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This week someone searches for 
Roblox cheats at work, gets 

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malware, and that one decision 
ends up breaching their sales 

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customers. 
Ritual shoppers find out that 

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their loyalty programme data has
been downloaded by attackers 

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researchers trusted with. 
Half a million people's health 

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records put them up for sale on 
Alibaba. 

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Anthropic quietly installs 
browser hooks on your machine 

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without asking a. 
Scam e-mail uses an old 

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password. 
To convince you that they've got

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footage of you, a journalist 
tracks a NATO warship by posting

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it a $5 Bluetooth tracker and a 
greeting card. 

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And the UK government says it's 
time to stop using passwords. 

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I believe that when I say it. 
All that and more of this week's

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The Awareness Angle. 
And with me, as always, is my 

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partner in cyber crime 
prevention, it's Mr Luke 

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Pettigrew. 
How you doing, Luke? 

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Hey, I'm doing well. 
Thank you. 

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How are you? 
All good, all good. 

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The sun's out, the sun is 
shining and yeah, yeah. 

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But that makes for a good day, 
so. 

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Should we get in some breeches? 
There you go for it. 

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OK, here's this week's breech 
watch, right? 

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Kicking us off this week, 
Versell. 

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If you're anywhere near 
cybersecurity, you've probably 

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heard about this one because 
everybody's been talking about 

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it. 
Versail breach widens, so it's 

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got bigger. 
So Versail is the company behind

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the next Dot JS framework used 
by lots and lots of different 

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people, lots of businesses, lots
of websites. 

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The breach. 
The breach originated from a 

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compromised third party AI tool 
called Context AI. 

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The breach they announced, and 
they've now announced that it's 

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even bigger than first thought. 
So Context AI is an AI 

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productivity tool. 
The adversal employee was using 

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third party AI tool. 
An attacker took over that 

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employees Google Workspace 
account through the compromised 

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AI tool and then use that access
to pivot into their sales 

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internal systems and start 
decrypting customer environment 

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variables. 
So as the investigation has 

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expanded, their sales now found 
additional compromised accounts,

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including some that appear to 
have been breached independently

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through social engineering or 
malware before this incident 

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even began. 
And Hudson Rock traced the 

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likely patient zero to a context
dot AI employee who got infected

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with Loomis dealer after 
searching for Roblox auto farms 

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scripts. 
And it's still unclear whether 

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verses use of context AI office 
suite was officially approved or

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just a case of shadow AI, which 
is where you know your people 

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use tools without asking the the
the pieces together on this the 

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journey. 
It's huge. 

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There's so many bits to dissect 
from this. 

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You've got the shadow AI 
argument or or act third party 

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AI argument. 
I love that I love it. 

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I mean, I hate it, but I love 
it. 

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It's the fact that the. 
Way that they did that, an 

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attacker took over the employees
Google Workspace account through

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the compromised AI tools. 
So they've gone back and use 

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that access to them, pivot into 
Versailles internal systems and 

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then in investigation they find 
out that there's other people 

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that have been popped already 
and the average time isn't it 

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that breaches you only? 
Like you discover a breach 

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typically that your system is 
impacted 200 days or something 

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after the initial point of 
access, so. 

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They've found other people on 
their network. 

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It's frightening. 
Frightening. 

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Yeah, definitely have a monster 
of the Disney breach with the 

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BMNBMNG mode or whatever it was.
And it makes you wonder, was 

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this person doing it on their 
work machine or was it bring 

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your own device like using their
personal machine for work? 

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And it's quite crazy how it can 
just happen from such a what 

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you'd point the person doing it 
where you wouldn't think 

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anything of browsing for some 
Roblox thing. 

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You wouldn't. 
They wouldn't expect it to blow 

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up like this, right? 
You wouldn't. 

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And the other worst part of this
is it's context AI is I mean the

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report in we're reading here 
says it's context AI is employee

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that has performed some that has
made some questionable decisions

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and because of the third party's
employees decisions that's led 

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to versailes getting breached. 
So actually. 

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Versail haven't really done 
anything wrong, you know 

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they've. 
They've probably assessed the 

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third party, but when you do a 
third party approval, is there a

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line on there that says do your 
employees look for Roblox cheats

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online like you could? 
This could almost happen to 

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anyone and that's what makes 
this quite frightening. 

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It's yeah, the context AI is 
user has reportedly gone and 

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looked for Roblox cheats. 
There's probably someone in 

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every organisation of a certain 
size that is using their. 

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Computer for something personal 
at some point and it's. 

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Yeah, yeah, that's a very unique
story. 

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Yeah, yeah. 
There's going to be unfair 

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parties as well. 
Just I feel like everybody's 

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going to Start Stop using third 
pies where they can maybe. 

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Yeah, yeah, and it's. 
Do you reckon? 

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It's difficult to know whether 
their cell were the initial 

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target and context AI was used 
as the bait. 

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You know, it's like, OK, I want 
to get into Versailles. 

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Context AI are a client. 
Therefore maybe I can poke at 

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them and then pivot across. 
Or did someone get access to 

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context AI and then go, Oh my 
God, like what have I got access

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to? 
This is amazing. 

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Like, and they've just purely 
won the lottery to get access to

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a massive client. 
This we don't know, but anyway, 

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that's that's I mean, that's how
lead breach this week 

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Versailles, everybody's reported
on it. 

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It's it's so many pieces to that
links. 

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If you want to read more about 
that links to this story and 

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every story we talk about is in 
the newsletter. 

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You can subscribe at 
riskycraive.com or you can find 

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00:06:32,120 --> 00:06:36,160
it by searching for the 
awareness angle on LinkedIn. 

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Right. 
Move on to the next one. 

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Cool. 
See our next breach. 

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We've got Ritual cosmetics. 
Hippitary breach customer 

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details are exposed such as four
names, emails, phone numbers, 

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date of births, home addresses. 
Pretty standard sort of data set

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of breach there. 
No payment information is 

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supported the accessed and no 
ransomware or extortion group 

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has claimed responsibility, 
which is interesting. 

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See, I'm not sure Rituals are a 
luxury body and home products 

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brand. 
I bought my wife a very 

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expensive room, smelly you know,
bottle with sticks and it was 

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like 25 LB. 
It was a birthday present or 

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something. 
I I cost me more than that if 

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she's. 
Listening. 

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She doesn't listen. 
But yeah, they're they're quite 

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expensive. 
They smell lovely. 

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I think they do hotels as well. 
So yes, that's. 

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Rituals, Yeah, this is here as 
well. 

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They've it affects members of 
It's My Rituals loyalty 

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programme as well. 
So Tech has gained unauthorised 

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access to the company's systems 
and managed to download part of 

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the membership database before 
the company spoiled it and tried

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it down. 
There's reportedly no sign of 

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data being publicly shared and 
the company have reported it to 

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the relevant authorities and 
have lost a forensic 

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investigation. 
So seems that they've done quite

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a good job with that so far. 
Yeah, I guess it's just one of 

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those things, right? 
If you're a customer and look 

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out for told you emails claiming
to be from them asking you to 

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like do things with your 
account, maybe might send like a

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fake update your password and 
then it asks for your account 

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password and you revealed it 
that way and stuff like that. 

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Yeah, I think there's too much 
more. 

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We've got another story later on
that kind of talks about 

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something that happened after a 
security incident. 

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So we talk about Grafana a 
little later. 

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There's a story we've got. 
It's kind of the kind of results

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of what can happen after an 
incident or suspected incident, 

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so. 
Yeah, yeah. 

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Yeah, it's that one. 
Made quite a big. 

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Splash in the news that one I 
saw it reported in quite a few 

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places and it's, you know, 
there's not an attacker 

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announced. 
Rituals isn't the largest of 

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companies. 
The data hasn't been seen 

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publicly. 
It's not the richest of data. 

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It's a pretty. 
Common data set to be stolen. 

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So it's. 
I was surprised it made such a. 

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Big splash in the news, but it 
did. 

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There's no information on like 
how many people are affected or 

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how how big the data is, right? 
Usually you get that maybe it's 

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quite early and maybe they maybe
didn't catch it quite early, so.

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Rituals. 
Is not quiet anymore. 

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Rituals is quite a they're a 
luxury brand, so the that list 

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of if you're in a loyalty 
programme and you're regularly 

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buying these luxury products, 
you're probably a certain 

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profile of individual high 
wealth, you know? 

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High income so. 
That way it's it's quite an 

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attractive data set I would have
thought. 

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You know, these are people with 
money and finances and credit 

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and stuff, so. 
Yeah. 

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Right, I'll move on to the next 
one. 

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And this one pinged on my phone.
The Times pinged Breaking news. 

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UK Biobank health data found 
listed for sale on Alibaba. 

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So this has been reported 
everywhere. 

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The data. 
The UK government has confirmed 

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that health data from UK 
Biobank, one of the country's 

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most important medical research 
databases, was found listed for 

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sale on Alibaba, the Chinese 
e-commerce platform. 

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It's connected to Aliexpress, 
which you've probably heard of 

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more. 
Alibaba is like I think. 

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I think it's where you buy in 
bulk rather than end user. 

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Yeah. 
Technology Minister Ian Murray 

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told MPs the breach involved de 
identified data from nearly all 

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of the projects 500,000 
participants. 

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But this wasn't a classic hack. 
The data had been legitimately 

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shared with researchers at 3 
accredited academic 

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institutions, who were 
contractually bound to keep it 

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secure and use it only for 
health research. 

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But instead they put it up for 
sale online so. 

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UK bio bankers suspended access 
for those institutions, they've 

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shut down its research platform 
temporarily and they've imposed 

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new restrictions on data 
exports. 

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And the ICO is investigating, 
formerly the Information 

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Commissioner's Office. 
If we look at the data exposed, 

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I mean this is this. 
It's significant gender, age, 

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month and year of birth, socio 
economic status, lifestyle 

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habits and measurements from 
biological samples. 

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But there is no names, 
addresses, phone numbers or NHS 

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numbers. 
So. 

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This isn't a hack. 
This has been downloaded, you 

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know, by accredited researchers.
They've just decided not to 

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research it and instead flog it,
which is crazy. 

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Yeah, it's very bizarre to end 
up on e-commerce platform like 

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that. 
It's not even the dark web. 

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00:11:51,280 --> 00:11:53,280
This is this is on the light 
web. 

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00:11:53,360 --> 00:11:55,400
You know this is available. 
We can. 

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Any computer, depending on your 
work policies, but any any open 

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wide computer, phone, Internet 
connected device can go to 

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alialibaba.com and browse the 
items for sale. 

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00:12:06,840 --> 00:12:08,360
These listings have been 
removed. 

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00:12:08,360 --> 00:12:11,400
You can't go and browse these 
anymore and there weren't any 

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confirmed purchases, but the 
fact is it's been offered. 

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So. 
Yeah, it's an interesting one. 

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Like, again, third parties, who 
do you trust? 

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00:12:22,240 --> 00:12:24,840
Can you actually trust them? 
And when they're all over the 

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world, you know, if you want to 
file charges against these 

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00:12:28,960 --> 00:12:32,400
individuals and and stuff. 
Can you realistically do it if 

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00:12:32,400 --> 00:12:34,480
they're? 
Based in China? 

