937 00:53:40,560 --> 00:53:43,720 just stumbled across that, so yeah, it's called. 938 00:53:43,960 --> 00:53:47,520 C stuff out there and that extension, it's probably not 939 00:53:47,520 --> 00:53:49,480 well advertised. I've never seen it before, no. 940 00:53:49,760 --> 00:53:51,160 I've never heard of it before SO. 941 00:53:51,520 --> 00:53:54,880 We'll put a link audience. Maybe we're not, but we can help 942 00:53:54,880 --> 00:53:57,880 spread the word, can't we? Because again, in an 943 00:53:57,880 --> 00:54:03,040 organisation you have parents, so share this with them, they 944 00:54:03,040 --> 00:54:06,000 can share it with their kids and it gets them to fishermen. 945 00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:07,960 Why is it called Fishermen with a pH? 946 00:54:08,320 --> 00:54:09,920 Oh, that's because of phishing emails. 947 00:54:09,920 --> 00:54:13,160 Opens up a conversation about cybersecurity and you can go on 948 00:54:13,160 --> 00:54:14,920 with that game and learn a whole lot more about. 949 00:54:14,920 --> 00:54:17,200 Personal information and fishing and stuff. 950 00:54:17,480 --> 00:54:19,480 So it's really there'll be other stuff out there. 951 00:54:19,880 --> 00:54:24,800 We've talked spoken before about is it Joe Hurd and the stuff 952 00:54:24,800 --> 00:54:27,920 that he's done. So anything like that. 953 00:54:27,920 --> 00:54:30,200 If you see something like that, share it with us and we'll 954 00:54:30,200 --> 00:54:31,520 spread the good word. Cool, right. 955 00:54:31,520 --> 00:54:33,440 I had one last thing. No, I didn't. 956 00:54:33,440 --> 00:54:34,720 I had to. I'm sorry. 957 00:54:34,960 --> 00:54:37,000 I won't be much longer. I just want to share these with 958 00:54:37,000 --> 00:54:38,320 you. This is something I saw on 959 00:54:38,320 --> 00:54:40,200 TikTok. Look at me sharing a TikTok. 960 00:54:40,440 --> 00:54:43,520 It's normally you. So let me share this with you 961 00:54:43,800 --> 00:54:47,120 spot in a deep fight. Have you got this as well? 962 00:54:47,280 --> 00:54:51,800 Yeah, that's cool. I think the algorithm obviously. 963 00:54:52,200 --> 00:54:53,240 Or what? What what? 964 00:54:53,480 --> 00:54:56,120 Why would that be? So let me just explain. 965 00:54:56,120 --> 00:54:59,840 This is a guy on camera spotting a deep fake using one sentence. 966 00:54:59,840 --> 00:55:04,400 OK, and I'll play this. I I think it plays fine. 967 00:55:04,600 --> 00:55:10,320 There's a guy sat in a chair with headphones on and and you 968 00:55:10,320 --> 00:55:13,160 can't see the voice the the English voice that's speaking 969 00:55:14,200 --> 00:55:17,800 this guy's. Very soft like it's a very poor 970 00:55:17,800 --> 00:55:22,280 quality webcam, very soft and. Fluffy around the face, but I'll 971 00:55:22,280 --> 00:55:25,120 play the audio. Why do I know you're not some AI 972 00:55:25,200 --> 00:55:27,560 thing or what what what? Why would I be able? 973 00:55:27,640 --> 00:55:31,640 To tell here, man, Yeah. Oh. 974 00:55:32,280 --> 00:55:34,680 He's just shown a certificate. It's not AI. 975 00:55:36,040 --> 00:55:39,640 Yeah, I was doing. So kind of proving. 976 00:55:40,080 --> 00:55:43,800 That's our director. Proving that the background is 977 00:55:43,800 --> 00:55:46,200 an AI. No, no, no. 978 00:55:46,200 --> 00:55:47,880 That's our director. We have a multiple. 