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00:12:34,480 --> 00:12:38,040
I don't know. 
Yeah, that's, that's 

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interesting. 
Yeah. 

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00:12:40,160 --> 00:12:44,000
It makes you wonder like you 
sign up to do something like 

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this, I guess. 
And yeah, you don't know where 

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your day is going to end up, but
thankfully, I guess it's de 

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identified, right? 
So maybe it'll get used to some 

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00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:58,800
AI training or something and 
that's the reason now. 

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00:12:59,360 --> 00:13:00,920
I mean, there's an interesting 
news case. 

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00:13:00,920 --> 00:13:02,520
Yeah, it's quite funny you say 
that. 

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00:13:02,520 --> 00:13:04,520
Actually. 
I remember last year at some 

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00:13:04,520 --> 00:13:10,400
point there was 2 trailers 
parked in my local Tesco's and 

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00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:13,320
they were be part of like a 
medical study and that kind of 

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thing. 
I it could be connected to this 

232
00:13:15,240 --> 00:13:18,480
and they were asking volunteers 
could go in and give blood and 

233
00:13:18,480 --> 00:13:21,640
get like, I can't even remember 
what it was, but it was, I don't

234
00:13:21,640 --> 00:13:24,840
participate in stuff like that 
because you never know where 

235
00:13:24,840 --> 00:13:26,720
it's going to where it's going 
to go. 

236
00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:29,640
Maybe this was that. 
I don't know, right. 

237
00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:33,040
That's this week's breaches of 
the week. 

238
00:13:33,880 --> 00:13:35,960
So now let's get on with the 
news. 

239
00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:44,600
And the first news is you. 
Yeah, so this one I saw there 

240
00:13:44,720 --> 00:13:50,960
was quite an interesting story. 
GCHQ have released a silent 

241
00:13:50,960 --> 00:13:55,360
glass gadget which can block 
malware over HDMI and display 

242
00:13:55,360 --> 00:13:58,760
port cables. 
Something I never thought was 

243
00:13:58,760 --> 00:14:00,640
really a thing, but proudly it 
is. 

244
00:14:02,040 --> 00:14:08,600
So it's built by NCSC and it 
blocks malicious traffic 

245
00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:10,400
travelling between monitor and 
computer. 

246
00:14:10,440 --> 00:14:15,040
It's it's a small hardware 
device that sits between the the

247
00:14:15,360 --> 00:14:19,680
computer and the monitor. 
It's aimed at high security 

248
00:14:19,680 --> 00:14:22,960
environments, government 
agencies and where the nation 

249
00:14:22,960 --> 00:14:26,240
state attackers have motivation 
and resources to exploit such a 

250
00:14:26,600 --> 00:14:30,360
unusual attack vector. 
Yes, this is here. 

251
00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:34,640
This previous research has 
demonstrated that attackers can 

252
00:14:34,640 --> 00:14:39,000
manipulate monitor brightnesses 
and exfiltrate data from a gap 

253
00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:42,640
machines, and how AI can 
reconstruct what's on the screen

254
00:14:42,640 --> 00:14:46,240
by analysing the signals from 
patient mark cables. 

255
00:14:47,920 --> 00:14:50,760
It says as well that it's 
already being deployed in some 

256
00:14:50,760 --> 00:14:56,080
UK government systems. 
The device the design has been 

257
00:14:56,080 --> 00:15:00,000
licenced to go to Goldilock Labs
and it's commercially produced 

258
00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:05,480
by Sony UK Technology Centre. 
So yes, an attack service I 

259
00:15:05,480 --> 00:15:09,200
never knew existed to be honest.
I mean, the boxes are amazing. 

260
00:15:09,200 --> 00:15:12,400
I'm going to let me let me show 
and get them up on the screen 

261
00:15:12,400 --> 00:15:13,840
here. 
Essentially a little box. 

262
00:15:13,840 --> 00:15:17,960
There's a HD MY1 and a display 
port one and then there's a 5 

263
00:15:17,960 --> 00:15:23,000
Volt power socket and it's just 
a tiny little box really that 

264
00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:27,480
you that you plug in. 
There's not really much to it. 

265
00:15:28,960 --> 00:15:34,160
Yeah, it's yeah. 
It's quite a bizarre thing. 

266
00:15:34,160 --> 00:15:37,200
It kind of feels like an April 
Fools story, to be honest. 

267
00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:38,680
But. 
I get that. 

268
00:15:39,160 --> 00:15:44,000
I get, I get why you'd say that.
In some ways, yeah, it's I like 

269
00:15:44,000 --> 00:15:47,640
the name, a genius piece of 
branding silent glass. 

270
00:15:47,880 --> 00:15:50,320
It's that's right out of a 
James. 

271
00:15:50,320 --> 00:15:53,320
That could be a James Bond movie
or something could do like. 

272
00:15:54,360 --> 00:15:57,280
Sign such as double O 7 in 
silent. 

273
00:15:57,280 --> 00:15:59,480
Glass it's. 
Yeah, it's cool. 

274
00:16:00,240 --> 00:16:02,760
Yeah. 
It's it makes you wonder about 

275
00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:07,880
all these different attack 
vectors that we haven't thought 

276
00:16:07,880 --> 00:16:09,760
about. 
Like you really wouldn't think 

277
00:16:09,760 --> 00:16:13,800
that just by plugging in an HDMI
cable you you could be 

278
00:16:13,800 --> 00:16:16,600
compromised, but obviously 
there's data going down that 

279
00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:18,760
cable that can be. 
Intercepted, I suppose. 

280
00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:21,800
Yeah. 
So yeah. 

281
00:16:22,120 --> 00:16:25,360
That's a different, interesting 
one, yeah. 

282
00:16:25,800 --> 00:16:29,840
Right, I'll move on to the next 
one and the next one. 

283
00:16:29,840 --> 00:16:35,360
Clawed Desktop silently installs
browser bridge across every 

284
00:16:35,360 --> 00:16:37,680
Chromium browser on your 
machine. 

285
00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:42,160
So this comes from that that 
privacy guy, I was going to go 

286
00:16:42,160 --> 00:16:45,840
American. 
Then that privacy guy, the 

287
00:16:45,960 --> 00:16:49,400
privacy researcher, discovered 
the installing clawed desktop on

288
00:16:49,400 --> 00:16:53,240
Mac OS silently writes 
configuration files into every 

289
00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:56,440
Chromium based browser on the 
machine. 

290
00:16:56,720 --> 00:17:01,800
This is, well, lots of them. 
Pre authorising a browser 

291
00:17:01,800 --> 00:17:06,440
extension bridge that the user 
never asked for and may never 

292
00:17:06,440 --> 00:17:08,520
install. 
So the bridge doesn't do 

293
00:17:08,520 --> 00:17:12,040
anything on its own. 
It's dormant until a paired 

294
00:17:12,040 --> 00:17:15,680
browser extension activates it. 
But once triggered the 

295
00:17:15,680 --> 00:17:19,079
capabilities include full access
to any site the user's logged 

296
00:17:19,079 --> 00:17:23,240
into, reading page content, 
filling forms and recording 

297
00:17:23,520 --> 00:17:26,160
sessions. 
The machine effectively pre 

298
00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:30,000
staging the hook for any future.
Browser install SO. 

299
00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:34,480
Yeah, every time you launch 
Clawed Desktop, these files are 

300
00:17:34,480 --> 00:17:37,840
rewritten. 
So if you manually delete them, 

301
00:17:38,520 --> 00:17:42,240
it's pointless unless you remove
called desktop completely. 

302
00:17:44,360 --> 00:17:48,800
The article argues that this is 
textbook dark pan like force. 

303
00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:53,120
Bundling across trust boundaries
with no usability, divisibility,

304
00:17:53,120 --> 00:17:56,160
no consent and no easy way to 
remove it. 

305
00:17:56,280 --> 00:17:59,920
Browsers affected include 
Chrome, Brave, Edge, Arc, 

306
00:17:59,920 --> 00:18:04,640
Vivaldi, Opera, and Chromium. 
Everybody switched to Safari and

307
00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:06,160
Firefox. 
Right now, that's the only 

308
00:18:06,160 --> 00:18:10,560
answer. 
Yeah, and ironically, I used 

309
00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:13,840
Claude to help me prep some 
notes for this story because I 

310
00:18:13,840 --> 00:18:15,160
was interested. 
In what it would. 

311
00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:19,840
Say and hang on, I've got it. 
I've got it was quite funny 

312
00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:23,320
spicy one this full 
transparency. 

313
00:18:23,720 --> 00:18:25,960
This is about anthropic who make
me. 

314
00:18:25,960 --> 00:18:31,160
Claude thinks it's spicy. 
Yeah, this is again. 

315
00:18:31,560 --> 00:18:35,560
I was almost scared to post this
at work in case they're like. 

316
00:18:35,560 --> 00:18:37,800
Everybody removed the clawed 
desktop browser because that's 

317
00:18:37,800 --> 00:18:39,920
going to be the initial 
reaction. 

318
00:18:39,920 --> 00:18:42,320
Lots of businesses are are 
jumping onto clawed. 

319
00:18:42,320 --> 00:18:46,400
Clawed I think has just 
overtaken an open AI in. 

320
00:18:47,040 --> 00:18:49,240
I don't know whether it was 
value or something but. 

321
00:18:49,960 --> 00:18:54,040
There's a real swing towards 
people switching from open AI to

322
00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:56,080
Anthropic. 
I've definitely I've made. 

323
00:18:56,080 --> 00:18:58,080
Personally have made that switch
and I find. 

324
00:18:58,080 --> 00:19:01,960
Clawed so much better. 
So it's, yes, it's quite this 

325
00:19:01,960 --> 00:19:03,880
one. 
This is quite scary, the fact 

326
00:19:03,880 --> 00:19:06,720
that they reckon it's perfectly 
OK. 

327
00:19:09,040 --> 00:19:15,280
Yeah, it's kind of like them. 
There's a lot of things going on

328
00:19:15,320 --> 00:19:22,440
with AI stuff and sort of kind 
of not similar as such, but how 

329
00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:28,160
TikTok recently added the, 
they've retracted it now. 

330
00:19:28,160 --> 00:19:32,480
But the whole AI remixing of 
your content, I think like 

331
00:19:32,480 --> 00:19:36,480
LinkedIn did something a while 
ago we spoke about using like 

332
00:19:37,080 --> 00:19:39,960
AI, you have your content to 
train AI and stuff. 

333
00:19:39,960 --> 00:19:43,000
And now this is like this being 
silently installed. 

334
00:19:43,520 --> 00:19:46,560
Even if it doesn't do anything 
yet, it potentially could, 

335
00:19:46,560 --> 00:19:48,920
right? 
And maybe criminals could get 

336
00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:52,960
access to it and do something 
bad of it in the future. 

337
00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:55,600
And it's just a little bit 
concerning in that way. 

338
00:19:56,120 --> 00:19:58,120
It really is. 
I mean, you can't audit. 

339
00:19:59,320 --> 00:20:02,160
I mean, in an ideal world, you'd
be able to audit and check every

340
00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:04,520
single permission of every 
single application that you 

341
00:20:04,520 --> 00:20:05,680
install on your device. 
But. 

342
00:20:05,680 --> 00:20:09,880
You really, really can't and. 
As we found like these tools 

343
00:20:10,280 --> 00:20:14,200
now, and I'm not blaming this 
researcher at all, but now it's 

344
00:20:14,200 --> 00:20:18,560
public that this information's 
out there, you can almost assume

345
00:20:18,560 --> 00:20:21,400
that there's going to be people 
trying. 

346
00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:24,360
To take advantage of that. 
There's going to be people 

347
00:20:24,360 --> 00:20:26,080
trying to. 
Poke at it. 

348
00:20:26,160 --> 00:20:28,520
And see if they can weaponize it
in some way. 

349
00:20:28,520 --> 00:20:31,640
It's almost nicer when this 
stuff isn't known, because then 

350
00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:32,480
it's not. 
So much of A. 

351
00:20:32,520 --> 00:20:36,800
Target but I now like by 
announcing it that privacy guy's

352
00:20:36,800 --> 00:20:39,520
done the world a favour because 
now Claude have got to be 

353
00:20:39,520 --> 00:20:43,440
accountable, you know, and now 
we can make a decision from a 

354
00:20:43,520 --> 00:20:47,440
position of knowledge rather 
than just, you know, trusting 

355
00:20:47,560 --> 00:20:50,400
Anthropic. 
I love I love saying the word 

356
00:20:50,400 --> 00:20:53,040
anthropic. 
It's a really nice word to say. 

357
00:20:53,680 --> 00:20:58,760
It's a right mouthful anthropic.
Yeah, there it's. 

358
00:21:01,360 --> 00:21:06,280
Yes, we spoke about Claude's, 
well, anthropic mythos, didn't 

359
00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:08,640
we? 
And I don't know if you're 

360
00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:11,480
talking about it this week, but 
that's what it was a news story 

361
00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:16,720
about how there was like the 
reported breach into the third 

362
00:21:16,720 --> 00:21:19,760
parties access, like 
unauthorised access to the 

363
00:21:19,760 --> 00:21:22,560
platform. 
And yes, like I said, like 

364
00:21:22,560 --> 00:21:26,080
they've announced that this tool
can do all this amazing stuff 

365
00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,160
and find all these exploits for 
businesses in a in a positive 

366
00:21:30,160 --> 00:21:32,800
way. 
And obviously the criminals have

367
00:21:33,160 --> 00:21:37,040
gone gone after it. 
You see, that's another. 

368
00:21:37,040 --> 00:21:40,320
Example though, isn't it? 
Because again, Anthropic, we're 

369
00:21:40,320 --> 00:21:43,320
like, we've got this amazing 
security tool that finds all of 

370
00:21:43,320 --> 00:21:47,400
these vulnerabilities, but it's 
so good we can't share it with 

371
00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:49,240
you. 
So we're only going to share it 

372
00:21:49,240 --> 00:21:51,920
with these companies. 
All of the attackers gone is 

373
00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:53,520
right. 
Let's go and try and attack 

374
00:21:53,520 --> 00:21:56,440
those companies. 
Then much in the way that we 

375
00:21:56,440 --> 00:22:00,760
spoke about earlier with Versal,
you know, it'll be like, right, 

376
00:22:00,760 --> 00:22:03,280
let's find it, go through a 
third party to get into that 

377
00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:06,000
company. 
If if we can't get access, we'll

378
00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:07,680
get access to the people who 
have access. 

379
00:22:07,760 --> 00:22:11,240
It's you're just kicking the can
down the road and pass, you're 

380
00:22:11,240 --> 00:22:13,240
making it someone else's 
problem, but. 

381
00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:17,360
Yeah, makes you wonder like, 
yeah, you some company has 

382
00:22:17,360 --> 00:22:22,840
access to mythos, right And then
that gets used by a criminal to 

383
00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:26,440
breach like find exploit in 
another company who's who's then

384
00:22:26,440 --> 00:22:29,360
responsible for for that and 
stuff. 

385
00:22:29,360 --> 00:22:34,760
It's quite a boring thing. 
I wonder if there is probably 

386
00:22:34,760 --> 00:22:37,200
long either before we we hear a 
story of that as well. 

387
00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:42,440
I wonder if there is something 
here like essentially Claude 

388
00:22:42,440 --> 00:22:45,720
Desktop has rewritten some of 
the code in Chrome. 

389
00:22:46,440 --> 00:22:49,880
It rewrite rewrites files on 
every launch and I'm wondering. 

390
00:22:49,880 --> 00:22:53,520
Whether there's some protective 
boundaries, whether there needs 

391
00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:58,000
to be some siloing of stuff like
this app is trying to perform 

392
00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:01,720
this action with this app. 
Do you approve or do you deny? 

393
00:23:02,320 --> 00:23:05,560
I get it on on my work device 
which is a Mac. 

394
00:23:05,880 --> 00:23:07,880
I get like Microsoft Updater 
wants to. 

395
00:23:07,880 --> 00:23:09,760
Access these folders and these 
files. 

396
00:23:09,760 --> 00:23:13,720
Because Mac permissioning on 
like the, the it's quite nice, 

397
00:23:13,720 --> 00:23:17,280
but clearly not with Chrome. 
And I don't know where whether 

398
00:23:17,280 --> 00:23:20,440
that would be an OS problem or a
Chrome issue or whether or not 

399
00:23:20,440 --> 00:23:22,960
this is just normal. 
And, and we're talking about 

400
00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:26,720
anthropic because it's the big 
one, but actually there's 

401
00:23:26,720 --> 00:23:28,360
hundreds of apps. 
That do this. 

402
00:23:28,480 --> 00:23:31,600
I don't know. 
It's the key thing to remember, 

403
00:23:32,040 --> 00:23:36,400
which this all boils back down 
to is it if a product is free or

404
00:23:36,400 --> 00:23:40,160
extremely low cost, you are the 
product. 

405
00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:44,160
So with them, you know there is 
a free version of Claude. 

406
00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,680
If you're using that, you're 
selling your salt to Claude and 

407
00:23:47,120 --> 00:23:49,440
you are the product. 
So they will use you how they 

408
00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:51,320
deem fit. 
If you want to use it, you have 

409
00:23:51,320 --> 00:23:53,800
to work in accordance to their 
terms and conditions and in 

410
00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:54,920
their terms and. 
Conditions. 

411
00:23:55,400 --> 00:23:59,720
It states, you know, this is 
there in the TS and CS that it's

412
00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:02,400
going to do this. 
So it's it's not hidden. 

413
00:24:02,920 --> 00:24:05,120
If anyone actually read the TS 
and CS? 

414
00:24:05,120 --> 00:24:06,280
Yeah, that's the thing, isn't 
it? 

415
00:24:06,640 --> 00:24:11,600
Yeah, yeah, it's I had something
here about the TS and CS, about 

416
00:24:11,600 --> 00:24:14,080
what it said. 
But I can't find it. 

417
00:24:14,280 --> 00:24:17,120
So yeah, that's. 
Probably enough on that one, 

418
00:24:17,120 --> 00:24:19,200
move on to the next one. 
Cool. 

419
00:24:19,440 --> 00:24:23,440
So the next one we've got 
sextortion scam disguised as a 

420
00:24:23,440 --> 00:24:29,760
Grafana alert notification as a 
Reddit post a user shared in a 

421
00:24:29,920 --> 00:24:33,400
sextortion e-mail they received 
that's been dressed up to look 

422
00:24:33,400 --> 00:24:39,120
like an automated alert from 
Grafana using the branding and 

423
00:24:39,120 --> 00:24:44,400
alert template format. 
This is screenshot here, isn't 

424
00:24:44,400 --> 00:24:46,880
there? 
Doesn't mean it's not the 

425
00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:48,960
greatest screenshot. 
I'll quickly bring it up on the 

426
00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:53,160
screen so you can sort of see 
here. 

427
00:24:53,160 --> 00:25:00,800
It's branded test alert instance
Grafana, the CMOS set 

428
00:25:00,800 --> 00:25:04,760
automatically for assistance 
contact security at 

429
00:25:04,760 --> 00:25:09,800
midwaymuseumstore.com. 
Interesting in your row. 

430
00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:13,640
And yeah, basically explains 
that there's a an issue here, 

431
00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:16,880
but not to panic, but also don't
ignore it. 

432
00:25:17,680 --> 00:25:21,760
And it displays a password as 
well on there. 

433
00:25:22,360 --> 00:25:26,760
And obviously as in the in the 
body of the image, it says that 

434
00:25:27,960 --> 00:25:30,080
they've been monitoring your 
activity and they've captured 

435
00:25:30,080 --> 00:25:33,280
high definition video of you 
performing compromising acts. 

436
00:25:33,280 --> 00:25:38,080
So it's like a typical extortion
template there. 

437
00:25:38,760 --> 00:25:44,080
It's interesting that they've 
put it into a Grafana template, 

438
00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:48,880
but basically it's asking for 
$800 in Bitcoin or they'll 

439
00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:51,600
release it. 
It's pretty standard stuff 

440
00:25:51,600 --> 00:25:55,120
there. 
But yeah, it seems like the 

441
00:25:55,120 --> 00:25:59,120
other thing here is that the 
Grafana breach that while ago 

442
00:25:59,960 --> 00:26:01,600
the informations were pulled 
from there. 

443
00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:08,960
So the victim has sort of been 
compromised across multiple 

444
00:26:08,960 --> 00:26:11,680
apps. 
So yes, it says here that the 

445
00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:16,000
the victim had actually been 
compromised across multiple apps

446
00:26:16,120 --> 00:26:19,520
back in February. 
And it says change the password,

447
00:26:20,040 --> 00:26:23,240
but that the e-mail contained a 
real password that they had 

448
00:26:23,240 --> 00:26:25,840
used. 
So obviously they didn't sort of

449
00:26:25,840 --> 00:26:29,320
believe that it was something to
be sort of concerned about. 

450
00:26:32,240 --> 00:26:35,400
I mean they use passwords like 
this to make it try and sound 

451
00:26:36,280 --> 00:26:41,000
genuine and it could be from any
old breach, it doesn't mean it's

452
00:26:41,000 --> 00:26:44,400
necessarily that tall. 
I found another write up about 

453
00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:47,320
this as well. 
That's and they say it's the 

454
00:26:47,320 --> 00:26:48,600
first time they've seen 
something. 

455
00:26:48,600 --> 00:26:51,280
Like this, the layout at the top
of the e-mail makes it look like

456
00:26:51,320 --> 00:26:54,920
a. 
Grafana alert and if you don't 

457
00:26:54,920 --> 00:26:59,040
know what Grafana is, they do 
data visualisation so they 

458
00:26:59,040 --> 00:27:03,440
analyse metrics, logs, profiles 
and graph it all nicely. 

459
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:05,480
So networking, you know, we had 
win. 

460
00:27:05,480 --> 00:27:08,280
Admin teams and networking teams
that had Grafana, you know, I 

461
00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:11,960
think, you know, organisations 
use it. 

462
00:27:11,960 --> 00:27:13,800
I think there's a free model and
a premium model. 