979 00:55:47,880 --> 00:55:50,320 You see all of them here. That's all I see. 980 00:55:50,800 --> 00:55:54,160 Not Ronnie, but. But you know, that's some way of 981 00:55:54,200 --> 00:55:55,880 telling whether you're real or not. 982 00:55:55,920 --> 00:55:58,840 Can you like hold up three fingers in front of your face? 983 00:56:01,040 --> 00:56:02,080 Oh, come on. Not. 984 00:56:02,120 --> 00:56:05,120 Come on. Oh, you don't want to do that? 985 00:56:06,720 --> 00:56:09,200 Well, I'll do that here. He's holding them just below his 986 00:56:09,200 --> 00:56:10,920 face. Too much. 987 00:56:10,920 --> 00:56:12,880 Come on, Ronnie. Why would it? 988 00:56:13,040 --> 00:56:16,240 Would it affect the AI if it was in front of your face? 989 00:56:18,040 --> 00:56:20,560 Well, not at all, but. Can you do that too? 990 00:56:20,560 --> 00:56:24,560 Much to ask somebody well. Make sure you're not AI is not 991 00:56:24,560 --> 00:56:27,120 unreasonable. I mean, can you do that in front 992 00:56:27,120 --> 00:56:30,000 of your face? Well, I think that that's too 993 00:56:30,000 --> 00:56:32,680 much to ask somebody. Don't you think that? 994 00:56:32,920 --> 00:56:36,080 No, I don't think it is. If I'm making sure you're not 995 00:56:36,120 --> 00:56:38,320 AI, I think that's a reasonable thing to ask. 996 00:56:38,320 --> 00:56:40,960 Can you hold up three fingers in front of your face? 997 00:56:42,680 --> 00:56:45,520 Well, I think that, well, is that enough? 998 00:56:45,800 --> 00:56:47,440 No, it's on the side of his face. 999 00:56:48,800 --> 00:56:50,480 Well, that's too much, don't you think? 1000 00:56:50,480 --> 00:56:54,120 Yes it is because you know if you were real, you would put up 1001 00:56:54,120 --> 00:56:56,440 three the. Host has ended this meeting. 1002 00:56:56,960 --> 00:57:00,080 How do I know you're not? See, I you obviously saw that as 1003 00:57:00,080 --> 00:57:01,600 well. The algorithm obviously, I mean 1004 00:57:01,600 --> 00:57:03,320 it's gone really viral. It's. 1005 00:57:03,560 --> 00:57:06,920 It's had loads of views but. It's Luke. 1006 00:57:06,920 --> 00:57:09,240 Can you hold three fingers in front of your face? 1007 00:57:09,240 --> 00:57:10,280 Is. It a dip. 1008 00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:14,400 I I'm not doing it. I think that's too much to ask. 1009 00:57:14,400 --> 00:57:15,480 Come on, that's too much. That's. 1010 00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:22,440 Quite a good one, yeah. I mean, yeah, there's a lot of 1011 00:57:22,440 --> 00:57:24,040 giveaways in there, isn't there? But. 1012 00:57:24,920 --> 00:57:29,240 When you watch it back, you can see when you watch it back that 1013 00:57:29,240 --> 00:57:32,800 he's got a curl of hair that kind of phases in and out of 1014 00:57:32,800 --> 00:57:35,000 existence. Where there's obviously some 1015 00:57:35,000 --> 00:57:38,480 deep fake face there, so the hair's real, but this curl of 1016 00:57:38,480 --> 00:57:41,000 hair, kind of the tip of it kind of keeps vanishing and 1017 00:57:41,000 --> 00:57:42,840 reappearing and vanishing and reappearing. 1018 00:57:43,320 --> 00:57:45,240 Don't what you're looking at the face, you're looking at the 1019 00:57:45,240 --> 00:57:46,360 eyes, you're looking at the body. 1020 00:57:46,360 --> 00:57:50,480 You don't look for those tying and kind of tells, but it's very 1021 00:57:50,480 --> 00:57:52,720 soft. The face is very soft. 1022 00:57:53,360 --> 00:57:56,000 Yeah, it was. I like the eyes and the mouth. 1023 00:57:56,200 --> 00:57:58,040 Very odd. Yeah. 1024 00:57:59,600 --> 00:58:02,200 But the part of the reason it is low quality as well is because 1025 00:58:02,200 --> 00:58:05,720 that kind of it gets less obvious if it's low quality 1026 00:58:05,720 --> 00:58:09,640 isn't it? It's if it was HD then it would 1027 00:58:09,640 --> 00:58:12,760 be really easy to tell. But with it all being a bit 1028 00:58:12,760 --> 00:58:17,720 crap, laptop cameras need to get better to help prevent AID fakes 1029 00:58:17,720 --> 00:58:19,440 in some ways. For that kind of thing. 1030 00:58:20,440 --> 00:58:21,920 Yeah. Right, I'll quickly share the 1031 00:58:21,920 --> 00:58:25,200 last one I had, and this was a LinkedIn post that I saw from 1032 00:58:25,200 --> 00:58:27,920 Maxime Hawks Hunt. I haven't told Maxime that I'm 1033 00:58:27,920 --> 00:58:30,480 sharing this, so I hope he doesn't mind, but it is on 1034 00:58:31,240 --> 00:58:33,960 LinkedIn, so it's kind of public domain in some ways. 1035 00:58:37,840 --> 00:58:40,400 This is a real smishing campaign currently circulating around 1036 00:58:40,400 --> 00:58:43,800 France, shared by a friend. A fake delivery message like 1037 00:58:43,800 --> 00:58:45,880 we've seen many, but with A twist. 