463
00:27:13,840 --> 00:27:17,680
You know, it's, yeah, it's very 
widely used in tech companies 

464
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:21,520
and, and beyond the. 
Functions, which is also 

465
00:27:21,520 --> 00:27:24,680
interesting. 
It's also strange because if you

466
00:27:24,680 --> 00:27:27,840
didn't know what Grafana was, 
that's meaningless like. 

467
00:27:28,560 --> 00:27:31,400
Yeah, it's. 
Who my mum gets that she doesn't

468
00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:35,440
know who Grafana is, She's got 
no idea it's meaningless so. 

469
00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:39,880
Yeah. 
So sort of quite a strange way 

470
00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:44,160
of of caring about that. 
But yeah, in the in the comments

471
00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:47,680
that there is someone that says 
that they work for Grafana and 

472
00:27:47,680 --> 00:27:49,920
confirm that it's not 
legitimate. 

473
00:27:50,720 --> 00:27:54,680
And there's a statement from Joe
McManus, Cesar, Grafana Labs. 

474
00:27:54,720 --> 00:27:57,160
And they said that over the 
weekend, we identified and 

475
00:27:57,160 --> 00:27:59,840
responded to an incident in 
which a malicious actor 

476
00:27:59,840 --> 00:28:02,760
exploited our platform to send a
large volume of phishing emails.

477
00:28:03,200 --> 00:28:05,680
We moved quickly to contain the 
activity and we implement 

478
00:28:05,680 --> 00:28:07,840
changes to effectively stop the 
campaign. 

479
00:28:07,840 --> 00:28:11,720
So it doesn't, the screenshot 
doesn't show, but maybe it did 

480
00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:16,800
come from Grafana. 
It's like an legitimate 

481
00:28:17,480 --> 00:28:19,320
platform. 
Yeah. 

482
00:28:19,800 --> 00:28:22,800
It's an interesting one to 
really say on that. 

483
00:28:23,480 --> 00:28:26,680
Yeah, there's a few posts on. 
I've just looked now looking at 

484
00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:28,400
the. 
So at the top of that 

485
00:28:28,400 --> 00:28:31,080
screenshot, it says this e-mail 
is sent automatically for 

486
00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:35,160
assistance contact security. 
At midwaymuseumstore.com. 

487
00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:38,040
There's no website currently at 
the domain, but there are a 

488
00:28:38,040 --> 00:28:40,560
couple there's on Reddit. 
There's another post in our 

489
00:28:40,560 --> 00:28:44,080
slash advice. 
The it's exactly the same text. 

490
00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:47,000
It doesn't mention Grafana, but 
it's exactly the same text and 

491
00:28:47,000 --> 00:28:49,480
it's just. 
The age-old sex, you know, 

492
00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:53,480
sextortion, you know, we have 
been monitoring your activity 

493
00:28:53,480 --> 00:28:56,640
we've taken over your webcam. 
We've spoken about it before you

494
00:28:56,640 --> 00:28:59,560
know it's. 
It's just trying to scare you 

495
00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:01,000
into paying money. 
Yeah. 

496
00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:03,720
Again, though, it's a good thing
these they can. 

497
00:29:04,160 --> 00:29:07,240
They can come in many different 
shapes, many different forms. 

498
00:29:07,240 --> 00:29:10,080
So it's good to. 
Something good to tell you 

499
00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:11,480
people about and keep an eye 
out. 

500
00:29:11,480 --> 00:29:13,920
For I think. 
Yeah, strange. 

501
00:29:13,920 --> 00:29:18,000
Well, yeah, next story. 
OK, the next one is 1. 

502
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:20,880
I think this this happened the 
day we're recording this first 

503
00:29:20,880 --> 00:29:24,760
saw this bit Warden, the 
password manager that command 

504
00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:28,200
line interface has been 
compromised in a supply chain 

505
00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:31,080
attack. 
And the malicious version stole 

506
00:29:31,520 --> 00:29:36,120
developer secrets. 
So a malicious version of bit 

507
00:29:36,120 --> 00:29:41,120
Warden's command line tool was 
briefly published to MPM after 

508
00:29:41,120 --> 00:29:45,640
attackers compromised the GitHub
action in bit Warden's build 

509
00:29:45,640 --> 00:29:51,520
pipeline as part of an ongoing 
supply chain campaign targeting 

510
00:29:51,520 --> 00:29:55,360
the check marks ecosystem. 
So this package ran a credential

511
00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:59,200
stealer and even configuration 
files for AI coding tools. 

512
00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:00,880
It went out. 
Yeah, it went after developer 

513
00:30:00,880 --> 00:30:02,240
secrets GitHub. 
Actions. 

514
00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:05,240
SSH keys. 
If you found GitHub tokens, it 

515
00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:08,120
used them to inject malicious 
workflows into the victims 

516
00:30:08,120 --> 00:30:11,800
repositories, spreading the 
compromise further down the 

517
00:30:11,800 --> 00:30:14,280
chain. 
But Bit Warden contained the 

518
00:30:14,280 --> 00:30:18,800
incident within about 90 minutes
and have confirmed that no user 

519
00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:21,720
vault data was. 
At risk? 

520
00:30:22,040 --> 00:30:25,520
But the attack is notable as 
reportedly the first time a 

521
00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:30,040
package using MPM's trusted 
publishing system has been 

522
00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:33,440
hijacked. 
This is linked to a threat actor

523
00:30:33,440 --> 00:30:37,320
called Team PCP, whose EX 
account has since been 

524
00:30:37,320 --> 00:30:40,960
suspended, and follows the 
Shahalud supply chain attack. 

525
00:30:40,960 --> 00:30:42,520
That first service this year 
we've talked. 

526
00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:47,080
About that before, definitely. 
Yeah, it's don't start panicking

527
00:30:47,080 --> 00:30:49,720
about your password manager 
being compromised. 

528
00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:52,720
Maybe don't tell your business. 
If you're in a business, don't 

529
00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:55,000
tell them about this because you
don't want to go. 

530
00:30:55,000 --> 00:30:57,080
Oh, This is why password 
managers are bad. 

531
00:30:57,080 --> 00:30:58,800
You know all your passwords in 
one place. 

532
00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:03,000
You can't hack my head. 
Password management were all OK 

533
00:31:03,040 --> 00:31:07,240
honestly. 
It's yeah, but the malware? 

534
00:31:07,280 --> 00:31:10,040
Interesting. 
The malware was designed to skip

535
00:31:10,040 --> 00:31:14,320
execution on systems with a 
Russian locale. 

536
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,160
Are you in Russia? 
You're OK. 

537
00:31:17,280 --> 00:31:20,440
We'll just move on. 
Don't worry, that's interesting.

538
00:31:20,760 --> 00:31:22,400
Isn't it? 
Yeah. 

539
00:31:23,720 --> 00:31:25,480
And it tells you where it came 
from I guess. 

540
00:31:25,880 --> 00:31:27,760
Yeah, we won't get into that 
though. 

541
00:31:28,720 --> 00:31:32,000
So yeah, this happened on April 
the 22nd, which was Wednesday 

542
00:31:32,000 --> 00:31:34,240
gone and was only live for 
around 90 minutes. 

543
00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:37,600
So it seems like Pete Warden 
have done done good, smacked it 

544
00:31:37,600 --> 00:31:40,360
down really quickly and closed 
the threat. 

545
00:31:40,680 --> 00:31:45,000
So. 
Yes, but it's again supply chain

546
00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:49,560
it's it's all that trusted third
parties and everything. 

547
00:31:49,600 --> 00:31:53,040
It's just yeah, right, move on 
to the next one. 

548
00:31:54,680 --> 00:31:57,040
Yeah. 
So next we've got It's got a 

549
00:31:57,040 --> 00:31:59,840
amusing one, although quite a 
serious one as well. 

550
00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:02,760
At the same time, a $5 Bluetooth
tracker. 

551
00:32:02,840 --> 00:32:07,320
It is inside a postcard exposed 
to NATO's warship location for 

552
00:32:07,320 --> 00:32:10,200
24 hours. 
And this says AM story where a 

553
00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:13,160
touch the journalist hit a cheap
Bluetooth tracker inside a 

554
00:32:13,160 --> 00:32:18,280
postcard, mailed it to HNLMS 
Everstein, which is a 

555
00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:23,720
$584,000,000 Dutch air defence 
frigate deployed as part of NATO

556
00:32:23,720 --> 00:32:25,520
group. 
And this, yeah, essentially the 

557
00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:30,120
tracker used the personnel's 
phones on board, I guess, like a

558
00:32:30,600 --> 00:32:34,560
Aqua tag or or whatever device. 
And it obviously then pings the 

559
00:32:34,560 --> 00:32:38,280
location as it sailed across the
world basically for roughly 24 

560
00:32:38,280 --> 00:32:40,240
hours. 
So the journalist was able to 

561
00:32:40,240 --> 00:32:44,000
follow some publicly posted 
instructions from the Dutch 

562
00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:46,720
Ministry of Defence for sending 
mail to deployed personnel. 

563
00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:50,000
And he says that postcards 
weren't X-rayed like packages 

564
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:51,920
were. 
So the track obviously found its

565
00:32:51,920 --> 00:32:56,400
way to the to the mail sorting 
facility on board, but by the 

566
00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:59,440
time it was discovered, the 
movements were already exposed. 

567
00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:04,040
And since this happened that 
they've banned greeting cards 

568
00:33:04,040 --> 00:33:08,040
containing batteries and is 
reviewing their policies around 

569
00:33:08,480 --> 00:33:14,000
mailing stuff like that. 
Similarly, I thought we spoke 

570
00:33:14,000 --> 00:33:18,240
about a couple of episodes ago 
as well about how the there was 

571
00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:25,080
a French officer border carry a 
ship which leaked the the 

572
00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:29,320
location through the Strava, 
running up as they went on like 

573
00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:33,680
a drug around the ship. 
Didn't realise that, but 

574
00:33:33,680 --> 00:33:38,440
publicly displaying the location
of that, yeah, quite a wild 

575
00:33:38,440 --> 00:33:41,760
story really. 
I mean if a Dutch. 

576
00:33:41,760 --> 00:33:45,160
Journalist can do this. 
Yeah, anyone can do it. 

577
00:33:46,400 --> 00:33:47,880
Yeah, it's. 
Yes. 

578
00:33:49,000 --> 00:33:51,760
All of a sudden, every ship in 
the world is getting sent 

579
00:33:51,760 --> 00:33:54,200
Bluetooth trackers disguised in 
postcards. 

580
00:33:55,120 --> 00:33:58,760
It's quite a crazy story really,
isn't it? 

581
00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:02,320
It's really possible as well, 
because if you think about the 

582
00:34:02,320 --> 00:34:06,880
size of an air tag and the size 
of a tile, like I don't have an 

583
00:34:06,880 --> 00:34:10,960
air tag, I have a tile. 
You think about how small they 

584
00:34:10,960 --> 00:34:15,159
are and then you think about the
plastic housing, the actual chip

585
00:34:15,159 --> 00:34:18,280
inside. 
It's just a slim piece of it's 

586
00:34:18,280 --> 00:34:23,320
just a tiny little battery and a
steam PCB and there's not a lot 

587
00:34:23,320 --> 00:34:28,280
in there at all, so. 
Dennis, it's kind of crazy to 

588
00:34:28,280 --> 00:34:33,120
think about all these different 
ways of potentially compromising

589
00:34:33,679 --> 00:34:36,159
to location of it. 
And obviously like the the 

590
00:34:36,199 --> 00:34:40,120
Strava ones, obviously 
unintentional, but obviously up 

591
00:34:40,120 --> 00:34:44,960
there's no sofa, sofa policies 
and lack of education maybe on, 

592
00:34:44,960 --> 00:34:50,040
on that, on that one. 
That's quite concerning that 

593
00:34:50,880 --> 00:34:53,360
it's that easy to compromise the
location. 

594
00:34:53,480 --> 00:34:56,800
Yeah, of a. 
Warship, I kind of feel like the

595
00:34:56,800 --> 00:34:59,800
Strava one that we spoke about, 
I kind of feel like there needs 

596
00:34:59,800 --> 00:35:02,760
to and there might be. 
And again, this this leans back 

597
00:35:02,760 --> 00:35:05,200
into stuff, but something that 
you mentioned frequently with 

598
00:35:05,200 --> 00:35:08,960
the Strava one, I reckon after 
you finish the run and it says, 

599
00:35:08,960 --> 00:35:11,440
do you want to share it? 
There kind of almost needs to be

600
00:35:11,440 --> 00:35:14,960
like a second warning, like 
everybody that you're about to 

601
00:35:14,960 --> 00:35:17,760
share your exact location 
publicly. 

602
00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:19,440
Are you sure you wish to 
continue? 

603
00:35:20,600 --> 00:35:22,960
But the problem is people get, 
if someone's used to always 

604
00:35:22,960 --> 00:35:25,280
doing that, they just get alert 
fatigue and they just end up 

605
00:35:25,280 --> 00:35:25,960
going. 
Yes, yes. 

606
00:35:25,960 --> 00:35:29,560
Yes, yes, yes. 
Because the default action is 

607
00:35:29,560 --> 00:35:32,000
yes, you normally you're 
normally good to pick up on 

608
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:34,040
default. 
Actions and I've been writing 

609
00:35:34,040 --> 00:35:36,440
some stuff about. 
Defaults and stuff like that at 

610
00:35:36,440 --> 00:35:40,400
the moment, you know, opt in is 
always less adopted than you 

611
00:35:40,400 --> 00:35:43,360
know, if that decision's made 
for you and it's opt out so. 

612
00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:49,440
Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
Right, I'll move on to the next 

613
00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:52,280
one and it's the last news story
we've got tonight and this is 

614
00:35:52,280 --> 00:35:53,920
something that I saw on tech 
radar. 

615
00:35:53,920 --> 00:35:59,080
NCSC, the UK's national 
cybersecurity Centre, has 

616
00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:03,280
officially declared pass keys 
should replace passwords as the 

617
00:36:03,280 --> 00:36:05,400
default. 
So they've said passkey should 

618
00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:09,080
be your default way of logging 
into online services and 

619
00:36:09,080 --> 00:36:12,440
passwords should be treated as 
the fall back, not the norm. 

620
00:36:13,240 --> 00:36:16,680
So this is a massive shift from 
decades of advice about making 

621
00:36:16,680 --> 00:36:20,440
your password stronger. 
But NCS CS own research has 

622
00:36:20,440 --> 00:36:23,440
found that pass keys are more 
secure than even the strongest 

623
00:36:23,440 --> 00:36:26,280
password. 
Paired with two Step 2 step 

624
00:36:26,280 --> 00:36:28,720
verification. 
And they're resistant to 

625
00:36:28,720 --> 00:36:32,000
phishing because there's no 
secret to intercept or reuse. 

626
00:36:32,640 --> 00:36:35,960
They work by storing A 
cryptographic cryptographic key 

627
00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:39,160
on your device and they're 
staying unlocked with your face,

628
00:36:39,160 --> 00:36:42,080
your fingerprint or PIN. 
So there's nothing to remember 

629
00:36:42,080 --> 00:36:45,800
and nothing to type. 
They didn't fully endorse pass 

630
00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:49,440
keys last year because of 
inconsistent support across 

631
00:36:49,440 --> 00:36:52,880
platforms, something we've 
talked about on here before. 

632
00:36:52,880 --> 00:36:54,440
Everyone talked about passwords 
and. 

633
00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:56,400
It was like, how the hell do I 
use? 

634
00:36:56,400 --> 00:37:00,880
Them someone please explain it. 
But the industry has caught up. 

635
00:37:00,880 --> 00:37:05,000
I now use them on my Google 
accounts and Apple seamlessly 

636
00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:08,440
which is really good across 
iPhone, Mac, Windows, you know, 

637
00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:11,040
anything. 
So that problem's really been 

638
00:37:11,040 --> 00:37:14,720
mopped up where pass keys aren't
available yet. 

639
00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:19,240
The advice is still to use a 
password manager and multi 

640
00:37:19,240 --> 00:37:21,440
factor authentication. 
So. 

641
00:37:22,120 --> 00:37:25,840
I think this is about as close 
to official as it gets for for 

642
00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:27,960
advice. 
Like they haven't, you know, 

643
00:37:28,480 --> 00:37:31,120
they haven't officially gone. 
Yeah, this is what you should 

644
00:37:31,120 --> 00:37:33,240
do. 
But they're kind of saying you 

645
00:37:33,240 --> 00:37:36,720
should do this. 
Like this kind of means next 

646
00:37:36,720 --> 00:37:38,440
year we're going to be telling 
you to do this. 

647
00:37:38,560 --> 00:37:44,400
So yeah, some interesting stats.
Pass key logins can be completed

648
00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:48,480
up to 8 times faster than the 
username, password and an MFA 

649
00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:52,680
code over. 50% I can't believe 
this over 50. 

650
00:37:52,680 --> 00:37:57,960
Percent of active Google users 
in the UK already have a pass 

651
00:37:57,960 --> 00:38:01,120
key registered. 
EBay, PayPal and other platforms

652
00:38:01,120 --> 00:38:04,400
now support them and this was 
announced at Cyber UK in 

653
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:08,160
Glasgow, which was held this 
week alongside Silent Glass 

654
00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:12,640
which were covered earlier. 
So both were announced by NCSC 

655
00:38:12,840 --> 00:38:16,000
at Cyber UK this week. 
So yeah, are. 

656
00:38:18,000 --> 00:38:20,520
You. 
Using Are you using pass pass 

657
00:38:20,800 --> 00:38:24,240
keys? 
There's passwords, pass phrases,

658
00:38:24,240 --> 00:38:26,760
pass keys. 
It's they're like we need to 

659
00:38:26,760 --> 00:38:29,160
work on the branding. 
Are you using pass keys? 

660
00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:33,360
I do, but not for everything, 
because, you know, not 

661
00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:38,000
everything supports it, right? 
And yeah, sometimes, obviously 

662
00:38:38,000 --> 00:38:42,800
when you can, you can still use 
a password as well. 

663
00:38:42,800 --> 00:38:48,920
So yeah, I tried to use it where
I can, but yeah, it's not always

664
00:38:48,920 --> 00:38:50,640
straightforward. 
Do you know what? 

665
00:38:50,640 --> 00:38:55,400
I like it because I I used to be
a LastPass user for password 

666
00:38:55,400 --> 00:38:57,760
managers because when we worked 
together for a. 

667
00:38:57,880 --> 00:39:00,280
Time LastPass was the approved 
password manager. 

668
00:39:00,840 --> 00:39:03,800
And then they went to Keeper. 
Keeper didn't have an 

669
00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:06,600
authenticator app. 
At that time, so I didn't. 

670
00:39:06,600 --> 00:39:08,440
Use that. 
But then I had a Microsoft 

671
00:39:08,440 --> 00:39:11,880
Authenticator app because that 
was required for work. 

672
00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:15,160
And then I used Bit Warden. 
So I've got Bit Warden 

673
00:39:15,160 --> 00:39:17,520
Authenticator and I also have 
Google Authenticator because 

674
00:39:17,560 --> 00:39:20,360
like back in the day I think 
Google was probably the first 

675
00:39:20,360 --> 00:39:23,000
one. 
So I'm currently running 4 

676
00:39:23,080 --> 00:39:25,120
authenticator. 
Apps. 

677
00:39:25,800 --> 00:39:29,200
Four, yeah, with a pass key I 
don't need them. 

678
00:39:29,280 --> 00:39:32,040
Well, I need them for fall back.
But and the problem is with 

679
00:39:32,040 --> 00:39:35,560
authenticators is when you want 
to change that authentication 

680
00:39:35,560 --> 00:39:38,200
app. 
You need to go into the account,

681
00:39:38,200 --> 00:39:41,120
you need to go into settings, 
you need to find out where you 

682
00:39:41,120 --> 00:39:43,720
do it, and then you've got to go
through the whole like it's 

683
00:39:43,720 --> 00:39:45,120
time. 
You don't have to. 

684
00:39:45,120 --> 00:39:48,840
People don't have. 
Time to be moving authenticators

685
00:39:48,840 --> 00:39:52,120
from one to the other. 
Pass keys kind of, you know, 

686
00:39:52,560 --> 00:39:55,760
kind of works. 
So I never you never used to 

687
00:39:56,000 --> 00:39:57,960
but. 
Maybe it did, it just wasn't 

688
00:39:57,960 --> 00:40:00,840
clear how. 
But I think it Google have kind 

689
00:40:00,840 --> 00:40:03,040
of nailed it now. 
I think there's lots of there 

690
00:40:03,040 --> 00:40:05,240
are lots of. 
Lance Spitzner from Sans has 

691
00:40:05,240 --> 00:40:08,520
spoken loads about. 
The amount of different phrases 

692
00:40:08,520 --> 00:40:12,760
and terminologies used NCSC, if 
they jump on and own this and 

693
00:40:12,760 --> 00:40:16,440
then they can get on with Cesar 
in America, we can agree some 

694
00:40:16,440 --> 00:40:19,520
terminology about what we're 
going to call stuff that would 

695
00:40:19,520 --> 00:40:21,400
be good. 
Like let's standardise the 

696
00:40:21,400 --> 00:40:23,920
naming convention across the 
board. 

697
00:40:24,600 --> 00:40:27,120
Maybe bring in a certification 
of a standard of. 

698
00:40:27,120 --> 00:40:30,080
Quality or something that would 
force adoption. 

699
00:40:30,440 --> 00:40:33,000
I think that's what we need to 
do because everybody's calling 

700
00:40:33,000 --> 00:40:37,840
them different. 
But yeah, pass keys. 

701
00:40:38,480 --> 00:40:41,400
Yeah, it's interesting. 
Just remembered as well as what 

702
00:40:41,400 --> 00:40:46,520
password day on May month. 
So it'd be interesting to see 

703
00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:50,640
what, what businesses and people
like Google and stuff that they,

704
00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:53,800
yeah, talk about pass keys, for 
instance. 

705
00:40:54,440 --> 00:40:56,440
Will it be World Pass key days 
soon? 