1038 00:58:46,240 --> 00:58:49,600 There's a picture of a package, a recipient's name on the label, 1039 00:58:50,040 --> 00:58:53,880 full home address in the SMS and a personalised link. 1040 00:58:54,560 --> 00:58:56,200 That picture is what makes it interesting. 1041 00:58:56,200 --> 00:58:58,920 It creates a strong sense of legitimacy. 1042 00:58:59,200 --> 00:59:02,160 You don't just read the message, you see your parcel waiting for 1043 00:59:02,160 --> 00:59:04,800 you. My friend immediately said crazy 1044 00:59:04,800 --> 00:59:07,720 what AI can do. Looking closer, it seems more 1045 00:59:07,720 --> 00:59:11,000 like a simple image template with text overlay. 1046 00:59:11,560 --> 00:59:14,720 But it's somewhat scary glimpse of what AI will enable. 1047 00:59:14,800 --> 00:59:19,080 The mass personalisation of scams with visual cues that our 1048 00:59:19,080 --> 00:59:23,920 brains instantly trust. So yeah. 1049 00:59:23,920 --> 00:59:28,120 And it's the message actually said hello, I came to your home, 1050 00:59:28,160 --> 00:59:32,080 full address for name. I sent your package back to the 1051 00:59:32,080 --> 00:59:34,280 warehouse because it didn't fit in your mailbox. 1052 00:59:34,720 --> 00:59:37,680 Please choose how to get it delivered with a link to a 1053 00:59:37,680 --> 00:59:40,360 malicious website. That's crazy, isn't it? 1054 00:59:41,480 --> 00:59:43,920 Yeah, crazy. Yeah, yeah, just yeah. 1055 00:59:44,040 --> 00:59:50,480 Like he says, Yeah, enhances those typical tracking like fake 1056 00:59:50,760 --> 00:59:55,040 shipment links texts that you get which are just very basic 1057 00:59:55,040 --> 00:59:59,320 and aren't personalised anywhere near as much as that. 1058 00:59:59,400 --> 01:00:02,400 No, no, I know where. They get the home address from. 1059 01:00:02,400 --> 01:00:07,240 I guess it's this day of breaches and it's very targeted. 1060 01:00:07,920 --> 01:00:09,720 It's probably all public record, isn't it? 1061 01:00:11,240 --> 01:00:15,640 I'm actually seeing, I've just done a search for that and it's 1062 01:00:15,640 --> 01:00:19,200 actually made, it's actually made the French news. 1063 01:00:19,200 --> 01:00:23,480 So there's an article there with that very same photo with the 1064 01:00:23,480 --> 01:00:29,240 name blurred out on a msn.com. Yeah. 1065 01:00:29,640 --> 01:00:32,480 So that, I mean, it's obviously big enough that that's made the 1066 01:00:32,480 --> 01:00:34,360 French news. So I thought that was. 1067 01:00:35,480 --> 01:00:38,680 Just it's another good example, isn't it, of stuff that we can 1068 01:00:38,680 --> 01:00:41,680 share with our people. You know, it's another attack 1069 01:00:41,680 --> 01:00:43,200 vector. There's so, so many. 1070 01:00:43,960 --> 01:00:47,080 That's my security, social, Social Security done. 1071 01:00:47,160 --> 01:00:50,640 So I'll pass over to you after I stole one of yours, So I'm 1072 01:00:50,640 --> 01:00:52,360 sorry. That's right. 1073 01:00:53,840 --> 01:00:55,360 Yeah. Sorry about one to share. 1074 01:00:55,360 --> 01:01:01,600 So this one TikTok I saw, it's basically, yeah, a sort of 1075 01:01:01,600 --> 01:01:07,200 example of how people could be using personal devices and sort 1076 01:01:07,200 --> 01:01:09,120 of exposing certain things, I guess. 