706
00:40:57,200 --> 00:41:00,360
Boy, yeah, that's the thing that
I don't think there is a pass 

707
00:41:00,360 --> 00:41:02,880
phrase day. 
Maybe that's what they need to 

708
00:41:02,880 --> 00:41:04,880
do. 
Maybe they need to say like this

709
00:41:04,880 --> 00:41:09,920
is the last ever world password.
We should have a in memoriam for

710
00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:15,680
passwords maybe, I don't know. 
They have maybe one for people 

711
00:41:15,680 --> 00:41:19,560
obviously working in our area as
well to raise some education on.

712
00:41:20,080 --> 00:41:22,280
Absolutely. 
For for what password? 

713
00:41:22,280 --> 00:41:27,840
They can talk about pass keys 
and authenticator apps and MFA 

714
00:41:27,840 --> 00:41:30,760
and everything else. 
It's passwords aren't going away

715
00:41:30,760 --> 00:41:33,960
anywhere that I mean, that's 
worth remembering because not 

716
00:41:33,960 --> 00:41:37,000
every service supports pass 
keys, but it it clearly more 

717
00:41:37,000 --> 00:41:38,520
are. 
But there's always going to be 

718
00:41:39,240 --> 00:41:41,880
passwords are going to be around
for years because pass keys are 

719
00:41:41,880 --> 00:41:44,400
going to require a certain level
of maturity to adopt. 

720
00:41:44,840 --> 00:41:47,080
There's always going to be 
legacy systems or legacy 

721
00:41:47,080 --> 00:41:50,760
platforms or your local Bowling 
Club or something that you're a 

722
00:41:50,760 --> 00:41:55,200
member of that, you know, has a 
really old forum, you know, not.

723
00:41:55,200 --> 00:41:58,680
Everywhere has 2F8 yet you know 
that's that's that's the 

724
00:41:58,680 --> 00:41:59,960
frightening thing. 
Not everywhere. 

725
00:42:00,640 --> 00:42:02,880
There are still places out there
that doesn't. 

726
00:42:03,120 --> 00:42:05,920
You that don't use MFI? 
Yeah. 

727
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:08,840
Reminded me of Microsoft's 
password. 

728
00:42:08,920 --> 00:42:11,160
This default thing that we spoke
about. 

729
00:42:11,320 --> 00:42:13,640
Yeah. 
Yeah, it's good that Microsoft 

730
00:42:14,320 --> 00:42:18,280
it's it's nice that Microsoft 
did the password less thing the 

731
00:42:18,280 --> 00:42:23,640
the tools, Google e-mail, 
Microsoft e-mail, eBay, PayPal, 

732
00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:27,600
those high volume services that 
everybody uses day-to-day. 

733
00:42:28,120 --> 00:42:29,400
It should all be like. 
This. 

734
00:42:29,400 --> 00:42:32,760
I think the sign in processes 
for TikTok and Insta might be a 

735
00:42:32,760 --> 00:42:35,440
little different because people 
use mobile and there's 

736
00:42:35,440 --> 00:42:37,840
verification through another 
logged into the stuff like that,

737
00:42:37,840 --> 00:42:41,840
but. 
These anything browser based 

738
00:42:42,040 --> 00:42:43,960
should definitely be like that, 
yeah. 

739
00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:47,000
Yeah, cool, cool. 
OK. 

740
00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:51,480
Benefit for this? 
Yeah, so let's move on to this 

741
00:42:51,480 --> 00:42:57,600
week's Security Socials. 
So the first one is from a 

742
00:42:57,600 --> 00:43:02,480
subreddit called SIPS T and this
isn't specifically about 

743
00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:05,800
security awareness. 
I kind of feel cybersecurity 

744
00:43:05,800 --> 00:43:07,880
felt relevant in this 
conversation. 

745
00:43:08,000 --> 00:43:09,360
OK. 
I'm just going to share the. 

746
00:43:09,360 --> 00:43:10,680
Screen here and then I'll read 
it to you. 

747
00:43:10,840 --> 00:43:15,480
This is called controversial 
opinion and it says HR is the 

748
00:43:15,480 --> 00:43:19,480
only department that gets a free
pass for being completely 

749
00:43:19,640 --> 00:43:23,440
useless. 
They produce 0 revenue, they 

750
00:43:23,440 --> 00:43:28,280
kill morale with endless 
policies, protect the company 

751
00:43:28,480 --> 00:43:33,560
not you, and somehow still get 
invited to every meeting like 

752
00:43:33,560 --> 00:43:36,840
they're essential. 
If you remove 90% of HR 

753
00:43:36,840 --> 00:43:40,360
tomorrow, the business would run
smoother, faster, and happier. 

754
00:43:40,720 --> 00:43:43,120
Changed my mind. 
Let me just read that back to 

755
00:43:43,120 --> 00:43:47,840
you but slightly different. 
Security is the only department 

756
00:43:47,840 --> 00:43:50,320
that gets a free pass for being 
completely useless. 

757
00:43:50,840 --> 00:43:54,040
They produce 0 revenue, kill 
morale with endless policies, 

758
00:43:54,400 --> 00:43:58,360
protect the company not you, and
somehow still get invited to 

759
00:43:58,360 --> 00:44:00,160
every meeting like they're 
essential. 

760
00:44:00,880 --> 00:44:04,800
Remove 90% of security tomorrow 
and the business would run 

761
00:44:04,800 --> 00:44:11,720
smoother, faster and happier 
now, I think I I don't think the

762
00:44:11,720 --> 00:44:14,600
only bit I think that isn't 
right when you reframe it as 

763
00:44:14,600 --> 00:44:17,520
security is that somehow still 
get invited to every meeting 

764
00:44:17,520 --> 00:44:19,880
like they're essential. 
I don't think security gets. 

765
00:44:19,880 --> 00:44:23,000
Invited to every single meeting.
I think we need to be invited to

766
00:44:23,000 --> 00:44:25,600
more. 
We quite often, no matter where 

767
00:44:25,600 --> 00:44:27,880
you, no matter who I talk to or 
where you are, we're the 

768
00:44:27,880 --> 00:44:30,520
afterthought where they're like,
oh, this goes live in a week and

769
00:44:30,520 --> 00:44:33,000
we haven't put it through 
security or something like that.

770
00:44:33,800 --> 00:44:41,880
But I can imagine how users see 
that, like people in a business 

771
00:44:41,880 --> 00:44:43,880
probably see security or they're
there. 

772
00:44:43,880 --> 00:44:47,440
They don't make any money. 
All it is is policies and more 

773
00:44:47,440 --> 00:44:50,960
policies and they're just here 
protecting the business And they

774
00:44:50,960 --> 00:44:53,840
make my work slower. 
You know, they make it more 

775
00:44:53,840 --> 00:44:55,720
difficult, make it more 
challenging. 

776
00:44:57,200 --> 00:45:00,160
I I saw that and I just thought 
there was a security spin on 

777
00:45:00,160 --> 00:45:03,520
that. 
Yeah, I think I could say it 

778
00:45:04,720 --> 00:45:06,880
probably works for a lot of 
departments maybe. 

779
00:45:06,880 --> 00:45:13,760
But yeah, no, it's one I guess 
that people in our space for 

780
00:45:13,760 --> 00:45:17,080
really need to prove the the 
worth, right. 

781
00:45:17,080 --> 00:45:20,000
It's why we're here. 
Talk about stuff and share 

782
00:45:20,000 --> 00:45:25,120
stories and explain why. 
But yeah. 

783
00:45:25,560 --> 00:45:30,560
Maybe HR needs an awareness 
team, maybe there needs to be an

784
00:45:30,600 --> 00:45:32,000
HR awareness. 
Who knows? 

785
00:45:33,640 --> 00:45:35,320
Yeah, I'll move on to the next 
one. 

786
00:45:35,520 --> 00:45:38,960
The next one was a video I saw 
and this is on a subreddit 

787
00:45:38,960 --> 00:45:45,120
called Interesting as F, and 
this guy built a script that 

788
00:45:45,120 --> 00:45:48,560
calls back spam callers and 
traps them in an endless loop. 

789
00:45:48,560 --> 00:45:50,960
I won't play at all, but let me 
just play a little bit to you 

790
00:45:50,960 --> 00:45:52,800
because it's it's quite humorous
here. 

791
00:45:52,920 --> 00:45:57,480
Here's a guy explaining to his 
daughter, who's probably about 8

792
00:45:57,480 --> 00:46:04,640
or 9, what he's built all the 
time. 

793
00:46:04,640 --> 00:46:06,920
All the time, right? 
Yeah, Punch them, right. 

794
00:46:07,520 --> 00:46:11,880
So what I've done is I've 
created this script and jipped 

795
00:46:11,880 --> 00:46:13,560
it. 
What this is going to do is 

796
00:46:13,560 --> 00:46:18,640
going to call them back, right? 
It's going to wait for them to 

797
00:46:18,640 --> 00:46:21,320
answer. 
It's going to interact with the 

798
00:46:21,320 --> 00:46:26,000
prompts automatically. 
And when they answer, it's going

799
00:46:26,000 --> 00:46:29,040
to play Rick Astley. 
Never going to give you up. 

800
00:46:38,880 --> 00:46:43,120
So now and then he hung up. 
But see what you don't know. 

801
00:46:45,280 --> 00:46:48,720
See what you don't know about 
the script though, is that I 

802
00:46:48,720 --> 00:46:52,200
have it on repeat. 
It's a, it's a 0 loop integer I 

803
00:46:52,200 --> 00:46:54,960
put in here. 
So it's so this guy, you can 

804
00:46:54,960 --> 00:46:58,160
hear that. 
OK, I take it, yeah, that that 

805
00:46:58,160 --> 00:47:01,640
guy's made a a script that gets 
a scam call. 

806
00:47:01,640 --> 00:47:05,120
It calls the scam caller back, 
and then it goes through all the

807
00:47:05,120 --> 00:47:07,880
prompts automatically and then 
plays Rick Cassidy, never going 

808
00:47:07,880 --> 00:47:11,360
to give you up down the phone. 
And then when they hang up, it 

809
00:47:11,360 --> 00:47:13,200
does it all again. 
And it just keeps calling and 

810
00:47:13,200 --> 00:47:16,560
calling and calling, playing 
Rick Cassidy every time, which 

811
00:47:16,560 --> 00:47:20,400
seems really funny, but then you
scroll and look at the first 

812
00:47:20,400 --> 00:47:24,840
comment. 
Oh God, this is a bad idea. 

813
00:47:25,160 --> 00:47:27,760
Spam callers spoof their phone 
numbers. 

814
00:47:28,240 --> 00:47:30,840
There's a good chance you're 
calling some poor guy in 

815
00:47:30,840 --> 00:47:35,000
Nebraska hundreds of times. 
Ask me how I know. 

816
00:47:37,880 --> 00:47:40,800
He was the person in the video. 
And then there's another guy. 

817
00:47:41,080 --> 00:47:43,200
I had some dude call me and 
freak out because the. 

818
00:47:43,440 --> 00:47:45,360
He because I wouldn't stop 
calling him. 

819
00:47:45,600 --> 00:47:48,240
I tried explaining to him about 
phishing scams and number 

820
00:47:48,240 --> 00:47:50,600
spoofing. 
He didn't believe me and got so 

821
00:47:50,600 --> 00:47:53,720
angry that he put my phone 
number on Craigslist for a 

822
00:47:53,720 --> 00:47:58,240
listing for a cheap motorcycle. 
He may have been an idiot, but 

823
00:47:58,240 --> 00:48:02,400
he kind of won that encounter. 
So yeah, it's it's a lovely idea

824
00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:06,400
in principle, but kind of falls 
down a little bit in execution. 

825
00:48:06,600 --> 00:48:11,280
I suppose. 
The next one I wanted to share 

826
00:48:11,280 --> 00:48:13,400
with you. 
This one came from this one came

827
00:48:13,400 --> 00:48:18,640
from iPhone Help and this is an 
interesting one. 

828
00:48:18,680 --> 00:48:23,120
I iPhone 17 Pro stolen, now 
being contacted by Chinese 

829
00:48:23,120 --> 00:48:27,560
reseller to remove the device 
from iCloud. 

830
00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:31,200
Is my data safe? 
So this person says the phone 

831
00:48:31,200 --> 00:48:34,840
was immediately locked and set 
to wipe upon restart but that 

832
00:48:34,840 --> 00:48:37,600
hasn't happened and now I'm 
getting these texts that say 

833
00:48:37,600 --> 00:48:41,880
they might go after my data or 
scan me if I don't allow them to

834
00:48:41,880 --> 00:48:44,480
wipe it. 
All I care about is my data. 

835
00:48:44,480 --> 00:48:47,720
The phone's gone so it'll take 
the target off my back by 

836
00:48:47,720 --> 00:48:49,920
removing it so they can wipe it 
and sell it. 

837
00:48:50,160 --> 00:48:53,720
But I just want to make sure 
that my data is safe, so you can

838
00:48:53,720 --> 00:48:57,800
see here on the screenshot. 
I've bought an iPhone 17 Pro I'm

839
00:48:57,800 --> 00:49:00,560
using. 
It has your messages, emails, 

840
00:49:00,560 --> 00:49:05,040
cards, banknotes and personal 
information on it, even your SIM

841
00:49:05,040 --> 00:49:07,520
number. 
That you transferred I get. 

842
00:49:07,520 --> 00:49:12,080
Your calls it was not erased. 
Did you make insurance claim 

843
00:49:12,960 --> 00:49:16,480
then another message the erase 
request you made didn't work. 

844
00:49:16,680 --> 00:49:20,720
It was connected on Wi-Fi in 
China, then got gaolbreak and 

845
00:49:20,720 --> 00:49:23,800
still saying pending it won't 
erase remotely. 

846
00:49:24,280 --> 00:49:26,400
I'm telling you because the 
phone is going to be auctioned 

847
00:49:26,400 --> 00:49:29,360
on the black market with your 
personal information and 

848
00:49:29,360 --> 00:49:31,080
everything about you that you 
had on it. 

849
00:49:31,440 --> 00:49:34,720
All your info including phone 
number, address, everything will

850
00:49:34,720 --> 00:49:37,040
be cloned. 
That's why I'm telling you so 

851
00:49:37,040 --> 00:49:40,640
you can remove it. 
From your device list and I will

852
00:49:40,640 --> 00:49:43,440
factory reset it manually and 
remove the number. 

853
00:49:43,840 --> 00:49:46,600
To remove it, open the. 
Find my app, it's on your home 

854
00:49:46,600 --> 00:49:48,640
screen. 
Then go to Devices, click the 

855
00:49:48,640 --> 00:49:49,920
old. 
Device and hit Remove this 

856
00:49:49,920 --> 00:49:52,800
device at the bottom. 
And then it goes on. 

857
00:49:54,040 --> 00:49:56,920
I'm very sad now. 
This is an old iPhone I bought 

858
00:49:56,920 --> 00:50:00,040
in second hand electrical 
appliance market in China, which

859
00:50:00,040 --> 00:50:02,520
I bought for my daughter. 
There's the emotional angle, 

860
00:50:02,800 --> 00:50:05,160
which I bought for my daughter. 
I'm very sad. 

861
00:50:05,160 --> 00:50:07,640
I regret buying an old iPhone 
because it was bound with your 

862
00:50:07,640 --> 00:50:10,960
Apple Idi cannot download the 
App Store I went to. 

863
00:50:10,960 --> 00:50:13,040
Find that business, but it's not
open today. 

864
00:50:13,280 --> 00:50:16,480
I'm really sad now. 
Would you please help me remove 

865
00:50:16,480 --> 00:50:18,400
it? 
Thank you very much indeed. 

866
00:50:19,040 --> 00:50:20,880
Then there's an image that 
didn't load. 

867
00:50:21,200 --> 00:50:23,240
I'm sad I still didn't remove 
it. 

868
00:50:23,400 --> 00:50:26,000
My daughter is angry because she
didn't go to school today. 

869
00:50:26,160 --> 00:50:28,400
I want to kill myself now. 
I'm so sad. 

870
00:50:28,600 --> 00:50:30,280
Maybe I should sell it to 
someone else. 

871
00:50:30,440 --> 00:50:32,720
I don't know what to do. 
Please help me remove it. 

872
00:50:32,800 --> 00:50:35,520
OK. 
And then? 

873
00:50:36,360 --> 00:50:38,120
Your old phone is recycled by 
us. 

874
00:50:38,120 --> 00:50:39,880
We are now just recycling 
merchants. 

875
00:50:39,880 --> 00:50:42,640
We are not the ones who steal 
your phone if you don't remove 

876
00:50:42,640 --> 00:50:44,400
it your old. 
Phone motherboard will be sold 

877
00:50:44,400 --> 00:50:46,320
to customers. 
Maybe they will hack your phone 

878
00:50:46,320 --> 00:50:48,520
and steal your credit card or 
contact your family. 

879
00:50:49,720 --> 00:50:51,320
And then some screenshots. 
It's I mean. 

880
00:50:51,320 --> 00:50:56,920
This whole interaction is just 
like mad, but that was like the 

881
00:50:56,920 --> 00:51:00,960
five stages of grief we had. 
Like anger we had, sadness we 

882
00:51:01,120 --> 00:51:04,920
had. 
Like it was and then social 

883
00:51:04,920 --> 00:51:06,840
engineering at work. 
This is what the top comment 

884
00:51:06,840 --> 00:51:08,320
says. 
Put it in loss mode. 

885
00:51:08,440 --> 00:51:12,000
Ignore the text. 
Leave here that nobody is 

886
00:51:12,000 --> 00:51:17,480
hacking the onboard storage. 
The ability to do that is worth 

887
00:51:17,680 --> 00:51:21,040
billions. 
Seriously, iPhone encryption is.

888
00:51:21,160 --> 00:51:24,280
Robust. 
So there we go. 

889
00:51:26,360 --> 00:51:31,520
Yeah. 
So just I mean, it's this is AII

890
00:51:31,520 --> 00:51:34,000
found this really interesting, 
the kind of peaks and troughs 

891
00:51:34,000 --> 00:51:36,640
and all the different angles 
that that person's tried to use.

892
00:51:36,800 --> 00:51:39,840
I, I think it's, I think I 
thought it was really quite 

893
00:51:39,840 --> 00:51:43,040
amazing, all the emotions. 
Yeah. 

894
00:51:44,280 --> 00:51:46,640
And if you do that kind of 
bizarre, leave it in, leave it 

895
00:51:46,640 --> 00:51:49,440
in loss mode. 
Don't ever erase it. 

896
00:51:49,440 --> 00:51:52,000
Leave it in loss mode and. 
Forget about it, because they. 

897
00:51:52,000 --> 00:51:56,320
Can't access the data on it and 
the device is only useful for 

898
00:51:56,320 --> 00:51:59,080
certain parts then. 
Yeah. 

899
00:52:00,080 --> 00:52:02,240
Now. 
I had one more. 

900
00:52:02,240 --> 00:52:04,880
Let me just show you this one. 
This one was sent to me by Liam.

901
00:52:05,320 --> 00:52:10,960
This is a TikTok video. 
It's only really short and and 

902
00:52:10,960 --> 00:52:15,440
this is a a play on privacy. 
OK, let me just show you how. 

903
00:52:19,520 --> 00:52:23,040
This is called my cocoon. 
You want privacy on a long 

904
00:52:23,040 --> 00:52:26,880
flight but still need to work? 
Welcome to my privacy park. 

905
00:52:27,120 --> 00:52:39,480
You can see it. 
That's great. 

906
00:52:39,600 --> 00:52:44,280
It's the when you delve into the
comments, this is shared by the 

907
00:52:44,280 --> 00:52:46,080
company that make these my 
cocoon. 

908
00:52:46,760 --> 00:52:49,920
But when you dive into the 
comments, so if sorry, if you're

909
00:52:49,920 --> 00:52:52,160
listening and you're not 
watching, someone sat on an 

910
00:52:52,160 --> 00:52:56,440
aeroplane with essentially a 
cocoon like a purple cloth are 

911
00:52:56,440 --> 00:52:57,920
all over. 
You can't see them at all. 

912
00:52:57,920 --> 00:53:00,600
It's like they it's like they've
climbed in a duvet. 

913
00:53:00,600 --> 00:53:02,760
Cover. 
And have just got them over it. 

914
00:53:04,360 --> 00:53:08,400
I don't think FAA rules will let
you fly because they can't check

915
00:53:08,400 --> 00:53:10,160
the seat belt. 
They can't see what you're 

916
00:53:10,160 --> 00:53:12,520
doing. 
There's all kinds of security 

917
00:53:12,520 --> 00:53:15,040
concerns. 
So actually I'd like, I don't 

918
00:53:15,040 --> 00:53:16,680
think this would be allowed to 
happen. 

919
00:53:16,680 --> 00:53:19,360
I think people in the comments 
reckon that this is like you can

920
00:53:19,400 --> 00:53:23,560
rent a plain fuselage for videos
and films and photos. 

921
00:53:23,560 --> 00:53:26,120
Like half a fuselage. 
More of a scam maybe? 

922
00:53:26,120 --> 00:53:30,160
I think it's either a scam or 
it's just designed to go viral. 

923
00:53:30,200 --> 00:53:33,840
Let's just build something 
unbelievable so more people 

924
00:53:34,240 --> 00:53:36,600
think about it. 
But they do they sell them for 

925
00:53:36,600 --> 00:53:39,920
like working spaces and, you 
know, all different. 

926
00:53:40,040 --> 00:53:42,360
It does look quite. 
I think I'd rather use a privacy

927
00:53:42,360 --> 00:53:44,480
screen at that point, Ryan. 
Why not a? 

928
00:53:45,440 --> 00:53:46,520
Little bit better. 
Why not? 

929
00:53:46,520 --> 00:53:48,200
That was embarrassing. 
Yeah, yeah. 

930
00:53:48,320 --> 00:53:50,160
Have you seen the guy in the 
cocoon? 

931
00:53:50,200 --> 00:53:51,720
Like what's his problem? 
Yeah. 

932
00:53:51,720 --> 00:53:54,520
Anyway, that's that's everything
I had. 

933
00:53:54,520 --> 00:53:59,040
What have you got? 
Carl yeah, this one video to 

934
00:53:59,040 --> 00:54:03,640
share this one's talking about 
the new GPT image two 

935
00:54:04,640 --> 00:54:05,560
generation. 
Yep. 