1077 01:01:09,120 --> 01:01:11,680 So I'll just share the video. Easier to to watch it. 1078 01:01:11,680 --> 01:01:16,920 And then if you saw it at all, oh wow, I'll play it and I can 1079 01:01:16,920 --> 01:01:19,640 probably listen along. Have some news right now? 1080 01:01:19,640 --> 01:01:22,080 A French service member accidentally opened up his 1081 01:01:22,080 --> 01:01:26,520 Strava on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and well, we 1082 01:01:26,520 --> 01:01:29,480 now know the location of France's aircraft carrier 1083 01:01:29,520 --> 01:01:33,760 because he decided to go on a 7 kilometre run in the middle of 1084 01:01:33,760 --> 01:01:37,040 the ocean. According to French news LeMond, 1085 01:01:37,480 --> 01:01:40,360 this service member decided to use Strava in the middle of the 1086 01:01:40,360 --> 01:01:42,880 ocean on the aircraft carrier as it was moving. 1087 01:01:43,120 --> 01:01:45,680 Now, it's no surprise that the aircraft carriers in water, but 1088 01:01:45,680 --> 01:01:48,000 it's an operational security risk that we now know where it 1089 01:01:48,000 --> 01:01:50,080 is. This is going viral on Twitter. 1090 01:01:50,080 --> 01:01:52,480 So it's not, I'm not revealing anything that isn't already 1091 01:01:52,480 --> 01:01:54,920 public, but as you can see, it's in the Mediterranean Sea. 1092 01:01:54,920 --> 01:01:59,080 And the exact location is now known because Arthur decided to 1093 01:01:59,080 --> 01:02:06,280 go on a run about 36 minutes, going for about 7 kilometres on 1094 01:02:06,320 --> 01:02:09,480 the on a Strava app in the middle of the ocean. 1095 01:02:09,520 --> 01:02:15,160 So anyways, spread the word itself, yeah? 1096 01:02:15,720 --> 01:02:21,240 Want to share with the risks of unintentional sort of innocent 1097 01:02:21,760 --> 01:02:25,040 thing, but probably should know better and that sort of this 1098 01:02:25,040 --> 01:02:28,160 scenario I guess should be more restricted but. 1099 01:02:28,880 --> 01:02:31,480 Yeah, I got sentenced by a couple of different people. 1100 01:02:31,960 --> 01:02:34,720 I think this happened just after we'd recorded the last episode 1101 01:02:34,720 --> 01:02:37,360 or something like that. I got sentenced by a couple of 1102 01:02:37,360 --> 01:02:40,640 different people. And obviously this isn't the 1103 01:02:40,640 --> 01:02:45,400 first time that military stuff has been leaked through Strava. 1104 01:02:45,400 --> 01:02:49,800 And I think it was 20188 years ago that some British soldiers 1105 01:02:49,800 --> 01:02:53,440 decided to go for a run and reveal where their kind of semi 1106 01:02:53,440 --> 01:02:59,040 secret military camp was. And this is a like maybe this is 1107 01:02:59,040 --> 01:03:01,920 a security awareness issue for armed forces, right? 1108 01:03:01,920 --> 01:03:05,320 Like Strava can be public, it can also be private. 1109 01:03:05,320 --> 01:03:08,520 And yeah, the I mean, think of the. 1110 01:03:08,520 --> 01:03:12,720 Potential issues that this could cause if they were on like, 1111 01:03:12,720 --> 01:03:17,040 secret military operations, like their location has to be quite 1112 01:03:17,040 --> 01:03:20,360 secret anyway. But supposing as as a result of 1113 01:03:20,360 --> 01:03:23,960 Arthur's run, they get torpedoed and destroyed and a whole like 1114 01:03:23,960 --> 01:03:28,120 ship of French servicemen get killed, all because Arthur 1115 01:03:28,120 --> 01:03:30,360 decided to go for a run and turn on his Strava, Yeah. 1116 01:03:30,840 --> 01:03:32,200 It's one of those sort of things, right? 1117 01:03:32,320 --> 01:03:36,080 Maybe not Philly, our area, but just like the whole permission 1118 01:03:36,080 --> 01:03:40,560 saying like, yeah, cheering up your location on your personal 1119 01:03:40,560 --> 01:03:43,160 device for an app like that whilst you're in a sort of 1120 01:03:43,160 --> 01:03:48,440 sensitive scenario, there's a lot of awareness to be sort of 1121 01:03:48,440 --> 01:03:50,480 shared there. And not just that kind of 1122 01:03:50,480 --> 01:03:53,960 scenario, there's probably lots of other similar things that 1123 01:03:53,960 --> 01:03:56,920 could happen different ways and it's all sort of unintentional. 1124 01:03:56,960 --> 01:04:01,160 We can't blame Strava for that because Strava aren't a fault. 1125 01:04:01,160 --> 01:04:04,520 Maybe Strava and it won't cover all solutions, but maybe Strava 1126 01:04:04,520 --> 01:04:06,640 needs to go. It looks like you're on a boat. 1127 01:04:07,080 --> 01:04:09,040 Are you sure you want to make this public? 1128 01:04:09,320 --> 01:04:11,840 But then if you're just running around the secret military camp 1129 01:04:11,840 --> 01:04:15,480 in the deserts, like there's, it's likely there's about to be 1130 01:04:15,480 --> 01:04:17,880 a whole load of servicemen in the Middle East, a whole load 1131 01:04:17,880 --> 01:04:21,040 more servicemen in the Middle East in places that's probably 1132 01:04:21,040 --> 01:04:23,680 quite sensitive. One of those has their Strava 1133 01:04:23,680 --> 01:04:26,400 turned on. Someone notices that could be 1134 01:04:26,400 --> 01:04:30,560 catastrophic. So like, yeah, if you're a 1135 01:04:30,560 --> 01:04:35,320 service member or or secret security guard at a secret 1136 01:04:35,320 --> 01:04:39,600 installation and are going for a jog on your break, Strava hides 1137 01:04:39,600 --> 01:04:41,760 your starting point. Now that was something they 1138 01:04:41,760 --> 01:04:44,160 didn't do it kind of. Blurs your starting point, but 1139 01:04:44,160 --> 01:04:48,320 it still gives so much away. Yeah, yeah. 1140 01:04:48,480 --> 01:04:50,960 But it's, yeah, could be. I can't think of any examples, 1141 01:04:50,960 --> 01:04:52,680 right? Just the whole thing of personal 1142 01:04:52,680 --> 01:04:57,280 devices and permissions and yeah, yeah, all kinds of things 1143 01:04:57,280 --> 01:04:59,840 there. Maybe, maybe there's something, 1144 01:04:59,840 --> 01:05:03,160 maybe Strava really needs to double down on the you are 1145 01:05:03,160 --> 01:05:04,920 sharing your location with the world. 1146 01:05:05,240 --> 01:05:08,880 Do you wish to continue? Maybe having just as a default 1147 01:05:08,880 --> 01:05:13,400 public setting isn't enough. Maybe before every activity they 1148 01:05:13,400 --> 01:05:17,000 need you need to explicitly declare that you are happy to 1149 01:05:17,000 --> 01:05:20,560 share your location publicly and then there needs to be awareness 1150 01:05:20,560 --> 01:05:23,120 to service members to not do that. 1151 01:05:23,480 --> 01:05:25,080 It's tough, though. Tough. 1152 01:05:25,080 --> 01:05:28,000 Nobody is right. But then not everybody reads it. 1153 01:05:28,000 --> 01:05:30,040 Everybody engages with it. Nope. 1154 01:05:30,160 --> 01:05:32,840 Nope. Yeah, yeah. 1155 01:05:33,640 --> 01:05:37,080 Cool, OK, well, I think that's it this week and we we've done 1156 01:05:37,080 --> 01:05:40,400 the whole week without talking about the director of the FB is 1157 01:05:40,480 --> 01:05:43,640 personal emails getting hacked by Handala because everybody 1158 01:05:43,640 --> 01:05:45,040 else has probably spoken about that. 1159 01:05:45,040 --> 01:05:46,840 But in case you missed it, there you go. 1160 01:05:46,840 --> 01:05:48,160 We did include it in the episode. 1161 01:05:48,160 --> 01:05:51,960 Kash Patel's emails got hacked personal e-mail not his FBI. 1162 01:05:51,960 --> 01:05:54,800 The FBI are fine. Personal e-mail got hacked by 1163 01:05:54,800 --> 01:05:59,400 Handala, years of photos, emails, resume has been leaked 1164 01:05:59,400 --> 01:06:02,600 by them and what they claim is just the latest of a long line 1165 01:06:02,600 --> 01:06:05,960 of high profile compromises. But we're not going to talk 1166 01:06:05,960 --> 01:06:08,400 about that because we try and avoid the politics. 1167 01:06:08,640 --> 01:06:11,160 So yeah, right. Yeah. 1168 01:06:11,160 --> 01:06:12,960 OK. I think that's it for this week. 1169 01:06:13,680 --> 01:06:14,880 Thank you very much for your time. 1170 01:06:15,360 --> 01:06:15,880 OK. Thank you. 1171 01:06:16,040 --> 01:06:17,120 Thanks everyone. Got you there. 1172 01:06:17,120 --> 01:06:18,880 Speak to you next week, see you later. 1173 01:06:19,560 --> 01:06:19,880 Bye bye.