936
00:54:05,840 --> 00:54:09,040
System. 
It's video Jeremy fans AI again.

937
00:54:09,040 --> 00:54:11,240
So same same guy you've spoken 
about before. 

938
00:54:11,280 --> 00:54:13,680
Jeremy, welcome back. 
Yeah. 

939
00:54:13,720 --> 00:54:15,520
I wonder if you ever watches 
this? 

940
00:54:15,520 --> 00:54:21,160
Maybe yeah, I'll play the video 
and we can sort of see what it's

941
00:54:21,160 --> 00:54:21,880
about. 
Cool. 

942
00:54:23,520 --> 00:54:26,440
Images are basically 
undetectable, and that's a huge 

943
00:54:26,440 --> 00:54:28,680
deal because it's coming from 
open AI. 

944
00:54:28,960 --> 00:54:32,560
There have been other great AI 
image generators, but numbness 

945
00:54:32,560 --> 00:54:35,160
powerful and when Google 
released Fano Banana Pro in 

946
00:54:35,160 --> 00:54:38,440
November, they released Synth ID
along with it. 

947
00:54:38,640 --> 00:54:42,800
So even if it generated a really
good AI image, there was always 

948
00:54:42,800 --> 00:54:45,040
a backup. 
There's no such system here. 

949
00:54:45,160 --> 00:54:48,800
It is not perfect, but it is 
almost there. 

950
00:54:48,880 --> 00:54:52,120
In the best case scenario, I was
able to generate this image of 

951
00:54:52,120 --> 00:54:55,560
Obama, this image of Harris. 
I was not able to generate a 

952
00:54:55,560 --> 00:54:58,000
certain New York financier. 
I might just not use the right 

953
00:54:58,000 --> 00:55:00,120
words. 
You can't use them by name for 

954
00:55:00,160 --> 00:55:02,360
any of these, but you can just 
describe people and it will 

955
00:55:02,360 --> 00:55:03,960
generate them. 
It is not perfect. 

956
00:55:03,960 --> 00:55:06,560
There are probably mistakes 
still being made here, but it 

957
00:55:06,560 --> 00:55:08,920
can do really accurate text 
generation. 

958
00:55:08,920 --> 00:55:11,560
It is very customizable. 
And look, if you're excited 

959
00:55:11,560 --> 00:55:15,120
about some cheap diagrams or 
funny photos or cheap 

960
00:55:15,120 --> 00:55:18,120
advertisements, I understand. 
But that comes with the cost of 

961
00:55:18,120 --> 00:55:20,800
no one being able to trust any 
new photo they see on the 

962
00:55:20,800 --> 00:55:22,840
Internet anymore. 
Software is not going to come to

963
00:55:22,840 --> 00:55:25,840
save us anytime soon. 
Our systems aren't ready for 

964
00:55:25,840 --> 00:55:27,240
this. 
Photographic evidence isn't 

965
00:55:27,240 --> 00:55:30,960
dead, but that does not scale. 
A chain of custody doesn't scale

966
00:55:30,960 --> 00:55:33,560
on social media. 
It's a very sad moment, and it's

967
00:55:33,560 --> 00:55:35,400
an incredibly cynical release 
from Open AI. 

968
00:55:35,640 --> 00:55:39,640
Open AI is new. 
Quite a concerning time. 

969
00:55:40,040 --> 00:55:45,400
It is, it is. 
It's almost when you see with 

970
00:55:45,440 --> 00:55:49,160
all of this, when you see a 
video, I mean, this is images, 

971
00:55:49,360 --> 00:55:55,120
like I saw something today about
images from the Iran war and how

972
00:55:55,120 --> 00:56:00,640
many of them were fake. 
And I see that last week we 

973
00:56:00,640 --> 00:56:03,200
talked to I talked about, I 
think it was last week I said 

974
00:56:03,200 --> 00:56:07,000
about the video from Married at 
First Sight Australia of the guy

975
00:56:07,000 --> 00:56:10,560
like saying unbelievable things 
and like I me and the wife were 

976
00:56:10,560 --> 00:56:13,240
like, this has got to be AI. 
Actually, it wasn't. 

977
00:56:13,320 --> 00:56:15,480
AI. 
He's just said those things, 

978
00:56:15,480 --> 00:56:17,680
which was. 
Which was mad, but this is the. 

979
00:56:17,680 --> 00:56:21,680
Point we're at right where you 
can't tell if it's AI or not and

980
00:56:21,680 --> 00:56:24,040
all of a sudden you start 
discrediting the genuine stuff 

981
00:56:24,040 --> 00:56:26,600
and you start believing the 
stuff that's disingenuous. 

982
00:56:26,720 --> 00:56:28,440
It's this genie's not going back
in the. 

983
00:56:28,440 --> 00:56:32,840
Box as well like what do we I I 
don't know what the future holds

984
00:56:32,840 --> 00:56:36,880
like you need to be able to only
trust we're going to go back to 

985
00:56:36,880 --> 00:56:40,000
people on street corners like 
yelling the news because you 

986
00:56:40,000 --> 00:56:42,200
need to hear it from an 
individual because you can't 

987
00:56:42,480 --> 00:56:45,720
trust anything this. 
I don't know. 

988
00:56:45,720 --> 00:56:48,720
No, it's crazy. 
Like I feel like yeah, there's 

989
00:56:48,720 --> 00:56:51,800
no, I mean, I thought it might 
be misinformed, but it's not, 

990
00:56:51,880 --> 00:56:56,320
doesn't seem to be any laws on 
or regulations on this sort of 

991
00:56:56,320 --> 00:57:01,120
stuff like the watermarking or 
metadata and stuff like that. 

992
00:57:01,240 --> 00:57:05,000
There's no standards it seems. 
Stuff out there obviously like 

993
00:57:05,000 --> 00:57:08,240
the Google SIMF ID, but this 
chat community doesn't have 

994
00:57:08,240 --> 00:57:10,840
that. 
There's this makes me think of 

995
00:57:10,840 --> 00:57:14,880
two things that I'm getting 
really deep now on a podcast 

996
00:57:14,880 --> 00:57:16,760
episode that probably should 
have ended 10 minutes ago. 

997
00:57:16,760 --> 00:57:19,320
Fahrenheit 451 is a book by Ray 
Bradbury. 

998
00:57:19,320 --> 00:57:21,480
And in the book Everybody goes 
Home. 

999
00:57:21,840 --> 00:57:23,960
Books are banned. 
They've burnt all the books. 

1000
00:57:24,160 --> 00:57:26,680
Books are banned. 
Everybody goes home and has to 

1001
00:57:26,680 --> 00:57:29,480
stand in front of these screens 
or sit in front of these screens

1002
00:57:29,760 --> 00:57:32,760
and consume everything. 
And it feels like that's the way

1003
00:57:32,760 --> 00:57:34,000
we're going. 
Like, you're not. 

1004
00:57:34,160 --> 00:57:36,040
They're literally setting fire 
to books. 

1005
00:57:36,040 --> 00:57:39,240
Books are illegal. 
And the other extreme is the old

1006
00:57:39,240 --> 00:57:41,640
HG Wells time machine. 
I remember the film from the. 

1007
00:57:41,640 --> 00:57:44,680
60s. 
And they find an old library 

1008
00:57:44,680 --> 00:57:46,480
where all the books just fall 
apart. 

1009
00:57:46,480 --> 00:57:51,240
And it's kind of feels like, 
yeah, to the same extreme Gen Z 

1010
00:57:51,240 --> 00:57:53,680
apparently a craving analogue 
more than ever. 

1011
00:57:53,680 --> 00:57:57,400
And going back to, like, wired 
headphones and, you know, dumb 

1012
00:57:57,400 --> 00:57:58,600
devices. 
Yeah. 

1013
00:57:58,680 --> 00:58:00,640
It's. 
That's probably a whole 

1014
00:58:00,640 --> 00:58:02,720
different conversation for a 
whole different time. 

1015
00:58:03,320 --> 00:58:06,440
Yeah, yeah. 
Anyway, so interesting time, 

1016
00:58:06,480 --> 00:58:08,080
right? 
Here, don't trust it, you can't 

1017
00:58:08,080 --> 00:58:10,640
trust it. 
So we're about to just as saw a 

1018
00:58:10,640 --> 00:58:14,040
dyed the video AI video 
generation tool just as that was

1019
00:58:14,040 --> 00:58:18,160
discontinued because like slop, 
they've replaced it with 

1020
00:58:18,160 --> 00:58:21,800
something that makes the text is
good, like the fact it's made 

1021
00:58:21,800 --> 00:58:23,880
better text. 
I'm up for that now, because 

1022
00:58:24,520 --> 00:58:26,920
when you now. 
But that's an AI tell that's 

1023
00:58:26,920 --> 00:58:28,840
gone like it used to be. 
Is this AI? 

1024
00:58:29,160 --> 00:58:30,600
Look at the text. 
Of course it is. 

1025
00:58:31,320 --> 00:58:34,440
Oh no, and I haven't even war 
marked it, which Google did. 

1026
00:58:34,440 --> 00:58:38,560
Nice one Google legislation. 
Maybe it's not going to happen 

1027
00:58:38,560 --> 00:58:40,800
under the current American 
government, but maybe under the 

1028
00:58:40,800 --> 00:58:44,680
next American government, if it 
changes, there will be some 

1029
00:58:44,680 --> 00:58:47,080
legislation that puts all this 
stuff in some. 

1030
00:58:47,080 --> 00:58:50,040
It needs to be controlled much 
in the way that France are 

1031
00:58:50,040 --> 00:58:52,000
trying to do and the UK have 
spoken about. 

1032
00:58:52,480 --> 00:58:56,120
There needs to be some some. 
Barriers put in place, surely? 

1033
00:58:56,520 --> 00:58:57,960
Yeah. 
Cool, right? 

1034
00:58:57,960 --> 00:58:59,920
Sorry, I've ranted too long. 
Thank you. 

1035
00:59:00,040 --> 00:59:00,760
Right. 
Don't forget. 

1036
00:59:00,760 --> 00:59:02,760
Get the newsletter at 
riskycreative.com. 

1037
00:59:02,800 --> 00:59:06,400
Search the awareness angle on 
LinkedIn. 

1038
00:59:06,480 --> 00:59:09,480
We haven't even mentioned the 
SANS and survey. 

1039
00:59:09,680 --> 00:59:10,720
We'll put that in the 
newsletter. 

1040
00:59:10,720 --> 00:59:13,600
The SANS survey is still open. 
Thank you for everyone that 

1041
00:59:13,600 --> 00:59:15,440
filled in the podcast survey as 
well. 

1042
00:59:15,440 --> 00:59:18,520
The results of that have been 
useful and stay tuned for stuff 

1043
00:59:18,520 --> 00:59:20,960
coming in the future. 
A couple of big announcements 

1044
00:59:20,960 --> 00:59:23,160
coming in the next couple of 
weeks as well, which is 

1045
00:59:23,160 --> 00:59:26,600
exciting, right? 
Have a great week and I'll speak

1046
00:59:26,600 --> 00:59:29,000
to you next week. 
Oh yeah, catch you later. 

1047
00:59:29,000 --> 00:59:30,600
See you later. 
Bye bye.